PART TWO
ON WORTHY RECEPTION OF BAPTISM
ARTICLE TWO
ON OBSTACLES TO THE RECEPTION OF BAPTISM
QUESTION ONE
WHETHER INFANTS RECEIVE SANCTIFICATION IN BAPTISM
So we proceed to the first question. That an infant cannot be justified would appear:
1. Because Bernard says in De libero arbitrio that two things are necessary for salvation, namely the one giving and the free will, and he goes on to say, “as there can be no salvation for us without the will of the one who consents, so there can be none without the grace of the giver.”1 However, there is no use of free will in an infant; therefore there can be no salvation in infants.
2. Again, Augustine, “He who created you without you will not justify you without you,”2 that is, without an act of your will. However, the infant does not have that; therefore the infant cannot be justified.
3. Again, the will of the infant does not change, and thus is always of one state with respect to grace. God however is always prepared to give. Therefore whether he sometimes gives and other times not, that is on account of the change in the will of the one who receives. Thus, if there is no change in the will of the infant, he does not receive it. If you should say that the infant is disposed, not by his own act, but by the faith of those who present him, suppose that those who present him are without faith, then the infant would accordingly be damned.
4. Again, signification precedes sanctification in this sacrament. Therefore, if there is no signification there is no sanctification. The sacrament holds no signification for the infant, because it causes nothing to enter into his mind; therefore it does not sanctify the infant.
But to the contrary: a. It is more consonant with reason and piety that the condition of infants be aided by another rather than be injured. This is because infants can and do incur guilt without their consent—therefore so much more so with grace.
b. Again, Romans 5:12-17 states, Through one man sin entered the world … and through one life. Christ is no less powerful than Adam, and grace spreads itself more extensively than guilt. Therefore, if Adam was able to corrupt them without their consent, so much the more so is the sacrament of Christ able to save them.
c. Again, everyone who receives a sacrament receives its res unless he has an obstacle. The child that receives the sacrament has no obstacle because the will does not resist it nor is fault itself able to resist it; therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that infants receive the res of the sacrament, which is the remission of original guilt. This is by the merit of the passion of Christ, the faith of another, and the power of the sacrament. The reason is because of divine mercy, as well as the inability of the infant, and the kind of guilt that is remitted. Since the original guilt was contracted through the act of someone else, and they were incapable of helping themselves, the merciful God judged it proper that they be assisted through the faith of another.3
Since no blameless person could offer satisfaction for that original guilt, God came to the aid of the whole human race through the passion of Christ. Again, because the passion has no effect except for those who wish to become members of Christ and give their consent, and because an infant is not able to make that choice, therefore the will and faith of another comes to the infant’s assistance.
To the objections: 1-3. The first is to be understood as concerning the justification from the guilt of actions, not guilt that is contracted.4 Likewise the second and third are solved, because the infant is not disposed by his own act, but by that of another, for the divine mercy considers the will of another as the infant’s own.
4. To the fourth it is to be said that the sacrament, considered just in itself, always signifies and sanctifies. Nonetheless in the case of an infant it does not have the effect of signifying, but only of sanctifying. This is because, while not capable of discernment, the infant is still capable of grace, just as he or she is capable of guilt, and this flows from the generosity of divine mercy. For, although it does not signify to the infant, nevertheless it signifies to others the grace which it conveys to the infant.
WHETHER EQUAL GRACE IS GIVEN TO ALL INFANTS IN BAPTISM
The third question is whether equal grace is given to all infants in the sacrament. And that it is would appear:
a. This is due to the fact that a cause does not result in different effects unless either the one acting is voluntary, or if it is not voluntary then it conducts itself differently; or when the one receiving receives the cause differently from others. However neither the sacrament nor the power of the passion is a voluntary actor, nor is the agent itself diverse, nor is one infant more disposed than another; therefore, etc.
b. Again, with whatever disposition the infant is born, with whatever natural qualities the infant has, one is not born more a sinner than another. Therefore, by the same token in regeneration one ought not be regenerated more or better than another.
c. Again, one infant is not punished more than another; therefore neither is one infant rewarded more than another.
To the contrary: 1. Goodness of nature is a disposition for grace. Therefore when nature is better, there is a better disposition. However, a cause acting uniformly makes a greater impression upon what is better disposed, as does light in air when compared with light in water. Therefore, when one infant is better disposed than another, clearly, etc.
2. Again, because God foresaw that Jacob would be good in the future, he gave him grace, but to the other, namely his brother, he did not give it because he foresaw that he would remain in evil. Therefore, if he foresees that some of the infants who are baptized are going to be damned, and others saved, it seems that he ought to give the greater grace to those who are to be saved.
I respond: It must be said that grace is measured out according to the liberality of the God who gives, not according to the quality of the one receiving. This is the case, unless, from the perspective of congruity, one considers the preparation and disposition of the one receiving rather than simply the capacity of the one receiving. Therefore because God there [in the baptism of infants] operates according to the exigencies of the sacrament, and moreover because one infant is not more disposed than another infant, God gives in equal measure to all, insofar as what normally happens is in view. Nevertheless, because God’s power is not bound to the sacrament, it is not necessary that he always give equally, but can provide, to whomever he wills, a special privilege.
To the objections: a-b. To what is first objected concerning an agent acting in a differing manner, it must be said that this is not valid. It is God who acts in the sacrament as voluntary agent. Likewise, the second objection is not valid because every infant is naturally born of libidinous procreation, and therefore all are born uniformly.5
c. To the third objection concerning punishment, it is to be said that it is not valid, because justice centers precisely upon merit, but mercy concerns the benevolence of the giver.6
1. To what is objected to the contrary it must be said that goodness of nature does not dispose to grace as a necessity, nor even by its suitability, unless a determined preparation intervenes, such as when one so prepares himself according to the capacity of his nature.
2. The final objection is clear, because the power of the sacrament does not look to the future, but to the present disposition. However, it is God who is concerned for both.
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1 Bernard of Clairvaux, De libero arbitrio, c.. 1, n. 2 (PL 182, 1002; SBOp 3, 167): Quod ergo a solo Deo, et soli datur libero arbitrio; tam absque consensu esse non potest accipientis, quam absque gratia dantis.
2 Augustine, Sermo 169, c. 11, n. 13 (PL 38, 923): Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te.
3 Notice the chiastic structure here in the text. The previous sentence moves from the mercy of God to the inability of the infant to the kind of guilt. This sentence begins with original guilt, moves to the infant’s inability and finishes with the mercy of God.
4 Latin: Nam primum intelligitur de iustificatione a culpa acta, non contracta.
5 Bonaventure is not disagreeing with the conclusion of argument b, but with its assertion that infants might have different dispositions or natures. All infants, according to Bonaventure, have the same dispositions and natures because they are produced of the same “libidinous” act. Thus, the haec refers to the nature and disposition of infants.
6 Thus all receive the same level of forgiveness, but some may receive more blessing because of God’s generosity.