Musicians have always appropriated ideas from other musicians. In recent years appropriation of musical ideas has been subjected to scrutiny, particularly when musicians borrow ideas that originate in cultures other than their own. Borrowing from indigenous and minority cultures has been particularly controversial. Other forms of appropriation, particularly that known as sampling, have also been widely discussed. Reflection on appropriation, especially cultural appropriation, and the hybridity that can result from appropriation, gives rise to both aesthetic and ethical questions. This chapter will introduce readers to the range of such questions.
The concepts of appropriation and hybridity are in need of clarification. Begin with the concept of appropriation. To appropriate is simply to take something for one’s own use. The appropriation with which this chapter is concerned is the taking of something produced by musicians. Usually, other musicians do the taking and they are engaged in the production of new musical works and performances. Appropriation takes two basic forms: appropriation by means of recordings and appropriation of musical content. Here ‘musical content’ refers to compositions, themes, styles, motifs, and other musical structures.
Let us begin by considering appropriation of musical content. Appropriation of content can involve taking over a complete composition. This occurs when a band “covers” a song originally produced by another group. Charles Avison’s arrangement of Domenico Scarlatti’s harpsichord sonatas as concerti grossi is a related example of this sort of appropriation. Elements of a composition can also be appropriated. For example, composers will often appropriate a theme from another composer. Examples include Brahms’s Variations on a Theme by Handel, Op. 24 and Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations, Op. 120. Appropriation of a theme is commonplace in jazz performance. Styles can also be appropriated. The use of jazz or blues styles by non-African Americans is a case of such appropriation. When such appropriation occurs, a new composition in an old style is produced. Sometimes something less than a complete style is appropriated. Stravinsky (Ragtime) and Darius Milhaud (the jazz fugue in the second section of La Création du Monde) appropriated elements of jazz styles without producing jazz compositions.
Appropriation can also be done by means of recordings. In the contemporary world, sampling (the re-use of a portion of a recording in a new recording) is a common sort of appropriation. Sampling was employed as early as the 1960s, and became commonplace on rap recordings in the 1980s. Sampling has also been widely used by experimental bands such as Negativland. A quite different sort of appropriation results from recordings made by ethnomusicologists. Ethnomusicologists have recorded music by indigenous people from Africa, Australasia, and the Americas. The use of recordings made by ethnomusicologists has been the source of concerns about the proprietary rights of individual musicians and cultures.
Cultural appropriation of music is appropriation which occurs across cultural lines. That is, individuals from one culture appropriate something that has been produced by musicians who belong to another culture. (For a discussion of cultural appropriation in the arts see Young 2008.) One widely discussed example of cultural appropriation has already been mentioned: appropriation of African American musical styles. (For discussions see Rudinow 1994; Taylor 1995; Gracyk 2001.) Appropriation of jazz styles has been going on since at least Bix Beiderbecke in the 1920s. Appropriation of blues styles continues in the music of Marcia Ball, Eric Clapton, John Hammond, Stevie Ray Vaughan and other non-African Americans. African Americans have also engaged in cultural appropriation. Herbie Hancock, on his album Headhunters (1973), appropriated the hindewhu style of the pygmies of central Africa. This appropriation was mediated via another act of appropriation: The Music of the Ba-Benzélé Pygmies (1966), a recording made by two French ethnomusicologists, Simha Arom and Geneviève Taurelle (Feld 1996). (The cycle of appropriation continued when Madonna used a short sample from Headhunters in the song “Sanctuary” on her 1994 CD, Bedtime Stories.) Paul Simon, who appropriated the music of South Africa’s townships, and Steve Reich, whose studies with a drummer of the Ewe people of Ghana have influenced his minimalist compositions, are two more examples of musicians who have engaged in cultural appropriation.
Not all appropriation across cultural lines counts as cultural appropriation. Something counts, for present purposes, as cultural appropriation only if something is taken in which an entire culture has a stake. Suppose that someone in China (that is, someone culturally distinct from me) brings out a pirate edition of my original compositions. The fact that the pirate belongs to another culture is not an interesting feature of the appropriation. If someone from my own culture pirated my compositions, the act would be wrong for the same reason. It is just garden-variety theft of intellectual property. For this reason, the appropriation of Solomon Linda’s composition “Mbube” (“The Lion Sleeps Tonight”) by The Weavers (1952), The Tokens (1961), and subsequently by the Disney Corporation does not count as cultural appropriation for present purposes. This is appropriation across cultural lines (Linda was a Zulu), but it does not count as cultural appropriation since something was appropriated from an individual. (This is not to say that Linda was fairly treated. He and his heirs likely received only a fraction of the royalties they were owed. A lawsuit with Disney was settled out of court.) If the entire Zulu culture were adversely affected by the appropriation of the song, or if the Zulus had a collective claim on the composition, then the appropriation would be cultural appropriation.
Turn now to an analysis of the concept of hybridity. A work of music can be hybrid in many senses, but usually to call a work hybrid is to say that it displays the influence of more than one style. Both compositions and performances can be hybrid in this sense, but this chapter will focus on compositions. The compositions Stravinsky produced during his neo-classical period are a good example of stylistically hybrid works. They are a composite of the composer’s earlier expressivism and elements of Classical and Baroque music. The most controversial sort of hybridity results from cultural appropriation. Many Western composers have appropriated musical content from non-Western cultures, including Native American, Balinese, African, and Middle Eastern cultures.
While appropriation and hybridity are both discussed in this chapter, the two are not necessarily connected. A musician could appropriate from another musician without the work being hybrid in any interesting sense; for example, if a musician working in a given style appropriated musical content from another musician working in the same style. When Handel appropriated from Bononcini, the resulting works were not stylistically hybrid: they both composed in the Italian Baroque style. Conversely, a musical work could be hybrid without its production involving cultural appropriation. This would be the case when a composer employs two styles both of which are native to his culture. Nevertheless, when appropriation is involved in the production of a work, it will often be stylistically hybrid. This is true, for example, of Stravinsky’s Ragtime and many compositions by Western composers that appropriate from non-Western cultures.
The musician who engages in appropriation might be thought to produce something aesthetically flawed. The appropriator’s work will, one could argue, be derivative and inauthentic. Music that is hybrid may seem to have other aesthetic flaws since unity of style may seem to be a precondition for aesthetic success. While completely derivative work will have little aesthetic value, a general aesthetic case against appropriation in music is harder to mount. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that all hybrid music is aesthetically flawed.
Examples of successful appropriation are easy to find. Johann Sebastian Bach borrowed freely from Vivaldi, Albinoni, and other composers with great success. Handel was an inveterate appropriator of musical content from other composers, yet the musical results were excellent. Uvedale Price remarked that, “If ever there was a truly great and original genius in any art, Handel was that genius in music; and yet, what may seem no slight paradox, there never was a greater plagiary. He seized [that is, appropriated], without scruple or concealment, whatever suited his purpose” (Price 1842: 573). These are, however, not clear examples of cultural appropriation. Even if appropriation can produce good works of music, one might still think that cultural appropriation will lead to disappointing music.
This claim is often made about the appropriation of African American music. Amiri Baraka (formerly LeRoi Jones) has maintained that in order to perform the blues a musician requires “the peculiar social, cultural, economic, and emotional experience of a black man in America. . . . The materials of the blues were not available to the white American” (Jones 1963: 148). A similar claim could be made about any style of music: in order to employ a style successfully one must have a particular cultural background. We may call this the cultural experience argument.
The cultural experience argument cannot show that all appropriation will be aesthetically unsuccessful. At best it shows that musicians cannot completely adopt the style of another culture. In many cases, however, musicians do not attempt to mimic the styles of other cultures. Rather, they take from another style and form a new, hybrid style. Steve Reich has written that, “Instead of imitation, the influence of non-Western music structures on the thinking of a Western composer is likely to produce something new” (Reich 1974: 40). Nothing in the cultural experience argument shows that innovative appropriation of the sort Reich has in mind will be aesthetically unsuccessful. Even Baraka admits as much. He has stated that Beiderbecke “played ‘white jazz’ . . . music that is the product of attitudes expressive of a peculiar culture.” Still, Baraka grants that Beiderbecke was “a serious white musician” and the hybrid music he produced was a successful creative re-use of the appropriated materials (Jones 1963: 154).
It is not even clear that the cultural experience argument is able to show that non-innovative appropriation of musical styles will be aesthetically unsuccessful. Sometimes appropriation of a musical style is unsuccessful, but no necessary correlation can be identified between cultural background and success in a particular musical style. One sometimes hears that only Italians can successfully sing Italian music, but the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. By most accounts, Kathleen Battle (African American) and Kiri Te Kanawa (Maori) have mastered bel canto singing as well as Cecilia Bartoli. Similarly, many authorities believe that non-African Americans have created aesthetically successful jazz and blues performances. Eric Clapton, Stevie Ray Vaughan and other non-African Americans are widely regarded as leading blues musicians. Ray Eldridge, the African American jazz trumpeter, was an advocate of the cultural experience argument. Despite his standing as the greatest trumpet soloist of his time, in a blind listening situation, he misidentified the cultural background of performers more than half of the time (Feather 1959: 47).
The examples just given may indicate that appropriation can give rise to good music. Examples of good hybrid music are just as easy to find. In addition to the example of Beiderbecke’s “white jazz” given above, much German Baroque music (including that of Bach) was a composite, or hybrid, of the Italian and French styles. Mozart’s Rondo alla Turca (from the Piano Sonata in A, K. 311) is only the best known of many great compositions that are hybrids of Turkish and European music. George Gershwin and Irving Berlin produced masterpieces of hybrid music by appropriating from African American culture. In the past forty years, aesthetically valuable hybrid compositions have become too common to enumerate. While it must be admitted that not all hybrid compositions are worth hearing, arguably hybridity is the most important source of new and aesthetically valuable ideas in contemporary music.
Appropriation gives rise to debates about the ownership of musical content. These debates see considerations about artistic creativity and freedom pitted against concerns about the proprietary rights of individual musicians and (in many cases of cultural appropriation) entire cultures. Resolving these debates can be quite complex. They often have a legal dimension. Legal questions can be complicated by the fact that different cultures and nations have different legal regimes. At the root of the debates are moral questions about what ought to be regarded as property.
Sometimes the answers to moral questions about the ownership of musical content are readily apparent and many legal systems track these answers quite reliably. Unauthorized duplication of entire copyrighted recordings and scores for commercial gain is clearly wrong. On the other hand, as long as appropriation of musical content results in a work that is not substantially similar to another work, the appropriation is permissible. This seems to be the correct position since appropriation that results in substantially new works does not adversely affect the economic opportunities of an original creator. A good balance is struck between encouraging musical innovation by permitting creative reuse and encouraging innovation by ensuring that creators are fairly rewarded.
Appropriation by means of recording gives rise to some difficult questions. In particular, the use of sampling has been widely debated. In the USA, the UK, and other jurisdictions, the courts have ruled that the use of any element of a sound recording without permission, no matter how small it may be, is actionable. For example, a US court has ruled that even the use of three notes constitutes a violation of copyright (Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005)). Now the use of samples is routinely cleared with copyright holders.
While the legal status of samples has been settled (at least for the time being), the moral question remains open. From a moral point of view, one can hold that artistic innovation has been wrongly sacrificed in favor of property rights, usually the property rights of corporations. The band Negativland holds this position, writing that
Artists who routinely appropriate . . . are not attempting to profit from the marketability of their subjects at all. They are using elements, fragments, or pieces of someone else’s created artifact in the creation of a new one for artistic reasons.
(Negativland n.d.)
The use of sampling does not normally cut into the market for the sampled recording. So normally no economic harm is done to the owner of the original copyright. Consequently, a situation in which sampling is used is arguably a Pareto improvement relative to a situation in which it is not employed. (An action is Pareto efficient, or a Pareto improvement, if it improves the well-being of some people without making anyone worse off.) One could conclude from this that sampling is not wrong.
Perhaps, however, economic considerations are not the only relevant ones. It has been argued that the use of sampling can devalue sampled works. Samples of some composition could be used, for example, in a parody of the composition. Still, it is not obvious that sampling devalues the sampled work, even if it is used in a parody. No one thinks any the worse of the Mona Lisa just because Duchamp parodied it in his L.H.O.O.Q (1919), a postcard reproduction of Leonardo’s painting, on which Duchamp drew a moustache and goatee. By parity of reasoning, the use of sampling should not hurt the reputation of a work or an artist. On the other hand, restrictions on sampling are certainly limiting musical innovation. Clearance fees are often very high and even when artists pay these fees, they sometimes still face legal challenges to their appropriation.
Sometimes music is regarded as the property, not of an individual composer but of an entire culture. This is a claim often made about the traditional music of indigenous cultures. In Western law, no one in the cultures in which the music originated has any proprietary rights to the music since it has no identifiable creator. Such music is regarded in Western law as “traditional” or “folk music” and anyone may freely appropriate it. Indigenous cultures, however, often regard this music as the property of an entire culture or of some clan within the culture. Sometimes cultures are said to own more than just particular compositions. Amiri Baraka has described blues as “the basic national voice of the African American people.” Its use by non-African Americans he describes as the “Great Music Robbery” (Baraka and Baraka 1987: 226, 328). Baraka and others believe that African Americans own not just particular compositions but collectively own an entire style of composition. Similar claims are sometimes made about the music of indigenous cultures.
It is easy to be sympathetic to indigenous and minority cultures from whom music is appropriated. They are often economically disadvantaged and it seems unfair that they should not benefit from something created by their culture. (It seems even more unfair when anthropologists who have recorded the music may receive compensation if their recordings are sampled.) Nevertheless, questions about whether cultures have proprietary rights to music are difficult to resolve.
Begin by considering the question of whether musical styles can be owned. The case that they can is difficult to make. The first reason is that styles can be difficult to individuate. Quite similar styles can come into existence at different times and in different cultural contexts. Consequently, assigning to a single culture proprietary rights over a style is likely to be unfair to other cultures that have just as good a claim on the style as another culture. (One could argue that two styles are distinct simply in virtue of having originated in different cultural contexts. Suppose this point is granted. Determining the style to which some new work belongs may still be difficult or impossible. A composer may have appropriated from some culture without it being possible to determine which.) A second, related reason for doubting that styles can be owned is that cultures have been interacting for a long time. As a result, a culture can seldom, if ever, claim sole credit for the development of a musical style. Without sole credit for developing a style, there is little basis for a claim to exclusive ownership. Finally, one can argue that the general interest is best served by allowing unfettered access of musicians to musical styles. Everyone’s interests are served when cross-fertilization of musical styles is permitted and even encouraged. Moreover, allowing members of one culture to use the styles of another does not deny opportunities to anyone. The members of the original culture can still employ their own styles. That is, the free exchange of musical content is likely Pareto efficient.
This leaves to be considered questions about proprietary rights to individual traditional compositions and recordings of such compositions. It is hard to see how the traditional compositions of certain cultures could be owned while those of other cultures are in the public domain. Certainly indigenous people ought to have unhindered access to any recordings already made of their music, particularly when these recordings may have a legal function. (The recordings could have a bearing on the resolution of land claims by indigenous people, for instance.) If the use of the recordings generates royalties, the performers ought to be compensated. If the performers belong to a culture that has not been integrated into the market economy, they will have no use for money. In such a case, royalties can be used to establish a fund that benefits the performers’ culture. Such a fund could, for example, be used to purchase land that would protect an indigenous people against unwanted intrusions.
Concerns about appropriation of music are sometimes linked to concerns about the appropriation of an audience. That is, there is a fear that when outsiders appropriate a musical style they may monopolize the market for performances in that style. This sort of concern has been raised both with regard to appropriation from African American musicians and from non-Western cultures. Paul Simon’s Graceland has often been regarded as an example of the latter. This fear may seem particularly well grounded when outsiders have better access to recording contracts and performance opportunities. Arguably this was the case when non- African Americans first appropriated jazz and blues styles.
The available evidence suggests that fear of the appropriation of audiences may be exaggerated. The argument is based on the assumption that musicians are playing a zero-sum game: any gain for one musician comes at the expense of another. In fact, the demand for music in a given style is elastic. There is no more a fixed market for music in a given style than there is a fixed market for books about wizards or murder mystery novels. Arguably Simon’s appropriation of South African music opened up opportunities for South Africans rather than closing them down. In the wake of Simon’s appropriation, the Zulu choir Lady-smith Black Mambazo rose to international prominence. A similar point could be made about appropriation from African American musicians, particularly in the 1950s and earlier. White American musicians took advantage of opportunities that were not available to their African American counterparts. Even here, however, one can argue that White musicians made audiences aware of the music of African Americans and, in this way, helped open up opportunities for minority musicians.
Many moral questions, besides proprietary questions, have been raised about appropriation of music from minority cultures. This section will address two of these additional issues. The first is the suggestion that appropriation can lead to the harmful misrepresentation of a culture. The second is the charge that appropriation can lead to the assimilation and distortion of minority cultures.
Begin by considering the first of these charges. Musicians from mainstream Western cultures are often held to have misrepresented non-Western cultures, indigenous cultures, and African American culture. This misrepresentation is thought to involve stereotypes that create or perpetuate cultural prejudices. Both Mozart, in Abduction from the Seraglio and Borodin, in Prince Igor, appropriate elements of non-Western music. Both have been suspected of Orientalism (the presentation of misleading stereotypes of Eastern cultures). Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess appropriates elements of African American music and this has led to charges of caricaturing African Americans: “black characters are commonly represented as ‘simple,’ either by folky pentatonics or the banjo tunes of ‘I Got Plenty o’ Nuttin’’” (Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000: 23). Tommie Shelby raises the possibility that the appropriation of musical styles from African American culture leads to another danger. Suppose that non-African Americans were to produce bad jazz and blues performances. “The uninformed or naïve will mistake the fake stuff for the real thing, coming away with a distorted view of the value of the original” (Shelby 2005: 191; Shelby does not endorse this argument.)
These sorts of observation are most often made by musicologists. Not being philosophers, they are not always explicit in drawing moral conclusions from these and similar observations about appropriation. Presumably, however, the implication is that the misrepresentation of other cultures is morally wrong, particularly when it creates or perpetuates harmful stereotypes. This point ought to be conceded. The creation of a Hollywood Western that misrepresents Native Americans as dim-witted or duplicitous is clearly morally wrong. If a work of music similarly misrepresents the members of a culture, its creation is also wrong. Some philosophers believe that when artworks express flawed moral perspectives, they are also aesthetically flawed (Gaut 1998). If they are right, then musical works that harmfully misrepresent cultures are also aesthetically flawed. Such works need not, however, be completely without aesthetic value. Few would deny that Abduction from the Seraglio is a masterpiece, even if Mozart is guilty of Orientalism.
While harmful misrepresentation in music is wrong, we have little reason to believe that all cultural appropriation of music involves misrepresentation, harmful or otherwise. As we have seen, Baraka is no admirer of cultural appropriation, but he grants that some appropriation can be helpful. He wrote that Beiderbecke’s appropriation of jazz “served to place the Negro’s culture and Negro society in a position of intelligent regard it had never enjoyed before” (Jones 1963: 151). If appropriation from African American culture is not harmful, appropriation from other cultures could also be benign or even beneficial. That a composition has been produced by cultural appropriation or is hybrid does not, by itself, demonstrate that the work is morally objectionable or aesthetically flawed.
Turn now to the second of the issues to be addressed in this section. Some writers have objected to cultural appropriation of music on the ground that it can contribute to the distortion or assimilation of minority cultures. It is easy to imagine how appropriation could lead to the distortion of a culture. Suppose that outsiders appropriate musical content from an indigenous culture. When these musicians engage in appropriation, they alter, perhaps subtly, the music that they appropriate. That is, the music becomes hybrid. Now one can easily imagine that musicians from the indigenous culture hear performances by the outsiders. The outsiders are likely to have greater access to recording contracts and performance opportunities than do musicians from the indigenous culture. The indigenous musicians may begin to adapt their music so that it sounds more like the music produced by outsiders. In time, the music of the indigenous people may be distorted. Since, in many cultures, music is an essential part of spiritual and ritual practices, distortion of a culture’s music can have far-reaching cultural implications. It may even contribute to the assimilation of cultures.
This argument correctly identifies the single biggest threat facing minority cultures and, in particular, indigenous cultures: assimilation. It is not clear, however, that it shows that musicians always act wrongly when they appropriate from minority and indigenous cultures. In an increasingly cosmopolitan world, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent cultures from influencing each other. Likely minority musical traditions are influenced as much (or more) by completely different musical traditions as they are by musicians who have appropriated elements of the minority cultures. Consequently, it seems that whatever musicians from majority cultures do, they may have an impact on minority culture. So, if the mere act of creating music that influences another culture can be regarded as wrong, musicians are damned if they appropriate and damned if they do not. Some responsibility for maintaining the integrity of minority musical traditions has to lie with the members of these cultures. If they wish their traditions to remain intact, then they need to take care to ensure that traditional training is preserved. For their part, musicians from outside a culture ought to ensure that they do not misrepresent their works, which will often be hybrid in style, as authentic expressions of the culture from which they borrow.
A final objection to the cultural appropriation of music remains to be addressed. Music can have more than aesthetic significance in many cultures. In certain cultures, particularly indigenous cultures, music can often have important spiritual or legal importance. For example, among the Kwakwaka’wakw people of the Pacific Northwest, the Blackfeet of Montana, and the Yolngu of Australia, songs can be seals of authority and indications of legal rights (Coleman et al. 2009: 186–7). Particularly when music has an important ceremonial or spiritual significance within a culture, its appropriation may be regarded as offensive or sacrilegious. This could be because its appropriation is regarded as a desecration of something sacred. In some cultures, for example, certain songs are to be sung only by persons properly initiated in certain rituals or secrets. A violation of this norm can be deeply offensive.
Musicians need to be aware of this possible consequence of their appropriation. This is not to say that the creation of an offensive work of art is always wrong. Carlos Serrano’s Piss Christ (a photograph of a crucifix immersed in the artist’s urine) is offensive, and offensive because it involves desecration. Still, it is not obvious that Serrano acted wrongly in creating this work. Few would want to say that he acted wrongly if he was engaged in an act of self-expression. (If he was simply trying to be gratuitously offensive, his actions would be assessed differently.) By parity of reasoning, musicians could engage in offensive cultural appropriation without acting wrongly. Nevertheless, gratuitous offensiveness is wrong. Consequently, when appropriation will cause deep offense in some culture, musicians ought to have compelling artistic or other reasons for their appropriation. Musicians may also be morally required to observe time and place restrictions on appropriation. If, for example, large numbers of Australian Aboriginals are profoundly offended by the appropriation of their music, then outsiders likely ought not to perform on the didgeridoo at a festival of aboriginal arts.
See also Authentic performance practice (Chapter 9), Music and dance (Chapter 43), Opera (Chapter 41), Song (Chapter 40), and Style (Chapter 13).
Baraka, A. [L. Jones] and Baraka, A. (1987) The Music: Reflections on Jazz and Blues, New York: William Morrow.
Born, G. and Hesmondhalgh, D. (2000) “Introduction,” in Western Music and its Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 280–304.
Coleman, E. and Coombe, R. with MacArailt, F. (2009) “A Broken Record: Subjecting ‘Music’ to Cultural Rights,” in J. Young and C. Brunk (eds) The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 173–210.
Feather, L. (1959) The Book of Jazz, New York: Meridian.
Feld, S. (1996) “Pygmy POP: A Genealogy of Schizophonic Mimesis,” Yearbook for Traditional Music 28: 1–35.
Gaut, B. (1998) “The Ethical Criticism of Art,” in J. Levinson (ed.) Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–203.
Gracyk, T. (2001) I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of Identity, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Jones, L. [Baraka, A.] (1963) Blues People, New York: William Morrow.
Negativland (n.d.) “Changing Copyright,” available at www.negativland.com/news/?page_ id=22.
Price, U. (1842) On the Picturesque: With an Essay on the Origin of Taste, Edinburgh: Caldwell, Lloyd and Co.
Reich, S. (1974) Writings about Music, Halifax: Nova Scotia College of Art and Design.
Rudinow, J. (1994) “Race, Ethnicity, Expressive Authenticity: Can White People Sing the Blues?” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52: 127–37.
Shelby, T. (2005) We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Taylor, P. (1995) “. . . So Black and Blue: Response to Rudinow,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53: 313–16.
Young, J. (2008) Cultural Appropriation and the Arts, Malden: Blackwell.