2 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes that along with the rejection of ‘materialistic atomism’ must go ‘soul atomism [der Seelen-Atomistik]’, i.e., ‘the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon’ (BGE 12 p. 20/KGW VI–2.21). Nietzsche adds that it is however not necessary to also at the same time get rid of the soul, as do ‘clumsy naturalists’, for the ‘soul-hypothesis’ can be refined: ‘such conceptions as “mortal soul”, and “soul as subjective multiplicity [Seele als Subjekts-Vielheit]”, and “soul as social structure of the drives and affects [Seele als Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte]” want henceforth to have citizens’ rights in science’ (BGE 12, pp. 20–1/KGW VI–2.21). The critique of soul here in Beyond Good and Evil section 12 is resumed in the analysis of will in BGE 19 in terms of ‘a commonwealth’ in which ‘the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth […] a social structure composed of many “souls” [Gesellschaftsbaus vieler “Seelen”]’ (BGE 19, p. 26/KGW VI–2.27). (To which corresponds the passage in the Nachlaß, where the ‘synthetic concept “I”’ is said to allow us to ‘disguise from ourselves’ the duality [Zweiheit] of willing (WLN p. 36 (n. 38[8])/KGW VII–3.334).) See also Z, Part One, ‘Of the Despisers of the Body’: ‘You say “I” and you are proud of this word. But greater than this—although you will not believe in it—is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say “I” but performs “I”’ (Z: 62/KGW VI–1.35), and TI: ‘The Four Great Errors’, 3: ‘And as for the ego [das Ich]! It has become a fable, a fiction [Fiktion], a play on words: it has totally ceased to think, to feel and to will!’ (TI: 59/KGW VI–3.85).