^* Christopher Lamont is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and International Organization at the University of Groningen. Lamont is the author of INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE (2010) and a coeditor of a special issue of EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES on post-Tuđman Croatia (2010). Research for this chapter was supported in part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).

^* See, e.g., PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE; NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 213. This type of argument is similar to the claims about authoritative narrative theory that Waters discusses, though the second type of argument is different from his second category.

^† RECOM is formally known as the Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia in the Period from 1991–2001. For more on RECOM, see Kostovicova’s chapter.

^‡ A methodological note: This chapter’s examination of public debates will be restricted to an elite level, in particular political and media elites.

^§ News of Milošević’s transfer to the ICTY was broadly welcomed among Croatian political elites in 2001. For reactions from a broad range of Croatian political elites to Milošević’s transfer, see Reagiranja na izručenje bivšeg jugoslavenskog predsjedinka sud za ratne zločine u Haagu, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, 29 June 2001, http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20010629/novosti4.htm. Croatia’s dominant narrative argues that the Homeland War, as the 1991–95 period is known there, constituted an international armed conflict waged on Croatian territory by Belgrade, a view that—tensions between Croatia and the ICTY notwithstanding—is largely consonant with the Prosecution’s theory in Milošević’s Croatia phase. See Hartmann, Waters, and Williamson for brief discussions of this alignment. For more on the Croatian government’s reliance on ICTY judgments to support its own view of the war in Croatia, see, for example, Presudom Martiću potvrđena umiješanost JNA i Srbije, JUTARNJI LIST, 12 June 2007, http://www.jutarnji.hr/presudom-marticu-potvrdena-umijesanost-jna-i-srbije/178119/.

^* See Nielsen and Prelec.

^† The Croatia indictment alleged that the JCE over which Milošević presided came into existence during August 1991.

^‡ In broad terms, nationalist challenges to ICTY indictments against Croats have for the most part employed just war rhetoric, rather than directly contesting allegations of individual responsibility for particular crimes. In its most extreme form, proponents of this line of thought argued that it was not possible for war crimes to be committed by individuals waging a defensive war. For example, Mile Bogović, historian and bishop of Gospić-Senj, argued “A war crime is committed by the side that started the war in the event that it commits a crime.” Bogović, “Is the Hague Tribunal Interested in the Complete and Objective Picture of the Events of the Past War?,” in CROATIAN GENERALS ARE NOT GUILTY 51 (Hitrec ed.).

^* Jus ad bellum refers to rules governing the resort to force, whereas jus in bello consists of rules governing conduct during hostilities. In the Croatian context, jus ad bellum rhetoric is often employed to emphasize the defensive and liberatory character of the Homeland War as set out in the 2000 parliamentary Declaration on the Homeland War and the Croatian Constitutional Court’s 2002 report examining the legality of the Croatian Army’s conduct during the Homeland War. Croatian Parliament, Deklaraciju o domovinskom ratu; Croatian Constitutional Court, Izvješće u povodu inicijative Vlade Republike Hrvatske, OFFICIAL GAZETTE 133/2002, 15 Nov. 2002.

^† Zoran Pusić, President of the Citizens Committee for Human Rights, pointed out that cooperation with the ICTY has always proven difficult for the HDZ, which eventually accepted the necessity to comply with Tribunal orders as a result of EU conditionality but remained hostile to ICTY efforts to prosecute Croats. Interview with Zoran Pusić in Zagreb, 8 Sept. 2010.

^‡ In April 2010 Josipović expressed deep regret for Croatia’s conduct during the war in Bosnia. In response, Kosor defended Tuđman’s attempt to secure territory in Bosnia. See Marijan Lipovac, Hrvatska politika u devedesetima nije bila agresorska, VJESNIK, 16 Apr. 2010, at 2. See also Jović & Lamont, Introduction: Croatia after Tuđman: Encounters with the Consequences of Conflict and Authoritarianism, 62 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 1610 (2010).

^§ This number excludes Bosnian Croats indicted for crimes committed in the territory of Bosnia.

This position was most clearly articulated by Croatian General Janko Bobetko who argued that the victorious parties in armed conflict have never had to answer for their actions in court. Quoted in PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS 132. It also can be found in CROATIAN GENERALS ARE NOT GUILTY 7, 16.

^* The cover illustration of the 7 July 2001 issue of the Split-based Feral Tribune showed Tuđman and Milošević together, with Tuđman commenting that the grave was preferable to being a slave—a view “epitomizing Croatia’s relationship” with the ICTY. Pavlaković, “Better the Grave than a Slave: Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” in CROATIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: WAR, POLITICS, SOCIETY, FOREIGN RELATIONS 447 (Ramet, Clewing & Lukić eds.).

^† See also Boas and van der Wilt.

^‡ Boas discusses the joinder of Milošević’s three indictments; Hartmann discusses the dynamics of indictment of other members of the JCE, though with particular focus on Bosnia.

^§ Other relevant cases included Martić, Babić, and Stanišić & Simatović.

^* The ICTY did indict four senior JNA officers—Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokić, Milan Zec, and Vladimir Kovačević—for the shelling of Dubrovnik in 1991. Pros. v. Strugar et al., Indictment (22 Feb. 2001). Although charges against Zec were withdrawn later in 2001 and Kovačević’s case was referred back to the Serbian judiciary under Rule 11bis, Jokić pled guilty to all charges and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Strugar was sentenced to seven and a half years imprisonment by the Appeals Chamber in 2008. Pros. v. Strugar (1), Appeals Judgment (17 July 2008).

^† Following Bosnia’s genocide suit before the International Court of Justice against the FRY, Croatia too filed suit against the FRY in 1999, alleging that Belgrade had committed genocide on Croatian territory. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Yugoslavia) 1999 I.C.J. 118, (2 July 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/7125.pdf [Croatia v. Yugoslavia, Genocide Application]. For a discussion of Bosnia’s genocide case, see Shany’s and Várady’s chapters.

^* Waters argues this point, whereas Nielsen shows the considerable value the evidence retains despite the lack of a judgment.

^† The OSCE reported that a lack of understanding among political and media elites on the distinction between the ICJ and ICTY further added to the “volatility of reaction in Croatia to international war crimes proceedings.” OSCE, News in Brief: April 4–April 17, 2007, OSCE MISSION TO CROATIA, 17 Apr. 2007, http://www.osce.org/zagreb/24936. See also Government of the Republic of Croatia, Predsjednik Mesić i premijer Sanader: Slučaj Del Ponte-Srbija pred nadležna međunarodna tijela, NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS, 16 Apr. 2007, http://www.vlada.hr/hr/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2007/travanj/predsjednik_mesic_i_premijer_sanader_slucaj_del_ponte_srbija_pred_nadlezna_medunarodna_tijela/(back)/temu.

^* In May 2009, Šljivančanin’s sentence had been increased to 17 years when the Appeals Chamber found Šljivančanin guilty of aiding and abetting the murder of prisoners at Ovčara. Pros. v. Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, Appeals Judgment (5 May 2009). Thus, his final sentence of 10 years represented a reduction.

^† Šljivančanin’s 10-year sentence provoked significant anger from victims. Vesna Bosanac, the director of the Vukovar hospital from which the victims of the Ovčara farm massacre were seized stated “The Hague died,” following Šljivančanin’s sentence. Branimir Bradarić, Bosanac: Sramotna presuda! Za Ovčaru je nagrađen, Haag je umro, VEČERNJI LIST, 8 Dec. 2010, http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/bosanac-sramotna-presuda-za-ovcaru-je-nagraden-haag-je-umro-clanak-226067.

^* The verdict was broadcast by Croatia’s state television channel HTV and the national networks Nova and RTL.