IV SENT D. 1, P. 1
DISTINCTION ONE

CONCERNING THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

PART ONE
CONCERNING THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

This book, book four, is divided into two parts. The first treats the sacraments according to the health they provide.¹ The second treats the glory toward which the sacraments dispose,² which begins below in distinction 43 at the words “Finally concerning the condition of the resurrection.”

The first part of book four, which treats the sacraments according to the health they provide, also has two parts. The first defines sacraments in general; the second considers sacraments in particular, which begins below in the second distinction at the words “Now let us approach the sacraments of the new law.”

The first part on the sacraments in general, which contains this present distinction, is divided into three sections. There is the introductory first section. Then, the second section lays out the principal part on the sacraments in general, beginning below at this point in the text: “A sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality.” The third deals with the implications of the second, beginning at the words “But there was among those sacraments a certain….”

In the introductory first section there are two points. The first, by means of a comparison, shows the instituitive cause of the sacraments. The second point speaks of those things which are generally determinative of sacraments, beginning at the words “Concerning which four things must first be considered.”

In the second and principal section, which pronounces on the sacraments in general, there are likewise four sections according to the four things which the Master³ set forth for determination. First of all, he determines what a sacrament is. Second, he determines why it was instituted, beginning at the words “The sacraments were instituted for a threefold reason.” Third, he determines in what it was instituted, beginning at the words “But there are two in which….” In the last section he determines the difference between the new and the old, beginning at the words “Now it remains to see the difference….”

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

In order to understand the things that are set forth in this first division of book four, the first question asks about the sacraments in general. There is inquiry about the institution of the sacraments; second, about their signification; third, about their content; fourth, about their efficacy; fifth, about the difference between new and old sacraments; sixth, about the grace bestowed in them.

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 1
ARTICLE ONE

CONCERNING THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

QUESTION ONE

ON THE INSTITUTION OF SACRAMENTS

The first question proceeds in the following manner. It would seem that sacraments should not have been instituted:

1. First of all it seems inappropriate for God, because re-creating or repairing is greater than creating. Therefore, if God reserves to himself alone the power to create, so much more, it would seem, the power to repair. Therefore, it would seem that God alone should be the medical doctor and the medicine. Therefore, no sacraments are needed.

2. Likewise, an inferior nature always makes do with fewer things whenever it can do so in good fashion. In this it is praiseworthy, because the greater way lies in the fewer things. Therefore, this should be applied also to the highest nature. If, therefore, humans can be sufficiently restored through faith and the virtues, it would thus be superfluous to supply the sacraments.

3. Likewise it does not seem expedient for one who is ill, because it is so much better for the sick person to have more and broader ways to arrive at good health. This person is in greater danger when the way to health is constricted. However, with the institution of the sacraments there is no other way of arriving at health except through the sacraments. Before, there was every way by which the sick disposed themselves for grace. Therefore, the institution of the sacraments narrows the ways.

4. Again, although it is not burdensome for a healthy nature to keep laws, it is nevertheless burdensome for a fallen nature. Thus, multiplication of laws does nothing but increase the burden. If there were only moral precepts, then it would be easier to arrive at salvation. Therefore the institution of the sacraments beyond these moral precepts does nothing but weigh down and obstruct the way to salvation.

To the contrary: a) The sick have need of something more than the healthy need.⁴ Therefore, it is appropriate that something more be given as a cure for restoration to health than would have been necessary if they had not fallen. This something more is nothing other than the sacraments. Otherwise the sick would [not] also have grace, and virtues and gifts; therefore, etc.⁵

b) Likewise, because men and women were ignorant, it was opportune and appropriate to provide them a record or legal document of the precepts. Therefore, since men and women were ill, for the same reason, they were also given sacramental medicines.

c) Again, human nature had fallen in soul and in body. In order that human nature be fully restored it was fitting that God take on the totality of human nature. Therefore if medicines are to correspond with the effect of restoration, it was fitting that the medicine be comprised of something corporeal and spiritual. Such are the sacraments. Therefore the sacraments ought to have been instituted.

d) Again, every religion, as Augustine says in Contra Faustum, has some external signs in which people come together to worship God.⁶ This is apparent by reviewing them individually, even the idolatrous ones. If, therefore, the Church must have sacred signs of religion that befit itself, and if such are signs of a sacred and sanctifying res, then it was fitting that God institute the sacraments.⁷

I respond: It must be said that the institution of the sacraments was fitting for God and advantageous for us. Indeed it befitted God’s mercy and justice and wisdom, which mark every way of the Lord.

It befitted his mercy because, on account of the changeableness of human will, humanity poorly kept his grace. Therefore, God instituted the sacraments to which humanity could have recourse to recover God’s grace. Thus, it was a great act of mercy, chiefly because the sacraments not only provide the remission of fault, but also the remission of penalty.

It befitted God’s justice as well, because since he is just he required some humiliation through which man would dispose himself toward grace. Thus, by receiving the sacraments he would find grace as if from a kind of covenant.

It was also befitting God’s wisdom. This is because it is of the highest wisdom to find a remedy in the very things that were the occasion of the fall, such that just as humans fell through wood, so through wood would they find the healthful remedy. Thus, because humans had taken the occasion for the fall from visible things, it befitted divine wisdom to find the remedy in the same things.

This was advantageous on the part of the sick people, because they were blind with respect to being able to consider things rightly. Therefore, visible sacraments were given to them for their education. Humans were also carried away by proneness to anger. Therefore, corporeal sacraments were given them for their humiliation. They were also despicable with respect to their lusts so that they had no taste for spiritual things. Therefore, sacraments were given to them for training,⁸ lest they give rise in themselves to contempt or boredom, and this by perceiving one thing only or by contemplating only spiritual things.

It was, therefore, necessary to institute the sacraments, by the necessity of congruity but not of inevitability, because “God did not bind his power to the sacraments,” as the Master says in one place.⁹

To the objections: 1. To the objection that he did not communicate the power to create, it must be said that creation is from non-being. Therefore in it neither the power to dispose nor the power to inform is necessary, but only the power to effect. Wherefore, etc. However, because justification is the bettering of some being, it can be informative and dispositive and effective. It does not befit God to inform; therefore he gave this to the creature as grace. To dispose is ours with God’s help, but to effect is God’s alone. Therefore he does not share effective power with anything, but he gives informative power to grace, and dispositive power in the sacraments.¹⁰

2. To the objection that the nobler thing is to operate with fewer things, it must be said that this is true as long as the operation can be accomplished equally well with fewer things. This is because our restoration does not come about solely through the power of the doer, but also through the congruity of the recipient. Therein lie mercy and truth, and so not only must there be justification through informative grace,¹¹ which is through the virtues, but likewise through preparation, which is through the sacraments. In other words, as Hugh says, “The virtues are arms for battle, the sacraments for defense.”¹² Hence the sacraments are a help to grace, and so are not superfluous. This is apparent because grace abolishes the fault, but does not excuse from the punishment. The sacrament of Baptism joined to grace frees from the punishment.

3. To the objection that the way to health would be easier, it must be said that although before the sacraments there were many ways to health, nonetheless none of these ways were as good, none as useful, and none as efficacious. Besides, humanity was unaware of the many ways and was lazy in searching them out. Therefore it was fitting and expedient that a better way be shown to them and that they be invited to it by a precept. This is especially so because humanity was necessarily in need of the effect of the sacrament.

4. To the objection that the commandments are burdensome to weakened nature, it must be said that there is an onerous burden and an uplifting burden, as are wings for birds and chariots for horses. The first burden is indeed one that weighs down. However, the second burden, though it is in itself a burden, does not weigh the bearer down. So it is with this commandment. By carrying this burden, though it is weighty, virtue is renewed in the fallen. It is a burden that nonetheless lightens because it is an aid to virtue. Such are the sacraments, in which are found the grace which fortifies and makes the commandments easy.

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 2
QUESTION TWO

THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE SACRAMENTS

Second, the sacraments are investigated according to their signification. That signification is of the essence or integrity of the sacrament is shown:

a) First of all by the definition or notification which the Master places in his text, “A sacrament is the sign of something sacred.”¹³

b) Likewise Hugh, in his book De sacramentis, says, “A sacrament is a material element that represents by likeness, and signifies by institution.”¹⁴ Therefore, if a sacrament has its being from its institution, and is instituted for the sake of signifying, then signification is essential to it.

c) Again, the sacraments were instituted “for our instruction,” according to what Hugh says,¹⁵ and the Master also touches upon this in his text.¹⁶ This instruction is not for corporeal things, but for spiritual things. However, the sacraments are corporeal and do not lead into spiritual things except by reason of signifying. This is because by offering themselves to the senses they cause one to come to another kind of knowledge; therefore, etc.

d) Again, a sacrament is an element. Therefore, it is either a purely corporeal element, or together with this it has something spiritual to say. That it is not purely corporeal is obvious. Therefore along with this it has something spiritual to say. This something spiritual is joined to it either according to truth or according to intention. It is not according to truth, since it is not capable, as will be proven below.¹⁷ Therefore, this something spiritual is united to the corporeal by intention. However, to be joined by intent is to be joined as the signified is joined to the sign. Therefore, signification itself belongs to the integrity of the sacraments.

To the contrary: 1. Sacraments are principally instituted for curing. However, to the end that some medicine is a curative agent, its signification of the cure contributes nothing. It suffices only that it cure. Thus a sacrament can be a perfect medicine even without signification. Therefore signification does not belong to the integrity of the sacrament.

2. Again, if a sacrament is a medicine,¹⁸ it can in some way be a cause. But a cause is not the sign of an effect. Indeed, a cause is connected to what is signified. Therefore, it is characteristic of a sacrament to be signified rather than to signify.¹⁹

3. Again, if the sign belongs to the integrity of the sacrament, then what it does not signify is not a sacrament. Thus, for the persons for whom it does not signify anything, it is not a sacrament. Since the sacrament of Baptism signifies nothing to an infant, it is not a sacrament for the infant. Therefore when an infant receives Baptism, it does not receive the sacrament. But this is absurd; so the sign does not belong to the integrity of the sacrament.

4. Again, if it is a sign, it is either demonstrative or prognostic or commemorative. It can only be demonstrative, because it effects what it stands for, or at least if it does not effect it, then since the sign and the signified are relative, they are alike in nature, and therefore if the sign is present, so is the signified. But it would not seem to be demonstrative, because, if it is, when it demonstrates that grace is present and it is not present, then it appears to be a false sign, and therefore a false sacrament.

5. Again, if it is a sign, it is either natural or voluntary [e.g., chosen]. If it is natural, then the sacraments are of nature. If this is so, since what is natural is the same for everyone, then so too the sacraments. That is certainly false. If it is voluntary, then, it is changeable, increasing and decreasing all day long, which is apparent in styles of speech. Therefore, by the same token it would seem that the sacraments can be changed at will. You might say that they are voluntary by divine will. However, so are other created things and everything that is under the sun. Therefore, they should not for this reason be called voluntary signs. If they are, then by the same token so are other created things.

I respond: To understand the preceding it must be noted that sacramental medicine has, of its integrity, signification. This is common and essential to all the sacraments.

The reason, I believe, is this: sacramental medicine is a sufficient medication. This is because the fallen fell not only into proneness to concupiscence but also into the blindness of ignorance. Therefore in order to be cured of both of these through the sacrament, the sacrament ought to have not only something freely given, but also something mystical. Thus sacraments are both figurative and significative. Again, because it is a medicine sufficient in itself, it bears within it its own preparation. Hence just as a bodily medicine is of no advantage unless the recipient is prepared, so also it is necessary to be prepared spiritually. Faith disposes one so that the sacraments might be health-giving. The movement of faith is aroused through the delivery of the sign, so that something signified is required, and, through this, one is disposed toward healing. Therefore as an effective and sufficient medicine, sacramental medicine has signification in its integrity. And so, essentially speaking, a sacrament is a sign.²⁰

To the objections: 1. And through this it is clear that the arguments of the respondeo and the first objection, which deal with corporeal medicine, are not the same.

2. To the objection that a cause is not a sign of the effect, it must be said that that is true when the character of signifying follows after the character of causation. However, in the sacraments it is the opposite; the signifying precedes. Or it could be said that this is true in cases which truly and properly have the character of cause and effect. For the true nature of a cause is prior, hence further from our senses.²¹ Thus because signification occurs through what is closer to us, we signify the cause through the effect, not vice versa.²² But this is not true in our case. A sacrament does not truly have the character of a cause, nor grace the character of an effect. Grace is higher than our senses, and the corporeal is nearer to us. Therefore grace is rightly signified through the latter, and not vice versa.²³ But that position has its merit in the case of a true cause.

3. To the objection that a sacrament signifies nothing to an infant, it must be said that a sign has a double point of comparison: both to that which it signifies and to whom it signifies. The first is essential and possesses it always in the act itself (in actu). However, it possesses the second in the disposition of the recipient (in habitu). Thus from the first it is said to be a sign, not from the second. Hence a crown above a tavern is always a sign even if no one looks at it. Thus a sacrament is always a sign even if no one recognizes it. However, the case is not yet solved, because, although it is a sign, it does not signify to this one.²⁴ Wherefore it must be said that just as for infants the faith of another suffices, so it suffices that it be signified in someone else. Thus, although it does not signify to them in themselves, it still signifies in another.

4. To the objection in which type of sign they are contained, it must be said that some sacraments have signified what was to come, such as legal matters; others, what had passed, such as our sacraments, which signify the passion [of Christ] in the past, as the Glossa on Romans 6:4 says: You have been buried with, etc. “Whatever was done on the cross of Christ, not only in what was said but acted as well, is represented.”²⁵ In that gloss, the writer is speaking of the sacraments. They are also demonstrative signs, because they signify what they provide. Hence they have a double signification: their own, and an allegorical one. They have their own signification with respect to the present, but allegorical with respect to the past. What is therefore objected, that the sign and the thing signified are both of the same nature, it must be said that this is true under the aspect of sign, but not necessarily so linked under the aspect of the underlying reality. For this intent of signs does not posit a reality’s existence except in the soul.

Likewise, to the objection that if they are demonstrative, then they are false, it must be said that a sign has a twofold truth, as Anselm says: one by reason of its institution, another by its use.²⁶ It has a truth by reason of its institution, because it was imposed upon it to signify this. This truth cannot be changed. Its other truth is according to its use, namely when in usage it signifies what it was instituted for. This second truth is the truth it loses when grace is not present. Therefore the sacramental sign as far as the first is always true. Likewise, as far as the second it is always true with respect to its own part or even that of the giver, but it is obstructed only on the part of the recipient. Then the sacrament is not falsified, but the one who receives it wrongly is judged to be false and a pretender.

5. To the objection that it is not natural but voluntary, it must be said that a sacrament has its capacity for signification from nature, but it has its actualization from its institution. Hence Hugh says there are three things in a sacrament, “its likeness from creation, its signification from its institution, and its sanctification from blessing. The first is implanted through the Creator, the second is added on through the Savior, the third is administered through the Dispenser.”²⁷ To the objection that what is voluntary to God is natural to us, it must be said that this is true, if it gives to something not only that it reside in it, but also that it be in it in such wise that it be from the principles of the subject.²⁸ Since such reasoning does not hold in the sacraments, they are therefore truly and properly voluntary. And thus it is apparent that the sacraments are signs and that the manner in which they signify is by way of signs

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 3
QUESTION THREE

THE CONTENT OF THE SACRAMENTS

Third, it is asked whether the sacraments contain grace. And that they do appears from these:

1. Upon the passage Psalm 18:11, He made darkness his covering, the Glossa says, “Divinity was hidden in the flesh, the remission of sins in Baptism.”²⁹ Since divinity was truly in the flesh, therefore the remission of sins is in Baptism. Therefore since the former was through grace, there is grace also in Baptism.

2. Likewise Hugh, in part 9, clearly says that five things combine to heal persons, namely, “God the doctor, the sick one, the priest as minister or messenger, grace the antidote,” and last he says that “the sacrament is a vase,” and adds, “Why? Because it contains grace as a vase holds medicine.”³⁰

3. Again, the same Hugh in the definition of a sacrament clearly says that a sacrament “by sanctification contains some invisible and spiritual grace.”³¹ Therefore grace is there in the sacrament as in a container.

4. The same likewise appears from the reason that in the sacrament of the altar the true body of Christ, which is signified, is not there only as in a sign, but is contained there according to truth. Otherwise it would not differ from the sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore in like manner if Baptism is a sacrament of the New Law, not only is there grace as in a sign, but grace is also essentially contained there.

5. Again, you might say that that is not fitting, because grace is an accident and ought to be the perfection of the noblest of creatures, namely the rational, and therefore it ought not be contained in an irrational creature. To the contrary, more noble is the divine essence than the grace which proceeds from it, but an irrational creature is capable of the divine essence; therefore much more is it of grace.

6. Again, an accident which does not have its origin from the principles of its subject does not determine matter of itself. Grace is of this type. Therefore it does not determine matter of itself. Therefore it can be in any creature whatsoever; therefore, etc.

7. Again, in the sacrament of the altar we see that there are material accidents. However, by virtue of the sacrament they are suspended from matter, in such wise that they are not in any subject. Therefore, since grace is much more spiritual, it appears grace is more apt to be in the other sacraments according to its essence and truly, but not as in a subject. Therefore it appears it must be asserted that grace is in a sacrament as in a container.

To the contrary: a. Grace is a mid-state between nature and glory. Therefore nothing is capable of grace which is not capable of glory, since that is as it were its ultimate disposition. But no sacrament is capable of glory; therefore neither is it capable of grace.

b. Again, if grace were in the sacrament beforehand, since accidents do not change their subject, then grace would never pass over into the soul. It would therefore be in vain. This however cannot be asserted, and neither therefore the former.

c. Again, grace is a perfection of the soul, and perfection as an accident depends much more on the soul than the soul on the body. But a soul is never created except in a body, and comes with the body; therefore, much more firmly is grace created together with the soul and is within it. Therefore, it is not in the sacrament.

d. Again, if grace is in a sacrament as contained in a vase, then it is obvious that it is for no other reason than that it be transferred from the sacrament into the soul itself. Therefore if it is not transferred, it is there in vain. However, it is possible that someone feigns approach to the sacrament. It is then obvious that grace is not transferred; therefore in vain was grace in this sacrament.

e. Again, grace immediately restores and reforms the soul unto God. Therefore it goes forth from God with immediate impact on the soul itself. It is not therefore transferred by means of some vase.

I respond: In this matter, according to some, it is to be understood that the sacraments themselves are vases of grace. This is because sacraments are part of the ultimate disposition, which is sanctification through word, and by means of them grace is transferred into the soul itself.³² Once transferred into the soul, grace cleanses or anoints inwardly, just as is signified exteriorly in the visible sign. In this sense they say that the sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace and that they effect what they figure.³³

Nevertheless, as has been shown by several arguments, it can in no way be said that grace is essentially contained in the sacraments themselves, as water in a vase or medicine in a box. Indeed this understanding is erroneous. But they are said to contain grace, because they signify grace and because grace is always carried along with them unless there is a defect on the part of the receiver. Grace is carried along with them in the manner of understanding that grace is in the soul, not in visible signs. Only in this sense can sacraments be called a vase of grace.

Sacraments are able to be called vases for another reason. This is because just as that which is in a vase is not of it nor from it, but nevertheless grace is drawn up with it, so grace is neither from the sacraments nor of the sacraments. Grace originates from the eternal fountain. From this is grace drawn up by the soul in these sacraments. Therefore just as one who returns to a vase when he requires liquid, so in searching for the liquor of grace and not having it, one ought to hasten back to these sacraments.

To the objections: 2-3 The response to these two is clear from the words of Hugh.

1. To that which was objected, that the remission of sins is hidden in Baptism, it must be said that this is to be understood concerning the hiddenness of the thing signified in the sign. But indeed there is a higher reason than the reason of signifying; nevertheless forgiveness of sins is not essentially contained in Baptism, but because of the thing that signifies, it is contained in the soul.³⁴

4. To that which is objected concerning the sacrament of the altar it must be said that God is able similarly to make as he is to will. But this is not fitting here. This is because transubstantiation is in that sacrament. Whence that which is signified in the sacrament of the altar is truly a substance which fittingly exists in itself, and it is fitting that it be veiled by those species for our advantage. It was not thus fitting that grace exist in itself, since neither is it a substance, nor is it fittingly contained in these corporeal sacraments which are of their nature created, but it was fitting that it exist in a much more noble state. Thus, since God’s power does not diminish his wisdom and ordering, although God could do it, he nevertheless did not. Nor is this case similar, as has been demonstrated. If you therefore object that this does not differ from the sacraments of the Old Law, because it was there only in the sign, it must be said that that sign has some notion of causality, as will later be apparent, but nevertheless it does not have the notion of materially containing grace.

5. To the objection that the divine essence is in any created thing whatsoever, it must be said that similarity is lacking and there is no proof from the lesser. The reason is that existence through inhabiting grace presupposes existence through essence and adds to it a much greater nobility on the part of the one who receives it. Hence it is the conclusion in that argument. That would be the right conclusion if existence through grace did not include in itself existence through essence; but it does include it just as “to be well” includes “to be.”

6. To the objection that grace does not determine a subject for itself because it contains no causality in it, it must be said that although grace does not have causality, it does provide the occasion, because the soul is created to be perfected by grace, and is capable of this of its own nature. This is not true of other irrational creatures.

7. To the objection that in the sacrament of the altar accidents remain without a subject, so likewise grace in the other sacraments, it must be said that similarity is lacking because there the accidents remain both because of the infirmity of our senses and on account of usefulness to our faith. But if that grace were in the sacraments, there would be no usefulness. God is always present and gives grace to the one who worthily approaches. Even more would there be a de-ordering in that as well as a degradation of grace itself. This should not come about by divine miracle, because grace is itself given to perfect the soul and to be in it.³⁵

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 4
QUESTION FOUR

THE EFFICACY OF THE SACRAMENTS

Fourth it is asked whether the sacraments effect grace. And that they do is seen:

A. 1. Because this is precisely the difference attributed to the sacraments of the New Law compared to those of the Old Law, that the former are effective, while the latter merely represent. Since what effects is an efficient cause, therefore the sacraments of the New Law effect grace.³⁶

2. Again, Hugh says, “the sacraments of the New Law, infused with blessing beforehand, sanctify.”³⁷ Elsewhere he says that they are “from sanctification sanctifying.” However the soul is not sanctified except through grace. Therefore they effect that grace in the soul.

3. Likewise, the Master, in his definition of a sacrament, says in a note that “that is a sacrament which bears a likeness and acts as a cause.”³⁸ However, it is not a formal cause, nor final, nor material, as has been demonstrated above. Therefore by exclusion it is an efficient cause.

4. Again, the same appears from reason, because a sign instituted by human disposition has the power to give rise in us to spiritual understanding and emotion. This is like when a crown before a building gives rise to the knowledge in the mind of one passing by that there is wine there. Additionally the gibbet and signs of war give rise to fear. Therefore if divine institution is more powerful than human, and the sacraments are signs by divine institution, then they can give rise in us to a much more noble effect. Therefore they can effect grace.

5. Again, opposites are created to contend over the same thing. Hence nothing is susceptible to guilt unless it is also susceptible to grace, and vice versa. Since the flesh, which is a bodily thing, can be so corrupted that it causes and gives rise to guilt in the soul conjoined to it, therefore so can a bodily sacrament be so sanctified that it pours forth grace. Nothing therefore prevents it from effecting spiritual grace in the soul.

6. Again, just as in the generation of flesh there is the one who generates, the one generated, and additionally the means by which generation happens, so also in spiritual regeneration there is the one who generates, Christ; the one generated, the human; and that by means of which generation takes place, namely the sacrament. So just as the seed, which was the means in fleshly generation, bears guilt, by the same token the sacrament bears the grace which makes a child of God. But the sacrament does not bear it essentially; it therefore bears it by way of causality. If you should say that there is no similarity, because it is easier to do wrong than to do good, this amounts to nothing. This is because Adam was never more capable of wrongdoing or its guilt than Christ in his passion is capable of good. Adam by his fault was able to corrupt all flesh. Therefore, Christ by his passion was able so to sanctify the sacraments that they might sanctify souls and give grace.

7. Again, Anselm says in De conceptu virginali³⁹ that if Adam had withstood he would have passed on original justice. However, this is not possible except by means of corporeal flesh. Therefore all the more so can Christ by means of a corporeal sacrament pass on gratuitous justice.

To the contrary: a. Every efficient cause is more noble than its effect, and nothing corporeal is more noble than something spiritual. Since, then, grace is spiritual, and a sacrament corporeal, as Hugh says, no sacrament is the efficient cause of grace.⁴⁰

b. Again, the Master says in a note that grace is not from them but through them.⁴¹ It would therefore seem that they are like streams, and not like a source spring. Therefore they are not an efficient cause of grace, just as streams are not causes of water.

c. Again, Hugh says that “grace is not from the sacraments but in them.”⁴² It is obvious that “from” means efficient cause, as is apparent here; therefore, etc.

d. Again, at the passage Psalm 15:7, I will bless the Lord who has given me understanding, the Glossa says, “God through himself enlightens dutiful minds.”⁴³ Therefore, since that enlightenment happens through the light of grace, it follows that grace is immediately from God, and not therefore from the sacraments.

e. Again, virtue is that which God works in us without us. If, then, his virtue does not work in us through some subject creature, consequently neither does grace.

f. Again, a certain order ought to be observed in agents. Therefore God ought not to influence the more noble through the less noble. However, the soul is nobler than a sacrament. Therefore, God does not pour grace into a soul through a sacrament. Thus, grace is effected solely by God. If, therefore, a sacrament is a cause of grace, this is only by way of disposing one toward grace.⁴⁴

B. Furthermore, it is asked whether a sacrament is a cause disposing toward grace. And that it is so is seen:

a. Because if the sacraments of the New Law were only a cause sine qua non, they would then not differ from the sacraments of the Old Law in the reason of causing, and would thus be a burden. This is unacceptable; ergo, etc.

b. Again, both Hugh⁴⁵ and the Master in a note as well as others say that God restores the soul through the sacraments. Therefore the sacrament is the means of divine action in the soul. However, every means of acting is either providing strength or disposing. The sacrament does not provide; therefore it disposes.

c. Again, the sacraments are spiritual medicines. Since corporeal medicine disposes to corporeal health, therefore a spiritual medicine disposes for spiritual health.

d. Again, if they do not dispose at all and do not contribute to the health of the soul, then health could be accomplished just as well without them as with them. Therefore those things imposed upon us in the New Law should be called burdens rather than medicinal, and the New Law a burdensome law and not a delight.

But to the contrary: 1. Disposing precedes that to which it disposes, not only in nature, but also in time. The reception of a sacrament is simultaneous in time with the infusion of grace. Therefore the sacrament does not dispose toward grace.

2. Again, grace is created from nothing and in an instant. Therefore, it requires no preparation for it to exist. Therefore, the sacraments do not dispose for grace. If you should say that they do not dispose to the end that grace exist, but to the end that it be present in the soul—hence they enable the soul by disposing it to the reception of grace—the response is that grace, in order to exist, must be in something else,⁴⁶ since it is an accident. Therefore, if it does not have the character of disposing to the end that it exist, then neither to the end that it be present in the soul.

3. Again, if the sacraments dispose the soul and make it suitable, they therefore have influence upon it. However, nothing corporeal has influence upon anything spiritual. Therefore, the sacraments, being corporeal, have no influence upon the soul. Therefore, they neither make it suitable nor dispose it.

C. If you should perchance say that there is in the sacraments some spiritual power through which they influence the soul, it is asked therefore by reason of this, whether there is in the sacraments some power through which they have influence on the soul. And that there is not would appear from:

1. That power is either a substance or an accident. If it is a substance, then it must be either God or an angel or a soul. It is certain that it is none of these because if that power were of the sacrament, then God is of the sacrament. If it is an accident, this cannot be because no spiritual accident exists in a corporeal subject. Therefore either that power is corporeal, and thus with no influence, or if it is spiritual, it is not in the sacrament.

2. Again, that that power is good is admitted. Either, then, that power is great or intermediate or small, as Augustine distinguishes them.⁴⁷ It is not among the great, because then it would be grace or a freely given power, which is only in the soul; not average, because such are the powers of the soul; therefore it is a slight good. But such is a corporeal good; therefore that power is not spiritual and has no influence on the soul.

3. Again, no corporeal thing is received corporeally in the spiritual, but only spiritually. Likewise nothing spiritual is received spiritually in something corporeal, but corporeally.⁴⁸ Therefore that power, since it is in the sacraments, is there in corporeal fashion, and thus has no power to influence the soul; so it is there to no purpose.

4. Again, “everything that is received in something else is there through the manner of the receiver, and not that of what is received,” as Boethius says.⁴⁹ Therefore, that power is received in a corporeal sacrament after the corporeal manner. If you should say that this is true, speaking naturally, that power is wonderfully there and beyond nature, the response is that as much as it wonderfully be there and in any manner you want, it is still less noble than the soul; it, therefore, has no influence upon it. Therefore, if it is not asserted for some other reason, it is apparent, etc.

To the contrary: a. Bede says that the Lord by contact with his purest flesh gave restorative power to the water.⁵⁰ Therefore some power was bestowed upon that water. This could not have been other than created, because it was bestowed upon a creature. Since it was power to restore, it could not be other than spiritual, because the power for a spiritual accomplishment is spiritual; ergo etc.⁵¹

b. Again, Augustine says, and it is found in the third distinction:⁵² “What is the power of the water that it should touch the body and cleanse the heart?” ⁵³ Therefore, there is some power in the sacrament by which the heart is cleansed; therefore, it is spiritual power.

c. Again, we see that the works of divine justice happen through the ministry of corporeal created things. These have from God some power through which they can act upon the soul. Otherwise they would not be able, as is clear in the fire of purgatory. Therefore in the works of mercy which are brought about through the sacraments, it must be that the sacraments have some power bestowed upon them by God through which they act upon the soul.

d. Again, we see that if some contrite person approaches Baptism, even though no grace is conferred upon him, because he already possesses it, nevertheless there is conferred upon him the remission of all punishment, which he did not previously possess. Therefore Baptism, besides the conferral of grace, adds the remission of punishment. Therefore there is in Baptism some power beyond the power of grace, and for the same reason also in the other sacraments of the New Law.

e. Furthermore, if there were no power there, then consequently the frequently mentioned objection returns, namely that they do not differ from the sacraments of the Old Law.

I respond: Some wish to say that there is in the sacraments some created power through which they influence the soul and have the reason of causing in different ways. So they say that in the sacraments is given the gratia gratum faciens.⁵⁴ Additionally, in them is given gratia gratis data⁵⁵ [special gifts of grace] such as character and the beautification of the soul. Further, there is given the weakening of evil desire or strengthening of the faculties; such is the efficatia gratiae.⁵⁶

So they say that with respect to gratia gratum faciens, the sacraments function as a cause sine qua non.⁵⁷ With respect to the bestowal of character and to the beautification of the soul, they are like an efficient cause. With respect to that power, namely with respect to the weakening of evil desire or the strengthening of the faculties, they are a dispositive cause.

That this is so is apparent. For we see that in the purgation of the soul through the fire of purgatory that this soul, which has some guilt or venial stain, is purifiable. This, then, is grace operating within the soul because without it there would be no purgation. On the other hand, there is the power of fire. In a sacrament there is a soul that has a defect and weakened faculties. There is also grace in the soul working from within, and again there is the outside power of the sacrament. When these three act together, the faculties are strengthened and healed, and grace becomes more efficacious in its action by means of the power of the sacrament. It is in this sense, then, that they say that a sacrament is a cause of grace sine qua non, namely of gratum facientis. It is the efficient cause of character and beautification, and it is a dispositive cause of the efficatia gratiae and healing of the faculties. And this is by reason of the spiritual power which the sacrament has and is bestowed on it by God.

In light of these assertions it is apparent what response they would make.⁵⁸

To the objections:

A. 1-2. To the one that was asked first, whether they are the efficient cause of gratia gratum facientis, they say they are not. What was then objected concerning the difference of these (of the New Law) and those (of the Old Law) they say that the difference occurs by reason of the imposition of character, the beautification of the soul, and efficacious grace. Thus this is how they respond to the quotation of Hugh, that it is to be understood as such sanctification.⁵⁹

3. They respond in a similar fashion to the quotation from the Master that it is a cause. Yet if it be understood to pertain to gratia gratum faciens, they say that it is a cause sine qua non. Alternatively they also say that it can be called a dispositive cause, either for that which dwells within it or to the end that it be effective, and this is by reason of the operis operati.⁶⁰ This was not so in those former sacraments.

4. To that objection that a sign of human design generates spiritual understanding and feeling, they say that this is only dispositive or occasional, but not effective. The soul itself by considering within itself generates understanding and feeling, as in the clear example that some see a gibbet and cringe, and others do not. Nevertheless through this it cannot be demonstrated that a sacrament is an efficient cause of grace.

5. To the objection concerning transferal of guilt by means of the flesh, they say that just as grace is not in anything corporeal, so neither is guilt. Yet, the inclination to vice in the flesh can have the character of effecting guilt in the soul. But this is not so with the power of the sacrament with respect to grace. The reason for this is that grace is a more noble effect than any corporeal power, and comes to being from nothing, and this belongs to God alone.⁶¹ On the other hand, the effect of guilt implies the ignoble and imperfect and defective. Hence all those arguments which rest on the likeness of grace to guilt have no validity.

6. To the objection that Christ has more power for good, they reply that this is true. But it does not follow from this, even if Adam transfers guilt by means of the flesh, that Christ transfers grace by means of the sacrament, for this would be disorder. Besides, just as the creature is not able to receive the power of creating, so neither of giving grace.⁶²

7. To the objection from Anselm, they reply that it is not meant that Adam would transfer justice by means of the flesh, but that all his descendants would have that justice from God, because there would be no obstacle on the part of the flesh.

B. To the point that asks whether a sacrament be a dispositive cause, they reply that it is, as has been said.⁶³ This is because it disposes for the effectiveness of grace by removing evil desire, which is an obstacle to the action of grace, or, as has been said, it disposes for the purpose that grace be present in the soul. However, it does not dispose to the extent that grace begins to exist. This is to say that grace can be compared to an efficient cause, that it is compared to receiving a substance. But a sacrament is not dispositive on the part of the agent, who is God, but on the part of the recipient—that is, the soul.

2. And thus the response to the objection that grace is from nothing becomes clear; for they say that a sacrament does not prepare for grace by reason of that from which, but by reason of that into which it is received.

1. To the objection that a disposition precedes that for which it prepares, they say that it does not always precede it in time. This is apparent, as in a disposition which is a necessity or in the final disposition. Thus a sacrament worthily received disposes with a final disposition, which is simultaneous in time with grace but, by nature, prior, as a part of it.

3. To the objection that if it disposes, it influences, they reply that it does influence. To the further objection that nothing corporeal has influence upon the spiritual, they reply that in the sacrament there is some spiritual power through which it influences the soul. However, that reason does not hold according to them, because in the cleansed soul there is the substance itself to consider and the stain from which it is cleansed. It is granted that according to substance it is superior to anything corporeal. Nevertheless by reason of its stain or defect it is inferior.⁶⁴

C. To the question whether a created power is placed in the sacraments, they respond that it is.

1. When it is then asked whether the created power is a substance or an accident, they reply that it is an accident. When it is further asked whether it is a corporeal or spiritual accident, they reply that it is spiritual. To the later objection that a spiritual accident is not found in a corporeal subject, they reply that this is true in nature, but that the sacrament has this power supernaturally according to the order of divine mercy, just as there is power in the fire of purgatory according to the arrangement of divine justice beyond the nature of fire. Furthermore, it is even greater in this respect, because a sacrament is neither a natural subject nor according to nature. Therefore it is no wonder that it has supernatural power.

2. To the question whether it⁶⁵ be a greatest good, etc., they respond that this power is to be placed among intermediate goods, since it is less than grace but above the bodily. If you object that such a good is within the power of the soul, they reply that Augustine does not on this account exclude that they be anything else. However, he said that by way of example or by narrowing that good to the human subject. If you object that it does not act upon or influence the powers of the soul, since it is an intermediate good and to influence belongs to a superior good, they reply that it has no influence upon the powers as powers, but by reason of their deficiencies because of guilt.⁶⁶

3. To the objection that concerns the reception of a spiritual substance, they respond that there is no similarity. This is because if a spiritual substance should receive something corporeal in a corporeal fashion, then it would be a disparagement to its very substance; nor would it be enhanced by such reception. However if something material receives something spiritual in spiritual fashion, there is no disparagement to it at all.

4. To the objection that anything received exists in the receiver after the manner of the recipient, they reply that this is true of receiving in nature, but this is above nature. Besides, a sacrament, according to this view, is a spiritual medicine, and therefore must have spiritual power. In natural things the material is of greatest concern, but in divine things the greatest and principal concern is the end. Hence because in the sacraments the character of the material is not taken into account, but the end or purpose, it is fitting according to them to place spiritual power in them.

To the other a response has already been made, according to them, because the power itself is more noble than the less noble fallen soul, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of the fall.⁶⁷ Thus in this manner the other objections according to this opinion are answered. This is the opinion of some of the great.

D. There is also an opinion of others among the great in this matter, who say that in the sacraments there is neither causality nor any power—neither effective nor dispositive—toward grace, which is a quality or some absolute property. Instead, they say that through the sacraments there is a certain assistance.

They say that the role of the sacrament is to assist the divine power, which is the cause of grace. It also assists the recipient’s faith and devotion, which dispose toward grace. To this they cite an example: at the word of Elisha when Naaman had bathed himself,⁶⁸ the divine effective power for healing was present, as well as the dispositive devotion and obedience of Naaman. However there was no causality either in the word of Elisha or in the water of the Jordan. So if the Lord so set down that at the word of Elisha not only Naaman, but others who come forward should be cured, and this by a certain agreement, in such wise that the divine power would always assist, that water would be said to cure and heal the leprous and to be the cause of the cure and to have the power to cure. Thus, in the sacraments they say that, at the pronunciation of the word, the divine power is present in the waters and pours out grace and restores when men and women subject themselves through a profession of faith and obedience. They therefore say that the sacraments are said to possess power and are called a cause and are said to be effective according to the common manner of speaking on account of their assistance to divine power.

And if you should ask whether sacraments have some created power over the uncreated, they respond by saying that a sacrament has some power over the uncreated, but in an extended sense of power. This is because if power means some quality or nature or essence added to the sacrament, as power properly means, so according to them it cannot be said that it has power. However, the concept of power is extended to a certain ordering, as when something has an effective ordering to something it is said to have power with respect to it.

To this they offer this example: a king decreed that anyone who had a certain seal would receive a hundred pounds. After his decree the seal does not have any absolute property that it did not previously have. However, it is ordered to something to which it was not previously. Thus because it possesses an effective ordering, it is said to have the power to cause someone to have a hundred pounds. Therefore that seal is said to be worth one hundred pounds, and nevertheless it does not have more value now than previously. So if you should ask what is the power in that seal, the response is that it is not something absolute, but it is power for something. Thus they say that the sacraments are similar seals decreed by God, so that when one receives them in the proper manner they should have a measure of grace or have grace for this act. Such effective ordering, I say, is according to them the power of the sacrament, and by reason of it, it disposes the human being to have grace, because it effectively orders to having and receiving grace.

Again they say that on the basis of this covenant the Lord binds himself in some way to giving grace to the receiver of a sacrament. Hence sacrament is said to have the power to effect and also to dispose. Thus just as the word “power” is stretched, so also the words “effect” and “dispose,” because it neither effects nor disposes by acting upon, but by effectively ordering. Therefore just as these are stretched, so too the word “cause,” because it is not called a cause inasmuch as it is a principle of operating but rather inasmuch as it has the reason of ordering.⁶⁹ The demands of faith are not opposed to this position, and reason finds it agreeable.

Now reason consents because it is very difficult to understand how such power can be given as an absolute quality. It is even more difficult when it is given. It is also difficult to understand to what it is given, namely to a word or an element, which are two things that do not make up a unity. It is also difficult to know how long it lasts. Likewise it is very difficult to understand how it influences. It is also difficult to know of what nature it is in itself; and many other such. Thus reason easily enough agrees with this other position.

Neither does piety or faith fight back against this. We must be careful not to attribute too much praise to corporeal signs. Otherwise we lessen the honor of curative grace and the honor of the soul of the recipient.⁷⁰ Now this opinion does not grant too much and does not detract anything from the honor due. So just as royal letters sealed with the king’s ring are of great dignity and power and worth, and are considered great for their power and effectiveness, still in them there is no absolute power, but only an ordering through the assistance of the royal power. This becomes clear in that when the king dies, no greater consideration is given his letters than to others. Still they have lost nothing absolute. In the same way it is to be understood with respect to the sacraments, and thus speak the authorities of the saints according to their common usage.

The reasons against the opposite are clear. If you should ask upon what the relation is founded and how it came about without the transferal of ownership, the response is that in the establishment of signs, as when money becomes a pledge, nothing new is given to that money.

Either of these positions seems probable enough; but the latter seems to me easier to defend. But I do not know which is more true, because, when we speak of things miraculous, reason is not so much to be relied on. We concede therefore that the sacraments of the New Law are a cause, and that they effect and dispose, by extension of the meaning of these words, as was said, and this is safe to say. Whether they contain more, I choose neither to affirm nor deny. Thus following this last step all questions are clear.

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 5
QUESTION FIVE

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SACRAMENTS OLD AND NEW

In the fifth place, the question of the difference between sacraments of the Old Law and the New is posed. The Master lays down this difference, “that the former only promised grace and did not give grace; these, however, give grace.”⁷¹ This is the difference commonly laid down. The sacraments of the New Law effect what they figure, but those of the Old Law do not.

1. Against this position, Hugh objects in his book De sacramentis: “Some sacraments are under nature, others under the Law, others under grace, still others in appearance, but they all have the same effect of health.”⁷²

2. Again, Hugh: “From the time that humans began to grow ill, God prepared the medicine in the sacraments.”⁷³ But it is impossible that God should heal without justifying grace. Therefore, justifying grace is in all sacraments. So there is no difference.

3. Again, through reason it is apparent that it was always fitting that the medicine accompany the sickness, because always and under every Law some have been saved. However, a sacrament is not a medicine unless it cures through grace. Therefore in every time period sacraments conferred grace, and so etc.

4. Again, the sacraments of the New Law do not have efficacy except through the grace of faith. This is because anyone who has no faith falsely approaches and gains no benefit. Those sacraments which are joined to faith justify, for every act, unless it is evil in itself, when it is out of faith working through love, becomes meritorious. Therefore just as these justify, so do those others.

To the contrary: a. Hugh in his work De sacramentis writes, “In the time of the Natural Law men and women were left to themselves, and left to themselves they erred through ignorance, and were thus convicted of blindness.” Afterwards, the Old Law was given without grace, in which people were aware of what was to be done. Weighed down by concupiscence, they fell, and were thus overcome by impotence. Then Christ came, of whom John 1:17 says, Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.⁷⁴ Therefore in the time of the Old Law sacraments did not confer any grace; therefore, etc.

b. Again, for the passage beginning in Romans 3:20, where it says, From works of the Law, the Glossa reads, “Those are called works of the Law which were instituted and terminated with the Law, and which were never able to justify, even if they were done in faith and charity.”⁷⁵

c. Again, for the passage beginning with Isaiah 1:11, where it says, I desire not the blood of goats, the Glossa reads, “Using the past he shows that he never loved the Jewish sacrifices.”⁷⁶

d. Again, it stands to reason, because the Old Law was imposed as a burden. Hence Ezekiel 20:25 states, I gave to them precepts that were not good, and words in which they could not live. But if they had had sacraments giving grace, these would have relieved them. Thus, Blessed Peter in Acts 15:10 says, This is a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear; therefore, etc.

I respond: It must be said that Hugh understood this difference differently than Poitiers and the Master understood it. For the Master,⁷⁷ following Poitiers, said that the sacraments of the Old Law, with the exception of circumcision, were instituted for signifying only in perfect and faithful men, because for the others they were instituted either as a yoke, if they were obstinate, or for calling back from idolatry. Thus if they were ordered to some efficacy—as were baptisms and sacrifices—this was only so that they might cleanse from some carnal irregularity or temporal punishment. Since they were instituted only for this, even if they were done out of faith and charity, there was no merit in them, because they did not reach beyond that for which they were instituted. Hence just as a gesture of charity is not meritorious in one’s own country, so at that time they could not gain merit in an external work, but only in an interior one. If you object to him concerning a medicine, he replies that faith in a Redeemer was the medicine for that time. Thus the sacraments of the Old Law⁷⁸ indeed had no power to justify either per se or per accidens.⁷⁹ And this was Poitiers’s position.

However, this position did not seem reasonable to Master Hugh, because, if so, the sacrifices performed by holy men would not have pleased God—neither the sacrifice of Abel nor Abraham nor Solomon. This is manifestly false, as appears in the narration of the Canon.⁸⁰ Furthermore, what then of the offering of the Sacred Virgin? When she offered a pair of doves, was her offering devoid of merit?⁸¹

For this reason, Master Hugh wanted to say in a different manner that the sacraments of the Old Law, except circumcision, were instituted primarily for signifying either the passion, such as were the sacrifices, or even our sacraments, as their baptism does ours. With regard to efficacy the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted only exteriorly, dealing with the flesh. However, because they signify what faith believes, in their reception there is a profession of faith, not only in word but in deed. Thus, because such faith disposed for justification, those sacraments of the Old Law justified per accidens. To the contrary, the sacraments of the New Law were ordered not only from their first institution toward signifying, but also toward obtaining grace. Hence, the sacraments of the New Law are per se ordered toward justification. Wherefore speaking essentially, the latter justify, the former do not unless per accidens. Thus the import of this is that the sacraments of the Old Law principally signify what is to be believed, such as Christ’s passion and the subsequent justification. The only exception to this is circumcision, which principally signifies the removal of original sin. The sacraments of the New Law, on the other hand, first signify the efficacy of grace and subsequently the passion or what must be believed, as Baptism signifies interior cleansing and then the passion.⁸² Hence Hugh: “The sacraments of the New Testament are primarily signs of spiritual grace, and they are principally instituted for conferring that grace on those to be sanctified. The sacraments of the Old Testament, on the other hand, were only signs of the New, and by means of these of the New, they provided grace for sustenance.”⁸³ With means of the sacraments of the New Testament” is meant faith in them, because they did not exist in fact, but in faith.

Several masters of modern times agree that these opinions are reasonable. They say that the Master has set out that the former do not justify per se, but Hugh that they do per accidens. Therefore there is no contradiction. There are also some who say the same thing in other words: that the new justify by reason of the work being worked,⁸⁴ but the old by reason of the work of the one working,⁸⁵ not the thing worked.⁸⁶ The work of the one working⁸⁷ is faith, but what is worked exteriorly⁸⁸ is the sacrament. Thus that the exterior work of the sacrament should justify is by reason of [the interior] faith conjoined with charity.

But if one looks closely these positions directly contradict one another. First of all because the Master not only says that the former sacraments did not justify, but also that they did not justify when they were done with faith and charity, and thus neither per se nor per accidens. Again, both speak of these inasmuch as they are sacraments. They are both clearly in agreement that the work of the one working⁸⁹ is not a sacrament, but the work worked.⁹⁰ Therefore both had an understanding of the concept of the work worked.⁹¹ And that is true, and concerning the old work worked, the Master says that this only signified, and did not justify, such as the sprinkling of water or of blood.⁹² For never did the sprinkled blood of goats justify,⁹³ even if done in faith and charity—and neither per se nor per accidens. And this was sufficiently probable.

But certainly much more probable is what Master Hugh laid out, that in the old work worked there would be a profession of faith. Thus by reason of conjoined faith, which was in the old sacraments first, there is through them justification per accidens. In this there is a difference between the old and the new. In the sacraments of the New Law, with regard to works worked, there is justification not only per accidens, but also per se. An evident sign of this difference is made clear in the way the old and new sacraments signify.⁹⁴

And if the reason for this is asked, the response is taken from what has been said above,⁹⁵ that the causality of the sacraments is nothing other than a certain efficacious ordering toward the reception of grace by divine covenant.⁹⁶ This was only in the sacraments of the New Law, and not the Old, except in circumcision, because there was a covenant. This is why in the latter there is an agreement and ordering, and not in the former, because then was the time of figures and of overcoming hardness. Now is the time of grace.

From these considerations, the objections are clear. Those which prove that they do not justify are understood speaking per se, the others, to the contrary, per accidens.

 

IV SENT D. 1, P. 1, A. 1, Q. 6
QUESTION SIX

THE GRACE CONFERRED IN THE SACRAMENTS

Sixth and last, the question is posed concerning sacramental grace, whether it is essentially the same as the grace of the virtues. And that they are the same seems to be so:

1. Because the grace of the sacraments is gratia faciens⁹⁷ in that it makes one worthy of eternal life, as is apparent in Baptism. But in a single soul gratia gratum faciens is one; therefore, etc.

2. Again, one thing is opposed only to one. Therefore since grace in the virtues is opposed to sins, and likewise grace in the sacraments, then that grace is one.

3. Again, one baptized by fire, if he approaches a sacrament, does not receive some other grace, as the Master says.⁹⁸ Therefore there is not a different grace in the sacraments than in the virtues, because such a one would not have any grace other than the grace of the virtues.

4. Again, it is the same thing that directs by separation from an end and that by inclination toward an end. The sacraments complement the soul by separating from evil, the virtues by ordering toward the goal; therefore, etc.

To the contrary: 1. Everyone who does not falsely approach already has the grace of the virtues. The one who approaches falsely receives no grace in the sacrament. Therefore either some grace is given him other than the grace of the virtues, or the sacrament gives none whatsoever.

2. Things which have essentially diverse differences are essentially diverse. Such are grace in the sacraments, in the virtues, in gifts, and in beatitudes; therefore, etc.

3. Again, there would be gifts and virtues and beatitudes if sin had never existed, but not the grace of the sacraments. Therefore, etc.

4. Again, there is an organic union between the virtues, but not among the sacraments; therefore, etc.

I respond: Some have wished to say that in the one and the other there is exactly the same grace, differing only in comparison or in the manner of their partaking. For the grace which causes the virtues and gifts to exist in the soul is called sacramental accordingly as it is given or is increased or recovered through a sacrament. Nor were the sacraments instituted for some other grace, but for acquiring and recovering it.

The second position is that they differ in essence, as the reasons above show. Thus, just as there are many graces freely given in one person, so too there are many instances of gratum faciens, on account of their ordering to diverse purposes. For the virtues and gifts are ordered toward good works, but the sacraments cure vices and are ordered to good works only by consequence. Hence, just as there are many vices, so there are many sacramental graces.

A third position is better and more probable.⁹⁹ The gratia gratum faciens is one. A sign of this is that it is totally lost by a single sin. It is to be noted that when I say the grace of the virtues, I mean gratia gratum faciens and its foundation of habits. Thus gratia gratum faciens is one, but the underlying habits differ one from another. Similarly, when I say sacramental grace, I mean not only grace, but also the effect of its healing. That grace is indeed one, but the effects of its healing are many. Therefore grace in the sacraments is distinguished from that in gifts and virtues by distinguishing their effects and underlying habits. Hence, sacramental grace on account of sin adds some effect beyond the grace of virtues.

An example is found in the one who is graced and baptized: to him is given the effects of grace, because he is not only absolved of guilt, but also of its punishment. Likewise, there is a difference in the other virtues and gifts and beatitudes, a difference which lies in their underlying habits, which differ on account of the difference in the acts to which they tend. For the virtues direct to basic works, the gifts to the intermediate works, and the beatitudes to the perfect, as is explained elsewhere.¹⁰⁰ The sacraments, on the other hand, add the relief of healing. Thus, the reasoning proceeds along these two directions.

_______________

¹ Throughout this translation, specific Latin terms, phrases, or texts considered important by the translators will be presented in the footnotes. These will be noted in the following manner: Latin: …secundum sanitatem quam tribuunt.

² Latin: …agit de gloria ad quam disponunt.

³ Throughout this text, when Bonaventure refers to “the Master,” he is referring to Peter Lombard (d. 1160), in most cases, to his Sentences.

⁴ Matt 9:12; Luke 5:31.

⁵ A “non” must have been accidentally left out of the text at some point. Otherwise the statement does not make sense.

⁶ Augustine, Contra Faustum, XIX, 11 (PL 42, 355; CSEL 25, 510, 1-6): In nullum autem nomen religionis, seu uerum, seu falsum, coagulari homines possunt, nisi aliquo signaculorum uel sacramentorum visibilium consortio conligentur: quorum sacramentorum uis inenarrabiliter ualet plurimum et ideo contempta sacrilegos facit. Cf. Answer to Faustus, a Manichean (Contra Faustum Manichaeum. Introduction, translation and notes by Roland Teske. WSA I/20 [Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2007], 244-45): “But people could not be gathered together under the name of any religion, whether true or false, if they were not bound together by some sharing of visible signs or sacraments. The power of those sacraments is great beyond description, and for this reason it makes people guilty of sacrilege if they hold them in contempt.”

⁷ Generally medieval theologians, in order to explain the relationship between the visible sacrament and the grace effected, utilized the following three concepts: the sacramentum, the visible sign; the res, the kind of grace; and the sacramentum et res, that by which the sign is effective for the grace conferred. These technical terms are presented in the original Latin.

⁸ Latin: …ad exercitationem. It is interesting to note that Bonaventure, like Peter before him, also understands that visible sacraments provide a disciplinary practice. Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 1, c. 5, n. 4 (Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata - Romae, 1981), 234-35.

⁹ Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 1, c. 5:5, 235: Cum igitur absque sacramentis, quibus non alligavit potentiam suam Deus, homini gratiam donare posset, praedictis de causis sacramenta instituit.

¹⁰ This dispositive power is the power in the sacraments to dispose the recipient toward receiving the informative power of grace. Thus, according to Bonaventure, the sacraments do not have creative or informative power in and of themselves, but only the power to dispose the recipient toward grace.

¹¹ Latin: …justificatio per informationem quae est per virtutes…

¹² Latin: Virtutes sunt arma ad impugnandum, sacramenta ad defendum. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor. De sacramentis christiane fidei, I, p. 9, c. 8 (PL 176, 328B; Corpus Victorinum) 222: In sacramentis arma, in operibus vero bonis tela ontra diabolum pugnaturo.

¹³ In this text Lombard quotes Augustine, De civitate dei X, 5 (PL 41, 282; CSEL 40, 452, 18-19; CCL 47, 277, 15-16): Sacrificium ergo uisibile inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est.

¹⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176, 317D; Corpus Victorinum, 209-10 ): …potest dicere quia sacramentum est corporeale uel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine representans & exstinctione significans & ex sanctificatione continens aliquam inuisibilem & spiritalem gratiam.

¹⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 3 (PL 176, 320A-C; Corpus Victornium, 211): …sacramenta instituta esse cognoscuntur propter humiliationem, propter eruditionem, propter exercitationem.

¹⁶ Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 1, c. 5:1, 234: Triplici autem ex causa sacramenta instituta sunt: propter humiliationem, eruditionem, exercitationem.

¹⁷ Cf. d.1, p.1, a.1, q.4.

¹⁸ Cf. Ambrose, De sacramentis, V, c. 4, 25 (PL 16,472A): Qui vulnus habet, medicinam requirit. Vulnus est, quia sub peccato sumus: medicina est coeleste et venerabile sacramentum.

¹⁹ Latin: Ergo sacramenti potius est significari quam significare.

²⁰ Thus the visible sign is necessary because it prepares one to receive the medicine. The delivery of the external sign arouses faith, which disposes one to receive the sacrament, which in turn disposes one toward the healing of the sacrament.

²¹ The Latin for this sentence is not clear. Latin: Vera enim causa natura prior est, et ideo a sensibus nostris remotior. Cf. Aristotle, Physica, I, 1; WAE, vol. 2, 184a: “In the science of nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed toward those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not ‘knowable relatively to us’ and ‘knowable’ without qualification. So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, toward what is more clear and more knowable by nature.”

²² In the case of a normal cause and effect situation, the effect flows directly from the cause. However, Bonaventure argues that the sacraments do not have a normal cause/effect relationship with the grace that they signify.

²³ In other words, we always signify things through what is nearer to our senses. Since grace is above our senses, we signify that grace through a visible sign. But this is not a cause and effect relationship, because the sacraments do not cause grace. They signify and predispose toward receptivity of grace.

²⁴ Thus a sign always signifies, but in order for it to be efficacious, someone has to recognize it.

²⁵ In this citation, Bonaventure is moving with the following specific text from the Glossa Ordinaria. Cf. Glossa Ordinaria on Rom. 6:4. Biblia cum glossa ordinaria; Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria: facsimile reprint of the editio princeps Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/81, ed. with introduction, K. Froehlich and M. T. Gibson, 4 vols. (Brepols: Turnhout, 1992) vol. 4, 285-86: Quidquid gestum est in cruce christi in sepultura in resurrectione in ascesione in sedere ad dexteram ita gestum est ut his rebus mystice non tantum dictis sed etiam gestis configuretur vita christiana.

²⁶ Anselm of Canterbury, De veritate, c. 2 (PL 158, 470; S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Seccovii, Romae, 1938), 179): Sed cum significat esse quod est, dupliciter facit quod debet: quoniam significat et quod accepit significare, et quod facta est.

²⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 2.2 (PL 176:318C; Corpus Victorinum, 210): Representatio ex similitudine. Significatio ex institutione. Virtus ex sanctificatione…Prima indita per creatorem. Secunda adiuncta per saluatorem. Tercia ministrata per dispensatorem.

²⁸ Latin: Quod ergo obicitur, quod est Deo voluntarium nobis est naturale, dicendum quod verum est, si det rei illud, non solum ut in ea sit, sed etiam ut sit ab ea, ita quod sit a principiis subiecti; et quia talis ratio non est in sacramentis, ideo vere et proprie sunt voluntaria. Et sic patet quod sunt signa et qualiter significant. In other words, what is natural to us, are sensible realities that have come into being. The sacraments are supernatural. They are embedded in creation, but they point to a supernatural reality by virtue of God’s will.

²⁹ Cf. Lombard, Psalterium commentarii, Ps. 17:11 (PL 191, 192): Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum, id est occultam spem in corde credentium, ubi latet, non deserens eos. Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum, id est obscuritatem sacramentorum, in quibus latet. Latuit enim divinitas in carne, remissio peccatorum in baptismo, Christus in altari sub sacramento panis.

³⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 4 (PL 176, 323B; Corpus Victorinum, 216): Postremo quinque discreta et distincta ab inuicem ad cognitionem procedunt. Deus medicus, homo egrotus, sacerdos minister uel nuncius, gratia antidotum, uas sacramentum. Medicus donat, minister dispensat, uas seruat que sanat, percipientem egrotum, gratiam spiritualem. Si ergo uasa sunt spiritualis gratie sacramenta non ex suo sanant, quia uasa egrotum non curant, sed medicina.

³¹ Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176:317B; Corpus Victorinum, 210): …et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam.

³² The Word is the operative power in the sacraments. Latin: Intelligendum est ad hoc secundum quosdam quod ipsa sacramenta sunt vasa gratiae, cum sint in ultima dispositione, quae est sanctificatio per verbum, et mediantibus illis transfunditur in ipsam animam. Cf. Ambrose, De sacramentis, IV, c. 5, 23 (PL 16, 463B): Et ante verba Christi, calix est vini, et aquae plenus: ubi verba Christi operata fuerint, ibi sanguis Christi efficitur, qui plebem redemit. See also c. 4-5 (PL 16, 458B-464C).

³³ This is a very important point. Latin: Et pro tanto dicunt quod sacramenta Novae Legis sunt causa gratiae et efficiunt quod figurant.

³⁴ The thing signified is not contained in the sign itself but in the soul.

³⁵ The substance of these objections seems to be the error of equating the middle term of the Eucharist (res et sacramentum) to the end (res) of the other sacraments. Christ is present in the Eucharist to give grace. The end of this sacrament is union with the Mystical Body (res tantum). Therefore, equating the grace of the other sacraments with the provider of grace in the Eucharist leads to these objections.

³⁶ Latin: …ergo, sacramenta Novae Legis sunt gratiae effectiva.

³⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 11, c. 5 (PL 176, 345B; Corpus Victorinum, 245): …quod sacramenta noui testamenti primo loco spiritualis gratie signa sunt et ad ipsam gratiam sanctificandis conferendam infusa sibi benedictione principaliter instituta.

³⁸ Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. I, c. 4, 2, 233: Sacramentum enim proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae. Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa exsistat.

³⁹ Anselm, De conceptu virginali, c. 24 (PL 158, 457C; S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, vol. 2 (Seccovii, Romae, 1938), 166): …quippe si Adam nequivisset ad eos, quos generaturus erat, justitiam suam perducere, nequaquam posset eis suam injustitiam transmittere.

⁴⁰ Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176, 318B; Corpus Victorinum, 210). In this text, Bonaventure does not closely quote Hugh. He interprets and develops the following principle of Hugh’s: Hoc autem interesse uidetur quod omne sacramentum similitudinem quidem habet ex prima conditione institutionem ex superaddita dispensatione sanctificationem ex apposita uerbi uel signi benedictione.

⁴¹ Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, Dist. I, c. 5, 235. Here, Bonaventure does not closely quote Lombard, but he picks up and develops the following principle that Lombard articulates: Cum igitur absque sacramentis, quibus non alligavit potentiam suam Deus, homini gratiam donare posset, praedictis de causis sacramenta instituit.

⁴² Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 4 (PL 176, 323B; Corpus Victorinum, 216): Si ergo vasa sunt spiritalis gratiae sacramenta, non ex suo sanant, quia vasa aegrotum non curant, sed medicina.

⁴³ Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 118, 18, 4 (PL 37, 1553; CCL 40, 1725, 22-24): Deus itaque per seipsum, quia lux est, illuminat pias mentes, ut ea quae diuina dicuntur uel ostenduntur, intellegant.

⁴⁴ Latin: …ergo Deus non influit per sacramentum gratiam in animam:ergo gratia a solo Deo est effective. Si igitur sacramentum est gratiae causa, hoc est solum dispositive.

⁴⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176, 318D; Corpus Victorinum, 210): Venit autem Salvator et instituit visibilem per ablutionem aquam corporum ad significandam invisibilem, per spiritalem gratiam emundationem animarum.

⁴⁶ Latin: …esse gratiae est suum inesse, cum sit accidens.

⁴⁷ Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, c. 19, 50 (PL 32, 1268; CCL 29, 271):Virtutes igitur quibus recte vivitur, magna bona sunt: species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt: potentiae vero animi sine quibus recte vivi non potest, media bona sunt.

⁴⁸ Spiritual things are influenced spiritually. Corporeal things are influenced corporeally.

⁴⁹ It appears Bonaventure is here paraphrasing. The actual quote from Boethius is as follows. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, V, p. 4, n. 25 (PL 63, 849A, CCSL 94. Edited by Ludovicus Bieler. Brepols: Turnholt, 1957), 96-97: Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. “Everything that is known is known not according to its own power, but according to the capacity of the knower.”

⁵⁰ Bede, In Lucae evangelium expositio, I, 3, 21 (PL 92, 358; CCSL 120, 83): Quia dum corporis humilitate Dominus undas Jordanis subiit, divinitatis suae potentia caeli nobis januas pandit.

⁵¹ Therefore through contact with the flesh of Christ, created things become more noble so that they can affect the soul. From this connection to the nobility of Christ flow the other arguments that God uses physical means to administer his purposes in the world. The incarnation shows that Gnostic dualism is a heresy.

⁵² Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 3, c. 1, 243.

⁵³ Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, LXXX, 3 (PL 35, 1840; CCL 36, 529, 9-11): Unde ista tanta uirtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente uerbo, non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur? For a similar thought cf. De cataclysmo, c. 3, n. 3 ( PL 40, 694).

⁵⁴ Often translated as “sanctifying grace.” Literally, “the grace that makes gracious.” That is, the grace disposes one to the reception of grace.

⁵⁵ Often translated “grace freely given.”

⁵⁶ Often translated “efficacious grace,” that is, a grace that helps one do something.

⁵⁷ This could be misread as saying that the sacraments are a cause sine qua non. However in the overall context of the question, and in Bonaventure’s theology as a whole, it is clear that he is referring to the gratia gratum faciens as the cause sine qua non, without which the sacraments would not be efficacious. His example of the fire of purgation not being efficacious without grace already in the soul demonstrates this. Also, this point is argued explicitly below in ad obj. A. 1-2.

⁵⁸ That is, the grace already “in the soul working from within.”

⁵⁹ Thus both in the Old and New the gratia gratum faciens was operating. This further shows that Bonaventure does not consider the sacraments to be a cause of this grace.

⁶⁰ That is, “the work having been worked.”

⁶¹ This is Bonaventure’s main point. If the sacraments are any sort of cause, they are not an efficient cause of grace. This belongs only to God.

⁶² Again, no created thing gives grace—neither the priest nor the sacraments. However, these can bear a likeness to the grace given.

⁶³ Cf. I respond, this article, below.

⁶⁴ Here, Bonaventure uses the term “substance” to refer to something spiritual. This exhibits his use of a Platonic world view. This has implications for how he understands the notion of transubstantiation.

⁶⁵ The antecedent to “it” is still the created spiritual power of the sacraments.

⁶⁶ Cf. above in this question, ad obj. B. 3.

⁶⁷ Cf. above in this question, ad obj. B. 3 and C. 2.

⁶⁸ 2 Kings 5.

⁶⁹ Latin: …quia non dicitur causa secundum quod est principium operandi, sed secundum quod est ratio ordinandi.

⁷⁰ Bonaventure is explicit in his caution about giving too much power to corporeal signs. Latin: …cavendum est.

⁷¹ Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 1, c. 6, 236. This quotation from the Magister is actually from Augustine on Ps 73. Even so, Bonaventure takes some liberty with the text of Peter: Latin: Eorum autem differentiam … breviter significabant, haec autem dant salutem. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 73, 2 (PL 36, 931; CCL 39, 1006, 19-22): Sacramenta noui testamenti dant salutem; sacramenta ueteris testamenti promiserunt saluatorem, cum ergo iam teneas promissa, quid quaeris promittentia, habens iam saluatorem?

⁷² Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 8, c. 12 (PL 176, 313D; Corpus Victorinum, 204): Que quidem pro ut ratio postulabat et causa diversis temporibus et locis ad creationem illius exibuit, alia ante legem, alia sub lege alia sub gratia diversa quidem in specie unum tamen habentia effectum et unam sanitatem perficientia.

⁷³ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 8, c. 12 (PL 176:313CD; Corpus Victorinum, 204): Ex quo enim homo a statu prime incorruptionis lapsus in corpore pro mortalitate in anima per iniquitatem egrotare cepit continuo deus reparando inde sacramentis suis medicinam preparauit.

⁷⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p.8, c.3 (PL 176:307C; Corpus Victorinum, 196): Tali igitur ratione in tempore naturalis legis totus homo dimissus est sibi. Sed postea in tempore scriptae legis cognoscenti ignorantiam suam datum est consilium. Postremo in tempore gratiae confitenti defectum suum praestitum est auxilium.

⁷⁵ With the above citation, Bonaventure captures the sense of the following longer text. Cf. Glossa Ordinaria on Rom 3:20, Biblia Glossa, vol. 4, 280-81: Opera legis dicuntur quoniam cum lege instituta et terminata sunt ut erant cerimonialia et figurativa quae nunquam valuerunt conscientiam mundare etiam si cum charitate et devotione fierent.

⁷⁶ Biblia cum glossa ordinaria, vol. 3, Isa 1:11, 4; See also PL 113, 1234C: Praeterito utens, ostendit se nunquam Judaeorum sacrificia amasse, sed propter significatum ad tempus sustinuisse: et vero sacrificio impleto, pro nihilo reputasse.

⁷⁷ Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 1, c. 4, 6 and 7, 233-37.

⁷⁸ Latin: Illa. The translation clarifies the antecedent.

⁷⁹ Throughout this respondeo Bonaventure articulates the distinction between sacraments conferring grace per se, the grace that accompanies the sacrament but not by reason of signification, and per accidens, the grace that the sacrament may bring with it, but not because of that to which it was instituted and ordered.

⁸⁰ These sacrifices are mentioned during what is now known as Eucharistic Prayer I in the Roman Canon. The text is as follows: Supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu respicere digneris: et accepta habere, siculti accepta habere dignatus es munera pueri tui iusti Abel, et sacrificium Patriarchae nostri Abrahae, et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos tuus Melchisedech, sanctum sacrificium, immaculatam hostiam.

⁸¹ Luke 2:22-24.

⁸² Therefore the sacraments of the New Law are almost the opposite to the Old in that what is primary in the Old, that is ordering toward what is to be believed, is secondary in the New, and what is secondary in the Old, that is the efficacy of grace, is primary in the New.

⁸³ Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, p. 11, c. 5 (PL 176, 345B; Corpus Victorinum, 245): Prima igitur differentia est quod sacramenta Novi Testamenti primo loco spiritualis gratiae signa sunt; et ad ipsam gratiam sanctificandis conferendam infusa sibi benedictione principaliter instituta. Illa vero, signa horum tantum; et mediantibus his quorum signa fuerunt, ne sine salute essent, qui tempus redemptionis praecesserunt, gratiam in sustentationem susceperunt contulerunt. Secunda differentia est quod qui in illis sacramentis imbuebantur antiqui justi; nondum adhuc regni coelestis januam intrare potuerunt donec salvator per carnem assumptam coelos ascendit, et in se omnibus credentibus ac se sequentibus viam aperuit. Tertia differentia est quod sacramenta naturalis legis non ex praecepto indicta videntur, sed ex consilio ad votum proposita; sacramenta non scriptae legis et gratiae necessitatem quamdam exsecutionis inducere propterea quod non ex consilio tantum, sed ex praecepto instituta noscuntur.

⁸⁴ Latin: …ratio operis operati.

⁸⁵ Latin: …ratio operis operantis.

⁸⁶ Latin: … operati.

⁸⁷ Latin: …opus operans.

⁸⁸ Latin: … operatum exterius.

⁸⁹ Latin: …opus operans.

⁹⁰ Latin: …opus operatum.

⁹¹ Latin: … de operato.

⁹² Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. I, c. 4.3, 233: Quae enim significandi gratia tantum instituta sunt, solum signa sunt, et non sacramenta: sicut fuerunt sacrificia carnalia et observantiae caerimoniales veteris Legis, quae nunquam poterant iustos facere offerentes.

⁹³ Hebr 9:13 with Hebr 10:4.

⁹⁴ This difference is that the old signifies the new, while the new signifies grace.

⁹⁵ Cf. Question 4, above.

⁹⁶ Latin: …causalitas sacramentorum non est aliud quam quaedam efficax ordinatio ad recipiendam gratiam ex pactione divina.

⁹⁷ Cf. above, I respond…, Question 4. The gratia gratum faciens is the “grace that makes gracious,” or the grace that enables one to receive grace.

⁹⁸ Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 4, c 5, 260.

⁹⁹ Here, Bonaventure articulates a new position on the question.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. III, d. 34, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.