Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.
American Petroleum Institute,
55Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement,
94anticompetitive practices,
54antitrust legislation,
36,
92Arabian Light: as marker crude,
137; OPEC price increase of,
130–31; prices compared to U.S.,
131Asian financial crisis,
162–63automobiles,
176; post-World War II increase in,
106; U.S. early manufacturing of,
42–43
Black Giant field,
75,
85,
201; martial law in Texas after,
74,
74; oil industry impact of,
72–74,
76,
107boom-bust cycles,
2,
6,
212; future responses to,
240; history of,
3,
17–18; nature of,
223,
223–24; oil prices during U.S.,
4,
38,
54,
168; origin of,
16; overview of,
226; swing producer and,
228; Texas Era management and,
107,
108–9; in 2008,
190–92; U.S. economy impacted by oil’s,
152–53; after World War I,
50–56.
See also oil boomBrent crude: benchmark price set on,
171,
274n10; price volatility for,
167,
194,
195,
212,
217,
219,
221; WTI prices compared to,
265n86,
274n10,
276n60Britain,
146; BP stake of,
85; coal to oil transition in,
43; oil policy during World War II,
93–94; Seven Sisters investigated by,
95British Petroleum (BP): Britain’s stake in,
85; Iran’s relationship with,
258n113; production forecasting by,
206–7; in Seven Sisters cartel,
88–89
California: field discoveries in 1920s,
53; regulation in,
83–84Canadian Oil Sands projects,
205cartels,
94,
266n23; classification of,
156; compliance with,
19; of early drillers/producers,
26–29; factors for success of,
235; FTC on impact of,
112,
261n169; global control with,
107–8; legality of,
45; Middle East oil management with,
87–88; origins of,
18–19; as swing producers,
225–26.
See also Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries;
Seven Sisters cartel;
Texas Railroad CommissionChicago Mercantile Exchange,
181China: demand in 1990s,
160; demand increase in 2000s,
170; energy intensity in,
243n6; oil market data from,
239; SPR capacity of,
280n41commodity: oil as “must-have,”
58–61; “peak oil” and debates on,
177–78; trading,
182Connally “Hot Oil Act” of 1935,
78conservation,
112,
250n61,
256n64; during 1920s,
52; factors in obtaining,
54–55; MER limits for,
80,
93,
256n61; Oklahoma statutes on,
46–47; policy during energy crisis of 1973,
135; unitization for,
54–57.
See also quotasconsumers: behavior with income change,
191; commuting for,
176; efficiency offset by,
6; elasticity and income of,
60–61,
252n11; gasoline price impact on,
188; oil abundance impact on,
44; producer dialogue with,
158–59,
235contracts: jet fuel,
191–92; spot transaction,
129; U.S. dollar-based,
128–29Coolidge administration,
55–56Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE),
136costs: of drilling/boring,
75; dry well,
252n21; operating,
17,
62,
64; production,
17,
62; refiners,
63; transportation,
21–22,
62–63
drilling/boring: costs of,
75; dangers with,
14; dry well costs in,
252n21; excess with,
33,
45–46; innovation in,
44,
248n7; invention of,
13; offshore,
64; pressure loss from unrestricted,
53
electricity: for lighting over oil/gas,
41; shortages,
170Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,
134Energy Information Administration (EIA): forecasting by,
210,
217,
243n5; on global reserves in 2014,
271n35; on OPEC production,
167; on Saudi production and capacity,
173,
208,
222; on shale prices,
218energy policies: failure of,
237; under Nixon,
133–34; price volatility impact on,
236Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
136environmental concerns,
6–8Exxon,
86,
103,
148; expulsion from Venezuela,
117; Iranian oil and,
116; in Libya,
126; price cut controversy in 1960s with,
119–20; in Seven Sisters cartel,
88–89
Federal Energy Administration (FEA),
134,
263n46Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
184–85,
267n28; on cartels impact on small business,
112,
261n169; on gasoline prices in 1951,
51,
250n44; on oil industry and government cooperation,
49foreign oil industry: concessions in,
88–89; in Libya,
126–27; “peak oil” fears and,
84; price setting in,
89–92; TRC and,
101–2; U.S. acquisitions in,
85–86; U.S. competition with,
31; U.S. quotas accommodating,
101.
See also imports, oilfree-market principles,
251n66; of Asian “Tigers,”
161–62; Bush, G. H. W., on,
154; in oil industry,
20,
45,
67,
155,
161–62,
241,
251n66; Saudi Arabia and,
229,
231–32
gasoline,
125; consumer impact by price of,
188; crude oil and, price correlation,
50–51; FTC on price of, in 1951,
51,
250n44; kerosene outpaced by,
43; Model-T and rise in sales of,
43; over alcohol fuel,
42; shortages of 1979,
141–42; shortages on West Coast,
51–52; substitutes for,
61; tax,
280n38; U.S. early market for,
42government: budget planning,
5; oil industry control by,
77,
83; oil industry cooperation with, during World War I and II,
49–50,
92–96; oil industry relations with,
46–47,
49–50,
68,
92–96,
260n167,
265n76; quotas set by,
1,
77,
102; regulations,
45–47,
55–57,
77–78,
80–82,
250n63; renewable energy subsidies from,
142; unitization to lessen control of,
55Greater Seminole field,
67–68Great Shutdown Movement,
31Gruenspecht, Howard,
59–60Gulf War,
226; Saudi Arabia’s role in OPEC after,
159; SPR and,
157–58,
185
imports, oil,
267n28; from Middle East,
96; national security and reliance on,
102; quotas on,
102,
128,
259n139; TRC and,
101–2; U.S., from 1945–1955,
96import tariffs,
84–85; investigation of Seven Sisters,
101; Reagan’s consideration of,
153; variable,
237–38,
267n29independent producers,
124; global market access of,
96,
102–3; Suez Crisis and,
98–99; TRC protecting,
81,
99; in Venezuela,
96,
102Independent Producers League,
47India,
239; energy intensity in,
243n6; kerosene price war in,
86innovation: in drilling/boring,
44,
248n7; in oil market volatility,
224; in oil/petroleum usage,
41–42; of Rockefeller,
247n106internal combustion engine,
41–42International Energy Agency (IEA),
240,
264n55; forecasting of,
6,
7,
61,
171,
180,
184,
205–6,
206,
228; forming of,
135–36; oil spike in late 1990s and,
161; on shale production,
204; SPR coordination within,
239; on SPR release,
186,
201International Petroleum Commission,
94International Petroleum Exchange (IPE),
267n40inventions: of drilling/boring,
13; fracking,
201–2; for production,
33investments: downstream,
215,
239,
268n46; in infrastructure,
57,
115,
174; Saudi Aramco, since 2011,
230,
231–32,
277n78; in shale production,
217; upstream,
174,
228,
240Iran,
94,
262n28,
265n82; nationalization of oil in,
116–17,
258n113; oil market shifts and,
115–16; oil worker strikes in,
139,
141; in OPEC and Seven Sisters bargaining,
127; production cuts in,
194,
269n20,
274n7; production freeze refusal by,
220; quota system opposition from,
121; Seven Sisters boycott of oil from,
116; U.S. support of Iraq against,
144Iraq,
156; coup of 1958 in,
118; early promise of oil in,
85–86; oil industry impacted by war,
175; pipeline sabotage in,
98; U.S. and European agreement to exploit oil in,
86; U.S. invasion of,
167–68; U.S. support of, against Iran,
144Iraq Petroleum Company,
86
Joiner, Columbus Marion “Dad,”
72,
143Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI),
239
kerosene,
22; gasoline sales outpacing,
43; history of, significance,
11–12,
248n119; market in 1860s,
39; as oil’s primary application,
41,
42; price war for,
86,
148; Russia in, market,
33; Standard Oil and price of,
40
Libya,
124,
263n36; foreign companies defeated in,
126–27; independent producers in,
96,
102; production in 1970s,
125–26; production in post-revolution,
210; spare capacity of in 1974,
138lighting,
244n3; electric over oil,
41; history of, elements,
11; oil boom and,
17
Market Demand Act of 1932,
75martial law: in Oklahoma in 1930s,
69–70,
70; in Texas after Black Giant discovery,
74,
74Middle East,
8; Achnacarry Agreement and,
86–87; cartels for oil management in,
87–88; dependence on, oil,
124,
132; Pérez Alfonzo courting, producers,
118–19; supply disruptions from,
97–98,
98,
124,
143; supply management after World War II,
93–94; U.S. in oil management of,
86–88; U.S. oil prices imbalanced with,
103military: coal to oil transition in,
43; production increase for,
93.
See also Navy, U.S.monopolies,
54; outlawing of,
66; of Petroleum Producers Agency,
27–28; public disapproval of,
35; of Standard Oil,
30–31Murray, William “Alfalfa Bill,”
69–70,
73
Naimi, Ali Bin Ibrahim al-,
198,
211; qualifications of,
165; on spare capacity,
174,
214; on U.S. energy industry,
277n80National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
77–78National Refiners’ Association,
26,
28,
29–30national security: oil imports reliance and,
102; with oil industry stability,
153–54,
225,
267n28; spare capacity and,
100natural gas,
249n17; for lighting,
41; Saudi Arabia investing in,
215Near East Development Corporation,
86New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX),
221,
267n40
oil boom: of 1918–1920,
53; birth of,
13–14; challenges with,
15–16; competition in,
22–23; lighting and,
17; overproduction in,
17–18; railroads in,
21–22; storage and transportation issues in,
15,
17; in Texas and Oklahoma,
33; after World War II,
105–6Oil Creek Association,
18–19oil fields: decline of Pennsylvania,
44; discoveries in 1920s,
53; discoveries in 1970s,
128,
146; discoveries in 1980s Soviet Union,
146; Gulf War agenda to protect,
157–58; “peak oil” based on U.S.,
178–79; regulation of shutting down,
80; shale compared to conventional,
203,
204.
See also Black Giant field;
Greater Seminole field;
Yates fieldoil industry: anticompetitive practices in,
54; antitrust cases against,
92; Black Giant impact on,
72–74,
76,
107; burden for supply stability,
227–28; economy impacted by,
2,
5,
16,
152–53,
228; FDR policies for,
77–78; free-market principles in,
20,
45,
67,
155,
161–62,
241,
251n66; government control of,
77,
94; government relations with,
46–47,
49–50,
68,
92–96,
260n167,
265n76; integration in,
65–66,
253n30; in Iraq in early 2000s,
175; marketing sector of,
245n44; in mid-1920s,
66; national security with stability of,
153–54,
225,
267n28; OPEC share of,
120,
147,
169; regulation compared with government,
55–57; self-balance inability of,
65; Seven Sisters control of,
89; Soviet Union’s entrance into,
102–3; U.S. cooperation with,
46,
49–50; in World War I and II,
49–50,
92–96.
See also foreign oil industryoil market,
268n54; in 1850s,
12; competitive free,
20; data reliability on,
238–39,
264n69; in early 2000s,
170–71; future control of,
228–32; innovation needed for,
224; Iran and shifts in,
115–16; Iranian revolution impact on,
139–43; Israel wars impact on,
130; managers of,
8; OPEC and 1980s upheaval in,
145–47; OPEC future in,
228–29; safety net for,
222; from seller to buyer dominated,
147–48; shale decline and balance of,
217; spare capacity scare in global,
173–74; speculators impact on,
183–84; spot transactions in,
129,
155; Standard Oil’s domination of mid-1880s,
32; unpredictability of,
225–27; U.S. and Europe unity on,
132–33; U.S. future in regulation of,
234.
See also oil prices;
price volatilityoil/petroleum: characteristics of,
252n23; coal to, transition,
42–43,
248n7; consumer impact of abundance of,
44; dependence on, globally,
3,
7; distillate fuel regulations and,
170–71; foreign competition to U.S.,
31; gasoline and, price correlation,
50–51; illegal sales of,
75–78,
79; innovations in use of,
41–42; for lighting,
11; as “must-have” commodity,
58–61; post-World War II uses for,
105–6; products from,
5; raw state danger of,
12–13; transportation and storage of,
15,
17,
62–64,
246n81; U.S. consumption of, from 1949–1973,
106,
107; U.S. demand for, from 1945–1970,
106.
See also fuel;
shaleoil prices,
252n15,
258n101,
263n46,
270n13,
277n68; from 1847–1960,
100; from 1859–1933,
54; from 1859–2007,
168; from 1859–2016,
4; from 1860–1911,
16,
19,
32; from 1925–1934,
70; from 1930–1940,
79; from 1955–1980,
140; during and after 2008 recession,
187–92; from 2014–2015,
211; administered,
121,
136–41,
146–47,
155; Arabian Light,
130–31,
131,
137; Black Giant impact on,
72–73,
76,
107; in boom-bust cycles,
4,
38,
54,
168; Brent crude as benchmark for,
171,
274n10; concessions and,
96; energy crisis of 1973 and control of,
134–35; Exxon 1960s controversy on cuts in,
119–20; forecasting on,
61,
189,
236–41,
271nn23–24; future of, without supply manager,
227–28; geopolitical unrest and,
167–68; global collaboration for stabilizing,
235–36; after Gulf War,
158; history of, in U.S.,
1–3,
4,
82; market-based system for,
155–56; national security with stability of,
153–54,
225,
267n28; netback pricing model for,
151–52,
155,
266n16; OPEC, war of 2014,
209–11; OPEC basket,
165–66,
173,
173,
269n37; OPEC control over,
2,
129; of OPEC era,
4; quotas impact on,
1; reaction to high,
271n26; Rockefeller’s impact on,
4,
38–40,
54; Saudi Arabia impact on 1980s,
150–52; setting global, after 1920s,
89–92; at shipping and receiving ports,
257n96; short-term compared to long-term impacts on,
60; speculators impact on,
182–83,
184–85; spot,
129,
141,
147; SPR release for stabilizing,
185–87,
199–200; supply and demand in response to,
58; taxes on,
257n95; Texas Era,
4,
115; Texas-plus system for,
91–92,
94–96,
258n99; Texas role in U.S.,
82; U.S. and Middle East imbalance in,
103; U.S. spare capacity compared to,
104,
104; wildcatting and,
44–45; after World War II,
96–97Oklahoma: conservation statutes in,
46–47; gushers in,
67; “hot” oil production in,
76; martial law in 1930s,
69–70,
70; oil boom beginnings in,
33; production in 1927,
67–68; quota law leadership of,
82Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
145–46,
146,
209,
266n3Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
1,
18,
84,
273n66,
276n51; in 1970s,
3; in 1990s,
160–61; administered price system by,
121,
136–41,
146–47,
155; Arabian Light price increase and,
130–31; Asian financial crisis reaction from,
162–63; basket price,
165–66,
173,
173,
269n37; cheating within,
150; conflict within,
121,
122,
149; demise of,
8; domination of, from 1970–1980,
122,
123–44; evolution of, in 1980s,
159; formation of,
103,
120; global spare capacity of, in 2003,
172; “Goldilocks” period for,
168–69; industry share of,
120,
147,
169; Iranian revolution and,
140–41; Jakarta debacle of 1997 and,
162–63,
172; market control in future for,
228–29; market upheaval in 1980s and,
145–47; nationalization response from,
137,
264n57; oil price control of,
2,
129,
174–75; oil prices during, era,
4; price war of 2014,
209–11; production cuts assumptions for,
206–7; production cuts for shale competition by,
208; production cuts in 2008 and 2009,
194; production cut strategy and,
121–22; production shares of,
120,
147,
167,
169,
208,
208–9; quota cooperation in 1960s of,
122; quotas in 2011,
198; quota system in 1980s,
148–49; quota system return in 2009,
193–94; Saudi Arabia in, after Gulf War,
159; Saudi Arabia power within,
197–98,
278n103; Saudi Aramco negotiations with,
129; Seven Sisters bargaining with,
127; Seven Sisters struggle with,
120; on shale production,
204–5; spare capacity of, in 2003,
172; supply and demand strategy of,
149; as swing producer,
229; TRC and Seven Sisters compared with,
155–56; U.S. relationship with,
125,
129–30,
154–55; Venezuela conflict with,
161
“peak oil”: early fears of,
46; foreign oil supply and fears of,
84; predictions of,
178–80,
271n34; theories of,
177–78Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company,
12Pérez Alfonzo, Juan Pablo: Middle Eastern producers courted by,
118–19; as OPEC founder,
120; production cuts strategy of,
121–22; as quota system proponent,
1,
117–18; resignation of,
122Petroleum Administration Board,
77Petroleum Producers Agency,
27–28,
39Petroleum Producers Association,
19,
246n65pipelines,
262n26; correlative rights with,
48; costs with,
62–63; gathering lines compared to,
21; sabotage of Iraqi,
98; Standard Oil monopolies and,
30–31price-fixing practices,
81,
90,
262n5; FDR administration on,
76–77; legality of,
73; quotas as,
75,
82–83,
111,
255n26; by TRC,
48,
71–72,
73,
255n26price volatility: for Brent crude,
167,
194,
195,
212,
217,
219,
221; causes of,
8,
20,
44,
57–58; energy policy reaction to,
236; factors of and impactors on,
5–6,
44–46,
61–66; innovation and,
224; shale production and,
204,
217–18; storage and,
63–64; of WTI,
171,
189,
217producers/drillers,
251n66; capital for,
245n46; cartelization of,
26–29; court case of, against TRC,
73–74; Great Shutdown Movement of,
31; “hawks” and “doves” on quotas for,
193; law evasion by,
75–78; Mediterranean,
127,
130,
157; Middle Eastern, courted by Pérez Alfonzo,
118–19; non-OPEC,
146,
147,
150,
152,
163–64,
167,
169,
171,
171–72,
205,
270n13,
276n51; oil abundance impact on,
44; physical risk for early,
244n15; refiners and, negotiations,
28; refiners flexibility compared with,
63; SIC opposition from,
25; Standard Oil’s relationship with,
30–31; upstream, owning refinery,
240.
See also independent producers;
Pennsylvania drillers;
swing producerproduction: from Black Giant field,
76; boosting, for military use,
93; costs,
17,
62; excess in,
17–18,
46; forecasting of global,
206,
206–7,
210; with fracking,
201–4,
203; freeze in 2016,
220–21; inventions for,
33; in Libya,
125–26,
210; maximum efficient rate for,
80,
93,
256n61; in Mexico, historically,
44,
146,
248n2,
257n81; in Oklahoma in 1927,
67–68; OPEC shares of,
120,
147,
167,
169,
208,
208–9; “peak oil” and,
177–78; planning,
89; primary and secondary drives in,
252n20; regulation methods on,
80–82; from Russia,
33,
64,
171–72; from Saudi Arabia historically and projected,
173,
196,
208,
208–9,
222; Soviet Union, historically,
146,
160,
261n9; in Texas and Oklahoma in 1927,
67; U.S., from 1920–2015,
179; U.S. peak in,
128,
178–79production cuts: in 2008 and 2009,
194–95; in Iran,
194,
269n20,
274n7; OPEC, for shale competition,
208; OPEC assumptions for,
206–7; from OPEC in 2008 and 2009,
194; OPEC strategy for,
121–22; of Pérez Alfonzo,
121–22; Riyadh on,
193; Russia’s promise of,
211; from Saudi Arabia in 2008,
194–95; from Saudi Arabia in 2014,
212–13; voluntary private,
254n24
quotas,
3,
256n64,
260n156,
260n161; Achnacarry Agreement on,
87; enforcement and compliance with,
76; FDR administration and,
1,
8; forced compared to voluntary,
68–72; global control with,
107–8; government setting,
1,
77,
102; import,
102,
128,
259n139; Iran’s opposition to,
121; legal implications with setting,
48–49; new regions compliance with,
83–84; OCC,
47,
68–70,
254n9; oil prices impacted by,
1; Oklahoma leading laws on,
82; OPEC, system in 1980s,
148–49; OPEC cooperation with,
122,
267n42; OPEC return to, in 2009,
148–49; OPEC wide target, in 2011,
198; Pérez Alfonzo support of,
1,
117–18; as price-fixing practices,
75,
82–83,
111,
255n26; purpose and forms of,
80–82,
255n26; refiners response to OCC,
68–69; Saudi Arabia system for,
154; Seven Sisters system of,
89; shale,
234; Shell,
35; spare capacity and,
83; state implementation of,
82,
267n42; Texas compliance with,
76,
256n65; of TRC after Black Giant discovery,
73–74; of TRC after World War II,
97–103; TRC impacted by,
82; of TRC pre-World War II,
48,
70–72,
255n26; U.S., accommodating foreign oil industry,
101; U.S. compared to non-U.S. system of,
89–92
real estate collapse,
190“rebound effect,”
6,
243n8refiners and refineries,
253n24; challenges with excess of,
21,
23; costs associated with,
63; first commercial,
244n3; flexibility of, over producers,
63; National Refiners’ Association for,
26,
28–29,
30; OCC quota response from,
68–69; organizing challenges of,
29–30; producers/drillers negotiations with,
28; railroad relationships with,
22; Rockefeller command of,
21,
23–24; Rockefeller unification efforts with,
25–26; Saudi Arabia netback pricing and,
151; Seven Sisters control of global,
89; Standard Oil’s control of,
24,
30; upstream producer owning,
240regulation: consequences of hasty,
237; FEA, on “old” oil,
134,
263n46; government,
45–47,
55–57,
77–78,
80–82,
250n63; industry over government,
55–57; methods for production,
80–82; with new regions,
83–84; price controls and rationing for,
238; quotas forced compared to voluntary,
68–72; supply and demand swings without,
226; U.S. future in, of oil market,
234.
See also quotasRiyadh: export ban by,
131; non-OPEC producers pressured by,
152; price increase opposition of,
137; on production cuts,
193; Tehran relations with,
143,
215Rockefeller, John D.,
3,
245n46; business tactics of,
30,
37,
54,
66,
247n106; business tactics of, during World War I,
49–50; Cleveland refinery of,
20; driller negotiations of,
28; early career of,
19–20; horizontal integration of,
66; innovation of,
247n106; media and public vilification of,
36,
40; oil price impact of,
4,
38–40,
54; railroad deals of,
23; refiner unification efforts of,
25–26; refinery command of,
21,
23–24; Standard Oil Trust establishment and,
35.
See also Standard Oil CompanyRoosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR),
1,
8; antitrust cases against oil companies under,
92; media/press vilification of,
37,
39; oil industry policies of,
77–78; on price-fixing practices,
76–77Russia: energy intensity in,
243n6; production cut promise from,
211; production from,
33,
64,
171–72; Standard Oil’s battles with,
33–34
Saudi Arabia,
263n36,
277n70; Chevron lease in,
88; consumption of oil in,
279n16; downstream investments for,
215; free-market principles and,
229,
231–32; Gulf War and role of, in OPEC,
159; independent producers in,
102; Iranian revolution and U.S. relations with,
142–43; Khurais Megaproject of,
174,
195,
214,
271n16; netback pricing of,
151–52,
155,
266n16; oil prices in 1980s impacted by,
150–52; OPEC authority of,
197–98,
278n103; production cuts from, in 2008,
194–95; production cuts from, in 2014,
212–13; production historically and projected from,
173,
196,
208,
208–9,
222; quota system for,
154; in Riyadh Pact,
163–64; on shale,
216; spare capacity and,
169,
172–73,
195–97,
198,
214,
222,
270n11,
270n14,
274n82; as swing producer,
138,
149–50,
159,
207–8,
212,
212–16,
222; U.S. and U.K. request to, for supply increase,
189–90; U.S. dollar-based contracts with,
128–29; Venezuela relationship with,
119.
See also Yamani, Ahmed ZakiSaudi Aramco,
214,
229,
263n36,
271n16,
279n17,
279nn16–17; cyber attack on,
265n82; investments since 2011 for,
230,
231–32,
277n78; OPEC negotiations and,
129.
See also Khurais MegaprojectSeven Sisters cartel,
8,
241; anti-Western uprisings challenging,
117; apogee of,
103–4; boycott of Iran’s oil by,
116; companies in,
88–89; control decline of,
115–16; FTC on,
112; investigations of,
95,
101; OPEC bargaining with,
127; OPEC compared with,
156; OPEC struggle with,
120; price squeeze on,
103,
118–19; pricing formula of,
95; quota system of,
89; refiners control globally of,
89; as swing producer,
225; U.S. and U.K. suspicions of,
94shale,
2; Barnett,
202; father of, boom,
201; fields compared to conventional,
203,
204; forecasting and, boom,
205; fracking into,
201–2; future of U.S., in global market,
232–34; as LTO,
202; OPEC on production of,
204–5; price volatility with,
204,
217–18; quotas,
234; Saudi Arabia’s view on,
216; as swing producer,
204,
216–18; in U.S.,
2,
216–18,
232–34,
275n41Shell,
35,
148; coal to oil conversion for,
42–43; in Seven Sisters cartel,
88–89; Standard Oil and, battle,
34Sherman Antitrust Act (1890),
36Socony (Standard Oil Company of New York),
86,
253n1South Improvement Company (SIC),
24–25Soviet Union: entrance into oil industry,
102–3; production from, historically,
146,
160,
261n9spare capacity,
83,
140,
271n19; decline in global,
173–75; fall in, after 2010,
195–96; global, defined,
279n21; global, from 1955–2015,
196; of Libya in 1974,
138; Al-Naimi on,
174,
214; of OPEC in 2003,
172; Saudi Arabia and,
169,
172–73,
195–97,
198,
214,
222,
270n11,
270n14,
274n82; Six-Day War and U.S.,
100; U.S., compared to oil prices,
104,
104; of U.S. and Suez Crisis,
97–100,
98; of U.S. in 1970s,
123–24; World War II and,
92–93speculators,
273n77; benefits of,
237; early,
244n14,
246n81; exchanges and,
181–82; oil market impacted by,
183–84; price distorted by,
182–83,
184–85; reputation and blame on,
28,
180–82,
190,
272n44sport utility vehicles,
59,
176Standard Oil Company,
246n81,
247n93,
253n1; dissolution of,
3,
41,
44; drillers relationship with,
30–31; expansion tactics of,
30; first corporate trust established by,
35–36; headquarters of,
36–37,
247n103; international threats to,
33–35; investigations of,
36,
248n111; kerosene prices and,
40; monopoly,
30–31; oil market domination by mid-1880s,
32; price stability impact of,
32–37; public criticism of,
36,
37; refiners controlled by,
24,
30; Roosevelt, T., administration targeting,
37; Rothschild family competition with,
34–35; Russia conflict with,
33–34; Shell battles with,
34storage: oil/petroleum, historically,
15,
17,
246n81; price volatility and,
63–64Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): build up and coordination of,
239; of China,
280n41; debate on future use of,
236,
273n66; Gulf War and,
157–58,
185; IEA on release of,
186,
201; price stabilization and release of,
185–87,
199–200; terrorist attacks and,
167; U.S. management of,
136,
198,
199–201,
272n57,
275n22,
280n41supply and demand,
103,
250n44; from 1945 and 1970,
106; in 1970s,
123–24,
128; in 1980s,
145; balances in and implications for,
16,
65; GDP relationship to,
60–61,
243n6; impact of, without supply regulation,
226; oil industry burden for,
227–28; OPEC strategy for global,
149; perception’s role in,
175; projections for,
205–6; stickiness in,
58–60,
61–66,
83,
224; trends in, after 2000,
176supply disruptions,
132,
141,
275n25; Middle East conflicts and,
124,
143; Suez Crisis and,
97–98,
98; TRC reaction to,
141; Venezuelan strikes and,
175,
243n5swing producer,
205; absence of,
197,
221–22,
228; boom-bust cycles without,
228; cartel success as,
225–26; OPEC as,
229; requirements and implications of,
225–26,
231,
234; Saudi Arabia as,
138,
149–50,
159,
207–8,
212,
212–16,
222; shale as,
204,
216–18; TRC as,
101,
109,
217Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC),
142
Teapot Dome scandal,
55–56Texas: Black Giant discovery in,
72–75,
74,
76,
85,
107,
201; boom-bust price cycles and, market,
107,
108–9; conservation laws in,
47–48; gushers in,
67; oil boom era origin and end in,
33,
105; oil prices during, boom,
4,
115; production in 1927,
67; quota compliance in,
76,
256n65; Spindletop’s impact on oil fame of,
33,
44; Standard Oil competition in,
33; waste regulation in,
71–72Texas National Guard,
74,
74Texas Railroad Commission (TRC),
48,
70; apogee of,
103–4; decline of,
105; drillers court case against,
73–74; foreign imports and,
101–2; independent producer protection from,
81,
99; OPEC compared with,
155–56; Pérez Alfonzo consulted by,
117–18; price-fixing and quotas by,
48,
71–72,
73,
255n26; quotas after Black Giant discovery,
73–74; quotas after World War II,
97–103; quota system impact of,
82; as swing producer,
101,
109,
217,
225Trans-Arabian Pipeline,
262n26Treaty of Titusville,
28–29Turkish Petroleum Company,
86Twilight in the Desert (Simmons),
177
United Kingdom (U.K.),
94; foreign reserves access of,
85; plea to Saudi Arabia for supply increase,
190; production from,
64United States (U.S.),
94,
267n28; automobile manufacturing in,
42–43; boom-bust cycles and economy of,
152–53; boom-bust cycles and oil prices in,
4,
38,
54,
168; contracts based on, dollar,
128–29; Department of Energy of,
158,
178,
200,
227,
238; energy crisis of 1973 response by,
134–35; energy intensity in,
243n6; energy policies of,
133–34; European agreement to exploit oil in Iraq with,
86; Europe and, unity on oil market,
132–33; foreign oil competition with,
31; foreign oil industry acquisitions of,
85–86; future market regulation for,
234; gasoline market in early,
42; Gulf War agenda of oil field protection,
157–58; imports from 1945–1955,
96; Iranian revolution and Saudi Arabia relations with,
142–43; Iraq invasion by,
167–68; in Middle East oil management,
86–88; Middle East oil prices imbalance with,
103; Al-Naimi on energy industry in,
277n80; oil demand and consumption from 1945–1973,
106,
107; oil industry cooperation with,
46,
49–50; oil prices compared to spare capacity in,
104,
104; oil price setting in,
89–92; oil prices historically in,
1–3,
4,
82; oil shortage panic of 1920s,
52–53; OPEC relationship with,
125,
129–30,
154–55; “peak oil” based on fields in,
178–79; producer-consumer dialogue and,
159; production and proved reserves in,
179; production peak in,
128; quotas accommodating foreign oil industry,
101; quota system in, compared globally,
89–92; Saudi Arabia contracts based on, dollar,
128–29; shale in,
2,
216–18,
232–34,
275n41; spare capacity in 1970s,
123–24; SPR management by,
136,
198,
199–201,
272n57,
275n22,
280n41; Suez Crisis and spare capacity of,
97–100,
98; supply increase plea to Saudi Arabia,
189–90; support of Iraq against Iran,
144
Venezuela,
158,
257n81,
268n46; independent producers in,
96,
102; oil worker strikes in,
167,
175,
243n5; OPEC conflict with,
161; quota system in,
117–18; revolution of 1958 in,
117; Saudi Arabia relationship with,
119
waste, physical and economic,
138; industry and government cooperation on,
49; Market Demand Act of 1932 on,
75; meaning given to,
53; OCC actions on,
68–69; overproduction and,
46; quotas addressing,
73,
255n26; Texas response to regulation of,
71–72wells: casinghead gas from,
249n17; Drake’s first,
13–14; dry, costs,
252n21; dry, occurrence in 1867,
14; explosions and fires at,
244n15; LTO compared to conventional,
203,
203; offset,
15; shale, performance,
217; stripper,
71,
81,
93,
268n44West Coast Gasoline Famine of 1920,
51–52Wilcox Oil & Gas Company,
70Windfall Profits Tax (WPT),
265n76World War II: Britain’s oil policy during,
93–94; “hot” oil controlled by start of,
78; oil industry and government cooperation in,
92–96; oil prices after,
96–97; oil usage after,
106–7; spare capacity and,
92–93; TRC production quotas before and after,
48,
70–72,
97–103,
255n26
Yamani, Ahmed Zaki,
122,
155; on Arab Oil Embargo,
132; on burden put on Saudi Arabia,
150; dismissal of,
154; on price instability of late 1970s,
141,
143–44; Tehran Agreement warning from,
129