SOLE ARTICLE
CONCERNING CHARACTER
QUESTION ONE
WHAT IS CHARACTER ACCORDING TO ITS ESSENCE
Concerning the first question, to which we now proceed, it is first shown that character is a habitus:1
a. “Because there are three things in the soul, namely potencies, passions and habitus.”2 Character is not a potency, because it is not in all souls; nor is it a passion, because in respect to it the soul is not affected; therefore it is a dispositio.
b. Again, it is a given that character is a “spiritual quality” of the soul. There is nothing in a determined genus that is not in the species of it. Since therefore “spiritual quality” is the first species of “quality,” and since, “spiritual quality” is either a habitus or a dispositio, then character is either a habitus or a dispositio. However because character is not easily changed it is not a dispositio but a habitus.
To the contrary: 1. Augustine in De bono coniugali argues that habitus is that through which someone does something.3 However a person does not do anything by means of character. Therefore character is not
a habitus.
2. Again, if character is a habitus, it is either natural, that is inborn, or acquired or infused. It is clear that it is not inborn; therefore it is either acquired or infused. However since every acquired or infused habitus is in the soul by means of it being perfected, it is either knowledge or virtue. Character is neither of these. Therefore it is not a habitus.
I respond:4 1 In this matter some have said that the act of impressing character is nothing more than making a seal. Therefore, according to them, character is the same as a sign. This sign adds nothing to the powers of the soul such that it means something absolute. This is the same as when the making of a seal, which is enclosed by a circle, does not absolutely change the circle. Rather, character is built upon the foundation of the bare powers of the soul, and is there by way of institution and the act of the one making the seal, with no change done to the powers of the soul. Hence, character is a pure relation like paternity. Furthermore, these say that the word of the Philosopher is to be understood concerning those things that indicate something absolute. To this they give the example that character is in the soul as consecration in a church—in which consecration the church is given no new quality but only a designation by one in authority that sacred mysteries are to be celebrated there. Thus they say that character is a certain seal upon the soul,5 by which the soul is said to be sanctified in order that God may reside there as in a temple. This they say Dionysus concluded in his book De ecclesiastica hierarchia, where he says that character is the holy sign of understanding or communication of the faith and of a sacred ordering given by the hierarchy to those who draw near.6
However this cannot stand, because character indicates some assimilation and configuration to Christ, just as the mark7 of the beast, of which Revelation 14:9 speaks, indicates the same toward the devil. This assimilation is founded upon quality. Therefore if this assimilation makes one like God again, and no other change to quality takes place on the other extreme, then it is necessary that character gives the soul a quality.
2 For this reason some have said that, although character speaks of a relation, it nonetheless indicates a quality upon which it is founded. That quality is like a disposition for receiving the light and warmth of grace, just as dryness in wood is to heat, and transparency in glass to light. Hence they place character in the second species of quality.
However that does not stand either, because then character would be a natural potency or impotency which is a consequence of nature. Besides, dryness and transparency are incapable of resisting. Thus, in this case character would be an impotency, which is a stupid thing to say.
3 For this reason others have said that character serves not only to dispose, but also to distinguish. Thus character is a certain quality that adorns and decorates the faithful soul, through which they are distinguished from the infidel. Hence it bears to the spiritual sense a delightful passion. Thus it is a passable quality and belongs in the third species of quality.
However neither does this stand, because that which conveys a passion to the interior or intellectual sense cannot be called a passible quality. For, since every truth is the object of the intellect, everything would belong to the third species of quality, and that is stupid to say. Therefore it is the same with character.
4 Furthermore, still others have said that character, as its name indicates, implies a configuration.8 Hence we find in Hebrews 1:3, where some translations say the figure of his substance, while others say the character of his substance.9 Hence character belongs to the fourth species, which “is the form and figure of something constant.”10
If you should object that figure belongs to quantity, and quantity to the corporeal, they respond that just as quantity is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal or flexible, so is figure twofold. This would seem not to hold, because a figure is a closure of terms and accordingly belongs to the fourth species. In spiritual matters conformation is not similar to the closure of terms, but rather is the impression of likeness or assimilation. Likewise if figure is placed in spiritual things, it is done only metaphorically. Thus, just as quantity of virtue is not placed in the genus of quantity of nature, so neither is figure in species of figure. Again, in what way according to the quality of virtue in act can there be said to be a closure of terms? Furthermore, upon what does that closure rest? If it is upon a given or innate virtue, recourse must necessarily be made to another species. Therefore, since a spiritual figure has no agreement with it, it seems that character does not fit a figure or conformation in the fourth species.
(5) Some strain to say that character does not belong to any of the species of quality as set out by the Philosopher, because the Philosopher set out only the species of innate or acquired quality, and not infused quality. The Philosopher himself insinuates this when he says, “And perhaps other modes of quality will become apparent.”11 They say that character belongs to another species, indeed that one species of quality is an infused quality. However, that seems to be a search for escape, because we place the theological and other virtues, which are infused, in the first species of quality. Why then not similarly with character?
Wherefore it must be said that the character,12 since it is in the soul, further is a spiritual quality, which is a habitus, and neither a passion nor a potency.13 However it should be noted that habitus is used in two ways: in one it is used in a particular way insofar as it is distinguished from a disposition as perfect or imperfect; and in the second it is used in a common way, insofar as it comprehends both, namely every quality that disposes the soul whether either easily moved or only with difficulty, whether perfect or imperfect. This is how it is understood when it is said that there are three things in the soul: potency, passion, and habitus. For a disposition is in the soul and is neither a potency nor a passion.
Hence it must be said that if habitus is taken in a broad sense, then character is a habitus. If taken strictly, it is the same. This is because character is perpetual, and therefore a habitus. However because it does not perfect, but disposes to further perfection, namely grace, in this respect character is a disposition. This is like the case of the bodily eye, because in the eye there is a connatural, inseparable light; this light is insufficient for seeing unless a visible spirit enters from the optic nerve. In like fashion there is in the intellect a connatural, inseparable light that does not suffice for guiding cognition unless the habitus of knowledge intervenes.
Hence in reality character is a certain quality that does not entirely perfect the soul, but which disposes the soul to further perfection, namely to grace.14 Therefore it is possible that character is a certain incomplete spiritual light and certain warmth freely given. Furthermore that light is called the seal of the soul, or to be sealed in the soul, according to what is read in the fourth Psalm: The light of thy countenance, O Lord is sealed upon us.15 Sealed, I say, through nature, but more especially through the divine sacraments, and most especially through the gratuitous gifts of the Holy Spirit.16
To the objections: 1-2. Thus the two objections are solved, because they are understood to concern a perfect habitus, which fully includes the notion of habitus. For, such a habitus of itself fully equips for some accomplishment. Thus this habitus equips either for cognition, for knowledge, or for motivation, and thus for virtue. This is, however, not true for a habitus which is imperfect. An imperfect habitus disposes for something, such as natural light for knowledge, or the light of the eye for the habitus of sight. Character is to be understood in this way: it is an imperfect habitus. Nevertheless it also possesses a certain action, as shall be apparent in the following problem.
FOR WHAT PURPOSE IS CHARACTER USEFUL
The second question about character concerns its usefulness: for what purpose in fact is character useful? Since it is a sacramental sign, it is said that it is for signing; but not only for this, but also for disposing; lastly it is for assimilating and also for distinguishing.
A. The first question therefore concerns signing.
1. Since a sign is something that makes itself available to the senses, it would seem that character is not a sign. It offers nothing to the senses.
2. Again, if it is a sign, it is then either natural or voluntary. If it is voluntary, then it appears in diverse ways to diverse people; and that is nonsense. If it is natural, then it owes its existence to nature, which is also a nonsensical statement.
3. Again, if it is a sign, the question is, What does it signify? If it signifies grace, the objection arises that there are many who have character but neither have, nor had, nor will have grace.
B. Concerning the second function, concerning disposing, the same question is put. That it does not function to dispose is seen:
1. Because, since God is an agent of infinite potency, he does not need a prior disposition to impress a form. Therefore there is no need for character or anything else to dispose to grace.
2. Again, if it is for disposing, the question arises, To what does it dispose? If to grace, the objection is raised that grace is possessed in the case of baptism by fire without character. Therefore we have no need of a mediating disposition.
3. Again, grace is joined to glory without a mediating disposition. Therefore it would seem in similar fashion that nature can be joined to grace. Therefore no other disposition is necessary.
C. Concerning the third function, which is assimilation, the question arises, To whom does the character assimilate? It is clear, at least to some, that it is to the one by whom character is impressed. Therefore it assimilates to God.
1. But to the contrary, likeness is the same quality in different things; but there is nothing common to Creator and creature. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, character can stand alongside guilt, which is altogether unlike God. However, likeness is dispelled by dissimilarity. Therefore guilt would expel or destroy character. Now, that is false; therefore, etc.
3. Again, since it would assimilate to the whole Trinity, because what is assimilated to one person, is assimilated to all three persons, the question arises, To which person by appropriation? And that it is to the Father is seen because it is a sacrament of regeneration. Thus it belongs to the one who generates to regenerate. Since generation is proper to the Father, it is clear, etc. That it is to the Son is seen because the Son is said to be the eternal character.17 That it is to the Holy Spirit is seen because character is the sign which prepares for grace and any gift given gratuitously. Grace is appropriated to the Holy Spirit; therefore, etc.
D. About the fourth function, namely distinguishing, the question also arises, Whom does it distinguish? The Damascene says that character distinguishes the faithful from the unfaithful.18
1. But to the contrary, there are many faithful persons who do not possess character, and many unfaithful who do; therefore, etc.
2. Again, if it distinguishes, the question is, To whom? It is either to God or to us. It is not to God, because God has no need of it. Neither is it to us, because we do not see whether someone has character. Although it would benefit the angels and the blessed, it would be superfluous for them because they know well without this.
I respond: It must be said that character is a sacramental seal impressed by God.19 Because character is a sacramental seal it thus signifies grace. Further not only does it signify grace, but it in some way prepares for it. This is because the function of the sacraments does not lie in signifying alone. Because character signifies grace and disposes to grace, it then has some similarity to grace, which is a likeness of God. Hence in some way character configures one to God.20 Because it molds all into one, it also assimilates the Lord’s flock among its members. In this way it distinguishes them from those who are not of the flock, or also creates a distinction within the same flock according to one or the other manner of assimilating.
To the objections: A. 1-2. To the first objection, that character is not visible, the response is that character together with the external sign makes one sacrament. Hence it does not have the manner of signifying through itself alone, but in conjunction with the external element. For that reason it is visible and one, just as it is one element. For this reason its signification is voluntary and from its institution, just like the element it signifies. Nevertheless it is not different in different subjects, because it is instituted by the authority of the master of the universe.
3. To the question concerning what it signifies, the response is grace. Further, where grace does not exist, as we held above, this happens only because of the defect of the one receiving it.21
B. To the question about the second function, it must be said that character disposes like a kind of light and gift of warmth. Still, the disposition provided by character is not of necessity, as if the agent or the receiver would not be able to act otherwise. But, since nature has been corrupted by sin and is not disposed for grace, it was fitting (congruum fuit) that a mediating disposition should intervene between sin and grace. However, this is not the case between grace and glory.
1-3. And so the response to the three objections becomes clear. To the first, that it is not a disposition on account of the need of the agent; to the second, that it is not a necessary disposition; to the third, that the disposition in a sinful nature to grace is not like that of grace to glory.22
C. To the question of assimilation, it must be said that there is assimilation in three ways: through participation in one quality, or imitation of the same, or through absolute indivisibility. The first is that of a creature to another creature. The second is that of a creature to God. The third is that of God to God, or as of one divine person to another.
Now, the assimilation of the creature to God is either perfect, or sufficient, or disposing to sufficient. The first is in glory, and this is incompatible with any dissimilarity, either of fault or of misery. The second is the case of grace, and this is compatible with the dissimilarity of misery, but not of fault. The third is that of character, and this is compatible with both fault and misery, because it is only of gratia gratis data, and even then from a great distance.23
1-2. And thus the response to these two concerning assimilation is clear.
3. To the further question, To whom does it principally assimilate? it must be said that it is appropriately to the Son, who is called “the character.”24 Another reason is because the baptized are said to put on Christ, for he is the head and leader of the army. Last, this is because character concerns faith through appropriation, as will be shown.
D. Concerning distinguishing, some conclude that character distinguishes those who are of the Church—that is, those who are of its number from those, with respect to merit, who are not. However this amounts to nothing because the heretic who is cut off has character and is nevertheless not of the Church.
Others hold that character distinguishes the recipients of the sacraments from those who have received only the sign of participation in the sacraments, and consequently also serves as a distinction with regard to non-participants.25 However, then it would seem that character would be a sign of itself.
1. Therefore it must be said that the manner of distinguishing in character proceeds from the manner of signifying. Character signifies the grace of faith according to a specific status.26 Hence it distinguishes either the faithful from the infidel, or faithful from other faithful, and the fact that they are intermingled is not the fault of the sign, but of those who are signed.
2. In this way the second is also clarified, in that the sign is for us, not per se, but by reason of its being conjoined with the element. Here is an example: if someone takes up the arms of the king, it would be a sign that he belonged to the king’s army. Nevertheless he could choose to belong to the other side. In this case the arms would continue to signify that he belonged to the king’s side. There is no deception in the sign, but only in the one who takes it up.
So it is to be understood in this case, in the sense that just as the arms are made to distinguish the armies, and nevertheless they are very frequently confused when war is going on, so likewise it is with us, as long as we exist in the midst of the conflict of the misery of this present life. Then there is the example of the religious habit, which is a sign of goodness, yet the good share it with the bad, the carnal as well as the spiritual, and those who love the world with those who despise it.
WHETHER BAPTISM CAN OR OUGHT TO BE REPEATED
The sixth and last question is whether Baptism ought to be repeated. And that it should is seen:
1. Because it is possible for someone to be baptized and receive no grace through Baptism. Therefore, if the way to salvation is not to be closed to such a one, Baptism can and ought to be repeated.
2. Likewise, two things are given in Baptism, namely character and grace. Although character is indelible, still grace is destructible. Therefore at least by reason of grace it can and must be repeated.
To the contrary: a. If Baptism were able to be repeated, then anyone could sin with impunity, since in it the remission of guilt and punishment takes place.
b. Again, if the effect cannot be repeated, then neither the cause. Therefore if character cannot be repeated, then neither can its visible sign, namely Baptism.
c. Again, many things ought not to happen de jure, but if they happen de facto, they are still done. For example, an excommunicated priest should not celebrate the Eucharist, but if he celebrates, it is nevertheless confected. It is therefore asked whether in this case anything happens. And that it does, seems to be the case, because “with the application of the word to the element, the sacrament happens.”27
I respond: It must be said that Baptism ought not, nor can it be, repeated. Because it cannot be repeated, it follows that whoever repeats it accomplishes nothing. Furthermore, because in truth it ought not be repeated, one who knowingly repeats it sins most seriously.
The reason that it ought not be repeated is threefold. The first is by reason of the malady that it cures, namely original sin, which cannot be repeated. The second is by reason of what it principally signifies, which is the passion and resurrection, which it is impossible to repeat. The third is by reason of its efficacy in curing, in that it absolves both from punishment and from sin. In that case the evil would not be punished, if whenever they sin they should be baptized.
The reason why it cannot be repeated is the impression of character, which once it is impressed cannot be impressed again. That is the first effect of the sacrament without which the sacrament accomplishes nothing. The second reason is divine institution, inasmuch as the Lord instituted it to have a perfect and unique effect, and to happen only once. If it then occurs a second time nothing takes place in the soul, and thus one knowingly voids the sacrament.
For this reason anyone who repeats Baptism accomplishes absolutely nothing, and he sins even more than someone who feigns reception, because such a one acts contrary to a divine ordinance. Such a person is also contemptuous of the sacrament. He is also contemptuous of Christ, for, considered just in itself, he crucifies the Son of God for himself and makes a spectacle of it, since Baptism is unique and has its unique and perfect effect from his unique passion. For this reason, on account of the gravity of the fault, our holy Fathers imposed heavy punishment on those who repeat Baptism and those who were knowingly rebaptized. This is because repeated Baptism either smacks of heresy, or, if it does not smack of it, leads to the most serious contempt of God and of the sacrament, and therefore ought to be gravely punished.28
To the objections: 1. To the objection concerning the pretense of the one baptized, the response is that when the pretense is removed, character supplies everything the sacrament would accomplish without the pretense.
2. To the objection concerning grace, the answer is that grace is not the immediate effect, but is mediated by character. Hence nothing is accomplished when character is not impressed.
c. To the final objection, the response is that the one who repeats Baptism neither bestows the sacrament de facto nor de jure. This is because that subject is incapable of receiving it. When he externally washes, whether he does it knowingly or carelessly, he sins gravely. However, if one has done due diligence, although he accomplishes nothing interiorly, he nevertheless does not sin.29
_______________
1 The Latin word here is habitus. The most natural translation would be “habit,” but this is not adequate because of the negative connotations associated with that word, and because the English word does not capture the full meaning of the Latin. The word is left untranslated so that the meaning can emerge from the context. In this context, the same is done for dispositio, which is contrasted with habitus.
2 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, b. II, c. 5 (WAE 9, 1105b): “Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds – passions, faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these.”
3 Augustine, De bono coniugali, 21, 25 (PL 40, 390; CSEL 41, 219, 17-19): Ipse est enim habitus, quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est.
4 In this response, Bonaventure presents five different opinions of others that character is a “quality.” And so he addresses five different species of quality as five possibilities for understanding character. In the end, however, he rejects all five and argues that character is a habitus. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8, (WAE 1, 10a): “There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.” See also ch. 8, 8b-9a: “Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call “habit” or “disposition”. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established…. Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.”
5 Latin: Sic dicunt quod character est quoddam animae signaculum.
6 Although often attributed to Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, this definition of character is not to be found in this text.
7 Latin: …character. This is the same both in this text, and in the Latin Vulgate. In English this is commonly known as “the mark of the beast,” not “the character of the beast”—thus the above translation.
8 Latin: …configuratio.
9 This is because the Greek of Hebrews 1:3 is χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως.
10 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, section 2, part 8.
11 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, section 2 part 8.
12 Here, Bonaventure begins to explain his own position.
13 Latin: Quod est habitus, non passio nec potentia.
14 Latin: Secundum rem igitur character est quaedam qualitas animam non omnio perficiens, sed disponens ad ulteriorem perfectionem, scilicet gratiae.
15 Ps 4:6 in English versions, verse 7 in other versions.
16 In this paragraph, Bonaventure employs two words interchangeably to describe character as a quality of the soul, namely signaculum and signatum.
17 Latin: Et quod Filio, videtur quia Filius dicitur esse character aeternus. This seems to be a reference to Heb 1:3. See the previous question, where Bonaventure discusses the fact that some translations of Heb 1:3 read “character” instead of “substance.”
18 Here, Bonaventure interprets a text from the Damascene rather freely. Cf. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, IV, c. 9 and 11 (PG 94, 1130B): Crucis signum fideles inter et infideles discernit. Haec nobis signi loco in fronte data est, haud secus ac circumcisio Israeli. Per hanc nos fideles ab infidelibus distinguimur atque agnoscimur.
19 Latin: Dicendum quod character est signaculum sacramentale a Deo impressum.
20 Latin: Et quia gratiam significat et ad gratiam disponit, ideo habet aliquam similitudinem cum gratia, quae est similitudo Dei; ideo aliquo modo configurat Deo.
21 Cf. d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad I.
22 In other words there is a difference between moving from sin to grace and moving from grace to glory. In the former there is a need for a mediating disposition, which is character impressed by Baptism.
23 This is often translated “grace freely given.” Cf. d. 1, a. 1, q. 4, Ad respondeo.
24 Heb 1:3.
25 Thus, in this view, character distinguishes in three ways: those who participate fully in the res of the sacrament, those who participate only in the sign but not in the res, and those who have neither the sign nor the res, i.e., non-baptized persons.
26 Status is a term Bonaventure uses in various ways, most often to indicate a foundation or origin. In this case, he uses it to identify a specific situation in which a person finds himself or herself.
27 Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, LXXX, 3 (PL 35, 1840; CCL 36, 529, 5-7): Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum, etiam ipsum tamquam visibile verbum.
28 The strongly worded nature of this respondeo leads one to believe that rebaptism may have been practiced and taught by some in the 13th century.
29 This would be in the case where the one baptized simply does not know whether or not he has been previously baptized and has done his due diligence in seeking out that answer. In this case, and if in fact he has been baptized, the second baptism would not be a true baptism, but the parties involved would not be guilty of any sin.