From Albert Schweitzer’s own writings it is clear that, aside from his more active life of good works, his theoretical interest centers in the questions: What is civilization? And how can it be restored? For, of course, he sees very clearly that the modern “civilized world,” so self-styled, is not really a civilized world at all, but as he calls it, a world of “Epigoni,” inheritors, rather than creators of any positive goods.
To the question: What is civilization? I propose to contribute a consideration of the intrinsic meanings of the words “civilization,” “politics” and “purusa.” The root in “civilization” is kei, as in Greek, keisthai, Sanskrit sî, to “lie,” “lie outstretched,” “be located in.” A city is thus a “lair,” in which the citizen “makes his bed” on which he must lie. We shall presently ask “Who?” thus inhabits and “economises.” The root in “politics” is pla as in Gr. pimplêmi, Skr. pr(piparmi) to “fill,” Gr. polis, Skr. pur, “city,” “citadel,” “fortress,” Lat. plenum, Skr. pûrnam, and English “fill.” The roots in purusa are these two and the intrinsic meaning therefore that of “citizen,” either as “man” (this man, So-and-so) or as the Man (in this man, and absolutely); in either way, the purusa is the “person” to be distinguished by his powers of foresight and understanding from the animal man (pasu) governed by his “hunger and thirst.”1
In Plato’s thought there is a cosmic city of the world, the city state, and an individual body politic, all of which are communities (Gr. koinônia, Skr. gana). “The same castes (Gr. genos, Skr. jâti), equal in number are to be found in the city and in the soul (or self) of each of us”;2 the principle of justice is the same throughout, viz. that each member of the community should perform the tasks for which he is fitted by nature; and the establishment of justice and wellbeing of the whole in each case depends upon the answer to the question, Which shall rule, the better or the worse, a single Reason and Common Law or the multitude of moneyed men in the outer city and of desires in the individual (Republic, 441, etc.)?
Who fills, or populates, these cities? Whose are these cities, “ours” or God’s? What is the meaning of “self-government”? (a question that, as Plato shows, Republic, 436B, implies a distinction of governor from governed). Philo says that “As for lordship (kyriôs), God is the only citizen” (monos polites, Cher. 121), and this is almost identical with the words of the Upanisad, “This Man (purusa) is the citizen (purusaya) in every city,” (sarvasu pûrsu, Brhadâranyanka Up., II.5.18), and must not be thought of as in any way contradicted by Philo’s other statement, that “Adam” (not “this man,” but the true Man) is the “only citizen of the world” (monos kosmopolites), Opif. 142). Again, “This city (pur is these worlds, the Person (purusa)) is the Spirit (yo’yam pavate =Vâyu), who because he inhabits (sete) this city is called the “Citizen” (puru-sa),” Satapatha Brâhmana, XIII.6.2.1—as in Atharva Veda, X.2.30, where “He who knoweth Brahma’s city, whence the Person (puru-sa) is so-called, him neither sight nor the breath of life desert ere old age,” but now the “city” is that of this body, and the “citizens” its God-given powers.
These macrocosmic and microcosmic points of view are interdependent; for the “acropolis,” as Plato calls it, of the city is within you and literally at the “heart” of the city. “What is within this City of God (brahmapura, this man) is a shrine3 and what therein is Sky and Earth, Fire and the Gale, Sun and Moon, whatever is possest or unpossest; everything here is within it.” The question arises, What then is left over (survives) when this “city” dies of old age or is destroyed? and the answer is that what survives is That which ages not with our inveteration, and is not slain when “we” are killed; That is the “true City of God”;4 That (and by no means this perishable city that we think of as “our” self) is our Self, unaging and immortal,5 unaffected by “hunger and thirst,” (Chândogya Up. VIII.1.1-5, slightly abbreviated), “That art thou” (ibid. VI.8.7); and “Verily, he who sees That, contemplates That, discriminates That, he whose game and sport, dalliance and beatitude are in and with that Self (âtman), he is autonomous (sva-râj, kreittôn heautou, self-governing), he moveth at will in every world;6 but those whose knowing is of what is other-than-That are heteronyomous (anyarâj, hettôn heautou, subject), they move not at will in any world” (ibid. VII.25.2).
Thus at the heart of this City of God inhabits (sete) the omniscient, immortal Self, “this self’s immortal Self and Duke,” as the Lord of all, the Protector of all, the Ruler of all beings and the Inward Controller of all the powers of the soul by which he is surrounded, as by subjects, 7 and “to Him (Brahma), thus proceeding in Person (purusa), as he lies there extended (uttânâya sayânaye), and enthroned (brahmâsandhîm ârûdhâ, atrasada), the powers of the soul (devatâ, prânâ), voice, mind, sight, hearing, scent, bring tribute.”8
The word “extended” here states a meaning already implied in the etymology of the “city,” kei including the sense to lie at full length or outstretched.9 The root in “extended” and ut-tâna is that in Gr. teinô and Skr. tan, to extend, prolong, in Gr. tonos, a string, and hence also, tone, and in tenuis, Skr. tanu, thin.
Not only are these worlds a city, or am “I” a city, but these are populated cities, and not waste lands, because He fills them, being “one as he is in himself there, and many in his children here” (Satapatha Brâhmana, X.5.2.16). “That dividing itself, unmeasured times, fills (pûrayati)10 these worlds ... from It continually proceed all animate beings” (Maitri Up. V.26). Or with specific reference to the powers of the soul within the individual city, “He, dividing himself fivefold, is concealed in the cave (of the heart) ... Thence, having broken forth the doors of the sensitive powers, He proceeds to the fruition of experience ... And so this body is set up in the possession of consciousness, He is its driver” (ibid. II.6.d).11 This “division,” however, is only as it were, for He remains “undivided in divided beings” (Bhagavad Gîtâ, XIII.16, XVII.20), “uninterrupted” (anantaram) and thus is to be understood as an undivided and total presence.
The “division,” in other words, is not a segmentation, but an extension, as of radii from a center or rays of light from a luminous source with which they are con-tinuous.12 Con-tinuity and intensity (samtati, syntonia) are, indeed, a necessary quality in whatever can be tensed and extended but, like the immanent Spirit, “cannot be severed” (acchedya, Bhagavad Gîtâ, II.23)—“no part of that which is divine cuts itself off and becomes separated, but only extends (ekteinetai=vitanute) itself” (Philo, Det. 90). It is then, the same thing to say that the Person “fills” these worlds as to say that Indra saw this Person “as the most widely extended (tatamam) Brahma” (Aitareya Âranyaka, II.4.3). In this way all the powers of the soul, projected by the mind towards their objects, are “extensions” (tetomena) of an invisible principle (Republic, 462E), and it is this “tonic power” by which it is enabled to perceive them (Philo, Leg. Alleg. I.30, 37). Our “constitution” is a habitation that the Spirit makes for itself “just as a goldsmith draws-out-for-himself (tanute) from the gold another shape” (Brhadâranyaka Up. IV.4.4).13
This is an essential aspect of the “thread-spirit” (sûtrâtman) doctrine, and as such the intelligible basis of that of the divine omniscience and providence, to which our partial knowledge and foresight are analogous. The spiritual Sun (not that “sun whom all men see” but that “whom few know with the mind,” Atharva Veda,X. 8.14)14 is the Self of the whole universe, (Rg Veda, I.11.5.1) and is connected to all things in it by the “thread” of his luminous pneumatic rays, on which the “tissue” of the universe is woven—“all this universe is strung on Me, like rows of gems on a thread” (Bhagavad Gîtâ, VII.7); of which thread, running through our intellect, the ultimate strands are its sensitive powers, as we have already seen.15 So, just as the noonday sun “sees” all things under the sun at once, the “Person in the Sun,” the Light of lights, from the exalted point and center “wherein every where and every when is focused” (Paradiso, XXIX.23) is simultaneously present to every experience, here or there, past or future, and “not a sparrow falls to the ground” or ever has or ever will without his present knowledge. He is, in fact, the only seer, thinker, etc., in us (Brhadâranyaka Up. III.8.23), and whoever sees or thinks, etc., it is by His “ray” that he does so (Jaiminîya Up. Brâhmana, I.28, 29).
Thus, in the human City of God which we are considering as a political pattern, the sensitive and discriminating powers form, so to speak, a body of guardsmen by which the Royal Reason is conducted to the perception of sense objects, and the heart is the guardroom where they take their orders (Plato, Timaeus, 70B, Philo, Opif. 139, Spec. IV.22 etc.). These powers—however referred to as Gods,16 Angels, Aeons, Maruts, Rsis, Breaths, Daimons, etc.—are the people (visa, yeomanry, etc.) of the heavenly kingdom, and related to their Chief (vispati) as are thanes to an Earl or ministers to a King; they are a troop of the “King’s Own” (svâ), by which he is surrounded as if by a crown of glory—“upon whose head the Aeons are a crown of glory darting forth rays” (Coptic Gnostic Treatise, XII), and “by ‘thy glory’ I understand the powers that form thy bodyguard” (Philo, Spec. I1, 45).17 The whole relationship is one of feudal loyalty, the subjects bringing tribute and receiving largesse—“Thou art ours and we are thine” (Rg Veda, VIII.92.32), “Thine may we be for thee to give us treasure” (ibid. V.85.8, etc.).18
What must never be forgotten is that all “our” powers are not our “own,” but delegated powers and ministries through which the royal Power is “exercised” (another sense of Gr. teino); the powers of the soul “are only the names of His acts” (Brhadâranyaka Up. I.4.7, 1.5.21,. etc.).19 It is not for them to serve their own or one another’s self-interests—of which the only result will be the tyranny of the majority, and a city divided against itself, man against man and class against class—but to serve Him whose sole interest is that of the common body politic. Actually, in the numerous accounts we have of a contest for precedence amongst the powers of the soul, it is always found that none of the members or powers is indispensable to the life of the bodily city, except only their Head, the Breath and immanent Spirit.
The right and natural life of the powers of the soul is then, precisely, their function of bringing tribute to their fountain-head, the controlling Mind and very Self, as man brings sacrificial offerings to an altar, keeping for themselves only what remains. It is the task of each to perform the functions from which it is fitted by nature, the eye seeing, the ear hearing, all of which functions are necessary to the well-being of the community of the whole man but must be coordinated by a disinterested power that cares for all. For unless this community can act unanimously, as one man, it will be working at all sorts of cross purposes. The concept is that of a corporation in which the several members of a community work together, each in its own way; and such a vocational society is an organism, not an aggregate of competing interests and consequently unstable “balance of power.”
Thus the human City of God contains within itself the pattern of all other societies and of a true civilization. The man will be a “just” (Gr. dikaios) man when each of his members performs its own appropriate task and is subject to the ruling Reason that exercises forethought on behalf of the whole man; and in the same way the public city will be just when there is agreement as to which shall rule, and there is no confusion of functions but every occupation is a vocational responsibility. Not, then, where there are no “classes” or “castes” but where everyone is a responsible agent in some special field.20 A city can no more be called a “good” city if it lacks this “justice” (dikaiosynê) than it could be were it wanting wisdom, sobriety or courage; and these four are the great civic virtues. Where occupations are thus vocations “more will be done, and better done, and with more ease than in any other way” (Republic, 370C). But “if one who is by nature a craftsman or some sort of businessman be tempted and inflated by wealth or by his command of votes or by his own might or any such thing, and tries to handle military matters, or if a soldier tries to be a counselor or guardian, for which he is unfitted, and if these men interchange their tools and honors, or if one and the same man tries to handle all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too hold that this sort of perversion and being jack-of-all-trades will be the ruin of the city”; and this is “injustice” (Republic, 434B).
Thus the ideal society is thought of as a kind of co-operative work-shop in which production is to be for use and not for profit, and all human needs, both of the body and the soul, are to be provided for. Moreover, if the command is to be fulfilled, “Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect,” the work must be perfectly done.21 The arts are not directed to the advantage of anything but their object (Republic, 432B), and that is that the thing made should be as perfect as possible for the purpose for which it is made. This purpose is to satisfy a human need (Republic, 369B, C); and so the perfectionism required, although not “altruistically” motivated, actually “serves humanity” in a way that is impossible where goods are made for sale rather than for use, and in quantity rather than quality. In the light of Plato’s definition of “justice” as vocational occupation we can the better understand the words, “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and these things shall be added unto you” (Matthew, 6:33).
The Indian philosophy of work is identical. “Know that action arises from Brahma. He who on earth doth not follow in his turn the wheel thus revolving liveth in vain; therefore, without attachment to its rewards, ever be doing what should be done, for, verily, thus man wins the Ultimate. There is nothing I needs must do, or anything attainable that is not already mine; and yet I mingle in action. Act thou, accordingly, with a view to the welfare of the world; for whatever the superior does, others will also do; the standard he sets up, the world will follow. Better is one’s own norm,22 however deficient, than that of another well done; better to die at one’s own post, that of another is full of fear ... Vocations are determined by one’s own nature. Man attains perfection through devotion to his own work. How? By praising Him in his own work, from whom is the unfolding of all beings and by whom this whole universe is extended (tatam, <tan). Better is a man’s own work, even with its faults, than that of another well done; he who performs the task that his own nature lays upon him incurs no sin; one should never abandon his inherited23 vocation.”24
On the one hand the inspired tradition rejects ambition, competition and quantitive standards; on the other, our modern “civilization” is based on the notions of social advancement, free enterprise (devil take the hindmost) and production in quantity. The one considers man’s needs, which are “but little here below”; the other considers his wants, to which no limit can be set, and of which the number is artificially multiplied by advertisement. The manufacturer for profits must, indeed, create an ever-expanding world market for his surplus produced by those whom Dr. Schweitzer calls “over-occupied men.” It is fundamentally, the incubus of world trade that makes of industrial “civilizations” a “curse to humanity,” and from the industrial concept of progress “in line with the manufacturing enterprise of civilization” that modern wars have arisen and will arise; it is on the same impoverished soil that empires have grown, and by the same greed that innumerable civilizations have been destroyed—by Spaniards in South America, Japanese in Korea and by “white shadows in the South Seas.”25
Dr. Schweitzer himself records that “it is very hard to carry to completion a colonisation which means at the same time a true civilization ... The machine age brought upon mankind conditions of existence which made the possession of civilization difficult26 ... Agriculture and handicraft are the foundation of civilization ... Whenever the timber trade is good, permanent famine reigns in the Ogowe region27 ... They live on imported rice and imported preserved foods which they purchase with the proceeds of their labour ... thereby making home industry impossible ... As things are, the world trade which has reached them is a fact against which we and they are powerless.”28
I do not consent to this picture of a deus, or much rather diabolus, ex machina, coupled as it is with a confession of impotence.29 If, indeed, our industrialism and trade practice are the mark of our uncivilization, how dare we propose to help others “to attain a condition of well-being”? The “burden” is of our own making and bows our own shoulders first. Are we to say that because of “economic determination” we are “impotent” to shake it off and stand up straight? That would be to accept the status of “Epigoni” once and for all, and to admit that our influence can only lower others to our own level.30
As we have seen, in a true civilization, laborare est orare. But industrialism—“the mammon of in-justice” (Gr. adikia)—and civilization are incompatible. It has often been said that one can be a good Christian even in a factory; it is no less true that one could be an even better Christian in the arena. But neither of these facts means that either factories or arenas are Christian or desirable institutions. Whether or not a battle of religion against industrialism and world trade can ever be won is no question for us to consider; our concern is with the task and not with its reward; our business is to be sure that in any conflict we are on the side of Justice.31 Even as things are, Dr. Schweitzer finds his best excuse for colonial government in the fact that to some extent (however slightly) such governments protect subject peoples “from the merchant.” Why not protect ourselves (the “guinea-pigs” of a well known book) ‘from the merchant’? Would it not be better if, instead of tinkering with the inevitable consequences of “world trade,” we considered its cause, and set about to re-form (Wideraufbauen is Schweitzer’s word) our own “civilization”? Or shall the uncivilized for ever pretend to “civilizing missions”?
To reform what has been deformed means that we must take account of an original “form,” and that is what we have tried to do in historical analysis of the concept of civilization, based on Eastern and Western sources. Forms are by definition invisible to sense. The form of our City of God is one “that exists only in words, and nowhere on earth, but is, it seems, laid up in heaven for whomsoever will to contemplate, and as he does so, to inhabit; it can be seen only by the true philosophers who bend their energies towards those studies that nourish rather soul than body and never allow themselves to be carried away by the congratulations of the mob or without measure to increase their wealth, the source of measureless evils32 but rather fix their eyes upon their own interior politics, never aiming to be politicians in the city of their birth” (Republic, 591 E, F).
Is not Plato altogether right when he proposes to entrust the government of cities to “the uncorrupted remnant of true philosophers who now bear the stigma of uselessness”33 or even to those who are now in power “if by some divine inspiration34 a genuine love of true philosophy should take possession of them”: and altogether right when he maintains that “no city ever can be happy unless its outlines have been drawn by draughtsmen making use of the divine pattern” (Republic, 499, 500)—that of the City of God that is in heaven and “within you”?35
“‘I’ do nothing, so should deem the harnessed man, the knower of Ultimate Reality” (Bhagavad Gîtâ, V. 8). “I do nothing of myself” (John 8: 28, cf. 5:19). To think that “I’” do” (kartò’ ham iti) or “‘I’” think” is an infatuation, Philo’s oiêsis (Leg. Alleg. 1.47, 2.68, 3.33) and Indian abhimâna. The proposition Cogito ergo sum is a non sequitur and non-sense; the true conclusion being Cogito ergo EST with reference to Him “who Is” (Damascene, De fid. orthod. I; Katha Up. VI.12; Milinda Pañha p. 73) and can alone say “I” (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 261). Cf. also the references in my “Âkimcaññâ: Self-Naughting,” New Ind. Antiquary 1940.
Nichts anders stürzet dich in Höllenschlund hinein
Als das verhasste Wort (merk’s wohl!): das Mein and Dein
Nothing else will so readily cast one into the jaws of Hell as the detestable words (mark them well!) mine and thine (Angelus Silesius, Der Cherubinische Wandersmann, V. 238).
The work to be done is primarily one of purgation, to drive out the money changers, all who desire power and office, and all representatives of special interests; and secondly, when the city has been thus “cleaned up,” one of considered imitation of the natural forms of justice, beauty, wisdom and other civic virtues; amongst which we have here considered justice, or as the word dikaiosynê is commonly translated in Christian contexts, righteousness.
It may be, as Plato says, very difficult “to bring about such a change of mind as is required if we are to ‘progress’ in this way,” but as he also says, it is “not impossible”; and so we may “not cease from Mental Fight ... till we have built Jerusalem.”