^* Florence Hartmann is a journalist, and formerly chief spokesman and Balkan advisor to the ICTY and ICTR Chief Prosecutor. She is the author of MILOSEVIC, LA DIAGONALE DU FOU (1999) and PAIX ET CHÂTIMENT, LES GUERRES SECRÈTES DE LA POLITIQUE ET DE LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALES [PEACE AND PUNISHMENT: THE SECRET WARS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE] (2007). She covered the Yugoslav wars for Le Monde. In 2008 Hartmann was indicted by the ICTY for contempt of court for exposing publicly how the ICTY judges had decided on Serbia’s request to block publication of the VSO documents. She was convicted in September 2009, upheld on appeal in July 2011.

^* Croatia Indictment. See Boas and Prelec for a detailed discussion of the Prosecution’s JCE theory.

^† Much of the evidence is summarized in the Rule 98bis Decision rejecting the Amici Curiae’s motion for acquittal at the end of the Prosecution phase, which Nielsen and Waters discuss at length. See Milošević case (1) 98bis Decision (16 June 2004).

^* Jovica Stanišić, Franko Simatović, Vojislav Šešelj, and Momčilo Perišić for Croatia and Bosnia, and Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Sreten Lukić, and Vladimir Lazarević for Kosovo. Vlajko Stojiljković was indicted with Milošević but committed suicide before he could be transferred. Several high-level Serbian or FRY officials named as members of the JCE in the Milošević indictments were never indicted by the ICTY: Borisav Jović, Branko Kostić, Momir Bulatović, Veljko Kadijević, Blagoje Adžić, Aleksandar Vasiljević, and Tomislav Simović. Radovan Stojičić “Badža” was assassinated in 1997. Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović was indicted in secret in 1999 but assassinated the following year, before his indictment was made public. Pros. v. Raznatović, Indictment (23 Sept. 1997).

^* Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Sreten Lukić and Vladimir Lazarević.

^* The description of the case is based on the Prosecution allegations expressed in the indictment and in the Prosecution opening statements presented on 28 and 29 April 2008 and, after a long break, on 9 June 2009.

^* This is the capacious plasticity of JCE theory that Boas critiques, but regardless of whether one agrees with his view, in this case, any JCE that reaches Milošević would logically catch up the subordinates directly interposed between him and the crime base, as Stanišić and Simatović were.

^* The other municipalities cited in the Decision were Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bijeljina and Bosanski Novi. Rule 98bis Decision 246.

^* Although some members of the Prosecution believed the Serbian and FRY state leadership had some effective control over the VRS through its command structures filled by VJ officers, others disagreed. All during the Milošević Prosecution case, the latter group used this additional argument to propose that genocide charges be dropped together with the Srebrenica section.

^* Radislav Krstić was found guilty of complicity to genocide, whereas in their first instance judgment in June 2010, Vujadin Popović and Ljubiša Beara were found guilty of genocide and Drago Nikolić of complicity in genocide in relation to Srebrenica. All of them were seconded VJ officers. Pros. v. Krstić (2), Judgment (19 Apr. 2004) [Krstić case, Appeal Judgment]. See also Pros. v. Popović, Beara, Nikolić, Borovčanin, Miletić, Gvero, Pandurević, Judgment Vol. 1 & 2 (10 June 2010) [jointly, Srebrenica Judgments]. Mladić, head of the VRS and Perišić’s subordinate, has also been indicted for genocide. Pros. v. Mladić (1), Amended Indictment (10 Oct. 2002). The Perišić indictment identified Mladić as one of Perišić’s subordinates. Pros. v. Perišić (2), Revised Second Amended Indictment 45 (5 Feb. 2008) (noting Mladić’s relationship to the VJ 30th Personnel Center, under Perišić’s control).

^* Namely Radislav Krstić. See Pros. v. Perišić (2), Revised Second Amended Indictment 39e (5 Feb. 2008).

^† Perišić spoke with Mladić on the phone and even met with him during the attack; he received all VRS Main staff reports from the field and had direct information about activities in the Srebrenica region and continued to provide additional VJ personnel. See Perišić case, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, supra note 34. In early 2010, the Prosecution sought to put into evidence taped phone conversations between Mladić and Perišić and parts of Mladić’s diary. In November 2009, the Prosecution put into evidence photographs taken on 18 July 1995 at the VRS Main Staff HQ in Crna Rijeka near Han Pijesak, showing Generals Ratko Mladić and Perišić together during the last days of the Srebrenica genocide. See Pros. v. Perišić (7), Trial Tr. 9533-620 (3 Nov. 2009) (seeking submission of a number of photographs authenticated in court by prosecution witness Ned Krajišnik); Pros. v. Perišić (9), Trial Tr. 9851, l.13-9852, l.15 (10 Feb. 2010) (seeking submission of Mladić’s diary); Pros. v. Perišić (8), Trial Tr. 9560, l.9-9573, l.7 (3 Nov. 2009) (discussing photographs).

^* Among the VJ officers serving in the VRS and de jure subordinated to Peričić were Mladić, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir, Ljubiša Beara, Radislav Krstić, Vujadin Popović, Vidoje Blagojević, Vinko Pandurević, Dragan Jokić, Dragan Obrenović, Drago Nikolić, all indicted or convicted in relation to the genocide in Srebrenica. Id. at 1667.

^† In that regard, see Srebrenica Judgments, in which the Chamber, after confirming that genocide was committed in Srebrenica, discussed in depth the nature of each Accused’s knowledge of the operations in order to establish precisely their different degrees liability in the genocide.

^* After the Milošević Prosecution phase ended, the Prosecution received the military personnel files of a number of VJ officers sent to serve within the VRS command; these were introduced in Perišić. The Perišić case extensively examined the operations of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centers within the VJ, and the ways in which the VJ and VRS functioned as one army. See, e.g., Pros. v. Perišić (1), Decision on Motion to Reopen the Prosecution Case and Tender New Evidence (4 Nov. 2010).

^† In previous Srebrenica cases, the Prosecution had also submitted evidence that the order to attack and capture the enclaves was drafted by Radivoje Miletić, a VJ officer serving as Chief of Administration for Operations and Training at the VRS Main Staff. In Milošević, the Prosecution brought evidence indicating that this military operation was prepared in coordination with the VJ Užice Corps, so under Perišić’s command and pursuant to the policies set up by the SDC.

^* For example, evidence submitted in Milošević indicates that on 7 July 1995, it was Mladić and not Karadžić who was called to a meeting with Milošević in Belgrade and a week later, with the massacres still underway, it was again Mladić who attended a meeting in Belgrade with Milošević and international officials. Milošević case (141), Trial Tr. 26981:13-17 (18 Sept. 2003); ARMATTA, TWILIGHT OF IMPUNITY 309.

^* Shany discusses this issue at length, as does Prelec.

^† Interviews with Bosnian officials and lawyers, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (2007–2009). These individuals—who were close to the Bosnian ICJ team—reasoned that, had Milošević been acquitted of genocide, it would have been difficult for the ICJ to find Serbia as a state liable, but by the same token, due to their reliance on ICTY jurisprudence in Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ’s judges would logically have felt similarly obliged to rely on a genocide conviction in one of the ICTY’s other cases against high-level Serbian officials.