After four decades of diplomacy and politicking between the European powers, the situation exploded on 28 June 1914 when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife, Sophie, in Sarajevo. The government retaliated by arresting 5,500 Serbs and organizing attacks on Serb communities. A month of negotiating known as the ‘July Crisis’ followed between Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain.
Austria-Hungary believed Serbian officials were implicated in the attack and an ultimatum was given to Serbia to provoke a war and end their meddling in the Bosnian region. The ten demands were intentionally unacceptable and when Serbia only agreed to eight, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July.
The British Government ordered the Home Fleet to their war stations the same day, as their test mobilization came to an end. The following day the British Army’s General Staff put precautionary measures into force, putting Regular Army troops on standby and recalling everyone on leave. The Belgian Government placed its army on a ‘reinforced peace footing’ the same day.
The political situation was also intensifying. The British Ambassador in Berlin had been asked to give assurance of Great Britain’s neutrality if Russia attacked Austria. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, refused to entertain the proposal.
Matters took a turn for the worse on 30 July when Russia mobilized her four Southern Armies. Germany responded by threatening to mobilize unless Russia stopped. The situation deteriorated when Austria-Hungarian artillery began shelling the Serbian capital, Belgrade. The following day both Austria and Russia mobilized all their forces, forcing Germany to warn of an ‘imminent danger of war’ as it introduced martial law, suspended civil rights and called up six classes of the Reserve.1 Germany’s ultimatum to Russia demanded she immediately cease mobilization or Germany would mobilize on both frontiers. Turkey also began mobilizing her troops.
Grey asked both France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality and while France said it would, Germany did not give a direct reply. So far the British Government had not committed itself and when France and Germany ordered a general mobilization on 1 August, it was still free to decide whether to get involved in a European war or stay neutral.
The British and French General Staffs had made a peacetime plan for deploying a British Expeditionary Force to France. They agreed four infantry divisions, one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade2 would cross the English Channel and concentrate between Avesnes and Le Cateau in northern France. They would be able to advance on day sixteen after mobilization, a few days after the French were ready.
The British General Staff suggested moving troops as quickly as possible to the embarkation ports, cancelling the imminent annual summer training and deploying Territorial Force units to guard the railways. But the government waited until the ultimatum to Germany expired at midday on 1 August. The following day Regular Army manoeuvres and Territorial Force training were cancelled but still no mobilization orders were issued. The Cabinet consulted Parliament the following day, confident in the knowledge that the Home Fleet was at its war station, ready to meet any threat posed by the German Fleet in the North Sea or the Channel.
The German Minister in Brussels presented a note to the Belgian Government on the evening of 2 August. It explained that the German Government believed French forces intended to march through Givet to Namur, to the Meuse River. The move would violate Belgian neutrality and Germany wanted free passage for her troops so they could counter it. Although the content of the note sounded feasible, it had been written on 26 July and then sent to the German Minister in Brussels three days later with instructions not to open it until instructed. The Belgian Government had only been given twelve hours to reply but they stated they would resist any French or German troops crossing their borders. Belgium also declined French help while mobilizing her own army.
On 2 August German troops crossed the French border at four points and entered Luxembourg. Germany’s deployment plan, Aufmarsch 1, was a development of the 1905 Schlieffen Plan.3 It called for seven armies to rapidly conquer France whilst one army delayed the Russians. The idea behind the plan was that the armies could defeat France and be transported east before the Russians completed their mobilization.4 A single army crossed their eastern border with Russia on the same day.
First contact with London was made when King Albert telegraphed King George V to ask for Great Britain’s diplomatic intervention. On 3 August Grey visited the House of Commons which approved his decision not to become involved in the Serbian situation. They decided the fleet could be used to help France but also agreed Great Britain would stand by her promise to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality. However, there was no resolution.
Grey then read out the German note to the Belgian Legation and explained that a German attack was imminent, if it had not started already. As a result the House agreed to mobilize the Territorial Force and the Naval Reserves, confident their reserved approach to the European situation had conserved the unanimity of the nation. It had also achieved the goodwill of neutral countries.
But events were moving fast on mainland Europe as the British politicians and military leaders conferred. When Germany declared war on France on the evening of 3 August, Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance,5 declared her neutrality. The following morning Germany declared war on Belgium and two cavalry divisions and several brigades of infantry were crossing the border within hours.
On the afternoon of 4 August, the British Government ordered the mobilization of the Regular Army and the Foreign Office issued a statement the following morning:
‘Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty’s Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty’s Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11pm on the 4 August.’
While the British Government was making its final decisions, the situation in Belgium and along the French frontier was developing quickly. By the night of 3 August it was clear the Germans intended to cross the Belgian border the following morning. The Belgian plan was to use one division to delay the German advance in front of Liège’s fortifications while four divisions advanced to the River Gette,6 screened by the army’s cavalry division.
German cavalry did cross the Belgian frontier on 4 August only to find the River Meuse bridge north of Liège had been blown up while Belgian troops were waiting along the river bank. Two regiments headed north and forded the river at Lixhe, 10 miles north of the city, and when the Belgians retired behind Liège’s ring of forts; they followed.
General Otto von Emmich’s demands for free passage through Liège were refused, because General Gérard Leman was sticking to King Albert’s orders to ‘hold to the end with your division the position which you have been entrusted to defend’. So six German infantry brigades prepared to attack while a cavalry corps assembled on standby. After an attempt to kidnap Leman failed, Emmich ordered a night attack towards the town and citadel while demonstrations were made against the outer forts.
The attack was a disaster. The two brigades to the north and north-east lost their way and while most battalions fell back with heavy losses, one battalion entered the town and was captured. The central column fell back after a tough fight and had to be stopped by Major-General Erich Ludendorff, Second Army’s Deputy Chief of the General Staff.7 One column to the south fell back with heavy losses while the second panicked and units fired on each other in the dark.
Ludendorff made sure the attack was renewed the following morning and the centre column advanced within a mile of Liège before making a dash for the citadel. The discovered that the Belgian garrison had withdrawn, leaving the fortress troops behind to face the German guns.
While the German Cavalry Corps worked round the west side of the fortress, the German artillery shelled Fort Barchon into submission on 8 August. Fort d’Évegnée and Fort de Lantin surrendered on 11 August, their garrisons incapacitated by fumes. Then the crunch came when huge 420mm howitzers came into action on 12 August and began battering the remaining forts. Fort de Chaudfontaine, Fort d’Embourg, Fort de Fléron and Fort de Pontisse fell on 13 August and Fort de Boncelles and Fort de Liers surrendered the following day. Then on 15 August a shell hit one of Fort de Loncin’s magazines and 12 tons of munitions exploded, killing most of the fort’s garrison. Fort de Flémalle and Fort de Hollogne surrendered the following morning, bringing the siege to an end.
On 5 and 6 August British Cabinet Ministers, including Field Marshal Lord Horatio Kitchener,8 met leading members of the Armed Forces to discuss the disposition and employment of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). They agreed that two corps, each of two divisions, would immediately move to the agreed assembly area around Le Cateau and Avesnes. The question was, where could they sail to? They could not sail to Antwerp because part of the Scheldt River was Dutch, and Holland was a neutral country. Ostend was also ruled out because the BEF could get separated from the French if the Germans kept advancing through Belgium. So the decision was delayed until the French had been consulted.
The ministers and generals also discussed how to protect Great Britain’s coast. One brigade of 4th Division was already at Colchester and could deploy along the Suffolk and Essex coast. Another brigade would deploy along the Norfolk coast while the third brigade would cover the Lincolnshire and Yorkshire coasts. Five cyclist battalions were also sent to the east coast.9 Two brigades of 6th Division would remain in Ireland while the third moved to the Edinburgh area to cover Scotland’s east coast.
The meeting also agreed three resolutions. Firstly, four infantry divisions and the Cavalry Division would begin to embark first while a fifth division would follow as soon as possible. Secondly, troops would be recalled from South Africa.10 Thirdly, two Indian divisions would be moved to Egypt to protect the Suez Canal while the Indian Government would be urged to send a division to German East Africa to capture Dar es Salaam.11
Field Marshal Sir John French was appointed Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field and his command was split into two corps; Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig with I Corps and Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson with II Corps; Major General Edmund Allenby was appointed commander of the Cavalry Division.12
When the generals said the Territorial Force units were already en route to their annual training camps, the Cabinet delayed embarkation until 9 August to allow them to return to depot. Otherwise the Army was ready and its whole mobilization plan was carried out according to the ‘War Book’. Every last detail for organization and deployment had been worked out. Each unit had been issued with a set of general instructions for mobilization and a set of specific orders for deployment. It meant officers knew what was expected of them when the order was given.
The rail network also had a strict timetable to work to and 1,800 special trains travelled across Great Britain and Ireland in only five days; eighty trains carried troops into Southampton Docks on the busiest day. Each train load was planned to carry a complete unit or part of a unit complete with its transport so everyone could march as soon as they arrived at their destination.
Ships were allocated to carry either personnel, horses and vehicles, motor transport or stores and an average of thirteen ships a day sailed for Havre, Rouen and Boulogne. They sailed day and night, leaving port as soon as they were loaded, as Royal Navy ships protected the Channel. Troops on the mainland embarked at Southampton while 5th and 6th Divisions moved to the Irish ports of Belfast, Dublin and Cork. Some motor transport and fuel sailed from Avonmouth, near Bristol while the rest were loaded at Liverpool. While frozen meat was delivered to Liverpool, other stores and supplies were loaded at Newhaven, East Sussex. A few details sailed from Glasgow.
The ‘War Book’ did its job as the mobilization of nearly 100,000 men and the assembly of 120,000 horses13 went ‘according to plan’.
The French Army had spent many years studying their deployment plans. They were based on an advance into the ‘lost provinces’ of Alsace and Lorraine which had been annexed following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. They had made many alterations and they were on their 17th revision by August 1914, hence the name Plan XVII.14
But despite all the forward planning, Field Marshal Joseph Joffre had to change them because they did not include an attack through Belgium. On 2 August Joffre choose new concentration areas for Fourth and Fifth Armies, extending the left wing north to cover the threat. The following day General Sordet was ordered to move his Cavalry Corps east of Mézières, ready to enter Belgium.
The French Army was not due to complete mobilization until 18 August but General Joffre decided to make a preliminary attack with his right according to the original plan. On 6 August the Army of Alsace crossed the frontier only to run into large forces around Mulhausen,15 so General Pau was forced to withdraw.
The same day Sordet’s cavalry crossed the Belgian border with King Albert’s consent, heading east towards Neufchâteau before turning north towards Liège. Joffre’s plan was to delay the German columns moving west across Belgium but Sordet fell back towards the Meuse when it was clear the Belgian Army had withdrawn from Liège. His cavalry had discovered little and had caused no disruption.
By now it was clear the Germans were advancing through Belgium. Joffre ordered General Lanrezac to advance from the Charleville-Mézières area on 12 August ‘to oppose any attempts of the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and Namur’. Fifth Army marched north along the Meuse and stopped German cavalry crossing near Dinant three days later.
The combined forces of First and Second French Armies advanced towards Mulhouse again on 14 August but events to the north changed everything. The following day the Belgian Army reported 200,000 German troops were crossing the Meuse 10 miles north of Liège, next to the Dutch border. Joffre was also about to find out that the German centre was advancing through Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg, towards the French centre.
Joffre’s plan took shape when it became clear the main German advance was through Belgium and not into France. His plan was for the Belgian Army, the BEF and Fifth Army to stall the German right while his Third and Fourth Armies advanced north, into the German flank. Meanwhile, First and Second French Armies would make secondary attacks between Metz and the Vosges. The advance began on 21 August but Joffre’s plan immediately started to fall apart.
While that covers the opening French moves, what of the early German movements? Aufmarsch 1 had seven armies deploying against France and it had taken over two weeks to assemble them along the German border between Liège and Strasbourg. By 17 August 1,485,000 men were ready to advance. General von Kluck’s 320,000 strong First Army would advance between Brussels and Wavre, while masking Antwerp and guarding against a British landing on the coast. General von Bülow’s 200,000 strong Second Army16 would advance between Wavre and Namur. The two armies would then swing south, crossing the French border between Valenciennes and the River Meuse.
Meanwhile, General von Hausen’s Third Army would advance towards the Meuse between Namur and Givet. General the Duke of Württemberg’s Fourth Army and the Crown Prince of Germany’s Fifth Army would conform, advancing towards Sedan and Thionville. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria’s Sixth Army and General von Heeringen’s Seventh Army were to advance towards the River Moselle. The German strategic objective was to outflank the French left (west) flank, push their armies away from Paris and drive them east towards the Swiss frontier.
One by one Joffre saw his armies stopped. We have seen how General Dubail’s First Army and General Castelnau’s Second Army encountered Sixth Army and Seventh Army on the defensive south of Metz. They had both been stopped with heavy casualties by 14 August. A week later General Ruffey’s Third Army and General de Langle de Cary’s Fourth Army encountered Fourth and Fifth German Armies north of Thionville in another bloody battle. That left the First, Second and Third German Armies heading for Lanrezac’s Fifth Army, the BEF and the Belgians. Or rather thirty-four German divisions facing only twenty Allied ones.
The BEF’s General Headquarters (GHQ) staff left London on 12 August, crossed the Channel two days later and joined the rest of the BEF on the 16th. Field Marshal French travelled from London to Amiens on 14 August and visited Adolphe Messimy, French Minister of War in Paris17 and then General Joffre at the Grand Quartier Général18 in Vitry-le-François. Finally he saw General Lanrezac at Rethel and learnt that Fifth Army was concentrating south of Charleroi and preparing to advance north.
While GHQ and French were meeting their Allies, the British four divisions had been moving to their assembly area between Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The Cavalry Division had deployed on the BEF’s north-east flank ready to link with the French Fifth Army.
On 17 August Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson, II Corps’ commander, died of natural causes on a train while travelling to the front. While French wanted Sir Herbert Plumer19 as his replacement, Kitchener sent Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. French was also told that 4th Division would be sent to France along with four spare battalions grouped into an independent brigade.20
While the BEF was ready to advance on 19 August, it needed to know where First Army was. So cavalry patrols headed north in search of German columns, as the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) started flying reconnaissance missions. The following day they spotted their first troops moving through Louvain, 15 miles east of Brussels.21 It meant contact was imminent.
While the British and French prepared to move north, Liège had fallen and the Germans were streaming across Belgium. Three corps were bearing down on the Belgian left and three corps were marching towards the Belgian right; a similar number of reserve corps were following. And neither the French nor the British were in a position to help. On 18 August German troops captured Haelen and entered Tirlemont, forcing the Belgians to withdraw from the River Gete and on the 20th they entered the Antwerp fortress.