ALONE
THE COLLAPSE OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE, MAY–JULY 1940
BY 4 JUNE THE bulk of the BEF had been evacuated, but that still left significant numbers of French forces (some 60 divisions) and a few British divisions (about three) south of the Somme where they would face an attack by the entire German army. Attention now turned to what additional help the British could provide. Churchill, an ardent Francophile, was eager to do all he could. But that eagerness had been tempered by his encounters with the French leadership dating back to the early days of the German invasion.
On 15 May he had been rung by Reynaud in ‘a very excited’ mood. The French Premier told him that the Germans had broken through south of Sedan and that the ‘battle was lost’.1 Churchill was so shaken by Reynaud’s apparent concession of defeat that he felt it necessary to stress that ‘whatever the French did, we would continue to fight to the last’.2
Soon after this call Churchill summoned the Chiefs of Staff to discuss Reynaud’s request for additional British resources, both troops and fighter aircraft. Before he detailed the Premier’s request he told the service chiefs that Britain would fight on whatever happened to the French, ‘if necessary alone’. There were no troops immediately available in Britain, so the discussion turned on sending more fighters. Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command, who had by then joined the meeting, emphasised his absolute opposition to ‘parting with a single additional Hurricane’. It is perhaps a sign of their concern over France’s resolve (even at this early stage) that no one suggested a single Spitfire, Fighter Command’s best aircraft, be sent to aid the French. Churchill closed the meeting by saying that the issue of assistance to the French was so important that he wanted the War Cabinet to consider the matter.3
The War Cabinet met later that day. It initially decided to send nothing to Reynaud on the grounds that his reaction was ‘alarmist’.4 But this attitude did not survive 24 hours. The next day, 16 May, as the width of the breach made in the French front became obvious, the Chiefs of Staff decided that six additional squadrons of fighters should be sent and the War Cabinet agreed. Four would be sent immediately and two more if required. The French, however, were only to be told about the first four; the availability of two additional squadrons was for the moment kept from them.5
These early meetings about the crisis in France reveal that as early as 16 May Britain was preparing for its own defence and Churchill was warning those elements in Britain – be they servicemen or politicians – not to link the fate of Britain with that of France. This stance would define British policy from this point. Churchill would do everything he could to support the French – short of endangering the defence of Britain. And he would do everything he could to support those politicians in France who would fight, but he would have no truck with defeatism wherever it appeared.
The War Cabinet had decided on 15 May that Churchill should go to Paris accompanied by General Dill, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Ismay, to see for himself whether the situation in France was as bad as Premier Reynaud had portrayed. The delegation assembled at the Quai d’Orsay where they met the ‘dejected’ Reynaud, Edouard Daladier, Minister of National Defence and War, and the French military commander-in-chief, General Gamelin.6 The discussion was notable for its gloom. Gamelin asked for more fighters as the French had only 100 in working order – a gross underestimate. He told Churchill that the entire French army was engaged, that there were no more reserves, that Paris lay exposed to the Nazis, and that its fall would mean the war would be lost.7 Ismay and Churchill were hardly cheered when they saw from the window that the courtyard garden at the Quai d’Orsay was now covered in burning documents as the French archives were consigned to the flames.8
Clearly action was required and quickly if the French were to remain in the war. From Paris, Churchill telegraphed to the War Cabinet that the situation was ‘grave in the last degree’. In this circumstance the policy decided just the day before was scrapped. The Prime Minister urged that six squadrons of fighters should be sent ‘tomorrow’, in addition to the four already allocated.9 Churchill was finding that the need to keep the French in line was rapidly outweighing any theoretical decisions made in London. The War Cabinet watered down his request. Six of the squadrons offered would only operate from France during daylight hours and they would operate in shifts – three squadrons deployed in the morning and three in the afternoon.10 This gave the French a little more than they originally requested, but not much.
The promise of additional help improved Reynaud’s mood, but over discussions during the next few days Churchill decided that no more fighters could be sent to France.11 Then the sacking of Gamelin and his replacement with General Weygand was announced. (Did no one in Britain note that Marshal Pétain was also added to the Cabinet this day, 18 May?) Churchill’s spirits rose and on his next visit to France he was assured by the new commander-in-chief that a pincer movement was being planned that would cut off the advanced German armoured spearheads and restore the situation. In this circumstance his decision to send no more fighters was modified. He now offered relays of fighters flying from Britain to participate in this battle.12
This offer rapidly became redundant. Weygand’s pincer movement failed to eventuate and soon Churchill was ‘demanding’ that he fulfil his promise.13 General Dill, who had just returned from visiting the French, warned Churchill that any major movement by their armies was almost certainly chimerical. It was hoped that Reynaud’s visit to London on 26 May would yield definite information on the timing of the Weygand Plan, but in the event the French leader offered only vague reassurances that an attack would eventually take place. His more definite news was thoroughly alarming. He told Churchill that he was sure terms would be forthcoming from Germany if he asked for them.14 Churchill successfully diverted Reynaud from this path as he had done with Halifax earlier in the day, but that was the only concrete outcome of the visit.
By the end of the week it was clear that Churchill would have to meet the French yet again to try to shore up their nerve. He flew to Paris on 31 May, but much of the discussion involved the evacuation from Dunkirk then in full swing. On the matter of additional help, the British promised to re-examine the whole question and report back to the French at the earliest possible moment.15
Back in London Churchill put the issue to the Chiefs of Staff. He informed them that he would like to tell the French that Britain would send three divisions and asked for them to consider the entire matter of aid to France.16 The Chiefs of Staff reported the next day that the most that could be done was to send two divisions to the French immediately, followed by an additional one in ten days’ time. As for aircraft, it was only possible to bring up to strength the six bomber and three fighter squadrons already operating with the Advanced Air Striking Force in France. Anything more would threaten the air defence of Great Britain.17
The admittedly modest British offer of aircraft was not sufficient for General Vuillemin, commander-in-chief of the French Air Force. In a note that the British received on 1 June he said:
The enemy is in position to launch at short notice a fresh attack on our front, prepared and assisted by their bombers; interception of these bombers by a powerful force of Fighter aircraft is bound to have a decisive influence on the result of the battle.
French Fighter aircraft, of which at the present only 350 are available, would soon be overwhelmed, if they are not heavily reinforced right from the start of the enemy attack by British Fighter aircraft. Such reinforcements, although provided tardily and in insufficient numbers at the time of the battle which started on 10th May, proved however to be of value … It is necessary that the British High Command should take every necessary measure so that at least half, and if possible all, the Fighter aircraft based in England (620 aircraft) could intervene in this eventuality … [and that] 320 aircraft from the 620 in England should be able to operate from bases situated in France … for both countries [it is] a question of life and death.18
It might be thought that accusing the British of tardiness and insufficiency of effort would not be the best tactic to induce them to commit more aircraft. But the issue went beyond verbal niceties. The French had now asked the British for more aircraft on 14, 15, 16, 20 and 31 May – five requests in two weeks. It might seem from these requests that the French were chronically short of fighters and indeed that has been the accepted story for many years. The actual situation was in fact more complicated.
On 10 May the French had a total of 67 fighter squadrons with a further 21 in reserve.19 In all that amounted to about 1,800 aircraft, about three times the number the British had. However, of these only 583 were deployed against the Germans, leaving the French outnumbered on the battlefront. This deplorable situation came about partly because their squadrons were scattered throughout France and in North Africa. Partly it came about because so many aircraft never got beyond the holding depots. The commander of the air force depots, General Redempt, had pointed this out, yet in mid-June air force officers found the depot at Toulouse full of aircraft – Potez 175 and Bloch 150 – the most modern French types.20
Those aircraft that did make it to the battlefront performed very well indeed against the Germans. The Dewoitine 52s, American Curtis 75A and the Bloch 150 were all modern types roughly comparable in speed and armament to the Me 109, and in fact these three types shot down more German aircraft than they lost themselves. However, the involvement of these French planes was limited to about one third of their total force as revealed in a census conducted in July 1940 that counted 1,739 modern French aircraft, the vast majority being fighters.
How did this situation come about? To some extent it was through inept leadership in the frontline squadrons. For every sortie flown by a French plane the Germans managed to fly four, magnifying the numerical superiority they already had. And partly it was defeatism, which rapidly took hold among the top French air leaders once it became clear that the battle had turned against them. Instead of bringing into battle some of their many aircraft held in reserve, from 15 June they actually sent planes to North Africa. In all, before the Armistice was signed, at least 20 fighter squadrons of the better types were there, along with older fighters and some bomber units. It was not technical or overall numerical superiority that led the French to ask for more and more of the RAF. It was a combination of ineptitude at all levels of command, disorganisation and, in the end defeatism.21 In fact it has been suggested that the early retirement of the fighter squadrons to North Africa was a ploy by the Air Force Chiefs to preserve their ‘precious capital’ as a bargaining chip in the talks they anticipated with the Germans.22
Churchill responded to Vuillemin’s ‘altogether unreasonable’ telegram on 5 June. He told Reynaud and Weygand that Vuillemin’s demands could not possibly be met.23 But he was now in possession of intelligence from Sir Roland Campbell, the British ambassador to France, that Pétain had told Reynaud that if no more British help was forthcoming, Reynaud should hand power over to him and he would make peace.24 Under this pressure Churchill modified British policy yet again. He told the French that an additional four squadrons of bombers and two of Hurricanes would be available for operations that day and that this commitment would be maintained for as long as possible.25 Once more the shaky resolve of the French had forced the commitment of yet more British aircraft.
Meanwhile Reynaud had reshuffled his Cabinet. Some defeatists were dropped, as was Daladier. This last move might not be thought such a disaster except that he was replaced at Pétain’s behest as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs by the slippery Paul Baudouin. One positive step was the addition of Charles de Gaulle as Under-Secretary for National Defence, but overall Reynaud’s new Cabinet was less resolute than the one it replaced.26
As the reshuffle took place so did the start of the German offensive across the Somme. This brought forth immediate French requests for yet more British aid. Once more, circumstances forced Churchill to respond. Two more fighter squadrons were dispatched to France to operate during daylight hours and the number of bombing sorties was increased.27 The French considered this additional effort insufficient for the situation and they asked Churchill yet again to cross to France to discuss what further resources could be provided. Churchill clearly thought that the crisis was at hand to the extent that he asked President Roosevelt to intervene: ‘Anything you can say or do to help them now may make the difference.’28 As it happened, before Churchill could leave, Roosevelt made a blistering attack on Italy for declaring war on France. He proposed that all material aid be given to the Allies to prosecute the war. Churchill listened to this speech and was emboldened to write to Roosevelt again:
Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of Paris, should it occur, becoming the occasion of any kind of parley. The hope with which you inspire them may give them the strength to persevere.29
Later that day, 11 June, Churchill caught a flight for France, escorted by 12 Hurricanes because of the proximity of the Luftwaffe. He was accompanied by Eden, Dill, Ismay, the Director of Operations at the War Office, Ismay’s assistant and General Spears, whom Churchill had appointed his personal liaison with Reynaud.30 This time they were not heading for Paris. The French government considered the danger to Paris so great that they had decamped to Briare, a small town on the eastern Loire.
There they were met by Reynaud, Pétain, Generals Georges and De Gaulle, and Admiral Darlan. Churchill began by detailing the help that was on its way – in fact it only amounted to one regular division with another two Territorial divisions to arrive shortly. In addition six to eight squadrons of fighters were in action every day and he would examine whether more could be done in the air. Could the French not hold on a little longer as they had in 1918? This cut little ice with the French. The battle was going badly, with German armour penetrations in several places. Pétain pointed out that he had had 20 divisions available to plug gaps in 1918; now he had none. Weygand was quick to agree. ‘I am helpless,’ he said, ‘I cannot intervene for I have no reserves, there are no reserves. C’est la dislocation – the break up.’31 He then demanded that Britain commit its entire fighter force. The dramatic moment is well captured by Ismay:
‘Here,’ Weygand exclaimed, ‘is the decisive point. Now is the decisive moment. The British ought not to keep a single fighter in England. They should all be sent to France.’ There was an awful pause, and my heart stood still … It was a terrible position for a man like Churchill – generous, warm-hearted, courageous and with a pronounced streak of optimism, and I was terrified lest he might be so moved as to promise that he would ask the Government to send some additional air support. Thank God my fears were groundless. After a pause, and speaking very slowly, he said, ‘This is not the decisive point. This is not the decisive moment. The decisive moment will come when Hitler hurls his Luftwaffe against Britain. If we can keep command of the air over our own island – that is all I ask – we will win it all back for you.’32
Ismay’s account might be thought too dramatic.33 Churchill had repeatedly said that the air defence of Great Britain would always come first. But since 20 May, when the decision to send no more aircraft to France had been made, the RAF had committed around 10 more squadrons to the fight, admittedly flying from bases in England but still suffering casualties and thus reducing the strength of Fighter Command. The help that Britain could give France on land was derisory. Now there were to be no more aircraft. The French must fight the battle with what they had. It is highly probable that both sides realised that the battle was lost. If there was a precise moment when France ceased to be a great power, it occurred on 11 June at the unlikely location of Briare.
The meeting that resumed the next day, 12 June, was a reprise of the issues discussed the day before. Churchill detailed the help given to the French in the air (50–60 fighters and 70–80 bombers per day) and the French declared it inadequate. The meeting ended with a Churchillian declaration that whatever happened Britain would fight to the end. The Prime Minister promised to make a further appeal to Roosevelt and he specifically requested from Reynaud a promise that ‘if there was any change in the situation’ (barely concealed code for the French leaving the war), the British government would be consulted. Reynaud agreed, although what store Churchill placed in French promises by this time is dubious.34
Nevertheless, Churchill had not quite given up. In London he promised Reynaud and Weygand that the RAF would make a further effort by directing 10 squadrons of fighters over the battlefield (a slight increase on what he had detailed at Briare) and by additional bombing sorties. In effect, though, the British knew that the game was up. At the War Cabinet later that day they conceded that this chapter of the war was closing. The French might continue the fight from their colonies but their resistance on land was almost over.35 Churchill also fulfilled his promise to Reynaud to intercede with Roosevelt. He told the President that now ‘is the moment for you to strengthen Reynaud the utmost you can, and try to tip the balance in favour of the best and longest possible French resistance’.36 Given Roosevelt’s silence so far, however, he could have had very little expectation of a positive response.
Churchill in any case had no time to wait for a reply. The French had summoned him back, this time to Tours, well west of Briare, an indication in itself of the deteriorating circumstances at the front. The situation seemed worse than the day before. There was no one at the airport to meet the British Prime Minister. When a taxi was summoned, he was whisked into Tours and after some detours finally located the French. Ostensibly French resolve was firm. Investigations were being made into the viability of the so-called Breton Redoubt as a last refuge; preparations were under way to transfer forces to North Africa if required.37 The Supreme War Council, however, gave a truer indication of French thinking. Two items dominated the agenda. The first was that without immediate American aid or an American declaration of war the French felt they could not continue. The second was: how would Britain act in ‘a certain contingency’, that is if France asked for terms? Churchill promised to contact Roosevelt yet again and asked the French to delay their decision until then. Whatever happened Britain would fight on, but France as well as the rest of Europe would then be subjected to blockade. This provoked a furious exchange between the delegations, but very little was actually resolved at Tours.38
When Churchill returned to London he received a copy of Roosevelt’s reply to Reynaud, sent three days before. It stressed that Roosevelt was ‘moved’ by the message and ‘impressed’ with Reynaud’s determination to fight on from North Africa and the Atlantic. Roosevelt declared that efforts to send material assistance to the Allies were being redoubled because ‘of our faith in and our support of the ideals for which the Allies are fighting’.39
Churchill became extremely excited about this message, which he momentarily took as a virtual declaration of war. He proposed to the War Cabinet that he tell Reynaud the message ‘fulfilled every hope and could only mean that the United States meant to enter the war on our side’. Clement Attlee then intervened. He thought the message from Roosevelt might be strengthened by ‘a statement in dramatic terms’ to the people of France. After discussion it was decided to proclaim ‘the indissoluble union of our two peoples and of our two Empires’, the statement to be given the widest possible publicity. The other matter that was also to be given the widest publicity was Roosevelt’s response to Reynaud. But that of course required the President’s approval.40
The first action taken by Churchill after this meeting was to write to Roosevelt and ask that he publish his message to the French. He told the President that in his view the French were on the verge of seeking an armistice and continued:
Mr. President I must tell you that it seems to me absolutely vital that this message should be published tomorrow June 14 in order that it may play a part in turning the course of world history. It will I am sure decide the French to deny Hitler a patched-up peace with France.41
Roosevelt’s answer was extremely dusty. After the usual platitudes about the magnificent courage of the French and British nations, he absolutely forbade the publication of his letter, noting that it ‘was in no sense intended to commit and did not commit the Government to Military participation’, adding for Churchill’s edification that only Congress could declare war.42
The letter was handed to Churchill by Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, who asked Churchill to pass on its contents to the French Premier. This infuriated Churchill who clearly thought that Roosevelt should do his own dirty work. He told the War Cabinet that he had declined this request and had stressed to Kennedy that if President Roosevelt appeared now to be holding back, this would have a ‘disastrous’ effect on French resistance.43 This would not be the last time that Churchill would misinterpret a strong statement by Roosevelt as an indication of future commitment.
In the end appeals to the Americans were to no avail. Two more letters flowed from Churchill to Roosevelt with essentially the same message – the US must act or the French would leave the war. The answers were also the same. Roosevelt would not intervene to save the French.44
Meanwhile, unknown to the British, the Vice President of the French Council, Camille Chautemps, had suggested that the government should approach the Germans ‘unofficially’ through a third party to ascertain what terms would be on offer. If these were too stiff they could be rejected and in any case an unofficial approach could not be construed as breaking their word with Britain.45 Reynaud opposed this manoeuvre but was outvoted 13 to 6. The only concession he could win was to postpone a decision until the British were made aware of the proposal and their reaction to it was gauged.46
When the Chautemps proposal was submitted to Britain, Churchill realised that the end game was fast approaching. The last British troops were being evacuated from France and the War Cabinet decided in these circumstances reluctantly to allow the French to make the approach, provided the French Fleet sailed for British ports before the question was raised.47
At this moment the matter of Anglo-French union, first mentioned by Attlee on 13 June, gained some traction. Since that meeting various parties – of whom the most important were Amery, Sir Robert Vansittart, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the government, Desmond Morton, Churchill’s Chief Economic Adviser, and on the French side Jean Monnet, René Pleven and later De Gaulle – had held a series of informal meetings to discuss a possible union. By the time the War Cabinet met on the afternoon of 16 June a draft declaration had been produced. Churchill then read it to the Cabinet. He said that he had at first been sceptical about it but that he now favoured some such proposal. This was not the time to be accused of a lack of imagination. After some redrafting, the declaration was ready to be dispatched to the French. And to encourage its acceptance, Churchill would tell Campbell, the British ambassador to Paris, to hold up the telegram regarding armistice terms and the fate of the French Fleet.
In its final draft the declaration read as follows:
At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indisoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to the life of robots and slaves.
The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.
The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies.
Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.
Both countries will share responsibility for the repair of the devastation of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as one, applied to that purpose.
During the war there shall be a single War Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever best it can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated. The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air. The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies, and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause.
The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be.
And thus we shall conquer.48
This startling document has received scant attention from historians. It is generally discounted as merely a last-minute attempt by the British to keep the French in the war – operating from North Africa or London. No doubt that was one purpose. But the declaration deserves to be taken more seriously than that. It was also an attempt to gather together what resources remained to the West (including the economic resources of the United States) to resist the tide of barbarism engulfing Europe. The British were indeed deadly serious about saving themselves from the evils inherent in this tide. But they were also serious about including the French in the system of resistance. If this meant merging the two nations, so be it. In an age when the nation state was supreme there could be no more serious move than sweeping away previous forms of citizenship, long-evolved institutions and customs. There would be no more Britain, no more France, but Franco-Britannia or Anglo-Franconia. The single War Cabinet would certainly have included Reynaud and De Gaulle. The question of leadership was left open. Reynaud thought he might have been given the task, but it is difficult to see Churchill being supplanted. In that case Reynaud would certainly have been his deputy. How long the union would have lasted is moot. Perhaps it would not have survived the war. But that is not the point here. The point is that the offer was made and could well have been accepted. The British, De Gaulle and other Frenchmen certainly thought it might sway Reynaud and his colleagues. In the sense that the French could have accepted it, the declaration might not have amounted to an empty gesture. No nation offers to surrender sovereignty on a whim.
As soon as the offer had been drafted by the War Cabinet it was handed to De Gaulle, who had been waiting outside the Cabinet room. He immediately telephoned Reynaud in Bordeaux, the last resting place of the Third Republic. Reynaud was at that moment engaged with Spears and Campbell on the fate of the French Fleet.49 Reynaud heard the message with mounting excitement and hastily scribbled it down as De Gaulle read it. At the end Reynaud asked whether Churchill approved and the Prime Minister was put on the phone to assure him that it was a Cabinet decision.50 Reynaud was enthusiastic and thought it might turn the defeatist tide. So did Spears. Campbell was less certain.
The last French Cabinet assembled in the next room. Meanwhile Reynaud informed the President (Albert Le Brun) of the news. He took the news calmly but Baudouin, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and another minister were more negative. Later the Council of Ministers confirmed the views of these two men. Chautemps thought it would reduce France to the status of a British Dominion, not a bad option considering what else was on offer, but at least one other minister exclaimed ‘better to be a Nazi province’.51 Pétain rejected ‘fusion with a corpse’. In fact only Reynaud, Le Brun and Mandel were enthusiasts of the plan. A few others were lukewarm; the remainder hostile.52 Reynaud left the meeting and later resigned. Whether it would have been more sensible to stay to try to persuade some waverers or to leave for England and join De Gaulle is outside the scope of this book. Pétain was now Premier, Chautemps his Deputy; Weygand was Minister for National Defence (an ironic title considering that there was now no nation to defend) and Darlan was Minister for the Navy; Baudouin was Foreign Minister.53
Churchill made one last effort to ensure that the French Fleet would not be used against Britain. He sent the First Lord of the Admiralty (A. V. Alexander) and the First Sea Lord (Sir Dudley Pound) to Bordeaux to obtain assurances. The question arose in discussion with Darlan about whether the Fleet would sail to British ports. This suggestion was brushed aside by Darlan, but he assured the British that on no account would he surrender the French navy. If the armistice terms turned out to be dishonourable (the idea of getting honourable terms from Hitler is an interesting construct), he would destroy the Fleet or sail what could be got away to a friendly country.54
This was the best that the British delegation could obtain, but then came the armistice terms. When it came to the French Fleet the clause read:
The French war Fleet – with the exception of that part left at the disposal of the French Government for the protection of French interests in its colonial empire – will be assembled in ports to be specified and there demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control.55
In the days that followed the French government tried to assure the British that they would keep as much of their fleet as possible in North African ports to subject as little of it as possible to German or Italian ‘control’ (actually ‘administrative supervision’ was a more accurate translation of that word in the armistice document).56
But it was too late for such assurances. The French Fleet was the second largest in Europe and if added to the Italian or German fleets would represent a mortal peril to Britain. And if the British offer of surrender of sovereignty was met with the seeking of an armistice from Nazi Germany, then what trust could be placed in any French assurances? As Churchill told the War Cabinet, once France had been occupied by Germany it would be entirely at the mercy of the conquerors.57
Indeed, the armistice meant that Churchill ran out of patience with the Pétain regime. He would never trust it because while the French Fleet remained in being he could not afford to. He quickly put it to the War Cabinet that they should recognise De Gaulle’s Council of Liberation as being the true representatives of France and arrange for De Gaulle to broadcast to France as the head of that organisation.58 Churchill made his views public on 25 June when he read out the armistice article concerning the French Fleet to the House of Commons and continued:
From this text it is clear that the French war vessels under this Armistice pass into German or Italian control while fully armed. We note, of course, in the same Article the solemn declaration of the German Government that they have no intention of using them for their own purposes during the war. What is the value of that? Ask half a dozen countries what is the value of such assurances … Finally, the Armistice can at any time be voided on any pretext of non-observance, and the terms of the Armistice explicitly provide for further German claims when any peace between Germany and France comes to be signed.59
And ominously Churchill added that he hoped the House of Commons would have confidence that the government would not lack the resolution to take any measures ‘they may think it right to take for the safety of the Empire’.60
Not surprisingly, the main topic on the agenda of the War Cabinet for the next few days was how to deal with the French Fleet. From the tenor of the discussions it is clear that Churchill favoured one of two options – that the French scuttle their heavy ships or that they be sunk by British naval action. Two other options were always on the table – that the French sail their heavy ships to a British port or that they sail them to a neutral or American port well away from European waters.61
Churchill’s resolute stand was determined by two factors. One, already discussed, was the imbalance of naval power should the Germans take over all or some of the French ships. The second was political. At the same time that decisions were being made about the French ships the oleaginous Rab Butler had re-entered the scene in a most disagreeable manner. On 17 June he had met the Swedish ambassador, Bjorn Prytz, ‘by chance’, and invited him back to the Foreign Office.62 In the course of the meeting Butler was called out by Halifax, who told him to tell Prytz that British policy would be dictated by ‘common sense and not emotion’, a direct slap at Churchill. Prytz relayed this message to his government and it was perhaps via an intercept of this telegram that Churchill got wind of these conversations. He felt it necessary to remind Halifax that ‘the present Government and all its Members were resolved to fight on to the death’ and that the ‘odd language’ used by Butler to the Swedes was taken by them as defeatism and that he must find out what actually was said.63 This was as much a warning to Halifax as to Butler and the Foreign Secretary moved quickly to reassure Churchill that the matter had been settled. Churchill did not follow up on the affair, but Butler would not last long at the Foreign Office.64 Here, then, was another reason for firm action. Churchill again needed to demonstrate that he would take any measures necessary to keep Britain secure. Not even a hint of parley, especially at a time when the French were talking to the Germans, would be tolerated.
There was a potential glitch in British policy towards the French. In a paper presented to the Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Planning Committee on 29 June the Planners worried about the implications of taking hostile action against the French Fleet. They thought a declaration of war by France might follow and concluded that ‘we do not consider that the destruction of these French ships by force would be justified’.65 These objections were swept aside by the Chiefs of Staff themselves. In their view the danger of the ships falling into German hands outweighed all other considerations. They also pointed out that any contemplated action taken would have to be swift to enable the forces in the Mediterranean to return to home waters to counter a German invasion threat.66
The French and British naval forces now began to gather. The new, yet to be finished, battleship Richelieu was at Dakar in West Africa from where it had attempted a breakout to home waters on 25 June but was shadowed by British ships and promptly returned to its base. The other super-modern battleship (the Jean Bart) was at Casablanca where it was also under watch by British cruisers. There were about 200 craft, including two old battleships, some cruisers, destroyers and submarines in British home waters, and finally there was a squadron of ships (one battleship, four cruisers, two destroyers and a number of smaller ships) at Alexandria watched by a powerful squadron under Admiral Cunningham. The most dangerous concentration of ships from the British point of view lay at Mers-el-Kabir near Oran in Algeria. These included two modern battlecruisers, Dunkerque and Strasbourg, two old battleships, Bretagne and Provence, a seaplane carrier, six large destroyers, seven smaller destroyers and four submarines. Unlike the Richelieu and Jean Bart, all these units were battleworthy and the speed of the modern battlecruisers made them potentially a deadly weapon against British commerce.67
In addition to the ‘watching forces’ in home waters, Dakar, Casablanca and Alexandria, the British began to concentrate Force H at Gibraltar, commanded by Admiral Somerville. It consisted of the battlecruiser Hood, the battleships Valiant and Resolution, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, two cruisers, 11 destroyers and some submarines. The battleship Nelson was on standby in home waters to join Force H if required.68
On 30 June the War Cabinet decided that the operation should take place on 3 July and to keep the Nelson at home because of the threat of invasion.69 The next day the Admiralty gave Somerville his instructions – the French Fleet should fight with the British, demilitarise in a British port, scuttle itself or scuttle the ships in situ to British satisfaction.70 Somerville begged to differ. He put forward some alternatives whereby the French would emerge from the harbour and be ‘captured’ by Force H, insisting that hostilities between the fleets must be avoided at all costs.71
This communication was not greeted kindly by their Lordships who in any case were acting under War Cabinet direction. They told Somerville in the bluntest of terms that force remained an option and that his proposals were not acceptable. However, they did modify the four options to include internment in a neutral harbour, possibly in Martinique.72
With these instructions Somerville sailed for Mers-el-Kabir where he arrived at 3 a.m. on 3 July. Captain Holland, the former British Naval Attaché in Paris, was sent in a destroyer to put the alternatives to Admiral Gensoul, the French commander-in-chief at Mers. The day played out as high farce. Gensoul refused to see Holland, who refused to hand his instructions to a French underling. Finally, late in the afternoon, Gensoul changed his mind. Holland showed him the proposals, which Gensoul rejected, emphasising that his orders were to sink his fleet rather than hand it over to the Germans. Holland reiterated that action must be taken immediately. Gensoul then contacted the French Admiralty with the gist of the proposals but omitted the option to sail to Martinique. Meanwhile the Admiralty had intercepted the message from Gensoul to the French authorities, which contained a hint that French reinforcements might be on the way. In other words Somerville might soon have an actual naval battle on his hands. He was therefore ordered to end the affair. Even then Somerville waited for 25 minutes after the ultimatum to Gensoul had expired. He finally opened fire at 5.54 p.m., very late in the day. By the time fire ceased at 6.06 p.m., 1,250 French sailors were dead. The Bretagne had blown up, the Dunkerque was damaged but not destroyed, the Provence had to beach, and other small craft were caught up in the fires that broke out. The Strasbourg, however, escaped. Belated and feeble attempts by the British to catch it failed and it arrived safely at Toulon. Elsewhere the Richelieu was put out of action for a year by Swordfish torpedo bombers; the Jean Bart at Casablanca was discovered to have no ammunition for its main armament; in England most French ships were taken over without bloodshed; and at Alexandria, by a remarkable piece of diplomacy, Cunningham secured the demobilisation of the French squadron without loss of life.73
In the event, the main operation had been rather botched, the gunnery had been poor, and the escape of one of the main French units was hardly to Somerville’s credit. Much sympathy has been showered on Somerville for what was indeed a most odious task. However, the decision lay with the civilian leadership. It was Somerville’s job to carry out its instructions or resign. There has also been much gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands about whether a bloodless compromise could have been reached. Given Gensoul’s slavish adherence to Darlan’s orders, this is doubtful.
Most of this hand wringing is beside the point. The British could not trust Darlan or indeed any member of the Vichy government, however well intentioned they might have been. In fact most were not at all well intentioned towards Britain and some were looking forward to what they regarded as an imminent British collapse. Churchill could not take naval or any other sensibilities into account in these circumstances. It was his job to secure the survival of Great Britain, which with its dominions and Empire was all that stood between Hitler and European supremacy. So far the United States had talked tough but carried a bundle of twigs, hardly a stance likely to bolster or strike terror into anyone. If sinking the French Fleet furthered those ends, so be it. Moreover, from Churchill’s reception in the House of Commons when he announced the news, the House was resolute for action of this kind as well. So, as we will see, were the British people. The scene played out at Mers-el-Kabir was a tragedy, but with the world to play for it was hardly extravagant.
So it was that from 10 May to Mers, Churchill, the War Cabinet and their military advisers did everything they could to keep France in the war. They sent valuable aircraft from home bases to France when requested and eventually sent far more than they had initially considered safe. Even as the French armies behind the Somme began to disintegrate, British fighters and bombers attempted to stem the tide.
Churchill’s reaction, had he known of the many uncommitted French fighters, can only be imagined. It is certainly true that Britain could offer little in the way of additional troops. But even if they had been available, the lamentable performance of sections of the French army might well have prevented their commitment as Churchill and other British leaders’ confidence in the French suffered one blow after another. Reynaud’s declaration that the battle was lost on 15 May, Weygand’s repeated failure to mount any kind of resolute offensive, and the infiltration of defeatists such as Baudouin and Pétain into the government, all eroded confidence. Nevertheless, Churchill never ceased to encourage and cajole the French into staying in the war, even if that be from one of their colonial outposts. He did this for three reasons. First, he was a great Francophile and hated to see what was happening to the French. Second, he saw the French as a vital part of what he sometimes called Western Christendom and sometimes called simply the West. Third, he realised that it was in Britain’s interest to have a major ally still in the fight. The Dominions and Empire could provide some help, but the extensive Empire of the French with what remained of their armed forces could provide more.
Only when Churchill realised that at least some of those forces might be turned on Britain did he determine on a hard line against the Pétain regime. He would blockade the country and sink their fleet. But at the same time he supported De Gaulle and if that partnership went through some turbulent times in the years ahead, Churchill in the end stuck to the leader of the Free French when the Americans were urging that he be ditched. At the end of the war French participation at the Nuremberg trials and the grant of a French occupation zone in Germany owed everything to Churchill. If he could not save the French in 1940, his promise that all would be restored to them came about in 1945, something that De Gaulle never forgot.