Chapter 4
The VI Corps Scores a Breakthrough
April 2, 1865
Editor’s Introduction
Shortly after 8:00 p.m., as soon as he learned of Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan’s victory at Five Forks, Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant informed Maj. Gen. George Meade of Sheridan’s success and added, “Humphreys must push now, or everything will leave his front and be concentrated against Sheridan. Inform Parke of this and tell him to be on the watch to go in.”1
At this hour the assault columns of the various corps had not been formed for a 4:00 a.m. attack Grant wished to launch. Meade replied, “In pursuance to your instructions orders have been sent to Humphreys to assault at 4 a.m. tomorrow.... Do you mean he is to attack tonight? Orders were sent to both Wright and Parke to morrow at 4 a.m. . . . Your last dispatch says “Parke should be notified to watch. Do you mean his orders are to be changed?”2
Grant replied, “Generals Wright and Parke should both be directed to feel for a chance through the enemy’s lines at once, and if they can get through should push on to-night. All our batteries might be opened at once, and if they can get through should push on to-night.”3
Twenty-five minutes later Grant told Meade, “I believe with a bombardment beforehand the enemy will abandon his works. If not pursued Sheridan may find everything against him.” Humphreys, added Grant, should press forward his skirmishers and attack if the Rebels were found leaving their trenches. If the enemy continued to hold their lines, he added, Humphreys should send Miles’s division down the White Oak Road to reinforce Sheridan. Parke, Wright, and Ord, meanwhile, should open their artillery and push skirmishers forward and attack if the enemy gave way.4
Meade’s corps commanders and Ord reported it was so dark that their men could not see well enough to move forward. In fact, the Confederates did not abandon their positions and turn on Sheridan. The Union guns opened about 10:00 p.m. and the bombardment of Lee’s lines lasted until 2:00 a.m. The infantry assaults that followed began about 4:30 a.m., thirty minutes behind schedule.
The night of April 1 found Maj. Gen. George Pickett’s defeated forces scattered and disorganized. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Gens. Rooney Lee and Tom Munford joined Fitzhugh Lee at Church’s Crossing, near the Ford Road junction with the South Side Railroad. Fitz Lee informed his uncle, army commander Robert E. Lee, of the defeat at Five Forks, and General Lee then sent Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s infantry to join Fitz Lee and help Pickett reassemble his command and hold the critical Southside Railroad. Leaving only a small force behind, Anderson abandoned his position at Burgess Mill at 6:30 p.m. and marched west while staying north of Hatcher’s Run. Anderson joined Fitz Lee at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of April 2. The Army of Northern Virginia’s intention was to defend the Southside Railroad at Sutherland’s Station with Maj. Gen. Bushrod Johnson’s division, Brig. Gen. Eppa Hunton’s brigade of Pickett’s division, and the fugitives from Pickett’s command.5
That same evening of April 1, two divisions of Warren’s V Corps spent the night deployed across the White Oak Road near Gravelly Run Church. His third division camped near the Ford Road. Sheridan’s cavalry camped on the Gilliam Farm near Five Forks while Mackenzie’s cavalry from the Army of the James bivouacked near the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher’s Run. Later that evening, Sheridan was joined by Miles’s division of Humphreys’s II Corps, directed there by General Grant to block any Confederate advance from Burgess Mill with the goal of hitting Sheridan’s right flank on the White Oak Road. The II Corps’s other two divisions faced Confederate defenses held by Lee’s army.
Late that night after informing Sheridan he was sending him Miles’ division, Grant also told the cavalry commander of his plans to attack Lee’s lines at Petersburg at 4:00 a.m. He ended his message by adding, “From your isolated position I can give you no specific directions but leave you to act according to circumstances. I would like you however to get something done to the South Side road even if they do not tear up a mile of it.” Sheridan replied to Grant at 12:30 a.m. that he intended to sweep the White Oak Road and all north of it down to Petersburg.6
Part I
Wright Prepares to Strike
Shortly after 4:00 p.m. on April 1, 1865, the telegraph operator in Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright’s VI Corps headquarters jotted down a message which came over the wire from General Meade’s headquarters: General Wright was to assault the works to his front at 4:00 a.m. Should this attack prove successful, Wright was to be prepared to “follow it up with all the force under . . . [his] command, except the garrisons of the enclosed works and supports to the batteries” which he had in the lines. After carrying the Rebel defenses, Wright’s troops were to push for the Boydton Plank Road and endeavor to establish contact with the assaulting columns to their right and left. It would be left up to Wright, since he was familiar with the area, to determine where the blow would fall. Wright was advised that the units to his right and left—the IX Corps and the Army of the James—were to launch simultaneous attacks.7
Having been alerted some 48 hours before that a major push was impending, General Wright and his staff were already working out a plan of attack. Wright was careful in selecting the point to be assailed. Besides making a personal reconnaissance of the VI Corps front, Wright interviewed dozens of officers who were familiar with the Rebel fortifications opposite Forts Fisher and Welch. At this point, the Union earthworks jutted to within 5,000 feet of the Petersburg perimeter.
On March 25, Wright had undertaken a limited offensive in the Fort Fisher sector to support the Union counterattack on Fort Stedman. Soldiers of the VI Corps had advanced, captured, and held an entrenched picket line approximately halfway between Forts Fisher and Welch and the Petersburg defenses. After they were refaced, these rifle pits would allow Union storming parties to execute a covered approach to within 2,500 feet of the Confederate trenches.8
The ground between the lines in the Fort Fisher area had been cleared of trees and offered “few natural obstructions, “except for the marshes which “intersected the Rebs’ front. The sector to be assailed was near the VI Corps left flank. Northeast of the Fort Fisher salient, the area fronting the Confederate works was inundated, while beyond the flooded area was the formidable belt of fortifications centering on the lead-works.” In Wright’s opinion, an attack in those sectors was out of the question.
When the Federal generals studied the works in front of Fort Fisher through their glasses, they saw that they consisted of an “extraordinary strong line of rifle pits, with deep ditches and higher relief.” To reach the Southerners main line of resistance, Wright and his staff calculated their men would have to feel their way through one or two lines of abatis. A number of redoubts in which artillery was emplaced were pinpointed along this line at strategic spots. Wright recalled that the Confederate officers might look upon the works as impregnable. Subsequent to the assault, Wright noted, “but for the successes of the 25th ultimo, in which the corps carried the entrenched picket-line of the enemy . . . the attack of the 2nd . . . could not have been successful.”9
Having selected the area where his attack would be delivered, Wright addressed a circular outlining his battle plan to his division commanders. The assault would be made at 4:00 a.m. on the Confederate defenses between the Jones house and the corps’ left flank. Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton’s division was to take the right; Brig. Gen. George W. Getty’s division the center; and Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour’s division the left. In forming, Getty’s troops would be in advance, and Wheaton’s and Seymour’s en echelon. The division commanders were to mass their units by brigades with regimental fronts. Understrength regiments would be consolidated so as not to extend the column too much. Division commanders were to form their units as near the picket line as practicable, and advance when the signal gun at Fort Fisher was discharged. When they organized their columns of attack, Wright recommended that Wheaton form his division “left in front,” and Seymour “right in front, so as to deploy to the right and left, if the need arose.”
The picket line would be advanced at the same time. If feasible, the skirmishers were to enter the Rebel works. Where checked by the fire of the Confederates, the pickets were to take cover, blaze away, and endeavor to pin down the grey clads posted in the trenches.
Troops occupying the fortifications from Fort Howard to Fort Urmston were to be cut to the minimum, as would the garrisons charged with the defense of Forts Gregg, Sampson, and Cummings. The force holding the rifle pits linking these works was to be reduced by nine-tenths, while the trenches connecting Forts Urmston and Gregg were to be abandoned.
Five four-gun batteries: Battery E, 5th U.S. Light Artillery; the 1st and 3rd Batteries, New York Light Artillery; and Batteries G and H, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery were to accompany the attacking force. Of these units, a battery would be assigned to each division. The other two would be held in reserve. The three other batteries of the corps were to remain in the works to the right of Fort Fisher and to the left of Fort Gregg. Commanders of these units were to look to corps Chief of Artillery Capt. Andrew Cowan for instructions.10
Pioneers would accompany the vanguard of each assaulting column; their task was to cut a path through the abatis and any other obstructions encountered. Sharpshooters were to be deployed where they would do the most good.
Troops left to occupy the investment line would be alerted to hold themselves ready to repulse Confederate counterattacks, or to rejoin their units in case the desired breakthrough was achieved.
Units slated to participate in the onslaught were to be put into motion for the marshalling area “tonight,” so that they could “complete” their formation before 4:00 a.m. Wright cautioned his subordinates that “perfect silence” was mandatory until the moment the signal gun was discharged.
Should the VI Corps succeed in breaching the Rebel line and gaining the Boydton Plank Road, its subsequent movements would be made in conformity with orders from General Meade.11
The sweeping victory scored by Sheridan’s command at Five Forks late on the afternoon of April 1st, caused General Grant to pressure Meade to start offensive operations east of Hatcher’s Run at an earlier hour than scheduled.
At 8:40 p.m., Grant notified Meade that the VI and IX Corps should “be directed to feel for a chance to get through the enemy’s lines at once.” If they found an opening, they were to “push on tonight.” “All our batteries,” Grant observed, “might be opened at once without waiting” for the assault columns to get into position. Meade was to inform his corps commanders of the rout of the Five Forks Confederates.12
At 9:00 p.m., General Meade notified the commanders of his II, VI, and IX Corps that General Sheridan’s cavalry and the V Corps had driven the Confederates from Five Forks, “capturing several batteries, over 4,000 prisoners, and numerous trains.” To keep the Rebels from rushing reinforcements to restore the situation in the Five Forks sector, Meade wanted the three corps commanders to feel the Southerners’ lines to their front. If the opportunity presented itself, they were to “push on tonight.” The II, VI, and IX Corps artillery was to start hammering the Rebs’ works, without waiting for the assaulting columns to form.
Major General Horatio G. Wright
Library of Congress
Wright moved to see that his superior’s instructions were carried out. Orders were issued for the artillery to open and the skirmish line to advance. Staff officers were sent to direct Wheaton and Getty to have their divisions move out and be ready to attack. Seymour’s division was alerted to be ready to support this thrust.13
It was almost 10:00 p.m. when Captain Cowan received instructions from General Wright “to open fire on the enemy’s lines with all the batteries.” Cowan relayed this news to his subordinates. A “moderate” bombardment was commenced and continued for about three hours. The Federal cannoneers pointed their pieces at the area where it was known that the Rebels were in the habit of posting their pickets.14
Meanwhile, at 9:05 p.m., Grant telegraphed Meade that in view of the Confederate disaster at Five Forks, he felt that a bombardment might compel the grey clads to abandon their Petersburg fortifications. If they were not pressed, Grant feared that General Lee might concentrate an overwhelming force against Sheridan. Maj. Gen. John G. Parke and Horatio Wright were to put their artillery into action and push forward their pickets and sharpshooters. If Lee had started to pull his butternuts out of the Petersburg defenses, the VI and IX Corps were to “push directly after him.”15
Thirty minutes later, Meade notified Wright and Parke that he was forced to modify his 9:00 p.m. order. As Grant had directed, they were to bombard the Rebel lines and make a forced reconnaissance of the works to their front. If it were discovered that the Confederates were withdrawing troops to counterattack Sheridan, they were to go after them.
At 10:05 p.m., Wright acknowledged the receipt of Meade’s 9:00 and 9:35 p.m. dispatches, and informed headquarters of the steps he had taken to carry out Meade’s 9:00 p.m. directive.
Prior to the receipt of Wright’s latest dispatch, Meade’s Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb, addressed a note to Wright, “Assault as you please,” the chief of staff wrote, “but feel with your skirmishers and batteries . . . while you are preparing your columns.”16 Webb handed the message to Capt. William S. Worth, who placed it in Wright’s hands a little before 11:00 p.m.
Before acknowledging the communication, Wright issued a circular addressed to his division commanders and Chief of Artillery Cowan. They were again informed that the assaulting columns would be formed as directed and held ready to advance at 4:00 p.m. The battery which had been sent out in front of the lines to shell the Confederates, in accordance with Grant’s orders, was to be recalled before the troops formed. At the same time, the pickets would cease firing.17
Wright was taken aback as he studied Webb’s paper. He felt that Webb was chiding him for not being ready to attack sooner. Replying, Wright assured Webb that everything would be ready, and the VI Corps would “go in solid.” Wright was confident that when they went in, his troops would make “the fur fly.” Since his division commanders were familiar with Meade’s battle plan, Wright assured Webb, there would “be no hesitation from want of knowledge of what is expected.” If his troops did half as well as he expected, they would crack the Rebs line 15 minutes after he had said go, Wright added.
After reading Wright’s telegram, Meade sought to calm his corps commander’s ruffled feelings. Meade informed Wright that he was “quite sick, and trusted to General Webb to attend to matters.” He accordingly wished to apologize for the tenor of Webb’s 10:15 p.m. dispatch, which had been composed when headquarters was under the impression that Wright didn’t intend to attack until 4:00 a.m., as previously ordered.18
A copy of Meade’s 9:00 p.m. message to his corps commanders took 50 minutes to reach General Grant’s Dabney’s Mill headquarters. When he looked at it, Grant was disgusted to see that Meade had misinterpreted his instructions. Grant had never intended for Wright and Parke to attack “without forming assault lines.” They were to have their batteries open fire and “feel out with skirmishers and sharpshooters if the enemy is leaving, and attack in their own way.”19
At 11:45 p.m., Wright reported to Meade that the VI Corp’s artillery had gone into action and that there was firing on the picket line. The division commanders were busy forming their “assault columns” and would attack at 4:00 a.m. It would be impossible, Wright notified Meade, for his generals to get the troops massed in time to step up the timetable. Unless he received orders to the contrary, Wright would send his troops forward as scheduled.20
General Meade relayed Wright’s “will make fur fly” dispatch to Grant’s headquarters. On doing so, Meade pointed out that Wright’s preparations were made “in accordance with his original order.” These plans, Meade noted, he had approved and if given the go ahead, he would order the VI Corps to carry them out.
Grant liked the way Wright talked. Replying to Meade’s communication, Grant instructed Meade to let Wright proceed as originally planned.21
Because Meade had retired for the night, at 12:25 a.m., Chief of Staff Webb notified Wright that General Grant was responsible for the orders for the VI Corps to assault “as soon as possible.” The orders from the Army of the Potomac headquarters had been drafted in spirit. Webb urged Wright to attack as early as he could “with any hope of success.”
Sixty-five minutes later, Webb notified Wright and Parke that the storming columns were to move forward at 4:00 a.m. All orders conflicting with this time were suspended.22
* * *
Upon the receipt of the orders from Meade directing that the artillery be put into action and forced reconnaissance undertaken of the Rebel works, Wright transmitted copies to his division commanders and Chief of Artillery Cowan. In a covering memorandum, he urged the officers to closely examine the ground over which their assaulting columns were to march. When they did, they were cautioned to be careful not to attract the grey clads’ attention. Since it could be fatal for the Union plans if intelligence of the preparations reached the foe, Wright cautioned his division commanders to make certain that “only reliable men” were detailed for outpost duty. If any soldiers of questionable loyalty were on the picket lines they were to be relieved.23
Wright’s three division commanders issued confidential instructions to the leaders of their brigades on steps that would be taken to guarantee the success of the projected assault. General Wheaton announced that his division (the First) would be massed near Fort Fisher inside the works with Joseph H. Hamblin’s 2nd Brigade bringing up the rear. The brigades were to be en-echelon. Each brigade commander to cover his front with a skirmish line, which was to “extend a sufficient distance to the right of each brigade front to more than cover and protect its flank.”
No less than 35 axes to be carried by the advance line of each brigade, with which to assist the pioneers in hewing a way through the abatis.
In the advance, the brigades were to preserve a sufficient interval to prevent the front line of one from mingling with the rear rank of another. The lines in each brigade were to be kept well apart, not less than 50 paces, and one line should not crowd another. The interval between lines could be increased to conform to the character of the ground. It would probably be necessary for Col. Oliver Edwards’ unit to march more rapidly than Penrose’s and Hamblin’s. Should the troops of General Getty’s division gain ground to the right or left in advance, Colonel Edwards would have to conform to their movements.
After storming the trenches to his front, Col. Edwards was to hold them and make such disposition with his right flank as would assist in Penrose’s troops in entering the rifle pits to his right. Penrose’s bluecoats were to assist Hamblin’s soldiers in the same fashion. If any of the brigades, upon approaching the Confederate works, found the ditch in their front impassable, its commander was to halt his front line, have it engage the foe, and move his other lines to the right or left and probe for a soft spot.
No lights were to be permitted or matches struck after the division had debouched from the main works. Noise would be curtailed. Orders were to be given in a “low tone.” General Wheaton recommended that the troops constituting the second and third assault waves not be allowed to cap their pieces. The division sharpshooters were to report to Colonel Edwards.24
Getty and Seymour issued similar instructions to their brigade commanders.
* * *
It was a little before midnight when General Getty’s troops marched from the division camps. The soldiers moved in light marching order, leavinag their canteens and knapsacks behind. A detachment from the 61st Pennsylvania remained behind to garrison Fort Urmston; the 62nd New York held Forts Tracy and Keene.25
* * *
A soldier in the Vermont Brigade reported:
The night of April 1st was dark, damp, chilly and gloomy. All was quiet along the line of the corps, although preparations were quietly going on. Tents were struck, personal effects which had accumulated, were assorted, the greater part of which were cast aside. Ammunition was served, knapsacks packed and left on the ground to be taken in charge by the Quartermaster. Haversacks were filled, muskets loaded, but uncapped, bayonets fixed. The special orders were read to each company, after which the commander reported that all was in readiness.26
* * *
According to regimental historian Penrose G. Mark of the 93rd Pennsylvania: The ranking officers of the regiment: Captains B. Frank Hean and P. G. Mark, along with the other regimental commanders were called to Col. James M. Warner’s headquarters. After Warner read Wright’s orders to the assembled officers, he dismissed them. It was after 10:00 p.m. when Hean and Mark returned to their camp. Instructions for the troops to get ready were issued. Within a few minutes, the soldiers were busy making the usual preparations for going into battle: short letters were written and messages given to non-combatants to be sent home “in case of accidents.” Useless clothing and playing cards were dispensed with, and as little as possible packed in the knapsacks. Some more careful than others, wrote their names, company, and regiment on pieces of paper and pinned them on their blouses, so as to be identified if killed. Cartridge boxes and canteens were filled and muskets carefully examined; rations were packed in haversacks; and the inevitable wooden pipe and tobacco bag were carefully placed where they could be as easily reached as cartridges.
Brigadier General George W. Getty
Library of Congress
Finally at midnight the word came to Captain Hean “to form on the regimental parade ground without noise; to join the brigade (Warner’s) and move out between the enemy’s line and ours in front of Fisher.” While the regiment was forming at midnight, knapsacks were collected and placed under guard at the fort. In the dark and damp of the early morning, the smoke from the artillery hung like “huge clouds near the ground deepened the obscurity and made our movements somewhat slow.”27
* * *
Getty’s column passed the breastworks and abatis to the right and left of Fort Welch through openings cut for that purpose. After hiking about one-half mile, the division halted in rear of the captured rifle pits. Here, Getty massed his brigades in columns by regiments. From the area where Getty marshaled his brigades, a slight ravine ran toward the Rebel line, 650 yards away. The ravine and the ground on either side to Getty’s front had been covered with pines. These trees had been cut for fuel during the winter; the stumps and brush remaining, with water standing in the lower spots. At the point where the ravine passed through the Confederate works, there was a gap about 50 feet across. To cover this opening, the Rebs had placed several cannons in redoubts on the rising ground on either side of the ravine.28
* * *
Brigadier General Lewis A. Grant’s Vermont brigade rested its left on the ravine; the other units in the advance would guide on the men from the Green Mountain State.29 By 1:00 a.m., Grant had completed his dispositions, and the troops were told to lie down while the other units were forming.30 Col. Thomas W. Hyde’s 3rd Brigade was posted on Grant’s right,31 while Colonel Warner’s brigade was on the extreme right. As Warner’s men filed into position, they were fired on by Confederate pickets and several men were cut down.32 Even so, “not a word was heard, men standing shoulder to shoulder were silent, as men by their side were hit. This inability to return the fire of the Rebs was ‘misery intensified to the men.’”33
* * *
Getty told his brigade commanders that when the advance began, they were “to force their way through all opposition and obstructions into the enemy’s works.” After carrying the Confederates’ position, the troops were to be halted, reformed, and held ready to cope with any emergency.34
* * *
For nearly four hours Getty’s soldiers were called to lie on their arms on “the cold, damp ground, awaiting the time when the booming gun from Fort Fisher should signal them to charge, drive home that mighty wedge of humanity, strike to the very heart of the Confederacy and to the life blood of treason and rebellion.”35
* * *
General Wheaton’s division moved out of its camps near the Weldon Railroad at 10:30 p.m. One of the soldiers recalled that at that hour “the moon was shining brightly, and the night was calm and beautiful, only disturbed by occasional discharges of artillery and the plunging and bursting of shells.” Penrose’s column, after marching about one and one-half miles, halted briefly near Globe Tavern. About midnight, “the moon went down,” and the artillery roared into action. This cannonade, one of the soldiers described, as “surpassing all we had before witnessed.”36
* * *
The troops were halted in rear of Fort Fisher to allow Getty to complete his dispositions. As soon as Getty’s division was out of the way, Wheaton led the way through the works. The 3rd Brigade, Colonel Edwards commanding, was massed in column of assault in three lines, 22 paces to the right and rear of Getty’s left flank brigade. Seventy-five volunteers from the 37th Massachusetts armed with Spencer Repeating Rifles were deployed as skirmishers to cover the brigade front. Besides the 20 axmen from the pioneers, Edwards saw that a number of men in his front were issued axes to assist the pioneers in cutting a path through the obstructions. While forming, Edwards’ bluecoats were harassed by the fire of the Confederate pickets.37
* * *
Colonel Penrose deployed the New Jersey Brigade in four lines, 30 paces behind to the right of Edwards’ unit;38 Colonel Hamblin’s troops took position in double line of battle, 30 paces to the right and rear of Penrose’s. A detachment of sharpshooters from the 49th Pennsylvania armed with Spencers was deployed as skirmishers on Hamblin’s right. Looking to their left and rear, Hamblin’s soldiers saw Fort Fisher silhouetted against the skyline.39
* * *
Clinton Beckwith of the 121st New York noted in his diary that his regiment had “scarcely gotten into position when we were ordered to lie down.” About this time the pickets began shooting, as Beckwith supposed to cover the noise of our forming, and we were treated to the sensation of lying upon a field for a long time exposed to the fire of the enemy’s skirmishers without any shelter. Every once in a while some one would get hit with a ball, and we could hear his cry of anguish as the lead tore through. Finally our men, by stopping their fire and crying, “April Fool, Johnnies,” restored quiet, and for a long time we lay perfectly quiet, waiting for the time to come when we could move forward. There was some firing away to our right but not more than usual.40
* * *
Brigadier General Truman Seymour
Library of Congress
It was after midnight before General Seymour’s two-brigade division marched through the works. As the head of the column approached the area where the division was to deploy, the soldiers came under fire. “By some mischance or misapprehension,” the Union outposts posted in this area commenced shooting at the Confederate pickets. The grey clads retaliated and the Feds got the worst of this exchange, as the Southerners’ missiles swept through the “dense masses” behind the pickets. A number of men were killed or wounded. Union officers feared that their massed units would open fire. If this happened, it would “seriously interfere with, if not break up, the plan of attack.”
* * *
The shooting spread to the right and along Getty’s front, where a number of officers were cut down. In Colonel Hyde’s brigade, the losses were especially serious—two regimental commanders were mortally wounded and carried to the rear. General Grant was struck in the head and compelled to turn over command of the Vermont brigade to his senior regimental commander—Lt. Col. Amasa S. Tracy of the 2nd Vermont. In the end, however, the officers got control of the situation and everything quieted down. Generals Wright and Seymour were impressed with the way their men behaved, for they stood the fire “without returning a shot or uttering a word to indicate their presence to the enemy.”
Colonel J. Warren Keifer’s brigade was massed into column of assault in rear of the rifle pits captured on March 25. Keifer’s right flank rested on “an almost impassable swamp and ravine.” On the opposite side of the ravine was the Vermont brigade. As if the sniping of the grey clad sharpshooters wasn’t bad enough, the “deep darkness and the deep swamps” plagued Keifer’s bluecoats.41
* * *
Colonel William S. Truex’s brigade of Seymour’s division reached the ground it was to occupy at 12:30 a.m. To his front, Truex made out through the gloom of the Union outposts, while to his rear he could see the outline of Fort Welch. Truex formed his brigade in three lines of battle to the left and rear of Keifer. Although his scouts warned him that he was within 150 yards of the Rebs’ picket line, Truex succeeded in completing his dispositions without attracting the grey clads’ attention. After his soldiers had been on the ground about one half-hour, Confederate pickets on the left began banging away. Shooting soon spread to Truex’s front and continued for about 60 minutes. At first, this musket fire caused confusion, but when it slackened the men calmed down. Though this firing was extremely galling, Truex’s troops didn’t reply. This was especially hard on the 87th Pennsylvania, which was made up largely of recruits.42
* * *
Chief of Artillery Cowan, in compliance with Wright’s instructions, had ordered Battery E, 1st New York to report to General Seymour; the 3rd New York Battery to General Getty; and Battery H, 1st Rhode Island to General Wheaton. The 1st New York Battery and Battery G, 1st Rhode Island would be held in reserve. At 2:00 a.m., the five batteries which were to accompany the assaulting columns were relieved from duty in the works and parked near Fort Fisher.
* * *
Captain George W. Adams of Battery G, 1st Rhode Island called for volunteers from the batteries that were to remain in the works. Twenty men were selected by the captain. With this detachment, Adams was to accompany the storming parties and take charge of turning the Confederate field pieces. Adams, before moving out, saw that his volunteers were equipped with rammers, lanyards, and friction primers.43
* * *
On the night of April 1, the works to be assaulted by the VI Corps were defended by troops from Maj. Gens. Cadmus M. Wilcox’s and Henry Heth’s divisions. During the past five days, a number of Wilcox’s and Heth’s units had been shifted west of Hatcher’s Run to counter the Union thrust toward Five Forks.
* * *
Daybreak on March 27 had found Wilcox’s and Heth’s commands, about 9,200 strong, charged with the defense of eight miles of front, extending from Lieutenant Run on the east to Burgess Mill to the southwest. Wilcox’s four brigades on the left held about four and one-half miles of front.44
* * *
On March 29, General Robert E. Lee issued orders for General Wilcox to have one of his brigades, Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan’s, report to General Heth. Accompanied by McGowan’s South Carolinians and three of Brig. Gen. William MacRae’s regiments (the 44th, 47th, and 52nd North Carolina), Heth was to cross Hatcher’s Run and operate against the Union columns which were threatening to turn the Army of Northern Virginia’s right.45
* * *
Brigadier General James H. Lane’s brigade was given the task of holding the rifle pits from which McGowan’s soldiers were withdrawn. Upon relieving McGowan, Lane posted his regiments: the 28th, 37th, 18th, and 33rd North Carolina from right to left. The right flank of the 28th North Carolina was anchored near the brown house in front of General MacRae’s winter quarters, while the left of the 33rd rested on the branch near Mrs. Banks’.46
* * *
The withdrawal of McGowan’s brigade reduced the density of the troops holding Wilcox’s sector from 1,000 to 888 men per mile. General Lane, on inspecting his front, found that the interval between men varied from six to ten paces.47 On Lane’s right, Col. W. J. Martin of the 11th North Carolina, who had remained behind when MacRae had moved to the southwest, reported that the men in the trenches from his regiment and the 26th North Carolina were “5 or 6 feet apart.”48
* * *
On March 30, General Lee called on General Wilcox for another brigade—Col. Joseph H. Hyman’s. Troops from Maj. Gen. Bryan Grimes’ division of the II Corps moved into the rifle pits formerly held by Hyman’s grey clads. As soon as Hyman and his North Carolinians reported to General Heth, they marched westward and took position across the Boydton Plank Road, west of Hatcher’s Run and just south of Burgess Mill. General MacRae, at the same time, crossed to the west of Hatcher’s Run with the 44th, 47th, and 52nd North Carolina. The transfer of Hyman’s brigade reduced the front held by Wilcox’s division to about two and one-quarter miles, while the sector for which Heth was responsible remained the same—three and three-quarter miles.49
* * *
The six miles of earthworks between Indian Town Creek and Burgess Mill, at dark on April 1, were defended by six brigades. Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas’ Georgia brigade was on the left. The Georgians’ left flank was anchored on Indian Town Creek. Lane’s North Carolinians defended the sector from the branch near Mrs. Banks’ to the brown house in front of MacRae’s winter quarters. Two of MacRae’s regiments, the 11th and 26th North Carolina, occupied the rifle pits on Lane’s right. From left to right, Col. Andrew M. Nelson’s Mississippi brigade and Brig. Gen. William McComb’s Maryland and Tennessee brigade, and the 44th, 47th, and 52nd North Carolina of MacRae’s brigade held the fortifications to Burgess Mill. (MacRae and his three regiments had been shifted during the day back to the east side of Hatcher’s Run.) Thomas and Lane reported to Wilcox, while MacRae, Nelson, and McComb looked to Heth for instructions.50
Part II
Wright’s Troops Overrun the Confederate Earthworks
The assaulting columns of the VI Corps were in position before 4:00 a.m., but it was unusually dark for that hour. Wright realized only too well that it would be impossible to launch a coordinated attack until day had started to break. He therefore took upon himself the responsibility of postponing the onslaught. Within 40 minutes, it was light enough for the soldiers “to see to step, though nothing was discernible beyond a few yards.” Wright now gave the word; the crew manning the Fort Fisher signal gun fired a blank round.51
So far as anyone could recall, the general, field, and staff officers of Getty’s division went into the fight on foot. Charles H. Anson reported, “The Vermont Brigade had been selected to lead the charge, every man understood such to be the case; but few orders were given, and those in a whisper; guns were loaded, but uncapped, bayonets fixed.”52
A heavy bombardment had broken out along the IX Corps’ front, so not all of Getty’s brigade commanders heard the report of the Fort Fisher signal gun. A staff officer soon hailed Colonel Tracy of the Vermont brigade and told him that the signal gun had been discharged and that his unit was the guiding brigade: the troops on the left and right were waiting for the Vermonters to advance. At a word from their officers, the men rose to their feet, leaped over the rifle pits, and took up the advance. The lines, which were massed, advanced successively, each moving forward as the preceding wave gained 100 yards. For several moments, Getty recalled, “nothing was heard but the tramp and rustle of the advancing columns.” As the Rebels’ picket line defended by McGowan’s sharpshooters was gained, the silence was shattered by a “scattering volley.” The troops responded with a ringing cheer and pushed ahead in the face of a galling small-arms fire, which was now spilling from the earthworks to their front. Rebel artillery on the division’s left and right roared and caused the lines of the Vermont brigade to waver. Colonel Tracy reported that this was the day’s most critical moment.53
A soldier recalled:
No word was spoken, as they (the Vermonters) came upon and passed over the entrenched picket line. No sound broke the stillness until the enemy’s pickets, conscious of some power advancing upon them like a mighty ocean wave, with unbroken crest, delivered their fire and ran to cover in disorder. Then went up a shout from 2,500 loyal hearts, taken up and repeated by the oncoming host. The charge was on! The leading brigade pressed forward on the line designated, unconsciously angling slightly to the left and into the ravine not a man flinching, though many considered it a “forlorn hope.” Consternation seized the Confederates within their entrenchments; rushing to their guns, a terrible fire of shot, shell and canister, was soon pouring into the advancing columns, especially from the forts located to the right and left of the ravine.54
Day was breaking and the Confederates, if the advance slowed, would discover what was transpiring. The hesitation, however, was only momentary; the Green Mountain boys pushed forward with a determination that knew no such word as fail. Case-shot and canister came whistling out of the gloom. Fortunately for Getty’s division, most of these projectiles passed overhead. Though considerable confusion was engendered by the character of the ground and the dim light, resolute men rushed ahead to assist the pioneers in hewing an opening through the abatis. Officers and men vied with each other in the race for the works. Passing through these gaps, the Federals crossed the ditch and swarmed over the works defended by the right flank companies of the 37th North Carolina.55
The Vermont brigade on the left brushed away the double line of abatis “like cobwebs and the men swarmed over the works with yells and cheers that struck terror to the rebels flying in all directions.” In crossing the ground in front of the abatis, casualties in the Vermont brigade were “numerous.” While passing through the abatis, “all formations were broken, each man seemed determined to be in the lead, and, not unlike other instances many claimed to have been the first to grapple with a Johnny in a hand-to-hand conflict. It has been conceded, however, that the ‘Yellow Flag’ was the first over the works.”56
Men of the Vermont brigade claimed for one of their number, Capt. Charles G. Gould of the 5th Vermont the honor of being first man in the VI Corps to mount the Rebel breastworks. Scaling the parapet, Gould found a muzzle of a rifle musket jammed against his chest. The weapon misfired. As the captain leaped down into the redoubt, a North Carolinian slashed him in the face with a bayonet. After sabering the Reb, Gould pulled the bayonet from his wound. Moments later, the intrepid captain was struck on the head with a saber, while another Johnny bayoneted him in the back. Gould sought to escape. Placing his hands on the interior slope of the parapet, Gould sought in vain to vault over the works. But with his strength ebbing, the captain slumped. A sergeant in the 5th Vermont rushed to Gould’s assistance. Dropping his rifle-musket, the burley sergeant grasped his captain and tried to help him over the parapet. A Confederate saw what was happening, and caught the captain from behind. At this, the sergeant snatched up his rifle-musket, dealt the Reb a deadly blow, and lifted Gould over the works. Both men rolled into the ditch, where they were safe from the deadly minies.57
Soldiers from the Vermont brigade entered a redoubt to the right of the ravine and captured four guns. Urged on by Lt. Col. Ronald A. Kennedy, men of the 5th Vermont swung to the left, crossed the hollow, and stormed a small work defended by the 28th North Carolina mounting two guns. Color-Bearer Jackson Sargent was the first to scale the parapet and plant the “State Colors of Vermont”; he was followed by Cpl. Nelson E. Carle with the national colors. Seymour’s division coming up, the 5th Vermont bore toward the right and rejoined the brigade. After passing to the left of the white house and reaching the wooded crest beyond, Colonel Tracy called a brief halt to allow his officers to reform their units.58
Colonel Hyde’s initial assault wave halted at the edge of the swamp fronting the Rebels’ abatis. As soon as the soldiers of the 49th and 77th New York had re-adjusted their lines, they stormed through the openings in the abatis cut by the pioneers and over the works. They were followed over the parapet by the three other lines. Some confusion occurred because of the darkness, “but the colors of the different regiments and those directly about them, guided by the fire of the enemy, went straight on to their destination.”59
After entering the defenses, Lt. Col. Stephen C. Fletcher of the 1st Maine called for Capt. Augustus Merrill. Fletcher told Merrill to take a few skirmishers and see if he could ascertain the enemy’s position and strength in our front. “Accompanied by 20 men, the captain advanced through the woods and came upon a hastily abandoned Rebel camp—McGowan’s winter quarters. Here, the bluecoats captured a lieutenant and three men belonging to Hill’s Corps. Questioning the grey clads, Merrill learned that the Southerners “would make but slight resistance this side of Hatcher’s Run.” Meanwhile, other units from Hyde’s brigade forged ahead. Colonel Hyde succeeded in reforming about 200 men into line of battle at a point near the South Side Railroad, a mile beyond the breakthrough.60
Colonel Warner’s troops to the right of Hyde’s column closed to within a few paces of the Rebel pickets (McGowan’s sharpshooters) before they were discovered. The space between the outposts and the rifle pits was uneven and swampy. Furthermore, it was still quite dark, and the Confederate artillery had opened. These factors combined to throw Warner’s assaulting columns into “great confusion.” The first line, the 102nd Pennsylvania, wavered. Major James McGregor of the 139th Pennsylvania, whose unit was following, feared that his soldiers would become intermixed with those from other units. He shouted for the color-sergeants to push ahead. When the 139 th Pennsylvania arrived in front of the abatis, McGregor found that it wasn’t as formidable as he had feared. It was quickly passed. The troops followed their color-bearers over the works, behind which were discovered many of Lane’s North Carolinians “who appeared only too glad of the opportunity” of being taken prisoner. Soldiers of the 93rd and 102nd Pennsylvania crossed the works at the same time. A brief halt was called while prisoners were collected and sent to the rear. Without much organization, Warner’s brigade pushed on toward the South Side Railroad. Finally, Warner and his officers “with great difficulty” halted and reformed their commands about a mile from the breached defenses.61
Cannoneers of the 3rd New York Battery entered the works, close behind Getty’s infantry. In accordance with instructions from Capt. William A. Harn, the New Yorkers unlimbered their four Napoleons and opened fire on several Rebel guns emplaced in a work to the right of the breakthrough. After a few minutes of hot action, the Federal gunners silenced the Rebel pieces.62
General Wheaton’s division advanced to the right of Getty’s column of assault. Each wave in Wheaton’s phalanx guided left, “each brigade taking up the movement toward the enemy’s lines as soon as the troops on its left had gained the prescribed distance of 100 paces between lines.” Wheaton’s bluecoats encountered “a sharp musketry and artillery fire,” from which their losses were comparatively small, considering the distance that they had to pass over and the abatis that had to be hewed away.
During the advance through the gloom, the commands became “more or less disordered.” The lines in many cases merged. Wheaton had seen that extra axes, besides those carried by the pioneers, had been issued to the men of the first wave. Apparently, the abatis in the sector against which Wheaton directed his division was more formidable than in the area assailed by Getty. Wheaton reported that his men “were astonished to find these obstructions such serious obstacles and so difficult to remove.” While the pioneers were cutting openings, they were subjected to “a severe canister and musketry fire.”63
Colonel Edwards’ troops cheered wildly as they beat their way through two lines of abatis, crossed the ditch, and mounted the Rebel works. Soldiers from the 37th Massachusetts and the 5th Wisconsin were first to plant their colors on a large redoubt. Rebel artillerists standing by their pieces sent several charges of canister crashing into the onrushing bluecoats. After a bitter hand-to-hand struggle, the Yanks found themselves in possession of the work, where they listed the capture of three guns, about 40 prisoners, and a battle flag.64
The 2nd Rhode Island which was following the 5th Wisconsin lost contact in the gloom. Diverging to the right, the regiment crossed two lines of abatis. The Rhode Islanders found themselves in front of a Confederate emplacement mounting one gun. Sweeping over the parapet, the soldiers from Rhode Island drove the grey clads from their defenses and through an encampment. First Lt. Frank S. Holliday, placing himself at the head of a small party, stormed a two-gun Confederate battery. After capturing the pieces, the Yanks turned them on the fleeing Southerners.65
When they crossed the works, several of Edwards’ officers saw that the butternuts still held the earthworks to their right from which they hammered Penrose’s and Hamblin’s onrushing brigades with small-arms fire, canister, and shell. Major William C. Gray of the 119th Pennsylvania wheeled his regiment to the right. Advancing along the line of works, Gray’s bluecoats captured three redans with seven guns and a large number of prisoners.66
Colonel Edwards, accompanied by a number of soldiers, pushed for the railroad. The 37th Massachusetts in its advance passed through a camp and turned to the demolition teams. Several wagons and a number of tents filled with clothing, officers’ baggage, and quartermaster’s stores were put to the torch.
Sergeant James Young of Company D, 5th Wisconsin and a score of men first reached the South Side Railroad. As they approached the tracks, a locomotive and a string of cars rumbled by. The soldiers blazed away but were unable to stop the train. A man from the signal corps on horseback had accompanied Young’s detachment. He rode up to a pole, rose in his saddle, climbed the pole, cut the wire, and after descending attached the wire to a battery, which he had fastened securely to his saddle. For the next several minutes, he sat his horse coolly receiving the Reb dispatches.
After crossing the Boydton Plank Road, Lt. Col. Elisha Rhodes of the 2nd Rhode Island called a halt. He formed his men into line of battle and awaited further orders.67
It was so dark that Penrose’s NewJersey brigade could “see only a few paces in advance. “The skirmishers supposed to screen Penrose’s advance failed to do so, and the 40th NewJersey spearheading the column encountered a scathing fire from Rebel outposts. The 40th New Jersey which today was getting its first taste of combat faltered. Coming up from behind, the 4th New Jersey commingled with the 40th. Urged on by Colonel Penrose, the two regiments overran the Confederate pickets, capturing a number of grey clads. Here, a portion of the 4th New Jersey halted and reformed.
Penrose’s brigade now diverged to the left. As it did, the 10th and 15th New Jersey closed up on the first line. Part of the NewJersey brigade entered a section of the Rebel defenses already carried by Edward’s bluecoats. Spotting two abandoned 3-inch rifles, a detachment led by Capt. Charles R. Paul of Penrose’s staff took possession. A guard was placed on the guns, and they were loaded within a few minutes. Two companies of the 37th Massachusetts dashed up and claimed the field pieces. When Penrose’s men protested, the soldiers from Massachusetts pushed them away.68
On the right of the New Jersey brigade, soldiers recoiled before “the terrible fire” of the Confederates. Spencer-armed riflemen of the 37th Massachusetts blazed away at the Rebs, pinning them down, so that “a handful of men under protection of their volleys, found a standing place under the angle of a parapet where they could not be reached by artillery or struck by riflemen unless exposed themselves.” After each volley, a few more men crossed the glacis and joined their comrades in the defiladed area in the angle of the works. Soon there were enough Federals to storm the redoubt.
When the bluecoats surged over the parapet, the defenders showed the greatest obstinacy. “Some refusing to surrender were shot. One, William Cheatham, said he would never surrender; when a man of the 15th (NewJersey) before the words were hardly spoken, drove a bayonet through his body. Major (J. Augustus) Fay of the 40th (New Jersey) led a storming party, which was joined by men from all our regiments. He (Fay) was uninjured, but had a number of bullet holes in his clothing. The color-bearer in the fort would not give up his flag, and the major had to draw his pistol and wound him before he would drop them.”69
Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Baldwin Hufty’s battalion of the 4th New Jersey had joined the 119th Pennsylvania in mopping up the rifle pits to the right of the breakthrough.70
After reforming his brigade, Colonel Penrose had his officers check the rolls. At the same time, the troops turned about 200 disarmed Confederates over to the people from the provost-marshal’s department.71
It seemed to the soldiers of Colonel Hamblin’s brigade that the signal gun would never be discharged. Anson Ryder, who lay beside diarist Beckwith, remarked, “I would rather charge than lie here in this suspense and misery.” As the first grey of dawn began to show, the gun “belched.” The soldiers of the brigade scrambled to their feet, closed ranks, and plunged forward into the darkness.72
Colonel Hamblin’s column of assault “advanced en echelon of twenty paces to rear and right” of Penrose’s brigade. A number of circumstances (the semi-darkness, a ground fog, and the nature of the terrain), caused the brigade’s lines to be thrown into “some confusion” by the time they reached the Confederate defenses. The 65th New York gained the honor of being the first regiment in the brigade to plant its colors on the parapet. Before reaching the Confederate rifle pits, the 121st New York divided. Most of the men along with the colors entered the works farther to the right than intended, capturing two guns. One of these pieces was immediately turned on the Rebels, loaded, and fired by Sgt. Redford Dustin of Company F.73
One of the men of the 121st New York wrote:
the Rebel works were marked by jets of flame from their rifles as they fired upon us. Another instant and we were up to their abatis, and we got into a tangle looking for a place to get through. Finally some fellow to our left sang out, “Here’s a road,” and a lot of us made for it, and followed it on a run to the Rebel works at that point a fort. Climbing up the sides, it being now light enough to see a few paces ahead, I went in through the embrasure of the guns, one of which had been firing on us. The Johnnies had run back among the huts and were firing back at us. We ran down toward them and they ran back into the field. Quite a number hid in the huts, and our fellows hunted them out.74
Colonel Hamblin now lost control of his unit. Colonel James Hubbard of the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery with one force drove for the railroad, another detachment swung to the right,75 while a third party led by Maj. J. W. Cronkite of the 121st New York struck for the Boydton Plank Road, and “fired into the running Rebs, and . . . into some wagons which were passing.” The bluecoats used their bayonets to twist off the telegraph wire. Within a few minutes, the Confederates counterattacked and compelled Cronkite’s detachment to abandon its toehold on the Boydton Plank Road.
The troops advancing to the right joined the 119th Pennsylvania and Hufty’s battalion in sweeping the Rebs out of their works to the right of the breakthrough. As they drove ahead, the colors of the 65th New York in the van, the Federals captured a redoubt armed with three guns. Spencer-armed soldiers from the 49th Pennsylvania screened the right flank of the column, as it drove through rapidly crumbling Confederate defenses toward Fort Gregg. In doing so, the sharpshooters bagged a number of Confederate pickets. As soon as the column was halted by the fire of Confederate guns emplaced in Fort Gregg, Capt. James T. Steuart wheeled his sharpshooters to the left. This movement brought them face to face with a redan mounting three guns. Steuart called for his men to charge. Sweeping across the ditch, the bluecoats entered the stronghold, capturing 3 guns, 3 officers, and 25 enlisted men.76
Lt. Col. Charles A. Milliken was in charge of the Union picket line to the right of the point of attack. Milliken’s pickets kept pace with Wheaton’s division to their left. Overrunning the Rebel outposts, the Federals captured and disarmed between 400 and 500 Johnnies. Milliken’s men claimed that they entered the redoubt near the Jones house ahead of Wheaton’s division. Swinging his skirmishers to the right, Milliken assisted Wheaton’s troops in enlarging the breakthrough.77
A section of Battery H, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery accompanied Wheaton’s assaulting columns. Almost as soon as the troops had carried the works, the cannoneers, amid a cracking of whips and shouts, drove up and put their pieces into action. Throwing their pieces into battery, they opened fire on a section of Rebel artillery which was enfilading Wheaton’s troops from the right. The Federal cannoneers quickly gained the upper hand; the Rebel guns withdrew. At this, Battery H ceased firing, limbered up their pieces, and moved to the left.78
As General Wheaton recalled, his troops “were perfectly wild with delight at their success in this grand assault.” Considerable difficulty was encountered by the officers in reforming the brigades.79
General Seymour’s division had advanced to the left of Getty’s. As soon as the signal gun was discharged, Colonel Keifer’s column of assault drove forward. Scattered clumps of underbrush and several “marshy ditches” were encountered and caused confusion. Keifer’s first wave (the 110th and 126th Ohio, and the 6th Maryland) rolled over the Confederate picket line, capturing a number of grey clads.
“Without halting or discharging a piece,” the column surged toward the Rebels’ main line of resistance. Men began to drop as they came under a heavy fire. Seconds seemed like hours, as the pioneers cut a route for the troops through the double line of abatis. Crossing the ditch, the Yanks scaled the earthworks, to the left of a salient angle. Six officers and about 20 enlisted men from the 6th Maryland claimed the honor of planting the first stand of colors on the works in the sector assailed by Seymour’s division. Several minutes elapsed before these soldiers were joined by other men of the regiment. During this time, a fierce hand-to-hand struggle took place, as soldiers of the 11th and 26th North Carolina vainly sought to seal the breach.80
The 126th Ohio crossed the ditch a short distance to the right of the 6th Maryland. Entering the Rebel rifle pits, the Ohioans captured a number of prisoners. To the Buckeye’s right and left were redoubts in which diehard Confederates continued to hold out. From these works, the Southerners blazed away at the Federals with small-arms and artillery. Col. Benjamin F. Smith quickly reformed his regiment. Swinging to the left, the 126th Ohio advanced against one of the redoubts.81
To the right of the area penetrated by the 126th Ohio, the 110th Ohio broke through. Troops from that regiment captured four pieces of artillery, 400 prisoners, and two battle flags.82
The 9th New York Heavy Artillery, on approaching the abatis obliqued to the left, and broke through the Rebels’ line to the left of the point penetrated by the 6th Maryland. Storming a redoubt, the New Yorkers captured four guns. These pieces were manned and turned on the retreating butternuts with effect. As soon as he could reform his regiment, Lt. Col. James W. Snyder wheeled it to the left and swept down the rifle pits. Encountering a deep swamp, the Yanks waded it and carried a second redoubt mounting two guns.83
Within a few minutes, Keifer’s brigade had captured 10 pieces of artillery, a large number of prisoners, three battle flags, and Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s headquarters flag.
Colonel Keifer’s third line (the 122nd Ohio, the 67th and 138th Pennsylvania) followed the other units through the abatis and into the works. A number of the regimental commanders had difficulties regrouping their units, after they had entered the fortifications. While several units swung to the left to roll back the Confederate line, others drove for the South Side Railroad. Two of these regiments, the 122nd Ohio and the 138th Pennsylvania, followed the rapidly retreating Confederates for several miles in a northwesterly direction. The Boydton Plank Road was crossed and a short distance beyond, a camp was overrun and prisoners taken.
Soldiers from the 138th Pennsylvania reached the South Side Railroad, cut the telegraph wires, and ripped up two rails. As they were returning to their regiment, Cpl. John W. Mauk and Pvt. Daniel Wolford lost their way and encountered two mounted Confederate officers. The Rebs drew their pistols and called on the Yanks to surrender. One of the officers shouted that other Confederates were coming. Undaunted, Mauk and Wolford fired—the corporal unhorsed one of the officers, while the private missed. Fearful that other Johnnies would show up, Mauk and Wolford fled and rejoined their unit. Subsequently, it was learned that the officer Mauk had killed was one of Lee’s corps commanders—the redoubtable Ambrose P. Hill.84
Colonel Truex led his cheering troops forward at the double-quick. A “terrible fire of musketry and artillery” was encountered before the first line had advanced more than a few steps. Since it was quite dark, many of the units became scrambled. Within a few moments, the blue-coated tide had engulfed the Confederate picket line. In passing the abatis, the lines were “considerable broken.” Part of the 10th Vermont on the right became separated and wasn’t seen again by Lt. Col. George B. Damon for several hours. The colonel with the rest of his regiment crossed the ditch and scaled the parapet, which at that point was from 12 to 15 feet high. The 10th Vermont won the distinction of being the first unit in Truex’s brigade to plant its colors inside the works; it was closely followed by the 106th New York and the 14th NewJersey. Soldiers of the 14th NewJersey entered the Confederate rifle pits defended by Martin’s North Carolinians near an unpainted barn.
Within a few moments, Truex’s troops rounded up about 300 Confederates who had grounded their arms. The prisoners were sent to the rear without guards; infantrymen were detailed to take charge of the five guns emplaced along the works carried by the brigade.
As soon as the officers of the 10th Vermont and the 106th New York could reform their units, Colonel Truex had them wheel their regiments to the left. Moving off on the double, the Federals charged down the line, rolling back the foe as they advanced. The Yanks overran a redoubt and captured 150 Rebs and two wagons. After pausing briefly to regroup, the battle line rolled on. A second redoubt was attacked. The Confederates evacuated the work and retired into a third redoubt. The 14th New Jersey, which had been called up to support the 10th Vermont and the 106th New York, was the first unit to enter the strongpoint which mounted two guns. Here, Truex’s command was reinforced by the 6th Maryland and the 7th New York Heavy Artillery of Keifer’s brigade.85
Grey clad battle lines now emerged from the woods to the right and from the open ground in front of the captured redoubt. The Unionists held their ground for about 20 minutes in the face of this slashing counterthrust. Over-powered, the Yanks retired across the swamp and into the next redoubt. Major William Wood and a detachment of the 7th New York Heavy Artillery took charge of the four guns mounted in the fort. The New Yorkers turned these pieces on the oncoming Confederates. By this time, grey clad artillerists had manned the two guns in the recaptured redoubt. With these pieces, they engaged Wood’s cannoneers in a lively duel. Within a few minutes, the New Yorkers succeeded in dismounting one of the Rebel guns.86
The redoubt was reoccupied without a struggle. Without pausing, the Federals advanced on the next redoubt, which was also given up almost without a struggle by the grey clads. Inspecting the work, the Northerners found that they had captured four guns, caissons, and several teams. About one-half mile beyond, Seymour’s troops met the XXIV Corps. A halt was called to allow Seymour to communicate with General Wright.87
One of the division hospitals, Wheaton’s, had been set up by Surgeon Redford Sharp near Fort Fisher, within the Union defense line. By daylight, the first of the walking wounded began to trickle back from the front, followed by the litter cases. From then until 4:00 p.m., the surgeons worked feverishly in “dressing wounds, extracting bullets and amputating limbs. There were the usual sad and terrible scenes of suffering and death.” Thirteen of the wounded expired after receiving treatment. All told, 300 cases were handled during the day by Dr. Sharp and his team. Among these were a number of Confederates, “who shared the attention bestowed by the surgeons and expressed their gratitude for kindness shown.” As fast as possible, ambulances took the wounded to the general hospital at City Point.88
Editor’s Conclusion
By late morning on April 2, Grant had driven the Confederates from the line jutting southeast from Battery No. 45 and had sealed Petersburg off by deploying troops from the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James close to the Dimmock Line. Now, he set about trying to block other possible Confederate escape routes. Grant issued new orders to Sheridan:
Lieutenant Colonel Commissary of Subsistence, and Acting Aide-de-Camp RICHIE HOUSE, April 2, 1865-12.30 p.m.
Major-General SHERIDAN:
I would like you to get the Fifth Corps and all the cavalry, except Mackenzie, across the Appomattox as soon as you can. You may cross where you please. The position and movements of the enemy will dictate your movements after you cross. All we want is to capture or beat the enemy. There is a pontoon train with the army. If you want it send an officer to conduct it where it will be required.
U. S. GRANT89
In reply to Grant’s message to block the Chesterfield county roads, Sheridan told Grant that all the Confederates had left Petersburg earlier that afternoon, and therefore there was no point in crossing to Chesterfield county: “From what has transpired here I think, beyond a doubt, that the enemy’s troops, wagons, and, in fact, everything that is left of them, have moved off and are moving toward Burkeville Junction. With these impressions and your instructions I am in some doubt as to the result of my moving north of the Appomattox. I think everything has left Petersburg, oris leaving it.” He ended by informing Grant that his cavalry was fighting the fugitives beyond the Namozine Road.
Sheridan’s obstinacy allowed some 40,000 Confederates to escape the Richmond and Petersburg front via Chesterfield county roads, for its ultimate surrender a week later at Appomattox Court House.
___________
1 OR 46, pt. 3, 397.
2 Meade to Grant, 8:30 p.m.April 1, 1865 OR Vol. 46, pt 4, 397.
3 OR 46, pt. 3, p. 397.
4 Ibid.
5 OR 46, pt. 1, pp. 1124, 1288-1289.
6 OR 46, pt. 3, p. 434, 454.
7 OR 46, pt. 3, 422.
8 OR 46, pt. 1, 903; Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ’65, 321.
9 OR 46, pt. 1, 903.
10 OR 46, pt. 3, 423-424. The Jones house had burned in the fighting on March 25. Battery E, 5th U.S. Artillery was armed with four 12-pounder Napoleons; the 1st New York with four 3-inch rifles; the 3rd New York with four 12-pounder Napoleons; Battery G, 1st Rhode Island with four 3-inch rifles; and Battery H, 1st Rhode Island with four 12-pounder Napoleons. OR 46, pt. 1, 660.
11 OR 46, pt. 3, 424.
12 Ibid., 397.
13 Ibid., 407.
14 OR 46, pt. 1, 1009-1012.
15 OR 46, pt. 3, 397-398.
16 Ibid., 422.
17 Ibid., 425.
18 Ibid., 423.
19 Ibid., 399.
20 Ibid., 423.
21 Ibid., 399.
22 Ibid., 477.
23 Ibid., 425. Wright had cause for worry on this score. Earlier in the day, four men of Wheaton’s division (one from the 4th New Jersey and three from the 40th New Jersey) had deserted to the foe. Ibid., 426.
24 Ibid., 427.
25 OR 46, pt. 1, 953-954.
26 Charles H. Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2,1865,” in War Papers Read Before the Commandery of the State of Wisconsin, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States (Milwaukee, 1891), Vol. 1, 89.
27 Penrose G. Mark, Red: White: and Blue Badge, Pennsylvania Volunteers, a History of the 93rd Regiment (Harrisburg, 1911), 321.
28 Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2, 1865,” 89; OR 46, pt. 1, 953-954.
29 OR 46, pt. 1, 953-954.
30 Ibid., 968. From front to rear, Grant massed his regiments: the 5th, 2nd, 6th, 4th, and 3rd Vermont Infantry regiments, and two battalions of the 1st Vermont Heavy Artillery.
31 Ibid., 975; Frederick D. Bidwell, History of the Forty-Ninth New York Volunteers (Albany, 1916), 85-86. Hyde’s column of attack was formed in four lines. The first line consisted of the 49th and 77th New York, the second of the 1st Maine, the third of the 61st Pennsylvania, and the fourth of the 43rd and 122nd New York.
32 OR 46, pt. 1, 962-963. Warner’s brigade was formed into column of regiments on the right of Hyde’s brigade: the 102nd Pennsylvania constituted the first line, the 139th Pennsylvania the second, the 93rd Pennsylvania the third and fourth lines, and the 98th Pennsylvania the fifth.
33 Mark, Red: White: and Blue Badge, 321-322.
34 OR 46, pt. 1, 954.
35 Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2, 1865,” 89.
36 Alanson A. Haines, History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers (New York, 1883), 301.
37 OR 46, pt. 1, 910, 941, 945. Edwards deployed his brigade from right to left: first line, the 37th Massachusetts and the 5th Wisconsin; second line, the 119th and 49th Pennsylvania and the 2nd Rhode Island; third line, the 82nd Pennsylvania.
38 Ibid., 910, 927-928. Penrose’s brigade was massed in column of regiments from front to rear: the 40th, 4th, 10th, and 15th New Jersey Infantry regiments.
39 Ibid., 910,931,940. Colonel Hamblin’s first line had the 65th New York on the right and the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery on the left; his second line consisted of the 95 th Pennsylvania and the 121st New York, the New Yorkers on the left.
40 Isaac O. Best, History of the 121st New York Infantry (Chicago, 1921), 209-210.
41 OR 46, pt. 1, 903, 978, 992. Before moving out, Keifer’s brigade, with the exception of the 138th Pennsylvania, occupied the works from Fort Fisher to Fort Gregg. The 138th Pennsylvania garrisoned Fort Dushane. Keifer formed his command into three lines of battle. From right to left Keifer’s first line consisted of: the 110th and the 126th Ohio, and the 6th Maryland; his second line of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery; his third and rear line of the 122nd and the 138th Ohio, and the 67th Pennsylvania.
42 Ibid., 978, 981-982; Helena A. Howell, Chronicles of the One Hundred Fifty-First Regiment New York State Volunteer Infantry 1862-1865 (Albion, 1911), 98-99. Truex’s first line had the 10th Vermont on the right and the 106 th New York on the left; the second line was composed of the 14th New Jersey on the right and the 151st New York on the left; the 87th Pennsylvania constituted the third line.
43 OR 46, pt. 1, 902, 910.
44 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 30.
45 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 207; Martin, “History of the 11th North Carolina Regiment,” 56.
46 OR 46, pt. 1, 1285.
47 Ibid., Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 30.
48 Martin, “History of the 11th North Carolina Regiment,” 54.
49 Freeman, R. E. Lee, vol. 4, 32-33.
50 Ibid., 43.
51 OR 46, pt. 1, 902.
52 Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2, 1865,” 88.
53 OR 46, pt. 1, 954, 962, 968.
54 Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2, 1865,” 91-92.
55 OR 46, pt. 1, 954, 962, 968, 1285.
56 Ibid., 969, 974; Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2,1865,” 89, 92. Among the officers killed or wounded in front of the abatis were: Lt. George C. French of the 1st Vermont Heavy Artillery who was killed as he gallantly cheered his men on, while Lt. G. C. Hawkins of the 3rd Vermont was wounded. Captain E. G. Ballow was struck by a shell fragment and compelled to retire from the field. The 1st Vermont Heavy Artillery carried “a yellow flag, distinctive in beauty; printed upon its silken folds were the memorable words ‘Freedom and Unity.’”
57 Anson, “Assault on the Lines of Petersburg, April 2, 1865,” 92-93.
58 OR 46, pt. 1, 969, 974.
59 Ibid., 976. When the advance began and the first line moved forward, Colonel Hyde reported, “After they had advanced 100 yards the second advanced, the third in like manner, and the fourth after the third had gone 250 yards in advance, the first line got nearly up to the picket-pits of the enemy before their movement was discovered; swept them easily, followed by the second and third.”
60 Ibid., 976-977.
61 Ibid., 963-966; Mark, Red: White: and Blue Badge, 322.
62 OR 46, pt. 1, 1010, 1013.
63 Ibid., 910.
64 Ibid., 941, 945, 952. Captain John C. Robinson of the 37th Massachusetts was one of the first to reach the abatis, where he was wounded. Corporal Richard Welch of Company E, 37th Massachusetts knocked down the rebel color-bearer, took the flag, and shot one of the gunners as he was discharging his piece.
65 Ibid., 951.
66 Ibid., 950.
67 Ibid., 946, 951, 953; Mark, Red: White: and Blue Badge, 322.
68 OR 46, pt. 1, 927-929; Haines, History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey, 301.
69 Haines, History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey, 301-302.
70 OR 46, pt. 1, 929.
71 Ibid., 927.
72 Best, History of the 121st New York Infantry, 210.
73 OR 46, pt. 1, 931, 935, 936.
74 Best, History of the 121st New York Infantry, 210-211.
75 OR 46, pt. 1, 931-932. The party swinging to the right consisted of detachments from the 65th and 121st New York, the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery, and the 95th Pennsylvania.
76 Ibid., 935-936, 940; Best, History of the 121st New York Infantry, 211.
77 OR 46, pt. 1, 962.
78 Ibid., 1010, 1014.
79 Ibid., 910.
80 Ibid., 992-993,1000. In this fight, Maj. C. K. Prentiss, Capt. Thomas Coker, and Lt. Thomas Duff and Thomas H. Goldsborough were severely wounded.
81 Ibid., 1005.
82 Ibid., 1003. Lieutenant Colonel Otho H. Binkley in his after-action report cited a number of his men, “The flags were captured by Private Isaac Jones, Company H, and Sergt. Francis M. McMillen, Company C.... Capt. George P. Boyer made himself conspicuous by his activity and bravery. Adjt. William H. Harry, Lieuts. John T. Sherer, A. A. Hubbard, D. S. French, and Amos Shaul deserve great credit for the manner in which they conducted themselves during the engagement. First Sergt. John W. Hays, commanding Company A, and Sergt. Richard Pearson, commanding Company G, are entitled to mention for their good conduct during the assault, in which the latter was severely wounded. Sergt. Thomas Goe, Company D, in charge of three men, caused 130 rebels to surrender to him; among those were 3 captains and 4 lieutenants. Corpl. Keeran McKenny, Company C, was the first to reach and capture a four-gun battery, overpowered two rebels who refused to surrender to him.” Ibid., 1003-1004.
83 Ibid., 1002.
84 Ibid., 993, 1008; Oscela Lewis, History of the One Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (Norristown, 1866), 153-155.
85 OR 46, pt. 1, 982, 986-987, 990-991; Howell, Chronicles of the One Hundred Fifty-First Regiment New York, 98-99.
86 OR 46, pt. 1, 979, 982, 986, 991, 1000, 1002.
87 Ibid., 979, 982-983, 991, 993.
88 Haines, History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey, 302-303.
89 OR 46, pt. 3, 488-489.