CHAPTER 11

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

THE BATTLE WON 7 SEPTEMBER–31 OCTOBER 1940

THE DECISION TO BOMB LONDON constituted the third plan formulated by the Germans. First, there had been a ‘reconnaissance in force’ to test the strength of Fighter Command. Then there had been the more intense period with fighter airfields as the main, but by no means only, target. Now it was to be London’s turn.

The origin of this plan is often portrayed as a reprisal raid for the British bombing of Berlin. On 25 August a number of bombs had fallen on London. Churchill ordered an immediate reprisal and an ineffectual raid was mounted against Berlin. In retaliation, it is claimed, a furious Hitler and Goering decided that London would become the major target of future Luftwaffe operations.1 That bombs fell first on London and then on Berlin is not in doubt, but that bombing Berlin caused the Luftwaffe to change policy can be questioned.

In late August Luftwaffe Intelligence estimated that between 12 and 19 August 644 British aircraft had been destroyed (that is, almost all of Fighter Command’s serviceable strength), and 11 airfields (Eastchurch, Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Lympne, Manston, Tangmere, Hawkinge, Portsmouth, Rochester, Driffield, Martlesham) had been put permanently out of action.² The actual figures were 139 aircraft destroyed and two airfields out of action, but at a meeting of the Luftwaffe high command at The Hague in early September, Kesselring declared that on the basis of the intelligence figures the RAF was finished. Goering, always anxious to declare a victory in the west so that he could reorient the Luftwaffe towards Russia, agreed, and despite a warning from Sperrle that the British still possessed 1,000 fighters, Kesselring’s view prevailed. It was decided to finish off what little remained of Fighter Command by selecting a target that its few fighters were bound to defend – London. Without fighter defence civilian morale was bound to collapse and peace terms be sought. It would be victory without invasion.3 London must be attacked.

If Luftwaffe intelligence on the state of Fighter Command was deluded, their thinking about the importance of London was accurate enough. Fighter Command was bound to defend the capital. But when the first mass attack was made on 7 September, Park was not yet certain that London had become the main target. So when 300 German bombers escorted by 600 fighters crossed the coast just after 4.00 p.m., 11 Group expected the mass of aircraft to split into disparate raids and make for the fighter airfields, as had been the case for the last month. As a result the 11 Group controller dispatched many squadrons to patrol their own airfields, which gave the German bombers converging on London almost a free passage. In particular, the third wave of bombers penetrated to the capital unharried. It is clear from the combat reports that most British squadrons only intercepted the enemy after they had delivered their bombs. But even when a squadron managed to intercept enemy aircraft advancing on London, they were often unable to stop them. In this regard the experience of 54 Squadron was typical:

Twelve aircraft of 54 squadron engaged the enemy over Maidstone … Our fighters went in to attack the bombers in separate sections but were soon harassed by the fighters. Our pilots were unable to break the enemy bomber formations or to inflict much damage.⁴

There could be no doubting the effort put in by Fighter Command. That day 25 squadrons from 10, 11 and 12 Groups were sent up, some on more than once. A total of 817 sorties were flown and over 200 aircraft actually engaged the enemy. But when the locations of the combats are analysed, few of them took place over London. The most common location was Kent and the most common time after 6.15 p.m., that is after the last German bomber had dropped its bombs on the East End.5 In all, on 7 September the Germans dropped over 600 tons of high explosive and 13,000 incendiaries on the capital, killing over 400 civilians and seriously wounding about 1,400 others.⁶ The Luftwaffe paid a price. They lost 16 fighters, 15 bombers and 8 fighter-bombers – a total of 39 aircraft. In addition another 18 were damaged. But Fighter Command lost 25 Hurricanes and Spitfires, with another 29 damaged. This was the fourth highest loss for any day of the Battle of Britain, only exceeded on 15, 18 and 31 August. The attrition rate on Fighter Command had not been lessened by the change of targets.⁷

In the light of this heavy and concentrated raid, Park changed tactics. He noted that three or four hundred German aircraft in two or three waves had made the raid on London in rapid succession – the whole battle lasting only 45 to 60 minutes. To counter these tactics he divided his squadrons into three groups. ‘Readiness Squadrons’ would be dispatched in pairs against the first enemy wave, the Spitfire squadrons attacking the fighters and the Hurricane squadrons going straight for the bombers. The next group of squadrons would also operate in pairs and be at 15 minutes’ readiness. The third group would act as single squadrons and be used as a reserve against the second and third wave of bombers should they come in.⁸

That these tactics required honing is evidenced by the results of combat on 11 and 14 September, the next two days when the Germans mounted major raids on London. On 11 September, Fighter Command lost the same number of aircraft (28) as the Luftwaffe and on 14 September it lost 13 compared to the Germans’ 10.⁹ In addition, on these two days, 28 pilots were killed or so severely wounded that they would take no further part in the battle.¹⁰ It was no doubt some consolation to Park that London was not severely hit, but the attrition rate on his pilots and aircraft was unacceptable.

All that was to change on the day now celebrated as Battle of Britain Day, 15 September. German manoeuvres over the Channel had been observed by British radar since 9.00 a.m. By 11.00 a.m. it was clear that a large force was assembling near Calais. London, it was adjudged, would be their target. Immediately, 12 squadrons from 11 Group and the Duxford Wing of five squadrons from 12 Group were alerted. Between 11.05 a.m. and 11.25 a.m. they took off. The result was that between the coast and London the German force of about 50 bombers and probably 100 fighters was attacked by 12 squadrons (about 100 planes) from Fighter Command, many of them acting in pairs following Park’s instructions. These formations launched six separate attacks against the Germans, who were finally struck by the Duxford force over London. The result was a decisive defeat for the Luftwaffe. Most bombers failed to reach the capital and those that did dropped their bombs at random and turned for home. Even then, they were harried by three squadrons from the reserve which struck them over Brooklands and inflicted many casualties.11

Then, at 2.00 p.m., a time that allowed Fighter Command a period of recovery after the first raid, a second large force was detected by the radar chain. This time 15 squadrons from 11 Group and the five from Duxford were scrambled to meet them. In all eight attacks were delivered against the enemy – most in the area Canterbury–Dartford. Once more a concerted German bombing attack on the capital was thwarted. The experience of 213 Squadron (Hurricanes) from Tangmere is worth noting in detail:

Twelve Hurricanes of No. 213 Squadron took off from Tangmere at 1410 hours … The enemy aircraft were met at 1450 hours flying towards London at 13,000 feet. They consisted of about 80 Do. 17’s flying in two formations of 40 each … 213 Squadron carried out a head-on attack on the Do. 17’s. The Leader of the Squadron (F/Lt. Sing) singled out one enemy aircraft and shot away the whole of the nose, including the pilot’s cockpit. The a/c went into a steep dive and a probable [!] is claimed. Sub/Lieut Jeram (Green 2 and F/O Duryang) (Polish) Red 2 both went right through the enemy formation and then, turning back, attacked astern an enemy aircraft each and both claim one Do. 17 each destroyed, as they followed their opponents down through the clouds and saw them blazing on the ground. Green 1 (F/Sgt Grayson) carried out an astern attack on another and after several bursts saw e/a go down in an absolute vertical dive out of control … Sgt. Bushell carried out an astern attack on a Do. 17 and damaged it. Blue 2 (F/O Cottam) dived vertically onto a Do. 17, damaged it, and having lost it, proceeded to Dungeness where he saw a Spitfire attacking an Me. 110. He joined in and helped to shoot it down into the sea. Green 3 (Sgt. Snowdon) never had a chance of attacking a Do. 17 so he also proceeded to Dungeness on the look out for stragglers, and, having found an Me. 110 he attacked it, and using deflection, shot it down into the sea …

The enemy attack was completely broken up. Many e/a were seen to jettison their bombs as they were attacked and then turned back.12

The report reveals the absolute terror that must have been experienced by German bomber crew, in their Perspex cockpits, as a fighter approached them at 350 mph; the value of a head-on attack in breaking the bomber formation; the tenacity of the British (and Polish) pilots in seeking out a target; in this case the absence of any fighter protection for the bombers; and the ability of a force outnumbered 6:1 to thwart a large attack.

In the event, Fighter Command could not prevent some bombs falling on London. Targets in south London, including Tooting, and some in the West End, including Buckingham Palace, were hit, but the bombing was sporadic and no vital centres were irreparably damaged.

At the end of the day, Fighter Command had shot down far fewer than the 185 aircraft claimed at the time, but the actual result was still highly favourable to Park’s men. For the loss of 30 Hurricanes and Spitfires they shot down 56 German aircraft, comprising 23 fighters and 33 bombers, the second highest bomber loss for the entire Battle of Britain.¹³

Indeed, the turn to London placed the pilots of the short-range Me 109s in an impossible position. Their limited range meant that the Me 109s could spend little time protecting the bombers over the capital. In some cases a head wind forced the Me 109s to turn for home early and leave the bombers unescorted. This left the slow-moving Dornier 17 particularly vulnerable to the British fighters and many were picked off over London with the greatest of ease.¹⁴

The decision to bomb London did lessen the pressure on Fighter Command in several respects. The diminution of the mass attacks on their airfields enabled runways and buildings to be repaired and communications restored. Moreover, the defence of London actually cost Fighter Command fewer losses in aircraft in September than the losses suffered in August in defence of its airfields. From 11 August to 6 September, Fighter Command had lost from all causes about 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes.¹⁵ At the same time it received almost exactly the same number of new and repaired aircraft. During the intense phase of attacks on airfields Fighter Command was holding its own, but only just. From 7 to 30 September its losses from all causes were 440 aircraft while Fighter Command gained 534 from new production and the repair depots. In the two most intense months of the battle 1,240 front-line fighters had been lost. These were prodigious losses but over the same period 1,330 fighters had been gained.16 Some of this came from running down the number of aircraft in store, but it was always the case that more aircraft could have been flown into 11 Group from other areas of the country. Park noted in his report to Dowding in October that the position of Fighter Command had improved both in regards to the efficiency of their airfields and in the growth in numbers. The pessimism of his earlier report had gone.¹⁷

The one factor that caused great concern to Park and Dowding in this period was the attrition of their fighter pilots. Table 5 gives the weekly available pilots compared with the weekly available serviceable aircraft. The dates for serviceable aircraft and available pilots do not exactly coincide but are close enough to make reasonable comparisons. The final figure in Table 5 expresses the number of available pilots per serviceable aircraft.¹⁸

Table 5: Fighter Command Aircraft and Pilot Availability.
Date	Serviceable aircraft	Available pilots	Pilots per plane
8 July	749	1,259	1.68
15 July	828	1,341	1.62
22 July	771	1,365	1.78
30 July	828	1,377	1.67
4 August	879	1,434	1.63
12 August	811	1,396	1.72
16 August	793	1,379	1.74
26 August	888	1,377	1.55
2 September	864	1,422	1.65
10 September	762	1,381	1.81
17 September	737	1,492	2.02
22 September	791	1,509	1.91
29 September	755	1,581	2.09

If a squadron is taken as consisting of 12 aircraft and 18 pilots, Table 5 reveals that at no point during the Battle of Britain was there a pilot shortage.¹⁹ So the constant worry expressed by Dowding and Park during the battle, that they were facing an acute pilot shortage, requires explanation. Partly, as Stephen Bungay explains, Dowding had created the shortage in May 1940 when he increased the establishment of a squadron from 18 pilots to 26.²⁰ No doubt this was a prudent step, designed to give pilots sufficient rest between sorties to remain at peak efficiency, but it meant that from then on Fighter Command figures always showed a deficiency of pilots to establishment.

Nevertheless, Table 5 should be read bearing in mind that it relates to Fighter Command as a whole. There were days in August when the pilot availability in front-line squadrons fell alarmingly. For example, in August, Spitfire squadrons had only 16 operational pilots for their 12 aircraft.²¹ Douglas Evill (Senior Air Staff Officer to Dowding) noted that in just two weeks in August, Fighter Command lost 114 front-line pilots killed, wounded or missing. Replacement pilots from the Operational Training Units (the penultimate training establishment for pilots before release to combat squadrons) only made up for 60 per cent of these losses. The situation was particularly serious regarding Hurricane pilots, where replacements would only account for 16 per cent of losses. He concluded that ‘the period under discussion is very short but it does look as though we shall have to do something to boost up the production of Hurricane pilots in particular’.²²

In early September, Dowding called a meeting between his staff, Park and Sholto Douglas from the Air Ministry to discuss the pilot shortage. Various expedients were adopted, including taking pilots from Lysander and Fairey Battle squadrons and retraining them in modern types. In addition, pilots from Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular were to be trained in Hurricanes, adding another 40 pilots to the total. This was a very bad-tempered meeting with Douglas rather sanguine about the position but with Dowding insisting that ‘I want you to take away from this meeting the feeling that the situation is very grave’. The key remark, however, was probably made by Park, usually (with good reason) the most pessimistic of the group. He assured the others that in his opinion the Luftwaffe could not keep up the pressure on Fighter Command for more than three weeks and that they would probably get through.23 And so they did. Table 5 shows that while the pilot position did indeed weaken in August, it soon improved and by 17 September was as strong as it was to be for the entire battle. Certainly Dowding never attained the comfortable reserve that he had sought in May, but the fact remained that the British had a sufficiency of pilots to win the battle.

On the other side of the Channel attrition had also been at work on the Luftwaffe and the state of its operational aircraft bore out Park’s suspicions. On 10 August the Luftwaffe had 2,651 serviceable aircraft. In the weeks that followed there was a downward trend as indicated in Table 6.²⁴

Table 6: Luftwaffe: Serviceable Aircraft, 10 August–5 October 1940.
Date	SE fighters	TE fighters	Bombers	Dive-bombers	Total
10 August	933	357	1,015	346	2,651
17 August	853	254	1,038	307	2,452
24 August	839	266	1,038	328	2,471
31 August	692	215	866	354	2,127
7 September	762	175	876	344	2,157
14 September	755	154	915	340	2,164
21 September	727	136	846	352	2,061
28 September	721	114	818	375	2,028
5 October	667	99	836	379	1,981

These figures reveal that the Luftwaffe suffered an overall decline in aircraft numbers of 25 per cent during the intensive phase of the Battle of Britain. The numbers of serviceable, single-engine fighters declined by 28.5 per cent and bombers by 18 per cent. The decline in twin-engine fighters was a catastrophic 72 per cent. The figures for dive-bombers actually indicate an increase, but this was only because they had largely been withdrawn from the battle around 18 August. Indeed, the figure for the dive-bombers should actually be removed from the Luftwaffe total altogether, and if this is done it shows that the number of usable German aircraft available to the Luftwaffe suffered a 40 per cent overall decline.

What is the explanation for this precipitate decline? The first part of the equation is the fearful losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by Fighter Command during this phase of the battle. It will be recalled that from 12 August to 30 September the British suffered 1,240 aircraft lost and damaged. In the same period, however, the Germans lost 1,760 aircraft to the British Hurricanes and Spitfires. These losses consisted of 565 fighters, 812 bombers, 291 twin-engine fighters and 92 dive-bombers. The vulnerability of the Me 110 is demonstrated by the fact that in just four days of combat 78 were shot down or damaged. In the case of the dive-bombers, on 18 August the Germans lost 18 aircraft or 6 per cent of their total force, which was why they were rapidly withdrawn. As for bombers, the Luftwaffe lost 10 per cent of its force in the week of 12–18 August, another 10 per cent from 24 to 31 August, and 6 per cent of the force from 1 to 7 September. The losses of the fighter force are just as drastic. Between 12–18 August they lost about 10 per cent of their force, from 24 to 31 August close to 15 per cent, and from 1 to 7 September another 15 per cent.

The second part of this equation is the German aircraft production effort. Here the figures are indeed stark. While losing 565 fighters the Germans produced only 250, for bombers the figures are 812 lost and 350 produced, for twin-engine fighters 291 and 147. Only with dive-bombers are losses and production about equal (92 and 88), but as noted the losses are low because the Ju 87s were withdrawn from the battle after 18 August. As for the numbers of damaged aircraft returned to service by the Germans, there are no available figures, but Table 6 reveals that they were insufficient to prevent the decline of the force.

In short, during this phase of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe was a wasting asset, whose position was only likely to worsen as British production continued to outstrip German.

The Germans were well aware of the decline of the Luftwaffe and Goering was certainly conscious of the planned attack on the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. This meant that there would have to be a radical change in Luftwaffe policy if the air force was to play a meaningful role in the eastern campaign. Goering decided therefore to persist with the night bombing of London but to use the bomber force sparingly by day. Instead he would equip his single-engine fighters with bomb racks (250 or 500kg bomb loads) and direct them to make tip-and-run sweeps over southern England while flying at heights of 30,000 feet to make interception difficult.

Ironically, at the very moment the new tactics were implemented, the Luftwaffe bombers scored their most telling blow against Fighter Command. On 24 September the Supermarine works at Southampton was raided. Forty-two people were killed and 161 wounded but the aircraft production line was hardly touched. Then a lucky blow was struck on 26 September. Two waves of bombers hit the Spitfire factory with 70 tons of high explosive. The plant was wrecked to such an extent that it was never rebuilt. Although Castle Bromwich in the Midlands, beyond the range where bombers could be escorted, was entering full production, it could not make up for the loss of the Southampton works. Emergency measures were put in place, which saw the dispersal of production of Spitfires to dozens of sites across southern England. This masterpiece of improvisation did not fully solve the problem, however. In early 1941 Spitfire production had been reduced to 30 per cent of its September 1940 figure.25 But by then the Luftwaffe was largely confining itself to night-bombing operations.

Goering’s change of tactics was in effect a tacit recognition that the battle against Fighter Command had been lost, because even if the German fighters penetrated to vital targets, the constraints on their bombing capacity would strictly limit any damage they might do. For example, even a direct hit by a 250kg bomb on a concrete control room on a Sector airfield would not materially damage it. Nevertheless, during October the Germans kept coming and Park found it particularly difficult to intercept the sweeps. Radar could not give accurate information on very high raids and it was found that large numbers of fighters were being dispatched without sighting or engaging the enemy.²⁶ In mid-October he issued revised instructions to his controllers to take account of the new situation. Spitfire squadrons were to be assembled in pairs and given fixed patrol lines near the coast, from where they could intercept high-flying enemy fighter raids. Behind these forward patrols mixed wings of Hurricanes and Spitfires would engage the enemy in the usual way – the Spitfires tackling the fighters while the Hurricanes went for the bombers. If the enemy appeared to be in great strength, squadrons based to the north of London would converge on the capital.²⁷

Even so it proved difficult to inflict great damage on this sort of raid:

9 a/c from 41 squadron left Hornchurch … to patrol Maidstone … When at 31,000 feet ‘A’ Flight in the rear of the squadron sighted a large number of widely dispersed Me 109’s at 30,500 feet. A few Me 110’s accompanied by Me 109’s were also seen. ‘A’ Flight dived on the enemy who immediately fled, diving for cloud at such speed that the Spitfires could not overtake. They were last seen dodging in and out of the 9/10 cloud.28

However, a bomb-carrying Me 109 was no match for a determined Spitfire pilot:

The Squadron [74] was given various vectors for single high raiders but did not connect. They were then ordered to join No. 92 Squadron at 30,000 feet over Maidstone. The Squadron Leader (S/Ldr. A. G. Malan) remained at 30,000 feet in order to push out exhaust condensation to frighten the Messerschmitt bomb carriers. No. 92 Squadron gave a ‘Tally Ho’ and No. 74 Squadron dropped to 28,000 feet. The enemy, consisting of 6 plus Me 109’s were seen steering S. E. over Ashford at 26,000 feet and were attacked.

Squadron Leader Malan attacked the leading enemy aircraft in a fast dive and fired bursts from 200 to 50 yards range. The enemy aircraft smoked heavily after the second burst, but carried on. Malan continued to fire but had to break away momentarily to wipe ice off the windscreen. He then followed the Me 109 to the coast, and saw the enemy aircraft crash into the sea five miles out from Hastings – the Dungeness area.²⁹

The main point to note is that compared with August and September these were minor skirmishes. In all of October, Fighter Command lost just 161 Hurricanes and Spitfires, less than half those lost in August and September, and with production figures averaging over 100 per week British fighter defences gained markedly in strength. German fighter losses were also down from 225 in September to 129 in October, but production still struggled to keep pace. German bomber losses decreased but only from 258 to 182, still well above replacement levels.

In this way the Battle of Britain rather fizzled out, but there is no doubt that Fighter Command had won the day. The Germans just could not risk large losses of fighters or bombers by day and so bombed at night.

How did the British achieve this victory? In war, casualty statistics can often illustrate the decline of one side as against the other. Here the statistics tell only part of the story. In terms of pilots Fighter Command suffered significant losses. Between 10 July and 31 October 1940, of its 2,228 pilots, 537 were killed and a somewhat larger number wounded. This amounts to an overall casualty rate of about 50 per cent. Yet because the training of new pilots proceeded throughout the battle, Fighter Command had more pilots available to it in November than it had in July.

The Luftwaffe lost many more personnel simply because most of their casualties were bombers with crews of two, three or four. The total German aircrew killed was 2,262. Attrition rates of aircraft add another dimension to the picture of decline. Although the Germans still possessed 836 bombers in October, this was 25 per cent fewer than they had started with in July. The numbers for single-engine fighters tell a similar story. There were over 900 available in July – just 650 in October, a decline of almost 30 per cent. No force could continue to suffer losses at this rate, especially when the aircraft were being insufficiently supplemented by new production. These German statistics reveal two things. First, the reduced number of available fighters meant that fewer bombers could be safely escorted. Second, because of the losses, the pilots of both bombers and fighters were much less experienced in October than those in July.

These figures reveal another factor that is a major part of the explanation for the defeat of the Luftwaffe – it was just too small to mount a constant series of raids over Britain. If we examine those days during the battle when the Germans managed to fly over 1,000 sorties, we find they only amounted to eight days out of 113 – on 13, 14, 15, 16, 30 August and 7, 18, 30 September. What is doubly notable about these figures is that only in one period (13–16 August) did the Luftwaffe mount consecutive attacks on this scale. On most occasions, therefore, a massive raid would be followed by a pause while pilots were rested and aircraft repaired. The Germans just did not have the capacity to maintain constant heavy pressure on Fighter Command.

One feature of the battle is seldom dealt with. Because the British won it, the manner of its winning is seldom questioned. But was there a better way? One of the great historians of the battle, T. C. G. James, thought there was. In his official narrative of the battle, written in 1944, he said:

It is at least debatable whether the Commander-in-Chief’s policy [of retaining so many squadrons in the north] was correct. If, for example, he had packed additional squadrons into No. 11 group early in the battle so powerful a blow might have been struck at the attacking forces that the daylight offensive might conceivably have been abandoned.30

Certainly Dowding was parsimonious in the number of squadrons he maintained in the front line. 11 Group never had more than 43 per cent of Fighter Command’s serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes at any period of the battle. No doubt Dowding wanted to keep a reserve of his modern fighters distant enough from enemy aerodromes in France so that escorted German bombers could not attack them. But could Dowding not have done more to reinforce Park? Would not an additional 100 fighters have dealt the Luftwaffe such a blow that they might have called off the battle? After all, 15 September demonstrated that Goering was not prepared to take losses of that scale as a regular occurrence.

In Dowding’s defence it is said that there was a limit to the number of squadrons that a single Group could handle. Let us examine this situation more closely. When battle commenced 11 Group had 18 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, two squadrons of Defiants and three squadrons of Blenheims. The location of the Defiants and Blenheims in the front line does raise some questions about Dowding’s strategy. Both types had been used in the French campaign where they were found to be entirely outclassed by the Me 109 and even by the Me 110 fighter-bomber. They had no place, therefore, in the front line of British air defence. Yet Dowding only moved two of them (141 Defiant Squadron and 604 Blenheim Squadron) to the north during the first month of battle. If all five of these obsolescent squadrons had been moved, Park’s group could have been provided with five modern squadrons – about 60 additional Hurricanes and Spitfires – without being required to handle more squadrons than he began with. The remaining two Blenheim squadrons stayed with Park throughout the battle and, more amazingly, a squadron of Defiants was moved back into 11 Group on 22 August. (These did not last long. The squadron was so knocked about that it was removed a week later.)

Park certainly thought that 11 Group could handle additional squadrons. In early September he wrote to Dowding drawing his attention to the movement of German aircraft from Scandinavia (as a result of the disaster they suffered on 15 August) to the Pas de Calais. He asked for two additional squadrons, one to be based at Hendon under the control of the North Weald Sector and the other at Red Hill to operate under the control of the Kenley Sector.31 So Park foresaw no difficulty in handling two new squadrons and there seems little doubt that yet more could have been brought into 11 Group along the lines he suggested.

The fact that Dowding stuck to his strategy was not of course a matter of pure stubbornness. Dowding, it will be recalled, had overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe bomber force by about 100 per cent. Air Ministry estimates were similarly astray and Lindemann, Churchill’s scientific adviser, had pointed this out to them as early as July. However, there is no evidence that they passed these revised figures on to Dowding. Perhaps they themselves placed no credibility on Lindemann’s figures. The result of this lamentable situation was that the head of Fighter Command considered he was confronting a force twice as strong as it actually was. In this position no doubt he thought it prudent to hold back a considerable proportion of his fighter force to meet an onslaught that never came.

In fact, it is not the case that Dowding did nothing in the face of the intensification of the German effort in late August and early September. As the fighting approached London, he strengthened that section of 12 Group that lay just to the north of the capital. Thus we can see that the percentage of fighters allocated to 12 Group increased from just fewer than 20 per cent to 26 per cent in the first week of September. So while Dowding kept 11 Group at about the same strength throughout the battle, this move enabled 12 Group to take a larger percentage of the fighting.

Moreover, if Dowding refused Park’s request to strengthen his group, at least he ensured that Park received the best pilots. At a meeting with Park and Air Ministry officials on 7 September, Dowding decided to stop rotating squadrons into 11 Group but instead to rotate pilots. These were divided into three categories, A, B and C. Only A pilots – that is, the most experienced – would be sent to Park. The next most experienced – the B group – would be sent to 12 Group, and C pilots would be sent to 13 Group for training until they reached B or A standard. A nucleus of A pilots would remain in 12 and 13 Group for training purposes.³² There was a justification for this policy of which Dowding was aware at the time. There was a very small number of pilots in Fighter Command who could shoot well enough to destroy an enemy aircraft. These men had to be placed in the front line to ensure that the attrition rate on the Luftwaffe would be maintained.

Of course, for the pilots, Dowding’s policy was a two-edged sword. It actually increased the attrition rate on Fighter Command’s best pilots. In the event, however, this did not affect the battle. By the time the scheme was operational, the Luftwaffe was turning to night bombing. If the battle had continued during the latter half of September and October at an intense level, it remains a serious question as to how long the experienced fighters in 11 Group would have lasted.

Did, then, ‘the few’ prevail over the many? Some commentators have pointed out that on most days of the Battle of Britain the British had more serviceable fighters than the Germans and more pilots. This might well be true but it misses the way in which the battle was fought. Because of Dowding’s cautious disposition of squadrons and because Park had limited time in which to scramble his squadrons, there was always the probability that any British force engaging the enemy would be outnumbered. Some of the examples given earlier suggest that the ratio could be as high as 8:1 in favour of the Luftwaffe. Indeed, if we calculate the number of British aircraft actually in combat on any particular day, we find that they were almost always outnumbered by the Luftwaffe. To take just two examples, on 18 August just 328 aircraft from Fighter Command fought 560 German aircraft, and on Battle of Britain Day (15 September) 392 British aircraft were in combat against over 600 from the Luftwaffe.33 Similar figures or ones even more favourable to the Germans can be found for almost all days of the battle.

The other point to be made about the ‘few’ is that it was usually the same squadrons from 11 Group that confronted the Germans day after day. While it is true that for most of the battle squadrons were rotated, many of them stayed in the battle zone for considerable periods of time. Thus 56, 1, 43, 54 Squadrons stayed in the south from 10 July until early September, and 17 Squadron remained in the Group throughout the battle. These squadrons therefore experienced all the major battles in August and many in the first week of September. Later in the battle these figures disguise the effect on particularly experienced pilots who, under Dowding’s ‘stabilisation’ scheme, would have found themselves rotated back into the combat areas even when their squadrons were located in the north.

There was an even smaller group who inflicted a very high percentage of casualties on the Germans. As noted above, there were very few British pilots who had mastered the art of deflection shooting or who were just good shots. It has been calculated that 3.5 per cent of pilots in Fighter Command accounted for about 30 per cent of German casualties. Other pilots did their bit in disrupting the German bombers, but for the battle to be won German aircraft had to be destroyed. Most of them were destroyed by just a handful of men.

Overall we can conclude that Fighter Command won the battle by a considerable margin. However, it must always be remembered that this was not obvious at the time. Few then seem to have been aware of the actual combat strength of their opponent or the feeble effort of the German aircraft industry compared to the British. Moreover, it could not be known how long the battle would last or whether the strain on the British pilots might prove too much. During the battle, day after day after day three or four hundred men from Fighter Command were obliged to risk their lives – often several times on the same day. They proved capable of the task. They were the few. And they won the battle.