INTRODUCTION
1. I will translate the German “Sein” as “Being,” “Seiend” as “being,” and “Seiendes” as “beings.” If I use the word “being” with a lowercase b, it is because I refer to a definite or indefinite article: e.g., “a being” = “ein Seiendes.”
2. A very clear exposition of deconstructionism in the philosophical and literary American context can be found in R. Gasché, Views and Interviews: On “Deconstruction” in America (Aurora, Colo.: Davies Group, 2007).
3. J. Derrida, Positions, trans. A. Bass (London: Continuum, 2002), 9.
4. The list of studies on this theme is enormous. These are some recent titles: G. Stenstad, Transformations: Thinking After Heidegger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); D. M. Kleinberg-Levin, Gestures of Ethical Life: Reading Hölderlin’s Question of Measure After Heidegger (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); D. Wood, Thinking After Heidegger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); D. C. Jacobs, The Presocratics After Heidegger (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); and J. Sallis, Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
5. M. Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. T. Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 198.
6. M. Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 71–73.
7. This sense of Being is conditioned by the grammatical category that dominates our apprehension of being in the third-person-singular, present-indicative “is.” “Is” conceptualizes the infinitive “to be”; that is, it is the third-person-singular ontology that has governed philosophical consciousness and its Being since antiquity.
8. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. G. Fried and R. Polt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 35. The translators add a note in their translations explaining that the expression “Wie steht es um das Sein?” “could be translated more colloquially as ‘What is the status of Being?’ or even ‘What about Being?’ We have kept the German in order to preserve Heidegger’s various plays on standing” (35). Note that Heidegger, on pages 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 70 of the original German edition uses “Wie steht es um das Sein?” and on pages 26, 56, 153, and 154 uses a different formula: “Wie steht es mit dem Sein?” Both versions have been translated as “How does it stand with Being?” by the translators. Although I agree with them that there is not a big difference in meaning between the two formulations, I have decided to translate both versions as “How is it going with Being?” because it better captures the postmetaphysical formulation of the question, thus the fact that it has gone through destruction. C. Guignon notes that the “question has a colloquial, almost slangy ring to it” (C. Guignon, “Being as Appearing: Retrieving the Greek Experience of Phusis,” A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. R. Polt and G. Fried [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000], 34).
9. M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 39.
10. Although Heidegger believes that, before metaphysics began with Plato, there were premetaphysical understandings of Being (pre-Socratic thinkers asked questions concerning the Being of beings but in such a way that Being itself was laid open), I prefer to think of ontology as starting with Plato, because the philological justifications of the pre-Socratic (nonmetaphysical) understandings of Being are too ambiguous.
11. G. Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, trans. D. Webb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 25.
12. J. Stambaugh, “Heidegger,” in Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 7.
13. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. D. F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1991), 3:202.
14. G. Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, ed. S. Zabala., trans. W. McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 6.
15. This course was partially published first in Magazine littéraire 207 (May 1984): 35–39, and recently as “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” in M. Foucault, Dits et écrits II, 1976–1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 1498–1507. This edition of the essay was not included in the three-volume English translation of Dits et écrits (which includes both editions) edited by P. Rabinow for the New Press. Only the second edition, from 1984, was translated and included in The Foucault Reader, edited by P. Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32–50; and now in M. Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, ed. P. Rabinow, trans. R. Hurley and others (New York: New Press, 1997), 304–319. One of the first philosophers to comment on Foucault’s ontologie de l’actualité (sometimes translated as “ontology of the present,” “ontology of ourselves,” or “ontology of current events”) was Vincent Descombes, in The Barometer of Modern Reason: On the Philosophies of Current Events (1988), trans. Stephen Adam Schwartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), which is an investigation of how philosophy should deal with world events.
16. Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”
17. M. Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in M. Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, ed. P. Rabinow, trans. R. Hurley and others (New York: New Press, 1997), 253–280.
18. Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” 1506–1507.
19. Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” 315.
20. Ibid.
21. “All my philosophical edification,” said Foucault in 1984, “has been determined by the reading Heidegger. . . . Had I not read him, I would not have studied Nietzsche either” (M. Foucault, “Le retour de la morale,” in Dits et écrits II [Paris: Gallimard, 2001], 1522). This is one of the few interviews not translated in the three-volume English translation of Dits et écrits.
22. Vincent Descombes confirms this in his outstanding analysis on Foucault’s ontology of actuality: “An ontology of the present must tell us about the present as present, about time as time, about the unaccomplished as unaccomplished, about the past as past. Yet conceptual discussions of this order are notoriously absent from Foucault’s writings. In keeping with the positivist program, he can only conceive of studying a concept in the historical mode. Which amounts to saying that an entirely historicist philosophy may well be political but, prima facie, it has nothing to do with any sort of ontology” (Descombes, The Barometer of Modern Reason, 18).
23. I. Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
24. D. D. Roberts, Nothing but History (Aurora, Colo.: Davies Group, 2006).
25. Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, 87.
26. G. Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” trans. B. Spackman, in Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy, ed. G. Borradori (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
27. G. Vattimo, “Ontology of Actuality,” in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, ed. S. Benso and B. Schroeder (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 89–107; G. Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans. D. Webb (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); and Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation.
28. Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, 86. Note that G. L. Bruns and V. Descombes gave formulations very similar to Vattimo’s question despite the fact that the question is intended, in Bruns’s case, for hermeneutics and, in Descombes’s, case, for a criticism of modern philosophy, while Vattimo formulated it for ontology. Bruns specified the question by saying, “the main question in hermeneutics is reflective and historical rather than formal and exegetical; the question is not how do we analyze and interpret but how do we respond to hermeneutical situations (or to any situation in which we find ourselves?). A critical form of this question is: How do we stand with respect to all that comes down to us from the past?” (G. L. Bruns, Hermeneutics: Ancient and Modern [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992], 195). And Descombes stated that the “heart” of The Barometer of Modern Reason is “how can philosophy deal with the world events [l’actualité]?” (Descombes, The Barometer of Modern Reason, 8).
29. J. Kristeva, “Psychoanalysis and the Polis,” in Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, ed. G. L. Ormiston and A. D. Schrift (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1990), 99. The recent publication of M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981–1982 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), will be very useful for understanding the significance of hermeneutics in France, which until now has only been attributed to Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005). A very interesting dialogue between Ricoeur and Gadamer can be found in “The Conflict of Interpretations,” in Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1982), 299–320.
30. M. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 29.
31. Ibid., 36.
32. Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? 67, 69.
33. Ibid., 71.
34. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 77.
35. Heidegger, in Introduction to Metaphysics, referred to Being after deconstruction as the “un-graspable.”
36. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 97.
37. Although Marion is known for his investigations of Descartes, he has devoted a great deal of analysis to ontology and Heidegger, such as Reduction and Givenness: Investigation of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology, trans. T. A. Carlson (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1998). His most original book, God Without Being, trans. T. A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), is all based on Heidegger’s philosophy.
38. On the very first page of his magnum opus, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2005), Badiou declares that “Heidegger is the last universally recognizable philosopher.”
39. E. Lévinas, Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. J. Robbins (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 176. In Ethics and Infinity, trans. R. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 1985), Lévinas goes on to say that a “man who undertakes to philosophize in the twentieth century cannot not have gone through Heidegger’s philosophy, even to escape it. This thought is a great event of our century. Philosophizing without having known Heidegger would involve a share of ‘naiveté’ in the Husserlian sense of the term” (42).
40. E. Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being; Or, Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 2004).
41. E. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
42. Ibid., 43.
43. Lévinas, Is It Righteous to Be? 105.
44. Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being, 42–43.
45. Lévinas, Is It Righteous to Be? 250.
46. From J-L. Marion, God Without Being, trans. T. A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 61. The original is published in M. Heidegger, Seminare, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986), 15:436–437.
47. M. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology” (1927), in Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–62.
48. Marion, God Without Being, xx.
49. D. Janicaud, “France: Rendre à nouveau raison?” in La Philosophie en Europe, ed. R. Klibansky and D. Pears (Paris: Gallimard/Folio, 1993), 187.
50. Badiou, Being and Event, 10.
51. A. Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. R. Brassier and A. Toscano (New York: Continuum, 2004), xv.
52. Badiou, Being and Event. 5.
53. Badiou recorded this objection in Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. L. Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
54. Badiou, Being and Event. 10.
55. R. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, trans. C-M. Gros (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 284.
56. M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 56.
1. BEING DESTROYED:
HEIDEGGER’S DESTRUCTION OF BEING AS PRESENCE
1. The complete works of Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, are published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt.
2. Although I will hardly quote any secondary literature on Heidegger, since this chapter does not pretend to be either an introduction to or a faithful interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy, it is important to indicate some essential studies that have been done on some of the concepts I will be discussing here: on the concept of Being, H. Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). On Being and Time, T. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); H. L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991); C. Lafont, Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000); T. Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). On the concept of truth, O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). On Heidegger’s thought in general, W. J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); G. Steiner, Martin Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); J. Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); J. E. Faulconer and M. A. Wrathall, eds., Appropriating Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Indispensable for anyone working on Heidegger today is M. Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (London: Blackwell Publishing, 1999); and Heidegger’s biography by R. Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. E. Osers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
3. This is the only passage where Wittgenstein talks about Heidegger: “Apropos of Heidegger: To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is no answer whatsoever. Nevertheless we do run up against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running against paradox). This running up against the limits of language is ethics. I think it is definitely important to put an end to all the claptrap about ethics—whether intuitive knowledge exists, whether values exist, whether good is definable. In ethics, we are always making the attempt to say something that cannot be said, something that does not and never will touch the essence of the matter. It is a priori certainly that whatever definition of the good may be given it will always be merely a misunderstanding to say that the essential thing, that what is really meant, corresponds to what is expressed. But the inclination, the running up against something, indicates something. What, you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, is does not matter!” (Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Circle of Vienna, ed. B. McGuinness [Oxford: Blackwell, 1979], 68–69).
4. Hermeneutics was certainly not understood by Heidegger as a “philosophy,” but we call it this because it has become, since Heidegger, a philosophical position. Either way, Heidegger explained what he intended for hermeneutics in a passage from an early (1923) lecture course: “Hermeneutics is itself not philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration.’ That such minor matters are lost sight of today should not be surprising, given the great industry of philosophy where everything is geared merely to ensuring that one will not come too late for the ‘resurrection of metaphysics’ which—so one has heard—is now beginning, where one knows only the single care of helping oneself and others to a friendship with the loving God which is as cheap as possible, as convenient as possible, and as profitably direct as possible into the bargain inasmuch as it is transacted through an intuition of essences” (M. Heidegger, Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. J. van Buren [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999], 16).
5. “Amend” should not be understood as “problem-solving” but as “problem-regulating.”
6. M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 55.
7. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 23.
8. Luther uses “destruere” in his Heidelberger Disputation.
9. We now know that in several courses from before and during 1927 Heidegger used the concept of destruction—especially in the 1923 course, Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity.
10. M. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 2.
11. M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1989), trans. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 154.
12. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (1953), trans. G. Fried and R. Polt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 218.
13. M. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 23.
14. On the difference between Destruktion and déconstruction, see H.-G. Gadamer’s essays “Destruktion and Deconstruction” and “Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed. D. P. Michelfelder and R. E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 102–125; and R. Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), who thoughtfully analyzes the origin of destruction in Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida. Also R. Bernasconi, “Seeing Double: Destruktion and Deconstruction,” in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 233–250, is very clear on this difference. Among other studies on Heidegger and Derrida, see G. Stellardi, Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and Metaphor: Imperfect Thought (New York: Prometheus Books, 2000); H. Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); and the recent investigation by P. Marrati, Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).
15. J. Derrida, Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994, ed. E. Weber, trans. P. Kamuf and others (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 211.
16. J. Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. R. Bowlby (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 117.
17. Derrida, Points, 83.
18. Ibid., 211.
19. Derrida, Paper Machine, 115.
20. J. Derrida, “A Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” Writing Instructor 9, nos. 1–2 (Fall 1989–Winter 1990): 18. Derrida went on to explain that one “must remember the Nietzschean, Freudian, and above all Heideggerian premises of deconstruction. And especially, in relation to Heidegger, that there is a Christian, or more precisely a Lutheran tradition of what Heidegger calls Destruktion. Luther, as I describe in my book on Jean-Luc Nancy and what Nancy calls the ‘deconstruction of Christianity,’ was already talking about destruction to designate the need for a desedimentation of the theological strata hiding the original nakedness of the evangelical message to be restored. What interests me more and more is to make out the specificity of a deconstruction that wouldn’t necessarily be reducible to this Lutheran-Heideggerian tradition” (Derrida, Paper Machine, 137–138).
21. Heidegger, Being and Time, 20.
22. Ibid., 23.
23. Ibid., 22–23.
24. M. Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 1959–1969, ed. M. Boss, trans. F. Mayr and R. Askay (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 117.
25. Ibid., 118.
26. Heidegger, Being and Time, 10. “Dasein” is Heidegger’s way of characterizing the being of humans and the entity or person who has this being.
27. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 32.
28. Ibid., 40.
29. Heidegger, Being and Time, 20.
30. M. Heidegger, The Principle of Reason (1957), trans. R. Lilly (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1996).
31. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 76.
32. M. Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” in Philosophical and Political Writings, ed. M. Stassen (New York: Continuum, 2003), 38.
33. In a famous essay entitled “Overcoming Metaphysics,” Heidegger explained the relation between the oblivion of Being regarding the realization of war: “The ‘world wars’ and their character of ‘totality’ are already a consequence of the abandonment of Being. They press toward guarantee of the stability of a constant form of using things up. Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process. Man is the ‘most important raw material’ because he remains the subject of all consumption. He does this in such a way that he lets his will be unconditionally equated with this process, and thus at the same time become the ‘object’ of the abandonment of Being. The world wars are the antecedent form of the removal of the difference between war and peace. This removal is necessary since the ‘world’ has become an unworld as a consequence of the abandonment of beings by Being’s truth” (M. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, trans. J. Stambaugh [New York: Harper and Row, 1973], 103–104).
34. M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 80.
35. This term is used by Heidegger to evade classical philosophical connotations attached to the notion of the subject, by giving the most basic sense possible of what it means to “exist” as a conscious being. Rocks do not exist in the same sense we do. Since the seventeenth century, the infinitive was nominalized as (das) Dasein originally in the sense of some “presence,” and since the eighteenth century it started to be used as an alternative to the Latinate existenz (the existence of God or of life). Dasein is essentially temporal, and this characteristic is derived from its tripartite ontological structure: existence, thrownness, and fallenness.
36. “Thrownness” refers to the fact that Dasein always finds itself already in a certain spiritual and material, historically conditioned environment, thus, in the world, in which the space of possibilities is always historically limited. It represents the phenomenon of the past as having-been. Dasein’s “fallenness” characterizes its existence in the midst of beings that are both Dasein and not Dasein. “Existence” means that Dasein is potentiality-forbeing, Seinkönnen; it projects its being upon various possibilities, especially the phenomenon of the future.
37. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 23.
38. Heidegger, Being and Time, 3.
39. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 86.
40. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, 34.
41. Heidegger, Being and Time, 3.
42. This is the passage from Being and Time where Heidegger explains the significance of the ontological difference: “The distinction between the being of existing Dasein and the being of beings unlike Dasein (for example, reality) may seem to be illuminating, but it is only the point of departure for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy can rest and be satisfied” (397). It is interesting to note a testimony by Gadamer that shows how the ontological difference is not something that can really be neglected, because it is always happening: “I still recall,” says Gadamer, “quite clearly how, in Marburg, the young Heidegger developed this concept of the ‘ontological difference’ in the sense of the difference between being and beings, between ousia and on. One day, as Gerhard Krüger and I accompanied Heidegger home, one of the two of us raised the question of what, then, the significance of this ontological distinction was, how and when one must make this distinction. I will never forget Heidegger’s answer: Make? Is the ontological difference something that must be made? That is a misunderstanding. This difference is not something introduced by the philosopher’s thinking so as to distinguish between being and beings” (H.-G. Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy, trans. R. Coltman [New York: Continuum, 2001], 123).
43. Heidegger, Being and Time, 16.
44. Ibid., 10.
45. Ibid., 18.
46. M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 143.
47. Heidegger, Being and Time, 352.
48. M. Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (1930), trans. T. Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 198.
49. M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 352.
50. Heidegger, Being and Time, 39.
51. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 98.
52. Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 37.
53. This is the passage in Being and Time: “Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analysis of existence, has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and to which it returns” (34).
54. M. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” in Pathmarks (1967), ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002), 261.
55. In the essay “Time and Being,” Heidegger justifies this by saying that “the only possible way to anticipate the latter thought on the destiny of Being from the perspective of Being and Time is to think through what was presented in Being and Time about the dismantling [which is another word for destroying] of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings” (Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, 6).
56. Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 38.
57. M. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, trans. G. E. Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 51–52.
58. Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 37.
59. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 241.
60. Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 42.
61. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 239.
62. Ibid., 251.
63. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, 97.
64. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 60.
65. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? 137.
66. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” 90.
67. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 250.
68. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” 91.
69. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, 24.
70. Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, includes “Metaphysics as History of Being,” “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,” “Recollection in Metaphysics” (all three included now in volume 2 of Heidegger’s Nietzsche), and “Overcoming Metaphysics” (from Heidegger’s Vorträge und Aufsätze).
71. Heidegger, introduction to The End of Philosophy, xiii.
72. M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 48.
73. Ibid., 50.
74. Ibid., 52.
75. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 51.
76. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, 85.
77. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 239.
78. Heidegger, Being and Time, 211.
79. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” 6.
80. Ibid., 9.
81. Ibid., 19.
82. Ibid., 21.
83. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 52.
84. Ibid.
85. Heidegger, Being and Time, xvii.
86. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 35. As I write in the introduction, note 8, I have made a small change to the translation of this question.
87. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 38. Heidegger is quoting Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, §4, “‘Reasons’ in Philosophy.”
88. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 41.
89. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 52.
90. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 77.
91. Note that in all the Heideggerian secondary literature I have studied, only Steiner (in Martin Heidegger, 40) and Derrida (in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question [1987] and “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy Before Linguistics” [1971], included in his Margins of Philosophy) have emphasized the significance of this prior question. Marrati has recently also analyzed this question in relation to the problem of the origin in Heidegger (in Genesis and Trace, 109–139).
92. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 216.
93. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 52.
94. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 219.
95. Ibid., 44.
96. Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 239.
97. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, 30.
98. Contrary to Descartes’ and Husserl’s cognitive and theoretical traditional attitude toward the world, it is “care” that is Dasein’s essential attitude and that determines its relation to the world. “Factical Dasein exists as born, and, born, it is already dying in the sense of being-toward-death. Both ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are as long as Dasein factically exists, and they are in the sole way possible on the basis of the Being of Dasein as care” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 343).
99. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 144.
100. Ibid., 97.
101. Ibid., 90.
102. Ibid., 86.
2. AFTER THE DESTRUCTION:
THE REMAINS OF BEING
1. See O. Pöggeler, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans. J. Baliff (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1998); R. P. Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); and G. Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, trans. D. Webb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
2. Although Heidegger criticized such truth theory in several courses, it is in Being and Time that his criticism is first brought forward in relation to the statement “truth by no means has the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a correspondence of one Being (subject) to another (object)” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 201).
3. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 90.
4. M. Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. J. Young and K. Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 37.
5. This “turn” is supposed to indicate a certain shift within Heidegger’s philosophy, from understanding being from the standpoint of Dasein to an understanding of being from the standpoint of being itself. I do not believe such a change actually occurred, and I am convinced that it is clear that even the early Heidegger understood Dasein only from the standpoint of being itself.
6. M. Heidegger, “Anaximander’s Saying,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. J. Young and K. Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 275.
7. Ibid.
8. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, 3.
9. Heidegger, “Anaximander’s Saying,” 275.
10. Derrida, Paper Machine, 151–152.
11. Ibid., 152.
12. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, 91.
13. Just as the first chapter did not pretend to be a faithful interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy, neither does this second chapter pretend to introduce these authors’ thought. A clear and complete introduction to these philosophers may be found in the following texts: On Schürmann, the essays by R. Bernasconi, D. Janicaud, J. Sallis, R. Gasché, M. Harr, and others, in “Memory of Reiner Schürmann,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19–20, no. 2 (1981) and no. 1 (1997); and A. Martinengo, Introduzione a Reiner Schürmann (Rome: Meltemi, 2008). On Derrida: B. Stocker, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2006); and N. Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). On Nancy: I. James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006). On Gadamer: J. Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003). On Tugendhat: S. Zabala, The Hermeneutic Nature of Analytic Philosophy: A Study of Ernst Tugendhat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). On Vattimo: M. Frascati-Lochhead, Kenosis and Feminist Theology: The Challenge of Gianni Vattimo (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1998); G. Giorgio, Il pensiero di Gianni Vattimo. L’emancipazione dalla metafisica tra dialettica ed ermeneutica (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006); and the essays by U. Eco, R. Rorty, C. Taylor, J. Miles, C. Dotolo, and others in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. S. Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
14. R. Schürmann, “Deconstruction Is Not Enough: On Gianni Vattimo’s Call for ‘Weak Thinking,’” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 10 (1984): 173.
15. R. Schürmann, On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, trans. C.-M. Gros (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 10.
16. R. Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundations of Practical Philosophy,” in Phenomenology Dialogues and Bridges, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982), 12.
17. Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundations of Practical Philosophy,” 12.
18. R. Schürmann, “Deconstruction Is Not Enough,” 172.
19. Ibid., 173.
20. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 41.
21. Ibid., 301. Schürmann’s main point is not only to show that thinking means remembering, recalling the birth of an epoch and the sequence of ancestors that established its filiations, but to point out that when a historical world falls in place, another epoch takes over with a new dwelling. This new dwelling, or arrangement, produces a new nomos of our oikos, a new “economy,” which can best be recalled as an economic thinking. He illustrates what “economic thinking” is in this significant passage: “The Parthenon: within the network of actions, things, and words, the way an entity like the Acropolis is present epochally assumed a well-defined, although complex character—when rhapsodes prepared for the Panathenean festival, when the Parthenon served as a Byzantine church, when the Turks used it as a powder magazine. Today, when it has become a commodity for tourist consumption and when UNESCO plans to protect it from pollution with a plastic dome, it is present in an epochal economy in yet another fashion—a mode of presence certainly inconceivable for its architect, Ichtynos. At each moment of this history, the edifice was present according to finite, unforeseeable, uncontrollable traits. And each entailed the irremediable disappearance of such an epochal physiognomy” (Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 57).
22. Ibid., 49.
23. Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundations of Practical Philosophy,” 13.
24. Ibid., 18.
25. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 145.
26. Ibid., 50.
27. Ibid., 295.
28. Ibid., 273.
29. Ibid., 228.
30. Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundations of Practical Philosophy,” 16.
31. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 150.
32. Ibid., 25.
33. Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundations of Practical Philosophy,” 18.
34. Ibid., 19.
35. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 149.
36. Broken Hegemonies is the title of Schürmann’s 1996 book.
37. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 286.
38. Ibid., 284.
39. Ibid., 297.
40. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 12.
41. J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 177.
42. Ibid., 125.
43. Derrida, Points, 374.
44. Ibid., 145.
45. Ibid., 149.
46. Ibid., 211.
47. Derrida, Positions, 9.
48. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 66–67.
49. Ibid., 66.
50. Ibid., 24.
51. Ibid.
52. M. Heidegger, “Anaximander’s Saying” (1946), in Off the Beaten Track, trans. J. Young and K. Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 278.
53. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 25–26.
54. Derrida, Paper Machine, 159.
55. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 22.
56. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 3.
57. Ibid., 22.
58. Ibid., 5.
59. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 62–63.
60. Derrida, Positions, 26.
61. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 11.
62. Derrida, Points, 208.
63. Derrida explained that “the words I had somewhat privileged up till now, such as trace, writing, gramme, turned out to be better named by ‘cinder’ for the following reason: Ashes or cinders are obviously traces—in general, the first figure of the trace one thinks of is that of the step, along a path, the step that leaves a footprint, a trace, or a vestige; but ‘cinder’ renders better what I meant to say with the name of trace, namely, something that remains without remaining, which is neither present nor absent, which destroys itself, which is totally consumed, which is a remainder without remainder” (Derrida, Points, 208).
64. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 5, 6.
65. J.-L. Nancy, The Birth to Presence, trans. B. McDonald (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 84.
66. J.-L. Nancy, A Finite Thinking, ed. S. Sparks (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 101.
67. Ibid., 10.
68. Ibid., 87.
69. J.-L. Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” in Religion and Media, ed. H. de Vries and S. Weber (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 121.
70. Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 87.
71. Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” 122.
72. Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 4, 5.
73. Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 13.
74. J.-L. Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. J. S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 35. Note that Nancy entitled an essay for the catalogue of the Italian artist Claudio Parmiggiani “What Remains of an Eternal and Fragile Art” (“Ciò che resta di un’arte eterna e fragile,” in Galleria d’Arte Moderna, Bologna. 23 gennaio–30 marzo 2003, by Claudio Parmiggiani, ed. Peter Weiermair [Milan: Silvana editoriale, 2003], 151–160).
75. Nancy, The Sense of the World, 132.
76. Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 185.
77. Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 38.
78. This is the title of an essay by Nancy included in The Birth to Presence.
79. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. R. D. Richardson (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 27.
80. Being is a participle or noun, “singular” and “plural” are nouns or adjectives, and all can be rearranged in different combinations.
81. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 37.
82. Ibid., 32.
83. Ibid., 62–63.
84. Ibid., 83.
85. Ibid., 26.
86. Ibid., 46–47.
87. Ibid., 2.
88. Nancy, The Sense of the World, 28.
89. Nancy has analyzed community in The Inoperative Community, ed. P. Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
90. Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 268.
91. Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 166.
92. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 85.
93. H-G. Gadamer, Das Erbe Europas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 166–173.
94. H-G. Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary, ed. Richard Palmer (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 56.
95. H-G. Gadamer, The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. L. E. Hahn (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1997), 22.
96. H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), 470.
97. H-G. Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, ed. J. Grondin, trans. R. E. Palmer (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 371.
98. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 248.
99. Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 365.
100. Gadamer, The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 171.
101. Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 382.
102. H-G. Gadamer, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed. D. P. Michelfelder and R. E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 100.
103. Ibid., 117.
104. Having said this, although most translators have translated “Gespräch” as “conversation,” in the few places where it has been translated as dialogue, I will change it to “conversation” in quotation marks in this book.
105. Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 371.
106. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 443.
107. Ibid., 449.
108. Ibid., 391.
109. Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation, 51.
110. H-G. Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo Dottori, trans. R. Coltman with S. Koepke (New York: Continuum, 2004), 77.
111. Gadamer, “Reply to Stanley Rosen,” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 221.
112. H-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. D. E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 9.
113. Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 384.
114. Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey,” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 30.
115. Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation, 68.
116. Gadamer, Dialogue and Deconstruction, 95.
117. Ibid., 118.
118. Ibid., 122.
119. H-G. Gadamer, “Die Stellung der Philosophie in der Gesellschaft,” in Hermeneutik im Rückblick (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 369.
120. E. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, trans. P. A. Gorner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
121. Ibid., 74.
122. Ibid., 63.
123. Ibid., 4.
124. Ibid., 8.
125. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 30.
126. E. Tugendhat, preface to the Italian edition of Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language (Genova: Marietti, 1989), 4.
127. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 31.
128. Ibid.
129. E. Tugendhat, “The Dissolution of Ontology Into Formal Semantics,” in The Hermeneutic Nature of Analytic Philosophy: A Study of Ernst Tugendhat, by S. Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 98.
130. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 33.
131. Tugendhat, “The Dissolution of Ontology Into Formal Semantics,” 105.
132. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 63.
133. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 144.
134. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 107.
135. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 149.
136. Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, 82–96.
137. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 150.
138. Tugendhat, “Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis,” in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. F. Elliston and P. McCormick (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 332.
139. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 29.
140. Ibid., 63.
141. The function of a singular term is to pick out one thing from a plurality as what is meant, that is, “as that to which the predicate is supposed to apply” (Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, 239).
142. E. Tugendhat, “Language Analysis and the Critique of Ontology,” trans. J. S. Fulton and K. Kolenda, in Contemporary German Philosophy, ed. D. E. Christensen (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), 2:110–111.
143. Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, 3–4.
144. Although this is Vattimo’s response, I should point out Vattimo has also once used the expression “residues” by stating that “what becomes truly human is the tending to what has been, to the residues, to the traces of the lived” (G. Vattimo, “Bottle, Net, Truth, Revolution,” Denver Quarterly 16 [1982]: 26). Also, C. Dotolo in his book on Vattimo notes in the Italian master’s “nihilistic hermeneutics the possibility to turn to the surviving residues” (C. Dotolo, La teologia fondamentale davanti alle sfide del “pensiero deboole di G. Vattimo” [Rome: LAS, 1999], 393).
145. G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. J. R. Snyder (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 86.
146. G. Vattimo, “Weak Thought and the Reduction of Violence: A Dialogue with Gianni Vattimo by S. Zabala,” Common Knowledge 3 (2002): 463.
147. G. Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy After Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans. C. P. Blamires and T. Harrison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 5.
148. G. Vattimo, “Foreword,” in Zabala, The Hermeneutic Nature of Analytical Philosophy, xvi.
149. G. Vattimo, foreword to F. D’Agostini, Analitici e continentali. Guida alla filosofia degli ultimi trent’anni (Milan: Cortina, 1997), xv.
150. G. Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 10 (1984): 151.
151. Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 149.
152. G. Vattimo, “Difference and Interference: On the Reduction of Hermeneutics to Anthropology,” Res 4 (1982): 87.
153. Ibid., 88.
154. Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought,” 156.
155. Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 156.
156. Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, xxv–xxvi.
157. Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 121.
158. Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 150.
159. Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 105.
160. Ibid., 110–111.
3. GENERATING BEING THROUGH INTERPRETATION:
THE HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY OF REMNANTS
1. Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 14.
2. M. Heidegger, Heraclitus Seminar, trans. C. H. Seibert (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 17.
3. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, xx.
4. Bruns, Hermeneutics: Ancient and Modern, 61.
5. In Hermeneutics: Ancient and Modern.
6. Plato Symposium 207c–208a.
7. G. Vattimo, “Nietzsche and Heidegger,” Stanford Italian Review 6 (1986): 28–29.
8. Derrida, Positions, 27.
9. G. Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. L. D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 67.
10. Ibid., 67–68.
11. Ibid., 68.
12. Heidegger, Pathmarks, 217.
13. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 73.
14. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 176.
15. Ibid.
16. Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought,” 152.
17. Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” 67.
18. Ibid., 70.
19. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 336.
20. Derrida, Paper Machine, 134.
21. Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 22.
22. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 49.
23. Heidegger, Being and Time, 20.
24. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 44.
25. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 288.
26. M. Luther, Dr. Martin Luthers Tischreden (1531–46) (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1914), 3:170.
27. R. Rorty and G. Vattimo, The Future of Religion, ed. Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 61.
28. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, 57.
29. M. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 66.
30. J. Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations,” in Philosophy in France Today, ed. A. Montefiore, trans. K. McLaughlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 45.
31. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, 31.
32. Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? 71.
33. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 51.
34. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 48.
35. Heidegger, Being and Time, 141.
36. G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 60.
37. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, 31.
38. J. Grondin, Sources of Hermeneutics (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1995), 1.
39. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? 80.
40. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 252.