ARTICLE ONE
THE ESSENCE OF MATRIMONY
QUESTION ONE
WHETHER MATRIMONY IS THE CONJOINING OF A MALE AND FEMALE
The first question is whether Matrimony is the conjoining of male and female. And that it is would appear:
a. For the reason that the Master lays down in his text where he says that Matrimony is the conjoining of male and female.1
b. And that it is so is shown from reason. When the man exists alone, there is no Matrimony. Likewise when the woman is alone, there is no Matrimony. Therefore, it is found in their togetherness and in the conjoining of one to the other.
c. Again, nothing absolute is one in two subjects. Yet Matrimony is one in the man and woman. Therefore it is not an absolute, but relative. But that, whatever it be, since it is not disparity, but conformity, is not disjunction but conjunction.
d. Again, anything is rightly Matrimony to which the consequences are the following three goods, namely, fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. These however are the conjoining of a man and a woman in which there is fidelity in its singularity, offspring in its fertility, and signification in its indissolubility; therefore, etc.
To the contrary: 1. When the higher essential is multiplied, the lower is multiplied. Therefore if Matrimony is the union, as often as a man and his wife are conjoined, that many times is Matrimony contracted. Thus between the same man and woman there will be many matrimonies. And if that is false, therefore, etc.
2. Again, no sacrament is repeated with the same matter. Therefore if Matrimony is the conjoining of a man and a woman, once they have joined, he should not be joined with the same one. But this is false and unfitting; therefore, etc.
3. Again, every sacrament is a sensible sign. Yet no relation is a sensible sign, and the conjoining of male and female is a relation. Therefore such a conjoining is not a sign, and neither then is it a sacrament. Therefore it is the other way around; no sacrament is a conjoining, and so neither is Matrimony.
4. Again, if Matrimony is a conjoining, it is either of bodies or of souls. It is not of souls, because then Matrimony would be in heaven; and not of bodies, because then there would have been no marriage between Mary and Joseph.
5. Again, whether it is the union of bodies by intercourse, or of souls by consent, it happens that such conjoining is removed by hatred. Therefore Matrimony too is dissolved and destroyed. But this is false, as will soon be shown, and therefore Matrimony is not a conjoining.2
I respond: It must be said that Matrimony according to its remote genus is a sign. Yet its specification or the descent to a lower genus is accomplished by comparison to what is signified.3 What is signified in this sacrament is the union of Christ and the Church. That union is better signified through external conjoining, just as the cleansing of Baptism is through the external cleansing with water. Hence, as Baptism is called a cleansing, so Matrimony is called, essentially within its genus, a conjoining. And it is to be noted that just as in the cleansing of Baptism there is something permanent, such as the internal impression of character, and something transient, such as the external bathing, and both are called Baptism, so also in Matrimony there is something permanent, and this is the bond, by which the man and woman are bound, no matter to what extent they are externally separated; and there is something transient, such as the conjoining first forged by the external word or through an exterior act. Both of these are called Matrimony, and each is a conjoining. Hence Matrimony is rightly called and is a conjoining, just as the first set of arguments demonstrate.
To the objections: To the objection that they are conjoined many times, it must be said that a certain conjoining is called the bond, another one produces the bond, and yet another is the use of the bond. I affirm, then, that the first and the second, because they pertain to the substance of Matrimony, are not repeated, but only the third. The multiplication of Matrimony does not follow from that multiplication, because it is not essentially its genus, but is an act of its use, or its use in action.
2. From this the following one is resolved, because it is not a repetition of the sacrament. Just as the frequent consumption of the body of Christ does not mean the repetition of the sacrament, but its use, so it is to be understood in this case, even though they are not completely alike. This is because what is once consumed cannot be consumed again; but the woman who once has intercourse can have intercourse again.
3. To the objection then that it is a sensible sign, it must be said that just as a corporeal likeness is perceived by the senses—not by reason of itself, but by reason of the qualities among which there is a similarity, which are perceived by the senses—so it is to be understood in this case. That is, although the union cannot be perceptible in itself as a relation, the bond is perceptible however by reason of those who are joined, of the man and the woman, and by reason of the sign into which and through which they are conjoined.
4-5. To the question whether it is of bodies or of souls, it must be said that the bond is of souls within bodies. This is because it is the joining by reason of those who use it and those having distinct sexes. Nevertheless this union, which pertains to the entirety of the union and is essentially Matrimony, is neither the feelings of souls nor the nearness of bodies, but a certain obligatory bond, which is not destroyed when they are apart either in affection or in body. Thus response to the final objection is explained.
QUESTION ONE
WHETHER CONSENT IS THE CAUSE OF MATRIMONY
Concerning the first, then, it will be shown that consent is the cause of Matrimony:
a. Through Chrysostom, who says, “intercourse does not make a marriage, but the will.”4
b. Again, Ambrose: “it is not the deflowering of virginity that makes a union, but a conjugal covenant (pactio conjugalis).”5
c. Again, it is proven by example, because between Mary and Joseph there existed Matrimony, and still nothing happened except consent.
d. Again, it is proven by reason, because the conjugal covenant enjoys greater liberty than that of servitude. But only by consent does one make himself a slave; therefore only by consent can one become the spouse of another.
To the contrary: 1. Nothing is the efficient cause of itself. Yet Matrimony is nothing other than consent, because that is the sign of the union of Christ and the Church. Therefore consent is not the efficient cause of Matrimony.
2. Again, if the purpose is the cause of what is purposed, then the opposite is cause of the opposite. Therefore if consent is the constituent cause of Matrimony, then dissent destroys it. Yet Matrimony is not destroyed by dissent between persons. Thus, then, neither is it constituted by consent.
3. Again, when a cause is multiplied so is the effect multiplied. Therefore if consent is the cause, and there are two consents, it would seem there are two Matrimonies between a man and a woman. But there are not two matrimonies; therefore, etc.
4. Again, if two consents make one Matrimony, it is necessary that they be united; but they are united when they unite for the same thing. However, in Matrimony they are not united unto one, because the consent of the man is to the woman, and the consent of the woman is to the man. Therefore they are diverse, and not one; therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that just as Baptism can be used in two ways—in one way as it comprises the external cleansing and the interior impression of the character, and in another way for the interior character—so Matrimony in one sense comprises the bond and its exterior sign. Thus Matrimony is the consent expressed, and not its effect. In another way as it stands for the interior bond. But a bond of this sort has a first cause as well as a proximate cause. The first is the divine institution, and the proximate is the human agreement, which is in the coming together of the two consents, namely of the male and the female. Hence it should be said that consent is the cause of Matrimony, not totally, but rather together with the divine institution. This consent, however, is not of one or the other, but of both persons.
To the objections: 1. And that settles the first argument.
2-3. To the objection that if the opposite is not the cause of the opposite etc., it must be said that there is an efficient cause that preserves, and there is an efficient cause that does not preserve. This is clear in that the sun is the cause of light in the first manner, and a knife is the cause of a wound in the second manner. Thus Matrimony has consent as efficient cause, but not as preservative. Therefore consent is the cause that Matrimony exists, but not that it lasts. Similarly the opposite of consent, that is dissent, is not the cause that dissolves the fact, but that stands in the way of its existence.
4. To the objection that they are not united, it must be said that there is uniting in object and in subject and there is uniting in effect. I hold therefore that although two consents are not united both in object and in subject, they are nonetheless united in the effect that arises from that mutual consent. For when one woman wills to have that man as husband, she wills to be his wife; and when that man wills to have this woman as wife, he becomes her husband. And if you should object that they are not united in effect unless they also be united in object, I reply that they are united in effect and secondarily also in object.
WHETHER VOCAL CONSENT WITHOUT MENTAL CONSENT SUFFICES TO CONTRACT MATRIMONY
The second question is whether vocal consent suffices to contract Matrimony without mental consent. And that it is would appear:
1. First, through what the Master says in his text: “if in words they express what they nonetheless do not will in their hearts, the obligation of the words with which they give consent saying, ‘I take thee as my husband,’ makes a marriage.”6
2. Again, this is demonstrated in a similar case, that of oaths. This is because of what Isidore says: “in whatever form of words one promises, in that meaning God accepts in which the one to whom the oath is made accepts it.”7 Therefore it would seem likewise that God accepts according to the intention in which a spouse takes it. So, then, if a spouse believes that through those words the other really consents, such consent makes Matrimony; and thus, etc.
3. Again, the Church judges there to be a marriage whenever some man contracts with some woman by way of words in the presence of others in public. If he should say that he did not intend it, still the Church pronounces that he must render what the law of Matrimony requires. Therefore if the Church judges rightly and does not believe him, when the one who gives witness against himself is to be believed, without heartfelt consent, then Matrimony exists with only exterior consent.
4. Again, it is taken as a rule in canon law that “Fraud and deceit ought to protect no one.”8 If, then, that one acted fraudulently in giving consent orally but not in his heart, his fraud should not support him. Therefore it obligates him just as if he had given consent orally and in his heart.
5. Again, the same appears from the reason that it leads to the unacceptable. For if interior consent is required, since no one is certain of this nor can be, no one knows whether he has contracted Matrimony. Therefore as often as he requests or renders it he puts himself at hazard.
6. Again, suppose that someone contracts with two women through words in their presence, first with one and then with the other, and he does not know to which of them he gave interior consent; therefore he does not know which is his true wife; but he is bound to render the debt to his true wife. It then seems that such a one is perplexed.
To the contrary: a. Innocent, in a certain decretal, De sponsalibus, in book IV, responding to a certain case in this matter where interior consent was lacking and the man changed his name, says that there is no Matrimony. The reason which he gives is contained in these words: “Because deceit was present and consent was absolutely lacking, and without such [internal] consent the [external] words and deeds cannot constitute a conjugal union.” 9
b. Again, in another decretal just before that one he says, “Children before their legal years do not contract it through words alone, since they are understood not at all to give consent.”10
c. Again, this stands to reason, for in the other sacraments, as in Baptism, in order for a sacrament to exist, the intention of the one dispensing it is required, as was demonstrated above for Baptism, regarding those who jokingly baptize.11 Therefore this is the case for equal or even greater reason in Matrimony, since for this sacrament there is required the consent of the broadest freedom.
d. Again, whenever in a sacrament there is lacking that which has the character of a means between the matter and the sign, nothing has happened. This is as if in Baptism character is not impressed, and in the Eucharist if the true body of Christ is not present there. Yet in this sacrament the consent of souls has the character of the means. Therefore when that is lacking the Matrimony is invalid.
e. Again, whenever something consists of something as its matter and of something else as its form, whatever is lacking, the thing itself is lacking. The sacrament of Matrimony is such a thing. Therefore since only the consent of souls is the arrangement, and the form of the words is the complement, whatever is lacking there is not a sacrament; therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that we can speak of marriage in two ways: either before the Church or in the arena of conscience, distinguishing the judicial arena from the penitential arena. Accordingly there is a twofold judgment, because in the judicial arena judgment is made in accord with allegations, and in the penitential arena in accord with truth and conscience. If, then, we are speaking in the penitential arena, because this requires a judgment in the sight of God according to truth, it must be said, as our doctors say, that Matrimony is neither there nor can it be judged to be there. There are many reasons, but this one is the principal reason: because in all the sacraments the voluntary intention of doing what the Church does is required. This is because in that case someone truly did not intend to contract Matrimony; thus there was no sacrament.
But if we are to speak in the judicial arena, where it must be judged according to allegations, and there if consent can be proven through external words in which there appears no apparent deceit, it is judged a marriage. If nevertheless the Church is deceived, it is not deceit contrary to justice, because there is in it no ignorance of the law but of the fact. Therefore if there is external consent without interior consent, there is marriage neither according to truth nor according to divine judgment, nor according to the arena of conscience, although there seems to be and is so judged according to ecclesiastical judgment.
To the objections: 1.To the first objection concerning the Master, the response is clear, because he is speaking of the ecclesiastical arena.
2. To the objection concerning an oath, it can similarly be said that according to human judgment it is binding. If however it is said to obligate according to God, that is because God considers a person worthy of the punishment of perjury, just as the one who does not fulfill an oath, and that because of his deceit.
3. To the objection concerning the judgment of the Church, it must be said that the Church is fallible. Thus although it might happen that she is led astray from the truth of a matter, she does not back away from the truth of justice, because she must judge according to the allegations. If you should object to me that in the judicial arena a man makes allegations against himself, and that he is to be believed when making allegations against himself, it must be said that because the Church has testimony to the contrary, and because such testimony also leads to certainty in the forejudging of a matrimonial case, which is exceedingly favorable, hence the testimony of such a man is not heard.12 This is even when he might be believed in the penetential or conscience arena where belief is given to a man who confesses his own turpitude, because in that arena nothing other is to be said than turpitude.
4. To the objection that deceit should not give anyone an advantage, it must be said that there are two things there, namely the deceit or falsity of the word, and the real lack of consent. Deceit in word gets no advantage; to the contrary it is an obstacle in every arena, whether judicial or penitential, because, in whatever place, it is either punished or is considered an obligation. But if consent is truly lacking, which is attested before God, then truly there is no Matrimony.
5-6. To the objection that no one knows whether consent is given interiorly, it must be said that good is to be presumed for anyone unless manifest fraud is apparent. Thus concerning anyone it must be presumed that he consents in his heart if he expresses it by mouth, and nothing else is to be believed. If this is not the case, nevertheless ignorance of this fact in the other person, who does not know that there was no internal consent, excuses intercourse. This is just as when Jacob is excused for having intercourse with Leah, because he believed he was having intercourse with his own wife. Nor does the person in this case entrust himself to risk or perplexity. For because the first must be believed to have given consent; hence she is to be clung to and the debt rendered. And thus all is clear.
THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF MATRIMONY
QUESTION ONE
WHETHER A CONSUMMATED MARRIAGE IS INDISSOLUBLE
Concerning the first, that such a marriage is indissoluble is demonstrated:
a. Through the word of the Lord in Matthew 19:6: What God has joined together, let no man put asunder. Therefore those who are conjoined by God are inseparable, because God separates none.
b. Again, whatever things are separable are more than one. Yet the Lord says that a man and woman are not two but one flesh.13 Therefore they are not separable.
c. Again, this same is demonstrated through the definition of Matrimony, which the Master lays down in his text: “retaining an indivisible way of life.”14
d. Again, this Matrimony is the sign of the union of Christ and the Church according to the conformity of nature.15 But that union is inseparable; therefore, etc.
To the contrary: 1. Every bond that can be repeated is dissoluble. However, Matrimony can be repeated, because there can be second nuptials. Therefore it is dissoluble.
2. Again, every perpetual sacrament impresses some sign in a perpetual subject. Yet Matrimony impresses nothing on the soul; therefore, etc.
3. Again, every effect whose cause is dissoluble is itself dissoluble. But the cause of Matrimony is mutual consent, and that is dissoluble; therefore, etc. The first is clear from the saying of Chrysostom: “by the same causes by which anything is built up, by the same is it destroyed.”16
4. Again, a husband is required by the bond of Matrimony to have intercourse with his wife. Yet, by mutual consent they can release themselves in perpetuity. Therefore, similarly they can by mutual consent divide their Matrimony. Similarly by the law of Matrimony they are bound to live together, yet they are able by common consent to enter different religious orders; therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that Matrimony is indissoluble, as long as the parties remain. Yet when one or the other of them passes on, it is dissolved. This is because there remains no binding unless those who are bound remain. The parties, then, are destructible, and because they are parties by reason of their sexes, not of their souls, and since sex concerns a disposition on the part of the body, and thus bodily life, I hold that Matrimony is rightly called an indissoluble bond, but not a perpetual one.
To the objections: 1-2. And by this the response to the first two is clear. For it objects as if the bond were perpetual. The reason for this indissolubility comes in a dispositive way from its signification. This is because it signifies an indissoluble union, namely of Christ and the Church according to natural conformity. Yet effectively it comes from its institution, because God so established it so that they be not unbound as long as they live.
3. And this provides the response to the one about consent, because it is not the complete cause of Matrimony. Hence if it were the total cause, then it would be well to object. But beyond that there is the divine institution. Still that is not a good solution, for the reason that if two causes concur for the same effect, when one is destroyed the effect does not remain. Hence if consent concurs with divine institution, it would seem, etc. It must be said therefore that there is a cause that only introduces and one that introduces and conserves. When it is said that if the cause is destroyed then the effect is as well, this is true of the preserving cause, but is not true of that which only introduces. Consent introduces that bond but does not preserve it, and hence when it ceases to exist the bond does not cease. So that clears it up.17
4. To the objection about rendering the debt and cohabitation, it must be said that this is under the control of the parties bound. This is because each has power over the body of the other, and because each one can renounce his own right.18 Hence it is that cohabitation and rendering the debt can be divided. Nevertheless it is not so with the bond, which God established, and which retains the nature of a sacrament.
WHETHER A RATIFIED MARRIAGE IS INDISSOLUBLE
The second question concerns the indissolubility of that Matrimony which consists solely of a union of souls. And that such a marriage is indissoluble is shown:
1. Because it is determined in law, that though someone gives consent to some woman through words in her presence, and afterward gives consent to another and has intercourse with her, that he is to be summoned back to the first.19 Therefore the first bond was indissoluble since it is not broken by a consummated Matrimony.
2. Again, this same is shown in the aforementioned definition of Matrimony. If you should then say it does not apply, the response is by way of Hugh, who defined Matrimony in this way: “Matrimony is the legitimate consent of a male and a female that binds them in an indivisible way of life.”20
3. Again, what the Lord said in Matthew 19:6, What God has joined together let no man put asunder, is to be understood either as the joining of souls or of bodies. It would seem to be that of souls, because that union is the holier one. Therefore if it is understood in this way, it would seem that with respect to that union it is inseparable.
4. Again, Matrimony signifies inasmuch as the conjoining of souls signifies the union of God and the Church. However, the Church, once espoused to Christ, is never separated nor will be separated; therefore neither Matrimony.
5. Again, when a man gives consent to a woman, he gives over the control of his body to the control of the woman.21 Thus because he is then bound to her, therefore if he does not belong to himself, he can neither enter a religious order nor bind himself to another.
To the contrary: a. Jerome says that the Lord called John from his marriage.22 Therefore he loosed him from his wife. Yet he would not have loosed him if he had been bound by an indissoluble bond; therefore, etc.
b. Again, the sacred canons grant liberal power before sexual intercourse for one to enter a religious order and to the other of marrying after his entry, as is clear through many cases contained in the Master’s text.23 Yet one would not be able to marry unless the bond were loosed; therefore, etc.
c. Again, the soul is never so bound in this life to God that it cannot be separated from him. Therefore neither is a spouse joined inseparably to his spouse before carnal intercourse.
Following upon this the question is whether immediately after entry into a religious order such a bond is loosed. It would seem so, because otherwise the woman would suffer loss, because she would be bound and the man would not be bound; which is not fitting, because they are judged as equals. But if it is loosed at that time, and later it is possible for him to exit the religious order, then he is able to marry, presuming that his wife has married another. This is contrary to the canons. For this reason the question arises, When is it loosed and why is it loosed by the bond of a vow, and not by the bond of a subsequent marriage?
I respond: It must be said that indissolubility is a consequence of Matrimony not only consummated but also ratified. For this purpose is it ratified, because it has a certain indissolubility, albeit less than the consummated Matrimony; yet ratified marriage has its own requirement, just as the other has. For just as a consummated Matrimony is indissoluble as long as the parties live bodily, nor is it loosed except by bodily death, so neither is the Matrimony in which there is the union of minds and souls able to be loosed, unless the man dies spiritually to this world or to the operation of the flesh. This happens by entering a religious order and making a solemn vow of chastity. For from that moment such a Matrimony is loosed, from the moment when he dies spiritually. This is proven by that decretal of Innocent Ex parte tua.24 It is therefore to be conceded that a ratified Matrimony (non-consummated) is indissoluble in its own unique way. Since it is a sacrament, it cannot be separated by man but only by God, to whom the solemn vow of chastity is promised.
To the objections: 1-4. This clears up all the objections except the last.
5. To the objection concerning the transfer of authority, it must be said that authority over the body is not transferred simply in a ratified Matrimony, but under the condition of each party, namely while they remain in their status and life. Hence, I hold, although the wife should ask that the debt be immediately rendered, he would not be bound to render it. Neither would the Church prompt him to render it immediately, but would grant delays of up to two months, beyond which time he would be bound to either render the debt or to transfer himself to a different life. Then, therefore, the bond is dissolved when the man has transferred without possibility of exiting to another life, and hence is said to be dead.
This should solve the last question, which is, When is the bond dissolved? The answer is, when he is so bound that he is unable to return to the world. If the wife insists, he must choose one of the two within two months according to the canons. And with this the whole question is clear.
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1 Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 27, c. 2, 422: Sunt igitur nuptiae vel matrimonium, viri mulierisque conjunctio maritalis, inter legitimas personas individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens.
2 Cf. below, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1-2.
3 Latin: …signatum.
4 John Chrysostom, In Matth. opus imperf., h. 32, n. 9 (PG 56,802): Matrimonium non facit coitus, sed voluntas.
5 Ambrose, De institutione virginis, c. 6, n. 41 (PL 16, 331A): Cum enim initiatur conjugium, tunc conjugii nomen adsciscitur; non enim defloratio virginitatis facit conjugium, sed pactio conjugalis.
6 Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 27, c. 3, n. 1, 422-23: Efficiens autem causa Matrimonii est consensus, non quilibet, sed per verba expressus, nec de futuro, sed de praesenti. Si enim consentiunt in futurum, dicentes: Accipiam te in virum, et: Ego te in uxorem, non est iste consensus efficax Matrimonii. Item si consentiant mente, et non exprimant verbis vel aliis certis signis; nec talis consensus efficit matrimonium. Si autem verbis explicatur quod tamen corde non volunt, si non sit coactio ibi vel dolus, obligatio illa verborum quibus consentiunt dicentes: Accipio te in virum, et ego te in uxorem, Matrimonium facit.
7 Isidore, Sententiarum, II, c. 31, n. 8 (PL 83, 634A): Quacunque arte verborum quisque juret, Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille cui juratur intelligit. Dupliciter autem reus fit qui et Dei nomen in vanum assumit, et proximum dolo capit.
8 Gregory IX, Decretals, I, t. 3, c. 16 (II, 23): … quia fraus et dolus aliqui patrocinari non debent….
9 Gregory IX, Decretals, IV, t. 1, c. 26 (II, 671): …quoniam ex altera parte dolus sollummodo adfuit, et defuit omnino consensus, sine quo cetera nequeunt foedus perficere conjugale.
10 Gregory IX, Decretals, IV, t. 1, c. 25, (II, 670): …et pueri ante annos legitimos per verba sola non contrahunt, quum intelligantur minime consentire.
11 Cf. above, d. 6, p. 11, obj 4.
12 Bonaventure is here giving an example of a man who claims that he did not give mental consent when he originally verbally consented to marriage. Since the ecclesiastical court knows he consented verbally, and cannot confirm whether or not he actually consented mentally, it must judge against the man. However, if the man confesses the sin of lying about his marital consent to his confessor, the confessor must nevertheless treat it as a true sin and deal with it accordingly. Yet, this does not suffice to get him out of his marriage.
13 Matt 19:6.
14 Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 27, c. 2, 422.: Quid sit coniugium. Sunt igitur nuptiae vel matrimonium viri mulierisque coniunctio maritalis, inter legitimas personas, individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens. Bonaventure quotes only the part of Peter’s definition for marriage that refers to it being “indivisible.”
15 Bonaventure refers to the signification of Matrimony according to the “conformity of nature,” above in d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, resp, which states, “It signifies the joining together of Christ and the Church through charity, and the joining together through the conformity of nature.” We find in d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, resp that “conformity of nature” refers to the external act of sexual intercourse, “since what is signified in this sacrament is the union of Christ and the Church, and since that union is better signified through external conjoining.” Therefore, if the marriage is consummated through sexual intercourse, it is indissoluble.
16 John Chrysostom, In Matth. opus imperf., h. 32, n. 9 (PG 56,802): Omnis res, per quas causas nascitur, per ipsas absolvitur.
17 Cf. above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, resp. and ad obj. 2-3.
18 The right being the right to have sex with the other marital partner.
19 Gregory IX, Decretals, IV, t. 1, c. 31 (II, 672): Si inter virum et mulierem legitimus consensus interveniat de praesenti ita, quod unus alterum mutuo consensu, verbis consuetis expresso, recipiat, utroque dicenti: ‘ego te in meam accipio,’ et: ‘ego te accipio in meum,’ vel alia verba consensum exprimentia de praesenti, sive sit juramentum interpositum sive non: non licet alteri ad alia vota transire. Quod si fecerit, secundum matrimonium de facto contractus, etiamsi sit carnalis copula subsecuta, separari debet, et primum in sua firmitate manere.
20 Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, II, p. 11, c. 4 (PL 176, 483A, Corpus Victorinum, 427): Quidam hoc modo conjugium diffiniendum putaverunt, ut dicerent conjugium esse consensum masculi et feminae individualem vitae consuetudinem retinentem. Cui diffinitioni legitimum adjungere oportet; quia si consensus masculi et feminae legitimus, hoc est legitime et inter personas legitimas factus, non fuerit, conjugium in eo consecrari non potest.
21 1 Cor 7:4.
22 Cf. “Prologue of St. Jerome on the Gospel according to John” in Works of Saint Bonaventure, XI (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2006), 51-52: “The author is John the Evangelist, one of the disciples of the Lord, who was a virgin chosen by God, whom God called when he had determined to get married. A double witness to his virginity is given in this Gospel. First, he was said to be beloved by the Lord above all the others. Second, while he was hanging on the cross, the Lord commended his Mother into his care, so that a virgin might take care of a virgin.” See also WSB XI.
23 Cf. Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 26, c. 6, 419-21.
24 Gregory IX, Decretals, III, t. 32, c. 14 (II, 583-84): …porro, licet praedicta mulier videatur in veli susceptione religionis habitum assumpsisse, si tamen velit in domo propria remanere, quasi propositum castitatis in saeculo servatura, nihilomenus consummandum est matrimonium jam contractum, nisi se voto adstrinserit ad observantiam regularem, in quo casu compelli potest, ut relicto saeculo religionis propositum exsequatur.