Conclusion

The world has never been closer to global nuclear war than it was during two weeks in October 1962. If the United States had undertaken air strikes or an invasion of Cuba, or if a Russian submarine captain had launched a nuclear torpedo against U.S. ships, or if the U.S. Navy had attacked a Russian freighter, it is all too easy to imagine a chain-reaction spreading to conclude with the launch of ICBMs by both superpowers. In any meaningful sense, that would have precipitated the end of the world as we know it.

The fact that the crisis didn’t end in nuclear war is partly a testament to the basic common-sense of two of the main protagonists: Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy. Both were aware that a nuclear war would devastate their countries and probably the entire world and both did everything they could to make sure this didn’t happen. But perhaps this outcome is also a testament to the effectiveness of MAD—Mutually Assured Destruction. In a pre-nuclear age, a crisis involving Russian troops in Cuba would almost certainly have involved some level of armed conflict. But at a time when war meant almost certain destruction for everyone involved, no-one could afford to let fighting supplant negotiating.

In that sense, the Cuban Missile Crisis exemplifies the Cold War between America and Russia. Both sides constantly maneuvered to gain the best advantage but, when confronted by a resolute defense, neither could afford to allow the situation to escalate to all-out war.