The Media, Political Parties,
and Interest Groups
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| Non-Institutional Players: The Media, Political Parties, and Interest Groups |
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Communication is an essential feature of representative democracy. Citizens and leaders must be linked in order for the political system to function effectively. Leaders need to be aware of citizens’ concerns so that they build policy accordingly and so they can mobilize policy support. Citizens must be aware of their representatives’ actions so that they can provide policy feedback and so they can hold leaders accountable in elections. Democratic theory suggests that citizens know their local elected leaders, having worked with them at the local level. In some states, that may still be the case. California, however, is so large and complex that communication between elected leaders and the public is a carefully mediated process. The media, political parties, and interest groups are the vehicles through which these communication functions take place.
The role of parties in linking the public to their elected leaders has also changed over time. The influence of parties has declined as a consequence of several reforms—some going back to the Progressives and some more recent—as well as a consequence of the emergence of media power over the past 40 years. Commensurate with the rising power of the electronic media, and the rising costs associated with media politics, interest groups and political actions committees (PACs) have gained power through their ability to channel economic resources to campaign staff.
Through political advertising, editorials and commentaries, and news and entertainment programming, media elites—those who exert a disproportionate influence over media content—are effectively able to control access to California’s political discourse. The degree to which ordinary Californians and their grassroots organizations are able to compete in this arena frequently determines the extent to which they are able to affect policy outcomes. At the same time, interest groups play a dominant role in applying direct pressure to the policy process and indirect influence through campaign contributions. The linkage between media politics, parties, and interest groups is made clear when correlating the costs of amplifying one’s message through broadcast media and the significant role parties and interest groups play in financing campaigns. The media provide the vehicle through which candidates and elected officials communicate with the public: Parties and interest groups are vehicles that citizens use to communicate with elected officials.
A significant body of research has been compiled on the question of mass media’s effect on political attitudes. The initial research found little relationship. The discussion was reframed in the 1960s, when political scientist Philip Converse questioned the dominant notion that citizens are rational actors with fully developed attitudes on a wide variety of issues.1 Walter Lippmann, after all, warned attitude researchers early in the twentieth century that individuals, like the media, simplify complex reality into a manageable representation. People simply cannot focus on every conceivable issue.2
Mass media, however, play a major role in defining the boundaries within which the public debate exists. The specific effect the media have on how individuals feel about specific issues is subtle. Rather than overtly propagandize, the media define the opinion choices citizens have. Over a lifetime, the cumulative effects of media messages are significant. Between 1946 and 1961 the Yale Program of Research on Communication and Attitude Change conducted numerous studies on the effect of communication on political attitudes. Shearon Lowery and Melvin DeFleur summarize the Yale findings:
In summary, the many separate but related studies of the Yale Communication Research Program can be categorized as focusing on the communicators, the message, the audience, and the audience’s responses to persuasive communications. In terms of the communicator, the program found that source credibility was an important factor in obtaining immediate opinion change. Low-credibility sources were seen as more biased and more unfair than were high-credibility sources. The researchers also found that the effects of the communicator’s credibility diminish over time, because members of the audience tend to disassociate the message from the communicator. However, these credibility effects can be reinstated simply by reminding the audience who said what. Overall, however, most of the opinion change obtained was short rather than long term. Thus, while it is not difficult to change opinion immediately after a persuasive communication, when the change is measured a month later the audience has often reverted to its original position.3
These studies suggest that repeated exposure to a similar message agenda, especially when delivered by sources deemed to be highly credible, results in opinion change to reflect the message agenda.
Observational learning is the most widely cited process through which television affects attitudes. People internalize depictions of reality and form attitudinal responses. This exists both within entertainment programming and news programming. Entertainment programming creates roles that viewers often accept as accurate depictions of social interactions, with which they measure their own social interactions. News programming is much less subtle, in that it overtly articulates an interpretation of reality upon which viewers base political attitudes.
Numerous studies have pointed out the inverse relationship between education levels and opinion influence by televised media. Nonetheless, issue awareness has always remained rather low among the whole population. People are simply too busy living their lives to follow politics closely. It is thus fair to assume that the influence of media on political attitudes is substantial, in that the media are the only access most individuals have to the world around them beyond their immediate community. The ability to determine the agenda and scope of media messages, then, may in fact translate into the ability to influence political attitudes.
The ability to amplify one’s message is critical in policy debates as well as elections. Electronic and print media, therefore, are necessary tools. In the past, the traditional family-owned newspapers played a major role in California’s political history, reflecting the economic and political interests of their publishers. Families used their papers to push policies, candidates, and commerce that they favored. All the large publishing families held an interest in land speculation and industry, and therefore generated extremely favorable—some might say skewed—coverage of the land speculation and development that came to characterize the first half of the twentieth century. The involvement of the Otis family’s Los Angeles Times in pressing for Owens Valley water to support sprawling residential development in the San Fernando Valley is merely one of the better-known examples.4 Hearst’s San Francisco Examiner, the de Young brothers’ San Francisco Chronicle, and McClatchy’s Sacramento Bee all followed similar paths. It was not until the 1970s that professional management and public ownership of newspapers forced more professional balance.
The Vietnam War demonstrated the power of broadcast media over print media. Television coverage of the war brought home the gritty reality of combat as never before. Americans increasingly turned to their televisions to get their news. By the war’s end in 1974, television had emerged as the primary source of information for Californians: Virtually all California households owned at least one television. The importance of television to politics had been made clear in the Kennedy-Nixon debate in 1960.5 But there remain serious questions as to the quality of information broadcast. In a state the size of California, statewide coverage is critical for keeping citizens informed. Yet no California station maintains a news bureau in the state capital. State politics receive less than 2 percent of newscast time, most of which is rehashed from newspapers and wire services.6 Observers suggest that national political coverage, although much less relevant to the everyday life of most people, is much more in demand, as is the typical scandal, crime, and fire coverage of local news.
Since 1960 political advertising has emerged as a major determinant of outcomes in the electoral arena. It is also a major factor in the abstract area of attitude acquisition, defining for many voters who is more “presidential” or more “electable.” Political advertising is successful in establishing an agenda both for the immediate election at hand, as well as the ongoing political climate. Several studies have found that political advertising can cause substantial change in voter attitudes.7
The need to advertise on television has increased the already colossal cost of mounting a statewide campaign in California. The 2006 gubernatorial race provides a case in point. The primary campaigns collectively spent over $29 million. The general election campaign between Democrat Phil Angelides and Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger was one of the most expensive governor’s races ever to date, with the two campaigns spending $32 million.8 Driving these figures is the high cost of advertising on television. To run a credible campaign for statewide office and to reach the voters from Alpine County to San Diego County, candidates must purchase massive amounts of paid TV ads to blanket the state.
Broadcast media markets are defined by areas of dominant influence (ADI). ADIs are the geographic boundaries that encircle a common audience. California is divided into 15 ADIs. Due to the concentration of population in four urban centers, however, 85 percent of the state can be covered in four ADIs: Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and Sacramento.9 The cost of advertising is dependent on an ADI’s size and the Nielsen rating of a particular show, in addition to ad length. Los Angeles currently is the nation’s most expensive ADI, at $1,150 per rating point. A 30-second spot on a show with 10 rating points would cost $11,500. In the 1994 gubernatorial race, political spots in Los Angeles ranged between $12,000 and $30,000. The enormous costs of political advertising on television may be prohibitive for smaller races or challengers with small campaign war chests. The high prices charged for California ADIs encourage all candidates to seek free media.10
Free media includes any news coverage a candidate might acquire through press conferences, photo opportunities, and staged spectacles. During campaign cycles, staged events tend to dominate political news coverage. Between cycles, elected officials hold news conferences to maximize visibility. Since candidates for office require extensive visibility, there often is a sense of spectacle to such events. The O. J. Simpson case provided ample opportunity for Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti to acquire statewide, and even nationwide, visibility. In the same way, elected officials are often tempted to pursue sensational policies in an effort to stimulate coverage. Within days of the death of Princess Diana, State Senator Tom Hayden was on the radio talk show circuit, pushing for anti-paparazzi legislation. Certainly some elected officials will pursue symbolic policies that may attract political support but may be extremely difficult to implement. Many observers suggest that Pete Wilson’s support of Propositions 187 and 209 was targeted at maximizing free media coverage in an effort to gain national visibility for a possible second run for president.
Arnold Schwarzenegger is, perhaps, the best example of successfully using free media. His entry into politics was made possible by his celebrity as a film actor and frequent guest on television. He announced his campaign for governor on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, and he continues to appear as a frequent guest to make his case for various policies or to talk his way out of political trouble. Unlike Gray Davis, his immediate predecessor, Schwarzenegger has been able to leverage his personal charisma through friendly free media environments. Similarly, Maria Shriver, Schwarzenegger’s wife, has been able to use her background as a network journalist with many years of public visibility to successfully establish the California first lady’s office as a major center of political influence.
One reason for the media’s significant role in state politics is California’s weak party system. Early in the twentieth century, Progressive reformers practically dismantled the parties in their zeal to fight corruption and the influence of special interests. California Progressives were concerned about the power of party machines, such as Boss Ruef’s rule over San Francisco, and the domination of state government by the Southern Pacific Railroad. The introduction of nonpartisan local elections, cross-filing, the construction of a civil service system, and the end of patronage are all reforms that weakened the influence of state parties in government and in elections. Public loyalty to the two major parties has also been in decline, both in California and nationwide.
The California State Election Code provides detailed rules and structures that both the Democratic and Republican parties must follow. These guidelines, however, were created by elected legislators—Democrats and Republicans—and thus the parties themselves enjoyed great latitude in scripting the guidelines. Registered voters of both parties elect representatives to the county central committees in the primary elections. County central committees are the primary managers of local party activities. The workhorses of California’s 58 county central committees are the assembly district committees, which are responsible for campaigns in the 80 assembly districts statewide. While these committees may appear to be independent, party affairs tend to be dominated by existing officeholders in each county who control the power, money, and resources locally. The state central committees have about 2,500 to 3,000 members on the Democratic party side and about 1,400 members on the Republican side. They coordinate state party affairs, orchestrate political campaigns for party designates, draft the state party platform (an agenda of major ideological principles and goals reflective of the party’s stance), and select presidential electors.
In addition, the state central committees, along with their executive board, nominate delegates to the national convention and serve as the state’s party representatives on the national committee of each party.
For many years, parties in the legislature maintained discipline by redistributing campaign money among members. This practice began under Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh, who coined the overused phrase “money is the mother’s milk of politics.”11 It continued under subsequent speakers, from Democrat Willie Brown to Republican Curt Pringle, whose domination of party campaign funds allowed them to maintain control of the institution and its agenda. However, the passage of Proposition 208 in 1996 limited the practice of redistributing campaign money, making the maintenance of party discipline more difficult.
The once-dominant role of the parties in campaigns and elections has been diminished since the Progressive era, and recent reforms have further weakened the parties. In 1974, in the aftermath of Watergate, California voters adopted Proposition 9, which was sponsored by Common Cause and Secretary of State Jerry Brown (then a candidate for governor). The initiative required politicians to disclose campaign contributions and expenditures of $100 or more as well as donations that could be potential conflicts of interest. It also established the California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC), an enforcement agency with the power to launch its own investigations into campaign finance abuse and to issue fines when violations occur.
In 1988, voters approved Proposition 73, which limited individual contributions to $1,000 and organizational and PAC contributions to between $2,500 and $5,000. The California supreme court struck down the measure in 1990. Voters approved Proposition 208 in 1996, which limits individual donors and groups to a maximum of $250 per candidate in an election, although they are allowed to donate more if the candidate agrees to a voluntary spending limit. It also imposes spending limits on parties and prohibits the transfer of funds between candidates. In short, Proposition 208 will severely restrict the role of the parties in state elections if it is allowed to stand. Currently, the measure is being held up in court. The waning influence of parties may have begun during the Progressive era, but voters continue to view party influence as suspect.
If broadcast and print media are used by elected officials and those seeking office to communicate with the public, interest groups are vehicles through which the public communicates with elected officials. Interest group politics is vilified by many, but it in fact represents a critical aspect of political participation. Interest groups participate in the governmental process by lobbying elected officials. They are also active in electoral politics by donating money and resources to candidates, and even by waging their own political campaigns.
All Californians are represented by several single-issue interest groups. Whether it is the local, county, school district, or favorite grassroots organization, all Californians benefit from the representation these groups provide. However, that representation is not equal, and some organizations benefit from much greater access than others. Interest group politics is a founding principle in American politics. We all recognize the problems of unequal access. James Madison argued 200 years ago that while factionalism represents a threat to democracy, the option to disallow such groups represents an even greater threat. Rather than outlaw interest groups, Madison argued persuasively that interest groups should be encouraged. In so doing, more groups will emerge, creating counterbalance to each other. If 1 group is bad, then 2 groups are better, and 2,000 groups are better yet. Problems emerge when powerful groups have coalescing interests.
The pluralist model of counterbalancing elites’ mediating interests is inadequate. The theoretical work done by Mills, and empirical work done by Dye, Domhoff, and Presthus, among others, suggest that rather than competing, the interests of economic elites tend to cohere in key policy areas.12 Lowi’s The End of Liberalism13 argues that this interest group influence threatens the democratic basis of government. If interest groups provide the framework for government-citizen interaction, and these groups are based on individual self-interest, there may be little opportunity for pursuing a meaningful public interest.
In 2005, 344 registered lobbying firms, representing 2,639 paying interests throughout the state and beyond, spent almost $228 million lobbying California state government. The top ten lobbying organizations during this period included the California Teachers Association ($9,456,813), AT&T and its affiliates ($4,065,146), Western States Petroleum Association ($3,130,034), the California Chamber of Commerce ($2,570,516), the California State Council of Service Employees ($2,014,715), Edison International & Subsidiaries ($1,873,265), BHP Billiton LNG International ($1,765,541), the California School Employees Association ($1,570,845), Blue Cross of California (Wellpoint Health Networks) ($1,566,508), and the Consumer Attorneys of California ($1,549,113).14
Interest groups have long influenced the California political landscape. The Central Pacific Railroad, for example, dominated California politics from the 1860s through 1910, when the Progressive movement successfully won constitutional amendments and new statutes to limit railroad influence. Today, lobbyists advocate on everything from agriculture, to organized labor, to university student services, to theme parks. When successful, the interest group dynamic allows Madisonian democracy to flourish, allowing the public access to politics and policy in a direct and meaningful way. When unsuccessful, the group dynamic maximizes the power and influence of those interests most able to pay.
Interest groups have learned to exploit the ballot initiative process to circumvent elected representatives altogether. By placing legislative proposals directly before the voters, groups have more control over final policy outcomes. Even when an initiative’s chances of victory are slim, interest groups have strong incentives to pursue this type of strategy.15 These reasons revolve around mobilization and group cohesion. First, a controversial ballot measure can help mobilize group members, whose participation is crucial for the group to be effective. Second, an initiative campaign can invigorate the group itself—regardless of outcome. Even a futile campaign for an unpopular ballot measure is an opportunity to attract and recruit new members. Third, groups have an unparalleled opportunity to influence public opinion in the context of an election. Groups can take advantage of free media to get their message out and possibly influence public opinion in advance of the next legislative session or election. Finally, the issue may entice enough sympathetic voters to go to the polls to influence the outcome of other races on the ballot. The increasing use of the initiative by deep-pocket interests threatens to destabilize the democratic equilibrium Madison was so concerned about.
Stepping into the void that was left by the weakened parties, interest groups are asserting an ever-greater role in the state’s political campaigns. Key to their influence are campaign donations from PACs. Much of the money that used to be distributed by parties is now filtered to candidates through PACs which are controlled by interest groups. In contrast to parties, many of these groups are motivated by narrow agendas, to which candidates must cater in order to secure contributions. This reliance on single-issue groups, it is argued, contributes to the fragmentation of politics.16 Even though individual donors are still the largest source of donations to political campaigns, PACs are growing in significance.
Even without PAC money, the augmented role of interest groups means that in some races, groups can outspend the candidate’s own organizations, hijacking the political debate and rendering the parties irrelevant. The influence of interest groups in one recent election gained national attention. A special election was held in 1998 to replace the late U.S. Representative Walter Capps, a Democrat whose 22nd District encompassed San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara Counties along the central coast. Two Republicans faced the late congressman’s widow, Democrat Lois Capps, who was running to succeed her husband. Initially, the campaign revolved around local and state issues, including the future of a nearby Air Force base, HMO reform legislation, and a school construction bond. However, the contest took place in a competitive district, and national interest groups poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into the race in order to influence the outcome. The AFL-CIO, Planned Parenthood, and the Wisconsin-based Americans for Limited Terms spent money on ads and direct mail intended to help Capps. The Republicans competing for the seat benefited from similar activities, financed by the Christian Coalition, the Foundation for Responsible Government (an anti-tax group), and the Campaign for Working Families (a conservative group opposed to late-term abortions).17 Capps won the election, but only after she and her opponents had lost control of the campaign agenda. They spent most of the campaign debating abortion and term limits, not the issues of primary concern to the voters of the central coast.
| Term Limits Add Up to Brain Drain | Jordan Rau |
Until this year, Margaret Gladstein was chief advisor to the California Assembly’s Banking and Finance Committee, which shapes hundreds of laws including those that govern credit cards, identity theft and flood insurance.
But in June, Gladstein appeared before the committee in a different role: representing the California Retailers Assn., a client of her new employer, a Sacramento lobbying firm.
“I’ve missed all of you,” she playfully told the 10 legislators she had worked for.
Gladstein is part of an exodus of experienced legislative staff to California’s lobbying corps, known in Sacramento as the Third House. The staff migration—a repercussion of term limits passed in 1990—has strengthened the influence of interest groups in crafting laws but weakened lawmakers’ ability to obtain the objective advice and institutional knowledge that once made California’s Capitol a model for other states, according to many lawmakers, lobbyists and Sacramento veterans from both parties.
“What we have seen is the empowerment of the Third House at the expense of the Senate and Assembly,” said Senate Majority Leader Gloria Romero (D-Los Angeles). “I’m one of the old-timers, but I find myself going to some of the folks who have already left the building to say, ‘Hey, can you give me a history lesson?’”
Though all lawmakers hire office staff who often come and go with their bosses, California’s Legislature has long been distinguished by policy experts who devoted years and even decades to transportation, agriculture, education or another specific subject.
Paid salaries sometimes topping $100,000, they work as chief consultants in committees or as senior advisors to legislative leadership. In deciding how to vote, legislators routinely rely on the in-depth analyses consultants write for every bill.
But those jobs feel less secure and professionally satisfying, many staffers say, because of the regular changes in committee leadership due to term limits, which cap tenure at six years in the Assembly and eight in the Senate.
“I had the opportunity to work for two very good chairs, but there was a constant uncertainty about who would be the next chair,” Gladstein, who earned $105,000 a year in the Assembly, said in an interview. “My current organization is much more stable.”
New legislative leaders can push out or reassign staffers and change the office atmosphere from pleasant to oppressive. And committee chairs who once also sought to master policy are now consumed with plotting their next political step.
All this has made it easier for the Third House—which always had the advantage of offering higher salaries—to lure away Capitol experts.
Once there, some former staffers immediately begin work on proposals pending before their former bosses. As in other states, California’s former staffers are unencumbered by “cooling off” rules that require former lawmakers and gubernatorial staff to wait a year before lobbying in the areas they worked in.
In the current 2005–06 session, the chief consultants to four major legislative committees—including Andrew Antwih, chief consultant to the Assembly Transportation Committee, and Mark Sektnan, chief consultant to the Assembly Insurance Committee—have moved to the Third House. Not coincidentally, all four left in the year their chairpersons were termed out.
Of course, lobbying has always appealed to staffers enticed by salaries double or more what can be earned on the public payroll. But since 1996, when the first batch of lawmakers was forced out office, annual staff turnover in the state Assembly has increased to 36% from 22% during the four years before the initiative, Proposition 140, passed in 1990, records show.
Forty percent of Assembly aides now have less than two years’ experience. Senate turnover has averaged 22% a year since 1996. Comparison figures for the years before the initiative’s passage were not available.
“This is one of the subtle effects of term limits that voters probably haven’t noticed and may not have wanted,” said Thad Kousser, a UC San Diego political science professor who co-wrote a 2004 study on the effects of term limits on the Legislature. “Interest groups play a much more active role in actually drafting the legislation, negotiating the amendments.”
The emigration does not disturb many term limits advocates, who view staff as just as interchangeable as their elected bosses.
“It was not, right now, nor was it ever intended to become, a lifetime job to be a staffer in the Capitol,” said Ted Costa, one such advocate. “People are always going to go up to bigger and better things. Dick Cheney started as a staffer.”
Some other staffers who took their legislative expertise to the Third House in the current two-year session include:
• Nicholas Louizos, who left his job as senior consultant for Assemblyman Hector De La Torre, chairman of a subcommittee overseeing the health and human services portion of the state budget, to become a lobbyist for the California Assn. of Health Plans.
• Patrick Moran, Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez’s advisor on law enforcement issues. He now works for Aaron Read and Associates, whose clients include the state firefighters’ union and the Peace Officers Research Assn. of California.
• Robert Giroux, a veteran advisor to former Senate President Pro Tem John Burton and more recently to Nunez. He now works at Lang Hansen O’Malley and Miller Governmental Relations, whose 54 lobbying clients include chemical, alcohol, racing and pharmaceutical concerns.
One former staffer’s private sector work exemplifies the type of Capitol influence they can wield. Steven Thompson, a longtime advisor to former Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (whose 14-year tenure galvanized the term limits movement), took a post with the California Medical Assn. after staff cuts required by Proposition 140 eviscerated the Assembly Office of Research, which Thompson had headed.
As head of the government relations office for the influential doctors lobby, Thompson used his knowledge and close relationships with lawmakers to initiate and rewrite dozens of healthcare laws on behalf of physicians. After his death in 2004, the Legislature even renamed a state program he helped create in his honor: The Stephen M. Thompson Physician Corps Loan Repayment Program encourages doctors to work in underserved areas by paying off some of their medical school debt.
Today, former staffers are ubiquitous in the Third House. At the California Chamber of Commerce, seven of 15 employees in the legislative unit previously worked for the Senate or Assembly.
“What better lobbyist could the California Chamber have than one who has served the very Legislature he or she is now working with?” said Vince Sollitto, the chamber’s spokesman and a former aide to Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger.
At Capitol Advocacy, the 7-year-old firm that Gladstein joined when she left the Assembly banking committee, four of the five other lobbyists also spent time in the Legislature.
Capitol Advocacy earned $3.2 million lobbying last year, more than all but four other firms, according to the secretary of state’s office. The firm’s bigger clients include the Safeway grocery chain, Yahoo, Ameriquest Capital Corp., Apple Computer and Blue Cross of California.
Ron Calderon, chairman of the Assembly banking panel, said the Legislature has raised staff salaries since term limits to try to retain workers. But he said lobbying firms “are looking more than ever at those staff who have the long-term experience” in the Capitol.
To be sure, dozens of well-respected veteran staffers remain in the Capitol, particularly in the Senate, where policy advisors on the environment, public pensions, the judiciary and the regulation of professionals have more than a century of experience combined. Many of the newer ones have also distinguished themselves and are valued by legislators.
And certainly not all those staffers who leave the Capitol would have stayed were it not for term limits.
“It was a career goal of mine to eventually be a lobbyist,” said Todd Bloomstine, who left the Senate staff in 2001 and is now a lobbyist for the Southern California Contractors’ Assn.
Bloomstine said he had spent five years in the Capitol when a retiring lobbyist with whom he dealt regularly approached him and asked if he had interest in taking over his business. “It just naturally led from my work there,” he said.
It is such easy transitions that worry some good-government advocates. They fear that aides’ awareness that they may one day end up in the Third House could lead some to compromise the independence of their advice.
“It creates too much of an incentive to shade things while you’re working for the Legislature,” said Robert M. Stern, president of the Center for Governmental Studies.
“I’m more concerned with the staff leaving than with legislators leaving,” Stern said. “When legislative staff goes, the Legislature really has no one to rely on other than the lobbyists or the administration.”
Source: Jordan Rau, “Term Limits Add Up to Brain Drain” Los Angeles Times (California section), July 23, 2006.
This chapter has explored the role of the media, political parties, and interest groups in California’s political process. In this media age the escalating costs of political campaigns have encouraged interest groups and the media to play an enhanced role in governmental politics and elections, filling the vacuum left behind by weakened political parties. Print and broadcast media—particularly television—have emerged as the dominant tools with which elected officials and those seeking elected office amplify their voices to the public. Interest groups have emerged as the tools of sophisticated citizens who seek to maximize individual participation and influence. However, the major parties still play an important role in the electoral process, as we will see in the next chapter. This chapter began by exploring the impacts and effects of media messages, as well as the markets and costs of political advertising. It then examined the role and impacts of parties and interest groups in California. Ultimately, parties, interest groups, and the media are powerful tools in the policy process. Those individuals and organizations—whether public or private, for profit or non-profit—who can best utilize these tools will enjoy greater influence.
1. Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964).
2. See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 1922).
3. For a full discussion, see Shearon Lowery and Melvin DeFleur, Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects (New York: Longman, 1983).
4. The film Chinatown depicts the role of Los Angeles elites, in particular the Los Angeles Times, in foisting a false water emergency on Los Angeles residents in order to influence bond measures to fund the Owens Valley water grab.
5. The Kennedy-Nixon debate in 1960 was a turning point for demonstrating the power of television in politics. The debate was both televised and broadcast over radio. Television viewers widely credited Kennedy with “winning” the debate, while radio listeners credited Nixon with “winning.” The ability to convey nonverbal cues through a television debate or advertisement has become extremely important—and more so now that most people get most of their information from television.
6. Dan Walters, “Stations Ignore State Capitol,” San Jose Mercury News (November 22, 1988): B5, in Larry N. Gerston and Terry Christensen, California Politics and Government, 10th ed. (San Francisco: Wadsworth, 2008).
7. See Jay Blummler and Denis McQuail, Television in Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1969); Thomas Patterson and Robert D. McClure, The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in Elections. New York: Putnam, 1976).
8. Thad Beyle and Jennifer M. Jensen, “2006 Aggregate Contribution Information for All States,” The Gubernatorial Campaign Finance Database, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (www.unc.edu/~beyle/guber.html).
9. Gerston and Christensen, California Politics and Government.
10. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar, The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
11. Unruh’s advisors date the earliest use of that phrase in print to the article, “Big Daddy’s Big Drive,” Look, September 25 1962.
12. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1956); Thomas Dye, Who’s Running America? The Conservative Years, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Robert Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
13. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).
14. Bruce McPherson, Lobbying California State Government (Sacramento: California Secretary of State’s Office, 2006).
15. See Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999).
16. See Ross Baker, The New Fat Cats (New York: Priority Press, 1989).
17. Todd S. Purdum, “Interest Groups Run Own Race in California,” New York Times (March 7, 1998): A3.