part0010

“We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth. But neither will we shrink from that risk any time it must be faced.”

The photographs and their interpretation by experts from the NPIC and CIA were delivered to President Kennedy on October 16, 1962 by his National Security Advisor McGeorge “Mac” Bundy. Kennedy immediately convened a meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), a group comprising 16 of Kennedy’s most trusted advisors as well as senior representatives of the State and Defense departments. Although it now seemed certain that the Russians had nuclear missiles in Cuba, it was decided that there would be no public announcement. Kennedy wanted both to avoid alarming the American public and to hide from the Russians the fact that they knew about the missiles.

Over the next five days, ExComm met regularly, and a number of additional photographs from new U-2 overflights were examined and discussed. President Kennedy attended some, but not all of these meetings. He maintained his previously agreed schedule of meetings to avoid potentially alerting the Soviets that something unusual was going on. The latest U-2 photographs confirmed that there were anything from 16 to 32 Russian missiles on Cuba. The CIA was not able to confirm the presence of nuclear warheads on the island, but it was known that the MRBMs had the range and speed to hit almost any American city within minutes of lunch from Cuba. The situation was critical, and ExComm considered four alternative responses:

1. A negotiated response . This would involve either open negotiation through the United Nations or secret negotiations directly with the Russians. It was felt that an offer to remove American missiles from Turkey might be required in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. However, several members of ExComm were skeptical about the potential success of a negotiated response. They were concerned that this might seem like weakness on the part of America in the face of Russian aggression, and they pointed out that previous attempts to negotiate settlements with Khrushchev over the partition of Berlin had not been a success.

2. A naval blockade of Cuba . Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara advocated placing a U.S. Navy blockade of the island of Cuba and turning back any Soviet ships carrying equipment or supplies intended for the creation of missile sites. McNamara claimed that this would demonstrate strength and determination while avoiding armed conflict with the Soviet Union. Some members of ExComm were concerned about the legality of such a move while others, including the president, were concerned that if the Russians already had missiles and nuclear warheads on Cuba, a blockade would simply give them more time to prepare the missiles. There was also concern that the Russians might respond with a blockade of West Berlin.

3. Air strikes . Some members of ExComm favored air strikes against the missile sites by the U.S. Air Force. Other members, however, including the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, were concerned that this might influence international opinion against the United States. There were also doubts about the capacity of air strikes to destroy the Russian nuclear capability on Cuba—if some missiles were left intact, they might be launched against the United States in retaliation.

4. An all-out military attack on Cuba . A small number of ExComm members, led by Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, advocated an American invasion of Cuba to capture or destroy all Soviet missiles and to remove Castro from power. LeMay even suggested a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Cuba to ensure the destruction of all Soviet nuclear missiles.

For several days, ExComm debated these alternatives. All members of the group were aware of the gravity of the situation and the importance of adopting the correct course of action. Robert Kennedy later said of these discussions, “Each one of us was being asked to make a recommendation that would affect the future of all mankind, a recommendation which, if wrong and accepted, could mean the end of the human race. ”

During the ExComm discussions, President John F. Kennedy had a scheduled meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. During the meeting, Kennedy gave no clue that he knew about Russian missiles in Cuba, and he was angered when Gromyko assured him again that the construction work on Cuba was solely for the purpose of defending the Castro regime and had no offensive capability or intention.

By October 19, with President Kennedy in Chicago for a scheduled round of meetings, ExComm reduced the list of possible responses to Russia to just two options: air strikes against the missile sites or a naval blockade of Cuba. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara remained the main advocate of a blockade, supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet specialist Llewellyn Thompson. Robert Kennedy was the main supporter of the air strikes option, supported by McGeorge Bundy and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

ExComm was deadlocked, and on October 20, President Kennedy returned to Washington from Chicago—his departure was covered by a story that he wasn’t feeling well. His presence in Washington was required to break the ExComm deadlock and to decide what the American response to Russian missiles in Cuba was to be, surely one of the most difficult and potentially dangerous decisions ever faced by an American president.