CHAPTER 3

THE CABINET CRISIS

CHURCHILL CHALLENGED, 10–28 MAY 1940

THE GERMAN ONSLAUGHT in the west made the formation of a Cabinet by Churchill a matter of the utmost urgency. After returning from Buckingham Palace on the evening of 10 May he summoned Attlee and Greenwood for a discussion about its composition. They indicated that they both expected places in the War Cabinet.1 During the next forty-eight hours Churchill made various attempts to construct a War Cabinet and an outer ministry. His first efforts listed a War Cabinet of seven – himself as Prime Minister, Attlee as Lord Privy Seal, Greenwood probably as Minister without Portfolio, Sir Andrew Duncan as Minister for Economic Affairs, Halifax as Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain as Leader of the House and Kingsley Wood as Chancellor of the Exchequer.²

In a later iteration, Duncan and Greenwood were dropped and Lloyd George was added, but this list may be incomplete or represent musings on Churchill’s part because Greenwood had already been offered a post and Lloyd George was problematical because of the mutual antipathy between him and Chamberlain.³

The final group of five who were to sit on the War Cabinet was decided early on 11 May. They were Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Chamberlain as Lord President of the Council, Halifax as Foreign Secretary, Attlee as Lord Privy Seal and Greenwood as Minister without Portfolio. An attempt by Churchill to make Chamberlain either Leader of the House or Chancellor of the Exchequer was vetoed by the Labour members, an indication that their old foe was not to be given too much power.4

The outer Cabinet went through many permutations, most of which are recorded in the Churchill Papers. This casts some doubt on the story that the group was selected by Brendan Bracken and Margesson (the Chief Whip) and then shown to Churchill. The final list in many ways reveals Churchill’s influence, especially in the posts offered to Eden, Sinclair, Bevin and Beaverbrook. The most important portfolios were as follows:

Secretary of State for War: Anthony Eden

Secretary of State for Air: Archibald Sinclair

First Lord of the Admiralty: A. V. Alexander

Minister of Labour: Ernest Bevin

Home Secretary: Sir John Anderson

Chancellor of the Exchequer: Sir Kingsley Wood

Minister of Economic Warfare: Hugh Dalton

Secretary of State for India: Leo Amery

Minister of Food: Lord Woolton

Minister of Supply: Herbert Morrison

Minister of Transport: Sir John Reith

Minister of Aircraft Production: Lord Beaverbrook

Minister of Information: Duff Cooper

The composition of the Churchill government provoked much comment at the time and continues to do so. In relation to the outer Cabinet it has been claimed that the Conservative rebels were not sufficiently rewarded for their efforts and that there were too many appeasers such as Kingsley Wood and Samuel Hoare left in office. Amery, for example, was furious that these men remained in power and that he was fobbed off with the India Office which he regarded as a fairly minor post. However, if Churchill’s list is scrutinised dispassionately, it is probably the best that he could do at the time. Wood had been helpful to Churchill in the last days of the Chamberlain government and even before that they maintained a regular and friendly correspondence. It would not have been politic of Churchill to sweep all the appeasers away in one swoop. And if the posts in the outer Cabinet that he gave them are examined, none of them was crucial. Oddly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer also falls into that category. The demands of war meant that Treasury control of the spending departments was loosened, giving the Chancellor much less hold over ministers than in peacetime. Other posts such as the Woolsack were largely ceremonial and although it was no doubt galling to see Hoare elevated to such a position in the Lords, it hardly affected the running of the war. In contrast Churchill ensured that all three service ministers were anti-appeasers and he gave posts that were of the utmost importance in wartime such as Labour and Aircraft Production to staunch supporters such as Bevin and Beaverbrook.

The composition of the War Cabinet was more controversial. The inclusion in it of both Chamberlain and Halifax caused much adverse comment among the Tory rebels and within Labour circles.5 The view at the time was that Churchill ‘had not been nearly bold enough in his changes and much too afraid of the [Conservative] Party’.⁶ Modern scholarship has tended to endorse this view, one authority writing that Churchill was ‘a caged animal, prisoner to Chamberlain’s majority in the Commons’.⁷ Another account states that Chamberlain’s position in the War Cabinet was ‘pivotal to the existence of the new administration’.⁸

There is something to be said for this view. The vote, while toppling Chamberlain, still left a majority in the House of Commons at least as nominal supporters of the old administration. Chamberlain was also leader of the Conservative Party and any government claiming to be ‘all party’ would have found it difficult to exclude him.

Halifax is a slightly different case. His move away from appeasement has been much exaggerated by his admirers, as his basic acceptance of the Munich agreement and his hesitations on the declaration of war demonstrate. Nor, as we will see, did the outbreak of war mean that he was entirely weaned from his appeasing ways. Why then did Churchill not replace Halifax with Eden, who was the obvious alternative choice for the Foreign Office? This constellation would have given Churchill a solid bloc of three supporters in the War Cabinet and effectively isolated Chamberlain. Was Churchill so fearful of his position that he felt he could not take this step?

Churchill was certainly solicitous to his former antagonists. On achieving office he immediately wrote to Chamberlain noting that he would need his ‘help and council’ and that ‘to a very large extent I am in your hands’.9 He was no less emollient to Halifax, thanking him for the ‘chivalry and kindness with which you have treated me’ and signing himself ‘Your sincere friend Winston Churchill’.¹⁰

There is no need, however, to see these messages as acts of a ‘weak’ Prime Minister. Churchill soon felt strong enough to attempt to impose Chamberlain’s inveterate enemy Lloyd George on him as a Cabinet colleague. Chamberlain, under intense pressure from Churchill, finally agreed to what he regarded as a humiliation and was only spared this fate when Lloyd George eventually refused to serve.¹¹ It must be concluded, therefore, that Churchill’s subservience to Chamberlain, if it ever existed, was certainly short lived.

As for Halifax, by his own account, he felt himself tied to Chamberlain’s pre-war policies, had no stomach (seemingly literally) for the top job, and was a self-confessed ignoramus on military affairs, as well as having no position in the House of Commons. He was thus hardly in a strong position, especially taking into account the ever-deteriorating military situation in France.

By any measure Chamberlain and Halifax were finished as a political force. Why then did Churchill include them both in his War Cabinet? It seems likely that the Prime Minister took this step, not because he felt desperately weak, but because he was sure of his own ability to manage a War Cabinet in which in most cases he would have the support of Attlee and Greenwood. Moreover, he had strong backing in the press and in the country, something that is often forgotten when the machinations of ‘high politics’ are all that are taken into account. Furthermore the move was surely a sensible insurance policy. At least if Chamberlain and Halifax were inside the War Cabinet, Churchill could watch their every move. In thinking thus, Churchill may to some extent have miscalculated. The Labour ministers had never held office and had little direct knowledge of foreign affairs. On the other hand, Chamberlain and Halifax had either sat in cabinets or held high office for over a decade. Given this disparity in experience, Churchill was likely to hear much more in Cabinet from his Conservative colleagues than from the Labour men. During the month that followed the creation of his War Cabinet he must at times have wondered whether Amery and the rebels had not been correct in questioning his decision.

The other strand of the ‘weak’ Prime Minister theory derives from Churchill’s first appearance in the House of Commons after taking power and from the chattering of some diehard appeasers.

Churchill first appeared in the House as Prime Minister on 13 May when he made his ‘blood, toil, tears and sweat’ speech, to which we will return. It is the reception accorded Churchill and Chamberlain that concerns us now. Harold Nicolson recorded the scene in his diary: ‘When Chamberlain enters the House, he gets a terrific reception and when Churchill comes in the applause is less.’12 Later Lord Davidson, a Conservative peer, told Stanley Baldwin that Churchill had been received ‘in silence’.¹³

It seems likely that far too much has been made of this incident. The cheers for Chamberlain probably came from some of his diehard supporters – cheers that arose out of embarrassment from those who had failed to support Chamberlain on 8 May, and a last hurrah from some for a long-serving Prime Minister. The seemingly lesser enthusiasm for Churchill (we can dismiss Davidson’s ‘silence’ as an attempt to tell Baldwin what he might want to hear) probably derives from the fact that he was still an unknown quantity, that he had not yet had the opportunity to state his policy, and the sheer curiousness of a Tory leader so heartily endorsed by Labour.

The final strand of the ‘weak’ Prime Minister theory originates from two incidents involving some still-chattering appeasers. The first concerns John Colville, Rab Butler and Chips Channon. Colville relates a story in his diary about how the three of them gathered at the Foreign Office to drink a toast ‘to the King Over the Water’ (Chamberlain). He recorded the oily Butler as saying:

The good clean tradition of English politics, that of Pitt as opposed to Fox, had been sold to the greatest adventurer of modern political history … He believed this sudden Coup [!] of Winston and his rabble was serious disaster and an unnecessary one: ‘the pass has been sold’ by Mr. C[hamberlain], Lord Halifax and Oliver Stanley. They had mildly surrendered to a half-breed American.¹⁴

The second incident is recorded in a letter from Lord Hankey to Sam Hoare:

I found complete chaos [in government] this morning. No one was gripping the war in the crisis. The Dictator [Churchill] was engaged in a sordid struggle with the politicians of the left about the secondary offices. NC was in a state of despair about it all.

The only hope lies in the solid core of Churchill, Chamberlain and Halifax, but whether the wise old elephants will ever be able to hold the Rogue Elephant [Churchill again], I doubt.15

It is surprising that these bilious remarks are still taken seriously. On examination, the line-up of dissidents is not all that impressive. Colville was Chamberlain’s private secretary, a position from which he might be expected to show some loyalty to his old chief, but hardly a key post. Channon was Chamberlain’s poodle, a sycophant and a backbencher of no political account. Butler was an arch-appeaser, probably a defeatist, who would reveal his true colours later in the year and who was in any case a mere under-secretary. Hankey was yesterday’s man, an important figure during the Great War and in the 1930s but much to his chagrin a lightweight in 1940. Even as a collective this group had absolutely no political clout.

Their lack of judgement is even less impressive. It was grotesque of them to claim that Neville Chamberlain represented a ‘clean’ tradition in British politics. This was a man who did not hesitate to have his opponents’ phones illegally tapped or to have derogatory articles about them written by Conservative Party Central Office, and who used threats of de-selection to intimidate them. The chaos described by Hankey can well be imagined. Just before a new administration had taken over and was struggling to come to terms with the German advance in the west while still forming a government. His remarks about sordid struggles with politicians of the left can merely be taken as typical bile from a sclerotic man of the right. But to describe Chamberlain and Halifax as ‘wise old elephants’ is doing a serious injustice to that animal. Old they might have been, but wise? These were the men after all who had overseen such diplomatic ‘triumphs’ as the Munich conference, had sat by with insouciant passivity while Poland was overrun, and had conducted the war in such a manner as to cause a widespread revolt within their own party.

Others have suggested that Churchill was in a parlous position because he surrounded himself with ‘crooks’, ‘gangsters’ or ‘unscrupulous hangers-on and despicable jackals’. These are intemperate words, aimed no doubt at personalities such as Brenden Bracken, Beaverbrook, Boothby, Amery and the like. These remarks should not be taken seriously. They either come from politicians at the time who disliked Churchill or were about to suffer a diminution in their status, or from scholars who have not yet come to terms with the overthrow of their beloved Neville Chamberlain. The men described in such derogatory terms certainly had their share of character flaws but all were to serve their country well in the Second World War. Those who derided them reveal more about themselves than they do about Churchill.16

By 13 May Churchill had formed a Cabinet and had staked out his policy position in the House of Commons. He commenced his speech that day by saying ‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.’ It is these words for which the speech is largely remembered. But of greater importance was this section of it:

You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air … against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. Let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward toward its goal.¹⁷

Some regard this speech as merely windy rhetoric, others as bravado – necessary in the circumstances but bravado nonetheless. These interpretations fundamentally misread Churchill’s purpose. At times in 1940 he might use exaggerated language, especially if he was speaking to a foreign audience and especially if that audience was the United States. But when he was speaking to his own people, which is what he was doing here, he spoke the truth. When he spoke of achieving victory at all costs and in spite of all terror, and of persisting for however long it might take, he meant it literally. And in so speaking he had a dual purpose. He was telling the people that this would be a long and bitter war, with many privations. But he was also telling his Cabinet and parliamentary colleagues that they must come to grips with the policy just laid before them. There would be no hankering after peace deals under Churchill, there would be no half-hearted waging of war, there would be no compromise with the enemy. By saying this just three days after he had assumed office Churchill was also indicating that if any of his colleagues were inclined to oppose him, they would have to argue that victory over Nazi Germany was not a goal for which it was worth risking everything to achieve. They would now have to state why a compromise peace with such a ‘monstrous tyranny’ would be superior to victory. They would also have to argue against all the evidence of 1938 and 1939 that a bargain struck with Hitler in 1940 would endure while maintaining the British Empire as an independent state. With this speech, Churchill had stolen a march on those who might oppose him. His policy was clear. His opponents, so recently flung from office, had only the failed policy of appeasement to fall back on.

During May and June 1940 the War Cabinet met at least twice a day. Their meetings were attended by the five permanent members, with others such as the Minister for Air, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Minister for War and the various service chiefs in attendance as required. When matters of the highest secrecy were discussed usually only the permanent five participated.18

The critical meetings for this crisis were of course held against the background of the rapidly deteriorating situation in France. Indeed it is likely that the situation at the front was often worse than was realised because of the confusion surrounding the military operations. Nevertheless, just three days after Churchill became Prime Minister, the War Cabinet was discussing ‘The Invasion of Great Britain’ as an agenda item, so there was no doubt that the five were well informed about the main tendencies of the situation across the Channel.¹⁹

Meetings dealt with routine matters until 15 May. Then the War Cabinet learned that German armoured columns had broken through the French defences on the River Meuse. In the course of this meeting Halifax made the first tentative steps towards recommending overtures to Mussolini. At first the approach he suggested seemed innocuous. The matter under discussion was contraband control, the method by which British warships prevented warlike goods or armaments reaching hostile or potentially hostile countries. One such country was Italy. Halifax had entered into discussions with the Italian Economic Attaché in London because the Italians were becoming increasingly irritated at the British blockade. Halifax informed the War Cabinet that he had agreed to further discussions with the Italians with the aim of minimising their annoyance and keeping them neutral. He thought a friendly message from Churchill to Mussolini might help.20 Churchill agreed and a conciliatory message was dispatched on 16 May.²¹ Two days later the Italian dictator delivered a stern rebuff to Churchill. The Pact of Steel with Germany was inviolable – it would guide Italian foreign policy.²²

Meanwhile the War Cabinet was facing the ever-deteriorating situation in France. Chamberlain (temporarily in charge because Churchill was in France trying to stiffen the resolve of Paul Reynaud’s government) was asked on 17 May by the Prime Minister to consider two scenarios. What measures might be taken if Paris fell and the BEF had to be evacuated from France? What steps would be necessary if Britain was obliged to continue the war against Germany alone?²³ Chamberlain responded by placing before the War Cabinet a list of demands to be made of the French, including measures to prevent Germany laying hands on their factories and reserves of currency. He also listed the draconian measures (including the total control of labour and property) that Britain would be obliged to institute if it was to fight on alone.²⁴

Then on 19 May the War Cabinet was informed that German armoured columns were approaching the Channel, threatening to split the Allied armies and cutting the communications by which the BEF was supplied. The crisis of the war had been reached with alarming speed. On that day Halifax detailed his negotiations with the Italian ambassador. He informed the War Cabinet that he proposed revising contraband controls against Italy and that his proposals went ‘very far in the direction of weakening our control [but] if we could hold the position vis-à-vis Italy during the next critical weeks it would be well worth while’.²⁵ This proposal did not elicit any comment from members; if Italy could be kept neutral, so much the better.

Halifax also mentioned negotiations with Italy at the War Cabinet of 24 May. He read out a telegram from the British ambassador to France, Sir Roland Campbell, to the effect that the French would welcome an approach from President Roosevelt to Mussolini concerning Italian desiderata for remaining neutral. Roosevelt would agree to communicate these demands to the Allies, who would give them every consideration.26 Again, there was no dissent in the War Cabinet. Roosevelt would be approached.

The next day another line of action with the Italians was suggested. An official at the Italian Embassy met Sir Robert Vansittart, formerly permanent head of the Foreign Office, who suggested that the British make a direct appeal to Mussolini about some kind of mediation between the powers. Halifax told the War Cabinet that he thought the idea worth following up as it might gain time and that it was anyway in tune with French policy.²⁷

So far Churchill had not made any extensive comment on the overtures to the Italians. Whether he sensed danger in Halifax’s pursuit of Italy is uncertain, but perhaps because of the mention of mediation on the part of Mussolini, he now intervened. He said he had no objection to talking to the Italians but insisted that this be kept secret ‘since it might be taken as a confession of weakness’.²⁸

At this point Churchill’s position, namely that Britain would fight on whatever impact the Italian reply had on the French, had gone unchallenged. Indeed he had restated it with some vigour to the Chiefs of Staff at a meeting of the Defence Committee on 25 May.²⁹ However, now those same chiefs produced a paper that was decidedly unhelpful to Churchill. They had been working for some time on a document with the ominous title ‘British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality’, the eventuality that could not speak its name being the fall of France. The conclusions they reached around Britain’s ability to fight on in these circumstances were gloomy. The Chiefs of Staff stated that they were unable to say with any certainty whether the Royal Air Force could hold out if the French coast was in hostile hands. They concluded that most of the BEF would be trapped in France and in those circumstances once the German army landed in Britain it would be impossible to drive it out. Even their assessment of the naval position was downbeat. At sea all depended on whether the navy could be protected from aerial attack, and they had no confidence that it could. Finally, the Chiefs of Staff stated that they could see no path that led to the defeat of Germany short of full American military and financial cooperation.³⁰

Churchill read this paper on 25 May. It can be imagined that he was appalled by this assessment of Britain’s chances. He was also worried that when his War Cabinet colleagues read it the result might be to induce a move to make peace. He would have to deal with this the following day.

That day was to be the most difficult day so far in Churchill’s short premiership. He had been informed late on 25 May that Reynaud was coming to London next morning perhaps to discuss a method by which France could leave the war. He had also to manoeuvre the gloomy Chiefs of Staff report through the War Cabinet. Over all this lay the question of whether the BEF could fight its way back to the Channel ports.

Churchill called the first War Cabinet at the early hour of 9 a.m. on 26 May to consider what reply was to be made to Reynaud. He informed his colleagues that the projected French counter-offensive against the German spearheads ‘had no chance whatever’ of eventuating; that a telegram had been dispatched to General Lord Gort to this effect; and that ships were being collected for the evacuation of the BEF.31 In addition the War Cabinet should face the fact that Reynaud might tell them the French could not carry on the fight. Churchill then announced that in the light of the above events and in order to meet ‘all eventualities’ he had given the Chiefs of Staff new terms of reference concerning Britain’s ability to fight on alone:

In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans holding their present position, and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc, what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy. Can the Navy and Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.³²

In fact the ‘eventualities’ of which Churchill spoke had been apparent for some time. They were indeed the basis on which the Chiefs of Staff had prepared their gloomy report. Amending the terms of reference to them was simply a manoeuvre designed quite deliberately by the Prime Minister to bring forth a more optimistic assessment. In the new remit Churchill painted the German peace proposals in the bleakest possible light while highlighting the dangers to Germany (which he did not specify) of prolonged British resistance. If Britain was to be placed ‘entirely at the mercy of Germany’, why not fight on? Churchill was challenging the Chiefs of Staff to dispute this position or declare themselves defeatist.33

And surely Churchill was seeing events with greater clarity than the Chiefs of Staff. There was no reason to dismiss the RAF, which would fight the Luftwaffe over Britain behind the immense security of the radar chain. Nor was there any reason to question the effectiveness of the navy in warding off invasion – even without air cover. And the army was not yet ‘trapped in France’. It was perhaps a brave prediction to say that most of the BEF could be lifted from French ports, but there was also no reason for the Chiefs of Staff to write off the attempt before it had been made. Finally, the scenario sketched out by Churchill of Germany triumphant was hardly an exaggeration. If Germany were left in control of the economic and financial resources of Western Europe, it would only be a matter of time before Britain was entirely at Hitler’s mercy. If by some chance Hitler did make a ‘moderate’ peace proposal, it would only retain its moderation until the Führer was in a position to toughen it. Churchill was surely correct in seeing that any peace with Nazi Germany would not be worth having.

In issuing new terms of reference, Churchill was presumably trying to render the old report obsolete before it could be circulated. Sir Cyril Newall, who was chairing the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, quickly responded to Churchill’s new instructions by saying that although the service chiefs had prepared a paper on the subject they would now examine the question again.

Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, who had been much affected by the impending crisis outlined by Churchill at the beginning of the meeting, now made the first of his substantial interventions. He commented that a dark picture had been presented. ‘We now had to face the fact that it was not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat on Germany but of safeguarding the independence of our Empire and if possible that of France.’34 He then went on to inform the War Cabinet that he had talked to Signor Giuseppe Bastianini, the Italian ambassador to Britain. This was unremarkable in itself, as the War Cabinet had instructed him to do so. However, it soon became clear that the discussions had ranged more widely than had been intended. Halifax reported:

The Ambassador had said that Signor Mussolini’s principal wish was to secure peace in Europe. The Foreign Secretary had replied that peace and security in Europe were equally our main object, and we should naturally be prepared to consider any such proposals which might lead to this, provided our liberty and independence was assured … Signor Bastianini had asked for a further interview that morning, and he might have fresh proposals to put forward.³⁵

It is obvious that Halifax had departed from the War Cabinet’s instructions to address the Italians only on matters concerning Italy and its desiderata for remaining neutral. The Foreign Secretary’s introduction of the ‘peace and security of Europe’ as a whole was merely code. A European-wide settlement would mean that the Germans would have to be involved. Talking to Mussolini in this scenario would soon mean talking to Hitler.

Churchill grasped this point immediately. He replied that ‘peace and security might be achieved under a German domination of Europe. That we could never accept … He was opposed to any negotiations that might lead to a derogation of our rights and power.’

The War Cabinet left the question of negotiations and turned to an ‘Aide-Memoire’ prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, ‘Arguments to Deter the French from Capitulating’, which had been circulated. It pointed out to the French that Germany was not as strong as it looked but that if the French capitulated they should assist the BEF in any evacuation. It also stated that Britain would continue the fight whatever the French decided, the consequences of which might be that the French would find their cities under attack by the RAF and the whole country subject to blockade.³⁶

Halifax saw his chance to use the Aide-Memoire to restate his case for negotiations. Apparently he had been flicking through the Chiefs of Staff paper on ‘A Certain Eventuality’ and argued that while the service chiefs thought that the matter would turn on air superiority, if France collapsed as envisaged by the Aide-Memoire, the Germans would be free to turn the bulk of their war production to aircraft. Although Halifax did not state it directly, the implication was that Britain could not win.37 Newall once more helpfully intervened. The Chief of the Air Staff noted that the Aide-Memoire did not deal with the matter that Halifax had raised but that this point would be dealt with by the paper to be written on the Prime Minister’s new instructions. That for the moment ended the discussion.

Churchill then left his colleagues to meet the French Premier. Churchill had every reason to be apprehensive about this meeting. Ever since Reynaud had awoken him on 15 May to claim that France was beaten, following the German advance across the River Meuse, the state of French morale had concerned the Prime Minister. And since then the situation had grown much more perilous. The French had been unable to mount a counter-offensive against the Germans and the British were occupying only a thin strip of land between Arras and Dunkirk.

In the event, the matter of a separate peace did not arise at their meeting. But Reynaud was insistent that Britain and France approach Mussolini and ask what concessions he would require to remain neutral. Only then would the larger question of a European settlement be discussed.³⁸ The French stance, if not absolutely defeatist, was bad enough. Reynaud was now taking exactly the same line as Halifax.

Churchill returned to his Cabinet colleagues to give an ‘expose’ of Reynaud’s position. He told them that the new French commander-in-chief, Maxime Weygand, saw no possibility of winning the land war and that ‘someone’ (surely it was Reynaud) had suggested another approach to Mussolini. France had not been offered any peace terms but Reynaud considered that they ‘could get an offer if they wanted one’.³⁹ Churchill then restated his own position. He said he had told the French leader that Britain was ‘not prepared to give in on any account. We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved by Germany.’ Churchill then suggested that Halifax leave the meeting and meet Reynaud. However, the Foreign Secretary was not to be fobbed off by such an obvious ploy and proceeded to have his say. He stated that he too favoured an approach to Italy. Mussolini would not want to see Hitler dominating Europe. He was certain that Mussolini would ‘persuade Hitler to take a more reasonable line’. For the first time, Churchill seemed rather on the defensive. He replied that he doubted whether anything would come of an approach to Mussolini but that the matter was something the War Cabinet might have to consider. The meeting then broke up.

Later the same day, 26 May (around 5 p.m. according to Cadogan),40 after Reynaud had departed for France, an ‘informal’ meeting of the War Cabinet took place at Admiralty House. As the minutes inform us, ‘this record does not cover the first quarter of an hour of the discussion, during which the Secretary was not present’.⁴¹ We will never know exactly what was said during those 15 minutes, but it is clear from what followed that an approach to Italy was back on the table. When the Secretary (Sir Edward Bridges) entered, Churchill was making the point that Britain was in a much stronger position than France. Britain could defend itself; this might prove beyond the French. He was opposed to joining France in any negotiations because ‘there is no limit to the terms Germany would impose on us if she had her way’. Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, added rather unhelpfully that if France went out of the war, Hitler would be able to turn on Britain ‘the sooner’. Churchill replied that he hoped the French would hang on but that ‘we must take care not to be forced into a weak position in which we went to Signor Mussolini and invited him to go to Herr Hitler and ask him to treat us nicely’.

Halifax then spoke. He began by saying that he did not disagree with Churchill’s position but,

He attached perhaps rather more importance than the Prime Minister to the desirability of allowing France to try out the possibilities of European equilibrium. He was not quite convinced that the Prime Minister’s diagnosis was correct and that it was not in Herr Hitler’s interest to insist on outrageous terms.

He went on to say that Britain should not fear such a prospect. Hitler was well aware of his internal weaknesses and if Britain could save France from being subjected to the Gestapo so much the better. His conclusion made it clear that any talks should include not just terms for France from Hitler but terms for Britain as well:

The Foreign Secretary thought that we might say to Signor Mussolini that if there was any suggestion of terms which affected our independence, we should not look at them for a moment [but] … at any rate he could see no harm in trying this line of approach.

The gauntlet had now been thrown down. So far from not disagreeing with the Prime Minister and suggesting that the differences between them were ones of emphasis, Halifax was suggesting a policy diametrically opposed to Churchill. His ‘European equilibrium’ meant nothing less than a settlement with Germany. Halifax was restating the position of the appeasers – that a deal could be struck with Hitler and that such a deal would last, thus ensuring British independence.

At this point Churchill might have expected that a restatement of Halifax’s policy at the Munich conference would elicit strong dissent from the Labour members of the War Cabinet. But on this occasion it did not. Attlee remained silent. Greenwood said that while he was doubtful whether Mussolini had much influence with Hitler, he saw no objection to Halifax’s line of approach. Chamberlain also joined the chorus. He referred back to a statement made by Churchill to the effect that Britain might be better off without the French. If Britain could now obtain safeguards on particular points, why not make an overture to Mussolini?

The mention of the Italian dictator and the apparent lack of support for Churchill led Halifax back to the charge. He reminded colleagues of the interview he had had with the Italian ambassador on 25 May. He had told Bastianini that he wished to improve relations with Italy as he had done with some success over contraband control, which tended to suggest that Halifax had been playing a long game when he opened those discussions. He went on to say that he had told Bastianini he wished nothing left undone to ‘avoid any misunderstanding or something worse between our two countries’. Bastianini replied that Mussolini thought problems between Italy and any other country should ‘be part of a general European settlement’, which was now the generally accepted code for saying that the Germans must be included in any talks that might take place. Halifax had concluded his meeting with the Italian ambassador by saying that Mussolini should be informed that the British government did not exclude the possibility of some discussion on the wider problem of European security.42

Churchill then intervened. He said that:

His general comment on the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini was that it implied that if we were prepared to give Germany back her colonies and to make certain concessions in the Mediterranean, it was possible for us to get out of our present difficulties. He thought no such option was open to us. For example, the terms offered would certainly prevent us from completing our re-armament.43

These words have to be read carefully. Some authorities have suggested that Churchill was making a concession to Halifax – that a colonial deal with Hitler and Mussolini could extricate Britain from ‘its present difficulties’.⁴⁴ But this was not what he was saying. All he was saying was that this was the implication of the Halifax–-Bastianini conversation and that he disagreed with it. At no time during the Cabinet crisis did Churchill ever consent to bringing Germany into the discussions. With Italy he also maintained a consistent line. He was prepared (without enthusiasm) to listen to what Mussolini required to remain neutral, his lack of enthusiasm reflecting his view that Mussolini’s price would always be too high. Indeed, Churchill continued in this fashion by concluding that the only way to deal with Hitler was to ‘show him that he could not conquer this country’, but ‘at the same time he did not raise objection to some approach being made to Signor Mussolini’.

Despite pressure from Halifax and the lack of help from Attlee and Greenwood, Churchill had the situation well in hand. At the end of the meeting he invited Halifax to circulate a draft communication to Italy but added that as the matter was so important the leader of the Liberal Party, Archie Sinclair, should be present when it was discussed. Sinclair was a firm supporter of Churchill and was bound to agree with the Prime Minister on the undesirability of peace talks. Moreover, Churchill would by then have the revised paper from the Chiefs of Staff to discuss and he may have estimated that it would be far less gloomy than their last effort. Next day, 27 May, would likely be a difficult one, but Churchill had no reason to doubt that he could weather the storm.

The War Cabinet reassembled at 11.30 a.m. on 27 May. The news from the front was grim. The Belgians were wavering and in the last 12 hours just 7,600 troops had been evacuated from Dunkirk. Apart from how to deal with the defeatism of the Australian High Commissioner in London (Stanley Melbourne Bruce), the first business of the day was the original and revised reports from the Chiefs of Staff. Churchill opened the meeting by saying that he did not believe the first report gave ‘a true picture of the position’ and in particular he challenged the attached tables of British and German air strength.45 A very long discussion of the merits of the statistics followed. The revised paper, ‘British Strategy in the Near Future’, which concluded that Britain could indeed hang on if the French capitulated, was not even discussed.⁴⁶ Instead, the War Cabinet ‘invited the Prime Minister to conduct a searching examination into the strengths of the British and German Air Forces with a view to revising the [Chiefs’ figures]’, and decided that dis-cussion of the two reports be deferred until that investigation was completed.⁴⁷ So by diverting the attention of his colleagues to the detail of the first paper rather than its broad conclusions, Churchill sidelined the entire discussion.

The War Cabinet next met (at 4.30 p.m.) to consider Halifax’s draft note on an approach to Mussolini. In part the note read:

If Signor Mussolini will co-operate with us in securing a settlement … we will undertake at once to discuss, with the desire to find solutions, the matters in which Signor Mussolini is primarily interested. We understand that he desires the solution of certain Mediterranean questions: and if he will state in secrecy what these are, France and Great Britain will at once do their best to meet these wishes.⁴⁸

Churchill replied by stating that the tone of the note was very like that suggested to President Roosevelt several days before and it would be better to allow the President to make the approach. Halifax said that since he had circulated the note there had been three developments. First, Roosevelt had approached Mussolini, and second, the French now required that ‘geographical precision’ (that is, the precise pieces of territory it was proposed to cede to Italy) be added to the note. Third, he had received a telegram from the British ambassador to Italy suggesting that it was too late to make any kind of approach to Mussolini.⁴⁹

Those developments, it might be thought, would spell the end of any approach to Italy. Indeed, Chamberlain seemed to agree. He thought that Mussolini would not state his desiderata until France was beaten and therefore the proposed French approach ‘would serve no useful purpose’. However, the French should be allowed to go ahead with an approach in order that there could be no reproaches with Britain if they were beaten.50

Churchill had no time for this line. He commented that Chamberlain’s argument amounted to this, ‘that nothing would come of the approach but that it was worth doing to sweeten relations with a failing ally’.⁵¹ Sinclair agreed. He said ‘he was convinced of the futility of an approach to Italy at this time. Being in a tight corner, any weakness on our part would encourage the Germans and Italians, and would tend to undermine morale both in this country and in the Dominions.’ Halifax tried to stem the tide by arguing that Mussolini would realise that Roosevelt’s approach ‘had been prompted by us’ and this would in itself be interpreted as showing weakness.

Faced with a definite proposal to approach a fascist dictator for peace terms, the Labour members weighed in. Attlee said ‘the suggested approach would be of no practical effect and would be very damaging to us’. Greenwood (reversing himself from the previous day) agreed: ‘the approach now suggested would put us in the wrong … If it got out that we had sued for terms at the cost of ceding British territory, the consequences would be terrible.’

Churchill now had three members of the War Cabinet opposed to talks with Italy and one (Chamberlain) saying that the French alone should be allowed to make an approach. Halifax was isolated. Now was the time for a conciliatory statement from the Prime Minister to the effect that Britain should be guided by Mussolini’s response to Roosevelt. Instead, Churchill, perhaps carried away by the solid support for his position, proceeded to overplay his hand. He started well enough, remarking that ‘he was increasingly oppressed by the futility of the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini, which the latter would certainly regard with contempt’. He continued:

The best help we could give to M. Reynaud was to let him feel that, whatever happened to France, we were going to fight it out to the end … At the moment our prestige in Europe was very low. The only way to get it back was by showing the world that Germany had not beaten us. If, after two or three months, we could show we were still unbeaten, our prestige would return. Even if we were beaten, we should be no worse off than we should be if we were to abandon the struggle. Let us therefore avoid being dragged down the slippery slope with France. The whole of this manoeuvre was intended to get us so deeply involved in negotiations that we would be unable to turn back. We had gone a long way already in our approach to Italy, but let us not allow M. Reynaud to get us involved in a confused situation. The approach proposed was not only futile, but involved us in a deadly danger.52

And after an interruption from Chamberlain to the effect that Britain should wait for the Italian response to Roosevelt, Churchill forged ahead:

France had got to settle this matter [of peace talks] for herself. It was a question of her word and her army’s honour. He had heard that there had been some change for the better in the fighting spirit of the French troops. There might be some hope in this. Otherwise everything would rest on us. If the worst came to the worst, it would be no bad thing for this country to go down fighting for the other countries which had been overcome by the Nazi tyranny.⁵³

To some extent this statement merely repeated Churchill’s call for victory at all costs. But there is little doubt that some of what he said had been better omitted, especially that in fighting it out for other countries Britain might go down. In any case this last statement hardly represented Churchill’s considered view. He had been scathing about the strategic review of the Chiefs of Staff, and he had a clearer idea than they that Britain had an excellent chance with its air force and navy of preventing a German invasion. Why then did he say it? The impression must be that he was hypnotised by his own rhetoric and he momentarily forgot to whom he was speaking. He was about to receive a nasty reminder.

We can well believe that Churchill’s sentiments were anathema to Halifax, the arch-negotiator, who had no doubt entered the meeting expecting that his draft for an approach to Italy would be taken seriously. Never having grasped the fact that it was impossible to negotiate in good faith with Hitler and there were no conceivable terms regarding British independence to be had from the German dictator, what undoubtedly stuck in his craw was that going down fighting would be ‘no bad thing’. This hyperbole from Churchill stung the Foreign Secretary to reply that

He was conscious of certain rather profound differences of points of view which he would like to make clear … He could not recognize any resemblance between the action which he proposed, and the suggestion that we were suing for terms and following a line which would lead us to disaster. In the discussion the previous day he had asked the Prime Minister whether, if he was satisfied that matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected, he would be prepared to discuss terms. The Prime Minister had said that he would be thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retained the essentials and the elements of our vital strength, even at the cost of some cession of territory. [As we have seen Churchill had said no such thing. Halifax here is summarising his own position not Churchill’s.] On the present occasion, however, the Prime Minister seemed to suggest that under no conditions would we contemplate any course except fighting to a finish. The issue was probably academic, since we were unlikely to receive any offer which would not come up against the fundamental conditions which were essential to us. If, however, it was possible to obtain a settlement which did not impair those conditions, he, for his part, doubted if he would be able to accept the view now put by the Prime Minister.54

Halifax concluded by saying that if Britain’s independence was not at stake, ‘he would think it right to accept an offer which would save the country from avoidable disaster’.⁵⁵

Once again, the minutes tone down much of what was said. There is no doubt that Halifax threatened resignation at this point. Immediately after the meeting he told Cadogan ‘I can’t work with Winston any longer.’⁵⁶ And that night Halifax wrote in his diary: ‘I thought Winston talked the most frightful rot, also Greenwood, and after bearing it for some time I said exactly what I thought of them, adding that, if that was really their view, and if it came to the point, our ways must separate.’57

Actually it had been Halifax who had talked ‘rot’, in the sense that he still thought it possible to negotiate with Hitler, but Churchill had been unnecessarily belligerent at this meeting. He had isolated Halifax in the War Cabinet and then humiliated him. Threatened resignation was the result. Could Churchill’s two-week-old administration have withstood the departure of Halifax? Almost certainly. Halifax had no standing in the country and was in the Lords not the Commons. Moreover, it seems likely that Chamberlain would not have followed Halifax’s lead and that this would have been enough to mollify the backbenchers. Finally, the Commons, having voted for war with Churchill, would hardly have reversed themselves over a resignation whose purpose was to institute peace talks. Yet the resignation of a Foreign Secretary at such a critical point in the war was no small matter. The government would be seen as divided and the issue of division would be obvious. The whole position of Britain would be weakened and Churchill had acted foolishly in putting himself in this situation.

The Prime Minister immediately realised that he had gone too far. To keep Halifax in the Cabinet he had to demonstrate that in some circumstances he was willing to negotiate. While insisting on his opinion that no acceptable terms were likely to be on offer, he threw Halifax this bone: ‘If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe, that was one thing. But it was quite unlikely that he would make any such offer.’⁵⁸

Too much can be made of this statement.⁵⁹ It was clearly a quite un-realistic scenario. Hitler was already overlord of Central Europe and well on his way to becoming overlord of Western Europe as well. Offering him less than he had already conquered plus Tanganyika would hardly have brought him to the negotiating table. On Churchill’s part this was a manoeuvre, not a policy. And the person who immediately recognised this was Halifax. He completely ignored Churchill’s gesture and brought the discussion back to what he thought was a realistic proposition. What would happen, he asked Churchill, if France collapsed and the French insisted on Britain joining them in talks with Germany? Churchill, realising that his first ploy had failed to move the Foreign Secretary, attempted another conciliatory move. He said ‘that he would not join France in asking for terms; but if he were told what the terms offered were, he would be prepared to consider them’.60 This reply also hardly suggested that Churchill was serious about peace offers. All he did was say he would look at terms that had not been formulated. He might have added that after he had considered them he would certainly reject them.

The War Cabinet was finally brought to a definite conclusion by an intervention by Chamberlain. He suggested that Hitler’s tactics would be to ‘make a definite offer to France, and when the French said that they had allies he would say “I am here, let them send a delegate to Paris”’.⁶¹ But the majority of the War Cabinet were having none of this. They bluntly concluded ‘that the answer to such an offer must be “No”’.⁶²

The day ended with Halifax being comprehensively outmanoeuvred. He knew that Churchill’s conciliatory gestures were essentially meaningless and he was still angry that his suggestions at compromise had been viewed as defeatist or worse. So after the meeting he asked to see Churchill privately in the garden of No. 10. We do not know what was said on this occasion but we have Cadogan’s strictures to Halifax that he not do anything foolish and Halifax’s diary entry in which he says that Churchill ‘was full of apologies and affection’.⁶³ This was enough to keep the Foreign Secretary on board.

This day, 27 May, has often been portrayed as the rational Halifax wringing concessions from the emotional Churchill. This is hardly the case. Even after the walk in the garden and despite Churchill’s ‘affection’ there was no indication that the Prime Minister had altered his position. His whole stance during that day had been designed to keep Halifax in the Cabinet. He had no more intention of making concessions to Germany or Italy than he had on 26 May. His tactical manoeuvres were just that and recognised by Halifax for what they were. It was the need for unity in a dark hour that kept Halifax from resignation on 27 May. And we must not push the ‘rational’ Halifax depiction too far. There was nothing ‘rational’ in trying to arrange what was essentially another Munich conference. Halifax vastly overrated the position of Mussolini, who had absolutely no influence over Hitler. The Führer hardly needed Italy in a war that was virtually won and anyway, if Halifax had not noticed, at Munich the only role played by Mussolini was to do Hitler’s bidding. Nor should we overrate the emotionalism of Churchill. Perhaps his rhetoric had got a little out of hand on 27 May, but he was surely correct in seeing any negotiations as a slippery slope to a humiliating peace. He also knew that Britain’s best weapons, the RAF and the navy, had not yet been tested and would be formidable obstacles to an invasion. In this sense it was Churchill who was being rational and Halifax not.

Yet, despite the rejection of negotiations on 27 May, they were back on the table on 28 May. That day was an exceedingly black one for Britain. The Belgians had capitulated, exposing the flank of the BEF, and the number of soldiers evacuated from Dunkirk was again very modest.64

The morning Cabinet meeting went well for Churchill. The War Cabinet had been informed by Halifax that Mussolini had at last replied to Roosevelt and that ‘the communication had been entirely negative’.⁶⁵ Yet at the afternoon session the Foreign Secretary announced that the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the government, Sir Robert Vansittart, had learned from the Italian Embassy that the Italians would like Britain to give a clear indication that it sought Italian mediation.⁶⁶ Halifax then went on to indicate that he still favoured an approach to the Italians. Churchill and Sinclair restated their own positions, Churchill repeating the metaphor of ‘the slippery slope’. But after a long discussion an alarming development occurred – Chamberlain wobbled. Until now his position was that whereas it would be advantageous for the French to approach Italy, he thought it futile for Britain to do so. Now, however, he stated:

It was our duty to look at the situation realistically. He felt bound to say that he was in agreement with the Foreign Secretary in taking the view that if we thought it was possible that we could now get terms which, although grievous, would not threaten our independence, we should be right to consider such terms.⁶⁷

This development, so potentially dangerous, was met by a storm of protest from other members of the War Cabinet. Attlee said it would be a severe shock to public opinion if it was known that terms were being sought and that in that situation it might be ‘impossible to rally the morale of the people’. Greenwood added that the industrial centres of the country ‘would regard anything like weakening on the part of the Government as a disaster’.68

Shortly after this exchange the meeting adjourned and reassembled 45 minutes later. In the interim Churchill had been busy. He had addressed the group of ministers outside the War Cabinet and plainly put the situation facing Britain before them. When he returned he described their reaction to his War Cabinet colleagues:

They had not expressed alarm at the situation in France, but had expressed the greatest satisfaction when he told them that there was no chance of our giving up the struggle. He did not remember having ever before heard a gathering of persons occupying high places in political life express themselves so emphatically.⁶⁹

In his memoirs Churchill portrayed this incident with more colour:

Quite a number [of ministers] seemed to jump up from the table and come running to my chair, shouting and patting me on the back. There is no doubt that had I at this juncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation I should have been hurled out of office. I was sure that every Minister was ready to be killed quite soon, and have all his family and possessions destroyed, rather than give in.⁷⁰

Hugh Dalton, who was present, remembered a murmur of assent at Churchill’s declaration that Britain would fight on and that after the meeting he clapped Churchill on the back.⁷¹ Leo Amery was also present. He states that Churchill placed the situation squarely before ministers ‘in no way minimizing the extent of the disaster [and] … that there could be no greater folly than to try at this moment to offer concessions either to Italy or Germany … We then had a little question and answering after that and then left all of us tremendously heartened by Winston’s resolution.’⁷²

There is no doubt that Churchill in his memoirs exaggerated the response of the ministers to his declaration. But there is also no doubt that the ministers, many of whom he had appointed, were entirely in agreement with his decision to fight on. Halifax (and Chamberlain) had now finally been outmanoeuvred. Within the War Cabinet, Attlee, Greenwood and the new addition, Sinclair, were at one with Churchill. Outside the War Cabinet, only a few ministers such as Reith opposed him. For the moment, that was the end of the matter. Churchill drafted a letter to Reynaud which said that whatever the attitude of France, Britain did not deem it appropriate, given ‘the firm and resolute’ morale of the British people, to approach either dictator at the moment.73 Churchill had prevailed. There would be no further mention of an approach to Mussolini or Hitler by Halifax or Chamberlain. The war would be fought to a finish.