Chapter 1

Prelude to the Five Forks Campaign

Battle of Lewis Farm (Quaker Road)

March 29-30, 1865

Editor’s Introduction

Lieutenant General U.S. Grant’s goal for this, his seventh offensive, was to force the Confederates out of their lines to defeat them in the open, and sever the South Side Railroad, one of the last two major logistical lifeline feeding Richmond and Petersburg. He planned a huge wheeling movement to outflank and turn the Confederate right flank to accomplish it. The Army of the Potomac’s II Corps, under Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys, would cross Hatcher’s Run on the Vaughan Road and Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren would form his V Corps on Humphreys’s left at the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker roads. On the far left, Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan, with Brig. Gen. Ranald Mackenzie’s Army of the James cavalry, the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry under Maj. Gen. George Crook (commanding what had been David McM. David Gregg’s cavalry division), and the cavalry from the Army of the Shenandoah, would ride to Dinwiddie Court House.

On the night of March 25, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord pulled three divisions of the Army of the James out of the Bermuda Hundred and Richmond lines and arrived at Petersburg about 5:00 p.m. on the 28th. His departure was so secretive that Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet did not realize the Federals had left his front. Sheridan, meanwhile, crossed to the south side of the James River March 27. Mackenzie’s cavalry left the Richmond lines on the night of the 28th, arrived in position the next evening and formed in rear of II Corps. Grant gave Mackenzie’s troopers the job of protecting Warren’s V Corps wagon train.

On the evening of March 28, the Union troops were arranged as follows: Three divisions of the XXIV Corps and XXV Corps held the trenches outside Richmond, while another division of the XXV Corps manned the Bermuda Hundred lines; Maj. Gen. John G. Parke’s IX Corps held the ground from the Appomattox River on the right to Fort Davis, with Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright’s VI Corps watching the front extending from Fort Davis to Arthur’s Swamp; on Wright’s left, Humphreys with II Corps held the line from Arthur Swamp to Hatcher’s Run, where the Vaughan Road crossed it; Warren’s V Corps was behind Humphreys, and Sheridan’s cavalry was at Hancock Station on the military railroad; Ord’s Army of the James infantry took the place of II Corps, with its line extending all the way to Hatchers Run.

Grant’s intent was to have the Army of the Potomac, except IX Corps, available for the campaign. The result was that Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, had some 60,000 men ready to go, Ord brought 17,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry under Mackenzie, and Sheridan had 12,000 cavalry from the Army of the Shenandoah and the army of the Potomac. The disposable force available for the capture of Petersburg was 70,000.

Grant’s orders to Sheridan for this offensive were issued on March 24:

You may go out the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched positions, but to force him out if possible. Should he come out and attack us or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow... as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side railroad between Petersburg and Burkesville and destroy it to some extent.¹

Note that Grant’s first priority was to force the Confederates out of their lines so Sheridan could defeat them. The destruction of the railroad was a secondary objective to be accomplished only if the first was not possible. Also note that Grant promised to come to Sheridan’s aid: “Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate.” Once having destroyed the railroad, Sheridan could either return to Grant’s army group or ride south and join Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, who was advancing north through North Carolina toward Virginia.

Three days later on March 27, Meade dictated Grant’s orders for the campaign to the Army of the Potomac. In essence, the plan called for the cavalry and the II Corps and V Corps to cross to the west side of Hatcher’s Run. The infantry would push the Confederates into their lines and keep them from sending troops west to oppose the sweeping cavalry. Meanwhile, XXIV Corps and XXV Corps troops from the Army of the James—which had slipped away undetected from Longstreet’s front outside Richmond north of the James River—would hold the ground vacated by the II Corps.

It is impossible to explain what trick of mental gymnastics enabled Grant to issue orders that said one thing to Sheridan (“Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate”) and something very different to Meade that essentially immobilized the Army of the Potomac in front of Lee’s trenches (with the possible exception of Wright’s VI Corps)? How could Meade assist Sheridan with his “entire force” if it was pinned down in front of the Confederate lines?

This offensive was the same basic plan that had failed time and again during Grant’s previous offensives. In each case, instead of sending a mobile column strong enough to achieve his goal, Grant immobilized all but a fraction of his infantry by advancing them as close to the Confederate lines as possible. This strategy had two goals. First, Grant hoped that if the Confederates weakened their line to oppose the turning movement, he would be close enough to attack and break through. Second, he hoped that by pressing against the Confederate lines, he might fulfill the opposite goal of keeping the Confederates pinned down in their trenches while a relatively small command, a corps, for example, tried to turn the enemy flank to get to the South Side Railroad. In each previous effort, while the Federal flanking force floundered through woods, swamps, and along difficult road and paths, or waited in trenches for the Rebels oppositie them to strip their lines so they could assault, the Confederates did in fact strip their lines, assemble a strike force, and attack the flanking force. And so every previous effort failed. The Virginia Campaign of 1864-65 is replete with examples of Grant attempting to achieve too many goals with too little force, and failing to achieve any of them.

The first battle of what should be viewed as the Five Forks Campaign took place on March 29 at the Lewis Farm, when Warren and his V Corps attempted to approach the Confederate entrenchments as Grant had ordered. Warren was attacked there by Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, but repulsed him. The second battle of the campaign took place two days later on March 31 when Warren attempted to advance on the White Oak Road. Under Gen. Robert E. Lee’s watchful eye, Anderson attacked and routed two of Warren’s three divisions, but the Federals eventually repulsed the attack and stood their ground.

Sheridan, meanwhile, moved to Dinwiddie Court House and was also expected to advance to the White Oak Road. Warren was continually instructed to extend his left flank and be ready to cooperate with Sheridan when he moved up to the road. Meade’s orders on the 29th to both Warren and Humphreys concerning movements set for the 30th included the following: “The object of this movement is to force the enemy into his line of works and develop the same, and if he is found out of his line to give battle.” Meade later acknowledged that Warren had accomplished this object in the fighting along the Quaker Road. By the end of the day on the 29th, however, Grant had still not informed Meade of the changes he was making in his operational plans. Sheridan told Grant that he would move up to the White Oak Road on the morning of the 30th to a position east of Five Forks. When Warren was informed of this move, he ordered a division under Romeyn Ayres to move toward the White Oak Road supported by another division under Samuel Crawford with the intention of cooperating with Wesley Merritt’s cavalry of Sheridan’s command. As it turned out, Merritt did not move as Sheridan indicated he would, but rode instead farther west. Although Sheridan reported him to be in possession of Five Forks that afternoon, this was not the case.

In making his plans for this offensive, Grant seems to have not taken into account what General Lee might do. Did it occur to Grant that Lee might do the same thing he himself had done with Ord’s infantry divisions—pull men from the lines farther north? What would prevent Lee from shifting a division of infantry from north of the Appomattox River or from outside Richmond?

Part I

General U.S. Grant Prepares for Action

Following the battle of Bentonville, General Sherman’s “Army Group” moved to Goldsboro, North Carolina. Here, Sherman’s troops rendezvoused with the forces commanded by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield. After arranging to have his troops take a well-merited rest, Sherman proceeded to General Grant’s headquarters at City Point, Virginia.

At meetings on March 27 and 28, also attended by President Abraham Lincoln and Admiral David D. Porter in the wardroom aboard River Queen, Sherman explained the plan of operations which he had previously broached to Grant in a letter. Sherman stated that in case it became necessary to bring his “Army Group” to the Petersburg front to encompass the defeat of the Confederates, he would be ready to march by April 10. If he were required to make this movement, Sherman proposed first to threaten an attack on Raleigh, North Carolina. After executing this feint, Sherman’s “Army Group” would veer to the right, striking the Roanoke River near Weldon, North Carolina, 60 miles south of Petersburg. At Weldon, Sherman’s troops would be in an excellent position to move to Burke’s Station, the junction of the South Side and the Richmond and Danville railroads. The occupation of Burke’s Station would enable Sherman’s “Army Group” to intercept General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate army in the event that it should be compelled to fall back on either Danville or Lynchburg. If, in the meantime, Lee’s hard-fighting Confederates continued to hold Grant at bay, Sherman would join the Union armies operating against Petersburg and Richmond.

Grant authorized Sherman to carry out his master plan. This was conditioned on the stipulation that Sherman received no further instructions. Grant, in turn, explained to Sherman the plan of operations that he had matured. The lieutenant general commanding stated he hoped his plan would lead to an early evacuation of the Petersburg lines by Lee’s army. The meeting then adjourned, and Sherman returned to North Carolina.²

By the afternoon of March 28, Grant had completed his dispositions. The various units of his mobile striking force had moved into their advance staging areas and the troops were eager to take the offensive. At a staff meeting in Grant’s City Point headquarters, a series of orders were drafted. Grant hoped these would set into motion a chain reaction which would force General Lee’s army to abandon the fortifications guarding the approaches to Petersburg. Once the Confederates were driven out of the Petersburg defenses, the Union generals believed that their superior numbers and mobility would ensure the destruction of Lee’s veteran army.

In accordance with the plan of operations outlined by Grant, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George G. Meade, prepared a set of instructions to guide his corps commanders. Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys was to hold the troops of his II Corps in their camps until 9:00 a.m. on the following day, “unless previously notified” that the Army of the James was in position. On moving out of the investment lines, Humphreys was to take position with “his right resting on or near Hatcher’s Run and his left extending to the Quaker Road.” Combat patrols would then be advanced. If the Confederates were discovered outside their works, Humphreys was to attack and drive them into their fortifications. The II Corps’ train was to be parked near the Cummings house.³

Major General Gouverneur K. Warren’s V Corps was alerted to be ready to march at an hour designated by Meade. Warren was admonished not to proceed beyond the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads until Humphreys’ troops had reached their initial battle station. After he had received information that Humphreys was in position, Warren was to advance along the Boydton Plank Road. The V Corps was to take position on Humphreys’ left with his left flank refused. Warren, like Humphreys, was to throw forward a strong force of skirmishers. These would be charged with the task of driving in the Confederate outposts.

The two other corps (the VI and IX) which constituted the Army of the Potomac were to remain where they were. At the moment, these two corps were holding the investment lines east and south of Petersburg. In case the Rebels should pull troops out of the Petersburg defenses to meet the Union turning movement, the VI and IX Corps were to attack.

General Grant himself signed the order detailing the cavalry’s role in the projected offensive. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s troopers were to be on the move at the earliest possible hour on the 29th. The cavalry’s line of march was not to be “confined to any particular road or roads.” Grant, however, suggested that Sheridan march “by the nearest roads” passing to the rear of the staging area occupied by the V Corps. To outflank the Confederates, Sheridan, after having passed beyond the left flank of the V Corps, was to strike for Dinwiddie Court House. Grant observed that it was not his intention to attack the Rebels in their entrenchments, but to force them to abandon their powerful fortifications to avoid being encircled. In case the Southerners should leave the protection of their works and attack the cavalry column, Sheridan was to hurl his entire force against them. Grant promised Sheridan that the remainder of “the army will engage or follow the enemy as circumstances will dictate.”

If the Confederates refused to take the field, Sheridan was authorized to cut loose from his base and strike for the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Furthermore, if it should prove feasible, Sheridan was to wreak havoc on the South Side Railroad at some point between Petersburg and Burke’s Station. After having wrecked the two railroads, Sheridan was given two alternatives: he could either rejoin Grant’s “Army Group” using a route to the south of his line of advance, or he could join General Sherman’s forces in North Carolina.⁴

After reading his instructions, Sheridan walked out of Grant’s cabin. The general followed, desiring to have a private conversation with the cavalry leader. A glance convinced Grant that Sheridan seemed to be “somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two armies (Lee’s and Johnston’s) of the enemy.” Speaking up, Grant said, “General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind.” Grant then informed Sheridan that he expected the movement that was about to begin to result in the Federals’ passing around Lee’s right flank. This would force the Confederates to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond and lead to an early end of the long bloody conflict. Continuing, Grant remarked that “the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise.” Grant informed Sheridan that the reason he had included the passages pertaining to the cavalry joining Sherman was that unless his plan proved successful it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat.⁵

Under cover of darkness on the 27th, a portion of General Ord’s Army of the James had been withdrawn from its camps on the north side of the James River. As the success of Ord’s movement depended in great measure upon its secrecy, the general took a number of precautions. Several days before the projected operation, Ord quietly withdrew from the front lines most of the troops detailed to accompany his expeditionary force. After making a demonstration against the Confederate earthworks in the Darbytown road sector, Ord concentrated, in camps calculated to be concealed from the eyes of the Rebel scouts, the units slated to march to the Southside. The troops that were to be left behind were kept constantly on the move. Camps were shifted. Combat patrols sent out at frequent intervals to harass the Confederate outposts. To deaden the sound of the marching columns, the pontoon bridges across which the troops were scheduled to pass were covered with moist straw and compost.

When the XXIV Corps moved out, Maj. Gen. John Gibbon took two of his three divisions with him. Brig. Gen. Charles Devens’ division was left behind to hold the line of works. Brig. Gen. William Birney’s division of the XXV Corps also accompanied Ord when he moved to the Southside. Crossing the James River at Deep Bottom, the troops of the XXIV Corps—Brig. Gen. John W. Turner’s division in the lead—marched to Broadway Landing on the Appomattox River. To avoid congestion, Birney’s black division crossed the James River at Varina. Birney’s troops rendezvoused with Gibbon’s column at Broadway Landing.⁶

By 7:40 a.m. on the 28th, the last of Ord’s infantry had crossed the Appomattox River. Turner’s division, which had the lead, pushed on toward the Petersburg lines without resting. Both Gibbon’s other division commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster and Birney’s division were badly jaded by the night march. Ord, therefore, permitted these two units to halt until noon. Recent heavy rains had turned the roads into ribbons of mud. Consequently, the Army of the James’ trains were “much delayed.” It was a number of hours before the last of the heavily loaded wagons rolled across the pontoon bridge.⁷

After the troops caught their second wind, the march was renewed. Before the afternoon was over, Foster’s troops overtook Turner’s division. At dusk, Gibbon’s troops went into camp near Fort Siebert; and Birney’s people bivouacked near Humphreys’ divisions. The ground occupied by the Army of the James was immediately in the rear of the II Corps’ staging area. General Gibbon was pleased with the way his troops had conducted the 36-mile march. He reported that his soldiers had performed “one of the most remarkable marches on record with very few stragglers.”⁸

Ord’s Cavalry, led by hard-riding Brig. Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie, departed from its encampments on the north side of the James River on the evening of the 26th. Crossing the James at Varina and the Appomattox at Point of Rocks, the cavalrymen reached Humphrey’s Station at daybreak.⁹

The departure of the three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry division cut the Union strength north of the James River into two divisions. With this greatly reduced force, Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel was expected to pin Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s Corps in position, while the Army of the Potomac and Sheridan’s cavalry turned the Confederate right. In an effort to deceive the Southerners, the regimental bands were left behind and they played as usual. On the night of the 27th and for several nights afterwards, men detailed by Weitzel kept the fires going in the camps of the troops who had accompanied Ord

Before leaving for the Southside, General Ord, feeling certain that Grant’s attempt to turn the Confederates out of their Petersburg defenses would be crowned with success, left written instructions for Weitzel’s guidance in case Richmond was evacuated. Weitzel was informed as to the route he was to follow to avoid Rebel torpedoes (land mines) when he marched his men into Richmond.¹⁰

When General Meade received reports indicating that Ord’s troops would reach the area behind the II Corps by dusk on the 28th, he re-adjusted his time table. Humphreys was alerted to have his troops on the road by 6:00 a.m. Upon receipt of this news, Humphreys drafted orders which would govern the II Corps’ movements on the 29th. In accordance with Meade’s directive, Humphreys announced that his troops would be ready to move at the designated hour and Vaughan Road would serve as the corps’ line of advance.

Brigadier General William Hays’ division would take the lead. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Hays was to deploy his troops north of the Vaughan Road. Hays’ right flank was to be close enough to the stream to be covered by artillery posted at the point where the Vaughan Road crossed the river. Hays’ division would also cover Dabney’s Mill Road.¹¹

Major General Gershom Mott’s division followed Hays. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Mott’s troops were to form north of the Vaughan Road. The left flank of the division was to be extended in the direction of the Gravelly Run Friends’ Meetinghouse. Major General Nelson A. Miles’ division would march behind Mott’s. Once Miles’ division had reached the right bank of Hatcher’s Run, the general was to post his troops on Mott’s left. Miles’ battle line was to extend from the vicinity of the Gravelly Run Friends’ Meetinghouse across the Quaker Road.¹²

Each division commander was to cover his flank with a strong skirmish line. After the divisions had completed their deployment, the skirmishers were to advance and drive the Confederate outposts back inside their works.

Humphreys informed his subordinates that he expected troops from General Gibbon’s XXIV Corps to relieve their outposts about 5:00 a.m. If Gibbon’s troops failed to show up, Hays’ people were not to delay their march. Miles and Mott, however, would each leave a brigade behind to hold the lines until Gibbon’s soldiers put in an appearance.¹³

The commissary, ordnance, and quartermaster departments spent a busy day supplying the men of the II Corps. Each soldier was issued four days’ rations of hardtack, coffee, and sugar. Salt meat to last one day was rationed to each individual. Enough cattle to last the Corps for three days were cut out from the army’s herd. These would be driven with the division herds. In addition, sufficient hardtack, coffee, sugar, and salt to subsist the Corps for another eight days was loaded into the division supply wagons. Beef on the hoof calculated to last for ten days was allotted to the Corps herd. Forage for eight days was to be carried along on the expedition.

Instead of the usual 40 rounds of ammunition, each soldier would carry 50 on his person. Furthermore, enough ammunition to supply every soldier with another 20 rounds was loaded into the division wagons.

Since the army expected to move light and fast, the amount of artillery to be taken along was limited. One four-gun battery of 12-pounder Napoleons and one four-gun battery of 3-inch rifled artillery were to be allotted to each division. The three batteries that were to be left behind were to report to the IX Corps’ chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. John C. Tidball.¹⁴

Meanwhile, General Warren had drafted instructions to govern the movements of his corps. Initially, Warren worked out his plans in accordance with a directive issued by Meade on the 27th. This memorandum, for some unexplained reason, was not delivered to Warren until the following afternoon. Maj. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres’ division was scheduled to take the lead when the V Corps took the field. Two batteries and the Corps’ pontoon train would follow close on the heels of Ayres’ infantry. After breaking camp at 5:00 a.m., Ayres’ troops were to cross Arthur’s Swamp. Gaining the stage road, the division was to seize the crossing of Rowanty Creek near the Perkins farm. As soon as a bridgehead could be established, the pioneers were to lay a “double bridge.” After the two batteries had crossed the pontoon bridge, Ayres’ division would proceed to the junction of the Vaughan and Monk’s Neck roads.

Major General Charles Griffin’s division was to march behind Ayres’ batteries. The remaining batteries and the wagons with the entrenching tools were to follow Griffin’s soldiers. Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford’s division would come next. The Corps’ trains would bring up the rear.

After entering the Vaughan Road, the Corps would proceed as rapidly as possible by way of J. Kidd’s to Dinwiddie Court House. If the enemy was encountered, he was to be attacked. To expedite the march, officers were admonished to see that the men remained in the ranks and did not straggle. Warren warned “any man may be justifiably shot who . . . falls out without permission from the division commander.”

As in the case of Humphreys’ Corps, Warren’s was stripped down so that it could travel light and fast. In this respect, Warren announced that as a battle was “expected the command must be as little encumbered as possible and prepared for action so that nothing will have to be sent to the rear when the fighting begins.”¹⁵ Only five four-gun batteries (three smoothbores and two rifled) would accompany the corps. The corps’ four other attached batteries would be left behind.¹⁶

To keep the Confederates in the dark for as long as possible, Warren ordered the musicians to be left behind. After sounding reveille at the usual hour, the musicians would rejoin their units.¹⁷

Shortly after Warren had issued these orders, he received an important message from Meade’s headquarters. Opening the dispatch, Warren discovered that Meade had changed his plans. The V Corps was not to go beyond the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads until General Humphreys was in position. Upon being informed that Humphreys was ready, Warren would resume his advance. Turning into the Boydton Plank Road, Warren would take position with his right anchored on Humphreys’ left.

Several hours later the thoroughly confused Warren received a third message from Meade’s headquarters. Scanning the dispatch, Warren learned that Humphreys was uncertain of his corps’ ability to reach the Quaker Road. Accordingly, Humphreys had been directed “to place his right within supporting distance of General Ord . . . .” Humphreys would then deploy his corps, letting his formation determine where his left flank would rest. In view of these circumstances, Meade thought it would be best if Warren’s corps moved up the Quaker Road instead of the Boydton Plank Road.

This placed Warren in a quandary. He had one message directing him to advance up the Quaker Road and another up the Boydton Plank Road. Worse, Warren did not know that Humphreys’ starting time had been changed. Warren calculated that if Humphreys marched at 9:00 a.m., the V Corps would reach the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads long before the II Corps could get into position. Warren, therefore, determined to take up a strong position west of Rowanty Creek. Here he would wait while Humphreys completed his dispositions. As a result of his previous visit to the area in February at the time of the battle of Hatcher’s Run, Warren was familiar with the terrain. He knew that there was a commanding ridge on the Hargrove farm. This was one-half mile east of the Boydton Plank Road. To be prepared to meet either eventuality, Warren determined to occupy this ridge with a strong detachment. He would hold the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads with the remainder of his Corps.¹⁸

General Sheridan likewise spent the afternoon of the 28th reviewing his plans. General Crook’s division was to be in the saddle at 5:00 a.m. Riding along the Jerusalem Plank Road, Crook’s troopers were to march by way of Gary’s Church and Ream’s Station. A detachment of pioneers with three pontoon boats would accompany Crook’s column. The cavalry planned to cross Rowanty Creek at Malone’s Bridge. If necessary, the pioneers would throw a bridge across the stream. After crossing the creek, the Federals would strike for Dinwiddie Court House. Sheridan’s two other divisions, Brig. Gens. George A. Custer’s and Thomas C. Devin’s, were to hit the road as soon as Crook’s cavalrymen had cleared the area. Custer and Devin would report to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt.

All the cavalry’s wagons were to be assembled on the Jerusalem Plank Road. They would be organized into a convoy and escorted by a brigade to be detailed by General Merritt. The ambulances, however, were slated to accompany their respective divisions.

During the advance to Malone’s Bridge, strong scouting parties would be thrown out to reconnoiter all the roads on the left of the column’s line of march. After crossing Rowanty Creek, patrols would be pushed out as far as Stony Creek.¹⁹

The intelligence flowing into General Lee’s headquarters on the 27th indicated that the Union was starting to stir restlessly. Lee felt that within a few days Grant would inaugurate an offensive designed to force the Confederates to abandon their Petersburg defenses. When the Federals moved out, Lee believed they would direct their movements toward the upper reaches of Hatcher’s Run. This meandering stream covered the right flank of Lee’s army. (Rising about 15 miles west of Petersburg, Hatcher’s Run was not a part of the watershed of the Appomattox River. Instead the stream ran roughly parallel to the Appomattox for about seven miles and then it veered to the southeast to become one of the effluents of the Nottoway.) Between Hatcher’s Run and the Appomattox lay the tracks of the vital South Side Railroad, one of Lee’s two essential links with the fragment of the Cis-Mississippi Confederacy not yet occupied by the Yankees.²⁰

General Lee realized that the South Side Railroad would undoubtedly be Grant’s prime objective, if the Federals planned to drive the Confederates from Petersburg without having to storm the powerful fortifications. To reach the railroad, Lee correctly deduced that Grant would probably cross Hatcher’s Run at a point some distance from the Rebel lines. To accomplish this, the Union army would have to march westward until it reached a point beyond the Confederates’ right flank, and then strike for the railroad. Examining his maps, Lee observed that the roads which the Union army would use in gaining his right passed through a wooded area which was cut up by numerous small but troublesome streams. Because of the recent rains, these watercourses could be expected to be running bank full.

After consulting all his available sources of information, Lee decided that the Union army would probably cross Rowanty Creek at Monk’s Neck Bridge. (Rowanty Creek was formed by the confluence of Hatcher’s and Gravelly runs.) Having crossed Rowanty Creek, Lee believed the Federal column would strike for the South Side Railroad by way of Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks. The marching distance was 15 miles or a 1 % days as the roads then were. If Lee endeavored to meet this thrust by merely lengthening his front, he would be compelled to extend his lines from the Claiborne Road to a point several miles west of Five Forks. This would be a prolongation of four miles, a distance the Confederates could not hope to protect adequately. Lee had already stretched his thin line almost to the breaking point. On the twenty-seven and one-half miles held by his infantry, Lee could count an average of only 1,140 men per mile.²¹

Helping to hold the lines on the north side of the James were two divisions of James Longstreet’s Corps. At this time, these once formidable divisions had been reduced to about 6,400 effectives. It would take the advance elements of the two units a minimum of 12 hours to reach the Petersburg area in the event of a crisis.²² Brigadier General Martin W. Gary’s understrength mounted brigade was attached to Longstreet’s Corps. Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry division was stationed on the Nine Mile Road guarding the crossing of the Chickahominy. This division mustered about 1,800 officers and men, but it was a two days’ march from the point of danger.²³ The only other troops north of the James were the heavy artillery units, the Virginia Reserves, and the Local Defense Troops. This hodgepodge of troops which were assigned to the Department of Richmond totaled about 4,250, commanded by Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell.²⁴ Altogether at this time, Lee could muster north of the James about 10,000 infantry, 1,800 cavalry, and 750 heavy artillerists. To do this, however, he would have to call out all the Virginia Reserves and Local Defense Troops. Without using his second line troops, Lee could deploy about 7,500 infantry. Exclusive of Fitz Lee’s cavalry, only Longstreet’s two divisions could be used to reinforce the Confederate right.²⁵

The Howlett Line between the James and Appomattox rivers was held by Maj. Gen. William Mahone’s infantry division, almost 4,000 strong. In addition, the big guns along Mahone’s line were manned by several heavy artillery companies and detachments from the Confederate navy. Mahone’s front was nearly five miles long. The troops charged with the defense could not be reduced, because if the Federals secured a breakthrough at this point they would cut Lee’s army in two and sever communications between Richmond and Petersburg.²⁶

Major General John B. Gordon’s Corps, supported by a heavy artillery concentration, occupied the sector from the Appomattox River east of Petersburg to the point where Lieutenant’s Run passed through the Confederate lines. Gordon’s front was slightly longer than four miles. After deducting his losses suffered in his March 25 dawn attack on Fort Stedman, Gordon was able to deploy about 5,500 soldiers. If the works had not been so formidable and all the ranges plotted, this would have been a hopelessly inadequate force for the task involved.²⁷

Two divisions of Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill’s Corps held the earthworks on Gordon’s right. Hill’s front extended from Lieutenant’s Run to the fortifications covering the Boydton Plank Road at Burgess Mill. This was a distance of more than eight miles, and it was held by approximately 9,200 officers and men.²⁸

To the right of Hill’s Corps, guarding the White Oak and Claiborne roads, was Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s small Corps. At this time, Anderson’s troops consisted of Maj. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson’s division and Col. Hilary P. Jones’ artillery. Johnson’s division mustered about 4,800 officers and men.²⁹

There was no cavalry on the army’s right flank. The nearest mounted force was Maj. Gen. William H. F. “Rooney” Lee’s division which was stationed at Stony Creek Station, 40 miles away by road. There were about 2,400 troops in Rooney Lee’s command. On the 28th, while the Federals were preparing to take the field, Rooney Lee’s division was reinforced by Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser’s division, approximately 1,200 sabers. Rosser’s battered division had been serving in the Shenandoah Valley.

The only command which General Lee could count on as a reserve was Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett’s division. On March 14, Pickett’s troops had been transferred to the north side of the James to forestall a threatened sweep by Sheridan’s cavalry. When the attack failed to materialize, Pickett’s troops remained north of the river. At the time of the assault on Fort Stedman, Pickett’s division was ordered to return to the Southside. Only one brigade, Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart’s, was able to reach Petersburg on March 25 before the attack was suspended. Even so, Steuart’s troops were not committed. Following the failure of the attack on Fort Stedman, Steuart’s soldiers were permitted to camp near the city. Two of Pickett’s brigades: Brig. Gens. Montgomery D. Corse’s and William H. Terry’s were halted before they reached Petersburg and bivouacked on Swift Creek. Pickett’s other brigade, Brig. Gen. Eppa Hunton’s, had remained north of the James. All told, the strength of Pickett’s scattered command was approximately 5,000. Since the battle of Gettysburg, Pickett’s troops had remained in the background. They had, in general, been assigned to quiet sectors on the front. The division had the highest rate of desertions in the Army of Northern Virginia, which was good evidence of low morale.³⁰

It is instructive to learn just how thinly stretched Lee’s army was at this time, and why his reserve was so small. The density of the Confederate infantry and the character of the various zones, as ofMarch 27,1865, were approximately as listed in the Table 1 on the next page.

To make matters worse, Lee received an urgent dispatch from General Longstreet. “Old Pete” informed Lee that General Gary’s scouts had spotted Sheridan’s cavalry on the previous morning near Malvern Hill. At the time they were sighted, the Union cavalry was moving up the right bank of the James. By 3:00 p.m., the last of the Federal column had passed from view. (Gary’s scouts were correct. Devin’s and Custer’s cavalry division had crossed the James River at Deep Bottom on the 26th.) In addition, reports had reached Longstreet’s command post indicating that Sheridan’s troopers had left White House in great haste. Many saddles and bridles, a large quantity of ammunition, and many sacks of oats had been left behind. Prior to its departure from White House, it was stated that the Union cavalry had received 2,000 fresh horses from the remount service. The Confederate scouts were also told by the inhabitants that the troopers of Maj. Gen. August V. Kautz’s cavalry division had bragged that they had been alerted and expected to go to North Carolina.³¹

In response to this news, Lee decided to concentrate most of his cavalry on the right flank of his army. A telegram was sent to General Longstreet, directing him to send Fitz Lee’s division to the Southside. Longstreet was not too impressed with General Lee’s plan to counter the Union thrust with cavalry. Old Pete thought that, instead of stripping all cavalry from his flank, it would be wiser if Lee constituted a special task force to deal with Sheridan’s hard-driving troopers. Longstreet believed that this task force ought to be composed of “an efficient cavalry force with Pickett’s division and two or three batteries.” This command, Longstreet reasoned, could watch Sheridan and keep him off the two vital railroads. If the Union cavalry joined Sherman in North Carolina, this specially constituted task force would reinforce General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate army. Longstreet concluded “I believe that our cavalry, supported by the infantry, will be more effective against the enemy’s raiders than our cavalry alone. I believe that such a force in proper hands will be able to frustrate the objective of the enemy, as nearly all his horses must be somewhat exhausted.”³² Lee saw the logic in Longstreet’s arguments. The decision having been made, Longstreet drafted orders for Fitz Lee to move his division at daybreak on the 28th to the Southside where he would report to General Lee. Since there was very little forage in the Petersburg area, Fitz Lee would take all the provender that he could collect with him when he marched. Lee’s dismounted troopers were to be left behind to man the works on either side of the Nine Mile Road.³³

TABLE 1
Zone and Command as of March 27, 1865 and Length of the Line Held	Infantry per Mile of Defended Lines
North of the James
Fitz Lee’s cavalry on the Nine Mile Road	1,800
Longstreet, with Field’s and Kershaw’s divisions (chiefly in field works), five miles	1,360
Ewell, with Virginia Reserves, Local Defense Troops and heavy artillery (in heavy earthworks), two and one-half miles	740
Howlett Line
Mahone’s division (heavy works with naval and Heavy ordnance support), nearly five miles	740
From the Appomattox to Lieutenant’s Run
Gordon’s Corps (heavy works, enemy very close), four miles	1,350
From Lieutenant’s Run to Burgess Mill
Wilcox’s division of Hill’s Corps (some heavy works chiefly field works, about four and one-half miles	1,100
Heth’s division of Hill’s Corps (works of the same type as Wilcox’s, though not as strong, except at Burgess Mill), three and one-half miles	1,200
Average density of this line	1,150
Beyond Burgess Mill
Anderson’s Corps (light field works on extreme right), three miles	1,600
Average density (31,400 men on twenty-seven and one-half miles of line defended by infantry)	1,140
Pickett's division, a quasi-reserve	5,000
Cavalry at Stony Creek	2,400
Ordered to Stony Creek, Rosser’s division	1,200

At the same time, General Lee had alerted Rooney Lee to hold his division ready to move to the point of danger. General Lee planned to mass all his mounted troops, except Gary’s brigade, on his extreme right.³⁴

In a desperate effort to further increase his cavalry force, General Lee sent an urgent telegram to Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, the commander of the Department of Western Virginia and East Tennessee. Besides informing Early that Sheridan’s cavalry was “probably on Grant’s left,” Lee inquired into the possibility of the departmental commander’s dispatching one of Maj. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax’s brigades to Petersburg.³⁵ Early replied immediately to Lee’s communication. He reported that his department was in danger and it would be impossible to send any troops to Petersburg. ³⁶

The news reaching Lee’s headquarters from the scouts on the 28th was more foreboding than on the previous day. First, there was the report brought in by an 18-year-old girl whose parents lived inside the Union lines. At the risk of her life, she passed through the Union picket lines and informed the Confederate outposts that strong contingents from the Army of the James had crossed the James and Appomattox rivers. Lee immediately relayed this intelligence to General Longstreet. Old Pete then sent observers to check on the report. The first scouts who returned to the Confederate line reported that the only Union force that had crossed the river on the night of the 28th was a supply train. Later, several of Gary’s scouts came in and confirmed the news that Sheridan’s cavalry had moved to the Southside. In addition, they correctly reported that Mackenzie’s division was still north of the James. Longstreet’s scouts were unable to discover whether any of Ord’s infantry and artillery had crossed the river. So far, the measures that Ord had taken to conceal the movement of his troops were working to perfection.³⁷

Lee, however, could not afford to take chances. In spite of Longstreet’s failure to penetrate the cordon with which Ord had veiled his movements, Lee alerted his subordinate to be prepared to release all the troops he could spare. As the next step in his campaign to protect his right flank, Lee executed the plan which Longstreet had broached on the preceding day. He would organize a special task force composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery to deal with the threat posed by Sheridan’s cavalry. Lee realized that he might have to augment this force if the cavalry were supported by infantry. But if he did, Lee hoped to do so without being compelled to draw troops from the Confederate Petersburg and Richmond lines in such numbers as to make a Union breakthrough inevitable. Lee’s plan of operation was, in short, a compromise between the detachment of a major force and a long extension of his already attenuated defensive line.³⁸

Lee, therefore, asked Longstreet to designate Pickett’s division as the one to cooperate with the cavalry. In acknowledging Lee’s communication, Longstreet stated that he did not think he could spare Pickett. But, he continued, the danger would be much greater if Sheridan were permitted to destroy the two railroads that served as the supply lines for the Army of Northern Virginia or to rendezvous with Sherman’s army in North Carolina. Longstreet felt that the Confederates’ only recourse was to “put a force in the field that can contend against” the Federals’ mobile striking force. Curiously enough, there is no record of any preliminary discussion between Lee and Longstreet as to who should command the task force charged with stopping Sheridan’s thrust.³⁹

Once the decision to constitute a special task force had been made, instructions were drafted alerting Pickett’s scattered brigades to be ready to move to the right. Lee could not bring himself to order Pickett to start moving his brigades on the 28th. The general was still apprehensive lest the activities of Sheridan’s cavalry were a feint designed to cover an attack north of the James.⁴⁰

During the day, Lee replied to Early’s message regarding the impossibility of sending one of Lomax’s brigades to Petersburg. Besides expressing regret that the “paucity” of troops prevented Early from dispatching reinforcements, Lee ordered Early to send Lt. Col. William McLaughlin’s Artillery Battalion to the Petersburg front.⁴¹

Part II

The Advance Begins: The V Corps Wins the Battle of the Lewis Farm

Long before daybreak on the 29th, reveille sounded in the camps of Sheridan’s cavalry corps. As soon as the troopers had eaten breakfast, the officers mustered and inspected their units. After the regimental commanders had satisfied themselves that each man had drawn the prescribed 5 days’ rations, the 30 pounds of forage and 40 rounds of ammunition, the buglers sounded “Boots and Saddles.” The cavalrymen then swung into their saddles. It was daybreak when Sheridan’s powerful mounted force, 9,000 strong, departed from the Hancock’s Station staging area. Crook’s division, with which Sheridan traveled, took the lead as the troopers rode southward along the Jerusalem Plank Road.⁴²

The cavalry column marched by way of Gary’s Church and Ream’s Station. At Webb’s Farm, the Union vanguard turned into the Malone’s Bridge Road. Nothing exciting occurred to mar the march until Brig. Gen. J. Irvin Gregg’s brigade, which was spearheading Sheridan’s advance, reached Malone’s Bridge. Much to his disgust, Sheridan discovered that the Confederates had burned the bridge. While Gregg’s troopers waited for the pioneers to throw a pontoon bridge across the stream, they were fired on by a small Confederate detachment posted on the west bank. Dismounting, the troops blazed away with their Spencer carbines. The Rebels scattered, and the pioneers quickly bridged Rowanty Creek.⁴³

Gregg’s troopers then clattered across the swaying structure. Pressing forward, the troopers veered to the right and drove the butternuts across Stony Creek. Several prisoners were captured. When questioned, the Southerners told Sheridan that they belonged to Rooney Lee’s division which was camped on the Weldon Railroad near Stony Creek Station. Information gleaned from the prisoners convinced Sheridan that the Confederate cavalry would not attack his powerful column. Examining his maps, Sheridan observed that if he pushed on to Dinwiddie Court House, Rooney Lee’s command would be forced “to make a wide detour” if it were to rejoin the Army of Northern Virginia. Consequently, Sheridan decided to push on.⁴⁴

Once the column had turned off the Jerusalem Plank Road, progress of the corps’ wagon trains was slowed by “the almost impassable dirt roads” of this section of Virginia. The thousands of horses’ hoofs and hundreds of wagon wheels turned the roads into ribbons of mud. Not wishing to be delayed by his trains, Sheridan decided to march without them. Custer’s division was detached and remained at Malone’s Bridge to assist and protect the trains from Rooney Lee’s cavalry.⁴⁵

Having provided for the security of his trains, Sheridan headed for Dinwiddie Court House. Gregg’s brigade continued to lead Sheridan’s advance. Several times during the march, Gregg’s troopers clashed with small, roving-mounted Confederate patrols. These were easily brushed aside by the Union vanguard. Muddy roads, however, proved to be a bigger obstacle. It was 5:00 p.m. before the column reached Dinwiddie Court House. Even then, Batteries C and F of the 4th U.S. Light Artillery were bogged down. The artillerists were unable to accomplish the day’s objective. After occupying Dinwiddie Court House, Sheridan posted the troopers of Devin’s and Crook’s divisions so that they covered the Vaughan, Flat Foot, Boydton Plank, and Adams roads. As soon as the officers reported that their men were in position, Sheridan permitted their units to camp.⁴⁶

Custer’s combative cavalrymen discovered that they had been given a most unpleasant assignment when they were detached and detailed to guard the trains. It was late afternoon before the last of the wagons crossed Rowanty Creek. To their dismay, Custer’s troopers quickly discovered that the road west of the creek was worse, if possible, than it had been on the opposite side. The passage of Devin’s and Crook’s divisions had turned the road into a sticky slime. In a futile effort to expedite the march, Custer organized fatigue parties. These groups were put to work assisting the pioneers in corduroying the road. Progress, however, continued to be agonizingly slow. When darkness descended, the head of the train was seven miles from Dinwiddie Court House. Because the road was too narrow to permit a night march, the wagons were parked. After picketing the area, Custer permitted his exasperated troopers to bed down for the night.⁴⁷

As a result of the excitement engendered by the projected offensive and the necessity for making last minute preparations, there was very little sleep in the camps of the V Corps on the night of the 28th. Long before daybreak, the soldiers had been fed and the units formed. As anticipated, Ayres’ division was on the road by 3:00 a.m. As soon as the road was cleared, the other units of V Corps moved out in accordance with the march schedule established by Warren.⁴⁸ By 4:45 a.m., Ayres’ vanguard reached the place where Monk’s Neck Bridge had formerly stood. The few Confederates manning the outpost on the far side of Rowanty Creek fired several scattered shots at Ayres’ scouts before taking to their heels. Obtaining a precarious footing on the ruins of the bridge and fallen trees, Ayres’ infantry scrambled across the stream. After the bridgehead was established, a company of the 50th New York Engineers speedily laid a canvas pontoon bridge. After the bridge was declared passable for horses, Warren crossed with his escort. Hailing Ayres, Warren ordered the division commander to reassemble his troops and resume the advance. The troops on the left bank would cover the bridgehead.⁴⁹

For the first mile beyond Rowanty Creek, the progress of Warren’s column was slowed by the necessity to remove obstructions from the road. The Confederates had felled trees to impede the Union advance. Unlike Sheridan, Warren had little trouble with “General Mud.” Warren reported that, except in the boggy areas, the roads were dry.⁵⁰

By 8:15 a.m., the head of the V Corps reached the junction of the Monk’s Neck and Vaughan roads. Except for the few shots exchanged at the bridge and the felled timber, the Federals had failed to see any signs of Confederate activity. From an old black man who had been hiding in the woods near Crawford Church, Warren learned that there were no Rebel troops at Dinwiddie Court House as late as the previous day. Warren drafted a message containing this data and handed it to Capt. Gordon Winslow. The staff officer, accompanied by a ten-man escort, galloped up Vaughan Road to deliver copies of this dispatch to Generals Meade and Humphreys.⁵¹

While waiting to hear from army headquarters and after Winslow departed, Warren deployed his command. Ayres’ division proceeded to the intersection of the Quaker and Vaughan roads and halted. Two of Ayres’ brigades took positions at the intersection; the other was formed into line of battle and sent a short distance up Quaker Road. After Ayres’ troops had moved off the road, Griffin’s division occupied the commanding ground separating the headwaters of Great and Little Cattail runs. Griffin’s troops were posted on the Chappell, Scott, and Hargrave farms. Two of Crawford’s brigades covered the county road leading to R. Boisseaau’s farm on the Boydton Plank Road. Crawford’s other brigade—Brig. Gen. Richard Coulter’s—guarded the corps’ train. The trains were parked at the junction of the Monk’s Neck and Vaughan roads.⁵²

The country into which the V Corps had marched and where the subsequent operations were to be conducted:

was of the forest kind common to Virginia, being well watered by swampy streams. The surface was level and the soil clayey and sandy, and, where these mixed together, like quicksand. The soil after the frosts of winter first leave it is very light and soft, and hoofs and wheels find but little support.⁵³

Upon questioning the inhabitants, Warren learned that Brig. Gen. Rufus Barrington’s North Carolina cavalry brigade had passed down Quaker Road the previous day. The farmers stated that the Confederate troopers had remarked that they were en route to Stony Creek.⁵⁴

At 10:20 a.m., Maj. William Jay of Meade’s staff galloped up to Warren’s command post, and handed Warren a dispatch from General Meade. Opening the message, Warren found that he was to move his Corps up Quaker Road to the Gravelly Crossing. Furthermore, Meade thought that if Warren sent out patrols on his right, he would contact Humphreys’ left near J. Slaughter’s house.⁵⁵

Replying to Meade’s communication, Warren gave a brief resume of the position of his corps. He informed his superior that his skirmishers on Quaker Road had probably already penetrated as far as Gravelly Run. If they hadn’t, Warren assured Meade, he would see that they did. Warren also passed on the information he had picked up concerning Barringer’s activities.⁵⁶

Warren continued to mark time while his patrols tried to establish a liaison with Humphreys’ corps. When the fiery Meade received Warren’s message, he simmered. It was evident that Warren had misinterpreted his orders. Instead of advancing in force up the Quaker Road, Warren had sent a force of skirmishers to the Gravelly Run crossing. Meade, calling to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Alexander S. Webb, told him to send a second message to Warren. After expressing his approval of the dispositions Warren had made to cover his left flank and rear, the general observed that “this must not prevent you moving your Corps up the Quaker Road across Gravelly Run . . . .” After he had crossed the stream, Warren was to form his corps facing north and anchor his right on Humphreys’ left. Only after this maneuver had been completed would Warren provide for the security of his left flank. If possible, Warren was to hold the Boydton Plank Road.⁵⁷

This message which General Webb signed at 11:20 a.m. was entrusted to Capt. Campbell D. Emery. A glance at the piece of paper convinced Warren that he had misunderstood Meade’s intentions. Hailing a staff officer, Warren sent him racing to tell General Griffin to move his division up the Quaker Road. General Crawford was alerted to hold his command ready to support Griffin’s advance. When he had taken care of this urgent business, Warren informed army headquarters of the measures he had undertaken to implement Meade’s instructions.

Shortly thereafter, General Meade and his staff rode up to Warren’s command post. After conferring briefly, the two generals accompanied Griffin’s vanguard as it trudged up the Quaker Road.⁵⁸

Unlike Sheridan’s and Warren’s corps, Humphreys’ did not get started at the designated hour. It was 6:30 a.m.—one-half hour after the scheduled time—before Humphreys’ advance division, Hays’, moved out of the Petersburg investment line.⁵⁹ Turning into the Vaughan Road, the troops passed through the picket line and crossed Hatcher’s Run without difficulty.

Even before all of the troops had reached the right bank, Hays sent a strong combat patrol composed of the 7th West Virginia, the 7th Michigan, and the 4th Ohio to reconnoiter the area into which the II Corps was moving. The bluecoats advanced about one and one-half miles without discovering any Confederates. They then retraced their steps and reported their findings to General Hays.⁶⁰

When the patrol returned, Hays halted his division one-half mile west of Hatcher’s Run.⁶¹ In accordance with Humphreys’ instructions, Hays deployed his troops about one-half mile north of the road. Two brigades—Brig. Gens. Thomas A. Smyth’s and Col. James P. McIver’s—were formed into line of battle. McIver’s right flank rested near the run. The opposite side of the stream was held by the troops of General Gibbon’s XXIV Corps. Hays’ other brigade—Col. William A. Olmsted’s—was held in reserve.⁶²

Mott’s division followed Hays’ across Hatcher’s Run. About one mile west of the run, Mott deployed his division north of the Vaughan Road. Two of Mott’s brigades—Brig. Gens. Byron R. Pierce’s and Robert McAllister’s—were formed into line of battle; the other, Brig. Gen. Regis de Trobriand’s, was held in reserve. The right flank of Pierce’s brigade rested on the left flank of Hays’ division. As soon as his troops were in position, General Mott put them to work throwing up a line of earthworks.⁶³

Close on the heels of Mott’s troops, Miles’ soldiers marched out of their camp near the Squirrel Level Road. By 8:30 a.m., the last of Miles’ division had crossed Hatcher’s Run. Passing beyond the area where Mott was marshaling his soldiers, Miles stopped his command. Miles then formed his division north of the Vaughan Road; its right rested on Mott’s unit and its left on Gravelly Run.⁶⁴ Since Miles had four brigades, he deployed three of them into line of battle—Brig. Gen. John Ramsey’s on the left, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Medill in the center, and Col. George W. Scott’s on the right. Col. Robert Nugent’s brigade was held in reserve.⁶⁵ After the troops had taken their positions, breastworks were constructed.⁶⁶

Except for Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, all the artillery units attached to the II Corps were parked once they had crossed Hatcher’s Run. The Rhode Islanders, however, unlimbered their four 12-pounder Napoleons on the north side of the Vaughan Road about one-half mile west of the watercourse. Once they had emplaced their guns, the cannoneers trained them on Dabne/s Mill.⁶⁷

While the infantry was forming, Humphreys sent out several mounted patrols. By 9:00 a.m., one of them had succeeded in opening communications byway of the Vaughan Road with Warren’s Corps. A second group moved up the valley of Gravelly Run to the Quaker Road. Encountering a few Confederate vedettes, the Yankees drove them up the Quaker Road. Beyond the “old saw-mill,” the bluecoats were fired on by an infantry outpost. Because the Confederates were protected by breastworks, the Unionists returned and reported their findings to Humphreys.

When the division commanders completed their dispositions, they covered their fronts with a strong line of skirmishers.⁶⁸ Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter. The scouts returned with information that they had pinpointed the outlying Confederate defenses in this sector. They stated that the Confederate outposts were sheltered behind a line of breastworks covering the approaches to Dabney’s Mill. This was about three-fourths of a mile in front of the ground held by the II Corps.⁶⁹ Humphreys, however, had to postpone his attack on these Confederate fortifications while Warren was getting into position.

Early on the 29 th, Gibbon’s Army of the James corps marched out of its camp behind Fort Siebert. In accordance with Grant’s orders, Gibbon’s troops moved into the entrenchments formerly held by the II Corps.⁷⁰ General Foster’s division occupied the fortifications from Fort Sampson on the right to Hatcher’s Run on the left.⁷¹ Turner’s division was held in reserve and camped east of Hatcher’s Run near the Vaughan Road.⁷² During the early afternoon, two of Turner’s regiments were sent across Hatcher’s Run. These two units were posted in support of the four guns of Battery B, 1st New Jersey Light Artillery.⁷³

Later in the day in accordance with General Ord’s instructions, Gibbon saw that all his troops were supplied with four days’ rations which were to be carried in their haversacks. Rations to last an additional eight days were stored in the corps’ wagons. To the soldiers, this was a certain indication that a period of active campaigning was in the offing.⁷⁴

General Birney’s black division, which had accompanied Gibbon’s corps to the Southside, remained at Humphreys’ Station throughout the day.⁷⁵

News that the Yankees had crossed Rowanty Creek reached General Lee’s headquarters before noon. When the scouts brought in this information, they stated that infantry and cavalry had crossed the stream at Monk’s Neck Bridge and were massing toward Dinwiddie Court House.⁷⁶ Lee, as he informed Longstreet, was unable to deduce from these fragmentary reports the immediate Union objective.⁷⁷ The situation, however, was so critical that Lee would have to take some action. Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan’s brigade of Wilcox’s division was pulled out of the defense lines on the east side of Hatcher’s Run. Following the withdrawal of McGowan’s troops, Wilcox’s three other brigades had to spread out to cover the vacated rifle pits. McGowan’s brigade was sent to the sector west of Burgess Mill held by Anderson’s corps.

With this business taken care of, Lee directed Pickett to transfer Corse’s and Terry’s brigades from the Swift Creek staging area to Petersburg. At Petersburg, Pickett was joined by Steuart’s brigade. The three brigades then entrained on the cars of the South Side Railroad, which the railroad authorities had previously spotted in the Petersburg yards. The troops were then sent to Sutherland’s Station, ten miles west of Petersburg, where they detrained. Many hours were required to make this shift. It was late on the night of the 29th before the last of Pickett’s three brigades had been shuttled to Sutherland’s Station.

While General Lee was drafting the orders for the movement of Pickett’s and McGowan’s soldiers, Fitz Lee rode up to his headquarters. The cavalryman informed his uncle that his division, which had left Nine Mile Road the day before, was in Petersburg. General Lee told his nephew that Sheridan was striking for Dinwiddie Court House. Lee stated that he thought the Union cavalry would concentrate at Five Forks before breaking up the South Side Railroad. Fitz Lee was to go to Sutherland’s Station where he would be joined by Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s cavalry and Pickett’s infantry. Fitz Lee was then to attack Sheridan. General Lee was confident that the only way the raid could be stopped was to wrest the initiative from the Yankees. To ensure cooperation between the three cavalry divisions—which had not been under a unified command since Lieutenant General Wade Hampton’s departure form the Virginia theater of operations—Lee told Fitz Lee to take charge of the cavalry corps. No written instructions, however, were given Fitz Lee on this matter. Fitz Lee was to give a strict interpretation of these verbal orders long after the entire complexion of affairs changed.⁷⁸

Taking leave of his uncle, Fitz Lee rejoined his division. At an order from the general, the troopers again moved out. To reach the Sutherland’s Station rendezvous area, Lee’s cavalrymen took Cox Road as they rode out of Petersburg. Reaching Sutherland’s Station, Fitz Lee’s division camped, pending the arrival of Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s troopers.⁷⁹

As the next item on his agenda, General Lee issued instructions for Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s division to report to Fitz Lee. Since Sheridan’s column had cut direct communications between Petersburg and Stony Creek, these two divisions would have to detour to the west of Dinwiddie Court House if they were to carry out their assignment. Consequently, Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s grey clads were unable to join Fitz Lee until the evening of the 30th.⁸⁰

After arranging for the protection of the South Side Railroad, General Lee realized that steps would have to be taken to guard the Richmond and Danville Railroad. The latter railroad was almost as vulnerable to a Union raid as the former. Accordingly, Lee decided to use Pickett’s other brigade, Hunton’s, which was stationed north of the James, to fend off any raids the Federals might be planning on the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Eppa Hunton’s brigade was to be withdrawn from the rifle pits flanking the Williamsburg Road. To avoid the allurements of the Richmond streets, Hunton’s grey clads were to cross the James River by way of the pontoon bridge located below the city and camp near Manchester. From Man- chester, Hunton’s troops could be shifted by rail to either Petersburg or Burke’s Station, as the situation demanded. It was late afternoon before Gary’s troopers relieved Hunton’s infantry. By then, however, the situation had changed drastically.⁸¹

Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson

Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park

Lee would have preferred to withdraw additional units from north of the James to confront the Union threat to his right. But before doing this, he decided to get Longstreet’s reactions. When Lee informed Longstreet of the latest developments on the Southside, he stated that Old Pete might have to come to Petersburg with Field’s division. In the meantime, Lee wanted Longstreet to ascertain what Union troops were stationed north of the James.⁸² Longstreet replied, “The usual force is in our front, so far as we can learn. Our scouts are in from the enemy’s line this morning, and report affairs as usual.” (Evidently, General Weitzel was carrying out his mission. More than 60 hours had passed since Ord had led three of his infantry divisions to the Southside, and still Longstreet was in the dark regarding this movement.) Longstreet observed that if Fields’ men were moved, the VMI Cadets Local Defense Troops must be called out to take their places in the lines.⁸³

Meanwhile, General Anderson, whose Corps was directly threatened by the Union advance, began to institute measures which he hoped would enable his command to cope with the situation. General Johnson was authorized to recall his outposts as soon as he was satisfied that the Federals were moving in force up the Quaker Road. To cover the pickets’ retreat, Johnson was directed to post one of his brigades in advance of the earthworks.⁸⁴

About noon, Johnson learned from his scouts that a strong Union force (Warren’s Corps) was coming up the Quaker Road. Johnson immediately forwarded this information to Anderson. The corps commander replied, directing Johnson to take his division, attack the bluecoats, and drive them back to the Vaughan Road. Just as Johnson’s butternuts were starting to form, several excited cavalrymen galloped up. They informed Johnson that the foe was “retiring beyond Gravelly Run.” Consequently, Johnson did not anticipate meeting the foe until after his troops reached the stream. When his division moved out of the works, Johnson had Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise form his Virginia brigade into line of battle. One of Wise’s regiments, the 34th Virginia, was detached and sent to support the cavalry patrols operating on the Boydton Plank Road. Brig. Gens. William E. Wallace’s, Young M. Moody’s, and Matthew W. Ransom’s brigades marched by the flank in the rear of Wise’s battle line. Wise’s Virginians passed beyond the forks of the Boydton Plank and Quaker roads before they encountered any Federals. As the grey clads entered the skirt of the woods north of the junction, they were fired upon by Warren’s skirmishers.⁸⁵

Advancing up the Quaker Road, Warren’s vanguard soon reached Gravelly Run. To their disgust, the Federals found that the Confederates had broken down the bridge. Undaunted, General Griffin shouted for Brig. Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain to deploy his brigade into line of battle. Chamberlain’s troops were to cross the run and occupy the rifle pits which were visible on the far side. Plunging into the water, Chamberlain’s eager troops experienced considerable difficulty in wading across the waist-deep stream. Upon gaining the left bank, Chamberlain deployed and threw forward a battalion of the 198th Pennsylvanians as skirmishers. The remainder of the 198th Pennsylvania and the 185th New York were formed into line of battle on either side of the road. After these dispositions had been completed, Chamberlain’s troops advanced and drove the Confederate outposts out of the earthworks guarding the crossing. Chamberlain’s troops continued to push ahead until they reached Lewis’ farm. Observing that the foe (part of Johnson’s division) was posted in strength on the opposite side of the clearing, Chamberlain halted the pursuit. No farther advance would be undertaken, pending the arrival of the remainder of Griffin’s division.⁸⁶

As soon as Chamberlain’s troops had established a bridge- head, Warren directed Griffin’s pioneers to construct a bridge. Within a short time, a usable structure was thrown across the stream. When this bridge was completed, the remainder of Griffin’s division crossed the run. Warren and Meade now parted. The corps commander accompanied Griffin’s division and the army commander returned to his command post. Later in the afternoon, the 50th New York Engineers, to help facilitate the crossing of the artillery, laid a pontoon bridge at this point. The banks were very steep and the artillery could not cross the pontoon bridge until proper approaches had been made. It therefore took the batteries considerable time to affect a passage of Gravelly Run.⁸⁷

Major General Bushrod R. Johnson

Library of Congress

Having reached the right bank of Gravelly Run, the remainder of Griffin’s division tramped up the Quaker Road. The road was choked with felled timber. To secure the advance of the artillery, the pioneers were put to work clearing away the obstructions. Even so, Griffin’s troops forged ahead of the II Corps. Humphreys’ troops, who were advancing on the right of Warren’s Corps, were having a difficult time working their way through the wooded countryside between the Quaker Road and Hatcher’s Run.⁸⁸

Upon overtaking Chamberlain’s brigade at the Lewis farm, Griffin ordered his subordinate to resume the advance. Griffin also had Col. Edgar M. Gregory deploy his brigade on Chamberlain’s left.⁸⁹ At this time, the firing on the skirmish line had practically died out. Consequently, Chamberlain reformed his battle line at the Lewis house. After reinforcing his battalion of skirmishers with a company from the 185th New York, Chamberlain moved his men forward. The brigade swept ahead. Chamberlain’s skirmishers gained the woods on the far side of the clearing before the fire of the Confederates became severe. The general hoped that his battle line would likewise reach the timber before the grey clads sprang into action. This was not to be. Before the bluecoated battle line gained the woods, Wise’s Virginians started to blaze away with a vengeance. Chamberlain’s troops recoiled for an instant. Urged on by their officers, the Yankees recovered their poise and forged ahead. Attacking fiercely, Chamberlain’s troops forced part of Wise’s brigade to fall back into the open ground south of the junction of the Boydton Plank and Quaker roads.⁹⁰

General Anderson rode up as Wise’s troops were falling back. The corps commander directed Johnson to have Wallace’s brigade support the part of Wise’s brigade that still contested the Union advance. At a word from Wallace, his grim South Carolinians moved into the woods on the right of Wise’s Virginians.⁹¹

After forcing Wise’s grey clads to fall back about a mile, Chamberlain halted his brigade. Even though they had encountered only a few pockets of resistance, Gregory’s Yankees were unable to keep pace with Chamberlain’s troops. While Chamberlain was regrouping his brigade and waiting for Gregory to come up, Wise’s and Wallace’s soldiers launched a powerful counterattack. Soon, Chamberlain’s troops were “completely enveloped in a withering fire.” Taken by surprise, the Northerners were thrown on the defensive. At the end of one-half hour’s combat, Chamberlain’s left began to give ground. Redoubling the fury of their onslaught, the Rebels turned Chamberlain’s left flank. Falling back, the Federals took position in a clearing. Here, the line occupied by the left flank of the brigade was parallel with the Quaker Road. Chamberlain’s battle line, instead of being straight, was L-shaped.⁹²

The Confederates quickly moved against Chamberlain’s reorganized main line of resistance. So terrible was the Southerner’s onslaught that Chamberlain despaired of holding his new position for longer than ten minutes. In desperation, the general sent a request to Col. Gregory (whose brigade had now arrived) to attack the Rebels on the right flank when they renewed their assault on his battered command. In the meantime, General Griffin had galloped up. Griffin assured Chamberlain that if he would hold on for five more minutes, the artillery would be up. Shouting this encouraging news to his men, Chamberlain succeeded in rallying them.

Two batteries had followed Griffin’s division up the Quaker Road. While the infantry was able to march up the timber-strewn road with comparatively little difficulty, the artillery was stopped cold. Finally, however, the pioneers cut a path and Battery B, 4th U.S. Light Artillery thundered up the road. Reaching the Lewis clearing at a critical moment, the cannoneers unlimbered their four pieces. A section was emplaced on each side of the Lewis house. Going into action immediately, the artillerists hammered away at the oncoming Confederates. The two 12-pounder Napoleons on the west side of the house raked Wise’s hard-charging Virginians with canister.⁹³

When General Johnson observed that Wise’s troops had closed to within canister range of the Union guns, he shouted for General Moody’s Alabamians to move to the attack. The Alabamians formed on Wise’s left and charge the guns. At a word from Moody, the cheering Alabamians started forward on the double.⁹⁴

Supported by the fire of Battery B’s four smoothbores, Chamberlain’s left flank companies recovered the initiative. Counterattacking, they re-entered the woods. Feeling for an opening, the Confederates, following the arrival of Moody’s Alabamians, started to exert tremendous pressure on Chamberlain’s right and center. By this time, many of the Federals had fired up all the rounds in their cartridge-boxes. In addition, the cartridge-boxes of friend and foe were rifled. Many of the troops, refusing to trust the bayonet, began to slink to the rear. To stave off disaster, Chamberlain sent a second plea to Gregory for help. At the same time, General Griffin, sensing that his subordinate was in grave trouble, rushed three of Brig. Gen. JosephJ. Bartlett’s regiments—the 1st and 15th Michigan and the 155th Pennsylvania—to Chamberlain’s assistance. In response to Chamberlain’s plea, Gregory sent the 188th New York. These fresh troops arrived none too soon. As they came up on the double, Chamberlain’s battered brigade fell back on the Lewis house to protect the artillery.⁹⁵

It seemed that Chamberlain was omnipresent. The general circulated along the battle line, urging his men to hold on for a few more minutes. The general became a target. Chamberlain’s faithful charger “Charlemagne” was shot from under him, and the general’s arm was disabled when his steed fell. A minie ball struck him in the chest, glanced over his chest, and left a painful wound and “a disreputable-looking coat.” Chamberlain, however, refused to relinquish his command.⁹⁶

Passing through Chamberlain’s retreating brigade, the fresh regiments moved to the attack. On the right, Bartlett’s three regiments led by Col. Alfred L. Pearson, who had grasped the colors of the 155th Pennsylvania, dashed straight toward the Confederate battle line.⁹⁷ As the 188th New York emerged from the woods into the Lewis clearing, Lt. Col. Isaac Doolittle saw that Bartlett’s battle line was sweeping forward on the right. Deploying on the double, the New Yorkers joined in the charge. Taking cover behind piles of sawdust which served them as breastworks, the Southerners blazed away at the oncoming Yankees.

By this time, the southerners had had enough. When Anderson was informed that the Yankees had thrown in fresh troops and stopped his advance, he ordered Johnson to recall his soldiers. Covered by a strong rear guard, Moody’s, Wallace’s, and Wise’s troops pulled out of the woods north of the Lewis farm. Falling back, the Southerners established a roadblock on the Boydton Plank Road. Johnson posted his troops on the edge of the woods north and east of the Bevill house.⁹⁸

While Chamberlain’s brigade was fighting for its life, General Warren observed that a country lane cut across the Quaker Road a little south of the Lewis house. The general felt that if he sent a detachment up this road, it might be able to gain the Boydton Plank Road and turn the Confederates right flank. Calling for Capt. Napoleon J. Horrell, Warren directed him to take the escort company and reconnoiter the lane.⁹⁹

Before Horrell’s troopers had gone far, they were fired upon by the outposts of the 34th Virginia. This regiment had been given the task of guarding the Boydton Plank Road. As soon as Warren learned that his escort company was in contact with the Rebels, he ordered General Crawford to take his division and support the cavalry. Before taking up the advance, Crawford had Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter deploy his brigade into line of battle. The right flank of Baxter’s brigade rested on Griffin’s left. Col. John A. Kellogg’s brigade was massed in the rear of Baxter’s unit. Once these dispositions were completed, Crawford sent his troops forward. Passing through the escort company’s skirmishers, Crawford’s battle line easily drove in the Confederate pickets covering the approaches to the Boydton Plank Road. By this time, Griffin’s troops had broken the back of Johnson’s attack. When Col. John T. Goode of the 34th Virginia learned that Johnson was falling back, he decided to do the same. Skillfully breaking contact with the bluecoats, the Virginians rejoined their comrades. Following the Confederates retreat, Crawford’s troops reached the Boydton Plank Road.¹⁰⁰

Two of Ayres’ brigades crossed Gravelly Run close on the heels of Crawford’s troops. Since the emergency had passed, these two units were held in reserve near the Spain house. For the time being, Ayres’ other brigade, which was escorting the Corps’ train, remained south of the run.¹⁰¹

About 4:00 p.m., General Humphreys received a message from army headquarters informing him that the V Corps, on his left, was advancing up the Quaker Road. Humphreys was directed to advance his Corps and connect his left with Warren’s right.¹⁰²

Earlier in the afternoon, several of Humphreys’ subordinates had sent strong combat patrols to feel the Confederate defense in their sectors. On the right, one of General Hays’ brigade commanders, Col. William A. Olmstead, had made a forced reconnaissance. Three of Colonel Olmsted’s regiments—the 19th Maine, and the 59th and 152nd New York—were brought up from the reserve. Spearheaded by the 19th Maine, this combat patrol reached and occupied Dabney’s Mill. Like Hays, Mott also sent three regiments to explore no man’s land. After advancing about three-quarters of a mile, two of Mott’s units—the 17th Maine and the 93rd New York—came upon a line of breastworks held by a few pickets. Brig. Gen. Byron R. Pierce, who was in charge of the patrol, deployed part of the 93rd New York as skirmishers. Springing forward, the New Yorkers put the Confederates to flight and occupied the rifle pits west of Dabney’s Mill.¹⁰³ The other regiment sent out by General Mott, the 20th Indiana, failed to spot any signs of Confederate activity.¹⁰⁴

Accordingly, when Humphreys received his instructions to advance, he was reasonably certain that his men would not encounter much opposition. After the staff officers had relayed the word to Humphreys’ subordinates, the II Corps battle line moved forward. Miles’ left flank brigade, Ramsey’s, established contact with Warren’s right. As a result of the dense woods and tangled underbrush, this connection was repeatedly broken. Ramsey halted his brigade while communications were re-established.¹⁰⁵

Suddenly, the roar of battle was heard from the direction of the Quaker road. Shortly thereafter, Humphreys received a message from army headquarters stating that General Griffin had been attacked by two Confederate divisions. Humphreys was directed to support Griffin’s right with Miles’ division.¹⁰⁶ After relaying the necessary instructions to Miles, Humphreys rode to the point of danger. By the time he reached Griffin’s command post, the Confederates had fallen back. Here he was handed a message from Meade’s headquarters, dated 5:40 p.m. Humphreys learned that Warren was scheduled to make another attack at 6:00 p.m. If Miles could be spared, Humphreys was to support Warren’s advance. Furthermore, if Humphreys believed he could score any additional gains, he was to send his entire corps forward. Following the receipt of these instructions, Humphreys issued orders for his division commanders to continue the advance.¹⁰⁷

Two of Griffin’s brigades, Bartlett’s and Gregory’s, pressed forward hard on the heels of Johnson’s rear guard. Warren, as usual, was at the front with the skirmishers. Union skirmishers gained the junction of the Boydton Plank and Quaker roads. Soon, before they reached the junction, Johnson’s troops, in accordance with Anderson’s directive, retired into the fortifications covering the White Oak road. Outposts were left by the Confederates to contest the Federals’ drive.

Advancing beyond the junction, the Federals approached J. Stroud’s farm. Confederate sharpshooters posted in the Stroud house picked off several bluecoats. A combat patrol from the 118th Pennsylvania, led by Captain George W. Moore and Lieutenant William T. Godwin, sprinted toward the house. Unable to stop the onrushing Yankees, the Southerners abandoned the building. Occupying the house, the bluecoats rushed to the windows and blazed away at the rapidly disappearing grayclads. A section of artillery posted behind an earthwork covering the White Oak road returned the Yankees’ fire. The battery commander standing on top of the works directing the cannoneers paid no attention to the Yankees. The first shell from the Rebel field pieces passed over the house, the second struck it, and the third exploded in the chimney, wounding two men. Brick and plaster “flew about thick, enveloping the new occupants of the structure in dust and rubbish.” The house was hurriedly evacuated.¹⁰⁸

If Griffin’s men were to attack the Confederate battery, they would have to cross a large open field. To make matters more difficult for Griffin’s troops, the thick woods which flanked the Quaker road had prevented Crawford’s and Miles’ soldiers from keeping pace with them. Darkness blanketed the area before Crawford’s and Miles’ bluecoats drew abreast of Griffin’s. In the light of these difficulties, Warren decided against an attack on the Confederate earthworks guarding the approaches to the White Oak road.¹⁰⁹

Thus closed the battle of Lewis’ Farm. The Confederates reported that they lost about 250 men in this engagement. General Warren listed his casualties as: 53 killed, 306 wounded and 22 missing. If the report of General Chamberlain is to be believed, the Confederates understated their losses. Chamberlain boasted that his brigade, on the 30th, buried 130 Rebels who had fallen in the battle. In addition, Warren reported the capture of about 100 Rebels.¹¹⁰

Part III

Grant Modifies His Master Plan

The favorable way in which events were developing on the 29th led Grant to change his plan of operations. He decided to have Sheridan, for the time being, forego his projected raid on the Confederate railroads. In a letter informing the cavalry leader of the day’s happenings, Grant wrote: “I now feel like ending the matter (the investment of Petersburg) if it is possible to do so before going back.” After telling Sheridan to forget about the raid, Grant ordered the cavalryman “to push round the enemy if you can and get onto his right rear.” The cavalry would make this movement, Grant observed, in concert with the infantry. Grant cautioned Sheridan that the activities of the Confederate cavalry might cause him to modify his action. Sheridan was to put his new set of instructions into operation in the morning.¹¹¹

At the same time, Grant addressed a message to Meade informing him that “Sheridan has received orders to push for the enemy’s right rear in the morning, unless the position of . . . the Confederate cavalry makes a different course necessary.” Grant also outlined for his subordinate the moves which he wanted the II and V Corps to undertake on the 30th. If Warren’s advance up the Boydton Plank Road should compel the Confederates to fall back behind Hatcher’s Run during the night, the II and V Corps were “to wheel to the right so as to cover all the crossing of the run.” If the Rebels did not retire across the run, the Federals were to “push up close to his and feel out to . . . their left and endeavor to force him to this course.”¹¹²

In the meantime, Meade had already drafted a set of instructions to guide his corps commanders. Warren was directed to have his V Corps resume the advance at 6:00 a.m. The right flank of the V Corps was to extend across the Quaker Road; its left was to be pushed into the countryside west of the road.¹¹³

Humphreys’ II Corps was to move forward at the same time. The II Corps’ right flank division of Hays’ was to advance along the road leading from Dabney’s Mill to J. Crow’s farm. Miles’ division on Humphreys’ left would continue to maintain contact with Warren’s right, and if necessary, render support to the V Corps. Each of Humphreys’ three divisions was expected to hold one brigade in reserve. Humphreys’ and Warren’s troops were to force the Rebels to fall back into their fortifications. If, however, the Confederates came out of their works, the Yankees were “to give battle.”¹¹⁴

After evaluating Warren’s after action reports from the afternoon of the 29th, the Union brass were reasonably certain that in the Burgess Mill sector, Griffin’s division had forced the Confederates to retire into the earthworks. This intelligence, taken in conjunction with Grant’s orders, caused Meade to modify his previous instructions to Warren. As soon as Warren had ascertained that Meade’s interpretation of the tactical situation was correct, he was to extend his line to the left. Combat patrols would then be thrown out in an effort to pinpoint the Confederate positions west of the Boydton Plank Road. This dispatch reached Warren’s command post an hour before midnight.¹¹⁵

At the same time, Grant issued orders for General Ord to have one of his divisions cross Hatcher’s Run at 5:00 a.m. on the 30th. The soldiers from the Army of the James were to support Humphreys’ Corps.¹¹⁶

The staff officer entrusted with Grant’s message regarding the change in plans reached Dinwiddie Court House on the night of the 29th. Ushered into General Sheridan’s headquarters, the aide handed the cavalry leader Grant’s letter. Without a moment’s hesitation, Sheridan made his plans to cope with the changed situation. Sheridan proposed to send General Merritt with Devin’s division to gain possession of Five Forks. Crook’s division would be held in reserve; Custer’s would continue to protect the trains.¹¹⁷

It rained very hard throughout the night. When Devin mustered his division on the morning of the 30th, the rain was still falling. Before taking leave of Sheridan, Merritt received last minute instructions. Merritt was told that Devin’s division was to advance via Adams Road to J. Boisseau’s farm. If no opposition was encountered, the Federals were to turn into Crump Road and try to gain White Oak Road. Merritt then rejoined his command. When Merritt gave the word, the column moved out.¹¹⁸

Except for several brief stops to remove a few felled trees from the road, the march was routine. Two miles north of Dinwiddie Court House, Merritt halted the division. In accordance with Merritt’s instructions, Devin posted Col. Charles L. Fitzhugh’s brigade at the intersection of Brooks and Adams roads. One of Fitzhugh’s regiments advanced along Brooks Road and established a roadblock on the Boydton Plank Road. The rain-drenched column then continued to J. Boisseau’s farm. Devin massed one of his two remaining brigades, Col. Peter Stagg’s, at the junction of the Dinwiddie and Crump Roads. The general would use Brig. Gen. Alfred Gibb’s brigade for reconnaissance. Altogether, Gibbs sent out three combat patrols. Two of Gibb’s regiments—the 5th and 6th U.S. Cavalry—were sent up Dinwiddie Road with instructions “to feel and find the enemy.” Maj. R. Murray Morris of the 6th Cavalry was in charge of this patrol. The 6th Massachusetts—Col. Casper Crowninshield commanding—moved across to reconnoiter Boydton Plank Road. Col. Charles L. Leiper’s 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry advanced up Crump Road. The Pennsylvanians were to see if they could block White Oak Road. In addition, Leiper was to maintain contact with Harris’ and Crowninshield’s patrols.¹¹⁹

Within a short time the three Union patrols had established contact with Confederate outposts. These were the first butternuts that the cavalrymen had seen since leaving Dinwiddie Court House. Attacking, the bluecoats drove the Rebel vedettes back on their supports.¹²⁰

Although no fresh reports from the endangered right reached Lee’s headquarters on the morning of the 30th, the general became convinced that he would have to send additional reinforcements if he were to take the initiative against Sheridan. Any withdrawal from the Petersburg defense line was dangerous. But unless Lee was willing to have his right turned, there was no other alternative. Grimly, Lee issued instructions for General Gordon’s Corps to assume responsibility for the defense of a two-mile section of the earthworks on the west side of Lieutenant Run. These trenches were held by Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox’s division. Once Gordon’s troops had relieved Wilcox’s, Lee would reinforce his endangered right. Gordon planned to use Maj. Gen. Bryan Grimes’ division to relieve Wilcox’s left flank units.

Having taken care of this business, Lee rode out to Sutherland’s Station learned that Fitz Lee’s division was en route to Five Forks. The general was disturbed to learn that Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s troopers had not arrived from Stony Creek.¹²¹

Under the cover of darkness, Pickett’s three infantry brigades had marched form Sutherland’s Station to Burgess Mill. It was a cold, rainy night. The road was a ribbon of mud; the angry little streams athwart the division’s path were almost past fording. On the morning of the 30th, Anderson, Pickett, Heth, and several other ranking officers were summoned to a conference with General Lee at Sutherland’s Station.

At this meeting, the Rebel brass discussed various ways of dealing with Sheridan, but only two seemed promising. Heth expressed the view that, from his extended front, he might strike the advancing bluecoats a heavy blow. Pickett, however, seemed to have a better opportunity. He was told that he was to use his three brigades, and two of Johnson’s (Ransom’s and Wallace’s) in the projected attack. As the initial step in Lee’s battle plan, Pickett’s command was to march west on Five Forks, where his infantrymen would rendezvous with Fitz Lee’s cavalry. From Five Forks, with the cavalry in support, Pickett was to march toward Dinwiddie Court House and assail the Yankees. Six of Pegram’s guns were slated to go with Pickett. If the Confederates could drive Sheridan from Dinwiddie Court House, they would frustrate the Federal drive to cut General Lee’s vital supply lines. By these orders, Lee had carried out the suggestion originally advanced by Longstreet. A mobile task force had been concentrated and given the mission of guarding the army’s right flank. This force, when assembled, would consist of about 6,400 infantry and 4,200 cavalry. Having completed his business at Sutherland’s Station, Lee returned to Petersburg.¹²²

Transfer of Johnson’s two brigades to augment Pickett’s task force had dangerously reduced the infantry strength of Anderson’s small corps. Unless units were brought from other sectors to take their places on the lines, Anderson would have to spread his remaining men very thin. The position held by Anderson’s Corps was important in itself, and it also constituted the sector from which troops could be drawn quickest in case additional reinforcements had to be sent to Pickett. Accordingly, Lee moved to shift additional troops into this area. Brig. Gen. William MacRae’s brigade of Heth’s Division was transferred from the east to the west bank of Hatcher’s Run. MacRae’s troops were stationed east of Burgess Mill. One of Wilcox’s brigades—Col. Joseph H. Hyman’s—was transferred from the Lieutenant’s Run area to the rifle pits south of Burgess Mill. Following the arrival on the west side of Hatcher’s Run, McGowan’s brigade was temporarily attached to Anderson’s Corps. Hunton’s brigade, which arrived from Richmond on the morning of the 30th, was assigned to hold the works near the junction of the Claiborne and White Oak Roads. Hunton would receive his orders from General Johnson. The trenches vacated by this shift to the right were occupied by Grimes’ troops.¹²³

The changes effected by Lee left the dispositions of the Confederate troops on the right on the 30th are as shown in Table 2 on the previous page.

During his advance from Sutherland’s Station to Five Forks, Fitz Lee did not see the foe and continued to move down Dinwiddie Road. Before proceeding very far, the Southerners’ vanguard established contact with Morris’ combat patrol.¹²⁴

TABLE 2
Zone and Command	Infantry per Mile of Defended Lines
North of the James
Cavalry on the left flank, approximately	500
Longstreet, with Field’s and Kershaw’s divisions (no change)	1,360
Ewell, with Virginia Reserves, Local Defense Troops and Siege Artillery (no change)	1,320
Howlett Line
Mahone (no change)	740
From the Appomattox to Lieutenant’s Run
Gordon’s, with two divisions, by the extension of line two miles to the Right, density reduced on fronts of four miles from 1,350	870
From Lieutenant’s Run to Burgess Mill
Major General Bryan Grimes’ division of Gordon’s Corps, two-mile front	870
Wilcox’s division less McGowan’s and Hyman’s brigades but with line shortened to about two and one-fourth miles	1,100
Heth’s division, strengthened by Hyman’s brigade, line approximately three and three-quarters miles in length	7,787
Average density of this zone	1,370
Beyond Burgess Mill
Anderson, with Johnson’s division, less Ransom’s and Wallace’s brigades, but with Hunton’s brigade of Pickett’s division and McGowan’s brigade of Wilcox’s division added, three mile front	1,200
Mobile task force operating beyond the fortified lines at Five Forks	6,400 infantry 4,200 cavalry
Moving
Pickett, to join Anderson	5,000 infantry
Cavalry, on the right flank	4,200 cavalry

Meantime, Pickett’s column had also started for Five Forks along White Oak Road. The distance to be covered was little more than four miles. The road led through a flat, drab country of pine woods and small, open fields. Several roads, including Crump Road along which the 6th Pennsylvania was operating, approached White Oak Road from the south. Because Pickett’s column was passing across their front, the Union troopers made the most of their opportunity. In addition, patrols sent by General Ayres established contact with Pickett’s soldiers. Colonel Pegram’s adjutant, Capt. V. Gordon McCabe, wrote in his diary:

Our flank being exposed to the enemy, they harassed us with small bodies of cavalry without intermission. General Pickett, instead of pushing on, stopped, formed a regiment in line-of-battle, and awaited some attack. Much valuable time was lost in this way. A line of skirmishers marching on our flank would have been ample protection.¹²⁵

Pickett thought the march “necessarily slow” because of the constant skirmishing. “In front,” he reported, “we had to drive the enemy out of the way nearly the whole distance.”¹²⁶

Major Morris’ combat patrol penetrated to within three-quarters of a mile of Five Forks without difficulty. The few Confederate scouts encountered were easily brushed aside. Suddenly, however, the situation drastically changed and the attackers became the attacked, as Fitz Lee’s hard-hitting division arrived on the scene. Seizing the initiative, the Confederates quickly surrounded Morris’ regulars. Undaunted by this turn of events, the Union troopers dug their spurs into their horses and cut their way out of the trap. Nevertheless, the Federals lost 3 officers and 20 men. The Rebels likewise suffered several casualties. Among the Confederates wounded was Brig. Gen. William H. Payne. Returning to J. Boisseau’s farm, Morris informed General Merritt that a strong force of Rebel cavalry had occupied Five Forks.¹²⁷

The other two patrols sent out by Gibbs—Crowninshield’s and Leiper’s —crossed Gravelly Run. Advancing up Boydton Plank Road, Crowninshield’s cavalrymen successfully connected with Warren’s V Corps. Having accomplished their mission, Crowninshield’s troopers rejoined the brigade. Leiper’s troopers penetrated to within a sort distance of White Oak Road. Here they spotted a strong infantry column marching westward toward Five Forks. After sending back news of his discovery, Leiper and his men feigned attacks on the Confederates’ left flank. These harassing tactics proved to be effective, because the Rebels would halt and form line of battle. After the infantry had deployed, the cavalry could fall back. The Confederates would then re-assemble and resume the march. This operation was repeated several times during the afternoon, and the Southerners lost valuable time. The Yankees identified Pickett’s command from several prisoners they had captured. Once the Confederates had passed beyond the point where Crump Road deadended into White Oak Road, Leiper’s command retraced its steps and rejoined Gibbs’ brigade.¹²⁸

When General Devin learned of Major Morris’ setback, he sent the 1st U.S. Cavalry and two of Colonel Fitzhugh’s regiments to recover the lost ground. Advancing up Dinwiddie Road, the Union troopers penetrated to within a short distance of Five Forks. By this time, Pickett’s troops had reached Five Forks. Spotting a strong infantry battle line moving toward them, the cavalrymen fell back.¹²⁹

General Crook’s division remained at Dinwiddie Court House for most of the day. Gregg’s brigade was stationed at the point where Boydton Plank Road crossed Stony Creek. If Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s divisions were to rendezvous with Fitz Lee’s, they would have to make a detour south of Stony Creek and west of Chamberlain’s Bed, a typical narrow and sluggish Virginian stream. It meandered from south of Five Forks in a southerly direction towards Dinwiddie Court House. Roads crossed it at its two fords: Danse’s and Fitzgerald’s.

During the morning, one of Henry E. Davies’ Jr. regiments, the 10th New York, rode up Boydton Plank Road and opened communications with Warren’s Corps. When Sheridan learned that the Confederates had occupied Five Forks in force, he directed General Crook to reinforce Merritt with one brigade. Accordingly, Crook ordered Davies’ brigade to move out. Reaching J. Boisseau’s farm, Davies reported to Merritt. Because the Confederates gave no signs of exploiting the success which they had scored at Morris’ expense, Merritt decided not to commit Davies’ troopers. Though not called on, Davies’ men remained in the saddle ready to spring into action at a moment’s notice.¹³⁰

On the night of the 30th, Devin’s division, reinforced by Davies’ brigade, bivouacked on J. Boisseau’s farm. For security purposes, a line of outposts was established by the Federal officers to cover the camps.

Throughout the long dreary day, Custer’s troopers continued to escort the trains. The heavy rains made this task a nightmare. Even with corduroying, progress was disgustingly slow. Large details were constantly at work laying “corduroy” and lifting the wagons out of mud holes. At times, a horse or mule would be seen standing on what appeared to be solid ground. Suddenly, one of the beast’s hoofs would sink out of sight. As the animal struggled to catch itself, all its feet would disappear into the slime. The beast would then have to be pulled out of the Virginia quicksand by a detachment of soldiers. At dark, the head of the train halted four long, hard miles east of Dinwiddie Court House.¹³¹

The intensive scouting and patrolling carried out by Merritt’s command enabled Sheridan to get a good idea of the strength of the Confederate force to his front. Between 40 and 50 prisoners, including some from Pickett’s division, were bagged by Union troopers. One of the captured infantrymen told Sheridan that the Rebel cavalry was being concentrated at Five Forks. The same individual informed Sheridan that Pickett’s division had come from Burke’s Station. Supplemental reports reaching Sheridan’s command post from the front corrected this misinformation. The Union scouts reported that Pickett’s division was deployed along White Oak Road, with its right anchored at Five Forks. Sheridan relayed this intelligence to Grant, along with the news that Merritt’s command was encamped at J. Boisseau’s.¹³²

It was almost sundown when the head of Pickett’s column reached Five Forks. There, as anticipated, Pickett found Fitz Lee. The cavalryman told Pickett that his troopers were in contact with the Yankees on Dinwiddie Road. So far, Lee stated, his grey clads had more than held their own. Pickett had intended to press on toward Dinwiddie Court House. But after conferring with Fitz Lee, he decided that, because of the late hour, the weariness of the troops, and absence of Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s cavalry divisions, he would wait until morning.

Two of Pickett’s infantry brigades moved down Dinwiddie Road about three-quarters of a mile. These units would be responsible for protecting the task force from a surprise attack. Advancing, the infantry encountered dismounted Union cavalry armed with Spencer carbines. Undaunted, the butternuts pressed ahead and the Yankees fell back. After a brisk clash, the Confederates occupied the designated ground. The other Confederate units bivouacked in the woods at the forks. Mercifully, the rain ceased about dark. During the night, however, it began to fall heavily again. The infantry were prepared for this, after a fashion. Colonel Pegram and his staff had neither blankets nor food. They had hoped to return that night to Burgess Mill.¹³³

Shortly after the Confederates bedded down for the night, Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s divisions reached Five Forks. The muddy roads and booming creeks had made the march from Stony Creek Station a nightmare. Following the arrival of these units, Fitz Lee assumed command of the cavalry corps. Col. Thomas T. Munford took charge of Fitz Lee’s division.¹³⁴

General Grant had written Sheridan on the night of the 29th, “We will act altogether as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.”¹³⁵ Despite Grant’s intentions, the Union cavalry and infantry had acted independently of one another throughout the day. Humphreys and Warren were informed only that Sheridan was operating on their left. This was all. Warren had been repeatedly warned on the 29th that he must guard and protect his left, while at the same time his right would maintain contact with Humphreys’ Corps. Yet, in his letter to Sheridan, Grant had observed that “Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.”¹³⁶

The only other reference to cooperation between the infantry and cavalry up to this time is found in one of Warren’s numerous communications to Meade, sent at 9:50 a.m. on the 30th. A short time before, one of Sheridan’s staff officers, Capt. George L. Gillespie, had passed by Warren’s command post while bearing dispatches to General Grant. Gillespie told Warren that Merritt’s command was massing at J. Boisseau’s farm before sending out patrols to feel for White Oak Road. When Warren informed his superior of these developments, he also reported that Ayres’ division would be sent on a forced reconnaissance to W. Dabney’s. Upon reaching that point, Ayres’s troops would be in a position to “cooperate with General Sheridan if he comes within reach.”¹³⁷

By this time, however, Grant had decided that the operations for the day should be confined to the infantry. Taking into account the heavy rain that had been falling since the previous evening, Grant addressed a message to Sheridan. The lieutenant general commanding observed:

The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much until it dries up a little or we get roads around our rear repaired. You may therefore leave what cavalry you deem necessary to protect the left and hold such positions as you deem necessary for that purpose and send the remainder back to Humphreys’ Station, where they can get hay and grain. Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sent to you in the morning. Send an officer back to direct the wagons back to where you want them. Report to me the cavalry you will leave back and the positions you will occupy. Could not our cavalry go back by the way of Stony Creek . . . [Station] and destroy or capture the store of supplies there?¹³⁸

Following the receipt of this letter, Sheridan left Dinwiddie Court House and hastened to Grant’s headquarters. Reporting to Grant’s Gravelly Run command post, Sheridan urged the general to reconsider his order recalling the cavalry. Although the rain continued to pour down, the persuasive Sheridan succeeded in prevailing upon Grant to change his mind. The cavalry would not be withdrawn from Dinwiddie Court House. Grant expressed his hope “that some good might result from the presence” of Sheridan’s troopers near Five Forks. Evidently, Sheridan was so carried away with his arguments that he told Grant that his troopers had reached White Oak Road, which was not true. When Sheridan returned to Dinwiddie Court House, he carried an order from Grant to hold the positions on White Oak Road, even if it prevented the “sending back of any of . . . his cavalry to Humphreys’ Station to be fed.” If Sheridan thought it necessary, the 50 wagon loads of forage ordered to his command would be increased.¹³⁹

During his return trip to Dinwiddie Court House, Sheridan stopped at Warren’s command post. Before continuing his journey, Sheridan told Warren that he had issued instructions for one of his divisions to advance to White Oak Road.¹⁴⁰

It appears that General Meade and his corps commanders operated at a marked disadvantage. They had not been given an opportunity, as Sheridan had, to know what Grant’s plans were. General Meade’s position was especially embarrassing. The wings of his Army of the Potomac were separated by Ord’s Army of the James, which was independent of Meade. Humphreys and Warren were under Meade’s direct command, but the general could only give the two Corps commanders orders as he received them from Grant.¹⁴¹

The heavy rainfall had also rendered it extremely difficult to keep the supplies of war materiel moving to Humphreys’ and Warren’s corps. Warren decided to have the trains, which had accompanied his troops across the Rowanty, moved north of Gravelly Run. Large fatigue parties had to be turned out to help the teamsters. Even so, it was hard going, because the wagons “were nearly immovable in the mud.” Finally, the soldiers had to resort to the time-consuming task of corduroying to get the heavily loaded vehicles to the front. During the day, the portion of the V Corps’ train which had been parked at Perkins’ farm crossed the Rowanty and moved to the intersection of Monk’s Neck and Vaughan roads.¹⁴²

Colonel Theodore Lyman, a Meade staffer and diarist, reported that the heavy rains had “reduced the roads, already poor, to a hopeless pudding.” “Gravelly Run,” the colonel stated “was swollen to treble its usual size; and Hatcher’s Run swept away the bridges and required pontoons.”¹⁴³

The orders for the advance of the infantry, however, were not countermanded. Before retiring on the night of the 29th, Warren prepared the orders which he hoped would enable his corps to carry out the mission which Meade had assigned it. According to Meade’s directive, the V Corps was to force the Rebels back into their fortifications. In addition, Warren was to reconnoiter to the left to develop the Confederates position in the area adjacent to the Claiborne Road. Warren, therefore, ordered his three division commanders to hold their units ready to resume the advance at 6:00 a.m. Warren also alerted them to be on the lookout for a Confederate counterstroke.¹⁴⁴

On the morning of the 30th, while Warren’s troops were preparing to move out, Grant informed Meade:

As Warren and Humphreys advance, thus shortening their line, I think the former had better move by the left flank as far as he can stretch out with safety, and cover the White Oak Road if he can. This will enable Sheridan to reach the . . . South Side road by Ford’s road, and may be, double the enemy up, so as to drive him out of his works south of Hatcher’s Run.¹⁴⁵

Chief of Staff Webb reported that Grant’s letter reached the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac early on the 30th. This communication was not in complete accord with the one Grant had sent to Sheridan on the evening of the 29th. Stating that the cavalry and infantry would “act together as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.” In so far as the operations of the cavalry were concerned, Grant’s dispatch to Meade was “at a decided variance with the letter to Sheridan of the same morning telling him to leave only such force as he deemed necessary to hold the left and send the remainder back to Humphreys’ Station.¹⁴⁶

During the night, Warren had had time to reflect on the tactical situation. He did not think it would be advisable to pursue his advance up Boydton Plank Road until Humphreys’ corps was able to get into position on his right. (It seems that while Miles’ scouts had established contact with the V Corps, his battle line, however, had failed to draw abreast of Griffin’s division before halting on the 29th.) Warren was also worried about his left. The corps commander did not believe he could extend this flank “with propriety” until he could obtain some idea of Sheridan’s movements. If his left flank division (Crawford’s) moved forward, its left flank would “be in the air.” When Warren sent a message to headquarters at 5:50 a.m., reporting that his corps was ready to move, he called Chief of Staff Webb’s attention to these difficulties. In conclusion, Warren remarked that he considered the position then occupied by his corps as the best available unless Meade proposed to assault the Rebel fortifications at Burgess Mill.¹⁴⁷

It was 8:30 a.m. before Warren received an answer from army headquarters. Meade replied through his chief of staff. When Warren glanced at the message signed by Webb, he received scant satisfaction. Webb informed Warren that General Meade did not think he occupied as much of the front as the strength of his corps warranted. Meade wanted Warren to use two of his divisions—Ayres’ and Crawford’s—to reconnoiter the Confederate right. Webb was unable to give Warren much information regarding Sheridan’s movements. All that Webb would do in this respect was to state that Sheridan had been “ordered to attack or turn the enemy’s right.” Warren, however, was to act independently of Sheridan. If the Rebels moved out of their breastworks and assaulted Warren’s left, the V Corps was to counterattack. In this eventuality, Meade promised to support Warren “with all the available force to be procured.¹⁴⁸

In the meantime, Warren and Humphreys had exchanged messages. At 6:00 a.m., Warren informed Humphreys that he proposed to postpone his advance until such time as Miles’ division drew abreast of Griffin’s. Warren expressed himself as hesitant about sending Griffin’s troops, unsupported, across the broad open field to their front. Since Miles’ soldiers had to pass through a heavily wooded area, Warren felt it would be some time before they drew abreast of his corps.¹⁴⁹

Replying to Warren’s communication, Humphreys reported that his corps was moving ahead slowly through a dense and almost impenetrable swamp. In accordance with Warren’s wishes, Humphreys stated that he had reiterated his instructions for Miles to re-establish contact with the V Corps. Despite Humphreys’ efforts, it was almost 7:30 a.m. before Miles’ bluecoats moved into position on Warren’s right flank.¹⁵⁰

At 6:00 a.m., Warren directed Griffin to have Bartlett’s skirmish line feel the Confederate front. Bartlett’s bluecoats were to ascertain if the Southerners had pulled back from the earthworks which they had occupied when darkness put a stop to hostilities.¹⁵¹

A dense fog blanketed the area, so Bartlett determined to delay his reconnaissance in hopes that the atmosphere would clear. It was fortunate for the Federals that he made this decision. At 6:30 a.m., when the fog lifted a little, Bartlett discovered that the right flank of his skirmish line was within 150 yards of a line of Rebel rifle pits. The soldiers manning the Union outposts decided to see if they could entice some of the Rebels to desert. Loaves of bread were thrust on bayonets and held aloft. The bluecoats then shouted, “Hey, Johnny! Come over and get some fresh bread and coffee.” None of the Southerners took advantage of the offer.¹⁵²

A slight demonstration on the part of the bluecoats drew heavy fire. Satisfied that the grey clads held the earthworks in force, the Union skirmishers, having accomplished their mission, fell back a short distance.¹⁵³

Following receipt of the message signed by Chief of Staff Webb, Warren, despite grave misgivings, prepared to carry out the directive “to extend his line to the left as far as possible.” Ayres’ division was called up from the reserve and massed at Mrs. Butler’s. Reconnaissance parties were sent to explore the countryside west of Boydton Plank Road. After these items were attended to, Warren sent a letter to Meade’s headquarters acknowledging the communication. Warren wanted to know what would happen if he extended “his line to the left as far as possible, using both Crawford and Ayres,” and the Rebels suddenly flanked him. If this transpired, Warren wondered what he would counterattack with.

It was 9:55 a.m. before Warren received a reply to this dispatch. Webb observed that Meade was “very anxious” to have Warren cover as much of the front as possible consistent with the safety of his corps. Meade’s intention, Webb wrote, was to have Warren deploy Griffin and Crawford to the front, while he used Ayres to cover the corps’ left flank. In addition, Meade wanted the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry which was guarding Warren’s train to report to army headquarters at the intersection of Monk’s Neck and Vaughan roads.

In the meantime, Warren had received a letter from General Webb containing information regarding the Confederate fortifications. The chief of staff reported that he had recently questioned several deserters and prisoners. From these people, Webb had learned that the Confederate fortifications covered White Oak Road.

Acknowledging Webb’s message, Warren replied that the intelligence gathered by his scouts corroborated the information Webb had obtained about the location of the Confederates’ main line of resistance. Continuing, Warren wrote that two deserters had stated that the earthworks flanking Boydton Plank Road were strong “with two lines of obstructions in front.” These men reported that a large number of blacks had spent the 29th strengthening these works. Still thinking in defensive terms, Warren reported that Crawford’s troops were throwing up a line of breastworks near Boydton Plank Road. In case of a repulse, Warren observed, these rifle pits would make a good rallying point.

This dispatch was received by Meade at 9:35 a.m. Ten o’clock passed and still Warren’s Corps did not budge. In the meantime, Captain Gillespie had passed through the V Corps’ lines. From the captain, Warren secured information concerning the position of Sheridan’s cavalry. This news was promptly relayed to Meade. It appears that this was the first definite information that Meade had received of Sheridan’s activities.¹⁵⁴

At 10:15 a.m., Warren sent another message to headquarters explaining his delays. Warren told his superiors of his plans. He would push out Ayres’ division in column as he had Griffin’s on the 29th. If Ayres met the foe, he was to give battle. Meade was informed that, if need be, Warren would support Ayres “with nearly the whole Corps and follow up any advantage gained.” In the event that he was worsted, Warren wrote, he had “a good place to reform on.” Warren admitted that he was “a little slow,” but he believed that it was the only way he could keep his “troops working together and conduct operations with certainty.” The corps commander expressed the opinion that the roads and fields were getting too soft for artillery, and believed that Sheridan’s cavalry would have trouble operating advantageously.¹⁵⁵

At 10:30 a.m., Warren directed Ayres to make a reconnaissance in the direction of White Oak Road. Ayres was to take his division and move in a northwesterly direction from Mrs. Butler’s toward S. Dabney’s. As the column felt its way ahead, Ayres was to see that his scouts maintained contact with the corps’ skirmish line, which would remain stationary. If Ayres’ troops encountered any Confederates within a mile of Boydton Plank Road, they were to attack and drive them back. Ayres was admonished not to advance his main force farther than one mile, unless it was to secure an obvious advantage. The division would take up a strong position with its flanks secured. Scouts were to be sent “to reconnoiter and develop the character of the county and the enemy’s position.” Ayres was informed that Sheridan’s cavalry was massed at J. Boisseau’s farm and was examining Crump Road. In the event that Ayres encountered a superior force and could hold on, Warren promised to reinforce him with Crawford’s division. For communication purposes, a detachment of Warren’s escort accompanied Ayres.¹⁵⁶

Grant at this time had a different opinion of what Warren’s plan of operation should be. Writing to Meade, Grant observed:

My idea was that we should try to extend our left so as to cross the White Oak road, say at W. Dabney’s, or as near up to the enemy as we can. This would seem to cover all the roads up to Ford’s road, by which Sheridan might then move and get on to the South Side road, and possibly double up the enemy and drive him north of Hatcher’s Run.¹⁵⁷

The South Side Railroad, at the point where it was crossed by Ford’s Road, remained Sheridan’s objective.

For informational purposes, Webb forwarded Grant’s dispatch to Warren. The chief of staff reported that Meade, after examining Grant’s message, could see no reason for any change in the instructions which he had already sent to Warren. Webb reported that Meade had received “no information of General Sheridan’s movements beyond the general statement that General S. is to turn to the enemy’s right.”¹⁵⁸

Warren was perplexed by Grant’s and Meade’s messages. It seemed to Warren that Meade, on receiving Grant’s communication, should have signified to him whether or not he was to extend the left flank of his corps across White Oak Road. If he were not to block White Oak Road, Warren would have liked to know just how far his left was to move out. Had Warren been in communication with Grant, he probably would have sought to obtain definite information on this subject.¹⁵⁹

By 11:30 a.m., signal corps personnel succeeded in extending the field telegraph to Warren’s command post. The transmission of messages between Meade’s and Warren’s headquarters was thus greatly expedited.

In an effort to clarify the matter, at noon, Warren addressed another communication to General Webb. After acknowledging the receipt of the dispatch enclosing the one from Grant, Warren inquired about Meade’s statement that there was “no reason to change his previous orders.” Warren pointed out that Meade had “never said definitely how far he was expected to extend nor the object desired.” “General Grant,” Warren observed, “is definite on both points, and if I am to attempt... to block White Oak Road myself at all hazards I don’t shrink from it.” Warren thought that perhaps General Humphreys, if required, might occupy part of the front occupied by the V Corps. The corps commander knew from bitter experience that he should extend his “left toward the White Oak Road with strong force and precaution against an attack from the enemy.” Warren informed Webb that he had seen Sheridan, and the cavalry leader had ordered a division to White Oak Road. This, Warren believed, would simplify his scheduled movement.¹⁶⁰

General Warren was annoyed by the vagueness of his orders. According to the word he received from Meade’s headquarters, he was to extend his left and keep it well guarded—that was all. Grant, however, wanted Warren to shift to the left and support Sheridan’s cavalry in an attempt to turn the Confederates’ right. Warren inferred more from Grant’s dispatch than Meade’s. This disposition by Warren to know the object and extent of a movement directed by his superior officer was a fault in his military character.

Meade was more patient than Warren. An examination of the correspondence which passed between Grant and Meade on the 30th indicates that the commander of the Army of the Potomac knew very little of the lieutenant general commander’s master plan. Furthermore, it should be observed that at noon Warren had met Sheridan. The cavalryman, at this time, told Warren that one of his divisions was scheduled to move north to White Oak Road.¹⁶¹

Grant forwarded some information regarding Sheridan’s activities to Meade. Grant reported that the cavalry sent out by Merritt had encountered the Confederates in considerable force. The blue-coated patrols, as they advanced up the Dinwiddie and Crump Roads, found White Oak Road covered by the Rebel troopers. Pushing ahead, the Union cavalrymen were reported to have seized Five Forks. (Copies of this message were also sent to Humphreys and Warren.)¹⁶²

Yet, as late as 2:00 p.m., Grant refused to commit himself on the degree of cooperation that should exist between Meade’s infantry and Sheridan’s cavalry. At that hour, the general telegraphed the President who was at City Point:

I understood the number of dead left by the enemy yesterday for us to bury was much greater than our own dead. The captives were larger than reported also, amounting to about 160. This morning our troops have all been pushed forward, and now occupy a line from which you see marked on the map as the Crow house across the Boydton Plank road north of where the Quaker road intersects it. Sheridan’s cavalry is pushing forward toward the White Oak road, and I think this afternoon or to-morrow may push on to the South Side Railroad.¹⁶³

As if Warren were not having enough troubles with his left, the badgered general could not ignore his right. At 11:20 a.m., Warren received a dispatch from Humphreys. The II Corps commander informed Warren that, at the moment, his line of battle extended “in a straight line past the Crow house” to the V Corps’ right. Humphreys stated that he had directed Mott’s and Hays’ skirmishers and those on the right of Miles’ division to see if they could reach Hatcher’s Run. Consequently, Humphreys wanted to know if Warren intended to move forward.¹⁶⁴

In reply, Warren pointed out that, as the Confederates were reported to be strongly entrenched, he would be unable to advance up Boydton Plank Road. The regiments on his extreme right, Warren commented, had been refused for the want of a connection the previous evening. These organizations would be able to cooperate in Humphreys’ advance, General Miles, Warren continued, had his permission to make any adjustments in this sector that he thought practicable.¹⁶⁵

Throughout the morning, Warren had been so busy receiving dispatches and giving orders that he had been unable to leave his command post. After eating lunch, Warren decided to visit the front. Proceeding up Quaker Road, Warren reached J. Stroud’s just as Bartlett’s skirmishers started to move forward. Prior to Warren’s arrival, Griffin had been told by his scouts that the Confederates were pulling back. In the face of Humphreys’ advance, the Southerners had determined to abandon their line of outposts in the Burgess Mill sector. To take advantage of this situation, Griffin authorized Bartlett to advance his skirmish line.¹⁶⁶

Following this Confederate pull back, a personal reconnaissance convinced Warren that Griffin’s battle line could now cross the open field in safety. In addition, an advance would enable the V Corps to gain possession of the point where Dabney’s Mill Road debouched into the Boydton Plank Road. This would be an important gain because it would facilitate communication between the II and V Corps. Warren accordingly directed Griffin to advance his battle line.

Griffin relayed this information to his brigade commanders. Bartlett’s line of battle, closely supported by Gregory’s brigade, moved up Boydton Plank Road. On the right, Miles’ bluecoats likewise forged ahead. Within a few minutes, the Federals occupied the field fortifications recently held by Johnson’s outposts. Having gained their objective, the Northerners halted and took cover. A Rebel battery mounted behind a parapet near the Burgess house hammered away at the advancing Yankees with shot and shell. Two Union artillery units—Battery B, 4th U.S. and Batteries D and G, 5th U.S.—emplaced at the junction of the Boydton Plank and Quaker roads returned the butternut cannoneers’ fire. No opposition from the Rebel infantry was encountered by Griffin’s troops.¹⁶⁷

As soon as his men had gained the abandoned rifle pits, Warren rode forward. Training his field glasses on the Confederate main line of resistance, Warren found that the fortifications covering Burgess Mill “were well located and constructed, and defended by infantry and artillery.” The timber had been slashed and where there were no trees, an “abatis had been laid.” It was apparent to Warren that any advance by the Federals up the Boydton Plank Road would be fiercely contested.

There was no further action along Griffin’s front until late in the afternoon. At 4:00 p.m., Colonel Hyman’s North Carolina brigade moved out of the fortifications. Driving in the Union skirmishers, the Rebels launched a sharp attack on Bartlett’s battle line. Assisted by the fire of the two regular batteries posted at the junction, the blue-coated infantry easily beat off this sortie. Several prisoners were captured by the Federals. One of them, a member of the 34th North Carolina, told the Yankees that Hyman’s brigade had moved into the Burgess Mill sector during the morning. Following Hyman’s arrival, Johnson’s division shifted to the right.¹⁶⁸

As darkness approached, Griffin recalled Gregory’s brigade; Bartlett’s troops were left to hold the captured rifle pits. Returning to the junction, Gregory’s soldiers camped in the field around the Stroud house.¹⁶⁹ Griffin’s other brigade, Chamberlain’s, spent the day at Lewis’ farm burying the dead and collecting the wounded from yesterday’s engagement.¹⁷⁰

Ayres’s division moved out about noon to make its forced reconnaissance toward White Oak Road. The route selected for the division’s advance was the road which led from Mrs. Butler’s house on Boydton Plank Road by the Holliday house. This road entered White Oak Road near Halter Butler’s residence, which was a short distance west of the Claiborne Road. Ayres’ vanguard reached Holliday’s without encountering any opposition. The advance brigade, Col. Frederick Winthrop’s, crossed the branch of Gravelly Run that was to play so important a part in the battle of White Oak Road on the next day. Observing that his troops were having difficulty getting across the rain-swollen stream, Ayres ordered his two other brigades, Cols. Andrew W. Denison’s and James Gwyn’s, not to cross. Taking position on the right bank of the branch, these two units began to entrench.¹⁷¹

Winthrop’s brigade penetrated to within 600 yards of White Oak Road before halting. Skirmishers were then pushed to within 400 yards of the road. Captain Horrell with the support company succeeded in getting astride the road for a few moments. From their advance position in a small clearing, the Federals observed the afternoon’s activities on the White Oak Road. The Yankees watched as a strong force of Rebel infantry—Pickett’s command— marched westward toward Five Forks. When Griffin’s troops moved to occupy the advance rifle pits flanking Boydton Plank Road, the sound of battle came drifting in from the east. For a few minutes, the Confederate column paused before pressing on. During this time, Ayres dashed off a message to Warren reporting that Rebel infantry was moving toward Burgess Mill. Warren, in turn, relayed this news to Meade’s headquarters.¹⁷²

After a few minutes, the Southerners resumed the march. Shortly thereafter, Captain Horrell’s troopers captured a Rebel officer. The Confederate told the Federals that he belonged to Pickett’s division and was in charge of a wagon train. This intelligence was forwarded to Meade.¹⁷³

Reconnoitering the area north of Holliday’s farm, Ayres reported that there were no Confederate entrenchments to his front. As Ayres interpreted his front, he was correct when he made this statement. At this time, however, the general was gazing out on the portion of White Oak Road west of the Claiborne Road junction. Had Ayres faced north instead of northeast, he would have observed that there was a fortified line covering White Oak Road at its convergence with Claiborne Road, which veered sharply to the right and extended to Hatcher’s Run.¹⁷⁴

News that Ayres’ patrols were feeling their way toward White Oak Road west of Halter Butler’s house spurred the Confederates to take action. General Lee issued instructions for General Johnson to deploy one of his regiments outside the works. No attack was to be made on the Federals at this time. If, however, this Union unit proved to be the left flank of the Army of the Potomac it would be assaulted at a later date. In accordance with Johnson’s orders, the 41st Alabama moved out of the works, crossed White Oak Road, and took position athwart the Union line of advance. Before darkness put a stop to activities in this sector, the Alabamians were in contact with Ayres’ scouts.¹⁷⁵

Ayres, having accomplished his mission, covered his front with a line of outposts and waited for further developments. On his right, Ayres’ skirmishers were in contact with Griffin’s pickets. About dusk, Warren visited Ayres’ command post. After approving Ayres’ dispositions, Warren rode back to his headquarters, which he reached after dark.¹⁷⁶

Crawford’s troops spent the day strengthening their main line of resistance which paralleled Boydton Plank Road. The divisions’ left flank rested on Gravelly Run and its right near the Stroud farm. In addition to throwing up breastworks, the troops kept busy slashing timber. The gunners of Battery D, 1st New York Light Artillery emplaced their four 12-pounder Napoleons west of the Rainey house. Here they would be able to furnish support to Crawford’s infantry in case of a sudden Confederate onslaught.¹⁷⁷

Before the II Corps resumed its advance on the 30th, it was reinforced by a division from the Army of the James. In accordance with the order from Grant, Ord directed General Gibbon to have one of his divisions cross Hatcher’s Run and support Humphreys’ Corps. Before retiring on the night of the 29th, Gibbon issued instructions for General Turner to have his XXIV Corps division on the road by 5:00 a.m. After crossing to the west side of Hatcher’s Run, Turner would report to General Humphreys.¹⁷⁸

Turner’s division moved out at 5:00 a.m. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Turner’s troops marched to Dabney’s Mill. Within one hour after leaving his camp, Turner, despite the terrible weather, completed his dispositions. As directed by Humphreys, Turner posted his command on the right of Hays’ division. To make room for soldiers from the XXIV Corps, Hays’ troops closed to the left. Turner’s left flank rested on Dabney’s Mill and his right on Hatcher’s Run near Armstrong’s Mill. Brigadier General Thomas M. Harris’ and Lt. Col. Andrew Potter’s brigades were deployed into line of battle. Harris’ was on the left and Potter’s on the right. Col. William B. Curtis’ brigade was held in reserve.¹⁷⁹

The speed with which Turner had formed his division enabled Humphreys to start his attack as scheduled. At 6:00 a.m., the powerful Union battle line started forward. A large number of skirmishers screened Humphreys’ advance.¹⁸⁰

It took Hays’ division about two and a half hours to reach the area around J. Crow’s farm. Since the bluecoats expected to encounter heavy resistance, their advance had been cautious. At J. Crow’s, the Yankees found plenty of evidence in the form of abandoned gear and supplies which indicated that the Rebels had hurriedly evacuated this area during the night. Having reached his goal, General Hays put his troops to work throwing up breastworks. Two brigades—McIvor’s and Olmsted’s—were stationed on the lines, while Smyth’s were held in reserve.¹⁸¹

After the troops started to dig in, Hays told Colonel Olmsted to send a combat patrol and see if he could locate the Confederates main line of resistance. Within a short time, a three-regiment patrol—the 19th Maine, the 184th Pennsylvania, and the 36th Wisconsin—moved forward. The Maine regiment, deployed as skirmishers, was supported by the other two units. After advancing about three-fourths of a mile through a belt of slashed timbers, the bluecoats spotted a Confederate strong point. The soldiers observed that this redoubt (Fort Powell), which was situated on the south bank of Hatcher’s Run, mounted two guns. A second earthwork, in which one gun was emplaced, was also spotted. Both forts were within supporting distance of one another. After sending back news of his discovery, Olmsted had the soldiers of the 19th Maine open fire. The Maine men had previously occupied positions within 300 yards of Fort Powell. Unable to depress their cannon enough to play on the Yankees, the grey clads had to rely on small-arms when they returned the Yankee’s fire. The Confederates and the men of the 19th Maine sniped away at one another until 4:00 p.m. At that hour, the 36th Wisconsin moved forward and relieved the Maine regiment.¹⁸²

Turner’s troops kept abreast of Hays’ battle line as it pushed ahead. As the advance continued, Turner’s division found itself squeezed out of line. The reason behind this development was the sharp meander to the southwest described by Hatcher’s Run in the portion of channel between Burgess and Armstrong’s mills. To avoid being completely crowded out of position, Turner’s division was forced to cross Hatcher’s Run a second time. When the division halted and entrenched, Harris’ left flank rested on the stream. On the opposite side of Hatcher’s Run was Hays’ right flank unit, McIvor’s brigade. Potter’s brigade on Turner’s right was in contact with Foster’s division.¹⁸³

On Hays’ left, Mott’s battle line worked its way through a dense belt of undergrowth. The few Confederate pickets encountered were brushed aside. Mott’s troops drove across the road linking Dabney’s Mill with the Boydton Plank Road. A swampy branch of Hatcher’s Run was also negotiated. After an advance of about three-quarters of a mile, the division halted and entrenched. The right flank of Pierce’s brigade was posted west of the Crow house. Pierce’s troops were in contact with Hays’ bluecoats. De Trobriand’s brigade, as on the previous day, was held in reserve by Mott. While Pierce’s and McAllister’s soldiers were throwing up earthworks, de Trobriand was called upon to furnish large fatigue details. Some of these groups were put to work repairing Dabney’s Mill Road. Others were given the task of corduroying roads and building bridges to facilitate the movement of the Corps’ artillery to the front.¹⁸⁴

Miles’ division with three brigades—Ramsey’s, Madill’s, and Scott’s—deployed into line of battle had a rough time working its way through the thick woods and dense underbrush. Each brigade commander covered his front with skirmishers. During the night, Ramsey’s brigade on the left lost contact with the V Corps. It was 7:30 a.m. before Ramsey’s unit re-established contact with Warren’s soldiers on their left. At 9:00 a.m., Miles’ troops reached Dabney’s Mill Road and the division halted, while the brigade commanders reformed their units. Since Miles’ battle line was now abreast of Warren’s, it would be dangerous to proceed farther without a corresponding movement on the part of the V Corps. Warren, however, refused to budge. Artillery was brought forward. The four 12-pounder Napoleons of Battery K, 4th U.S. Light Artillery were unlimbered at the junction of the Boydton Plank and Quaker roads. The cannoneers of Battery M, 1st New Hampshire emplaced their four 3-inch rifles a short distance to the left of Battery E.¹⁸⁵

General Miles employed his other brigade, Nugent’s, on fatigue details. Large detachments were drafted from Nugent’s command and put to work corduroying roads.¹⁸⁶

During the morning, two Confederate deserters surrendered to Miles’ scouts. When escorted to the general’s command post, the Southerners stated that they belonged to Scales’ North Carolina brigade. (At this time, Scales was sick, and Hyman was in charge of the unit.) The duo informed the Federal officers that their brigade had been pulled out of the Petersburg lines long before daybreak. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, their organization had occupied the rifle pits covering Burgess Mill. News of this interesting development was promptly relayed to Meade’s headquarters.¹⁸⁷

Early in the afternoon, Humphreys received instructions from Meade to move his troops as close to the Confederates’ main line of resistance as possible. When this had been accomplished, he was to entrench his command. Humphreys would then make an inspection and notify headquarters as to how many troops would be needed to hold the front from Boydton Plank Road to Hatcher’s Run.

The extensive scouting and patrolling carried out by his soldiers throughout the morning allowed Humphreys to pinpoint most of the Confederate fortifications. Humphreys knew that Hays’ and Mott’s troops had driven almost as close to the foe’s works as possible. If these two units attempted to renew the advance, it would probably precipitate a general engagement. Only on the left, in Miles’ sector, was there a chance of inching closer to the Confederate works without much fighting. Humphreys, therefore, issued instructions for Miles to push forward and examine the fortifications which the grey clads had erected to cover the approaches to Burgess Mill.¹⁸⁸

Following receipt of Humphreys’ orders, Miles’ division resumed the advance. Covered by a strong force of skirmishers, the line of battle moved relentlessly ahead through the thick undergrowth. Because Mott’s division held its ground, Miles’ command pivoted on its right flank brigade, Scott’s. On the left, Ramsey’s left flank guided on the Boydton Plank Road. Skirmishers of the 53rd Pennsylvania pushed ahead and forced the Confederate outposts to fall back. As soon as their pickets had retired, the Southern artillerists opened fire on the bluecoats. Both Ramsey’s skirmishers and his battle line were shelled by the Confederate cannoneers. This bombardment, however, proved to be so ineffective that, for all practical purposes, it was useless.¹⁸⁹

When they moved forward, the skirmishers covering the advance of Miles’ center (Madill’s) and right flank (Scott’s) brigades clashed with the Confederate pickets. The 111th New York, which was screening Madill’s units, drove the Rebel skirmishers across the road linking J. Crow’s with Boydton Plank Road. At the same time, the regiment covering Scott’s advance, the 5th New Hampshire, struck and drove in the Rebel outposts.¹⁹⁰

When General Humphreys learned that Miles’ division had crossed Crow Road and was in full view of the Rebel fortifications, he ordered the advance stopped. Miles was directed to entrench his position. Within a few minutes Miles had his troops at work throwing up fortifications.¹⁹¹

At the time that Hyman’s North Carolina brigade drove in Griffin’s outposts, the grey clads made a feeble thrust against the left flank of Miles’ division. Ramsey’s skirmishers, two companies of the 53rd Pennsylvania, easily beat off the attack. About this time, Colonel Scott decided to relieve his skirmishers. The 5th New Hampshire was recalled and the 26th Michigan and the 140th Pennsylvania moved forward. Taking position near the Confederate fortifications, the sharpshooters from these two regiments exchanged shots with the grey clad snipers until darkness put a stop to the day’s hostilities in this sector.¹⁹²

After Miles’ troops had started to dig in along Crow Road, the cannoneers of Battery E, 4th U.S. Light Artillery and Battery M, 1st New Hampshire Light Artillery limbered up their pieces. Moving up Boydton Plank Road, the gunners placed their eight guns in battery near the Rainey house. Just before dark, Battery B, 1st New Jersey Light Artillery left the artillery park at Brown’s house. Using a road opened by fatigue parties, the gunners headed for the front. The NewJersey battery emplaced their four 12-pounder Napoleons near the Crow house.¹⁹³

When Humphreys reported to Meade at 4:00 p.m., he announced that the right flank of the II Corps was anchored on Hatcher’s Run, at a point 400 yards east of the J. Crow house. The corps’ left flank, he stated, rested at the junction of Boydton Plank and Dabney’s Mill roads. Scouting parties had located the Confederate defense line in this sector and found two large redoubts. These formidable earthworks were about 600 yards in front of, and opposite the II Corps flanks. A third strong point, which was farther from the Union lines was also observed between the two redoubts. From time to time, the butternuts had employed the cannon emplaced in these works against Humphreys’ troops. Humphreys informed his superior that his line was “already tolerably entrenched” and could be held by Mott’s and Hays’ divisions. This would leave Miles’ command available for any other assignments Meade might be contemplating.¹⁹⁴

Throughout the remainder of the wet afternoon, the rain-drenched men of the II Corps were kept busy throwing up earthworks and corduroying roads. Altogether, 1,300 men were ordered to report to Capt. Charles W. Howell for labor on the roads. The work on Dabney’s Mill Road, which was the corps lateral line of communications, was hindered by a shortage of tools. By dark the fatigue parties from Nugent’s brigade had laid only a mile of corduroy. When informed of this, Humphreys issued instructions for Miles to put every man he could spare on this project in the morning. In an effort to cheer up the water-soaked troops’ lagging spirits, Humphreys authorized his division commanders to send for whiskey. Humphreys cautioned, however, that he didn’t know where they would obtain the fiery stimulant.¹⁹⁵

After covering their fronts with a strong line of outposts, Humphreys’ division commanders permitted their men to bivouac. Since the corps was camped near the foe, the sentries were directed to sound the alarm in case of any unusual firing on the picket line. Before retiring, the brigade commanders were instructed to have their troops under arms at 4:30 a.m. After being formed the soldiers were to remain at their battle stations until daylight.¹⁹⁶

On the morning of the 30th, General Mackenzie’s cavalry division of the Army of the James was transferred from Hancock’s Station to Humphreys’ Station. Later in the day, the cavalrymen broke camp for a second time and marched to Monk’s Neck Bridge. Here, Mackenzie’s troopers were tasked with guarding the trains of the Army of the Potomac, which were parked in the fields east of Rowanty Creek.¹⁹⁷

Throughout the late afternoon and evening, the frequent exchange of messages between corps, army, and group headquarters continued. At 4:00 p.m., Warren informed Meade that Ayres’ vanguard was near W. Dabney’s and had White Oak Road under observation. Warren now felt confident of his position. He reported that his troops had fortified a line extending from Griffin’s right almost to Gravelly Run. If Humphreys could take over the front held by Griffin’s and Crawford’s divisions, Warren told Meade, he would take his “Corps and block the White Oak Road.”¹⁹⁸

Although Warren sent this dispatch at 4:00 p.m., it did not reach Meade until 7:30 p.m. Evidently, the military telegraph was not functioning properly. Before relaying Warren’s message to Grant’s headquarters, Meade added his comments. Meade expressed himself as satisfied that Warren’s suggestion was “the best thing we can do under existing circumstances—that is, let Humphreys relieve Griffin, and let Warren move on to the White Oak Road and endeavor to turn enemy’s right.” As he understood the situation, Meade told Grant, Ayres was between the two Dabney farms, and liable to be isolated. If Ayres were reinforced by the remainder of the V Corps, Warren “ought to overcome any opposition the enemy can make, except from strong entrenchments,” Meade wrote.

In the meantime, Grant had received a number of interesting reports from other sections of the front. These messages indicated that General Lee was stripping the inactive sectors of his front of troops to counter the Union threat to his right. If this were true, Grant knew that some parts of the Confederate defense line must be very thinly held. Accordingly, General Ord and the commanders of the VI and IX Corps were directed to ascertain the feasibility of carrying the fortifications in their sectors by assault. Both Generals Wright of the VI Corps and Parke’s of the IX Corps reported that it was practicable to storm the Rebel defenses. Orders were issued, scheduling an attack on the Petersburg defenses for daybreak on the 31st.¹⁹⁹

Evidently, Grant was beginning to despair of accomplishing anything decisive in the Burgess Mill area. After having alerted Ord, Parke and Wright to be ready to storm the works, Grant dashed off a letter to Sheridan. In this message, Grant broached the idea of reinforcing Sheridan with a corps of infantry. Grant wrote, “If your situation in the morning is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the enemy’s right with the assistance of a corps of infantry, entirely detached from the balance of the army, I will so detach the Fifth Corps, and place the whole under your command for the operation.” Sheridan was asked to let the general know his thoughts on the matter. If they were in the affirmative, Grant promised to draft the necessary orders. Sheridan was also advised of Grant’s plan to hurl Ord’s, Parke’s, and Wright’s troops against the Petersburg defenses.²⁰⁰

Grant, however, now had change of heart. He decided to call off the scheduled assault. In notifying Meade of this, Grant stated that Parke and Wright were to “watch their fronts and go in if the enemy strips to attack our left.” Grant also informed Meade that he had “pretty much made up his mind on the course to pursue, and will inform you in the morning what it is.” In the meantime, Humphreys and Warren were to “secure their present position and await further orders.”²⁰¹

Meade’s message endorsing Warren’s plan to turn the Rebel right reached Grant’s headquarters before the lieutenant general commanding sent the telegram directing that Humphreys and Warren “secure their present situation and await further orders.” Consequently, Grant added a postscript. Humphreys was to relieve Griffin’s division, which in turn was to move to the left. Warren was to “get himself strong to-night.”

Grant’s telegram was in Meade’s hands at 8:35 p.m. Meade immediately wired Humphreys his instructions. The commander of the II Corps was to have Miles’ division relieve Griffin’s troops and the units from Crawford’s division that were holding the fortifications covering Boydton Plank Road. One of Mott’s brigades would support Miles’ shift to the left. Shortly thereafter, a communication was sent to Warren informing him that Humphreys had been ordered to relieve Griffin’s and the troops occupying “the return on the Boydton Plank Road.” After Griffin’s troops were pulled out of the lines, they were to be sent to Ayres’ support. Warren was to hold his “Corps ready to attack and await further orders.”²⁰²

Next, Meade acquainted Grant with the steps he had taken to implement his superior’s instructions. He informed Grant that he had not assigned Warren a specific mission. Meade had inferred from Grant’s telegram that the lieutenant general commanding would do this.²⁰³

Replying to Meade, Grant wrote, “Your orders to Warren are right. I do not expect to advance him in the morning. I supposed, however, that was now up to the White Oak Road. If he is not I do not want him to move up without further orders.”

As yet, Grant had refused to take Meade into his confidence. As demonstrated by his letter to Sheridan, Grant was already seriously thinking of sending the V Corps to Sheridan. The commanding general, however, maintained a discreet silence on this subject in his communications with Meade.²⁰⁴

About 9:45 a.m., Grant received an important message from Sheridan informing him of what had transpired on the extreme left during the afternoon. Sheridan reported that Pickett’s division was deployed along White Oak Road—its right at Five Forks and its left extending toward Petersburg.²⁰⁵

This information convinced Grant that Warren would not have the cavalry support, which he had been led to expect, on his left flank. Sheridan’s troopers would be fully occupied with Pickett’s soldiers. Warren, therefore, would have to be advised of this development and alerted to watch his left flank closely. After adding these comments, Grant forwarded Sheridan’s communication to Meade.²⁰⁶

A few minutes later, Grant sent a supplemental telegram to Meade’s headquarters. Grant observed that with the Confederates on White Oak Road and the Federal cavalry at J. Boisseau’s farm, it was not “improbable” that the Southerners would launch an attack in the morning on Warren’s left. Grant, therefore, issued instructions for Sheridan to be prepared to push to Warren’s assistance if he were attacked. Continuing, Grant wrote:

Warren, I suppose, will put himself in the best possible position to defend himself, with the notice that he has already received; but in adding to this I think it will be well to notify him again of the position of Sheridan’s cavalry, what he reports the enemy’s position on the White Oak Road, and the orders he has received.

If the Rebels raised the initiative, Grant thought it would be a good idea for Meade to direct Humphreys to help Warren. Humphreys could do this either by sending reinforcements to Warren or by going over to the attack on his own front.

Before receiving Grant’s second telegram, Meade forwarded a copy of Sheridan’s message to Warren. In addition, the general observed that, in view of the intelligence obtained by Sheridan, it would be necessary to alert Ayres. Meade also wanted Ayres reinforced “without delay, as the enemy may attack him at daylight.” The commander of the Army of the Potomac presumed that Warren would use Crawford’s division to support Ayres.

Meade, when he sent this message to Warren, failed to include Grant’s endorsement to Sheridan’s original letter. Grant had commented, “Warren will not, from this dispatch, have the cavalry support on his left flank that I expected. This information had better be sent to him, with instructions to watch closely on his left flank.” This omission on Meade’s part would have important repercussions.²⁰⁷ Nor, so far as Warren was concerned, did Meade take notice of Grant’s supplementary order that Warren be informed “again of the position of Sheridan’s cavalry, what he reports the enemy’s position on the White Oak Road, and the orders he has received.”²⁰⁸

Only one more message was sent to Warren from Meade’s headquarters on the 30th. At 10:35 p.m., Chief of Staff Webb informed Warren that Griffin’s division would be relieved as soon as possible. General Humphreys was to contact Warren as soon as Miles’ division had started for Boydton Plank Road.²⁰⁹

Replying to Grant’s supplemental message, Meade reported that he had sent a copy of Sheridan’s dispatch to Warren. Meade stated that Warren had been alerted “to put Ayres on his guard, as he might be attacked at daylight.” Crawford was to move immediately to Ayres’ assistance; Griffin was to take position within supporting distance as soon as relieved. By daylight, Meade reasoned, Warren “should have his whole Corps in hand ready for the defensive or offensive, and ought to be secure in either contingency, particularly as he can always fall back on Humphreys.” Meade, however, could not bring himself to believe that the Rebels would be able to assemble a force large enough to do the powerful V Corps any harm. In closing, Meade observed that Warren had been given “no orders to advance, but simply to strengthen and secure his position.” The V Corps would not be ordered to take the initiative unless Grant gave the word.

At 11:00 p.m., following the receipt of Meade’s order to reinforce Ayres, Warren drafted a set of instructions to govern his corps’ movements in the morning. At daybreak, Ayres was to reinforce his advance brigade (Winthrop’s) with his entire division and Crawford was to hold his command ready to support Ayres. As soon as it relieved by Humphreys’ Corps, Griffin’s division was to move down Boydton Plank Road and join Ayres.²¹⁰

In the meantime, Humphreys had been informed of the decision to use part of his corps to occupy the position currently held by Griffin’s division. At 8:50 p.m., General Webb telegraphed Humphreys that he was to have Miles’ division relieve Griffin’s bluecoats. One of Mott’s brigades would be used to support Miles. Humphreys would see that this order was executed as soon as possible.

Humphreys quickly drafted and distributed a set of instructions to his division commanders calculated to implement this directive. Hays was to call up his reserve brigade (Smyth’s). All of Hays’ troops were to be placed on the front line. The left flank of the division would then be extended to the left and part of the breastworks held by Mott’s division occupied. Hays’ soldiers would also be responsible for holding the picket line currently held by Mott’s men. Once Hays’ troops had relieved his right flank units, Mott was to shift his division to the left. Miles’ division would be relieved. Two of Mott’s brigades were to occupy the trenches from Hays’ left to Boydton Plank Road. Miles’ troops, in their turn, would relieve Griffin’s division and hold “the return on the Boydton Plank Road.” One of Mott’s brigades was to support Miles’ left flank. The three division commanders were alerted to be ready to carry out their scheduled movements at daybreak.²¹¹

Next, Humphreys addressed a message to Warren stating that he had been directed to relieve Griffin with Miles’ division. The commander of the II Corps wanted Warren to give him a description of the position occupied by Griffin’s troops. Since Warren had retired, the general’s adjutant sent Humphreys a sketch and a description of the works held by Griffin’s command.²¹²

Editor’s Conclusion

When the Confederates failed to continue the attack at the Lewis Farm and instead withdrew to their former White Oak Road Line, General Grant expanded General Sheridan’s raid into a major offensive mission. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Lewis Farm (Quaker Road) fighting, coupled with the bad weather, put the pieces in motion for the marching, riding, skirmishing, and fighting that occurred on March 30 and the battles of Dinwiddie Court House and White Oak Road the following day.

___________

1 OR 46, pt. 3, 234.

2 Andrew A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘65, 322.

3 OR 46, pt. 3, 224.

4 Ibid., 231, 234. Grant wished Sheridan to strike the Richmond and Danville Railroad near Burke’s Station.

5 Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York, 1917), vol. 2, 300-301. All references to this source are to volume 2 unless otherwise indicated.

6 OR 46, pt. 1, 1160, 1173, 1179, 1236, 1238.

7 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 236.

8 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1160, 1173, 1236, 1238.

9 Ibid., 1244. When General Mackenzie’s division left its camp near the New Market Road, it mustered 54 officers and 1,629 enlisted men.

10 Ibid., 1160, 1227. In addition to Devens’ division, Weitzel’s command included Maj. Gen. August V. Kautz’s division of the XXV Corps.

11 Ibid., OR 46 pt. 3, 224-226.

12 Ibid., 226.

13 Ibid., 226-227. If it became necessary to leave the two brigades behind when the Corps took the field, the one from Mott’s division was to be posted near the Tucker house battery and Batteries C and D. The brigade from Miles’ division was to be stationed near Battery 4. Ibid., 227.

14 Ibid., 225-226.

15 OR 46, pt. 1, 797-798. The only vehicles authorized to accompany the corps across Rowanty Creek were one medical wagon and one army wagon loaded with hospital supplies to each brigade; and one army wagon with forage for each division. The ambulance train was to consist of one-half the vehicles assigned to the corps. In addition to the ammunition each soldier carried, another 20 rounds per man, was to be transported in the ordnance wagons. One sutler’s wagon was authorized to accompany each brigade. Forage to last for one day was to be carried either in the spring wagons or on the horses. The remainder of the V Corps’ wagons were to be parked near the Perkins house, and supplies brought forward as needed. Ibid., 798.

16 OR 46, pt. 3, 230.

17 Ibid., OR 46 pt. 1, 798.

18 Ibid., 798-799.

19 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 234.

20 Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee : A Biography, 4 vols. (New York, 1935), vol. 4, 22.

21 Ibid, 22-24.

22 Ibid., 24; OR 46, pt. 1, 388. The two divisions from Longstreet’s Corps stationed north of the James River were commanded by Maj. Gens. Charles W. Field and Joseph B. Kershaw.

23 Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 24.

24 OR 46, pt. 3, 1331.

25 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 24.

26 Ibid.; OR 46, pt. 1, 389.

27 Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 25.

28 Ibid. Maj. Gens. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Henry Heth led the two divisions from A. P. Hill’s Corps charged with the defense of this sector.

29 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 24.

30 Ibid.

31 OR 46, pt. 3, 1357-1358; Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1101. General Kautz had commanded the cavalry division attached to the Army of the James until March 20, 1865. On that date, Kautz was detached and placed in charge of an infantry division in the XXV Corps. General Mackenzie commanded of the cavalry division formerly led by Kautz.

32 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 1357.

33 Ibid., 1358. There were 385 men and 5 officers in Fitz Lee’s division that were without mounts and had to be left behind.

34 Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 26-27.

35 OR 46, pt. 3,1358. At this time, Gen. R. E. Lee ordered the 1st Maryland Cavalry, stationed at Gordonsville, to join Fitz Lee’s division.

36 Ibid., 1362.

37 Ibid., 1359-1360; Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 27.

38 Ibid.

39 OR 46, pt. 3, 1360.

40 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 27.

41 OR 46, pt. 3, 1362.

42 OR 46, pt. 1, 1101, 1116.

43 Ibid., 1101, 1141.

44 Ibid., 1101, 1116, 1141; OR 46, pt. 3, 267. Dinwiddie Court House consisted of a court house, a hotel, and a few farm houses. Davies’ brigade camped on the Boydton Plank Road; the 1st New Jersey cavalry was posted on the Flat Foot Road. OR 46, pt. 1, 1143, 1148.

45 Ibid., 1101, 1116, 1129.

46 Ibid., 1101, 1116, 1141; OR 46, pt. 3, 267.

47 Ibid., pt. 1, 1116, 1129, 1134; OR 46, pt. 3, 267.

48 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 779, 870.

49 Ibid., 799; OR 46, pt. 3, 253, 258.

50 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 799.

51 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 254.

52 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 799, 896; OR 46, pt. 3, 243, 259.

53 Survivors’ Association’, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 562.

54 OR 46, pt. 3, 254.

55 Ibid.; OR 46, pt. 1, 799.

56 Ibid.; OR 46, pt. 3, 254.

57 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 799; OR 46, pt. 3, 255.

58 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 800. Warren’s command post was located at the intersection of the Quaker and Vaughan roads.

59 Ibid.; OR 46, pt. 3, 249.

60 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 766.

61 Ibid., 675, 757, 791.

62 Ibid., 757, 766.

63 Ibid., 776, 781, 785.

64 Ibid., 709-710.

65 Ibid., 714, 724, 733, 744. Miles’ division, unlike the others in the II Corps and V Corps, contained four brigades instead of three.

66 Ibid., 733.

67 Ibid., 791. The two batteries assigned to Mott’s division were parked on the Vaughan Road near the Brown’s house.

68 Ibid., 676, 710, 714, 733, 766, 776. Among the regiments deployed as skirmishers by Miles’ brigadiers were the 26th Michigan, the 126th New York, and the 140th Pennsylvania. Mott’s battle line was screened by the 20th Indiana, the 17th Maine, and the 93rd New York. Hays’ brigadiers threw forward the 7th Michigan, the 4th Ohio, and the 7th West Virginia.

69 Ibid., 710, 776.

70 Ibid., 1173.

71 Ibid., 1179.

72 Ibid., 1214.

73 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 270.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1332, 1334-1336.

76 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 1362.

77 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 28.

78 Ibid., 28-29.

79 OR 46, pt. 1, 1298-1299.

80 Ibid., 1299; Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 28.

81 OR 46, pt. 3, 1364.

82 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 29.

83 OR 46, pt. 3, 1363.

84 Ibid., 1365.

85 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1286-1287.

86 Ibid., 800, 845, 847. The 198th Pennsylvania was formed on the right of the Quaker Road and the 185th New York on the left.

87 Ibid., 800; OR 46, pt. 3,255; Capt. Charles H. Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps on the Left, March 29, to Nightfall March 31, 1865, Gravelly Run,” Papers of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 6 (Boston, 1907), 215.

88 OR 46, pt. 1, 800.

89 Ibid., 800, 853.

90 Ibid., 847, 1287.

91 Ibid., 1287.

92 Ibid., 847-848, 1287.

93 Ibid., 848, 899, 1287. So close were the artillerists to the Confederate infantry that battery commander Lt. John Mitchell and four of his men were cut down.

94 Ibid., 1287.

95 Ibid., 848.

96 Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Regiment,, 563.

97 OR 46, pt. 1, 848.

98 Ibid., 858, 1287.

99 Ibid., 800. Company C, 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry served as Warren’s escort.

100 Ibid., 884, 892. Two of Kellogg’s regiments—the 6th and 7th Wisconsin—were formed into line of battle behind Baxter’s troops. Kellogg’s other regiment, the 91st New York, was massed on the left of the brigade, ready to be deployed either on the left flank of the battle line or in rear of the first line, as circumstances dictated.

101 OR 46, pt. 3, 255, 257.

102 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 676.

103 Ibid., 758, 785.

104 Ibid., 781. The 20th Indiana had moved out to the left of Mott’s division.

105 Ibid., 676, 710.

106 OR 46, pt. 3, 250.

107 OR 46, pt. 1, 676.

108 Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 563-563.

109 OR 46, pt. 3, 245; OR 46, pt. 1, 801-802, 853, 862, 1287.

110 OR 46, pt. 1, 803, 849, 1287.

111 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 266.

112 Ibid., 243.

113 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 803.

114 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 251.

115 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 803.

116 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 269.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1116, 1122.

119 Ibid., OR 46, 1116, 1122, 1128.

120 Ibid.

121 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 30-31.

122 Ibid., 31; Douglas S. Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. (New York, 1944), vol. 3, 657-658.

123 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 32; OR 46, pt. 1, 1287. MacRae’s sharpshooters, however, remained on the east side of the run.

124 Ibid., 31; OR 46, pt. 1, 1299.

125 Armistead C. Gordon, Memories and Memorials ofWilliam Gordon McCabe, vol. 1 (Richmond, VA: Old Dominion Press, Inc., 1925), 163

126 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3, 658-659.

127 OR 46, pt. 1, 1122, 1128, 1299.

128 Ibid., Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3, 658-659.

129 OR 46, pt. 1, 1122.

130 Ibid., 1112, 1141, 1144.

131 Ibid., 1116, 1129, 1134; Grant, Personal Memoirs, vol. 2, 302-303.

132 OR 46, pt. 3, 324.

133 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 6, 31-32; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3, 659.

134 OR 46, pt. 1, 1299.

135 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3,266; William W. Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” Papers of the Military Society of Massachusetts (Boston, 1907), vol. 4, 278.

136 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 278-279; OR 46, pt. 3, 266.

137 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 279; OR 46, pt. 3, 266.

138 OR 46, pt.3, 325.

139 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 324-325; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 280; Horace Porter, “Five Forks and the Pursuit of Lee,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,, vol. 4, 709-710.

140 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 280.

141 Ibid., 280-281.

142 OR 46, pt. 1, 803; OR 46, pt. 3,298-299. The V Corps trains were guarded by the 11th and 14th U.S. Infantry.

143 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 281.

144 OR 46, pt. 1, 803.

145 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 282.

146 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign, 282; OR 46, pt. 3, 266, 325.

147 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 298.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 803-804.

150 Ibid., 804.

151 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 307.

152 Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 564.

153 OR 46, pt. 3, 308-309.

154 Ibid., 299-300. Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 284. General Grant had indicated to Meade that Sheridan was moving up Ford’s Church Road in an effort to reach the South Side Railroad. Furthermore, Grant had informed Meade that the cavalry was operating at too great a distance from the Army of the Potomac to effect any direct cooperation.

155 OR 46, pt. 3, 300-301.

156 Ibid., 309-310.

157 Ibid., 283.

158 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 807.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 302.

161 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 287.

162 OR 46, pt. 3, 283.

163 OR 46, pt 3, 280-281

164 Ibid., 280-281, 292.

165 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 806.

166 Ibid., 807, 846.

167 Ibid., 807, 808-828, 853, 862-863, 899.

168 Ibid., 808-809, 863, 899.

169 Ibid., 853, 863. For security purposes, the left flank of Bartlett’s brigade was refused.

170 Ibid., 849.

171 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 218; OR 46, pt. 1, 809, 871.

172 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 219; OR 46, pt. 1, 808.

173 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 219; OR 46, pt. 1, 808.

174 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 219.

175 OR 46, pt. 1, 1287.

176 Ibid., 809-810, 871.

177 Ibid., 892, 899.

178 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 269-270.

179 Ibid., 322; OR 46, pt. 1,1214. In reaching Hatcher’s Run, Turner’s troops marched by way of Squirrel Level and Vaughan roads.

180 Ibid., 676; OR 46, pt. 3, 288.

181 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 757, 759, 764, 766. McIvor’s brigade was posted on the right and Olmsted’s on the left.

182 Ibid., 759, 762; OR 46, pt. 3, 290.

183 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1214.

184 Ibid., 776, 781, 785, 788.

185 Ibid., 676, 710, 791.

186 Ibid., 710, 724.

187 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 289.

188 Ibid., 290, 295.

189 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 744.

190 Ibid., 714, 734. The 111th New York had relieved the 126th New York on the skirmish line just before the advance began.

191 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 295.

192 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 714, 734, 744.

193 Ibid., 791. The 10th Massachusetts Battery also moved from the artillery park. Proceeding to Dabney’s Mill, the Massachusetts unit parked its guns in a field.

194 OR 46, pt. 3, 290-291.

195 Ibid., 291, 296. Captain Howell of the Engineer Corps had been assigned to the II Corps on March 29 by the Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, Col. James C. Duane.

196 Ibid., 297.

197 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1244.

198 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 304.

199 Ibid., 284-285; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65, 329.

200 OR 46, pt. 3, 325.

201 Ibid., 285. Grant planned to use General Warren’s V Corps to support Sheridan’s thrust.

202 Ibid., 285, 291, 305.

203 Ibid., 285.

204 Ibid; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 293.

205 OR 46, pt. 3, 324.

206 Ibid.

207 Ibid., 286, 306, 324; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 294-295.

208 OR 46, pt. 3, 286.

209 Ibid., 306.

210 Ibid., 286, 306.

211 Ibid., 291, 294.

212 Ibid., 293.