Chapter 2

The Five Forks Campaign

The Battles of Dinwiddie Court House and White Oak Road

March 30-31, 1865

Part IV

The Battle of Dinwiddie Court House

The courier bearing Grant’s letter inquiring about placing the V Corps under JL Sheridan’s control reached the cavalryman’s headquarters early on the morning of the 31st. Replying to Grant’s communication, Sheridan confidently stated that if the rain stopped and the ground dried, he believed he would either turn the Confederate right or score a breakthrough. He could do this if he were reinforced by an infantry corps. Sheridan, however, wanted the VI Corps and not Warren’s V Corps. He observed that he “would not like the Fifth Corps to make such an attempt.”

Next, Sheridan jotted off a few lines concerning the situation in the Dinwiddie Court House area. His scouts had just returned from the front with important news. They told Sheridan that the Rebels were busy throwing up breastworks at Five Forks. From the sound of the chopping, the scouts believed the fortifications extended at least a mile west of the vital crossroads. In addition, noises made by the trains on the South Side Railroad were distinctly audible to the Federals. All the trains seemed to be westbound.¹

Major General Philip H. Sheridan

Library of Congress

A number of hours elapsed before Sheridan’s message reached Grant’s command post. When Grant drafted his reply, he informed the cavalry leader that it would be impossible to give him the VI Corps. At the moment, the VI Corps was in the center of the Union line between the Appomattox and Hatcher’s Run. “Besides,” Grant continued, “Wright thinks he can go through the line where he is, and it is advisable to have troops and a commander there who feel so to cooperate with you when you get around.” Grant was willing, however, to give Sheridan the II Corps instead of the V Corps. If this were agreeable with Sheridan, orders would have to be issued in the very near future to ensure that Humphreys’ troops would be in position and ready for action by the morning of April 1. Before Sheridan could answer this dispatch, the situation had changed drastically.²

At 9:00 a.m. on the 31st, General Merritt reinforced his picket line. At the same time, Merritt directed Devin to send out several strong combat patrols. These groups were to undertake a forced reconnaissance of the Confederate positions covering White Oak Road. In accordance with Merritt’s instructions, “old war horse” Devin sent Colonel Stagg’s Michigan brigade up Crump Road; Colonel Fitzhugh’s brigade was dismounted and advanced up Dinwiddie Road. Devin’s third brigade, Gibbs’, was massed at J. Boisseau’s. Gibbs’ unit could be used to support Stagg’s and Fitzhugh’s troopers in case they were unable to handle the Confed- erates that they encountered.³

Major General Wesley Merritt

Library of Congress

Davies’ brigade of Crook’s division which had been ordered to the front on the previous afternoon was also posted at J. Boisseau’s. Patrols from Davies’ brigade were given the task of watching the countryside west of Chamberlain’s Bed. Crook’s two other brigades—Cols. J. Irvin Gregg’s and Charles Smith’s—were based at Dinwiddie Court House. Detachments from these two commands picketed Boydton Plank and Flat Foot roads. The crossings of Stony Creek were also kept under close surveillance by Crook’s troopers. Sheridan’s third division, Custer’s, guarded the wagon train which was still bogged down somewhere west of Malone’s Bridge.⁴

Fitzhugh’s and Stagg’s troopers had not advanced very far up Dinwiddie and Crump roads before they came upon the Confederate outposts. Discovering that the Rebels held White Oak Road in force, Stagg’s men fell back. After relaying this information to Devin, Stagg established a roadblock on Crump Road. The ground where Stagg formed his brigade was a short distance north of Gravelly Run.⁵

As soon as his men had crossed a branch of Chamberlain’s Bed about one mile southeast of Five Forks, Fitzhugh halted his brigade. He proceeded to deploy his dismounted troopers on either side of the road. Once his men had taken up a strong defensive position, Fitzhugh advanced two of his regiments—the 6th New York and the 1st U.S. (The 1st U.S., an organic part of Gibbs’ command, had been temporarily assigned to Fitzhugh’s brigade.) These two units penetrated to within a short distance of Five Forks before being checked. During the advance, the bluecoats captured several prisoners. On being questioned, the captives told the Yankees that Five Forks was “occupied by Pickett’s division of infantry and at least a division of cavalry.” This disturbing news was immediately forwarded to headquarters. In response to Sheridan’s instructions, Devin directed Fitzhugh to hold his ground and open communications with Davies’ brigade which was operating on his left. A glance at his maps showed Devin that Fitzhugh occupied “the apex of a triangle, the left of which was held by Davies’ brigade and the right by Stagg’s.”⁶

In the meantime, one of Davies’ patrols had obtained some interesting information regarding Confederate movements. A company of the 1st NewJersey Cavalry led by Capt. Samuel Craig crossed Chamberlain’s Bed. Passing through the Confederate vedettes, Craig’s troops swooped down upon and captured a Rebel outpost manned by infantry. The foot soldiers told the Yankees that Johnson’s infantry and Rooney Lee’s cavalry divisions were moving down the opposite side of Chamberlain’s Bed toward Dinwiddie Court House. If this information was true, and the Southerners were allowed to continue their march unimpeded, they would turn Sheridan’s left flank.⁷

Undoubtedly, this report caused Sheridan a few unpleasant moments, because it indicated that the Confederates had poured additional troops into the area. Since Sheridan had anticipated the arrival of Rooney Lee’s troopers, the information that they were operating west of Chamberlain’s Bed probably did not bother him very much. Sheridan, however, was troubled by the news that Johnson’s troops had reinforced Pickett. The cavalryman had not calculated on this turn of events. Sheridan did not know, of course, that only two of Johnson’s brigades were serving with Pickett. Now, to make matters worse, the foe had apparently seized the initiative. Instead of attacking, the aggressive Sheridan would have to use all his skill to check the Confederate effort to outflank his corps.

Major General George Crook

Library of Congress

To counter this Rebel thrust, Sheridan decided to commit Crook’s division. The extensive reconnaissance carried out by the Federals had revealed that there were two roads that crossed Chamberlain’s Bed and gave ready access to their left flank. A short distance above the upper crossing, Chamberlain’s Bed branched. The west fork, know as Bear Swamp, was crossed by Scott Road which connected Five Forks and Little Five Forks. Because it was presumed that the Confederates were advancing along Scott Road, the Federals, if they were to hold Dinwiddie Court House, would have to cover the two lower crossings: Danse’s and Fitzgerald’s. Davies’ brigade which was already at the front was rushed westward from J. Boisseau’s. Reaching the Lewis farm, Davies formed his brigade in the field east of Danse’s Ford. The 3rd Battalion, 1st New Jersey Cavalry led by Maj. Walter W. Robbins was sent across Chamberlain’s Bed. Robbins’ troops were to see if they could locate the Rebel column reportedly advancing along Scott Road. Davies manned a line of outposts covering the approaches to the ford with Maj. James H. Hart’s battalion of the 1st New Jersey.⁸

Colonel Charles Smith’s brigade was rushed from Dinwiddie Court House to the point where Ford Station Road crossed Chamberlain’s Bed at Fitzgerald’s Ford. This was about one mile south of Danse’s Ford which was guarded by Davies’ troopers. After he had deployed his command, Smith sent a detachment of the 2nd New York Mounted Rifles across the stream. To ensure that Smith would have a timely warning of the approach of the Confederates, the New Yorkers established a picket line several hundred yards west of the ford.

One of Crook’s three brigades—Gregg’s—was held in reserve. Taking their station at the junction of Adams and Brooks roads, midway between the two fords, Gregg’s troopers were ready to assist Davies and Smith in case they were needed.⁹

After having made these dispositions, Sheridan was confident that he could cope with the situation. Sheridan’s main line of resistance now faced west instead of north. Fitzhugh’s brigade held the right on Dinwiddie Road; Smith’s the left at Fitzgerald’s Ford; and Davies’ the center at Danse’s. Stagg’s brigade, on Crump Road, guarded Fitzhugh’s rear; while Gregg’s and Gibbs’ units constituted a strategic reserve. So certain of his position was the cavalry leader that he decided not to order up Custer’s division at this time.¹⁰

The news that Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s divisions had reached Five Forks early in the morning persuaded Pickett to press on toward Dinwiddie Court House, and he quickly formulated a well-thought plan of operations.

A short distance southeast of Five Forks, Munford’s cavalry division took up its battle station astride Dinwiddie Road. Strong detachments from Munford’s division were posted on Crump and Gravelly Run Church roads. Munford’s mission was to hold White Oak Road and pin the Federal cavalry in position while the remainder of Pickett’s task force turned Sheridan’s left.

Spearheaded by Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s cavalry, Pickett’s infantry marched southward from Five Forks about 9:00 a.m. Scott Road served as the Confederate line of advance. The Southerners crossed Bear Swamp near the E. P. Scott farm. Chamberlain’s Bed protected the exposed left flank of the greyclads column as it pushed ahead. In spite of the weather and hunger, the cavalry was in excellent spirits. The infantry, too, were alert and full of fight. At Little Five Forks, the Rebels turned into Ford Station Road. Pickett planned to re-cross Chamberlain’s Bed at Fitzgerald’s Ford and assail Sheridan’s left flank. As soon as Munford heard the sound of Pickett’s guns, he was to launch a frontal attack on the bluecoats.¹¹

After crossing Chamberlain’s Bed, Robbins’ patrol found that the road leading to Danse’s Ford was unprotected. Before proceeding, Robbins detached Companies K, L, and M and had them establish a roadblock. Accompanied by Company H, Robbins rode down the right bank of the stream as far as Fitzgerald’s Ford, and conferred briefly with Colonel Smith. The general told the major that his scouts had not yet seen any Confederates. Robbins then retraced his steps, picked up his troopers holding the roadblock, and re-crossed the stream. The troopers were dismounted and their horses sent to the rear. Next, Robbins put his men to work building breastworks of fence rails. Hardly had Robbins’ troopers completed the barricade before they heard the crackling of gunfire from the direction of Fitzgerald’s Ford, and took cover. They then anxiously waited for the butternuts to appear.

The rest of Davies’ brigade, with the exception of Hart’s battalion, was posted in a field east of Danse’s Ford. After Robbins’ troopers had slowed the Confederate advance, Davies planned to counterattack and hurl the foe back into Chamberlain’s Bed.¹²

About 11:00 a.m., Fitz Lee’s vanguard—Barringer’s North Carolina cavalry brigade from Rooney Lee’s division—established contact with the picket line held by a detachment of the 2nd New York Mounted Rifles as it felt its way toward Fitzgerald’s Ford. Fighting a skillful delaying action, the New Yorkers retired across the stream. Colonel Smith learned that his outposts were engaged, so he prepared to defend the ford. When the cavalrymen of the 2nd New York re-crossed the watercourse, they were dismounted. The 6th Ohio also dismounted and moved into position alongside the New Yorkers. Taking cover, the Unionists opened fire on the Confederate cavalrymen when they appeared on the opposite bank. Unable to breast the fire of the repeating carbines, the grey clads recoiled.

To exploit this temporary success, Col. Smith sent a battalion of the 1st Maine across the creek. The Maine men reached the right bank without difficulty. But as soon as the battalion deployed and started to advance, it ran into trouble. Encountering a powerful Confederate battle line composed of both mounted and dismounted troopers, the bluecoats were hurled back in confusion. The panic-stricken men either sought refuge among the “led horses” or plunged into the neck-deep stream.

As they approached Chamberlain’s Bed, scouts from Barringer’s brigade realized that the Federal cavalry had crossed it and were advancing to attack them. General Rooney Lee ordered Barringer to dismount his command and meet the Union advance. Colonel William H. Cheek’s 1st North Carolina Cavalry was in front supported by Colonel James L. Gaines’ 2nd North Carolina and Major James H. McNeill’s 5th North Carolina. The 3rd North Carolina Cavalry and Beale’s Virginia Cavalry Brigade stood in reserve and McGregor’s Horse Battery was put into position. The fight between the Maine men and the three North Carolina regiments was severe. Among the Confederate casualties was Colonel Gaines who lost his right arm.

After reaching the creek, Barringer’s brigade formed a line of battle. The 5th North Carolina Cavalry took position opposite Fitzgerald’s Ford backed by the 2nd. Colonel Cheek’s 1st North Carolina Cavalry formed 150 yards north of the ford. A gap of one hundred yards separated the right flank of the 1st and the left of the 5th. Barringer’s plan was for the 5th to cross at the ford in columns of four and deploy to the right of and below the ford. The 2nd was to follow behind and once on the east bank to deploy in line of battle to the left and above the ford. After they reached the east bank the 2nd would form on the 5th’s left. Meanwhile, the 1st would cross downstream. They would thus form a long continuous line, make their charge, drive back the Federals and pursue them. McNeill’s 5th North Carolina Cavalry entered the creek as planned, every man holding his cartridge box high above the water with his left hand and his rifle with his right. The Federals opened a heavy fire on the dense mass. Nevertheless the regiment reached the east bank and deployed in line of battle on the right of the road, waiting for the 2nd North Carolina to cross.

Barringer sent a courier to McNeill to learn his situation. McNeill was advancing slowly, waiting for the supporting regiment to form on his left. He realized that the fire was so furious that it was better to advance than to stand. Colonel McNeill coolly said: “Please tell General Barringer that I am all right and advancing slowly for the Nineteenth [2nd] to form on my left that we may charge and carry those works. Ask him, please, to hasten the Nineteenth over.”¹³

To distract Union fire from the 5th and 2nd regiments, Rooney Lee ordered the 13th Virginia Cavalry from Beale’s brigade to charge across the ford mounted, just when the 2nd North Carolina was stepping forward to cross. Only the first squadron of the Virginians galloped into the creek, however, as the second squadron refused to follow and blocked the road so that the rest of the regiment could not advance. The 2nd closed in behind the first squadron of Virginians. Meanwhile, north of Fitzgerald’s Ford, Colonel Cheek’s 1st North Carolina Cavalry crossed the creek and, despite opposition from the 2nd New York Rifles, gained the east bank.

The battalion from the 1st Maine retreated before the charging cavalry, but Smith brought up the rest of the regiment which was stationed a mile to the rear behind a slight rise. Reunited, the regiment lay down in double rank formation on top of the hill overlooking the ford. The 6th Ohio cavalry was formed in the woods on the left of the 1st Maine. As the first squadron of the 13th Virginia rode past, the 6th Ohio fired into it. When the Virginians neared the top of the hill, the Maine boys rose up and opened fire on them. As the Confederates recoiled, the 6th Ohio fired into their flank again and the 1st Maine followed them down the hill pouring volleys into them, causing them to break and retreat.

Trying to halt the fleeing Virginians, Barringer’s brigade color-bearer waved his battle flag in his hand while Barringer’s aides rushed at them on the enemy’s side of the stream and tried to rally them, especially to keep them from riding headlong into the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry. But the horsemen crashed into the poor North Carolinians, pushing them down into the deep water at the lower side of the ford. At the ford, General Barringer mounted on his horse, observed the disaster that befell his brigade. He sent a courier to form the 5th along the top of the bluff. The men came up from the water and were supplied with ammunition as quickly as possible. Under the fire of the Tar Heels, the Union cavalry went back to their works on the ridge.¹⁴

The 1st North Carolina pursued the New Yorkers into the pines when bullets began falling in their right and rear. Cheek galloped to the right of his line and found the enemy moving up the creek in his rear. He withdrew his regiment as rapidly as possible and reformed in his original line on the west side of the creek.¹⁵

Sometime after 11:00 a.m., Pickett and his infantry reached Fitzgerald’s Ford just after Rooney Lee’s attack ended. Pickett rejected his plan to cross at Fitzgerald’s, settling on Danse’s Ford located one mile to the north, where there was supposed to be a bridge. He now formulated a new plan. Fitz Lee, with Rooney Lee’s cavalry division and Ransom’s two infantry brigades, was to cross Chamberlain’s Bed at Fitzgerald’s Ford. The three infantry brigades of Pickett’s division and Rosser’s cavalry division were to force their way across at Danse’s Ford. Pickett’s contingent reached Danse’s Ford about 2:30 p.m.

Sheridan, as was to be expected, was elated by Smith’s success. At 2:30 p.m., he dashed off a message to Grant informing him: “W. H. F. Lee attacked Smith’s brigade, of Crook’s division, on Chamberlain’s Creek, and got cleaned out. I will now attack him and push First Cavalry Division (Devin’s) against their infantry line.” Sheridan also reported that Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke’s division and three of Pickett’s brigades were at Five Forks on the night of the 30th. (The cavalry commander was badly mistaken when he reported that Hoke’s division was at Five Forks. Hoke’s division was in North Carolina.) General Devin’s division, Sheridan stated, was in contact with the line of outposts covering the Rebel infantry’s Five Forks encampments. (Sheridan was wrong again. At this very minute, Pickett’s infantry was preparing to force its way across Chamberlain’s Bed at Danse’s Ford. It was Munford’s dismounted troopers that Devin’s patrols had spotted near Five Forks.)

Despite the disastrous outcome of the efforts in the morning, Rooney Lee prepared to make another attack on the Chamberlain’s Bed fords. The afternoon plan was for the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry, Colonel Gaines commanding, supported by the 5th North Carolina, to attack at the ford and for the 1st North Carolina to cross at the same place as it had in the morning. Although Sheridan’s men had strengthened their positions by throwing up rifle-pits in the edge of the pines, Lee and Barringer were determined to renew the attack. For the second time and at nearly the same places the Confederates formed line of battle, from the experience of the morning every man knowing the danger that lay ahead.¹⁶

The 2nd North Carolina Cavalry met the same fate at the ford as did the 5th in the morning, and for half an hour the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, being the only Confederates on that side, were subjected to the concentrated fire of the entire line of the Union cavalry. To break the uneven contest, Rooney Lee ordered Beale’s brigade to attack across the creek and come into the fighting on the left of the North Carolinians. Thus encouraged, both Confederate brigades rushed over Smith’s rifle-pits, broke his line, and drove his men pell-mell through the pines, out into an open field. A few moments after this General Rooney Lee, at the head of a mounted squadron from the 5th, came up the road from the ford at a gallop. He charged across the open field and into the woods beyond, but the Union forces had already withdrawn.

Colonel Cheeks described the fighting in a letter to his wife the next day:

My Dear Alice:—We had a terrible fight yesterday. I lost eighty in my regiment. Colonel Cowles severely wounded; Maj. [Marcus] McLeod slightly; Captain Dewey killed; Captain Coleman killed. Thirteen other officers wounded, several of whom will die. John and Al were not hurt. Nearly all the brim of my hat shot off. My horse (the one I lately bought) shot twice, and killed.

My regiment fought more gallantly than I ever saw it before. We waded a creek waist-deep and seventy-five yards wide under heavy fire and drove the enemy from an [e]intrenched position. Will give you full particulars when I have more time. General Lee complimented us in the highest terms. The Thirteenth Virginia was on my left, and after the fight gave me three most enthusiastic cheers. ‘Boots and saddles’ has sounded. Goodbye.

Rooney Lee is reported to have told a friend, “There was nothing done at Gettysburg more gallant than this charge of the 1st North Carolina Cavalry at Chamberlain’s Run.”

When General Crook learned that the Confederates had stormed across Chamberlain’s Bed at Fitzgerald’s Ford, he prepared to rush reinforcements to Smith’s assistance. Because no Rebels had appeared at Danse’s Ford, Crook ordered General Davies to support Smith. Davies would leave Robbins’ battalion to hold the ford. Since the road was impassable for mounted troops, Davies’ cavalrymen left their horses behind when they marched. As soon as his command had started for Fitzgerald’s Ford, Davies rode ahead. The general wanted to find out how tidings were going with Smith’s command. By the time Davies reached Fitzgerald’s Ford, Smith’s troopers had crushed the Confederate bridgehead. Davies, seeing that his command’s services were not needed, wheeled his horse about. When the general encountered the head of his mud-spattered column, he ordered the troops to countermarch. An air of urgency was added to the situation when heavy firing broke out in the direction of Danse’s Ford. This noise could mean only one thing—the Confederates had attacked Robbins’ battalion. The troops, at a word from the general, moved off on the double.¹⁷

Shortly after Davies’ brigade had started for Fitzgerald’s Ford, Robbins’ scouts reported that a strong force of Rebel infantry was approaching Danse’s Ford. Moments later, the Confederate vanguard (Corse’s brigade) attacked and drove in Robbins’ pickets. General Corse then formed his brigade and moved to carry the crossing. While the Southerners had the advantage of numbers, this was partially nullified by the strong defensive position held by the bluecoats. Besides being protected by breastworks, the Yankees were deployed on lower ground. Corse’s butternuts had to pass across the skyline to get at the Federals. Consequently, Robbins’ troopers threw back the initial Rebel onslaught. Undaunted, Corse prepared to turn the Yankees’ flanks. While a strong detachment of Corse’s Virginians feigned another frontal attack, strong combat patrols infiltrated the woods to the right and left of the road. One of these groups succeeded in fording the stream above the crossing. Pressing forward, the patrol encountered the line of outposts manned by Hart’s New Jersey battalion. Hart’s troopers were easily brushed aside by the rugged Rebel infantry. Simultaneously, Corse’s soldiers renewed their attack on Robbins’ battalion. Robbins’ troopers grimly held their ground until the grey clads had closed to within 15 yards. With his flank turned and his men unable to check this powerful frontal assault, Major Robbins abandoned all hopes of holding the ford. He shouted for his men to fall back. As the cavalrymen started to pull back, all thought of discipline vanished. It was every man for himself as the battalion came pouring back out of the bottom.¹⁸

Davies’ brigade came up just as the Confederate infantry started to flood across the ford. The troopers, not used to marching, were badly jaded. In an effort to contain the bridgehead, Davies threw his command into the fray. The 10th New York was formed into line of battle astride the road. Major Robbins now succeeded in rallying a portion of his command. The reformed battalion took position on the New Yorker’s left. Corse’s Virginians attacked the roadblock immediately. After delivering two or three volleys, the New York regiment fled. Major Robbins’ battered battalion was left to cover the New Yorkers’ “shameful retreat.” Pressing on, the Confederates came close to capturing the brigade’s “led horses.” At the last minute, the horse soldiers succeeded in saving their mounts.¹⁹

Davies’ brigade had failed to check the Confederate advance. As soon as Corse’s troops had established a bridgehead, Pickett sent the other four infantry brigades that were available wading across Chamberlain’s Bed. To save his brigade from being cut to pieces, Davies gave orders to fall back to Adams Road. The general hoped to reorganize his battered command at that point. Colonel Hugh R. Janeway was directed to cover the retreat with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of his 1st New Jersey Cavalry. Janeway hurriedly deployed his two battalions across Danse’s Ford road. Davies’ troopers, after passing through Janeway’s command, headed for the previously designated rendezvous. One of Colonel Stagg’s Michigan regiments, which had been rushed to Janeway’s support by General Devin, now put in an appearance. The Michiganders moved into position alongside the New Jersey unit.²⁰

There was scant activity along Devin’s picket line until 2:00 p.m. The Confederates precipitated what little action there was along Dinwiddie Road. To cover the right of Pickett’s flanking column, Munford sent out several patrols. These groups carried out their assignment so successfully that the Federals kept their attention on White Oak Road. Devin’s scouts failed to pick up any intelligence of Pickett’s march down the west side of Chamberlain’s Bed. When Devin learned that Five Forks was held by Pickett’s division reinforced by at least a division of cavalry, he ordered Fitzhugh’s troopers to fall back. Re-crossing Chamberlain’s Bed, Fitzhugh’s brigade retired about one-half mile. The brigade took up a new position covering the junction of Dinwiddie and Gravelly Run Church roads.²¹

Brigadier General Thomas C. Devin

Library of Congress

About 2:30 p.m., Devin’s troopers were surprised when the sound of heavy firing came rolling in from the southwest. Shortly thereafter, Devin received an urgent request from Colonel Janeway for help. Devin ordered Colonel Stagg to send one of his Michigan regiments to Janeway’s assistance. (Stagg’s brigade, except for the detachment manning the roadblock on Crump Road, had returned to J. Boisseau’s farm.) In an effort to discover what was happening at Danse’s Ford, Devin accompanied the Michiganders as they rode toward the sound of battle. Devin, arriving in the neighborhood of the crossing, found Davies’ troopers “retiring precipitately.” The general waved the Michigan regiment into position alongside Janeway’s troopers. Next, he sought to rally Davies’ frightened men. Finding that this was impossible, Devin called for his adjutant, Maj. Amasa E. Dana. Devin told the staff officer to hasten to Colonel Fitzhugh’s command post and order Fitzhugh to move his brigade by the left flank and take position on the road leading to Danse’s Ford. One regiment would be left behind to hold Dinwiddie Road.²²

As soon as Dana contacted Fitzhugh, the brigade commander hastened to carry out Devin’s instructions. The 6th New York was detached to hold the roadblock, and the trumpeters were ordered to sound “Boots and Saddles.” Fitzhugh’s column moved off in a fast trot. Leaving Dinwiddie Road, Fitzhugh’s brigade turned into the road leading to Danse’s Ford. Some confusion ensued when stragglers from Davies’ brigade broke through Fitzhugh’s ranks. Finally, Fitzhugh’s troopers caught up with Janeway’s hard-pressed command. In accordance with Devin’s orders, Fitzhugh dismounted and deployed his brigade. The troopers took position on either side of the road near the Williams house. Janeway’s hard-pressed rear guard passed through Fitzhugh’s ranks. Colonel Janeway then disbanded his group. The Michigan regiment reported back to Colonel Stagg; Janeway’s troopers rejoined Davies’ brigade, which was being reorganized near J. Boisseau’s farm. Pressing forward hard on the heels of Janeway’s rear guard, Corse’s butternuts struck the fresh Union battle line. A bitter contest ensued. Fitzhugh’s bluecoats were able to hold their own. Corse’s heretofore irresistible sweep had been checked.²³

The Yankees’ jubilation, however, was short-lived as Munford now committed his division. Advancing down Dinwiddie Road, Munford’s scouts established contact with the 6th New York. Before attacking, the colonel directed brigade commander Col. William A. Morgan to dismount several of his regiments. When the officers had formed their men into line of battle, Munford sent Morgan’s brigade forward. The Confederate assault wave rolled over the New York regiment. Part of one of Colonel Stagg’s Michigan regiments was rushed to the New Yorkers’ assistance. Between them, the two Union units momentarily checked Munford’s drive. Quickly regrouping, the Confederates again drove ahead, however, and the Union line collapsed.²⁴

In an effort to enhance the pressure he could generate on Corse’s front and get this stalled attack rolling, Pickett committed Terry’s brigade. This increment to their strength enabled the Rebels to extend their right flank. To make matters worse for the Yankees, Devin learned that the 6th New York was in full retreat. Next, a powerful line of Southern infantry emerged from the woods to the general’s front. Devin realized that, if he left Fitzhugh’s brigade where it was, it would be annihilated. He issued instructions for Fitzhugh to retire. At the same time, Devin called up Stagg’s brigade.²⁵

Covered by a strong rear guard, Fitzhugh’s brigade retired a short distance. Stagg’s Michiganders filed into position on Fitzhugh’s left. Pushing rapidly ahead, Munford’s butternuts quickly established contact with Fitzhugh’s right flank units on Dinwiddie Road. The Federals beat off Munford’s initial thrust. A second attack by the grey clads, however, was successful, and Fitzhugh’s troopers fell back. Devin’s defensive line had been rendered untenable. To cope with Munford, Fitzhugh redeployed his entire brigade athwart Dinwiddie Road. Stagg’s Michiganders were left to deal with Pickett’s infantry.²⁶

Fitzhugh’s and Stagg’s brigades were unable to check the Confederate advance. Munford’s troopers forced Fitzhugh’s bluecoats back. At the same time, Pickett’s infantry hammered away at Stagg’s Michiganders. The two Union brigades fell back on J. Boisseau’s farm, where General Davies was reforming his command. General Merritt sought to defend this strategic point. Devin’s two brigades were deployed on the right; Davies placed his troopers on the left. Patrols were sent down Adams Road. These groups expected to open communications with the Federal troopers covering the Dinwiddie Court House.²⁷

After driving back Stagg’s brigade, Pickett moved to take possession of Adams Road. A combat team was sent through the woods. Reaching the vital road, the Confederates set up a roadblock. By this adroit move, Pickett succeeded in isolating the Union forces at Dinwiddie Court House from their comrades at J. Boisseau’s farm.

The patrols sent out by Merritt were unable to get through Pickett’s roadblock. To extricate his men from this dangerous situation, Merritt ordered Devin to take the two brigades—Fitzhugh’s and Stagg’s—and move across to Boydton Plank Road. In case the foe continued his push toward Dinwiddie Court House, Devin was to strike him in the flank and rear. Once he had mustered his command, Devin proceeded to carry out the first part of Merritt’s instructions. Because Munford’s Rebel division was hovering in the area, Devin screened his march with a strong rear guard. Though the Confederates adopted a threatening attitude, they did not attack. When his command reached A. Dabney’s farm, Devin formed it into line of battle covering Plank Road. The “led horses” were brought up, and Devin prepared to advance along Brooks Road and establish contact with Gibbs’ brigade. At this time, Gibbs’ brigade was covering the junction of Adams and Brooks Roads.²⁸

Davies’ brigade crossed the Boydton Plank Road shortly after Devin’s troopers. Confederate patrols from Munford’s division, both mounted and dismounted, harassed Davies’ column. When Davies reached Plank Road, he assumed command of Devin’s troops as ranking officer. One of Stagg’s regiments, the 6th Michigan, was sent to check the Confederate pursuit. The Michiganders easily drove back the grey clad patrols that had been worrying Davies’ men. Next, Davies issued orders suspending Devin’s projected movement down Brooks Road. Instead, Devin was told to march to Dinwiddie Court House by way of Plank Road. It was starting to get dark when Fitzhugh’s and Stagg’s brigades reached Dinwiddie Court House. In accordance with Merritt’s instructions, Devin moved his two brigades to Crump’s farm, where they camped. Davies’ unit also marched to Dinwiddie Court House. Here, the brigade was rejoined by the men with the “led horses.” The troopers had not seen their horses since they had been sent to the rear early in the afternoon. Davies’ brigade camped for the night on Great Cattail Run near the Kidd farm.²⁹

When the foe had first appeared at Fitzgerald’s Ford, Gregg’s Pennsylvania brigade had been rushed to that point. Gregg posted his men in support of Smith’s command. Smith’s troopers, however, handled the situation without calling upon Gregg for help. Around 2:00 p.m., the sound of heavy firing drifted in from the north. Shortly thereafter, Gregg learned that the Confederate infantry had stormed across Chamberlain’s Bed at Danse’s Ford. Reports reached Gregg’s command stating that Davies’ brigade had been unable to check the grey clads’ onslaught. Expecting to receive orders to march to his comrades’ relief, Gregg alerted his regimental commanders to hold their men ready to move on a moment’s notice.

Despite the bad news from the front, Sheridan refused to throw in his reserves until Pickett had committed himself. The cavalry leader was uncertain of the Confederates’ intentions. Dinwiddie Court House might be their objective, or they might wheel to the left and drive up Boydton Plank Road in an effort to roll up the V Corps. Sheridan bided his time until Pickett’s vanguard drove across Adams Road. This success enabled the Southerners to isolate three of Sheridan’s brigades—Davies’, Fitzhugh’s, and Stagg’s. Sheridan, hoping to convert this Confederate success into a disaster, ordered Merritt to march these three units across to Boydton Plank Road. If the grey clads pursued, Sheridan planned to strike them in the flank and rear. Next, Sheridan planned to organize his attacking forces. Gregg’s brigade was to move across country and “attack the enemy in the flank and rear.” Devin’s third brigade, Gibbs’, was to take position at the junction of Adams and Brooks roads. Gibbs’ troopers were to delay Pickett’s infantrymen in case they should strike for Dinwiddie Court House. A staff officer was sent to contact General Custer. The aide was to direct Custer to hasten to Dinwiddie Court House with two of his brigades. Custer’s other brigade would be left to guard the train.³⁰

Following the receipt of Sheridan’s orders, Gregg’s eager troopers, guided by a staff officer, rode off in the direction of the firing. After riding about a mile, Gregg halted his command. The 4th, 8th, and 16th Pennsylvania were dismounted and deployed into line of battle. There were no grey clads in sight. The Pennsylvanians, covered by a strong force of skirmishers, then worked their way cautiously forward, guided by the sound of heavy firing. Within a few minutes, the blue clads sighted Pickett’s oncoming battle line. A fierce engagement ensued.³¹

A short time before Fitzhugh’s and Stagg’s troopers had been driven back on J. Boisseau’s farm, Gibbs’ brigade had taken position at the junction of Adams and Brooks roads. The four guns manned by the cannoneers of Batteries C and F, 4th U.S. Light Artillery were emplaced on the hill north of Dinwiddie Court House. When Gregg’s Pennsylvanians moved forward, they established contact with Gibbs’ left flank companies. Gibbs planned to get in touch with the remainder of Devin’s division after it had retired to Boydton Plank Road, but he was unable to do so.

As soon as most of his infantry had reached the junction of Dinwiddie and Crump roads, Pickett formed his brigades into line of battle. Covered by a strong force of skirmishers, the Rebel infantry advanced on Dinwiddie Court House. Pickett’s battle line guided its movements on Adams Road. Munford’s troopers covered the infantry’s left flank. Within a few minutes, Pickett’s soldiers were in contact with Gregg’s and Gibbs’ hard-fighting troopers. On the Union left, Gregg’s Pennsylvanians did not wait for the Confederates to charge. Pressing ahead, the bluecoats hurled the Confederate skirmishers back. In this thrust, a number of prisoners were captured by the Unionists, and sent to the rear. The Yankees held their own for almost two hours. Finally, however, Pickett’s soldiers succeeded in dislodging Gibbs’ brigade. The untimely retreat of Gibbs’ command rendered Gregg’s position untenable. Cover- ed by a strong rear guard, the Federals fell back.³²

Major General George C. Custer

Library of Congress

The combative Custer was overjoyed when a staff officer galloped up and told him to march to Dinwiddie Court House with two of his brigades. In accordance with Sheridan’s instructions, Col. William Wells’ brigade was de- tached and left to guard the wagons. Accompanied by Cols. Alexander C. M. Pennington’s and Henry Capehart’s brigades, Custer rode forward “at the trot.” Upon reaching Dinwiddie Court House, the head of the column halted while Custer reported to Sheridan. The cavalry leader directed Custer to place his “command in position to support and relieve” Crook’s division, which was being forced back by the Confederates. Rejoining his command, Custer directed Pennington to reinforce Smith’s brigade at Fitzgerald’s Ford. Capehart’s troopers were to take position on the left of Adams Road. Just as Pennington was marshalling his command preparatory to carrying out Custer’s instructions, one of Sheridan’s staff officers galloped up. The aide told Pennington to deploy his brigade on Capehart’s right.

By 5:30 p.m., Custer’s command had taken position about one-half mile north of Dinwiddie Court House. Pennington’s brigade was posted a short distance in front of and to the right of Capehart’s. One artillery unit (Battery A, 2nd U.S. Light Artillery) reported to Custer. The “Boy General” had the artillerists unlimber their four 3-inch rifles in the field on the left of Adams Road. His dispositions completed, Custer confidently waited for the Confederates to appear.³³

Smith’s troopers held Fitz Lee’s command at bay until 5:30 p.m. Immediately after the Confederate horse artillery started to shell his command, Smith’s scouts reported that Pickett’s infantry was closing in on his brigade. (The retreat of Gregg’s and Gibbs’ commands had uncovered Smith’s rear.)³⁴ If Smith’s bluecoats remained where they were, they would be crushed between Pickett’s advancing infantry and Fitz Lee’s cavalry. Consequently, Smith ordered his men to fall back. Before they reached Dinwiddie Court House, Smith’s people spotted Custer’s battle line. Halting his command, Smith reformed his brigade on the left of Capehart’s unit.³⁵

As soon as Smith’s brigade pulled back from Fitzgerald’s Ford, Rooney Lee’s and Rosser’s cavalry divisions forded Chamberlain’s Bed. Once the troopers had gained the left bank, Fitz Lee massed them on the right of Pickett’s battle line. The Confederate infantry, after forcing Gregg’s and Gibbs’ units to give way, had resumed its push toward Dinwiddie Court House. Before they had advanced far, the Southerners encountered a fresh Union formation—Custer’s division. It was getting late and darkness was not far off. Now that Fitz Lee was up, Pickett determined to make one final effort to smash Sheridan’s Corps. The infantry would attack down Adams Road, while Fitz Lee turned the Union left. Munford’s cavalry would cover the countryside between the Adams and Boydton Plank roads.³⁶

Gregg’s and Gibbs’ battered commands had passed through Custer’s line a few minutes before the Confederates emerged from the woods. Gregg’s brigade was posted on the right of Pennington’s brigade; Gibbs’ was sent to the rear and rejoined Devin’s division at Crump’s farm. When the Confederates attacked, Pickett’s infantry first assailed Pennington’s troopers. (This Union command had taken position in advance of Custer’s main line of resistance.) Pennington’s brigade gave way. Falling back, Pennington reformed his command on the crest of a ridge on the right of Adams Road. This retreat enabled Pennington to re-establish contact with Capehart on his left. The grey clads failed to follow up on their success. Pennington’s troopers were given time in which to throw up fence rail barricades. When they did attack, the Confederates were thrown back by the troopers holding Custer’s reorganized defensive line. A second attempt by Pickett’s infantry to storm the Union position was also repulsed. Custer’s troops then counterattacked and forced the Confederate skirmishers to recoil on their line of battle.³⁷

In the meantime, Fitz Lee’s cavalry had assailed the Union left. Smith’s bluecoats, despite heavy losses, held their “ground under the hottest fire of which the enemy was capable,” losing heavily all the while, till nearly dark.” Smith now learned that his men had shot up all their ammunition. Consequently, he permitted them to fall back. Reforming on Adams Road, Smith’s troopers “intimidated the advance of the enemy by presenting a good front, without a cartridge.”³⁸

It was now getting very dark; therefore, Pickett ordered the attack suspended. When the fighting ceased, the two contending battle lines lay very close to each other. Pickett’s infantry was massed astride Adams Road, with Fitz Lee’s cavalry on the right and Munford’s on the left. The Confederate picket lines extended from G. U. Brooks’ on the left to Fitzgerald’s Ford on the right. Two brigades of Custer’s division held Sheridan’s front on the night of the 31st. In anticipation of a dawn attack, Custer’s men slept on their arms.³⁹

After the fighting had ceased, Gregg’s and Smith’s troopers secured their “led horses.” The two units then marched to Great Cattail Run, where they rendezvoused with Davies’ brigade. Once he had regrouped his division, Crook permitted his men to camp. Following Custer’s departure for the front, the wagon train was parked near the junction of Vaughan and Monk’s Neck roads.⁴⁰

While the Southerners had failed to score a sweeping success in the battle of Dinwiddie Court House, they had wrested the initiative from the aggressive Sheridan. If progress had been slow, it was because the Federal cavalry (most of them armed with seven-shot repeating carbines) had fought hard. The spirit of Pickett’s hard-bitten fighters seemed as stout as ever. No reports were made by the Confederate leaders of the losses suffered by their commands in the battle of Dinwiddie Court House. In addition to the battle casualties, Pickett had lost the services of one of his brigadiers. During the day, General Terry had received a disabling injury. The ranking officer in the brigade, Col. Robert M. Mayo, assumed command of Terry’s brigade.⁴¹

Having lost the initiative, Sheridan was forced to fight a delaying action. Each time the Confederates overcame a pocket of resistance, they were confronted by another. Nevertheless, by nightfall, Sheridan’s Corps had been pushed back nearly to Dinwiddie Court House. Union losses during the day had totaled about 450.⁴²

Late in the afternoon of the 31st, Grant sent a member of his staff, Brig. Gen. Horace Porter, to see Sheridan. Porter reached the junction of Adams and Brooks roads just as Gregg’s and Gibbs’ brigades were falling back. At this time, Porter recalled, one of Sheridan’s bands, while under a heavy fire, was “playing ‘Nellie Bly’ as cheerily as if it were furnishing music for a country picnic.”

Porter encountered Sheridan just before he reached Dinwiddie Court House. After Porter had reported on how the Army of the Potomac was faring, Sheridan remarked, “he had had one of the liveliest days in his experience, fighting infantry and cavalry with cavalry only.” Sheridan told Porter “that he was concentrating his command on the high ground just north of Dinwiddie, and would hold that position at all hazards.” Continuing, Sheridan declared, “that with the Corps of infantry he expected to be put under his command he could take the initiative the next morning and cut off the whole of the force Lee had detached.” Sheridan, referring to Pickett’s force, commented: “This force is in more danger than I am—if I am cut off from the Army of the Potomac, it is cut off from Lee’s army, and not a man in it should ever be allowed to get back to Lee. We at last have drawn the enemy’s infantry out of its fortifications, and this is our chance to attack it.”

Sheridan begged Porter to hasten to Grant’s headquarters and again urge the lieutenant general commanding to send him the VI Corps, “because it had been under him in the battles in the Valley of Virginia, and knew his way of fighting.” Porter repeated the information which had been forwarded to Sheridan the previous evening regarding the VI Corps—namely, that Wright’s Corps was on the right of the Army of the Potomac, and the only infantry force which could promptly join Sheridan was Warren’s V Corps. With this business taken care of, Porter returned to Grant’s headquarters. The staff officer reached Dabney’s Mill at 7:00 p.m. and gave Grant a full report of Sheridan’s operations.⁴³

Evidently, Sheridan was not quite as confident of his position as he had led Porter to believe he was. When the cavalry leader composed a letter to Grant describing the day’s fighting, he wrote, “This force (Pickett’s) is too strong for us. I will hold on to Dinwiddie Court-House until I am compelled to leave.”⁴⁴

Part V

The Battle of White Oak Road

It stopped raining on the afternoon of the 30th, but by 3:00 a.m. the next morning it started again. The streams continued to rise, and the roads were getting worse. Except where corduroyed, they were practically impassable. When Grant awoke and found that the rain had recommenced, he determined to do nothing until the precipitation ceased. The general’s first order of the day was to Meade, sent at 7:40 a.m., announced, “Owing to the heavy rain this morning the troops will remain substantially as they are now, but the Fifth Corps should today draw three days’ more rations.”⁴⁵

When he acknowledged Grant’s telegram (at 7:45), Meade inquired if there were any objections to the II Corps also drawing three days’ rations. The empty supply wagons would then be returned to the military railroad to be refilled.⁴⁶ Grant saw no objections. The II Corps was authorized to draw its rations.

Humphreys’ and Warren’s Corps had started taking up the positions which they had been ordered to assume the previous evening, about two hours before Grant issued his directive suspending all activities for the time being.

At daybreak, Ayres started massing his division near the S. Dabney house. First, the general issued orders calling up Denison’s and Gwyn’s brigades. These two organizations had spent the night camped on the left bank of the rain swollen branch of Gravelly Run, near Mrs. Butler’s. After fording the three-foot deep stream, the two brigades marched to S. Dabney’s, where they rendezvoused with Winthrop’s command. In an effort to increase his striking force, Ayres sent an urgent dispatch to Warren. Ayres wanted the soldiers from his division who were manning the line of outposts relieved by men from some other unit. Ayres informed his superior that he would have already replaced the pickets from his own command, but he did not feel it would be wise to reduce his strength at this time.⁴⁷

Major General Gouverneur K. Warren

Library of Congress

A staff officer delivered this message to General Warren at 6:10 a.m. Warren saw the logic behind Ayres’ request. He dashed off a hurried reply, informing Ayres “that the matter of relieving the pickets will be attended to at once.”⁴⁸

For some unexplained reason, forty-five minutes elapsed before Warren moved to secure a relief for Ayres’ outposts. At 7 o’clock, Warren ordered General Crawford to recall his pickets covering the Boydton Plank Road. Crawford would then concentrate his division at the Holliday house. When his troops had reached Holliday’s, Crawford was to see that soldiers from his division relieved Ayres’ on the picket line. Crawford’s men were to picket the front from Humphreys’ left to a point north of Holliday’s. In case of a Confederate attack on Ayres’ division, Crawford was to move to his comrade’s assistance. The pioneers from two of Crawford’s brigades were to be detached and left to throw a bridge across the rain swollen branch of Gravelly Run that barred the passage of the corps’ artillery. Crawford would establish his command post at Holliday’s house.⁴⁹

Warren would have liked to visit Ayres’ division and superintend the operations at the front. In fact, he intended to leave for the point of danger “as soon as the giving and receiving instructions necessary for the operations of the day would permit.” On the 31st, as on the 30th, the influx of dispatches received, and the orders that they made necessary, kept Warren at his headquarters and accessible to the telegraph until almost 9:00 a.m.⁵⁰

The II Corps, as scheduled, had moved to take over the rifle pits held by Griffin’s division. Since the Federals were on guard against a Confederate counterattack, they moved cautiously. Long before daybreak, General Hays issued instructions calling up General Smyth’s brigade from the reserve. Moving to the front Smyth’s troops halted in the rear of the trenches occupied by Pierce’s brigade, the unit holding the right flank of Mott’s main line of resistance. At dawn, Smyth’s bluecoats relieved Pierce’s soldiers. By this maneuver, Hays had succeeded in deploying his three brigades in the rifle pits—McIvor’s on the right, Olmsted’s in the center, and Smyth’s on the left. The right flank of Hays’ division was anchored on Hatcher’s Run; its left flank joined Mott’s right at the Taylor house. Hays had no reserve.⁵¹

As soon as Smyth’s men had relieved Pierce, Mott’s division shifted to the left. Mott’s troops filed into the earthworks occupied by Miles’ division. Two of Mott’s brigades, McAllister’s and Pierce’s, were stationed in the breastworks. McAllister’s left rested on the Boydton Plank Road, while Pierce’s right was in contact with Hays’ left at the Taylor house. De Trobriand’s brigade was massed near the Rainey house, ready to move to Miles’ assistance in case of an emergency.⁵²

Upon being relieved by Mott’s troops, Miles’ division shifted across the Boydton Plank Road. Ramsey’s and Madill’s brigades relieved Griffin’s troops in the fortifications. Nugent’s and Scott’s brigade were held in reserve. Throughout the morning, Miles gave his two reserve units various assignments. Nugent’s soldiers were organized into fatigue parties and put to work slashing timber. The 5th New Hampshire of Scott’s brigade was used to man Miles’ picket line. When the New Hampshire regiment moved into no man’s land, it was accompanied by two companies of the 64th New York.⁵³

The II Corps batteries were not moved at this time. Three of the batteries were on the line and three were parked in reserve.⁵⁴

By daylight, the II Corps had completed its shift to the left. When General Meade (at 7:30 a.m.) called for a report of the disposition of the II Corps, Humphreys replied:

The position of my troops this morning is: Hays extending from right, near Crow House, to Taylor house; Mott from Taylor house to Boydton Plank Road. Miles has relieved Griffin in his position. ... I find that Miles is strong enough in Griffin’s position to admit of my putting de Trobriand’s brigade in a little more central position from which it can move in a few minutes to the left.⁵⁵

After being relieved by Miles, Griffin received instructions from Warren to move his division from the Boydton Plank Road to Mrs. Butler’s. Griffin would mass his division at that point. Evidently, Griffin did not move promptly. When Humphreys reported to Meade (at 7:40 a.m.), he wrote: “Miles has relieved Griffin in his position, but Griffin has remained some hours.”⁵⁶

Warren, like Humphreys, was requested by General Meade (at 7:30 a.m.) to locate his units. The commander of the V Corps, however, hedged in his reply. Instead of telling where his divisions were, he indicated where he intended to post them. Warren, therefore, reported that Griffin’s division would be concentrated at Mrs. Butler’s, Ayres’ near S. Dabney’s, and Crawford’s in between. In addition, Warren informed Meade of the existence of the road linking Mrs. Butler’s on the Boydton Plank Road with W. Dabney’s on the White Oak Road. At this time, Warren warned, this road is “not practicable” for wheeled vehicles. To make matters worse, the road crossed “a very difficult branch of Gravelly Run.” Warren reported that he had all the pioneers he could spare working on a bridge. Even so, it would “take a long time to make” a practicable crossing for the wagons.

This telegram reached Meade’s headquarters at 8:06 a.m. Meade immediately forwarded a copy of this message to Grant. In a covering dispatch, Meade commented that additional tools would be sent to the V Corps as soon as they could be moved to the front. Meade wanted to insure that the connecting road was rendered “passable for artillery and wagons at the earliest moment.”⁵⁷

A little before 8:30, the rattle of musketry from the direction of Humphreys’ front became audible to the officers at Meade’s headquarters. Messages were immediately sent to Humphreys and Warren. Humphreys was directed to ascertain and report the cause of the firing. Besides informing the commander of the V Corps of the skirmishers, Meade directed Warren to stand ready, if called upon, to rush his reserve to Humphreys’ support. Meade, in compliance with Grant’s directive, took this opportunity to inform his Corps commanders, “There will be no movement of troops today.”

Making an investigation, Humphreys discovered that General Miles had sent a 60-man combat patrol from the 64th New York. Miles had done this in accordance with an order which Humphreys had issued to his subordinates. The division commanders were directed to reconnoiter the Confederate fortifications, try to capture prisoners, and ascertain the strength and identify of the units opposed to the II Corps. This information, Humphreys felt, would be invaluable in case an attack was ordered.

In carrying out this mission, Miles’ combat patrol had clashed with Rebel pickets. After a few shots had been exchanged, the Southerners fled, leaving 16 prisoners in the Yankees’ hands. The Confederates then sent a small detachment to drive back Miles’ patrol, but it failed. Accompanied by their prisoners, the Yankees returned to their lines. Upon being questioned, the grey clads stated that they belonged to McGowan’s South Carolina brigade. Furthermore, they identified Scales’ brigade (under the temporary command of Col. Joseph Hyman) as the unit holding the lines on their left.⁵⁸

Replying to Meade’s communication, Warren explained that there was “a good deal of musketry firing going on in our lines by the men firing off their guns to put in fresh loads.” Warren thought that, unless he completely lost contact with Humphreys, the force (Miles’ division, reinforced by de Trobriand’s brigade) which had relieved “Griffin is much more than under any circumstances could be needed there.” If the Confederates, however, should break Humphreys’ line or threaten to do so, Warren promised not to wait for orders to assist his brother officer.⁵⁹

Meade had also informed Grant of the firing on the left of the II Corps’ front. After stating that he had directed Warren to support Humphreys if necessary, Meade thought it would be a good idea if Grant alerted Ord. Meade reported that he had issued instructions for the II and V Corps to be supplied with rations. The general, however, expressed concern lest the condition of the roads render it impossible to re-victual Humphreys’ and Warren’s commands.

Following the receipt of Meade’s dispatch, Grant telegraphed Ord to hold his troops ready to support Humphreys in case the II Corps was attacked.⁶⁰

At 8:50 Warren received a message from Humphreys sent at 7:40. Humphreys wanted to know where Warren proposed to rest his right flank. At the moment, Humphreys reported, there was “a vacant space” on Miles’ left.⁶¹

In answering Humphreys’ dispatch, Warren stated that he was unable to “take up any regular line of battle on account of the woods and swamp.” Instead, he had concentrated each of his divisions in a specified point so they could meet an attack from any direction with the line refused.” Warren did not believe that the Confederates would be able to turn the II Corps left without Humphreys being forewarned, even if the V Corps moved away. As the troops were now deployed, Warren informed Humphreys, he could move Griffin and his supporting artillery into position on Miles’ left in short order. A copy of the message to Meade locating the areas where Warren had posted his divisions, and a sketch map of the countryside west of the Plank Road, were also forwarded to Humphreys.⁶²

At this time, Warren was not anticipating making any forward movements. Five minutes before he dictated the message to Humphreys, Warren received another telegram from Meade’s headquarters. Meade again pointed out to his subordinate that “Owing to the weather no change will today be made in the present position of the troops.” To take advantage of this hiatus, three day’s rations and forage would be brought up and issued to the command. The empty wagons were to be sent to the rear to be refilled. Warren was admonished to “use every exertion to make practicable the roads to the rear. . . .”

During the night, Warren had received a copy of Sheridan’s message to Grant reporting that Pickett’s division was deployed along the White Oak Road, its right at Five Forks, and its left extending toward Petersburg. At 8:15 a.m. Warren relayed this communication to General Ayres. In his covering memorandum, Warren commented that he inferred from Sheridan’s correspondence that Merritt’s “small force” had been dislodged from the White Oak Road. Consequently, Warren warned Ayres that he would have to be on the lookout for a Confederate attack on his “left flank from the west as well as from the north.” Ayres was also informed that Crawford had been directed to mass his division at Holliday’s, while Griffin’s division was being concentrated at Mrs. Butler’s.⁶³

Although the Union brass did not know it, the left flank of Ayres’ picket line extended about three-quarters of a mile beyond the point where the Rebel fortifications veered sharply north at the junction of the Claiborne and White Oak Roads. Ayres’ presence in this sector was a result of the message which Warren had sent Meade at 4:00 p.m. on the 30th. At that time, Warren had written that he could take his “Corps and block the White Oak Road.”⁶⁴ Meade had forwarded a copy of Warren’s dispatch to Grant. The lieutenant general commanding had replied at 8:30 p.m., “It will just suit what I intended to propose—to let Humphreys’ relieve Griffin’s division and let that move farther to the left. Warren should get himself strong tonight.”⁶⁵

Later in the evening, Grant sent two telegrams to Meade. In both of these, Grant pointed out that Warren was not to attack without orders signed by him. Since it was feared that the Rebels were about to seize the initiative, Warren was to strengthen his position. Grant was correct in his estimate of the situation. Not only were the Confederates about to launch a powerful assault on the left flank of Warren’s Corps, but Pickett’s task force was preparing to move against Sheridan’s cavalry.⁶⁶

On the morning of the 31st, General Lee visited the sector held by Anderson’s Corps. The general rode along the White Oak Road inspecting the fortifications as far to the west as the Claiborne road. Upon reaching “the return,” Lee learned from General Johnson that Union troops (Ayres’ division) which were in front of the works at this point were deployed with their “left flank in the air.” To take advantage of this carelessness, and to preclude the possibility of the Federals’ interposing between Pickett’s task force and Anderson’s fortified position, Lee determined to attack and roll up the exposed Union flank.

This would be a desperate gamble, because there were only four brigades available with which to undertake this task. To make matters worse, these four units came from three different divisions. Moody’s and Wise’s brigades belonged to Johnson’s division, Hunton’s to Pickett’s, and McGowan’s to Wilcox’s. Accordingly, they would not be accustomed to working as a team. Johnson was placed in charge of the projected attack, under the general supervision of Anderson. The corps commander, however, seems to have taken little or no part in the subsequent engagement.⁶⁷

Upon being given tactical control of the situation, Johnson quickly made his dispositions. McGowan’s brigade, which was posted west of Burgess Mill, was pulled out of the rifle pits. When he formed his troops on the White Oak Road, McGowan moved to join Johnson at the junction of the Claiborne and White Oak Roads. Hyman’s brigade extended to the left, and occupied the trenches vacated by McGowan’s South Carolinians.

An air of urgency was added to the situation when Johnson spotted two Union battle lines (Winthrop’s and Gwyn’s) moving into the field west of Halter Butler’s house. Johnson ordered Hunton’s troops to leave the protection of the earthworks and take position in the woods north of the White Oak Road. The Alabama brigade was formed on Hunton’s right. Since General Moody was ill, Col. Martin L. Stansel (the ranking regimental commander) was in charge of the Alabama brigade. At the same time, Johnson notified Anderson and Heth that he would attack as soon as he could form his line of battle. McGowan’s grey clads now came hurrying up the White Oak Road. Johnson shouted for McGowan to deploy his men on Stansel’s right. Within a few minutes, the three battle-hardened Rebel brigades had taken position in the woods north of the White Oak Road. Wise’s brigade was on the ground but not in line.

Johnson was encouraged when he saw that the Union left flank was still dangling “in the air.” Furthermore, the woods west of Halter Butler’s field would screen the Confederates’ approach march. Johnson, therefore, issued instructions for McGowan to take his brigade and assail the exposed Union flank. McGowan was to drive the Federals across the front of Johnson’s other brigades. Hunton’s and Stansel’s troops would then move to the attack. Following the receipt of Johnson’s orders, McGowan’s South Carolinians crossed the road. Before McGowan’s troops got into position, the Yankees suddenly resumed their advance.⁶⁸

In the meantime, one of Ayres’ staff officers had reached Warren’s command post. The aide informed Warren that the Confederates still held a line of outposts south of the White Oak Road. (On the morning of the 31st, the 41st Alabama had continued to man the line of outposts which General Johnson had established covering the approaches to the White Oak Road.) Warren decided that, if his position were to be rendered secure from attack by the Five Forks Rebels, it would be necessary to do something about the Rebel pickets. In addition, the general was afraid that the suspension of hostilities ordered by Grant would give the foe an excellent opportunity to reconnoiter the V Corps’ position. Finally, Warren believed that his troops would be unable to obtain much rest during this hiatus in action operations unless there were “a greater distance” between his picket line and line of battle. As the situation then was, Warren felt that his men would have insufficient time to get under arms in case a strong force of butternuts “showed itself at the advance posts.” To prevent any relaxation of vigilance until after his position had been made secure, Warren did not announce that orders had been received suspending all movements.

At 9:40 a.m. Warren telegraphed Meade that he had directed Ayres to drive in the Confederate outposts. In addition, Ayres was to see if he could ascertain the strength of the Rebel force holding the White Oak Road. A copy of this dispatch was forwarded to Ayres.⁶⁹

General Meade approved of Warren’s forced reconnaissance. At 10:30 Chief of Staff Webb informed Warren: “Your dispatch giving Ayres’ position is received. General Meade directs that should you determine by your reconnaissance that you may get possession of and hold the White Oak Road you are to do so notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations today”.⁷⁰

Ayres’ division, however, had moved forward and a desperate contest had been precipitated before Webb’s communication reached Warren.

General Ayres spent a busy morning marshalling his division at S. Dabney’s. As soon as all his units were up, Ayres proceeded to form his men in accordance with Warren’s instructions. The troops were deployed east of S. Dabney’s place in Halter Butler’s field. This field was bounded on the north by the White Oak Road.⁷¹

Ayres had Winthrop form his brigade into line of battle north of the Holliday dwelling. The 140th New York was thrown out as skirmishers and covered Winthrop’s battle line.⁷² Gwyn’s brigade was deployed into line of battle and took position en echelon on Winthrop’s right.⁷³ These two brigades faced the White Oak Road, which was about one-fourth of a mile to their front. To protect his left flank, Ayres placed Colonel Denison’s brigade in a wooded ravine west of the field. Two of Denison’s regiments, the 4th and 7th Maryland, patrolled the woods on the left of the brigade.⁷⁴

Major General Romeyn B. Ayres

Library of Congress

It was a little after 7:00 a.m., when Crawford’s division moved out of the breastworks covering Boydton Plank Road. The muddy road and the rain-swollen branch slowed down the pace of Crawford’s march. Inspite of these difficulties, Crawford succeeded in massing his troops at Holliday’s by 10:00 a.m.⁷⁵

Meanwhile General Griffin concentrated his division at Mrs. Butler’s. Protected as he was by the booming branch, Griffin held an impregnable position. Therefore, when Griffin’s division had taken its position astride the wood road, arms were stacked, knapsacks unslung, and the men prepared breakfast. It now ceased raining and the sun, bright and warm, broke through the clouds. Blankets were spread out to dry, and the soldiers felt the “buoyancy always so distinctively dominant during the short rifts in seasons of continual contacts.”⁷⁶

Warren’s artillerists would not be able to move their pieces to the front until the pioneers had completed the bridge. The eight guns manned by the gunners of Battery D and Battery E, 1st New York Light Artillery, therefore, were emplaced to cover the spot where the Boydton Plank Road crossed Gravelly Run. In addition, these two units would protect Griffin’s left flank. Following the departure of Griffin’s troops, Battery B, 4th U.S. and Batteries D and G, 5th U.S. Light Artillery had remained in position at the junction of the Boydton Plank and Dabney Mill roads. They would furnish fire support to Miles’ division of the II Corps.⁷⁷

Shortly after Ayres had completed his dispositions, one of Warren’s staff officers (Major Emmor B. Cope) galloped up to his command post. The aide-de-camp told Ayres that he was “to take the White Oak Road and entrench a brigade up on it.” Ayres was also authorized to call upon Crawford for one brigade to support his attack. When Crawford received Ayres’ request, he issued marching orders to Col. Richard Coulter’s brigade. When Coulter reported to Ayres, he was directed to form his brigade in the rear of Winthrop’s command. While Coulter’s troops were filing into position, Winthrop’s moved to the attack.

As soon as Coulter’s brigade had advanced to reinforce Ayres, Crawford hastened to form his two other brigades. Brigadier General Henry Baxter’s and Col. John A. Kellogg’s brigades were massed in columns of regiments in a thick woods south of Halter Butler’s field. Kellogg’s organization was on the right and Baxter’s on the left.⁷⁸

In obedience to Warren’s orders, Ayres at 10:30 a.m. sent Winthrop’s brigade forward. Gwyn’s troops supported Winthrop’s advance on the right. Covered by the skirmishers from the 140th New York, Winthrop’s grim battle line swept ahead. As they advanced across the field, the Federals were greeted by small-arms fire. At first, this was scattered, but as the Yankees drove closer to the White Oak Road, it increase in intensity. Lieutenant Colonel William W. Swan recalled:

I sat on my horse between the two lines of reserves, watching Winthrop go forward steadily in painful silence. Not an enemy was to be seen, not a musket was fired, until the advancing troops were half across the field, when suddenly along the edge of the wood at the other end there appeared a long blue line of smoke. . .

The bluecoats were unable to see their tormentors who were concealed in the woods north of the road. Winthrop’s soldiers, however, drove to within “ten to fifteen yards” of the road.⁷⁹

At the time that Winthrop’s brigade moved to the attack, McGowan’s troops had not been able to get into position on Ayres’ left. Consequently, when he saw the bluecoats coming across the field toward the White Oak Road, Johnson ordered his “command to advance and meet the enemy’s attack.” Before Johnson’s message could be relayed to his brigade commanders, a lieutenant in Hunton’s brigade who had been watching Winthrop’s advance sprung to his feet, waved his sword, and shouted “Forward!” Hunton’s eager Virginians, answering the lieutenant’s call, rushed from their places of concealment. Stansel’s Alabamians moved to the attack on Hunton’s right. McGowan had not completed his dispositions when Johnson’s attack order reached his command post. His line was not formed, but his South Carolinians, on hearing the shouts of Hunton’s troops, could not be restrained. Surging forward, McGowan’s brigade assailed Ayres left flank.⁸⁰

Hunton’s Virginians and Stansel’s Alabamians, in a short desperate contest, bested Winthrop’s New Yorkers. To escape annihilation, Winthrop bellowed instructions for his soldiers to face about. Covered by a rear guard, the brigade fell back on the position occupied before the advance.⁸¹

When Colonel Gwyn saw the Confederates come pouring across the road, he led his brigade forward on the double. Before Gwyn’s troops could intervene, Winthrop’s command was in full retreat. Gwyn’s battle line halted and blazed away at the oncoming Rebels. This served to check momentarily the Confederate drive. Encouraged by Gwyn’s stand, Winthrop rallied his command. The Confederate onslaught was slowed. Reacting to this situation with his customary vigor, Johnson hurled Hunton’s Virginians against Gwyn’s line of battle. Stansel’s Alabamians pressed against Winthrop’s flank. The Alabamians’ volleys struck Winthrop’s brigade in the flank, and Winthrop’s troops resumed the retreat. Colonel Swan recalled that:

Winthrop’s brigade then returned slowly to the branch of Gravelly Run. There was no order, however. Each man was looking out for himself and all were making for the entrenched line. . . . The men did not run. The stream was much swollen and at places too deep for the infantry to ford. I remember that I rode with Winthrop in rear of the retreating troops. My horse was killed, shot through the neck, from side to side, just as we entered the wood.⁸²

Hunton’s troops found the going more difficult. The Virginians centered their attack on the left flank and front of Gwyn’s battle line. Following Winthrop’s withdrawal, Gwyn’s position became untenable. Hunton’s troops turned Gwyn’s flank. The regiment on the left, the 210th Pennsylvania, broke and fled. Gwyn’s brigade fell back upon Crawford’s division.⁸³

In the meantime, McGowan’s South Carolinians moved against Denison’s brigade. Denison’s Marylanders checked McGowan’s initial thrust.

Coulter’s brigade, which had been sent to reinforce Ayres’ division, had not completed its deployment at the time that Winthrop suffered his repulse. Observing that Gwyn’s troops were already moving to Winthrop’s assistance, Coulter advanced to help Denison. McGowan by this time had renewed his attack on Denison’s Maryland brigade. Infiltrating the woods to the left of the ravine held by Denison’s battle line, the South Carolinians compelled the 4th and 7th Maryland to fall back. This success enabled McGowan’s soldiers to enfilade the left flank of Denison’s line, and the Marylanders were forced to evacuate the ravine. When they retreated, Denison’s bluecoats fell back on Coulter’s command. So shaken was the Maryland brigade by this setback that Denison was unable to reform his unit until after it had crossed the rain-swollen branch. Among the casualties in this fighting was Colonel Denison, who was wounded. He, however, refused to leave the field.⁸⁴ After Denison’s troops had passed beyond their field of fire, Coulter’s battle line commenced to blaze away at McGowan’s oncoming grey clads. Coulter’s men, however, had been badly unnerved by the sight of Denison’s frightened soldiers pounding for the rear. The officers of Coulter’s left flank units found, much to their consternation, that McGowan’s battle line overlapped theirs. Subjected to a deadly enfilade fire, the left flank companies eroded away, file by file. Three of Coulter’s regimental commanders were cut down—wounded. The brigade then fell back in confusion. Before reaching the run, Coulter succeeded in rallying the hard-core elements of his command for several brief stands. Each time, however, the advancing Confederates smashed these pockets of resistance.⁸⁵

It had been General Ayres’ intention to reform his division in the edge of the woods on the south side of Halter Butler’s field. When the Rebels overwhelmed Denison’s and Coulter’s brigades on the left, the general’s plan was doomed. He then sought to rally his troops behind a ravine near the Holliday cabin, but he failed. Ayres’ shattered division then retreated in confusion across the run.

In their initial surge, the Southerners had scored a sweeping success. Johnson’s three brigades (Hunton’s, McGowan’s, and Stansel’s) had routed Ayres’ formidable reinforced division. Four Union brigades, mustering more than 5,000 officers and men, were in wild retreat. Having cleared the Yankees out of Halter Butler’s field, Johnson’s troops advanced into the woods that bounded the field on the south.

General Lee had been anxiously watching the progress of Johnson’s attack. Lee feared that Hunton’s brigade on the left of Johnson’s battle line would lose contact with the troops holding the fortifications. Consequently, Lee ordered Wise’s brigade which was held in reserve to advance and take position on Hunton’s left. Wise proceeded to carry out Lee’s instructions with his customary alacrity.⁸⁶

When General Crawford learned that General Ayres, instead of being the attacker, had become the attacked, he ordered Baxter’s and Kellogg’s brigades deployed in the woods north of Holliday’s cabin. Baxter formed his brigade on the right, Kellogg on the left.

Four of Baxter’s regiments deployed into line of battle, while the 39th Massachusetts was thrown forward as skirmishers. Observing that the Rebels were advancing in great strength, Baxter reinforced the 39th Massachusetts with the 11th Pennsylvania. Both of these regiments were composed of hardened veterans. As soon as the retreating elements of Ayres’ division had moved out of range, the skirmishers opened fire upon the Confederates. The butternuts were in full view as they charged across Halter Butler’s field. Although but few in numbers when compared with the assaulting column, the two regiments caused Hunton to hesitate. After a brisk fire fight, the Confederates pushed ahead. The 39th Massachusetts and the 11th Pennsylvania were brushed aside. In this engagement, Lt. Col. Henry M. Tremlett of the 39th Massachusetts was mortally wounded. The colonel was carried from the field on a tent fly by several of his devoted men. Falling back, the bluecoats expected to rendezvous with the remainder of the brigade. But upon reaching Holliday’s, they were unable to find any sign of their friends. Disgusted at being left to their fate, the two regiments “fell back without much order to the branch which they had crossed four hours before.”⁸⁷

Baxter encountered much difficulty in forming his battle line. Hundreds of Ayres’ frightened soldiers rushed through the ranks of the brigade. By the time Baxter had completed his deployment, the skirmishers of the 39th Massachusetts and the 11th Pennsylvania were in contact with Hunton’s Virginians. At first, Baxter’s right flank rested in the air. Gwyn’s brigade now came flooding back from the front, and officers succeeded in rallying some of the braver souls on Baxter’s right.

Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford

Library of Congress

When the graycoats attacked Baxter’s line of battle, they concentrated their efforts on his left. Within a few minutes, Stansel’s Alabamians forced Baxter’s left flank regiment to give way. Having gained an opening, the Southerners rolled up Baxter’s brigade. Soon only the right flank regiment, the 107th Pennsylvania, was left on the field. Seeing the havoc that the Rebels were raising with Baxter’s brigade, Gwyn’s men had also disappeared. The Southerners now prepared to knock out the Pennsylvania regiment. Colonel Thomas F. McCoy, realizing that if he permitted his command to remain where it was, it would be surrounded, ordered his men to retreat. The Pennsylvanians reached the branch “with little loss.”⁸⁸

Colonel Kellogg had not completed his dispositions when Ayres’ reinforced division fell to pieces. To check the rout, General Crawford directed Kellogg to deploy the elite 6th and 7th Wisconsin (once members of the “Iron Brigade”) to arrest the retreat of Ayres’ troops. The two Wisconsin regiments, however, found this impossible. Ayres’ panic-stricken troops broke through Kellogg’s ranks and threw the two Wisconsin regiments “into confusion.” As soon as the fugitives had passed, Kellogg had the 6th and 7th Wisconsin close ranks. When his battle line was formed, Kellogg shouted for his troops to open fire on the advancing Confederates.

Kellogg now called up his third regiment, the 91st New York. The New Yorkers formed on the left of the 6th Wisconsin. Taking cover behind a slight rise, they raked the Rebel battle line with well-directed volleys. This caused a number of the grey clads to veer off to the left. At the same time, the 6th and 7th Wisconsin held fire in the face of the Rebel onslaught. The retreat of Baxter’s brigade, however, had exposed Kellogg’s right flank.

McGowan, observing that he was unable to smash Kellogg’s brigade with frontal attacks, determined to bypass this island of resistance. Sweeping to the left, McGowan’s troops passed around Kellogg’s right flank. To cope with this dangerous situation, Kellogg had the 7th Wisconsin wheel to the right. Kellogg merely postponed the inevitable by this move. The Confederates had now succeeded in turning Kellogg’s flanks. Worse, Rebel patrols had started to infiltrate the area in the rear of the brigade. Kellogg, confronted by this emergency, ordered his men to fall back behind the branch. The officer sent to relay this message to Col. Jonathan Tarbell of the 91st New York was wounded. Therefore, when Kellogg’s brigade retreated the New Yorkers were left behind. Since the grey clads had already bypassed their position, Kellogg’s soldiers had to conduct a fighting withdrawal. Several times, the Federals were compelled to cut their way through Confederate roadblocks. Crossing the run, the 6th and 7th Wisconsin took position near the bridge which the pioneers had recently completed.⁸⁹

A number of minutes elapsed before Colonel Tarbell realized that his regiment was terribly alone. Rather than surrender, the colonel decided to fight his way out of the trap. The regiment fell back to the Holliday cabin. Here, the colonel succeeded in forming part of his command on the colors. He then determined to make one final attempt to slow the Rebel advance. This last-ditch stand by the regiment failed. Overpowered by the Confederates, the New Yorkers retreated across the branch. After crossing the run, Colonel Tarbell reformed his regiment, and posted it in support of Battery H, 1st New York Light Artillery.

Colonel Kellogg, in his “After Action Report,” proudly claimed that his “command were the last organized troops to leave the field.” This statement by the Union brigade commander is a clear indication of the scope of the Confederates success at this stage of the battle. The outnumbered Confederates had simply carried everything before them. Johnson’s three brigades had swept the area between the White Oak Road and the run clean of organized Union troops. (It appears that Wise’s Virginia brigade, when it was finally committed, did not engage the V Corps.) Two powerful Federal divisions (Ayres’ and Crawford’s) had been mauled. Warren’s forced reconnaissance had ended in disaster.

Major General Charles Griffin

Library of Congress

It was about 10:30 o’clock when General Warren left for the front. The general intended to take charge of Ayres’ forced recon- naissance. By the time Warren reached the run, Ayres’ division was in full retreat. Crossing the stream, he hastened toward the point of attack. Before the general reached Crawford’s command post, that officer’s division was also falling back. In an effort to rally the soldiers, Warren seized the colors of a Pennsylvania regiment. Warren galloped up and down the lines, brandishing the banner, but the soldiers refused to stand and fight. It was evident that the men could not be induced to stop their retreat until they had placed the branch between themselves and Johnson’s terrible men. The general, therefore, re-crossed the stream. Still flaunting the colors to encourage the disheartened troops, Warren, ably assisted by his more resolute subordinates, succeeded in curbing the panic. Regiments which had held together were deployed on the right of Griffin’s division. The remainder of Ayres’ and Crawford’s regiments were rallied behind Griffin’s main line of resistance. Here, the routed units were re-formed and the rolls called.⁹⁰

It was about 11:00 a.m. when the sound of “heavy musketry” from the direction of White Oak Road became distinctly audible at General Griffin’s headquarters at Mrs. Butler’s. Without a moment’s hesitation, Griffin had the “long roll” beaten. The command, “Fall in! Fall in!” rang out simultaneously with the crashing volleys. This order was obeyed with alacrity. Rifles were quickly taken from the stands and the regiments fell in on their colors. Griffin then put his division in motion toward the point of danger. When Griffin’s troops reached the rise overlooking the branch, they witnessed a melancholy sight. They saw hundreds of their comrades falling back toward the stream as fast as their legs would carry them. As the wave of fleeing soldiers floundered through the waist-deep water, General Griffin’s voice could be heard, “For God’s sake, let them through, or they will break our line.” In his “After Action Report,” Griffin stated that his troops were “met by the Third Division [under Crawford] running to the rear in a most demoralized and disorganized condition, soon after followed by the Second Division [Ayres’].” In accordance with Warren’s instructions, Griffin quickly formed his division into line of battle along the left bank of the stream.⁹¹

News that the Confederates were sweeping everything before them caused the V Corps’ chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Charles S. Wainwright, to shift several of his batteries. The two artillery units (Battery D and Battery E, 1st New York Light Artillery) that had been guarding the Boydton Plank Road crossing of Gravelly Run limbered up their pieces. When they turned off the Plank Road at Mrs. Butler’s, the gunners found the going exceedingly difficult. They literally had to lift their guns through the Virginia mud. Reaching Griffin’s main line of resistance, the artillerists placed their guns in battery. Major Charles E. Mink saw that the four 12-pounder Napoleons of Battery H were unlimbered on a commanding knoll in a small field. The gunners trained their pieces on the woods beyond the run. They had an excellent field of fire. Captain Deloss M. Johnson of Battery D was unable to find such a favorable location for his four Napoleons. He emplaced them in a wooded area. Johnson’s guns, accordingly, played but small part in the subsequent fighting.⁹²

Griffin had barely completed his deployment before the Confederate skirmishers emerged from the woods on the opposite side of the branch. In general, the Rebel advance had followed the Union retreat along the wood road. The bluecoats watched as the Southerners descended a hill and crossed the swale that separated the rise which they had just left from the one occupied by Griffin’s division. It seemed evident to the Yankees that the Rebels intended to force their way across the run. Actually, the Southerners merely planned to make a forced reconnaissance. Mink’s four Napoleons opened the engagement. The gunners raked the advancing Confederates with shell and canister. Moments later, Griffin’s infantry started to blaze away. After a brisk engagement, the grey clads fell back about 400 yards.⁹³

For the next several hours, Union and Confederate sharpshooters sniped at one another. Many of the bluecoats’ skirmishers expended up to 80 rounds. Learning that the sharpshooters had about exhausted their ammunition, Lt. Col. Henry O’Neill of the 118th Pennsylvania called for a volunteer to carry cartridges to the line. It was a perilous undertaking. Sergeant George W. Stotensburg responded. He ran along the front from man to man, dropping a fresh supply of ammunition in the rear of each sharpshooter. The daring sergeant was shot at a number of times, but discharged his mission successfully and rejoined his regiment unharmed.⁹⁴

As soon as Warren learned of the desperate state of affairs at the front, he sent a staff officer to contact General Humphreys. The commander of the II Corps was requested to make a diversion in favor of the V Corps. When he sought to obtain additional details of the extent of the setback suffered by the V Corps, Humphreys’ staffers were unable to contact Warren. One of them did see Griffin, however. Griffin assured the aide that his division would be able to hold its line on the branch. Humphreys accordingly issued instructions for “General Miles to throw forward two of his brigades and attack the enemy.”⁹⁵

In the meantime, a large number of fugitives from the V Corps’ debacle had descended on Miles’ left flank brigade, Ramsey’s. To cope with this situation, Ramsey established a straggler line manned by the 66th New York and the 116th Pennsylvania. These regiments took position behind Ramsey’s main line. When the frightened soldiers entered Miles’ lines, they were stopped and turned back.

It was about 12:30 when Miles received the orders from Humphreys to move to the relief of the V Corps with two of his brigades. Colonels Madill and Ramsey were alerted by Miles to be ready to take up the advance. Nugent’s brigade would support Madill’s and Ramsey’s attack. Scott’s brigade was called up from the reserve and relieved Madill’s and Ramsey’s commands in the rifle pits.

When Miles gave the word, Ramsey’s and Madill’s battle lines moved out of the works. Swinging to the left, the two brigades advanced into the woods west of the Boydton Plank Road. Miles’ troops reached the run a short distance beyond the right flank of the V Corps. Ramsey’s brigade, which was on the left, waded the stream; Madill’s lagged behind. Near the crest of a ridge several hundred yards beyond the branch, Ramsey’s troops ran afoul of Wise’s Virginians. A sharp engagement ensued. At this time, three of Ramsey’s regiments (the 64th New York and the 145th and 183rd Pennsylvania) were on detached service. The brigade was, therefore, considerably understrength. Even so, the bluecoats, for several minutes, gave a good amount of themselves. Suddenly, however, without warning, the 148th Pennsylvania gave way “unceremoniously and in confusion.” The retreat of the 148th left Ramsey’s right flank regiment, the 53rd Pennsylvania, isolated. To escape destruction, the 53rd Pennsylvania likewise retired and re-crossed the run. Ramsey, realizing that it would be foolish to continue the conflict with just two regiments (the 66th New York and the 116th Pennsylvania), passed the word to fall back.

When he reached the left bank of the branch, Ramsey, in spite of the harassing fire of Wise’s sharpshooters, quickly reformed his brigade. Subsequently, Ramsey bitterly castigated the conduct of Madill’s command. He reported, “Had the Third Brigade [Madill] advanced with me, after crossing the run, instead of remaining idle spectators, the result of the assault would have been different and my brigade spared the mortification of a repulse.”⁹⁶

As soon as he had redeployed his troops into line of battle, Ramsey again led them across the run. Ramsey’s bluecoats slowly closed on Wise’s battle line which was formed along the crest of the ridge. In the meantime, Madill’s brigade had forded the stream. While Ramsey’s troops pinned Wise’s grey clads in position, Miles proposed to turn the Confederates left flank with Madill’s brigade. Madill’s bluecoats, after crossing the branch, detoured to the right. The scouts soon reported that the brigade’s battle line had passed beyond Wise’s left flank. The colonel now wheeled his brigade to the left. Pressing eagerly forward, Madill’s troops struck Wise’s command on its exposed flank. So sudden and swift was this blow that Wise’s Virginians were driven back in confusion. Over 100 prisoners and one stand of colors were left behind by the Southerners.⁹⁷

All this time, Ramsey’s soldiers exerted heavy pressure on Wise’s front. When Wise’s brigade collapsed in face of Madill’s flank attack, Ramsey’s soldiers dashed forward and secured the crest of the ridge. Miles decided to capitalize on his success. The mopping up operation would be left to Nugent’s brigade; Madill’s and Ramsey’s troops would be entrusted with the pursuit.⁹⁸

When Miles’ troops attacked Wise’s brigade, Hunton’s soldiers shifted to the left to assist their comrades. This forced Stansel’s Alabamians to extend to both the right and left to cover the V Corps line to their front. Convinced that his men would not be able to fight their way across the run, Johnson ordered them to hold the ground gained.

General Lee, accompanied by General McGowan, also reconnoitered the small watercourse behind which Warren’s two shattered divisions had found sanctuary. After examining the terrain, Lee approved Johnson’s decision to hold it. Returning to the White Oak Road, Lee tried to find some artillery and, if possible, some cavalry to send to Johnson’s assistance.

It soon became evident to Johnson that his men were approaching exhaustion, and if they were to hold on, they would have to be reinforced. But there were no fresh troops available. General Anderson, upon being advised of the situation, ordered Johnson to withdraw his command. The troops were to be pulled back and occupy the line of breastworks south of the White Oak Road which Ayres’ troops had thrown up the previous evening. The collapse of Wise’s brigade had added an air of urgency to the situation. Screened by a rear guard, the Rebels abandoned their gains and fell back. In the course of this retrogressive moment, Hunton’s and Stansel’s brigades changed positions. By 3 o’clock, Johnson announced that McGowan’s, Hunton’s and Stansel’s units had moved into their designated rifle pits. Stansel’s Alabamians on the left held the angle, which formed the connection between “the return” and the field fortifications south of the White Oak Road. Wise’s brigade, however, had been so roughly handled by Miles’ Yankees that it was withdrawn inside the fortifications east of “the return.”⁹⁹

About the time that Madill’s and Ramsey’s troops marched out of the works, General Miles had trained his field glasses on the Confederate rifle pits west of the Plank Road. What the general saw convinced him that these trenches were unoccupied. Miles, therefore, ordered the 5th New Hampshire of Scott’s brigade to charge this position. At this time, the New Hampshire regiment was manning the Union picket line in this sector. In moving to carry out Miles’ instructions, the regiment became confused. Instead of attacking to their front, the soldiers from New Hampshire obliqued sharply to the left. Shortly thereafter, they overran the right flank of Madill’s brigade. Before a semblance of order could be restored, the Confederates had thrown troops into the heretofore deserted rifle pits and a splendid opportunity to penetrate the defenses in this sector had been lost.¹⁰⁰

Upon witnessing the rout of Wise’s brigade, Miles became convinced that he could carry the Confederates fortifications if he were reinforced by another brigade. Miles accordingly relayed this information to Humphreys. The corps commander authorized Miles to go ahead. To implement his decision, Humphreys ordered de Trobriand’s brigade to support Miles’ right. At the same time, the general notified Mott that he might have to rush a second brigade to Miles’ assistance.¹⁰¹

De Trobriand’s brigade had spent much of the morning massed in support of Miles’ division near the Rainey house. At 9:30 o’clock, Ord had telegraphed Grant that the Confederates were marshalling troops east of Hatcher’s Run.¹⁰² A copy of Ord’s message was in Humphreys’ hands by 10:15. When Meade forwarded Ord’s dispatch to Humphreys, he sent a covering communication. Meade left it up to the judgment of his corps commander whether to relieve the Army of the James by attacking, or send his reserve to Ord’s assistance.¹⁰³

Humphreys decided to rush his reserve (de Trobriand’s brigade) to Ord’s support. Consequently, de Trobriand’s command was shifted to the right and stationed near the Crow house. When the Confederates attacked, they moved against Warren and not Ord. De Trobriand’s presence on the right of the II Corps became superfluous. To obtain troops to support Miles’ offensive, Humphreys again issued marching orders to de Trobriand. The disgusted troops retraced their steps. Returning to the Rainey house, de Trobriand’s soldiers relieved Scott’s in the rifle pits west of the Boydton Plank Road.¹⁰⁴

Following the arrival of de Trobriand’s bluecoats, Scott’s men moved forward. The brigade soon overtook Miles’ division. At this time, the division was cautiously working its way through the woods fronting the Confederate earthworks which covered the approaches to the White Oak Road. Miles had Colonel Scott deploy his brigade en echelon on the right of Madill’s unit. Scott’s mission was to protect the division’s right flank. As the advance progressed, Scott’s brigade and Madill’s diverged. Miles halted his battle line. To plug this gap, Miles called up Nugent’s brigade from the reserve. The sweep was then renewed. As the Federals forged ahead, they drove in the grey clads skirmishers. In this fighting, the 111th New York of Madill’s brigade cut off and captured over 100 men and the colors of the 41st Alabama.

At 3:30, Miles’ troops reached the edge of the abatis that protected the approaches to the Confederate fortifications. The left flank of Ramsey’s brigade rested near Halter Butler’s field. A glance at the formidable works and the “almost impassable slashing” convinced Miles that it would be “impossible to take them with the force available.”¹⁰⁵

Because his right flank unit (Scott’s brigade) had lost contact with Mott’s division, Miles decided he had better close to the right. The entire division then moved by the right flank. After forming a connection with de Trobriand’s brigade of Mott’s command, Miles put his troops to work throwing up earthworks. Several of Miles’ units became scrambled in the confusion caused by the shift. When this situation was ironed out, Miles found that his brigades were deployed from left to right: Scott’s, Ramsey’s, Madill’s, and Nugent’s.¹⁰⁶

When Miles’ division marched off to the west in pursuit of Wise’s Virginians, General Mott sought to maintain contact with his brother officer’s command by extending his left flank. To do this, Mott was compelled to pull out part of de Trobriand’s brigade from the earthworks. Leaving two of his eight regiments to guard the artillery, de Trobriand moved out. De Trobriand’s brigade accomplished its mission by bridging the gap that had opened between Miles on the left and McAllister on the right. While de Trobriand’s soldiers took position, they were subjected to a brisk shelling by Confederate artillery. The brigade then dug in.¹⁰⁷

In the meantime, General Humphreys decided to have Mott make a forced reconnaissance of the Confederate fortifications east of the Plank Road. This movement, the general believed, would pin the Rebels down and keep them from detaching troops to oppose Miles’ advance. Mott then alerted McAllister and Pierce “to assault the enemy’s works on their respective fronts.”

Pierce’s attacking force on the right consisted of the 5th Michigan and the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery. An unhappy combination of circumstances rendered Pierce’s task difficult. To Pierce’s right, there was a bend in Hatcher’s Run. This meander restricted the movements of Pierce’s battle line as it advanced to the attack. Worse, the Rebel batteries emplaced in front of the Crow house and near Burgess Mill (to the right and left of Pierce’s front) caught the advancing Yankees in a deadly crossfire. Nevertheless, the general grimly formed his men. At 2:30 o’clock, he moved the two regiments forward. The bluecoats drove ahead on the double. Not until they reached the felled timber fronting the Rebel’s works did the soldiers falter. Unable to work their way through the abatis, Pierce’s men recoiled.¹⁰⁸

McAllister planned to have a strong team feel the Confederates works covering Burgess Mill. The combat patrol from McAllister’s brigade was composed of the 11th Massachusetts, the 120th New York, and a battalion of the 8th New Jersey. This force would be supported by the 11th New Jersey. At a word from McAllister, the combat patrol dashed forward. Working their way through the abatis, the bluecoats reached the crest of a ridge overlooking the Confederates main line of resistance. Several outposts were overrun by the Yankees and 15 pickets captured during the advance. Soon after this initial success, the Union drive ground to a stop. In addition to the musketry of the Rebel infantry, the Yankees came under an enfilade fire from the Confederate batteries. To save themselves, the bluecoats lay down. After his men had spent a very uncomfortable hour hugging the ground, McAllister received orders from Mott to recall them. The soldiers were drawn off, one by one, under a severe fire from Southern sharpshooters. This attack had cost McAllister’s command a number of casualties.¹⁰⁹

Hays’ division also launched a limited attack on the Confederate defense line on the afternoon of the 31st. In the morning, General Smyth with the 108th New York had made a bold reconnaissance of his front. Smyth returned with information that the Rebels still held Fort Powell. Hays then ordered Smyth to capture this strong point. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Delaware, the 7th Michigan, the 4th Ohio, and the 7th West Virginia. After deploying his command into line of battle, Smyth moved against Fort Powell. Everything went according to plan until the Federals reached the broad belt of slashed timber fronting the strong point. The felled timber was so thick that the battle line was unable to get through. Smyth, therefore, sent his skirmishers into the abatis, and they succeeded in driving in the Rebel outposts. Taking position near the redoubt, the Northerners sniped away at the cannoneers manning the two guns emplaced in the work. Evidently, this proved to be very disconcerting to the gunners, because they soon deserted their pieces and ceased firing. Since his battle line had been unable to penetrate the belt of slashed timber, Smyth was not able to capitalize on this situation. At dusk, Smyth recalled his sharpshooters and returned to the rifle pits.¹¹⁰

These thrusts on the part of Hays’ and Mott’s troops, in conjunction with the pressure Ord’s Army of the James was exerting on the Rebel position east of Hatcher’s Run, accomplished their purpose. When McAllisters’ and Pierce’s troops moved against the rifle pits held by Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke’s brigade east of the Plank Road, General Heth asked General Wilcox for help. Wilcox, however, was unable to send his brother officer any assistance. At this time, Brig. Gen. James H. Lane’s brigade, which was holding the fortifications on either side of Hatcher’s Run, was under heavy pressure from Hays’ and Ord’s commands.¹¹¹

The II Corps’ batteries remained in the position they occupied at dark on the 30th until noon of the 31st. As the Rebel attack on Warren’s Corps gathered steam, Battery B, 1st New Jersey Light Artillery and the 11th Battery, New York Light Artillery were ordered up by the corps’ chief of artillery, Lieutenant Colonel John G. Hazard. Captain A. Judson Clark had his New Jersey artillerists emplace their four Napoleons in front of the Rainey house; the New Yorkers relieved one of the V Corps’ batteries on the knoll to the east of the house. Opening fire with their four 3-inch rifles, the New Yorkers silenced a troublesome Rebel battery located in the peach orchard west of Burgess Mill. At the same time, Battery E, 4th U.S. and Battery M, 1st New Hampshire (which had been in position at the Rainey house since the previous afternoon) concentrated their attention on the large redoubt near the Boydton Plank Road. These two batteries were able to gain fire superiority over the Confederate guns mounted in the redoubt.

Under the cover of darkness, Clark’s cannoneers limbered up their pieces and moved to the left. Utilizing a road recently opened by the pioneers, the battery reached the rifle pits held by Miles’ division. The gunners then proceeded to emplace their pieces at strategic places along Miles’ main line of resistance. What he had seen during the afternoon convinced Colonel Hazard that a smoothbore battery could be more effectively employed if mounted on the knoll occupied by the 11th New York. He, therefore, ordered Battery K, 4th U.S. Light Artillery to change places with the 11th New York. By 11 o’clock, this shift had been affected. At 1:00 p.m. Colonel Hazard called up the 10th Massachusetts Battery. The Massachusetts gunners, on reaching the front, emplaced their four 3-inch rifles on the right of Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery at the Crow house.¹¹²

At dusk, Mott shifted McAllister’s and Pierce’s brigades to the west side of the Boydton Plank Road. Before moving to the left, the brigade commanders detached a number of troops. These men were left behind to hold the rifle pits when their units moved to the left.¹¹³

By 1:00 p.m. General Warren was satisfied that his corps could contain the Confederate attack. Griffin’s division, supported by the fire of Mink’s battery, had forced Johnson’s’ vanguard to fall back. At the same time, Ayres and Crawford had reformed their divisions. Warren now dashed off a message to Meade’s headquarters telling of the morning’s disaster. He told of his plans to recover the initiative. Already, he wrote, his skirmishers on the left had crossed the run. One of Griffin’s brigades, supported by the reorganized portion of Ayres’ and Crawford’s division, was preparing to counterattack. When the advance started, it would pivot on the corps right flank. Warren calculated that his men would be ready by 1:45, unless the Rebels beat him to the punch.¹¹⁴

Warren, in announcing the time that his counterthrust was to begin, had underestimated the difficulties involved. It took longer than anticipated for Ayres and Crawford to complete their dispositions. In addition, the troops experienced considerable difficulty in crossing the rain-swollen branch. It was 2:30 before Warren gave the order to advance.¹¹⁵

Warren’s failure to attack on time caused Meade to have serious misgivings. At 2:50 p.m., Chief of Staff Webb forwarded to Warren a copy of a message which Humphreys had sent to army headquarters. Humphreys reported that Miles’ troops had taken prisoners from Pickett’s Division. This intelligence led Humphreys to assume (incorrectly) that Pickett’s division was opposite Miles’ center. Humphreys had concluded that if Warren’s wheeled to the right it would “take Pickett on his right flank.” In his covering dispatch, Webb observed: “Since Miles is already well forward from your right flank the general commanding [Meade] considers that that must be secure. Miles is ordered to take the enemy’s works supported by his own Corps. You will see the necessity of moving as soon as possible.”¹¹⁶

Because this communication from Meade’s headquarters reached Warren after he had started his advance, he ignored it for the time being. Subsequently, Warren pointed out: “The information about Pickett’s division was erroneous, and was worse than useless to me. According to subsequent information his division was at that time some three or four miles away driving General Sheridan. Nor did Miles assault the enemy’s breast-works as the dispatch led me to infer he would.”¹¹⁷

When Warren set about organizing his counterattack, he and General Griffin rode to the left to confer with General Chamberlain. The two officers asked Chamberlain if, suffering as he was from the wounds incurred on the 29th, he felt able to spearhead the projected attack. Warren’s and Griffin’s language in this “exigency” was very strong. Chamberlain, though in considerable pain, was ready for the hazardous assignment. Griffin then gave Chamberlain his instructions. He was to regain the ground lost by Ayres’ and Crawford’s troops.¹¹⁸

At a command from Chamberlain, his troops forded the waist-deep run. As soon as all his men had gained the right bank, Chamberlain formed his brigade into double line of battle.¹¹⁹ Gregory’s brigade followed Chamberlain’s across the branch. Like Chamberlain, Gregory deployed his command into two lines of battle—the 188th and 189th New York in front, the 187th New York in the rear. Gregory’s unit moved into position on Chamberlain’s right.¹²⁰ Bartlett, after crossing the stream, massed his brigade on Chamberlain’s left rear. Ayres’ division supported Griffin’s troops on the left en echelon by brigades. Griffin’s skirmishers commanded by Colonel Pearson covered Ayres’ front; Crawford’s division watched Griffin’s right flank. The wood road served as the axis of Chamberlain’s advance. The remainder of Warren’s Corps guided their movements on Chamberlain’s brigade.¹²¹

Brushing aside the few skirmishers encountered, Chamberlain’s bluecoats reached Holliday’s cabin with ease. When Chamberlain’s troops emerged from the woods into the southern edge of Halter Butler’s field, they were greeted by a heavy fire. Chamberlain observed that there was a strong force of Confederates (Hunton’s Virginians) ensconced in the rifle pits, which Ayres’ troops had thrown up in the field prior to their retreat. Hunton’s grey clads had “turned” these trenches. Additional Confederate soldiers could be distinguished in the edge of the woods which bounded the field on the north.

Chamberlain halted his brigade and rearranged his lines, which had been broken to some extent by the march through the ragged terrain and thick woods between the branch and Holliday’s. Warren now rode up and directed Chamberlain to entrench. By this time, Chamberlain’s advance line (the 198th Pennsylvania) had “gained a slight crest in the open field.” Here, the Pennsylvanians were subjected to a galling fire by the Virginians holding the rifle pits. At the same time, sharpshooters posted in the woods which flanked Halter Butler’s field on the east commenced to snipe away at the Yankees. It appeared to Chamberlain “that the enemy’s position might be carried with no greater loss than it would cost us merely to hold our ground.” When Chamberlain told Griffin of his observations, he received permission to push ahead.¹²²

After he had readjusted his lines, Chamberlain led his cheering troops to the attack. As the Yankees surged across the field, the Rebel troops posted in the woods to the right poured several volleys into the flank of Chamberlain’s battle line. In addition, Confederate artillery emplaced in “the return” had growled into action. The 198th Pennsylvania wavered. Chamberlain called for assistance; Gregory’s brigade responded handsomely. Gregory’s command, advancing by battalion en echelon to the left, dashed into the woods. The Rebel sharpshooters gave way in face of Gregory’s sudden onslaught. Chamberlain’s blue clads, their right flank secured, charged the works on the run. This time the determined Yankees were not to be denied. Chamberlain’s troops reached the rifle pits and drove Hunton’s Virginians from them in confusion. One regiment, the 56th Virginia, was cut off and much of it was captured. Pressing on, Chamberlain’s and Gregory’s soldiers stormed across the White Oak Road.¹²³

Hunton subsequently recalled, “The 198th Pennsylvania wavered under the fire very decidedly, and a portion of it broke and ran. The balance of the line reformed under my fire, advanced, and drove us back. I thought it was one of the most gallant things I had ever seen.”¹²⁴

Following the smashing Union attack, Hunton’s brigade (without the 56th Virginia) retired into the fortifications. McGowan’s grey clads had been isolated by Chamberlain’s and Gregory’s breakthrough to the White Oak Road. To rejoin their comrades, the South Carolinians had to detour to the north a considerable distance to bypass the Federal roadblock.¹²⁵

When General Hunton returned from the fray, his scabbard had been bent almost double by a missile and he had three bullet holes through his clothes. General Lee greeted the doughty fighter briskly, “I wish you would sew those places up; I don’t like to see them.”

“General Lee,” said Hunton, “allow me to go back home and see my wife and I will have them sewed up.”

The answer amused Lee. “The idea,” he replied, “of talking about going to see wives; it is perfectly ridiculous, sir.”¹²⁶

Chamberlain’s and Gregory’s soldiers had crossed the White Oak Road a short distance west of “the return.” Warren was understandably elated by the success scored by Griffin’s troops. The general thought that his men might be able to carry the fortifications guarding the junction of the Claiborne and White Oak Roads. If they could storm “the return” it would render the Confederate position south of Hatcher’s Run untenable. Warren, therefore, ordered the advance suspended while he made a personal reconnaissance.

In the meantime, to secure his gains, Griffin had Chamberlain’s and Gregory’s soldiers throw up entrenchments. Ayres’ division, which had not fired a round during the advance, was halted just short of the White Oak Road. Taking position near the W. Dabney house, Ayres’ troops were faced west toward Five Forks. Like Ayres’, Crawford’s soldiers had not been engaged since leaving the branch. His division was posted northwest of the Holliday cabin. Its mission was to watch the gap between Griffin’s right and Miles’ left.¹²⁷

Accompanied by a strong force of scouts, Warren rode forward. As the general’s party approached the works, they “drew a very severe fire from the line, particularly of artillery.” Nevertheless, Warren made a thorough examination of “the return.” What he saw convinced the general “that the foe’s defenses were as complete and as well located as any he had ever been opposed to.” After concluding “that it would be useless to sacrifice the men in an assault,” Warren retraced his steps.¹²⁸

When Griffin’s troops crossed the White Oak Road at 3:40, Warren dashed off a message to Meade’s headquarters, telling of his gains. In addition, Warren reported that the Rebel fortifications veered sharply to the right. Warren had also seen General Miles, who announced that his division was “close up” to the Confederate works.¹²⁹

It was about 5:00 p.m. before Warren received a reply to his message. Upon opening the dispatch, which was signed by Chief of Staff Webb, Warren found that he was to secure his position and protect, as well as possible, his left flank. Humphreys, Webb observed, had been directed to extend to the left and connect with Warren’s right. Webb reported that Sheridan’s cavalry was believed to be advancing. (At this time, Sheridan’s troopers, in the face of Pickett’s slashing attack, were falling back on Dinwiddie Court House.) Warren was authorized, if he wished, “to push a small force down the White Oak Road and try to communicate with Sheridan. . . .”¹³⁰

Warren had already taken the precautions outlined in Webb’s memorandum. Two of Griffin’s brigades (Chamberlain’s and Gregory’s) were dug in along the White Oak Road. Gregory’s right flank was in contact with Miles’ left flank unit—Scott’s brigade. The corps’ left flank was guarded by Ayres’ division. Crawford’s division, reinforced by Bartlett’s brigade, constituted the corps reserve. Wainwright’s artillerists, however, had been unable to take their guns across the run. Consequently, the V Corps did not have any artillery support at the front.

The battle of White Oak Road, which had begun so disastrously for Warren’s Corps, had ended in victory. Johnson’s gallant Confederate command had seen its morning’s gains wrested from it by the Union counterattack. Indeed, the Southerners were worse off than before, because they had lost control of the vital White Oak Road. They were now penned up in their works. The direct line of communications between Johnson’s division and Pickett’s task force had been severed. Worse was the effect of the battle on Confederate morale. The Southerners, after a brilliant start, had failed in their attempt to roll up the Union left. Furthermore, the Rebels had suffered losses which they could ill afford.

All told, the Yankees reported that the battle of White Oak Road had cost them 177 killed, 1,134 wounded, and 594 missing. Of these casualties, the V Corps had suffered 1,407. General Johnson announced that his losses in the engagement totaled “about 800, including killed, wounded, and missing.” In addition, Johnson claimed the capture of about 470 bluecoats.

Part VI

The V Corps Reports to Sheridan

When the fighting on the White Oak Road ceased, Warren’s soldiers heard the roar of battle rolling up from the southwest. Warren, as well as his troops, was disheartened to observe that the distant rumble seemed to be receding. If this were true, it indicated that Sheridan had encountered a force which was giving him trouble. Instead of advancing, it seemed to the interested listeners that Sheridan was being steadily driven back by the Confederates.¹³¹

Warren accordingly determined to rush a force to the assistance of the cavalry. General Griffin was alerted to have Bartlett’s brigade ready to move out. Bartlett was to march cross country and attack the Rebel force which was presumably driving Sheridan’s cavalry on its naked left flank. Major Cope of Warren’s staff was detailed to accompany Bartlett’s column.

Preceded by Captain Horrell’s escort company, Bartlett’s brigade took up the march. The orders Bartlett had received from Warren were simple. He was to proceed toward the sound of the firing and attack the Rebels in the rear. After leaving the White Oak Road, Bartlett’s troops advanced in a southwesterly direction. It was starting to get dark when the brigade passed through the picket line. The head of the column guided by the distant battle sounds. When the pickets shouted to the passing soldiers as to their intended destination, their inquiries were unanswered. Bartlett’s people were as ignorant—except that the line of march trended toward the sound of battle—of their destination as were the men manning the line of outposts.

At first, the march led across a belt of open ground. When the vanguard reached a branch of Gravelly Run, the Federals left the fields and entered the timber. Locating a “wood road,” Major Cope guided the column slowly forward. Before the soldiers had proceeded far into the timber, the firing died down. After advancing about one mile and crossing several arms of Gravelly Run, the head of the column debouched into an open field. On a hill in the soldiers’ immediate front could be seen Dr. Boisseau’s house.¹³²

As Captain Horrell’s troopers approached the doctor’s outbuildings, they were fired on by Confederate pickets belonging to Munford’s division. Quickly dismounting and deploying, Horrell’s cavalrymen chased Rebel outposts from Dr. Boisseau’s farm. Pressing eagerly ahead, Horrell’s bluecoats drove the Southerners from the slope and across Gravelly Run. Since the Yankees did not attempt to cross the run, the Confederate troopers halted and took position covering the ford.¹³³

It was already quite dark, and General Bartlett decided to take up a strong defensive position and wait for daylight. In the meantime, the general had learned from Major Cope that the Crump Road lay a short distance west of Dr. Boisseau’s house. Bartlett therefore posted his brigade with its right flank anchored on the Crump Road; his front and left flank covered the road leading eastward from Dr. Boisseau’s toward the Boydton Plank Road. Outposts were sent to relieve Horrell’s troopers. Throughout the early part of the evening, the Federal and Confederate pickets sniped at each other from opposite sides of Gravelly Run.¹³⁴

By the time that Bartlett had completed his dispositions, it was very dark. The Federals then turned their attention to the Confederate camp fires. Major Cope reported that these fires “seemed to stretch for miles on the south side of the run.” In addition, the Yankees could hear the characteristic noises made by a large body of soldiers—wagons rumbling, men talking and shouting, and the thud of axes against trees. Most of the officers were in agreement that the exposed position occupied by Bartlett’s brigade was “a perilous one and required considerable delicacy in handling.” The night, however, cloaked the Union dispositions and helped add to the command’s security.¹³⁵

At 5:45, shortly before Bartlett’s troops moved off, Warren received a message signed by Chief of Staff Webb. It had required 30 minutes to transmit this communication from Meade’s headquarters to Warren’s command post. Glancing at the dispatch, Warren discovered that he was to push a brigade down the White Oak Road. This force was expected to open communications with Sheridan and, if necessary, support the cavalry. Since the personnel at Meade’s headquarters mistakenly thought that the firing was steadily drawing nearer, Webb felt that the column which Warren was directed to send down the White Oak Road would not have far to go to establish contact with the cavalry.¹³⁶

Warren, however, saw things different from the way the headquarters people did. He was convinced that the firing was not getting any closer. Instead, Warren correctly believed that the roar of battle was receding in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House. The general had talked with two of Sheridan’s cavalrymen, a lieutenant and a sergeant, who had been cut off from their units by Pickett’s attack. They told Warren that Sheridan’s cavalry had been “attacked about noon by cavalry and infantry and rapidly driven back, two divisions (Crook’s and Devin’s) being engaged.” Relaying this information to Meade, Warren reported that he had sent Bartlett’s brigade to support the cavalry. Warren expressed his candid opinion that Bartlett’s relief column would not arrive in time to be of assistance.¹³⁷

A little after 6 o’clock, one of Merritt’s staff officers reached Meade’s headquarters. He told Meade that two of Pickett’s brigades had advanced and secured a position between Sheridan’s and Warren’s commands. Furthermore, by this time, it had become apparent to the officers at army headquarters that the roar of battle was not getting any closer. They now came to the same conclusion as Warren—the firing was receding toward Dinwiddie Court House.

When Meade wrote Grant (at 6:35 p.m.), he told of these developments. Meade observed that if Sheridan were unable to overcome the Rebel force opposed to him, he would be obliged to contract the left flank of his Army of the Potomac. Meade warned Grant that if he were compelled to reduce his front, he “must do it tonight.” Grant was also informed that Meade was ordering Warren to send a force down the Boydton Plank Road. This command would be charged with the mission of re-opening communications with Sheridan.

While Meade drafted Grant’s message, Chief of Staff Webb sent fresh instructions to the commander of the V Corps. Warren was also informed that elements from Pickett’s division had penetrated into the area between the V Corps and Sheridan’s command. To cope with this situation, Warren was to send down the Boydton Plank Road the force previously ordered out the White Oak Road.¹³⁸

When this message reached Warren, Bartlett’s column had been gone for almost an hour. If he were to recall Bartlett’s troops, it would require at least two hours for them to reach the Boydton Plank Road. By then, it would be too dark for Bartlett’s troops to accomplish anything. He, however, thought of another solution to the problem. Because of the muddy condition of the “wood road” leading across to Holliday’s, the artillery had been parked near the Boydton Plank Road. Three of Bartlett’s regiments had been detailed to guard the artillery and the corps’ wagons. Colonel Pearson was in charge of this force. Warren determined to send Pearson’s command down the Boydton Plank Road.

Following receipt of his marching orders from Warren, Pearson started down the Plank Road. When the head of Pearson’s column reached Gravelly Run, it was discovered that the stream was running bank full. The bridge had been broken down by retreating Confederates on the afternoon of the 29th. Since Warren had been required to operate without any cavalry to cover his left flank, he had made no effort to have the bridge rebuilt. Pearson was unable to proceed any farther until a new structure was built. After passing this information to Warren, Pearson let his men fall out and take it easy, while waiting for the pioneers to arrive and rebuild the bridge.¹³⁹

After he had given Pearson his instructions, Warren sent another message to Meade’s headquarters. He reported that it was too late to stop Bartlett; therefore, he had sent Pearson down the Plank Road. Warren promised to keep headquarters informed of Bartlett’s progress.¹⁴⁰

After directing his division commanders to secure the ground gained by entrenching their positions, Warren returned to his headquarters. (At this time, Warren’s headquarters were at Mrs. Wilson’s.) The general wanted to be near the telegraph, so he could keep in touch with General Meade throughout the night. By 8:00 p.m., Warren and his staff had reached Mrs. Wilson’s.¹⁴¹

In the meantime, Meade had received a reply to his 6:15 telegram to Grant. Besides sending Meade a copy of Sheridan’s 2:30 p.m. message, Grant informed the commander of the Army of the Potomac that Colonel Porter had just returned from Dinwiddie Court House. Porter had told Grant that Devin’s division “had been driven back in considerable confusion south of J. Boisseau’s house.” At the time that Porter had left Sheridan, Crook’s division was moving to the front. Sheridan had told Porter that he expected Crook to turn the Rebel’s flank. Grant stated that he hoped to get Sheridan’s cavalry “onto the White Oak Road west of W. Dabney house.” Up to this time, Grant wrote, Sheridan had failed to carry out his assignment. Furthermore, the way things were developing, there was no assurance that the cavalry leader would succeed. In this case, it would be necessary for Warren to watch his left. Grant believed that if Sheridan could hold on to Dinwiddie Court House, it would discourage any ideas the Confederates have of sweeping around Warren’s left flank. Even so, Grant warned, Warren “cannot be too much on his guard.”

In addition, Grant wanted Meade to have the Confederate prisoners captured in the battle of White Oak Road, closely questioned. He wanted to see if Lee had received any reinforcements from North Carolina. Sheridan had incorrectly identified Hoke’s division as one of the units opposing him. This was the reason behind this request.¹⁴²

Meade answered Grant at 7:10 p.m. He announced that he had learned nothing concerning the reported transfer of Confederate units from North Carolina to the Petersburg theater of operations. Meade added, however, that this certainly would not be an impossible move on the Rebel’s part. Continuing, Meade reported that Capt. Michael V. Sheridan (General Sheridan’s adjutant and brother) had just reached his headquarters. The captain told Meade that the Confederates were in possession of the Brooks road. If, as this news indicated, the Rebels had concentrated a large force of infantry to General Sheridan’s front, Meade observed, the Plank Road was open to their advance. The captain had warned Meade that the Southerners would probably resume their attack on the cavalry corps in the morning. If they did, Meade was of the opinion that General Sheridan would either have to rejoin the army or to be reinforced. Meade did not believe it possible to detach any units from the Army of the Potomac to send to Sheridan. To justify his position, Meade pointed out that not only was his left flank resting in the air but that his line was dangerously extended.

After waiting 30 minutes and receiving no reply to his communication, Meade sent Grant another telegram. He again announced that Captain Sheridan was at his headquarters. The captain, Meade wrote, had said that General Sheridan had fallen back on Dinwiddie Court House, after having been “repulsed” by the Confederate infantry. In event that he was compelled to evacuate Dinwiddie Court House, Sheridan had told the captain that he would retire via the Vaughan Road.¹⁴³

By 5 o’clock, another one of Sheridan’s staff officers, Colonel John Kellogg, had galloped up to Meade’s headquarters. Kellogg told Meade that Sheridan would be unable to hold Dinwiddie Court House in the face of a renewed Confederate onslaught. When he relayed this information to Grant, Meade broached the subject of transferring one of Gibbon’s divisions to the right bank of Gravelly Run. Meade also thought that it would be a good idea to have Turner’s division of the XXIV Corps march to Sheridan’s assistance. Meade had predicated this suggestion on the assumption that Grant would deny him permission to contract his lines.

It was 11:45 p.m. before Grant replied to Meade’s communications. When he did, Grant—who was becoming alarmed by the situation—ordered Meade to recall Warren’s Corps. When Warren had massed his troops on the Boydton Plank Road, he was to send one division to Sheridan’s relief. This column was to “start at once and go down the Boydton road.”¹⁴⁴

Following Warren’s return to his headquarters at Mrs. Wilson’s, he and Meade had been in frequent communication. At 8 o’clock, Meade warned Warren that Sheridan had been forced back on Dinwiddie Court House by a strong Rebel task force. The retreat of Sheridan’s cavalry, Meade continued, had exposed the rear of the II and V Corps to attack and would “require great vigilance” on Warren’s part. If Warren had sent a column down the Boydton Plank Road (as Meade had previously ordered), it was not to go beyond Gravelly Run.¹⁴⁵

Because Pearson’s troops had been unable to cross Gravelly Run, Warren had already taken the step which Meade urged. When Warren replied to Meade’s communication (at 8:20 p.m.), he conveyed this information to army headquarters. In addition, Warren announced that Bartlett had penetrated “nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run.” Warren said that he was confident that if Sheridan held on at Dinwiddie Court House, the foe would be unable to hold their gains and be compelled to fall back to Five Forks. Expressing strong opposition to a night march, Warren observed, “I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way.” Warren also inquired, “Does General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie Court House?”

At 8:35 p.m., Warren received a telegram signed by Chief of Staff Webb marked “confidential.” Scanning the message, Warren learned that headquarters was of the opinion that the Army of the Potomac would have to contract its lines. Warren would be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton Plank Road, resting his left flank on Gravelly Run. Hatcher’s Run would be covered by Humphreys’ II Corps and Ord’s Army of the James. Warren was alerted to hold his men ready to carry out this order on “short notice.”¹⁴⁶

By this hour, Meade knew that Bartlett’s brigade had taken position at Dr. Boisseau’s. Nevertheless, Webb gave no intimation as to whether Bartlett was to hold his ground. The staff, in its anxiety for the safety of Humphreys’ and Warren’s Corps, had forgotten about this important information. Furthermore, Grant, as yet, did not now that Bartlett’s brigade occupied a position on the left flank of Pickett’s.¹⁴⁷

Warren hated to see the army take the step outlined in Webb’s memorandum. He was afraid that a retreat to the Boydton Plank Road would prove to be a heavy blow to the morale of his soldiers. Furthermore, the general felt that Pickett’s force would be unable to hold its position in front of Dinwiddie Court House, because his corps threatened its left flank.¹⁴⁸

Consequently, Warren, when he answered Webb’s communication, argued that the Army of the Potomac should try to hold its gains. He pointed out that the fortifications which his troops had thrown up covering the Plank Road were “very strong.” One division, if supported by artillery, could hold this line, Warren argued. The only way the Confederates could carry this position, Warren stated, would be by a strong column operating south of Gravelly Run. The general believed that if Meade followed the course of action which he proceeded to outline, the Confederates would find plenty to keep them busy. Warren would have Humphreys, reinforced by the V Corps’ artillery, hold the Plank Road. The V Corps would be freed to cross Gravelly Run and assail the Rebels from one side, while Sheridan attacked from the other. Should the Southerners seek to reinforce Pickett, Bartlett’s roadblock would force them to detour to the west. In summing up his argument, Warren announced, “Unless Sheridan has been too badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of.”¹⁴⁹

Following receipt of Grant’s 8:45 p.m. telegram directing him to send a division of the V Corps to Sheridan’s assistance, Meade had Chief of Staff Webb prepare an order implementing this decision. Warren was instructed to pull back inside the earthworks covering the Boydton Plank Road. Griffin’s division was to be sent to Dinwiddie Court House. Upon reaching the Court House, Griffin would report to Sheridan. General Humphreys’ II Corps was to occupy the fortifications northeast of Mrs. Butler’s house.¹⁵⁰

Webb’s message which had been sent at 9 o’clock was in Warren’s hands 17 minutes later. Warren was distressed to learn that the ground which had cost so much blood was to be abandoned. Nevertheless, he proceeded to draft a set of instructions calculated to implement Grant’s decision. General Ayres, who was nearest the Plank Road, was to withdraw his division and mass it near the Boydton Plank Road; Crawford was to follow Ayres and concentrate his troops behind the entrenchments southeast of Mrs. Butler’s; Griffin was to recall Bartlett’s brigade from its position at Dr. Boisseau’s. When Bartlett had rejoined the division, Griffin was to return to the Boydton Plank Road. Griffin’s soldiers would then move to Dinwiddie Court House, where the general would report to Sheridan. In executing this movement, the division commanders were admonished to take care and see that none of their pickets or any portions of their units were left behind. They were to put their organizations into motion immediately upon the receipt of this order, which Warren handed to his staff officers for distribution at 9:35 p.m.¹⁵¹

At this hour, all of Warren’s command (with the exception of Bartlett’s brigade, Pearson’s three regiments, and the corps artillery), was based along the White Oak Road. Chamberlain’s brigade of Griffin’s division was on the north side of the road. Crawford’s division was near the road on Griffin’s right, and Ayres’ in a similar position on his left. Accordingly, considerable time would be wasted while the staff officers were contacting the three division commanders. In addition, Griffin would have to recall Bartlett. At best, Bartlett could not be expected to withdraw his pickets and get back to the Boydton Plank Road before 1 or 2 ‘clock in the morning.¹⁵²

Evidently, Webb decided that his 9 o’clock dispatch to Warren needed clarification. At 9:20 p.m. he handed the telegrapher at army headquarters another message. Warren was to see that the division slated to join Sheridan started at once. In addition, Warren was given freedom “to act within the Boydton Plank Road” as he saw fit. Webb again informed Warren that Humphreys’ II Corps would “hold to the road and the return.”¹⁵³

Warren replied to the chief of staff’s communication at 10:00 p.m. He pointed out that there would be a considerable lapse of time before Bartlett’s brigade would rejoin Griffin’s division. Since Ayres’ and Crawford’s divisions were not engaged, Warren had determined to withdraw them first. Even so, Warren did not feel that the march of Griffin’s division would be retarded, because, before the troops could cross Gravelly Run, the bridge would have to be rebuilt. The officer (Capt. William H. H. Benyaurd) whom Warren had sent to examine the crossing had pronounced it unfordable by infantry. Furthermore, Captain Benyaurd had stated a 40-feet span could be required to complete the bridge. The general informed Webb that he would exert himself to see that the bridge was passable by the time Griffin’s division reached it.¹⁵⁴

Warren’s Corps was without pontoons. The pontoon train which had started with the corps on the 29th had been used to bridge Rowanty Creek and the Quaker Road crossing of Gravelly Run. To construct a span at the Boydton Plank Road crossing of Gravelly Run, Warren put his pioneers to work razing a house. This building would supply materials for the construction of the urgently needed bridge. Captain Benyaurd was put in charge of the project.¹⁵⁵

In the meantime, Meade had been doing some deep thinking. Examining his maps, Meade came to the conclusion that Bartlett would be unable to rejoin Griffin in time for the division “to move with any promptitude” down the Plank Road. To facilitate Griffin’s march to the point of danger, Meade issued instructions for Warren to attach another brigade to his division in place of Bartlett’s. When Webb communicated this order to Warren, he reported that Sheridan had been attacked by four infantry brigades—three from Pickett’s division, one from Gordon’s Corps.¹⁵⁶

When Warren noted that Webb’s message had been sent at 9:40 p.m., he realized that army headquarters had not yet received his dispatch regarding the condition of the bridge. He trusted that, when Meade was apprised of this, he would agree that Bartlett would be able to rejoin Griffin before the bridge was passable. Consequently, Warren decided not to make any change in his marching orders for the time being. He would wait until Meade had received his telegram concerning the state of affairs at the crossing.¹⁵⁷

Warren’s 8:40 p.m. message suggesting that he be permitted to cross Gravelly Run with his entire corps and attack the Rebels’ rear, while Sheridan assailed them in front, made quite an impression on Meade. At 9:45 p.m., Meade inquired of Grant, “Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole Corps and smash up the force in front of Sheridan?” Meade agreed with Warren that the II Corps could hold the line of the Plank Road. Unlike Warren, Meade did not think the Plank Road was the best line for the V Corps to operate along. Instead, he would have Warren move his entire corps up to the position held by Bartlett’s brigade. From Dr. Boisseau’s, Warren’s troops would advance and take the Rebel force threatening Sheridan in the rear. “Or,” Meade continued, “he could send one division to support Sheridan at Dinwiddie and move on the enemy’s rear with the other two.” Meade neglected to inform Grant that the battle plan had originated with Warren.¹⁵⁸

This was the first news Grant had received that one of Warren’s brigades was at Dr. Boisseau’s on the Crump Road. Meade had been in possession of this information for at least an hour. Furthermore, Meade made no mention of the fact that he had already directed Warren to recall Bartlett’s brigade. Grant seems to have held the opinion that at least part of Warren’s Corps had already returned to the Plank Road.¹⁵⁹

Replying to Meade’s communication at 10:15 Grant tersely observed, “Let Warren move in the way you propose and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first directed.”¹⁶⁰ In a second telegram, Grant requested that Meade keep Sheridan posted on the dispositions being undertaken for his relief. Furthermore, Meade was to inform Sheridan that he was “to take general direction of the forces sent to him until the emergency for which they are sent is over.”¹⁶¹

Shortly thereafter, Grant handed a dispatch to one of his staff for delivery to General Sheridan. Grant notified the cavalry leader that the V Corps had been ordered to his support. Two divisions were scheduled to march by way of J. Boisseau’s; a third would move down the Boydton Plank Road. In addition, Grant announced that General Mackenzie’s cavalry division of the Army of the James had been directed to join Sheridan. Mackenzie’s troopers were to advance via the Vaughan Road. Grant, without having any justification for it, informed Sheridan that the V Corps should reach him “by 12 tonight.” Sheridan, Grant wrote, would “assume command of the whole force sent to operate with him and use it to the best of his ability to destroy the force which his command has fought so gallantly today.”¹⁶²

As soon as Grant had approved his proposed plan of operations, Meade sent another message to Warren. The leader of the V Corps was informed that he was to send Griffin’s division down the Plank Road. Ayres’ and Crawford’s commands were to join Bartlett’s brigade at Dr. Boisseau’s. They would then attack the rear of the Confederate force which was confronting Sheridan’s cavalry. According to the latest intelligence reaching GHQ, Sheridan’s troopers were reportedly posted a short distance north of Dinwiddie Court House. In case the Rebels bested the V Corps, Warren’s line of retreat would be by way of the Brooks and Boydton Plank Roads. Meade urged Warren to move rapidly, so that he would reach the junction of the Brooks and Boydton Plank Roads ahead of the Confederates. Meade believed, however, that the foe would fall back toward Five Forks, in the face of Warren’s advance. Warren was admonished to move light and fast. Any gear that would prevent the corps from moving cross country was to be left behind. Warren was to notify Meade as soon as his troops started to move.¹⁶³

Meade’s telegram was handed to Warren at 10:48 p.m. Upon reading it, Warren was distressed to learn that Meade still did not know about the bridge. Furthermore, Meade seemed to be unaware that a strong force of Confederates confronted Bartlett’s brigade and held the right bank of Gravelly Run south of Dr. Boisseau’s. Warren, had also received news from one of his staffers, Maj. William T. Gentry, that a Confederate force (Roberts’ North Carolina brigade) held the junction of the Crump and White Oak Roads. The major, in attempting to communicate with Bartlett, had accidentally blundered into this roadblock. The major had escaped, but his orderly had been captured.

Warren knew that it had been one and one-half hours since he had issued instructions recalling his corps. The general assumed that, at this very minute, the troops were moving back along the “wood road” toward the Plank Road. If his orders were being obeyed, Ayres’ division would be in the lead. If he followed Meade’s orders to the letter, Griffin’s division would have to be pushed to the head of the column, while Ayres’ retraced its steps. To keep from wasting valuable time while the two divisions changed places, Warren determined to send Ayres’ division instead of Griffin’s to Sheridan’s support.¹⁶⁴

Answering Meade’s message, Warren pointed out that on the receipt of Chief of Staff Webb’s 9 o’clock dispatch, he had issued instructions for his divisions to retire from the White Oak Road. Ayres’ division was to move first, to be followed in turn by Crawford’s and Griffin’s. Warren warned Meade that if he altered the march order during the night, it would produce wholesale confusion which would render all his “operations nugatory.” To escape from this impasse, Warren informed Meade that, on his own initiative, he had decided to send Ayres’s division to Sheridan. At the same time, he would take Crawford’s and Griffin’s divisions and move against the Rebel’s flank and rear. Warren, however, cautioned army headquarters that, with the Confederates holding Gravelly Run below Dr. Boisseau’s, he would not “accomplish the apparent objects” of Meade’s directive. As a result of a break in the telegraph line, this message was delayed in transmission.¹⁶⁵

After he had handed the signal officer the dispatch addressed to Meade, Warren (at 11:00 p.m.) drafted an order implementing this decision. Instead of halting his command near the Boydton Plank Road, Ayres would proceed down the Plank Road to Dinwiddie Court House and report to Sheridan. Crawford and Griffin, upon receipt of this order, were to halt and mass their divisions. The staff officers entrusted with the delivery of these orders would report to Warren the positions currently occupied by Crawford’s and Griffin’s commands.¹⁶⁶

A number of problems, however, had arisen to plague the V Corps. Not the least of which was the shortage of staff officers. (On the evening of the 31st, there were only six staff officers at Warren’s headquarters.) When Warren had moved to comply with Meade’s 9:00 p.m. order, he had been forced to detail one officer to contact each of the three division commands. In addition, Warren had to send a member of his staff, Major Gentry, to get in touch with General Bartlett. In trying to reach Bartlett’s command post, Major Gentry had blundered into the Confederate roadblock. When Gentry returned to report what had happened, Warren called for Major Cope, who had just returned from Dr. Boisseau’s. Cope, who knew the way, was detailed to carry the message to Bartlett. Furthermore, Warren had sent an officer to order up the pioneers, and guide them to the Plank Road crossing of Gravelly Run. At the same time, another aide (Captain Benyaurd) was sent to check on the condition of the crossing.¹⁶⁷

In the White Oak Road sector, the opposing lines were very close. If intelligence of the movement was to be kept from reaching the ears of the Confederates, the Union officers would have to forego the use of drums, bugles, and loud commands in arousing their units. Every order had to be relayed by word of mouth from each commander to his subordinates. As was to be expected, considerable time was lost while these orders were filtering down from the generals to the non-commissioned officers. To awaken the men, the sergeants and corporals had to shake them.¹⁶⁸

To make matters worse, the night was “intensely dark and stormy.” At the time that the staff officers reached Crawford’s and Griffin’s headquarters with Warren’s 11 o’clock order, they discovered that the two divisions had not moved. By 1:00 a.m., the aides had returned to Warren’s command post with this information.¹⁶⁹

In the meantime, Meade’s headquarters had been in frequent contact with General Humphreys’ II Corps. When the decision to reposition the V Corps was made, Chief of Staff Webb telegraphed Humphreys. At 9:10 p.m., Humphreys was directed to have his men reoccupy the position held during the morning. The II Corps was to anchor its left flank on Mrs. Butler’s and hold “the return.”¹⁷⁰ Fifteen minutes later, Webb repeated this message. In addition, the chief of staff informed Humphreys, “General Warren is to be left free to act and is to send a division to General Sheridan at once.”

In the wake of Meade’s 10:15 p.m. communication altering Warren’s orders, Webb sent another wire to Humphreys. The leader of the II Corps was informed that Warren was to move down the Crump Road and attack the Rebel force opposing Sheridan in the rear with two divisions. Warren’s third division was to join Sheridan by way of the Boydton Plank Road. In view of these developments, Humphreys was to remain on the defensive and strengthen his position.

Replying to Webb’s telegram, Humphreys announced that, according to the schedule he had worked out, his corps would fall back just before daybreak. His troops would reoccupy the rifle pits held on the morning of the 31st.¹⁷¹

Humphreys also dispatched a message to Warren. Besides informing Warren of the orders he had received from army headquarters, Humphreys wanted to know at what time the V Corps would march. Humphreys proposed to synchronize his movements with Warren’s.¹⁷²

Humphreys’ communication reached Warren’s headquarters at 12:30 a.m. Acknowledging the message, Warren pointed out that, at first, Meade had directed him to withdraw immediately the V Corps from the White Oak Road sector. Subsequently, he had been advised to attack the Rebels with two divisions of his V Corps, while sending a third down the Plank Road to reinforce Sheridan. Colonel Wainwright, with the corps artillery, was to remain on the Plank Road. Warren also expressed his belief that the position occupied by Bartlett’s brigade would compel the Confederate force confronting Sheridan to withdraw before morning.¹⁷³

Because the telegraph was not functioning properly, it was 11:45 p.m. before Meade’s headquarters learned that the Gravelly Run bridge had been destroyed and it would take considerable time to rebuild. Meade accordingly dashed off a message to Warren. He inquired about the possibility of using an alternate route to send the division to Sheridan’s support. Meade wanted to know if any time could be saved by sending the reinforcements by way of the Quaker Road. After pointing out to Warren that time was of the essence, Meade wrote, “Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without reinforcements, and yours are the only ones that can be sent.” Warren was urged to, “Use every exertion to get the troops to Sheridan as soon as possible.” In case it became necessary, Warren was to use both the Boydton Plank and Quaker Roads to rush assistance to Sheridan. After signing the dispatch, Meade added a paragraph, “If Sheridan is not reinforced in time and compelled to fall back he will retire up the Vaughan Road.”¹⁷⁴

At the same time, Meade telegraphed Grant. Meade informed his superior of the contents of the message which he had sent to Warren. Meade had apparently accepted Warren’s thesis that the Confederates would fall back during the night. He informed Grant, “I think it is possible the enemy may retire from Sheridan’s front tonight fearing an attack from the rear.”¹⁷⁵

It took Meade’s 11:45 p.m. communication one hour and a quarter to reach Warren’s headquarters. When he read the dispatch, Warren was shocked to discover that the Union brass was displaying “so much solicitude for General Sheridan’s position and the necessity of reinforcing him directly.” Warren felt that Sheridan’s plight must be desperate if Meade were willing for the V Corps to forego its scheduled attack on the Confederate rear to march to Sheridan’s assistance. Examining his maps, Warren discovered that, if his troops moved to Dinwiddie Court House by way of the Quaker Road, as suggested by Meade, it would require a march of over ten miles. Since the night was far advanced, Warren calculated that, if his troops marched via the route outlined by Meade, it would be impossible for them to reach Dinwiddie Court House before 8:00 a.m. By that time, the soldiers of the V Corps would be too late to be of any use to Sheridan in holding Dinwiddie Court House.

In the event that the Confederates occupied Dinwiddie Court House, Warren knew that a Union attack down the Boydton Plank Road would take them in the rear. A movement down the Plank Road would enable the entire V Corps to march as a unit. If one division were sent around by the Quaker Road (as Meade proposed), it would separate Warren’s Corps into three groups. A hard night march, on top of the previous day’s fighting, would sap the vigor of his soldiers, Warren believed. Accordingly, they could not be expected to go into action with much enthusiasm.¹⁷⁶

In view of these considerations, Warren determined to disregard Meade’s suggestions. Warren would hold Crawford’s and Griffin’s division where they were until such time as he learned that General Ayres’ troops and established contact with Sheridan’s cavalry. This time, Warren theorized, would not be wasted, because Crawford’s and Griffin’s badly jaded soldiers would get some needed rest.¹⁷⁷

Having arrived at this decision, Warren (at 1:00 a.m.) informed Meade that he believed the pioneers would complete the bridge across Gravelly Run before his infantry could reach the Quaker Road. If, however, he was wrong, Warren promised to have Ayres’ division follow the route proposed by Meade. Warren also informed Meade that he had heard from Captain Benyaurd, that it would not take the pioneers more than one hour to complete the structure.¹⁷⁸

It was about 10:00 p.m. when General Ayres received Warren’s 9:35 p.m. order directing him to fall back to the Boydton Plank Road. To reach the road, Ayres’ division beat its way through about two miles of difficult country and cross a branch of Gravelly Run. By the time that Ayres reached Mrs. Butler’s, he received the order directing him to march his command down the Boydton Plank Road. Leaving his soldiers to draw rations from the supply train which they met, Ayres hastened to Warren’s headquarters. Here, Ayres was informed by Warren that Sheridan had been hard-pressed and needed assistance badly. It was impressed on Ayres that he must exert himself to get his division to Dinwiddie Court House. The general then rejoined his command.¹⁷⁹

At 2:05 a.m., Warren received a message from Captain Benyaurd announcing that the bridge was open for traffic. Warren relayed this news to Meade and Ayres.¹⁸⁰

As soon as General Ayres learned that Benyaurd’s detachment had finished the bridge across Gravelly Run, he put his command into motion. Gwyn’s brigade took the lead as the division moved down the Plank Road. According to Ayres, there had been little delay at the bridge. The Plank Road was good enough, but the fatigue of the night march, in conjunction with yesterday’s battle, had pushed the men to the limit of their endurance. As customary, the men marched for 50 minutes and then were allowed to rest for ten minutes. During these stops, many of the soldiers fell asleep. To get the column moving again, “the officers had to use violence” to get the men on their feet. By 4 o’clock, the head of Ayres’ column had penetrated to within one mile of Dinwiddie Court House. Ayres now encountered one of Sheridan’s staff officers. This officer left Dinwiddie Court House at 3:20 and carried a dispatch from Sheridan to Warren.¹⁸¹

Ayres was told by the staffer that his column had arrived sooner than expected. In fact, Ayres’ division had come a mile too far. The aide announced that Ayres should have turned into the Brooks road. If he had, the staffer remarked, the division could have taken the Confederates from the rear. Ayres accordingly reversed his line of march. Returning to the Brooks road, the head of the division turned into it just as dawn started to break. The staffer did not remain with Ayres to show him the way, but galloped off to deliver Sheridan’s message to Warren.

Shortly after the division started down the Brooks road, General Ayres sighted a Rebel picket sitting on a rail fence. Spotting the approaching column, the Confederate leaped off the fence, mounted his horse and rode off. Ayres halted his column and threw out a strong skirmish line. The skirmishers were directed to feel their way toward Dinwiddie Court House. Ayres believed that if there were any Confederates holed up in the area between Brooks road and the Court House, they would be trapped between his soldiers and Sheridan’s cavalry.

When the skirmishers had moved off, the column resumed its advance along Brooks road. Colonel Swan recalled, “The march along the Brooks road was quite joyous. A clear day was breaking, and the cavalry bugles away to the left and then nearer were playing lively airs that told that the enemy had flown.” Near the junction of the Adams and Brooks roads, Ayres encountered General Sheridan. When Ayres reported to Sheridan, he was directed to mass his division in the fields west of the junction and let his men prepare coffee. Taking position in the designated fields, Ayres’ division rested on its arms until 2:00 p.m.¹⁸²

The staff officer bearing Sheridan’s message reached Warren’s headquarters at 4:50 a.m. Upon reading the dispatch, Warren learned that Custer’s division, which was deployed astride the Adams road, was guarding the approaches to Dinwiddie Court House. Sheridan reported that the Confederate main line of resistance covered the road linking the Adams road with Fitzgerald’s Ford. Because Sheridan had received erroneous information indicating that Warren had one division at J. Boisseau’s, he mistakenly believed that the V Corps was in the rear and almost on the flank of the Rebel battle line. Accordingly, Sheridan proposed to hold his position at Dinwiddie Court House. If the Rebels moved against Custer, Sheridan wanted Warren to hurl the division based at J. Boisseau’s against the Southerners’ left flank and rear. Even if the Confederates did not attack, Sheridan wanted the V Corps to go over to the offensive. The cavalry, Sheridan promised, would co-operate and try to seize the road linking Adams’ plantation with Fitzgerald’s Ford. If the cavalry were able to carry out its assignment, Sheridan believed that Warren would bag Pickett’s entire command. The aggressive Sheridan had written, “Do not fear my leaving here [Dinwiddie Court House]. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.”¹⁸³

Warren was distressed to learn that Sheridan had a mistaken impression of the tactical situation. There were no elements of the V Corps at J. Boisseau’s. The closest that any of the units of the V Corps had been to J. Boisseau’s was Dr. Boisseau’s. It was a mile and one-fourth from the doctor’s to J. Boisseau’s. Moreover, during the night, Bartlett’s brigade had been recalled from Dr. Boisseau’s. Warren knew it would be impossible for him to carry out the plan of operations advanced by Sheridan.¹⁸⁴

Following the receipt of Sheridan’s message, Warren left his headquarters and returned to the White Oak Road. With dawn approaching, Warren wanted to give his personal supervision to the movements of Crawford’s and Griffin’s divisions.¹⁸⁵

It was midnight when Bartlett’s brigade evacuated its position at Dr. Boisseau’s. The dark night, in conjunction with the narrow “wood road” made marching conditions difficult. Almost three hours elapsed before the last of Bartlett’s troops rejoined Griffin’s division near the White Oak Road. Bartlett’s soldiers were allowed only a short rest. About 5:00 a.m., Griffin received his marching orders. One of Warren’s staffers rode up to Griffin’s command post, and told the general “to move up the First Division with all possible dispatch, via the J. Boisseau house, and report to General Sheridan.” Griffin immediately alerted his brigade commanders to hold their units ready to move.¹⁸⁶

The Confederates were known to be occupying in force the fortifications covering the junction of the Claiborne and White Oak Roads, so the V Corps officers thought it necessary to exercise extreme caution in executing the shift to the left. To screen his division’s withdrawal from the rifle pits covering the White Oak Road, Griffin directed Colonel Gregory to have his pickets remain in position. After the division moved out, the pickets would be recalled and fall in behind Bartlett’s brigade.¹⁸⁷

Chamberlain’s brigade took the lead when Griffin’s division took up the march. At this hour, General Warren did not know that Pickett’s task force was falling back on Five Forks. So far as Warren’s information went, he expected to meet the Rebels near J. Boisseau’s. They had been there, he knew, as late as midnight. Sheridan, in his 3:00 a.m. dispatch from Dinwiddie Court House, had informed Warren that the Confederates were still there, and that the V Corps’ advance would take them on their flank and rear. Not knowing when he might encounter the foe, Griffin had Chamberlain’s brigade advance in line of battle. Under the impression that he would probably strike the Confederates before he reached J. Boisseau’s, Chamberlain moved with great care. Gregory’s and Bartlett’s brigades swung along in column by battalions behind Chamberlain’s. Griffin’s line of march led westward across the fields south of the White Oak Road. When Chamberlain’s soldiers reached the Crump Road, they wheeled to the left, the Crump Road now served as Griffin’s line of advance.¹⁸⁸

Since there was a possibly of a Confederate counterstroke, Warren had to be careful when it came to withdrawing Crawford’s division. To cover his retrogressive movement, Crawford formed his division for battle. Coulter’s brigade took position on the left; Baxter’s brigade held the center; while Kellogg’s troops watched the right. Baxter’s troops were the last to retire. The 39th Massachusetts, deployed as skirmishers, covered Baxter’s withdrawal. Warren accompanied Baxter’s command until he became convinced that the Rebels had no notion of following the V Corps. Besides watching the enemy, the 39th Massachusetts checked straggling.

Both Coulter’s and Baxter’s brigades marched in line of battle. Kellogg, who held the post of danger, had his command move in column by regiments. In event of a Confederate attack, Kellogg could quickly deploy his soldiers to the right and rear. After detaching a skirmishers to keep the Rebels occupied, Crawford’s division marched off toward the west.

As soon as the division was well on its way, the officers in charge of the skirmishers reassembled their men. They then hastened to rejoin their units. The Confederates, however, made no effort to follow the V Corps.¹⁸⁹

General Warren’s escort, after the departure of the corps, retired along the “wood road” toward the Plank Road. The cavalry had the task of turning back any men or supply wagons that had not received information regarding the V Corps’ withdrawal from the White Oak Road.

Warren remained with Crawford until after the head of the division had turned into the Crump Road. Convinced by this time that he had been successful in his efforts to disengage his corps, Warren left Crawford. Accompanied by his staff, Warren rode forward and joined Griffin. It was a little after 9:00 a.m. when Warren reached Griffin’s command post.¹⁹⁰

At J. Boisseau’s, Griffin’s vanguard encountered Devin’s cavalry division advancing up the Adams road. It was about 7:00 a.m. when Griffin’s troops established contact with Sheridan’s cavalry. Griffin stopped his division and reported to General Sheridan as directed. Sheridan ordered Griffin to halt his troops, mass them, and await further orders. Bodies of the men and horses killed in yesterday’s fighting were scattered about the area. A soldier in the 118th Pennsylvania recalled that, as the column came to a halt: General Sheridan and his staff emerged from a neighboring wood. His appearance had not become familiar to the soldiers of the 5th Corps, nor had they yet become impressed with that personal magnetism which roused all fighting men with whom he came in contact.¹⁹¹

When Sheridan rode up, he asked Chamberlain where Warren was. To this inquiry, Chamberlain replied that he thought Warren was at the rear of the column.

“That’s just where I should expect him to be!” said Sheridan. (Warren’s reason for being at the rear while disengaging his troops has already been discussed.) The imputation cast on Warren’s valor by this remark to one of Warren’s subordinates could not be deemed productive of good discipline, even if there had been a shadow of truth in it. The officers and men of the V Corps, however, knew differently. “Warren was never the one to be in the rear when there was a fight going on. When anyone wanted to find him during a battle, they had to go to the front line to do it.”¹⁹²

Griffin, in accordance with Sheridan’s instructions, massed his division across the Adams road, one-half mile south of J. Boisseau’s. When Warren joined Griffin, he learned that Ayres’ division was concentrated about three-quarters of a mile below Griffin’s, near J. M. Brook’s. Crawford’s soldiers reached J. Boisseau’s shortly after Warren. The division halted, and Crawford allowed his men to prepare breakfast and rest.¹⁹³

While Warren was conversing with Griffin and waiting for instructions from Sheridan, a staff officer rode up. The aide handed Warren a message signed by Chief of Staff Webb. The dispatch informed Warren that, as soon as the V Corps rendezvoused with the cavalry, he was to report to Sheridan for orders. General Meade also wanted Warren to submit a progress report. It was a little before 9:30 a.m. when this communication was delivered to Warren.¹⁹⁴

General Webb had signed this order at 6:00 a.m. At the same time, Meade had sent a telegram to Grant. Meade concluded his message with these words, “Warren will be at or near Dinwiddie soon with his whole Corps and will require further orders.”¹⁹⁵

In absence of evidence to the contrary, these dispatches indicate that Gouverneur Warren was responsible to Meade up until 6 o’clock on April 1. Up until then, Warren “had met the intentions and expectations of his commanding officer, and have even exceeded, or anticipated them.” Two divisions of the V Corps reported to Sheridan by or before 7:00 a.m.—two and one-half hours before the receipt of Webb’s 6 o’clock communication.¹⁹⁶

Warren immediately moved to comply with Meade’s request. He reported that the V Corps had crossed Gravelly Run and was massed at J. Boisseau’s. Warren pointed out that, while he hadn’t met Sheridan “personally,” Griffin had spoken with the cavalry leader. Delighted by his success in disengaging his corps, Warren informed headquarters, “The enemy did not follow with a single man when we left the White Oak Road this morning.” Warren also broached the subject of re-victualizing his command. He believed that his troops could draw rations by way of the Boydton Plank Road.¹⁹⁷

Warren’s failure to report directly to Sheridan might have been a contributing factor to his relief later in the day. Colonel Horace Porter, a key Grant staffer, was “positive that this delay in reporting was very annoying to Sheridan.” Several other commentators also subscribed to this view. In fact, after resting for several hours, it seems to have occurred to Warren that it might be a good idea to have an interview with Sheridan. About 11:00 a.m., when he finally contacted the cavalry leader, Warren pronounced his manner “friendly and cordial.” At this time, Sheridan was dismounted. After the two officers had conversed for a few minutes, Sheridan called for his horse and rode off toward the front. Following Sheridan’s departure, Warren rejoined his command.¹⁹⁸

Except for a daring coup carried out by three members of the 16th Michigan, the rank and file of the V Corps spent a quiet morning. Not knowing that the V Corps had been withdrawn from the White Oak Road, the three Michiganders passed to the west of the II Corps’ picket line. The soldiers planned to rejoin their regiment, which was assigned to Bartlett’s brigade. Encountering a captain and 14 men of the 16th North Carolina Cavalry Battalion, the Yankees forced the Southerners to surrender. Accompanied by their prisoners, the bluecoats rejoined their regiment south ofJ. Boisseau’s.¹⁹⁹

Following receipt of Meade’s directive ordering the II Corps to fall back and occupy the fortifications covering the Boydton Plank Road. Humphreys drafted an order calculated to implement his superior’s decision. The retrogressive movement was to begin on the right by Hays’ and Mott’s divisions. These two units were scheduled to retire by 3:30 a.m. Hays’ division on the extreme right would occupy a line extending from Armstrong’s Mill to the Taylor house; Mott’s command in the center was to hold the rifle pits between the Taylor and Rainey houses. General Miles’ division on the left was to fall back into the trenches covering the Boydton Plank Road. Miles’ left flank rested on Gravelly Run, while his right flank held “the return.” This dispatch went out from Corps headquarters at 1:30 a.m.²⁰⁰

At the stipulated hour, Colonel Olmsted (whose brigade had been shifted to the left on the previous afternoon to occupy the rifle pits vacated by Pearson’s troops) mustered his command. By 6 o’clock, Olmsted’s had reported to General Hays. The division commander had Olmsted’s soldiers reoccupy the trenches on the left of McIvor’s brigade, which they had formerly held.²⁰¹

Throughout the morning and early afternoon, Hays’ division took it easy. At this time, Hays had two brigades—McIvor’s and Olmsted’s—in the trenches, and one in reserve, Smyth’s. About 2:00 p.m., Hays issued instructions for McIvor and Olmsted to see if they could advance their lines closer to the Confederate main line of resistance. Covered by a strong skirmish line, the two brigades pressed forward. The Confederate outposts were easily driven in. All told, the Yankees advanced their line about 300 yards. On the right, McIvor’s brigade was in contact with the XXIV Corps on the east side of Hatcher’s Run. To secure their gains, McIvor’s and Olmsted’s troops threw up a new line of earthworks. Smyth’s brigade moved and occupied the trenches recently vacated by Olmsted’s troops. The ground gained by Hays’ bluecoats on the afternoon of the 1st would be used by the division as its jumping off point when it moved against Fort Powell. The attack on that stronghold was scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on the 2nd.²⁰²

Mott’s division returned without any incident worthy of note to the position which it had held on the previous morning. Upon reoccupying the breastworks between the Rainey and Taylor houses, Mott placed McAllister’s and Pearce’s troops in the rifle pits; de Trobriand’s brigade was posted in reserve.²⁰³

Miles started pulling his troops from the ground which they had seized near the White Oak Road at 3:30 a.m. The Confederates made no effort to harass Miles’ infantrymen as they retired. Accordingly, the withdrawal went off as scheduled. When he reached the Boydton Plank Road, Miles placed Scott’s brigade on the left. Scott, who would protect the II Corps’ left flank, rested his left on Gravelly Run. Colonel Ramsey’s brigade held the rifle pits on the right of Scott’s command. The brigade commanded by Colonel Madill held “the return” on the right of Ramsey’s bluecoats. Madill’s right flank was in contact with McAllister’s left at the Rainey house. Miles’ other brigade, Nugent’s, was in reserve. During the day, Nugent’s command was called upon to furnish large fatigue details for work on the fortifications.²⁰⁴

Not wishing to entirely waste the day, Miles saw that his men were supplied with rations and ammunition. In addition, the brigade commanders were directed to inspect their units to insure that their men’s arms and accoutrements were in order.²⁰⁵

With the exception of one battery, the II Corps’ artillery was not engaged on the 1st. Shortly after daybreak, the cannoneers of Battery B, 1st Rhode Island positioned at the Crow house, opened fire on Fort Powell. The Rebels replied. After a short duel, the artillery fell silent. During the late afternoon, Battery B, 1st NewJersey was again placed in battery near the Rainey house. Since an uneasy quiet had settled over Humphreys’ sector, the V Corps’ artillery, which was temporarily attached to the II Corps, remained parked throughout the day.²⁰⁶

By the evening of the 31st, the last of the trains belonging to the Army of the Potomac had crossed Rowanty Creek. As soon as the last wagon had reached the west bank of the creek, General Mackenzie relayed this information to General Meade. At the same time, Mackenzie requested a fresh assignment.²⁰⁷

When Grant learned that Mackenzie’s division was looking for work, he ordered Ord to send the unit to Dinwiddie Court House.²⁰⁸ Upon the receipt of Grant’s telegram, Ord issued instructions for Mackenzie “to get off as soon in the morning as possible.” Grant was not satisfied with this move on Ord’s part. A terse message went out under Grant’s signature, “I want Mackenzie to go tonight. It may be too late in the morning.” Grant then informed Meade of his plans to rush Mackenzie to Sheridan’s assistance.²⁰⁹

It was too late, however, to change Mackenzie’s orders. Accordingly, Mackenzie’s division did not get under way until early on the morning of the 1st. It was about 3:30 o’clock when Mackenzie’s troopers broke camp and crossed Rowanty Creek. Marching by way of the Monk’s Neck and Vaughan Roads, the hard-riding troopers headed for Dinwiddie Court House.²¹⁰

Editor’s Conclusion

The Confederate cavalry and infantry attack on March 31 collapsed and tightly pressed the Union lines and, temporarily, at least, brought General Sheridan’s major offensive move west and north to a halt. The Rebels, however, as we shall see in the third and final Five Forks Campaign chapter that follows, were unable to take advantage of their tactical success because of heavy columns of Union infantry approaching their left flank from the east. This new threat forced General George Pickett to pull back before daybreak and strengthen the absolutely vital road junction known as Five Forks. It was imperative for the Confederates to maintain their grip on the logistics hub, which General Lee ordered Pickett to hold at all hazards.

___________

1 OR 46, pt. 3, 380.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 1116, 1122, 1128.

4 Ibid., 1129-1130, 1141, 1144, 1154, 1156.

5 Ibid., 1122; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 303; Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, United States War Department. It was published in Washington, D.C. by the Government Printing Office in 1891-95. Plate LXXIV, No. 2.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., pt. 1, 1144, 1148.

8 Ibid., 1141, 1144, 1148; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ‘65, 334.

9 Ibid., 1141, 1156.

10 Ibid., 1129-1130; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 303.

11 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3, 660; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65, 334; OR 46, pt. 1, 1299.

12 Ibid., 1148.

13 Walter Clark, ed., North Carolina Regiments, 640-641.

14 OR 46, pt. 3, 471.

15 Ibid., 473.

16 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 3, 339; Clark, North Carolina Regiments, vol. 3, 640-641.

17 OR 46, pt. 1, 1144; Clark, North Carolina Regiments, vol. 3, 471-473.

18 Ibid., 1148-1149; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ‘65, 334. Major Hart was killed in the fighting.

19 OR 46, pt. 1, 1148-1149.

20 Ibid., 1122, 1144, 1149.

21 Ibid., 1122; Atlas to Accompany the Official Records, Plate LXXIV, No. 2.

22 OR 46, pt. 1, 1122-1123; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 303.

23 OR 46, pt. 1, 1123, 1144, 1149.

24 Ibid., 1123,1299. Colonel Morgan was in temporary command of the brigade formerly led by Munford.

25 Ibid., 1123; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65, 335.

26 OR 46, pt. 1, 1123.

27 Ibid., 1117, 1123, 1144.

28 Ibid., 1117, 1123; Atlas to Accompany the Official Orders, Plate LXXIV, No. 2.

29 OR 46, pt. 1, 1117, 1123, 1144.

30 Ibid., 1102, 1128, 1130, 1154.

31 Ibid., 1154.

32 Ibid., 1128, 1154.

33 Ibid., 1130, 1134. Only two of Pennington’s regiments—the 2nd Ohio and the 3rd New Jersey—were formed into line of battle on the right of Adams Road. At this time, the 2nd Connecticut had not reached Dinwiddie Court House, and the 2nd New York was guarding the bridge that carried Boydton Plank Road across Stony Creek.

34 OR 46, pt. 1, 1157.

35 Ibid., 1157.

36 Ibid., 1130, 1134, 1157, 1299.

37 Ibid., 1130, 1134-1135.

38 Ibid., 1157.

39 Ibid., 1130; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65, 336.

40 OR 46, pt. 1, 1142, 1155, 1157; Atlas to Accompany the Official Records, Plate LXXIV, No. 2.

41 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3, 660; OR 46, pt. 1, 1268.

42 OR 46, pt. 3, 381.

43 Porter, “Five Forks and the Pursuit of Lee,” 710-711.

44 OR 46, pt. 3, 301.

45 OR 46, pt. 3, 334; Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 34. On the evening of March 30, Grant moved his headquarters to Dabney’s Mill. Meade’s headquarters at this time were on the Vaughan Road, in the triangle formed by the road, Generally Run, and a small tributary of the Run.

46 OR 46, pt. 3, 335.

47 Ibid., 335, 368; pt. 1, 868.

48 Ibid., pt. 3, 368.

49 Ibid., 370; pt. 1, 812.

50 Ibid., pt. 1, 812.

51 Ibid., 759, 766; pt. 3, 346.

52 Ibid., pt. 1, 766.

53 Ibid., 710, 714, 719, 724. Ramsey’s brigade occupied the trenches on the left; Madill’s those on the right.

54 Ibid., 791. The four guns of Battery K, 4th U.S. Light Artillery and the four 3-inch rifles of Battery M, 1st New Hampshire Light Artillery were emplaced near the Rainey house; the four 12-pounder Napoleons manned by Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, were unlimbered near the Crow house.

55 OR 46, pt. 3, 346.

56 Ibid., 346, 361.

57 Ibid., 335, 346, 361.

58 Ibid., 346-347, 361. Lieutenant Colonel Welcome A. Crafts of the 5th New Hampshire was in charge of Miles’ combat patrol.

59 Ibid., 361.

60 Ibid., 335, 374.

61 OR 46, pt. 1, 813.

62 Ibid.

63 OR 46, pt. 3, 369.

64 Ibid., 304; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 315.

65 OR 46, pt. 3, 285; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 315.

66 OR 46, pt. 3, 285-286; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 315-316.

67 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 33-34.

68 OR 46, pt. 1, 1287-1288.

69 Ibid., 813; pt. 3, 362; Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 368.

70 OR 46, pt. 3, 362.

71 Ibid., pt. 1, 868; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 224.

72 OR 46, pt. 1, 868, 873. From right to left, Winthrop’s battle line was formed as follows: the 146 th New York, 5 th New York, and 15th New York Heavy Artillery.

73 Ibid., 875.

74 Ibid., 874; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 224

75 OR 46, pt. 1, 883, 892, 896.

76 Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 568.

77 OR 46, pt. 1, 899.

78 Ibid., 883, 868, 892, 896.

79 Ibid., 873; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 225; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 319.

80 Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 34; OR 46, pt. 1, 1287-1288; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 227.

81 OR 46, pt. 1, 871, 875.

82 Ibid., 871, 875; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 321.

83 OR 46, pt. 1, 875.

84 Ibid., 869, 874; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 227.

85 OR 46, pt. 1, 896; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 227. The wounded officers were: Major Dennis R. Dailey of the 147th New York, Lieutenant Colonel Horatio N. Warren, of the 142nd Pennsylvania, and Major Henry H. Fish of the 54th New York.

86 OR 46, pt. 1, 1288; Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 34.

87 Porter, “Operation of the Fifth Corps,” 227-228; Alfred S. Roe, The Thirty-Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers: 1862-1865 (Worcester, 1914), 281.

88 OR 46, pt. 1, 892.

89 Ibid., 884, 886-887.

90 Ibid., 814, 887; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 228; Roe, The Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts, 282.

91 OR 46, pt. 1, 814, 846; Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 569. Griffin was mistaken on one point: Ayres’ shattered division reached the run ahead of Crawford’s. Chamberlain’s brigade was deployed on the left of Griffin’s line.

92 OR 46, pt. 1, 899.

93 Ibid., 815; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 228.

94 Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 569-570. Colonel William Sergeant of the 210th Pennsylvania was mortally wounded by a Confederate sharpshooter.

95 OR 46, pt. 1, 677, 815; pt. 3, 348.

96 Ibid., 710, 714, 745, 750-751. The 145th and 183d Pennsylvania had been detailed to corduroy the Dabney Mill road; the 64th New York was on outpost duty.

97 Ibid, 710,734, 736, 738, 740. Captain AlbertF. Petersonof the 64th New Yorkand about 50 of his men rejoined the brigade in time to participate in the second advance across the run.

98 Ibid., 710, 734, 745. Before the day’s fighting was over, Madill’s brigade had captured 124 prisoners, and Ramsey’s 160.

99 Ibid., 1288; Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 34. When Johnson’s troops took position covering the White Oak Road, McGowan was on the right, Hunton in the center, and Stansel on the left.

100 OR 46, pt. 1, 710, 714, 719.

101 Ibid., pt. 3, 348.

102 Ibid., 374.

103 Ibid., 347.

104 Ibid., pt. 1, 781.

105 Ibid., 710-711, 714, 740. As soon as Scott’s unit overtook the division, the 5th New Hampshire rejoined the brigade.

106 Ibid., 711, 714.

107 Ibid., 776, 781.

108 Ibid., 776, 781, 785. In this attack, Pierce’s combat team suffered 16 casualties: two dead and 14 wounded.

109 Ibid., 776, 788.

110 Ibid., 766. A line of outposts were stationed in the edge of the woods fronting Fort Powell by General Smyth.

111 Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘65, 333.

112 OR 46, pt. 1, 791. Battery B, 1st New Jersey remained on Miles’ front a very short time. At midnight, the gunners limbered up their pieces and returned to the Boydton Plank Road. The pieces were then parked.

113 Ibid., 785, 788.

114 Ibid., pt. 3, 362.

115 Ibid., pt. 1, 815.

116 Ibid., pt. 3, 362-363.

117 Ibid., pt. 1, 815.

118 William H. Powell, The Fifth Corps (New York, 1896), 783; Survivors’ Association’, The Corn Exchange Regiment, 570.

119 OR 46, pt. 1, 849. The 198th Pennsylvania was in front, and the 185th New York was in support.

120 Ibid., 853.

121 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 229-230; Powell, The Fifth Corps, 783.

122 OR 46, pt. 1, 849; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 230.

123 OR 46, pt. 1, 849, 863; Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 230; Powell, The Fifth Corps, 784. Chamberlain’s brigade lost “not more than 75” men in this attack. Along with the colors of the 56th Virginia, the Federals captured 135 Confederates.

124 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 321-322.

125 OR 46, pt. 1, 1288; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘65, 334.

126 Freeman, R E. Lee, vol. 4, 35.

127 Porter, “Operations of the Fifth Corps,” 230-231; OR 46, pt. 1, 816.

128 OR 46, pt. 1, 816; Powell, The Fifth Corps, 784.

129 OR 46, pt. 3, 363.

130 Ibid., pt. 1, 677, 819, 1288.

131 OR 46, pt. 1, 817.

132 Ibid., 817, 821; Charles H. Porter, “The Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, VI, 239; Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, 571-572. Bartlett’s was the largest brigade in Griffin’s division. At this time, Bartlett’s brigade mustered nearly 2,500 officers and men. So far, in the Five Forks campaign, Bartlett’s troops had not been seriously engaged. Three of Bartlett’s regiments, however, were on detached duty at the time that the brigade was ordered to march to Sheridan’s assistance.

133 Porter, “The Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 239-240; OR 46, pt. 1, 821.

134 Porter, “The Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 240.

135 Ibid., OR 46, pt. 1, 821.

136 Ibid., pt. 3, 363.

137 Ibid., 364.

138 Ibid., 338, 364.

139 Ibid., 817, 818, 820. The Plank Road was the direct route over which Sheridan communicated with Grant. It seems almost incredible that news that the bridge across Gravelly Run was out had not reached Grant’s GHQ. Undoubtedly it had. On March 29, 30, and the early part of the 31st, staff officers and couriers were continually crossing the run and it was fordable. It had started to rain on the 30th and continued until the next afternoon. Streams that were easily passed on the 29th and 30th became difficult to cross on the 31st. Porter, “Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 243-244.

140 OR 46, pt. 3, 364. By this time, Warren had thoroughly reconnoitered the Confederate defenses covering the White Oak Road. He informed headquarters, “We can see the enemy’s breast-works for two miles east along the White Oak Road. If they are well manned they cannot be carried. I’m within 200 yards of where they turn off north from the White Oak Road.”

141 Ibid.,pt. 1, 818. It was about four and one-half miles from Mrs. Wilson’s to Meade’s GHQ. Grant’s headquarters were at Dabney’s Mill, four miles from Warren’s. About five and one-half miles separated Warren’s and Sheridan’s command posts. Grant’s, Meade’s, and Warren’s former headquarters on the Quaker Road were connected by telegraph. The only contact between Sheridan’s headquarters at Dinwiddie Court House and the other command posts was by courier.

142 Ibid., pt. 3, 338-339.

143 Ibid., 339, 340.

144 Ibid.; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 337.

145 OR 46, pt. 3, 364.

146 Ibid., 364-365.

147 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 338.

148 OR 46, pt. 1, 818.

149 Ibid., pt. 3, 365.

150 Ibid., 365-366. Meade informed Grant that he had ordered Warren to carry out the plan of operations advanced by the lieutenant general commanding.

151 OR 46, pt. 1, 820.

152 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 341.

153 OR 46, pt. 3, 366.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid., pt. 1, 820.

156 Ibid., pt. 3, 366.

157 Ibid., pt. 1, 821.

158 OR 46, pt. 3, 341.

159 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign.” 343-344.

160 OR 46, pt. 3, 342.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid., 381.

163 Ibid., 367.

164 Ibid., pt. 1, 821-822.

165 Ibid., pt. 3, 367, 417. Throughout the night, there had been a continual delay in the passage of orders between Meade’s and Warren’s headquarters. Colonel Swan attributed the lag to the fact that the telegraph line ended at Warren’s former command post on the Quaker Road. Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 345.

166 OR 46, pt. 1, 822.

167 Ibid., The staff officers present included: Col. Henry C. Bankhead, Majs. William T. Gentry and Emmor B. Cope, Capts. William H. H. Benyaurd, James W. Wadsworth, and Gordon Winslow.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid., 822-823.

170 Ibid., pt. 3, 351.

171 Ibid., 351, 352.

172 Ibid., pt. 1, 823.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid., pt. 3, 367.

175 Ibid., 342-343.

176 Ibid., pt. 1, 823-824; Powell, The Fifth Army Corps, 794.

177 OR 46, pt. 1, 824.

178 Ibid.

179 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 363-364. During the halt, cattle were butchered and the beef distributed.

180 Ibid., 364; OR 46, pt. 1, 824.

181 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 364; OR 46, pt. 1, 869, 876. Bowerman’s brigade brought up the rear of Ayres’ column.

182 Ibid., 364-365; OR 46, pt. 1, 869, 871, 874, 876. The 8th Maryland was one of the regiments which Ayres deployed and threw forward as skirmishers.

183 OR 46, pt. 3, 419-420.

184 Ibid., pt. 1, 824.

185 Ibid., Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 371.

186 OR 46, pt. 1, 846, 863.

187 Ibid., 854; Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 371.

188 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 371; OR 46, pt. 1, 846, 849; Porter, “Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 246.

189 OR 46, pt. 1, 879-880, 885, 889, 896; Porter, “Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 246-247.

190 OR 46, pt. 1, 825.

191 Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 371; Survivors’ Association, History of the Corn Regiment, 575-576.

192 Powell, The Fifth Army Cojrps, 798.

193 Ibid., Swan, “The Five Forks Campaign,” 371.

194 Porter, “Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 247; OR 46, pt. 1, 825-826.

195 OR 46, pt. 1, 385.

196 Powell, The Fifth Army Corps, 794.

197 OR 46, pt. 3, 418. Commenting on the Confederate failure to attack his corps as it was disengaging, Warren observed: “It was a matter of wonder at the time, and has been ever since, how the enemy permitted our thus withdrawing with out following us up to see the way we took, even if it had been with only a regiment. He would thus early have gained the knowledge that our infantry was moving toward his detached force, under General Pickett, which we beat so badly toward evening. General Lee could then have re-enforced his detached troops or timely warned them to withdraw. I kept my skirmish line halted a long while after my advance set out in the morning, so as to cover the movement as late as possible, and deployed my escort to fall back on the Boydton Plank Road and delude any pursuing forces, if possible, into the belief that we had all retired in that direction. It was a want of vigilance that was most rare on their part and betokened that apathy which results from a hopelessness as to the use of further resistance”. Ibid., pt. 1, 826.

198 Ibid., 829; Porter, “Fifth Corps at the Battle of Five Forks,” 247-248.

199 OR 46, pt. 3,419. The three Michiganders were: W. M. Cronkite, A. McCrory, and William Stubel.

200 Ibid., 411.

201 OR 46, pt. 1, 760, 762.

202 Ibid., 757, 760, 762, 764, 766; pt. 3, 411.

203 Ibid., pt. 1, 777, 781, 785, 789. Pearce’s brigade was stationed on the right and McAllister’s on the left.

204 Ibid., 711, 714, 724, 734, 744.

205 Ibid., 745.

206 Ibid., 791-792, 899.

207 Ibid., pt. 3, 382.

208 Ibid., 378.

209 Ibid., 341, 378.

210 Ibid., pt. 1, 1244.