ARTICLE TWO
CONCERNING THOSE WHO ARE ABLE TO RECEIVE ORDER
QUESTION ONE
WHETHER THE MALE SEX IS REQUIRED TO RECEIVE ORDER
Respecting the first, then, that the male sex is required is demonstrated:
a. First in this way: no Order can be conferred on one who does not have the natural possibility or aptitude for it. No one possesses the possibility for Order who does not have the aptitude for tonsure and the crown. Further, no one has the natural aptitude who fittingly always has a veiled head. If then only the man can fittingly by nature pray with his unveiled head, but a woman with head covered, as is said in 1 Corinthians 11:4, and which nature herself teaches, therefore, etc.
b. Again, no one is a candidate for receiving Order except the one who bears the image of God, because in this sacrament a man in a certain way becomes God or divine, since he participates in divine power. A man by reason of his sex is the image of God, as it says in 1 Corinthians 11:7. Therefore by no means can a woman be ordained.
c. Again, in Order spiritual power is given to the one ordained. Yet a woman is not able to receive such power, as is said in 1 Timothy 2:12, But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to use authority over a man. Neither then is a woman able to receive Order.
d. Again, if one conducts himself well in the other Orders, they prepare for the episcopacy. Yet the bishop is the spouse of the Church. Therefore, since a woman cannot be elevated to the episcopacy, but only a man—otherwise she would not be the spouse of the Church—therefore promotion to the antecedent orders belongs only to men.
To the contrary: 1. In Judges 4:4 it is read that Deborah judged Israel and led it. Therefore it seems that juridical power is appropriate for a woman to hold, especially when she abounds in grace; therefore priestly power as well.
2. Again, in the New Testament we find abbesses to whom communities are given to be ruled.1 Therefore it would seem that the power to bind and loose ought to be given them, and for the same reason it would seem that priestly Order can also be given to them.
3. Again, the priestly order and the other orders deal with the soul and not the flesh. But with regard to the soul there is no distinction of sexes; rather, the woman is equally the image of God as the man. Therefore she is equally well capable of receiving Order.
4. Again, there is no greater perfection than the religious state, nor any greater fortitude than in the suffering of the martyr. Yet women are admitted both to religious houses and to martyrdom. Therefore they can and ought to be admitted to sacred Order.
I respond: It must be said that the common opinion holds that women ought not to be admitted to sacred Orders.2 For it is expressly said in distinction 23, “It is reported to the apostolic See that it happens among you that women consecrated to God, or nuns, handle the sacred vessels or sacred robes and carry incense about the altar. Yet there is no doubt to anyone who rightly considers it that all these things are worthy of vituperation and full reprehension. For this reason, by authority of this holy See, we order that this plague be most quickly wiped out of all the provinces lest this plague be spread more abroad.”3
Further, all agree that they should not be promoted to sacred Orders. Yet whether they are able to be, is in doubt. It was indeed the opinion of some, who were called Cataphrygians,4 that they are able to be promoted. They are supported not only by past authorities, but they also rely on authorities of the canons and cite them for their position. In these canons it is shown that in antiquity women received Orders. For it says in Causa XXVII, in the first question, “We decree that a deaconess should not be ordained before the age of forty,”5 and in the same question, “If anyone should rape or solicit a deaconess,”6 and similarly in distinction 32 there is mention of a priestess.7 Yet certainly if attention is paid to what is said in distinction 32, “Presbyteram…” it is apparent that widows and the elderly and matrons are called presbyterae.8 From this it is concluded that those who communicated with deacons in reading the homily were called deaconesses, to whom were given some benediction. Hence it is in no way to be believed that according to the canons, women were ever promoted to sacred Orders. Thus according to the more healthy opinion and according to the more prudent doctors, women not only should not be, or cannot be by law, admitted to sacred orders; further that they cannot be so admitted in fact.
If the reason for this is sought, it must be said that this does not come with either the institution of the Church or from the fact that the sacrament of Order does not fit women. For in this sacrament the person who is ordained signifies Christ the mediator. Thus because the mediator was only of the male sex and can only be signified by the male sex, the possibility of receiving Order is applicable only to males. Males alone can naturally represent Christ and according to the reception of character can actually bear the sign of this. This position is the more probable and can be proven by many authorities.
To the objections: 1. To the objection, then, concerning Deborah, it must be said that that was temporal power and not spiritual. Indeed it is well permissible for women to rule in temporal affairs, but not in spiritual. Spiritual authority is the sign that he who rules bears the type of Christ the head. Since, then, the woman cannot be the head of the man, so she cannot be ordained.9
2. To the objection concerning abbesses it must be said that they do not have the position of ordinary prelacy, but as if to replace the abbots they are substituted for on account of the danger of cohabitation with males. Hence they cannot bind and loose as an ordinary. The priestly office, indeed of any Order, to whom that power and Order are ordinarily given, has a signification that does not fit a woman, though the office of ruling fits women.
3. To the objection that Order concerns the soul, it must be said that Order does not concern the soul alone, but the soul as it is conjoined to the flesh. It is by this reason of signification, which is about a visible sign, and through this is also about the body. Thus the execution and use of Order concerns body and soul conjoined. Therefore neither the signification of Order nor its dispensation is fitting for a woman, as was proven above, and that makes it clear.
4. To the objection concerning the perfection of religious life and martyrdom, it must be said that this is the perfection which concerns gratia gratum faciens,10 and of this grace the woman is equally well capable of receiving as the man. However, the perfection of a state which concerns something freely given [gratia gratis data]11 can be fitting for one sex though it may not be fitting for the other. This is because this grace deals with not only what is interior, but also what is exterior. Such is the perfection of Order, in which there is the conferral of power, which multiple reasons show is least fitting for women.
WHETHER THE USE OF REASON IS NECESSARY FOR THE RECEPTION OF ORDER
The second question is whether the use of reason is necessary for the reception of Order. That it is would appear:
1. For the more noble and perfect sacrament is the sacrament of Order rather than the sacrament of Matrimony. Further, Order places one in a higher state. Yet the sacrament of Matrimony cannot be contracted by those who are deranged or who lack reason, which is expressly concluded below; therefore, etc.12
2. Again, this is deduced from the form, because no one offers something to the unintelligent. But in Order the one ordaining says to the one ordained, “receive the power.…” Therefore he presupposes discretion in him. So then if he has no discretion, it would seem he cannot receive Order.
3. Again, the use of this sacrament is not suitable to anyone unless he has the use of reason. Therefore if it is given to any such persons it is given in vain. Thus if God does nothing in vain, it would seem that the sacrament of Order is never conferred on the one who does not have the use of reason.
4. Again, if someone offers power to someone who rejects it, there would be no reception of power there. This is because just as the giving is related to the will of the giver, so the reception is to the will of the recipient. Therefore if the giver gives nothing but his wish and intention, the recipient receives nothing but his wish and intent.
5. Again, the time and age are determined for the reception of Order in distinction 77:3.13 Yet this is not for anything but the sake of discretion and the use of reason, which is not possessed in those of minor years; therefore, etc.
6. Again, continence is necessarily connected to sacred Orders. But no one is obligated to continence unless he has the use of reason and by way of the consent of his own will. Therefore at least for sacred Orders no one can be promoted before the years of discretion. Thus the use of reason is necessary.
To the contrary: a. The other sacraments which impress a character, such as Baptism and Confirmation, can be given before the use of reason. Therefore, it would seem also to be so for this sacrament for the same reason.
b. Again, this same appears from Extra, De clerico ordinato per saltum,14 where it says that when one who is under the age of discretion is promoted to minor Orders, afterwards it is permitted him to minister without repeating these promotions.
c. Again, the keys of binding and loosing are given to a priest when he is ordained, even if the priest lacks the knowledge. Therefore for much more reason can an Order be given to a young boy if he lacks the use of reason.
d. Again, if someone, compelled by the fear of death, undergoes ordination and chooses to be ordained rather than to die, he is ordained, just as can obviously happen in Baptism. Therefore a forced will suffices. Thus it is not necessary that he freely consent, and it seems that age is not necessary.
e. Again, it is the wise person who considers not only the present, but also what the future holds. Therefore if many lack discretion, concerning whom it is presumed that at some time they will attain discretion, it would seem at least that an Order can be entrusted to them while its execution remains suspended.
f. Again, if something were necessary on the part of the recipient in the ordination, it would be necessary that at least his consent be expressed, and this would be required of him, as happens in Matrimony. Yet it does not happen in this way in Order; therefore it would seem that consent is not required, and so neither the use of reason.
I respond: Some respond to this that for the reception of all of the Orders the consent of reason is required. This is for the reason that in every Order there is committed an office with respect to an act elicited from reason. An office is committed to no one except to him who wills to receive it. Hence, they hold that the use of reason is required in the one ordained; otherwise nothing at all happens.
However, that seems to be contrary to the decretal de Clerico per saltum ordinato, where it is mentioned that he was promoted to minor Orders before the age of reason.15 What is more, every day we see young boys promoted to minor Orders, and they know neither what an Order is nor what is given therein. And again, one does not exercise the sacrament of Confirmation before adulthood, but nevertheless the sacrament is given.
So there is another opinion of the majority, that for some ordinations the use of reason is required by necessity of the sacrament, for some by necessity of precept, for the others by honor and suitability. For the episcopacy, because there is a spiritual marriage contracted, consent is necessarily required, for without it no marriage takes place, either spiritual nor corporeal, as will be seen below.16 For this the use of reason and discretion is necessarily required by the necessity of the sacrament, though many other things are required by necessity of precept. In the case of sacred Orders the use of reason is required by necessity of precept, for the reason that only those should be admitted to those Orders who can be obligated to continence. Hence those who knowingly ordain those who are incapable of being obligated because they are lacking in reason, do it against the decree and precept of the Church. Furthermore if such are ordained externally they de facto receive the character, because they do not contradict it, although they do not give consent.
In view of the honor and respect due to minor Orders, the use of reason is required. In minor Orders are handed over offices which deal with those who have the use of reason, and even with those who are literate. Nevertheless, because those Orders also serve some custom, where it seems expedient because of some usefulness or necessity, some may be promoted to minor Orders even before the age of discretion. They are not, however, to be enriched with ecclesiastical benefits. This can scarcely take place without contempt of the canons and scandal among the people. This would be a danger for souls. So, the arguments that demonstrate that the use of reason is not necessary for the sacrament’s existence or reception are to be conceded, but only with regard to good order and worthy reception.
To the objections: 1. To the objection concerning Matrimony, it must be said that there is no similarity. This is because in Matrimony the use of reason is not required on account of the dignity of the sacrament, but on account of the signification of the union of God and the soul, which does not exist without mutual consent. Besides, this is not concluded generally about the sacrament of Order, but only about the dignity of the bishop.
2. To the objection that he says “Receive” it must be said that this handing over signifies more the command and power of the giver than the activity of the receiver. Hence it is his office not only to offer but to confer. Unless there be an obstacle of contrary will, so that he is absolutely unwilling, he receives the sacrament, according to what is concluded concerning the sacrament of Confirmation.
3. To the objection concerning use, although he does not have immediate use, but because it is hoped that he will at some point have it, the sacrament is not given in vain, just as the priesthood is given to someone who puts off celebration for a long time.
4. To the objection concerning the one who receives, it must be said that this is a sophistic consequence. The one who refuses does not receive; therefore it is necessary that the recipient give consent, because he is the medium between the one who refused altogether and the one who consents.
5. To the objection concerning the time and age, it must be said that this determination of time is not with respect to the necessity of the sacrament, but rather with respect to the suitability and the solemnity of the recipient, which must be observed in major Orders. This is at least with respect to the years of discretion, on account of the vow of continence and the dignity of the Orders. Yet further delay of the time with respect to priests in modern times is not required, because, just as in many things malice supplies for age, so in many cases goodness and holiness supply. Besides many, such as religious, are now ordained who are not given pastoral responsibility. Hence it is not necessary to observe such times for them as in others, especially if there be present holiness of life and knowledge and maturity in morals.
6. To the objection concerning continence, the response should be clear; for continence does not belong to the essence of sacred Orders, but to their well-being.
WHETHER UNDIVIDED FLESH IS NECESSARY FOR THE RECEPTION OF ORDER
The third question is whether undivided flesh17 [indivisio carnis] is necessary for the reception of Order. And that it is appears:
a. 1 Timothy 3:2: It behooves a bishop to be the husband of one wife, and the same is said of a deacon.
b. Again, Ambrose in Ad Vercellenses, which is contained in distinction 34:3: “We know that the Apostle decreed concerning bishops and priests, but also the Fathers in a tract of the Council of Nicaea added on, that no one who undertook a second marriage should be a cleric of any sort.”18
c. Again, one is not able to be promoted who had a wife whose flesh is divided. Therefore much less the one who had many wives. The first is evident from what Pope Innocent said in distinction 34:4, “If anyone, though a lay person, takes a widow as wife,19 either before Baptism or after, he should not be admitted to the clergy.”20
d. Again, the priest as well as the bishop bears the figure of Christ. Yet Christ was not divided, rather united by unity. Therefore he is lacking in such signification of Order—thus the Order as well, because signification is essential to the sacrament.
e. Again, bigamy is a property which is never lost, nor can anyone who is a bigamist become a non-bigamist. Therefore if it impedes the sacrament, it would also seem that it renders it impossible for him to receive Order.
To the contrary: 1. The corruption of the flesh does not impede the reception of a sacrament, nor for a similar reason does division of the flesh.
2. Again, if division of the flesh impedes someone with a wife, and it is much more reprehensible for someone to be with a prostitute, which would seem to more strongly impede but it does not, then therefore neither does the former.
3. Again, if the division of flesh impedes, it is either by reason of something that happens in the flesh or by reason of something that takes place in the soul. It would seem not to be by reason of something that happens in the flesh, because it does not leave any disposition other than union with one wife does. It also seems not to be by reason of something that happens in the soul, because once the wife is dead, nothing remains of the marriage.
4. Again, I ask, Why does it impede? If it is on account of a defect in the sacrament, I ask, Which one? If that of Matrimony, I counter this way: he who never contracted Matrimony falls more short of the sacrament than the one who contracted it twice. Therefore it is not a lack of the sacrament of Matrimony. If that of Order, the counterargument is that bigamy is not considered with respect to the sacrament of Order, but with respect to Matrimony. Therefore it is not the fault of Order. So the question is, Why does division impede, and not corruption?
And again, Why does corruption impede in a woman, that she not be consecrated, and why not similarly in the bishop as well?
And again, Why does the fornication of a wife make the man irregular rather than the fornication of the husband, since in this case he should be punished more on account of the division of his own flesh rather than that of someone else?
I respond: To understand the foregoing it should be noted that the sacrament of Order is more abundant by reason of its signification than are the other sacraments.21 This is because not only does what is externally employed signify, but in addition the recipient himself is a sign, and the consecrated bishop or ordained priest signifies Christ himself, as was mentioned above.22 In this respect it differs from the other sacraments, except for Matrimony, in which the man, who is the subject of this sacrament, is the sign of Christ, just as the woman is the sign of the Church. Thus they combine to signify the same reality.
Therefore concerning the signification of Order it is primary that the ordained signifies Christ as the spouse of the Church. Thus a bigamist who had a widow for wife cannot signify in this way. This is because the Church had but one spouse, and Christ only one spouse. Therefore such are unfit for Order, especially the principal and sacred ones, in which a man already begins to signify Christ expressly. So bigamy renders one unfit for the diaconate, subdiaconate, priesthood, and especially the episcopacy. Hence in these Orders nowhere is it read that a dispensation for this is given, nor should it be. This is not because the sacrament would be essentially lacking, as the bigamist does receive character, but rather because the perfection of the sacrament in him is lacking. Thus it cannot by any reason be supplied or recompensed by a human being. Nevertheless in the inferior Orders, for the reason of necessity, a dispensation is able to be received, as is said in distinction 34, Necessitate cogente and again in Lector si viduam.23 From these remarks it is evident that division of the flesh impedes, and why it impedes, and what sort of division.
To the objections: 1-2. To the objection, then, concerning corruption, it must be said that there is no similarity, because it is opposed neither to the necessity of the sacrament nor to its signification like bigamy is. Similarly a division through fornication does not impede, because fornication is not division that signifies. Yet bigamy is a division that signifies.
3. To the objection that this is either from the side of the soul or from the side of the flesh, it must be said that the rationale is taken from the part of the whole person to whom it belongs to contract Matrimony and which is the subject of Matrimony. There is an impediment here not by reason of uncleanliness or of an absolute quality which takes place in the flesh, but on account of the deficient signification. For, because he contracted with one woman he signified Christ. But because he left the one and contracted with another, he withdrew from its signification. Thus, there is a defect in the sacrament, namely of unity, which in the sacraments of Matrimony and of Order should have been signified.
4. And this clarifies the following objection concerning the defect of the sacrament. For I say there is lacking in him the sacrament of unity, which, whether the lack is on his part or on the part of his wife, renders him less fit for the sacrament of Order. If you should then ask, Which sacrament is lacking, whether of Order or of Matrimony? I say that the sacrament of Order is lacking, because the perfection which is able to signify what Order requires is not there. Further, there is a defect of the sacrament of Matrimony—a defect, I say, not of simple negation, as there is in the person who never married, but a defect of privation, where there is something of signification and something of privation, which generates a certain enormity or deformity, by reason of which he ought not be admitted to such a noble sacrament.
From these remarks the following questions become evident, why namely division impedes, and not corruption, because the sacrament is not deprived of something nor is it made defective on account of corruption as it is on account of division.
To the question why corruption does not impede the consecration of a man as it does for a woman, some jurists say that the bishop signifies the militant Church, but the virgin signifies Christ, who was a virgin. But right reason does not grasp that. So it must be alternately said that the bishop signifies Christ, but the woman signifies the Church triumphant or the Church itself, which is a virgin and was never anything but the wife of Christ. Yet Christ, although he was a virgin, still had the Synagogue not as wife, but as concubine.
This clarifies the last one, why the man marries one corrupted by another and knows it is unfit and is considered a bigamist. It must be said it is because he is not the only one of one. For she is not the only one, and it is necessary that the greater unity be signified from the part of the wife than the husband. This is because the Church was joined only to Christ, neither in Matrimony nor in any other way. But Christ was joined to the Synagogue, although not indissolubly, and thus not in Matrimony. Thus it is clear that all such statutes are very reasonable, because in their establishment guilt is not weighed, but rather the fitting signification.
_______________
1 Bonaventure seems to be referring not to the writings of the New Testament, but to the early Christian era, when women were put in charge of monasteries. In earlier periods, it was common even for women to rule over double monasteries housing both male and female monastics.
2 Cf. d. 24, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1. Here, Bonaventure discusses the division of Order into the sacred and non-sacred orders, the sacred orders being those in which an individual in any way serves at the altar and handles the eucharistic elements.
3 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, d. 23, c. 25 (I, 86): Sacratas Deo feminas vel monachas sacra vasa vel sacratas pallas penes vos contingere, et incensum circa altaria deferre, perlatum est ad apostolicam sedem; que omnia vituperatione et reprehensione plena esse, nulli recte sapientum dubium est. Quapropter huius sanctae sedis auctoritate hec omnia vobis resecare funditus, quanto citius poteritis, censemus. Et ne pestis hec latius divulgetur, per omnes provincias abstergi citissime mandamus.
4 The Cataphrygians were the Montanists of the second century.
5 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, II, c. 27, q. 1, c. 23 (I, 1055): Diaconissam non debere ante annos quadraginta ordinari statuimus….
6 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, II, c. 27, q. 1, c. 30 (I, 1057): Si quis rapuerit, vel sollicitaverit, vel corruperit assistriam, vel diaconissam, vel monastriam, vel aliam mulierem religiosam vitam vel habitum habentem ….
7 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, I, d. 32, c. 19 (I, 122): Mulieres que apud Grecos presbiterae appellantur, apud nos autem viduae, seniores, univirae et matricuriae appellantur, in ecclesia tamquam ordinatas constitui non debere.
8 Thus, Bonaventure argues that the term does not refer to the office of priest, but that it is being used literally to refer to their age and status as respected elders. Presbyter in Greek, from which the word comes, literally means an older, mature person: an elder. This came to be an official term for the pastoral office in the Church, and in English the term is contracted to priest.
9 Cf. 1 Cor 11:3.
10 The grace which makes gracious.
11 Gratia gratus data. The gratia gratum faciens is the grace which all people need in order to be righteous before God. The gratia gratis data or “grace freely given,” is a specific grace given to specific persons in the fulfillment of specific roles, and does not essentially pertain to salvation.
12 Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 34, c. 4, n. 1, 465: Furiosi quoque, dum in amentia sunt, matrimonium contrahere non valent.
13 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, I, d. 77, c. 3 (I, 272-73): Quicumque itaque se ecclesiae vovit obsequiis a sua infantia, ante pubertatis annos baptizare et lectorum debet ministerio sociari; qui ab accessu adolescentiae usque ad trigesimum etatis annum si probabiliter vixerit, una tantum, et ea, quam virginem communi per sacerdotem benedictione percepit, uxore contentus, acolitus et subdiaconus esse debebit, postquam ad diaconii gradum (si se ipsum primitus, continentia preeunte, dignum probaverit) accedat….
14 Gregory IX, Decretals, V, tit. 29, c. un, (II, 833): … quod ipse tempore, quo ordines inferiores susceperat, infra annos discretionis fuerat constitutus … ipsum in diaconum ordinare procures, et sic de misericordia eundem ministrare permittas in ordine sacerdotis.
15 Cf. the previous footnote.
16 Cf. below, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1 and d. 29-31.
17 From the context of the question we see that a division of the flesh (divisio carnis) is remarriage. Primarily considered here is the instance where a person remarries after his first spouse dies. Yet instances of marriage after a lawful divorce as well as bigamy and polygamy also apply. The basic principle here is that those in sacred orders cannot have had more than one wife in their lifetimes. Bonaventure also introduces the concept corruptio carnis, which seems to refer to a physical defect.
18 Ambrose, Epistola 63, n. 64 (PL 16:1257C-1258A): Sed prius cognoscamus non solum hoc Apostolum de episcopo et presbytero statuisse, sed etiam Patres in concilio Nicaeni tractatus addidisse, neque clericum quemquam debere esse, qui secunda conjugia sortitus sit. See also, Ap. Gratian, Decretum, I, d. 34, c. 14 (1, 129): … clericum quemquam non debere esse, qui secunda conjugia sit sortitus.
19 This shows what is meant by indivisio carnis.
20 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, I, d. 34, c. 13 (I, 129): Si quis viduam (licet laicus) duxerit uxorem, sive ante baptismum, sive post baptismum, non admittatur ad clericum, quia eodem vitio videtur exclusus.
21 Latin: …quod sacramentum ordinis abundant ab aliis in ratione significandi.
22 Cf. above, d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 and q. 4.
23 Ap. Gratian, Decretum, I, d. 34, c. 17-18 (I, 130): Necessitate tamen exigente bigami usque ad subdiaconatum possunt promoveri. Lector, si vidaum uxorem alterius acceperit, in lectoratu permaneat, aut si necessitas fuerit, subdiaconus fiat, nihil autem supra. Similiter et si begamus fuerit.