Field marshal von mackensen had just walked out of the command post of the Bulgarian 1st Division at Adamclisi when he received the electrifying news that a substantial Romanian force had crossed the Danube near Rjahovo. Earlier that morning he had been at the front in Polucci, where he had seen for the first time the so-called wonder of German engineering, the King Carol Bridge at Cernavoda. The marshal had no time for sight-seeing, however. He had come to supervise preparations for the resumption of his advance across the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad, where it had stalled on 18 September. Bulgarian Crown Prince Boris, serving as von Mackensen’s interpreter and liaison to his Bulgarian allies, personally apprised him of the river crossing, and von Mackensen admitted that initially he did not know what to think of it. Was it a large undertaking of operational significance or just a boldly conceived demonstration? The first represented a serious threat and demanded immediate action; the second would be a nuisance, a situation to be handled in a timely manner, but not something that would prevent his continued movement to the north. What was not in doubt was his belief that, as senior commander in the region, he must adopt the attitude that the crossing was a bluff. Otherwise, the Bulgarians would take the first view and insist on calling off the impending advance.1
The Romanian crossing of the Danube was the work of General Averescu. He had replaced the disgraced Aslan as commander of the 3rd Army on 7 September, following a war council that day. Averescu arrived back at Peris on the 9th with a plan to engage von Mackensen’s army from both sides of the Danube. The general’s plan required reinforcements for the 3rd Army, and these were to come from the 1st and 2nd Armies in Transylvania. Although he expressly ruled out simultaneous offensives in Transylvania and the south, he indicated that he intended to resume the advance in Transylvania once the crisis in the south ended. One of the officers in the operations section of the general headquarters offered a countersuggestion – namely, a feint across the Danube to draw some of the enemy’s units in the Dobrogea that might otherwise aid von Mackensen.2 Nothing concrete came from the discussion.
Entreaties to the Russian military attaché and to General Zaionchkovsky to stand and fight the Bulgarians had not produced any noticeable change, so on 11 September, at the daily briefing, General Iliescu suggested combining Zaionchkovsky’s Dobrogea Army with Averescu’s 3rd Army. He wanted to place a Romanian general in charge, one whom he could order to attack von Mackensen’s army. Iliescu wanted the command of this army group to go to General Culcer and his chief of staff, Colonel Lupescu. The king agreed with the concept of unifying the armies operating in the south under one headquarters, but he displayed no enthusiasm for naming Culcer. Apparently he feared offending Averescu, and he took no immediate action.3
The king’s hesitation led a nervous Bratianu to request that another war council be convened.4 Ferdinand, Crown Prince Carol, Bratianu, and Generals Averescu, Culcer, Prezan, and Iliescu met at Peris at 9:30 AM on 15 September to discuss strategy. Averescu led off with a savage critique of the army’s operations and organization. Conducting offensives in two theaters, he argued, had proved impossible, given Romania’s resources. He decried the commitment of incomplete divisions to combat and the practice of moving the commanders and staffs around, resulting in situations where leaders did not know their units – which, while often equipped with modern weapons, had no training. He wanted to set up instruction camps to provide better training. Nor had separating the covering forces from their parent units in the mobilization process been a good idea, he argued, and it had been made worse by sending too many units initially into Transylvania. It was time to bring a halt to action in one theater and concentrate on the other. He called for ending the offensive in Transylvania. The terrain there was favorable for defensive actions. His recommendation was to execute a delay in Transylvania, leaving a minimal number of special units for occupation duties, thus making the regular units fully available for operations in the south against Bulgaria. A “general reserve” of two divisions (the 10th and 16th) would remain near Bucharest, but the rest would be sent to stop von Mackensen and the Bulgarians. In the Dobrogea, Averescu stated, Romania had the advantage. A victory there would have an immediate and positive effect on the Allied forces in Thessalonica.5
The Operations Section followed Averescu’s presentation with a detailed summary of the current situation in the Dobrogea, along with recommendations for an aggressive defense there, suggesting actions that would tie up the German-Bulgarian force. The section chief, Colonel Ioan Rascanu (1874–1952), argued that holding fast on the current line (just south of the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad) in the Dobrogea was absolutely vital. Not only did that artery to Romanian’s sole deep-water port require protection, but engaging the enemy all along it gained time for reinforcements to arrive. These consisted of the 12th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions and the 10th Jäger Regiment, with considerable heavy artillery, howitzers, and aircraft. Once these units joined with the forces already under Zaionchkovsky’s command, Rascanu wanted the Dobrogea Army to attack along the Danube in connection with Romanian monitors on the river, as well as with ground forces on the north bank, presumably from Averescu’s 3rd Army. In addition, the Russian corps would attack along the front between Cernavoda and Medgidia. The purpose of all this action was to wear down the Bulgarians, who, it was anticipated, would become further demoralized when attacked by Sarrail’s army coming from Thessalonica.6
Averescu suggested that reinforcements for the Dobrogea Army should come from the North Army. The commander of that force, Prezan, who had already spoken against shifting priority to the south, countered by reminding everyone that his mission of maintaining contact with the Russians in the Bucovina, according to Plan Z, had the highest priority. He called for reinforcing the Dobrogea with units from the 1st and 2nd Armies, a proposal seconded by General Iliescu. Culcer, the 1st Army commander, violently disagreed, adding that the situation in front of his army was critical. The debate lasted hours; the king brought matters to a close at 3:30 PM by stating that a Group of Southern Armies, consisting of the 3rd and Dobrogea Armies, would be organized and led by Averescu. He approved the Operations Section plan for the Dobrogea Army’s active defense along its front, and then he announced that two divisions would be sent to the 3rd Army to allow it “to cross the Danube and to attack the rear of von Mackensen’s army.” He said nothing about calling off offensive operations in Transylvania.7 The feint first suggested on the 9th had now become a full-fledged crossing.
The 1st Army was ordered to transfer the 12th, 16th, and 18th Divisions to the south. When all the movement was finished, Aevercu’s 3rd Army consisted of the VI Army Corps (16th, 17th, and 18th Divisions), the VII Corps (20th Division), and the 10th Division. The newly organized Bucharest Brigade went to the 3rd Army as well. Zaionchkovsky eventually had the 2nd, 5th, 9th, 12th, 15th, and 19th Romanian Divisions along with his one Serbian and three Russian divisions. The 9th and 19th divisions were at half strength after their retreat, as was the 17th, which had been decimated at Turtucaia.8 With both the 3rd and Dobrogea Armies reporting to him, Averescu commanded seventeen divisions. His opponent, von Mackensen, had four large Bulgarian divisions.
Ferdinand’s decision to mount an offensive in the southern theater while continuing to advance in Siebenbürgen was reckless. The Romanians would be conducting divergent operations on two fronts, both of immense length. Although they enjoyed the advantage of interior lines and, in the Dobrogea, of a converging attack, they were hamstrung by having an inadequate number of forces and virtually no reserves. The Russians thought the Danube crossing operation was risky. General Alexseyev suggested scrapping it and letting Zaionchkovsky’s combined Romanian-Russian army drive the Bulgarians out of the Dobrogea. The French military attaché, Colonel Maurice Despres (1866–1954), seconded that opinion. Bratianu said that he “trembled” when he heard about the concept of crossing into Bulgaria with only two or three divisions.9 Worse, vanguards of German units had begun to appear in Transylvania, harbingers of many more to come that would soon be organized into the German 9th Army. Von Mackensen’s army likewise did not go without reinforcements; a German division and a Turkish army corps of two divisions were en route.
Averescu organized a committee composed of officers of all specialties under the supervision of the commander of the 10th Division, General Artur Vaitoianu (1861–1956), to recommend a crossing site. On 21 September the committee reported back its choice: Flamanda. This site, where the Russians had made a feint in the war with the Turks in 1877, was fifteen miles east of Giurgiu on high ground. It was located on a connecting road between the river bank and the escarpment edge, some six to seven miles to the north. Called the Balta region, the area was swampy and dotted with small lakes, typical of almost the entire Romanian side of the Danube. The nearest railroad station was seven miles inland at Baneasa, while the closest town with a good highway was Prundu Belu, the same distance from the river. The hard-packed road running from Prundu Belu to the crossing site was adequate and could be improved, although swamps on either side of the road restricted traffic and severely limited the scope of improvements. The islands of Coreia and Lungu would give the Romanians some concealment when they assembled their forces and bridging equipment. The islands also extended halfway across the river and could be used as “stepping stones,” leaving only five hundred to six hundred yards of open water that had to be bridged. That was a relatively short distance, which meant the Romanians would not need steam power, making it easier to conceal the bridging equipment before the operation began. Finally, the depth of the river was lowest in the month of September, which would reduce the usefulness of the Austrian monitor flotilla.
The selected landing site on the Bulgarian shore was, generally speaking, suitable and without any obstacles to a crossing. Small arms and artillery fire could be brought to bear from the Romanian side. The site itself and its distance from von Mackensen’s forces were all part of the calculus employed by Averescu. The area along the Bulgarian side of the Danube where the Romanians planned to cross was devoid of any important villages or towns, which meant that the Bulgarians would have few if any entrenched defenders. Most likely, they would be relying on patrols. Crossing at dawn (4 AM) would further enhance the chances of catching the enemy off guard, and von Mackensen’s forces were seventy miles to the east, a march of four to five days. Moreover, if Zaionchkovsky’s Dobrogea Army attacked von Mackensen, the German-Bulgarian army would be tied up and unable to respond quickly when the enemy appeared in their rear. The Romanians could count on complete surprise.
The committee reported one important drawback to the landing site: in case of heavy rains, the lowlands along the banks of the river were subject to flooding and could become completely impassable. The committee nonetheless chose to rely on the usual sunny fall Romanian weather. Hedging their bet, however, Vaitoianu’s group decided to improve the road from Prundu Belu. The road had to be elevated above the likely flood depth and reinforced to allow the transit of heavy artillery and munitions wagons. Gravel and other types of construction materials were brought in. Engineer construction companies, augmented by artillery and infantry units, worked day and night for a week beefing up and camouflaging the roadway to the edge of the Danube. They also prepared artillery positions and the access to them.10
Averescu’s intent was to have two infantry divisions cross the Danube in small craft and establish a small bridgehead on the Bulgarian shore on D-Day. Once they had established security, the engineers would construct a pontoon bridge across the river, permitting the divisions’ artillery and a cavalry brigade to move over to the Bulgarian side. The cavalry had the assignment of fanning out and cutting telegraph and telephone wires and blocking roads and railroads near the bridgehead. On D+1, the bridgehead would be widened, and an additional infantry division and more support troops would come across. On D+2, the three divisions on the Bulgarian side would begin marching toward Dobrich, while a fourth infantry division would cross from Romania. By D+5 the entire 3rd Army was to have completed the crossing. Averescu expected that once von Mackensen realized his army was in danger of being cut off, he would violently counterattack westward near Silistria, some fifty miles from the bridgehead. As the German-Bulgarian army turned to meet the threat coming from its rear, Zaionchkovsky’s Dobrogea Army would attack. Von Mackensen would be caught between the two armies and crushed. Romania could then shift her attention to Transylvania.11
With von Mackensen’s forces several days distant, the Austrian Danube Flotilla presented a far more immediate threat. The Austrian monitors had arrived in the lower Danube area shortly after the Serbian campaign in the fall of 1915, patrolling the waters from the Iron Gate (an area on the Romanian-Bulgarian border where the Danube descended through rapids at a high speed, limiting upstream boat traffic to all but the most powerful vessels) to Kalimok, where the Romanian border crossed the river from north to south into the Dobrogea. The Austrians conducted reconnaissance patrols along the Danube, acquiring excellent, detailed knowledge of Romanian fortifications, barricades, minefields, and artillery defenses.12 As Romania’s neutrality became more questionable in the summer of 1916, the Austrians placed the flotilla under the operational control of Army Group Mackensen. At the same time, they designated the Belene Channel near Sistov as their primary anchorage. Separated from the main Danube stream by the large Persin Island, the site enjoyed cover and concealment from the enemy. The Austrians had already begun to stage their bridge train there, slowly moving the pieces from Belgrade. In the event that hostilities erupted, von Mackensen had issued directions for the flotilla to secure its anchorage facilities and to destroy enemy harbors and rail yards. At the same time, the flotilla was to lay mine barriers across the Danube to deny the Romanian flotilla use of the river. To that end, a mine barrier that could be detonated by an observer was prepared near Lelek.13 When hostilities began on 27 August, the monitors fled to safe anchorages, bombarding Romanian shore facilities and “cutting out” barges filled with oil and grain from Romanian harbors.
The Austrian vessels resembled American Civil War monitors, those so-called cheese boxes on rafts whose appearance on the rivers of the Confederacy inevitably heralded the arrival of a Union army. The resemblance was not coincidental. Impressed with the manner in which the monitors had facilitated successful campaigns in the heart of the American South, the Austro-Hungarian Navy had adopted the design. Sporting a turret with a single 120mm gun and some smaller twelve-pound guns, the Maros and Leitha, whose construction began in 1865, entered service in 1878 and promptly participated in the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next forty years saw the flotilla grow in numbers and size. It included nine vessels at the start of the 1916 campaign. The original monitors carried complements of fifty-seven men and could reach a speed of 7.5 knots; the most recently constructed vessels had crews of 105 men and could attain 13 knots. In addition, there were numerous patrol boats carrying machine guns and small cannons designed for reconnaissance and to engage enemy infantry and small watercraft. Armed steamers were also used. Like the patrol boats, they were protected against enemy rifle fire and could tow barges and carry troops. They also guarded civilian shipping. Mining craft were constructed to lay and sweep for mines, as well as demolish enemy barricades. Logistical vessels and tugs carried everything necessary to make the flotilla self-sufficient. Hospital barges took care of the wounded, while headquarters vessels had sleeping quarters for the staffs and support elements.14
With the Romanian monitor flotilla on the far side of the impassable Kalimok Barrier and engaged in operations in support of Zaionchkovsky’s army, Averescu knew he would have to rely on a combination of artillery, barriers, and mines to keep the Austrian vessels from the crossing site. At Fantanele, on the north side of the Danube across from the Austrian base at the Belene Channel, the Romanians had set up ten batteries (seven light and three heavy) as early as 11 September to prevent the Austrian Danube Flotilla from exiting the Belene Channel. The Romanians added another two 105mm batteries and a 150mm howitzer battery later in the month, after making the decision to cross the Danube. On Cinghinarele Island, opposite the eastern entrance to the Belene Channel, the Romanians had set up six guns. Two batteries of 87mm guns awaited the Austrians farther east along the river, south of Cioara.
For the river crossing, Averescu’s 3rd Army had twenty-three batteries, the largest having 210mm mortars and 150mm howitzers. Five heavy batteries (the mortars and 150mm howitzers) were near Flamanda to support the crossing; six heavy batteries (with 120mm guns) were in the Giurgiu sector and, along with the remaining twelve batteries of smaller-caliber guns, had the primary mission of stopping the Austrian monitors.15
The Romanian navy placed Commander Constantin Niculescu-Rizea in charge of maritime measures to stop the Austrians. Starting in mid-September, the Romanians laid minefields between Giurgiu and Zimnicea, and they later put down more at Cinghinarele, Pietrosani, and Mecica. They were only partially successful. The Austrians on the south bank at Pietrosani and Mecica heard several explosions when the Romanian mine-laying craft were on the river, and a number of Romanian sailors placing the mines were killed. West of Persin Island, Niculescu-Rizea had his sailors launch floating mines into the Danube in the hope that they would drift into the Austrian anchorage in the Belene Channel. None did. In the Taban Channel, between Rutschuk and the Flamanda crossing site, where the river narrowed considerably, the Romanians sunk a block ship on 23 September, and at Cosinul they set up torpedo launchers guarded by batteries of 75mm and 150mm guns. Finally, about two miles west of the intended crossing site, Niculescu-Rizea built a floating barrier, liberally protected by several minefields, to prevent the Austrians from drawing within gunnery range.16
Averescu knew his enterprise could not succeed without the element of surprise, and he paid close attention to those measures that enhanced his chances. The Romanian general headquarters had announced the formation of the Group of Southern Armies, but Averescu kept his headquarters in Bucharest to focus attention on it, not Flamanda. He was fearful that someone would betray the operation.17 Units moved close to the debarkation area at night and rested and hid in the daytime; equipment was staged in the dark and hidden in the forests along the shore. The Romanian precautions worked. Von Mackensen’s reconnaissance aircraft did observe some movement toward the Danube and the stockpile of watercraft at Pueni, but none of the German or Bulgarian headquarters staff drew the correct conclusions from what they saw. The newly formed German LII Army Corps18 headquarters did put some troops on alert and dispatched a battery from Rutschuk to Rjahovo,19 but there is no indication the Germans had any inkling about the crossing.
The first wave of Romanians from the 10th Division crossed in small craft concealed by a light fog at 4 AM on 1 October, facing no opposition. Each regiment brought its machine guns and a few 53mm howitzers. The latter had to be towed by hand and manipulated by their crews, limiting their usefulness, since horses could not come across to take up the towing until the pontoon bridge was complete. Around 5 AM, two tugboats arrived from Giurghiu and started towing pieces of the pontoon bridge into place, and the engineers began its construction. The crossing went smoothly all morning. By 11 AM, the 10th Division had its infantry on the Bulgarian side of the river, and the 21st Division began to board the small watercraft.20
The ability of the Romanians to execute the operation should not have come as a surprise. They had in fact bridged the Danube in their 1913 invasion of Bulgaria, and Austrian army engineers had publicly admired the skill of the undertaking.21 Caught flat-footed, von Mackensen’s 3rd Bulgarian Army had advanced too far into the Dobrogea to render immediate help, throwing the responsibility into the lap of General Robert Kosch’s (1856–1942) LII Corps in Sistov. Kosch had very few assets, but he had two that he immediately ordered into action: aircraft from the 1st Fighter Squadron and the Danube Flotilla.22
The German aircraft arrived first, around 1 PM, and bombed and strafed both the troops waiting on the shore and the soldiers attempting to erect the bridge. They returned to Bulgaria for fuel. The few Romanian pilots in the area made the mistake of trying to defend the bridge site by circling over it, leaving the initiative to the Germans, who simply waited until the Romanian planes left to refuel and then attacked.23 By playing this type of cat-and-mouse game, the Germans killed over 200 officers and 1,000 soldiers. The Romanian ground forces watched in impotent fury. The bombs seriously wounded Lieutenant Colonel Popovici, the engineer in charge of the bridging. General Dumitru Lambru, commander of the 21st Division, personally took over the construction efforts and pressed his staff into assisting the surviving engineers. Nonetheless, Lambru estimated that the German attack cost his advance four hours. The bridge was completed by 7 PM instead of the scheduled 3 PM. At that point, the 21st Division still had one-third of its infantry on the Romanian side of the river: the 61st Regiment and two battalions of the 46th.24 The loss of those hours proved fatal. Just as the Romanians began to cross, a violent storm arose, threatening the safety of anyone on the bridge and forcing a halt to all movement.
Meanwhile, at 10 AM, an alarming telegraph had arrived at the Danube Flotilla headquarters in the Belene Channel: “This morning at 0400 the enemy crossed the Danube at Rjahovo with three companies [of infantry]. Two heavy howitzers and two 90mm field guns already en route.”25 The flotilla commander, Captain Karl Lucich, sent a mine expert, Commander Karl Paulin, overland to Rjahovo to determine the best location from which to launch floating mines against the pontoon bridge. Meanwhile, the III Monitor Group (Bodrog and Körös) under Commander Charles Masjon, two patrol boat sections, a mining squadron, and the German motor launch Weichsel raised steam and departed for Rjahovo in two sections, the patrol boats leaving at 7 PM and the rest at 9 PM. Masjon had orders to destroy the bridge and to prevent the units that had crossed over to the Bulgarian side from returning. The late departure times allowed for an arrival at or close to dawn. The river near the crossing site was shallow, a major concern, and Austrian vessels had not been able to pass through the area as recently as August. The many sandbars and shoals shifted constantly, requiring approaching vessels to sound the depth, thus ruling out a night approach by the monitors. The Austrians also feared, with ample justification, mines and obstacles placed upstream of the bridge. Finally, the river was narrow, restricting both maneuvering and the number of vessels that could approach the bridge closely. A daylight approach offered visibility to adjust fire as well.26
The storm that halted crossing also slowed the progress of the Austrians, both the arrival of those in the vessels making their way to Rjahovo and Commander Paulin’s efforts at launching floating mines. The winds blew all of the mines back to shore.27 As the storm grew in intensity and ferocity, it wreaked havoc with the bridge as well. Wind, rain and lightning scattered the engineers, causing the bridge to sway laterally and pitch up and down, breaking it in three places, rendering passage impossible until the weather subsided. At 3 AM on the 2nd, Kosch’s headquarters radioed Masjon, who had temporarily anchored his vessels because of the storm and zero visibility conditions, informing him that “attacking and destroying the bridge was of decisive importance.”28
Meanwhile, at 5:45 AM the Romanians had repaired the breaks in the bridge and resumed crossing the river. Their artillery led the way. They expected the Bulgarian defenders to start arriving in increasing numbers, and howitzers, field pieces, and machine guns were essential to hold them off. The bridge flooring was damp and slippery, and the wind and rain were up, scaring the draft animals and making them reluctant to cross. The artillery brigade commander, Colonel Petre Peteus, balked, pointing to Colonel Dimitre Warodin (who had finished repairing the bridge) and telling Lambru he would not assume the responsibility of taking his guns across a bridge built by a cavalry officer (Warodin). Lambru looked at Warodin, who said, “If something goes wrong, tie me to a tree and shoot me.”29 The guns started moving across, but very slowly. On the north bank, a queue almost a mile long developed. The water kept rising as the rain came down mercilessly. The area near the bridge and the road soon turned into a morass.30
The storm had not only severely damaged the bridge, but it had also raised the water level of the Danube to the point where the Austrian patrol boats could now cross the barrier the Romanians had constructed two miles upstream of their bridge and eliminated worries about shallow water. At 8 AM the patrol boats Barsch and Viza arrived at Rjahovoa and approached to within 600 feet of the bridge, driving off an enemy battery that had recklessly set up along the bank without any cover. The Austrian boats drew close to the bridge and opened fire with machine guns and small (53mm) cannon, the shrapnel shells inflicting many casualties and scattering the enemy infantry. Romanian artillery zeroed in on the Austrian vessels, and a direct hit on the bridge of Barsch took out her steering, killing three sailors and wounding five. Having expended all their ammunition and unable to launch floating mines owing to the height of the waves, the boats withdrew.31 At 10:30 AM, the monitors Bodrog and Körös arrived, circling two miles upstream of the bridge. Blocked from coming closer by the Romanian barrier on account of their greater draft, the two began a steady bombardment with their 120mm guns, ignoring a hail of fire delivered by the Romanians from both sides of the river. The Romanians brought in as many guns as they could, but the storm had flooded the lowlands behind Lungu and Coreia Islands, hampering movement and ammunition replenishment. Gun positions constructed before the operation were, despite the storm, serviceable for the most part, but when their fire proved inadequate, General Constantin Burghele tried to bring in more heavy weapons. Within the crossing area, only the road constructed from Prundu Belu to the landing site was above water. The arriving guns, pushed off the road into firing positions, gradually sank in the water and mud. The road itself, the sole avenue in and out of the crossing site, soon became so congested that traffic ceased to move.32
At 11 AM, Aversecu ordered a halt to the crossing while he discussed the situation with his staff and the general headquarters. He saw two options: to continue the crossing, with the inevitable casualties, or to suspend operations while he brought up heavy artillery to force the monitors from the scene.33
On the water, Masjon realized his monitors’ guns could not shatter the bridge, so he considered trying to cross the barrier and ramming the bridge. He backed off when he realized the surface of the bridge was higher than the deck of his vessels, which meant the turrets of the monitors, rather than their hulls, would make contact. There was a good chance that the turret guns would snag on the bridge, trapping the Austrian vessels, leaving them immobile and exposed to Romanian fire.
Both sides continued their shelling. Bodrog took five hits and ran behind Taban Island to repair a stuck turret. Körös continued firing until enemy shells severed steam lines and temporarily blinded everyone on her bridge. With no one able to see, the crew ran the vessel aground momentarily on the Romanian side of the river. Körös ended up taking twelve hits. Finally, after a bombardment of five and a half hours, the exhaustion of the crews and the discovery that the Romanians had launched floating mines forced the monitors to leave the scene. The battered vessels withdrew in the late afternoon and started back to their Belene base later that night.34
To the east, Zaionchkovsky’s Dobrogea Army had attacked all along the line running parallel to the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad on 1 October, the day of the river crossing. His orders called for engaging the Bulgarians so they could not free units to send back to the bridge crossing at Rjahovo. If Averescu’s forces succeeded in breaking into the open and advancing to the rear of the 3rd Army, then Zaionchkovsky could attempt to break through and link up with the Romanians. The Dobrogea Army attacked for six days, driving the Bulgarians six to ten miles back in some places. Von Mackensen’s newly arrived and unprepared Turkish VI Army Corps took the brunt of the losses for the Central Powers, whose total casualties exceeded 7,300. The 19th Romanian Division did particularly well, capturing seven artillery pieces, but its losses were high – over 3,000 killed or wounded. The same held true for the 61st Russian Division, which took six guns.35
With the bulk of the 3rd Army struggling to contain Zaionchkovsky’s offensive, von Mackensen had to rely on Kosch’s LII Corps to block the Romanian bridge. From the land side, small forces of Germans, Bulgarians, and Austrians began to arrive. Kosch sent anyone he could find to Rjahovo, and General Toshev found a few units to send despite having to fend off Zaionchkovsky’s assault. The Bulgarians had left nine battalions of infantry behind to garrison Turtucaia and Silistria, and Toshev ordered these battalions to head in forced marches to Rjahovo. Unfortunately for Kosch, many of his units were neither mobile nor configured for combat. He had replacement depots, garrison artillery, supply units, and prisoner guards, but he sent what he had. Elements from the German 217th Division at Dobrich, in transit for the front at Constanta, were instead loaded into trucks and driven back to Rutschuk, arriving on 2 October. They disembarked and started marching toward Rjahovo. In Rutschuk under Colonel Entscheff were three Bulgarian battalions and four batteries, likewise set in motion toward the crossing site. Bulgarian Landsturm units were loaded up, as were three companies of cadets from an officers’ training academy in Schuma. Most arrived late in the afternoon of the 2nd,36 and by then the situation was almost in hand, thanks to the work of the storm, the aircraft, and the Austrian Danube Flotilla.
That afternoon, Averscu went to Peris to advise the king that the crossing was not going to work. Blaming the weather, he proposed changing the operation from a major undertaking designed to sever the enemy’s principal lines of communication to what he called a demonstration. Averescu suggested constructing another bridge over the Danube at Turtucaia. This concept drew the criticism of the operations division of the staff, with one of the officers moaning that given the situation in Transylvania, where von Falkenhayn had just taken Sibiu and threatened Brasov, the headquarters could “not allow the immobilization of five divisions by five enemy monitors.”37
Averescu prevailed, however, and he issued his orders for shrinking the bridgehead later that afternoon. “The Danube crossing operations of the 3rd Army,” he wrote, “will take … the character of a demonstration while retaining the appearance of a real operation.” All the artillery that had been moved to the south side of the Danube was to be brought back as quickly as possible, but under covers or tarps so the enemy would not realize the extent of the withdrawal. The 10th Division would secure the area around the bridgehead, while the other units retreated.38
Averescu’s plan to retain the bridgehead with a reduced number of troops had some merit. Von Mackensen could not tolerate a Romanian salient threatening his critical lines of communication. The German leader would have to take some action, which would relieve the pressure on Zaionchkovsky. Unfortunately, the deteriorating situation in Transylvania ruled out any further Romanian offensives in the Dobrogea. Ferdinand agreed with his staff about the seriousness of the developments to the north and ordered Averescu to release the 22nd Division to the 1st Army and the 21st Division to the 2nd Army.39 The departure of these divisions meant the end of any offensive operations along the Danube, and Averescu and 3rd Army Commander General Gheorghe Valeanu directed the closing down of the Flamanda operation. Zaionchkovsky was told to adopt a defensive position. The Group of Southern Armies was disbanded on 8 October.40
On 2 October, while Monitor Group II (under Masjon) slugged it out with the Romanians, Groups I and IV (under Lieutenant Commander Olaf Wulff) had departed from Belene, towing barges with filled with ammunition, coal, and petroleum to be set on fire and floated down river to the Romanian bridge. Enemy shore batteries opposite the east end of the Belene Channel on Cinghinarele Island holed the coal barge, forcing Group I to run for cover to make repairs, while Group IV dared not risk shell fire hitting the fuel barge and had to wait until nightfall to head downstream. The two groups arrived at Rjahovo during the morning of the 3rd. They discovered that the Romanians had repaired the previous day’s damage to the bridge, and enemy troops were streaming across it – but they were marching back to the Romanian side. Meanwhile, Army Group von Mackensen had learned from a captured Romanian colonel that Averescu had ordered a retreat and had even agreed to abandon his artillery on the Bulgarian side of the river if necessary. Von Mackensen frantically called for destroying the bridge at all costs to thwart the enemy’s retreat. His staff suggested using fire ships if necessary to burn the bridge.41
Monitor Groups I and IV had brought good weather with them, and Szamos, located some two miles upstream, near Taban Island, released a number of floating mines. So did the patrol boat Compó. Around 11 AM came a series of mighty explosions, ripping enormous gaps in the bridge in three separate locations. Joined by Leitha, the monitors kept the remnants of the bridge under fire until dark on the 3rd, preventing the Romanians from making repairs and escaping. As night fell, the Monitor Group I relieved Group IV. Group I had brought along two empty barges, partially flooded to ensure a low profile in the water but otherwise filled with demolitions. The men released the barges into the current and heard five large explosions an hour or two later, but darkness kept them from ascertaining the damage.42 Around 11 PM word came that Bulgarian-German forces had taken Rjahovo. More alarming, at 1 AM a radio message indicated that the Romanian monitor flotilla was heading up the Danube and was already north of Turtucaia. At 4 AM, orders came from the LII Corps to finish destroying the bridge and any related material left on the shore, then head for the barrier at Kalimok.43 Darkness prevented the Austrian monitors from departing until daylight, but by midday it was clear that the news about approaching Romanian monitors was false. The flotilla returned to the base at Belene.
A nasty surprise awaited the vessels. At the east opening of the Belene Channel lay Cinghinarele Island, a low-lying land mass about a third of a mile wide and two and a half miles long, behind which stretched impenetrable swamps and marshes for several kilometers before the high ground at Fantanele, on the Romanian side of the river. The Romanians had put artillery at Fantanele, but their bombardment of the Belene base had done little damage because forests on Persin Island blocked direct observation. The Romanian occupation of Cinghinarele at the end of September somewhat rectified that failure, allowing partial viewing for artillery spotters. Averescu had put an infantry company and two artillery batteries (six guns in all) on Cinghinarele. The monitors had successfully gotten around the artillery on Cinghinarele when leaving the Belene base for Rjahovo; what was new when they returned was a minefield blocking the entrance into the base at the Belene Channel. The monitors could not risk attempting a passage, so they returned downstream to wait at Lelek. Clearing the minefield was impossible as long as the Romanians had the six guns on the shore. The Austrians decided to drive the Romanians off the island, but their infantry could not cross to Cinghinarele until the artillery there was silenced. That mission fell to the Monitor Group II (Inn and Sava), along with a 100mm artillery battery that was already on Persin Island. With the fire support of the monitors and the German artillery on both the 7th and 8th, a combined force of German infantry and Austrian combat engineers overran Cinghinarele on the 8th, capturing six guns, 130 prisoners, and related equipment. The flotilla’s minesweeping detachment then cleared the channel, allowing the entry of Monitor Groups I and III, which had been waiting at Lelek after their successful operations against the Romanian bridgehead at Rjahovo.44
With the Romanians driven back across the Danube and facing a crisis in Transylvania, von Mackensen could concentrate on overrunning their defenses in front of the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad. He had received some reinforcements: the Turkish VI Army Corps. Von Mackensen liked the Turks and had a higher opinion of them than of his Bulgarian allies, but the Turks were not ready for combat. Many of them had arrived half-trained, without weapons, and in civilian clothes. Consequently, the Germans had to outfit them with everything and complete their training before they could be used. They learned fast, noted von Mackensen, and they always came through in a tight spot, but their performance depended on the caliber of their officers. Fortunately for the Germans, many Turkish officers had trained in Germany before the war. Von Mackensen thought the commander of the VI Corps, General Hilmi Pasha, was “top notch and prudent.”45
While the Turks trained, the rest of von Mackensen’s paltry reinforcements arrived in driblets, much to his annoyance. The lines of communication were poor, with the Bulgarian rail lines being the Achilles’ heel. Delays forced him to postpone his offensive from the 11th to the 17th and finally to the 19th, as he waited for his heavy artillery and the full complement of the German 217th Division. On the 18th, von Mackensen inspected his units, planning to attack all along the Cernavdoa-Constanta line. He wrote in his diary that the German units had his confidence and that he wished he had just one more German division. “Both the Bulgarians and Turks,” he noted, “call for ‘Germanskis.’ They want German soldiers standing next to them. But I cannot spread the German units everywhere.” Instead, he formed his forces into two large columns, weighting the one on the right and assigning it the mission of making the decisive thrust east of the Cara Omer-Medgidia rail junction toward Topraisar and Constanta. Led by General Kantardjiev, this force consisted of the Bulgarian 1st Cavalry Division, the Varna Defense Force, and a brigade of the 6th Infantry Division along with the German 217th Division. This column enjoyed better lines of communication. The left column, under Toshev, had the Bulgarian 4th Division, the bulk of the 6th Division, and the Turkish VI Army Corps. Its mission was to capture the King Carol Bridge.46
Von Mackensen’s frustration with assembling his forces paled, compared to that of his opponent, Zaionchkovsky, who had seen his reinforcements come and go along with his welcome at Stavka. By the end of September, the Romanian Army Command had shifted the bulk of forces to the Dobrogea to reverse the situation there. The 2nd, 5th, 12th, and 15th Divisions came from Transylvania, joining the 9th and 19th Divisions already in Zaionchkovsky’s Dobrogea Army.47 On top of these, he had his own Russian divisions (the 1st Cavalry and the 61st and 115th Infantry Divisions) and the Serb Division. At the end of the month, the 3rd Rifle Division arrived from Russia, giving Zaionchkovsky an army of eleven divisions, almost three times larger than the forces facing him. Von Mackensen had the 1st, 4th, and 6th Bulgarian Divisions and the Varna Defense Force. The newly formed German 217th Infantry Division, composed of soldiers culled from garrison duties inside Germany, had just arrived.48
The reversal of the Romanian crossing of the Danube and the rout of the 2nd Romanian Army at Brasov had led to consternation in Peris. The Romanians begged the Russians for help. Awakening to the seriousness of the situation, Alexseyev had ordered Zaionchkovsky to send one of his elite units north, and the Romanians pulled out two of their divisions as well, leaving the distraught Dobrogea commander with the worn-out, “ragged” ones. He poured out his ire on Alexseyev. The Romanians should be prevented from taking their best divisions, he wrote. The ones they left him had “little skill and will.” With all the good units taken from his army,49 he cried that he now had an insufficient number of units to hold the line, making it doubtful he could hold on to Constanta. It might be time, he added, to “spit on the Romanians” and give priority to watching out for Russian interests. Prompting this angry exchange was the transfer of the Russian 3rd Rifle Division to Transylvania in response to the request for help. Zaionchkovsky had offered Stavka his battered and under-strength 61st Division, but Alexseyev sent the fresh 3rd Rifles.50 The tendency of Zaionchkovsky to view matters from his perspective alone had thoroughly taxed Alekseyev’s patience. The Russian chief of staff told Zaionchkovsky “to have confidence in the fact that the big picture is more important than [your] local concerns” and to stop bombarding Stavka with worst-case scenarios and instead stick to “frank reports describing the real situation.”51
Alekseyev’s outburst is even more forgivable given the numerical preponderance that the Army of the Dobrogea had over von Mackensen’s 3rd Bulgarian Army. The Russian chief bluntly told his compatriot that “you have sufficient forces at your disposal, and [I expect that] with your experience and resolution you will employ them in appropriate groups that will minimize the inexperience of the young Romanian soldiers.”52 Unfortunately, when von Mackensen’s offensive began a few days later, the Russian and Romanian reinforcements destined for Transylvania were in the worst possible place – on trains between the two fronts.
Stymied, Zaionchkovsky organized his forces along a line some fifty long. The Russian general had divided his sector into three zones. The smaller two zones on each flank contained the bulk of his defenders. The wide, center zone was the weakest. Zaionchkovsky had spent his time and labor fortifying his flanks, confident the German-Bulgarian attack would try to turn them. He possessed ninety-three battalions: forty-four on the Constanta flank, twenty battalions in the long stretch between Cernavoda and Constanta, and another seventeen at the Cernavoda bridgehead. The remaining twelve battalions of infantry and twenty-four cavalry squadrons formed his reserve, which he kept near his headquarters at Medgidia. The Romanian monitor flotilla provided artillery support to the right flank of the Army of the Dobrogea, and on the opposite side of the region, Russian naval vessels in Constanta reinforced the artillery of the Romanian divisions holding the city. From Cernavoda to Constanta, Zaionchkovsky had stationed the Romanian 2nd and 12th Divisions, the Russian 115th, a regiment from the 3rd Rifle Division, and the Romanian 9th and 19th Divisions. The Romanian 5th Division, the remainder of the 3rd Rifles, the Serbs, and the Russian 61st Division filled out the reserve, along with a Russian cavalry division, the 5th.
Von Mackensen began his offensive on 19 October. He established his command post on an ancient burial ground just behind the attacking right wing and near General Kantardjiev’s headquarters at Gheringer. Von Mackensen wrote that from a water tower on the railroad at Cobadinu, he could see the entire front to the coast.53 The attack met with powerful resistance all along the line. General Paul Liebeskind’s (1857–1918) 217th Division had a particularly hard time at Topraisar. At other places gains were made, and the Turkish VI Corps did well on the west flank. Zaionchkovsky thought the Bulgarians were holding back, probing the flanks while advancing very slowly, expecting him to make his usual turn from an advanced center position to attack one of their exposed flanks. When the Bulgarians realized that Zaionchkovsky was no longer trying to crush their exposed flanks, they unleashed all their forces. It became clear to Zaionchkovsky that he could not hold Constanta much longer, and he told his chief of staff, General Nikolai Augustovich Monkevits, to ask the Southwest Front’s staff for reinforcements.54
Zaionchkovsky had good reason to be concerned. The fastest way for reinforcements to reach him was via rail, and the only railroad into the region passed over the King Carol Bridge, clearly the object of the left flank of von Mackensen’s forces. If that fell, getting reserves into the area meant ferrying them across the Danube. In addition to serving as the avenue for reinforcements, the bridge also was the exit route. If the enemy captured the bridge, all of Zaionchkovsky’s forces would be trapped in the northern Dobrogea, between the bridgeless Danube and the Black Sea. Again, ferries were the solution, but sending soldiers across a river on barges and small craft under enemy pressure was truly a nightmare scenario. The Russian general had recognized this situation when he arrived in August, and he had had two pontoon bridges erected, one at Hirsova and the other at Braila. He had also badgered the Southwest Front and Stavka for more service and support troops, but Alexseyev, hostile to the entire Romanian operation, had turned a deaf ear.55
General M. S. Pustovoitenko, the deputy chief of staff at Stavka, understood the danger a little better and ordered the recall of the 3rd Rifle Division, which was then en route to Transylvania, and arranged for water transportation to move 6,000 soldiers. The transport craft were sent to the Danube port of Reni, on the Russian side of the northern Dobrogea. In addition, Pustovoitenko indicated that the IV Siberian Corps would arrive soon. A follow-up conversation later that day between Monkevits and General Dukhonin, chief of staff of the Southwest Front, revealed that the latter still did not understand the seriousness of the situation. When Monkevits stated that the Army of the Dobrogea had no reserves left and his commander (Zaionchkovsky) feared the battle could not be turned to his favor, Dukhonin said retreat from the defense lines could not be undertaken without Stavka’s approval. At the same time, he dismissed von Mackensen’s offensive as a “preparatory operation for the major one.”56 Monkevits could only point out that time and distance worked inexorably against the movement of reinforcements; they were arriving in the Dobrogea at a rate of two to three battalions per day,57 an insignificant number.
On the 21st the German 217th Division successfully stormed Topraisar, breaking the Russians’ back. Soon thereafter Cobadinu fell, rupturing Zaionchkovsky’s main line. Von Mackensen claimed victory that afternoon, which was confirmed the next morning as the Romanians abandoned their positions along the line of the Trajan Wall outside Constanta. Both Russian and Romanian units gradually began to pull back behind the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad.
As the Central Powers approached Constanta, von Mackensen noted that haze covered everything. A direct hit from an artillery piece had caused a petroleum tank to explode and burn on the edge of the city, throwing enormous clouds of dark smoke over the battlefield. He could see the wide swale in which an arm of the Danube had once run to Constanta. The hollow now held the rail link to that city. As the fog began to lift, Constanta slowly became visible. Its white minarets emerged first, then the rest of the city’s varied buildings, and, finally, the Black Sea. A Russian naval squadron was fleeing the harbor. Von Mackensen could see the flash of their broadsides, but their salvoes did not reach the Germans or the troops advancing from Tuzla on the far right flank.
Von Mackensen said he would never forget that scene. He could see enemy army and naval units simultaneously engaged, a rare sight, and all of the army’s branches as well – artillery, cavalry, and infantry operating interdependently. In the background, the white city of Constanta and the dark waters of the Black Sea shimmered through the haze and smoke. The three nationalities of von Mackensen’s army were in competition with one another to see who was best. All the troops gave their utmost, but he thought the Turks did really well. He then went to the left flank of his army to see what was going on near the King Carol Bridge and to issue orders. “There was a lot to do,” he wrote, “but already my thoughts had begun to swing from the Dobrogea toward Bucharest.”58
Constanta fell on the 22nd, Medgidia the next day, and Cernavoda and the Danube bridge on the 24th. Zaionchkovsky notified the Romanian headquarters that he intended to retreat north from the bridge, but Iliescu insisted that it had to be demolished first. Romanian engineers blew up the span, but the massive towers remained unharmed.59 The booty captured by the Central Powers in their offensive was significant: 6,600 prisoners, twelve artillery pieces, fifty machine guns, railway equipment and cars, and the valuable oil and grain storage facilities at Constanta.60 The silos and storage tanks were filled.
On the 26th, von Mackensen walked across the bridge at Cernavoda. Examining it closely, he concluded that neither the German bombers nor the fleeing Romanians had permanently damaged it. Nonetheless, it would not withstand the passage of troops or trains for many weeks. He then left for Toshev’s headquarters, to discuss the situation with Crown Prince Boris and his Bulgarian generals. From there, he issued orders for the infantry to take a rest and for the cavalry to run down the fleeing Romanians and Russians. Cold rain and impassable roads forced them to call off the chase on 4 November.61
In abandoning the positions along the Cernavoda-Constanta railroad, Zaionchkovsky had instructed his subordinates to retreat far enough north to place them two days in front of their pursuers.62 The Russian units escaping along the Danube through the city of Hirsova stumbled across quantities of alcohol, and discipline collapsed. The drunken soldiers looted and ransacked the city, tormenting the inhabitants and angering the Romanian government. The fleeing soldiers continued north and, joined by the usual terrified hordes of refugees and their herds of livestock, clogged the roads, contributing immeasurably to the confusion, and threatening to cut off the Russian line of retreat. It took Zaionchkovsky a day or so to regain control over his army. He managed to bring things to a halt along a line from twelve miles above Hirsova on the Danube to Lake Golovitsa on the Black Sea.63
The Russian retreat north of Hirsova ended the patience of the Romanians. Iliescu wrote Alexseyev on 25 October, asking him to replace Zaionchkovsky. The drunken looting in Hirsova was the final blow as well for Alexseyev. First, he first ordered General Vladimir Sakharov to head south to the Dobrogea to take command. Stavka also sent reinforcements; the IV Army Corps crossed the Danube from Russia into the Dobrogea at Reni.64 Next, Alexseyev telegraphed Zaionchkovsky on the 28th, expressing his anger over the reports he had received about Hirsova. He told Zaionchkovsky that he held him personally responsible for restoring discipline “with a severe hand.” There could also be no further retreat; he must hold where he now stood at all costs. There was also no question where the blame would go. “Your retreat north,” wrote Alexseyev, “has created for now and for the immediate future an extremely dangerous situation … I can only assume this move was done under duress.”65 A follow-up telegram was more direct: “You were given everything that could be given under the circumstances … so it is very difficult for me to comprehend the disorder, the chaotic administration, and breaking contact with the enemy…. I am not going to waste words … belaboring the obvious; the crisis demands energetic action to restore order.”66
Zaionchkovsky set up his defenses on a line running across the Dobrogea from just above Hirsova to Topolog, in the center of the region, and to Lake Golovitsa, bordering on the Black Sea. In the zone between the Danube and Topolog, he placed the 2nd and 5th Romanian Divisions and some regiments from the arriving 4th Siberian Corps, with General Sirelius in command. In his eastern sector, he located the 115th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. Zaionchkovsky retained the Serbian Division for his reserve, but all in all, his army was in sad shape. Between the pounding it had taken from von Mackensen’s forces and the chaotic retreat north, the Army of the Dobrogea had simply fallen apart. Zaionchkovsky reported that the rifle regiments had 2,500 men each, while the two Siberian regiments numbered around 1,000 each, as did the 115th Division. The Romanians were in better shape, with 8,000 men on average in each division, and the 61st Division had 3,000. The Serbian Division had disintegrated: it was down to 800 soldiers.67
On 30 October, Alexseyev relieved Zaionchkovsky and replaced him with Vladimir Viktorovitch Sakharov (1853–1920), an experienced army commander. He had led the 11th Army since 1915 and had taken the city of Brody in May. In a draconian order of the day announcing his assumption of command, Sakharov noted with dismay the panicked, disorganized retreat of the Danube Army. He called on the soldiers “to remember that we are sent here by the Emperor to fight against the enemy and not to run and retreat, especially without any orders.” To ensure that such actions would not be repeated, he authorized commanders to establish military police units in the rear of the lines and to use deadly force if necessary to block unauthorized withdrawals.68
Sakharov’s admonitions had the desired effect. In fact, his forces now styled the Danube Army counterattacked and retook Hirsova and some territory on the opposing north side of the Danube by the 10th of November.69 The Russians and the Romanians in the Dobrogea, however, no longer faced the first team of the Central Powers. Von Mackensen had left the front on the first of the month, with the German 217th Division and the Turkish VI Corps. He had left the Bulgarian 1st Army in the Dobrogea and had moved back to his base at Tirnova. Preparations for crossing the Danube and marching on the enemy capital in conjunction with the 9th Army was now the top priority. Von Mackensen nonetheless did not feel comfortable leaving Toshev in charge. The Bulgarian general had disappointed him, so he appointed a German officer, Colonel Karl von Dunker (1868–1946), as chief of staff of Toshev’s army.70 On the 25th, the Bulgarians replaced Toshev with General Stefan Nerezov.71
The guns of the Danube Flotilla and the bombs of the 1st Fighter Squadron had smashed Averescu’s pontoon bridge to pieces, along with his daring attempt to cut the German-Bulgarian lines of communication in the Dobrogea. Von Mackensen’s army had then breached the Russian-Romanian defenses along the critical Cernovoda-Constanta railroad, forcing their enemy to abandon Romania’s sole deep-water port and to destroy the only bridge across the lower Danube. Even more traumatic, both of von Mackensen’s Dobrogea campaigns had compelled the Romanian High Command to call off offensives in Transylvania and to transfer large numbers of forces to the south of the country, where they spent most of their time in trains and trucks and were of little use to anyone. Romanian losses were substantial. Although the Germans had no way of knowing Romanian casualties, they captured 513 officers and 37,600 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, along with 170 artillery pieces and 170 machine guns.72 Von Mackensen had managed to get age-old mortal enemies, the Bulgarians and Turks, to pull together in harness. It was no wonder that the kaiser recognized his achievements by naming Infantry Regiment No. 129, after him. Von Mackensen wrote proudly in his diary that for a Prussian officer, this was the highest possible honor.73