This part of the current work is a translation of nine excerpts from three of the four extant books of Epictetus’s Discourses. These books in total comprise almost one hundred items ranging in length from about twenty pages of a modern volume to less than a single page. The longest item, from which I have taken the passages numbered 3 and 4, is entitled simply On Freedom. Arrian or a later editor applied this title. Apt though it is, the topic of freedom is ubiquitous throughout the Discourses just as it is in the Encheiridion. I have supplied the titles to each of these excerpts, to indicate Epictetus’s multipronged treatment of his favorite theme.
In making this selection, I have had two principal goals: first, to supplement the Encheiridion with additional philosophical content, and second to give readers a taste of Epictetus’s dialogical style. To savor Epictetus in depth, the Discourses are indispensable, but Arrian did an equally fine job in extracting from them the compendious guidance of the Encheiridion. As the little classic that it is, you can take it everywhere, and if you are like me, you will find its abrasive message provocative, invigorating, and even comforting.
1 Learning to Desire Each
Thing as It Happens
The person who is getting an education ought to approach this process with the following aim:
How can I follow the gods in everything, how can I be content with the divine administration, and how can I become free?
Well, you are free if nothing happens that conflicts with your will and if no one is able to obstruct you.
What does that mean? Are you telling me that freedom is madness?
No, of course not. Freedom and madness don’t go together.
But I want my every wish to come to pass, however crazy that may seem.
You really are mad, you are raving. Don’t you know that *freedom is something fine and wonderful? To be so happy-go-lucky in one’s wishes as to want every whim fulfilled is tantamount to being the reverse of fine—utterly shameful in fact. Think how we proceed in the case of the alphabet. Do I want to write the name “Dio” in whatever way I like? No, I am taught to like it the way it should be written. How is it in music? Just the same, and so it is quite generally wherever some skill or expertise is involved. Otherwise, if knowledge were adjusted to everyone’s individual whims, there would be no point in learning anything.
Is it only here, then, in the case of the greatest and most important thing, freedom, that I am allowed to be happy-go-lucky in my wishes?
Not here, least of all! Because education is precisely learning to want all individual things to happen just as they do happen. And how do they happen? In the way that the one who has arranged them has arranged. He has arranged for there to be summer and winter, plenty and dearth, virtue and vice, and all such opposites on behalf of the harmony of the universe. And he has given each of us a body and bodily parts and property and fellow human beings.
Mindful thereafter of this arrangement, we should proceed to education not in order to change the conditions (for this is not granted to us nor would it be better) but in order that, with things about us as they are and as their nature is, we may keep our minds in harmony with what happens. Tell me then.
Is it possible to escape from people?
How could that happen?
But is it possible to change them by being in their company?
Who gives us that option?
What else is there, then, and what resource can we find for dealing with them?
The sort of resource, whereby they will do what seems good to them, but we shall just as surely be in harmony with nature. Yet you are unhappy and discontented. If you are alone, you call it isolation, but if you are in company, you call people schemers and robbers. You even find fault with your parents and children and brothers and neighbors. But when you are alone, you should call it peace and freedom and liken yourself to the gods. And when you are in a group, you should not call it a crowd and a mob and an unpleasantness, but a party and a festival, and so accept everything cheerfully.
What, then, is the punishment for those who don’t accept?
To be just as they are.
A man doesn’t like being alone.
Let him be in isolation.
He doesn’t like his parents.
Let him be a bad son and moan.
Let him be a bad father.
Throw him in jail!
What jail? You mean where he is now. For he is there against his will, and wherever someone is against his will, there he is in jail. That’s how Socrates was not in jail because he was there willingly.
2 Freedom from Emotional Distress
What is the fruit of these [Stoic] doctrines?
The very thing that has to be the finest and most fitting outcome for people who are getting a real education—tranquility, fearlessness, and freedom. For on these matters we should not trust the many people who say that education is only available to the free, but rather the philosophers who say that only the educated are free.
Well, ask yourself about freedom in this time of ours; doesn’t it consist simply in the power to live as we wish?
Absolutely.
Tell me then, you people, do you wish to live in error?
We do not.
That’s right; no one is free who is in error. Do you wish to live in fear and sorrow and disturbance?
Certainly not.
So, no one who is fearful or sorrowful or disturbed is free, but the person who is relieved of sorrows and fears and disturbances is relieved of enslavement by the very same process.
Do you think freedom is something great and noble and valuable?
Is it possible to be submissive if you obtain such a great and valuable and noble thing?
It is not.
So whenever you see someone groveling to another person or flattering him insincerely, you can confidently say that this man also is not free, and not only if he is doing it for the sake of a meager meal but even if he is hoping for a governorship or a consulship. Call people who act like this for small things petty slaves, and call the others, as they deserve, slaves on the grand scale.
You are right again.
Do you think freedom is something in one’s own power and self-determined?
Of course.
You can confidently say, then, that no man is free if someone else has the power to obstruct and compel him. And don’t consider his family tree, or investigate whether he was ever bought or sold, but if you hear him say, “Yes sir,” within himself and with feeling, call him a slave even if he is preceded by a consular retinue. And if you hear him say, “Poor me, what things I suffer,” call him a slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, and unhappy, call him a slave in official dress. If, however, he does none of these things, don’t call him free yet but examine his judgments to see whether they are in any way subject to compulsion or obstruction or unhappiness, and if you find him to be of that sort, call him a slave on vacation at the *Saturnalia, and say that his master is away. Soon he will come back, and then you will learn the nature of this man’s sufferings.
Who will come back?
Everyone who has authority over anything that the man wants, either to get it for him or to take it away from him.
Do we have so many masters then?
Oh yes! Prior to people we have masters in the form of circumstances, and there are lots of those. For this reason, then, everyone with authority over any of our circumstances is bound to be our master. Caesar himself, you see, is not what people fear; they fear death, exile, confiscation of property, prison, loss of citizenship. In the same way, no one loves Caesar himself, unless he happens to be an outstanding person; what we love are wealth and high position in government or military service. Whenever these are the things that we love and hate and fear, it must be the case that those who have authority over them are our masters.
4 Freedom to Assent without Impediment
Is it possible for someone who desires any of the things that are up to others to be unimpeded?
It is not.
Is it possible for them to be unconstrained?
It is not.
Therefore they cannot be free, either. So think: do we have nothing that is exclusively up to us, or is everything like that, or are some things up to us and some things up to others?
How do you mean?
When you want your body to be completely sound, is it up to you, or is it not?
It is not up to me.
And when you want it to be in good health?
Not that either.
And when you want it to be handsome?
No again.
And when you want to live or to die?
Not that either.
Therefore, your body is not your own property. It is dependent on everything that is stronger than itself.
Granted.
And is it up to you to have land whenever you want, for as long as you want, in the condition that you want?
It is not.
And likewise in the case of slaves, clothes, house, and horses?
None of these either.
And if more than anything you want your children to stay alive or your wife or your brother or your friends, are these things just up to you?
They are not.
Have you, then, nothing that is self-determined, that is up to yourself exclusively, or do you have such a thing?
I don’t know.
Well, look at it like this and think about it. Can anyone make you assent to something untrue?
No one can.
Therefore, in the domain of assent you are unimpeded and unconstrained.
Granted.
Let’s continue: can someone compel you to have a motivation for something you do not want?
They can: whenever they threaten me with death or with fetters, they compel me to have such a motivation.
Suppose, though, that you disdain dying and being fettered; are you still going to pay attention to them?
I am not.
Is disdaining death your own function, then, or does it not belong to you?
It is mine.
So being motivated is also your own function, or is it not?
I grant that it is.
And repulsion from something? That is also yours.
What if I am motivated to take a walk and another person impedes me.
What part of you will they impede? Surely not your assent?
No, but my poor body.
Yes, as they would impede a stone.
Let that be so, but the fact is that I don’t continue with my walk.
And who told you, “It is your function to walk unimpeded”? What I have been telling you is that the only unimpeded thing is the motivation. Wherever there is a need for the body and the body’s cooperation, you have heard long ago that none of it is your own.
I grant that as well.
Can anyone compel you to desire something that you don’t want?
No one can.
Can anyone exert compulsion over your intentions and projects, or to speak quite generally, can anyone manipulate the way you deal with the impressions you experience?
Not that either; but when I do desire something, they will stop me from getting what I desire.
But how will they stop you if you desire one of the things that are your own and not liable to impediment?
In no way at all.
So who is telling you that you can be free from impediment if you desire things that are not your own?
Am I not to desire health, then?
Certainly not, and nothing else that is not your own, because nothing is your own that is not up to you to procure or to secure whenever you want. Keep your hands right off it, but first and foremost keep your desire well away. Otherwise, you are giving yourself up to slavery and submitting your neck to the yoke, if ever you admire what is not your own and feel strongly for things that are dependent on others and are perishable.
Isn’t my hand my own?
It is a part of you, but by nature it is clay, subject to impediment and compulsion, a slave to everything that is stronger. And why do I mention your hand to you? You should treat your entire body like a little overloaded donkey, just as long as that is possible and allowed to you. But if it is pressed into public service and a soldier seizes it, let it go and don’t resist or grumble. If you do, you will get a beating and lose your little donkey just the same. Since this is the attitude you need to have to the body, consider what you need to do about the rest of the things that one gets for the sake of the body. Since the body is a little donkey, everything else becomes bridles, saddles, shoes, barley, and hay for the donkey. Let them go too. Dismiss them more quickly and more easily than the donkey itself.
Everything everywhere is perishable and vulnerable. If you get attached to some of them even a little, you are bound to be troubled and discouraged, a prey to anxiety and distress. You will have desires that are unfulfilled and aversions that are fully realized. Are we not willing, therefore, to secure the only safety that has been granted to us—to give up the perishable and slavish things, and work on those that are imperishable and naturally free? Don’t we recall that no one does injury or benefit to another, but that the cause of each of these things is a judgment. This is what does harm and wreckage, it is this that is battle, this that is strife, and this that is war.
What made *Eteocles and Polyneices the mortal foes that they were was simply this—their judgment concerning kingship and their judgment concerning exile. They judged the latter to be the worst of bad things and the former to be the greatest of goods. This is everyone’s nature, to pursue the good and avoid the bad, and to regard a person who deprives us of the one and inflicts us with the other as an enemy and a schemer, even if he is a brother or a son or a father; for nothing is more closely related to us than the good.
So if these things are good and bad, no father is dear to his sons, and no brother is dear to his brother, but everything is full of enemies, plotters, and informers. But if the right will is the only good thing and the wrong will the only bad thing, what place is left for battle, what place for abuse? About what things? About things that are nothing to us? Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unfortunate, against people who have been deceived about what matters most?
Look, my friend, you have a will that is by nature unimpeded and unconstrained. . . . I will prove it you, first, in the area of assent. Can anyone prevent you from assenting to a truth?
No one can.
Can anyone compel you to accept a falsehood?
No one can.
Do you see that in this area you have a will that is unimpeded, unconstrained, unhindered? Come now, is it different in the area of desire and motivation? What can overcome a motivation except another motivation? What can overcome a desire or an aversion except another desire or aversion?
Yet if someone threatens me with the fear of death, they do compel me.
What compels you is not the threat but your decision that it is better to do something else rather than die. Once again, then, it is your judgment that compelled you; in other words, will compelled will. For if God, in taking from himself his own special part, which he has given to us, had constructed it to be impeded or constrained by himself or by something else, he would no longer be God or be caring for us as he should. If you so will it, you are free; if you so will it, you will blame no one, accuse no one, and everything will be in accord both with your own judgment and with God’s.
7 Making Correct Use of Impressions
We are endowed with many attributes that are uniquely requisite for rational creatures, but, as you will find, we also share many faculties with the animals that lack ability to reason.
Do they too pay attention to what happens?
By no means. “Using” and “paying attention” are quite different from one another. God needed the other animals as creatures that make use of their impressions, but he needed us as creatures who pay attention to how we use them. Therefore, it is sufficient for them to eat and drink and rest and copulate, and do everything else that each kind of animal does. For us, on the other hand, to whom God has also given the *power of paying attention, these animal activities are no longer sufficient, but unless we act appropriately and methodically and in harmony with our individual nature and constitution, we shall no longer attain our own ends.
Beings that have different constitutions also have different functions and ends. In those whose constitution is designed for use alone, use of that constitution is quite sufficient. But those who have the additional power of paying attention will never attain their ends unless they exercise this faculty properly.
What, then, is the consequence?
God constituted each of the other animals, either to be eaten, or to serve in farming, or to produce cheese, or for some other comparable use. To perform these functions, what need do they have of the power to pay attention to impressions and to discriminate between them? But God introduced human beings to be students of himself and his works, and not merely students but also interpreters of these things. It is wrong, therefore, for us to begin and end where the nonrational animals do; we should rather begin where they do but end where nature has ended in our case. Nature ended at studying and paying attention to things and a way of life in harmony with itself. See to it, then, that you do not die without having studied these things.
All the other creatures have been left without the ability to pay attention to the world’s divine government. Rational animals, however, have resources for reasoning about all these things, and to conclude that they themselves are a part of the world, a part of a particular kind, and also that it is right for the parts to give way to the whole. Furthermore, since it is their nature to be noble, high-minded, and free, they see that they are positioned in a world where some things are unimpeded and up to them, while other things are liable to impediment and up to others. Things of the first kind belong to the sphere of the will, while those that are outside it are liable to impediment. Accordingly, if rational animals restrict their own good and interest to the former kind alone—the things that are unimpeded and up to themselves—they will be free, contented, happy, unharmed, high-minded, reverent, grateful to God for all things, never finding fault with anything that has happened, or blaming anyone. If, on the other hand, they identity their good and interest with things that are external and outside the sphere of the will, they are bound to be impeded and frustrated, subservient to those who have authority over the things that they have admired and fear; they are also bound to be utterly irreverent, since they think that God has a grudge against them, and to be unfair, since they always grab more for themselves; and they are bound to lack self-respect and generosity.
If you understand these truths, what is to stop you from living in a free and easy way, calmly accepting everything that can happen and putting up with what has already taken place? “Do you want me to be poor?” Bring it on, and you will learn what poverty is when a good actor plays that part. “Do you want me to hold office?” Bring it on. “Do you want me to leave office?” Bring that on too. “Do you want me to endure pains?” Bring them on as well. “And exile?” Wherever I go, I will be fine, because I was already fine here—not on account of the place but as a result of my principles, and I am going to take them with me. No one can take them away from me; they are my only possessions, irremovable ones that are enough for me wherever I am and whatever I do.
“But it’s now time for you to die.”
Why do you say “to die”? Don’t make it into a tragic business. Tell it as it is – “It’s now time for the material you are made of to *return to the source it first came from.” What’s terrible about that? What is the world about to lose of its contents, what strange and unheard of thing is going to happen? Is it for this that the tyrant makes us afraid? Is this why the swords of the guards seem long and sharp? Let others worry about that. Having looked into it all, I find that no one has authority over me. I have been liberated by God, I have gotten to know his commands, no one has power any longer to enslave me, I have the right kind of emancipator and the right kind of judges.”
Study the powers that you have, and then say: “Bring on now, O Zeus, whatever circumstance you like; for I have the equipment and resources, bestowed on me by yourself, to distinguish myself by means of the things that come to pass.” No! You sit trembling for fear of what may happen, weeping, wailing, and groaning over what actually is happening, and then you put the blame on the gods; for the feebleness that you display amounts to nothing short of impiety. Yet God has not only given us these powers as the means for us to bear everything that happens without being humiliated and crushed by them, he has also, like a good king and a true father, given them without impediment or constraint or hindrance. He has made them entirely up to us, without reserving even for himself any power to impede or hinder. Since you have these powers free and entirely your own, why don’t you put them to use and take cognizance of what gifts you have received and from what donor you have received them instead of sitting grief-stricken and groaning?
ὁ δὲ παιδευόμενος ταύτην ὀϕείλει τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔχων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, “πῶς ἂν ἑποίμην ἐγὼ ἐν παντὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πῶς ἂν εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ πῶς ἂν γενοίμην ἐλεύθερος;” ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται κωλῦσαι. τί οὖν; ἀπόνοιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐλευθερία; μὴ γένοιτο. μανία γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἔρχεται. “ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ θέλω πᾶν τὸ δοκοῦν μοι ἀποβαίνειν, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν δοκῇ.” μαινόμενος εἶ, παραϕρονεῖς. οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καλόν τι ἐλευθερία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀξιόλογον; τὸ δ’ ὡς ἔτυχέν με βούλεσθαι τὰ ὡς ἔτυχεν δόξαντα γίνεσθαι, τοῦτο κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον οὐκ εἶναι καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων αἴσχιστον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ γραμματικῶν ποιοῦμεν; βούλομαι γράϕειν ὡς θέλω τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα; οὔ· ἀλλὰ διδάσκομαι θέλειν, ὡς δεῖ γράϕεσθαι. τί ἐπὶ μουσικῶν; ὡσαύτως. τί ἐν τῷ καθόλου, ὅπου τέχνη τις ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν; εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδενὸς ἦν ἄξιον τὸ ἐπίστασθαί τι, εἰ ταῖς ἑκάστων βουλήσεσι προσηρμόζετο. ἐνταῦθα οὖν μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου, τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐϕεῖταί μοι θέλειν; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι τοῦτ’ ἔστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται. πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων. διέταξε δὲ θέρος εἶναι καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ ϕορὰν καὶ ἀϕορίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἐναντιότητας ὑπὲρ συμϕωνίας τῶν ὅλων ἡμῶν θ’ ἑκάστῳ σῶμα καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἔδωκεν.
Ταύτης οὖν τῆς διατάξεως μεμνημένους ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἵν’ ἀλλάξωμεν τὰς ὑποθέσεις (οὔτε γὰρ δίδοται ἡμῖν οὔτ’ ἄμεινον), ἀλλ’ ἵνα οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔχει καὶ πέϕυκεν αὐτοὶ τὴν γνώμην τὴν αὑτῶν συνηρμοσμένην τοῖς γινομένοις ἔχωμεν. τί γάρ; ἐνδέχεται ϕυγεῖν ἀνθρώπους; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ἀλλὰ συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους ἀλλάξαι; καὶ τίς ἡμῖν δίδωσιν; τί οὖν ἀπολείπεται ἢ τίς εὑρίσκεται μηχανὴ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν; τοιαύτη, δι’ ἧς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ποιήσουσι τὰ ϕαινόμενα αὐτοῖς, ἡμεῖς δ’ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατὰ ϕύσιν ἕξομεν. σὺ δ’ ἀταλαίπωρος εἶ καὶ δυσάρεστος κἂν μὲν μόνος ᾖς, ἐρημίαν καλεῖς τοῦτο, ἂν δὲ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιβούλους λέγεις καὶ λῃστάς, μέμϕῃ δὲ καὶ γονεῖς τοὺς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τέκνα καὶ ἀδελϕοὺς καὶ γείτονας. ἔδει δὲ μόνον μένοντα ἡσυχίαν καλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ὅμοιον τοῖς θεοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι αὑτόν, μετὰ πολλῶν δ’ ὄντα μὴ ὄχλον καλεῖν μηδὲ θόρυβον μηδ’ ἀηδίαν, ἀλλ’ ἑορτὴν καὶ πανήγυριν καὶ οὕτως πάντα εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι.
Τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὐ προσδεχομένοις; τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἔχουσιν. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τῷ μόνος εἶναι; ἔστω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τοῖς γονεῦσιν; ἔστω κακὸς υἱὸς καὶ πενθείτω. δυσαρεστεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις; ἔστω κακὸς πατήρ. “βάλε αὐτὸν εἰς ϕυλακήν.” ποίαν ϕυλακήν; ὅπου νῦν ἐστιν. ἄκων γάρ ἐστιν· ὅπου δέ τις ἄκων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο ϕυλακὴ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. καθὸ καὶ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἦν ἐν ϕυλακῇ, ἑκὼν γὰρ ἦν.
Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καρπός; ὅνπερ δεῖ κάλλιστόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ πρεπωδέστατον τοῖς τῷ ὄντι παιδευομένοις, ἀταραξία ἀϕοβία ἐλευθερία. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ τούτων πιστευτέον, οἳ λέγουσιν μόνοις ἐξεῖναι παιδεύεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ϕιλοσόϕοις μᾶλλον͵ οἳ λέγουσι μόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι.—Πῶς τοῦτο;—Οὕτως· νῦν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόμεθα διεξάγειν; “οὐδέν.” λέγετε δή μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; “οὐ βουλόμεθα.” οὐδεὶς τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. βούλεσθε ζῆν ϕοβούμενοι, βούλεσθε λυπούμενοι, βούλεσθε ταρασσόμενοι; “οὐδαμῶς.” οὐδεὶς ἄρα οὔτε ϕοβούμενος οὔτε λυπούμενος οὔτε ταρασσόμενος ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅστις δ’ ἀπήλλακται λυπῶν καὶ ϕόβων καὶ ταραχῶν, οὗτος τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδῷ καὶ τοῦ δουλєύєιν ἀπήλλακται.
Δοκεῖ σοι μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ γενναῖον ἡ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀξιόλογον ;—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;—Ἔστιν οὖν τυγχάνοντά τινος οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ ἀξιολόγου καὶ γενναίου ταπεινὸν εἶναι ;—Οὐκ ἔστιν.—Ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὑποπεπτωκότα ἑτέρῳ ἢ κολακεύοντα παρὰ τὸ ϕαινόμενον αὐτῷ, λέγε καὶ τοῦτον θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον· καὶ μὴ μόνον, ἂν δειπναρίου ἕνεκα αὐτὸ ποιῇ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπαρχίας ἕνεκα κἂν ὑπατείας. ἀλλ’ ἐκείνους μὲν μικροδούλους λέγε τοὺς μικρῶν τινῶν ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, τούτους δ’, ὡς εἰσὶν ἄξιοι, μεγαλοδούλους.—Ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα.—Δοκεῖ δέ σοι ἡ ἐλευθερία αὐτεξούσιόν τι εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομον ;—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;—Ὅντινα οὖν ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ κωλῦσαι ἔστι καὶ ἀναγκάσαι, θαρρῶν λέγε μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον. καὶ μή μοι πάππους αὐτοῦ καὶ προπάππους βλέπε καὶ ὠνὴν ζήτει καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐκ πάθους “κύριε,” κἂν δώδεκα ῥάβδοι προάγωσιν, λέγε δοῦλον· κἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος “τάλας ἐγώ, οἷα πάσχω,” λέγε δοῦλον· ἂν ἁπλῶς ἀποκλαιόμενον ἴδῃς, μεμϕόμενον, δυσροοῦντα, λέγε δοῦλον περιπόρϕυρον ἔχοντα. ἂν οὖν μηδὲν τούτων ποιῇ, μήπω εἴπῃς ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ κατάμαθε, μή τι ἀναγκαστά, μή τι κωλυτικά, μή τι δυσροητικά· κἂν εὕρῃς τοιοῦτον, λέγε δοῦλον ἀνοχὰς ἔχοντα ἐν Σατουρναλίοις· λέγε, ὅτι ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ ἀποδημεῖ· εἶθ’ ἥξει καὶ γνώσῃ οἷα πάσχει. —Τίς ἥξει ;—Πᾶς ὃς ἂν ἐξουσίαν ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τινὸς θελομένων πρὸς τὸ περιποιῆσαι ταῦτα ἢ ἀϕελέσθαι.—Οὕτως οὖν πολλοὺς κυρίους ἔχομεν ;—Οὕτως. τὰ γὰρ πράγματα προτέρους τούτων κυρίους ἔχομεν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά ἐστιν. διὰ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς τούτων τινὸς ἔχοντας ἐξουσίαν κυρίους εἶναι· ἐπεί τοι οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν τὸν Καίσαρα ϕοβεῖται, ἀλλὰ θάνατον, ϕυγήν, ἀϕαίρεσιν τῶν ὄντων, ϕυλακήν, ἀτιμίαν. οὐδὲ ϕιλεῖ τις τὸν Καίσαρα, ἂν μή τι ᾖ πολλοῦ ἄξιος, ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον ϕιλοῦμεν, δημαρχίαν, στρατηγίαν, ὑπατείαν. ὅταν ταῦτα ϕιλῶμεν καὶ μισῶμεν καὶ ϕοβώμεθα, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν ἔχοντας κυρίους ἡμῶν εἶναι.
Τὸν ἐϕιέμενόν τινος τῶν ἐπ’ ἄλλοις ὄντων ἐνδέχεται ἀκώλυτον εἶναι ;—Οὔ.—Ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραπόδιστον ;—Οὔ.—Οὐκοῦν οὐδ’ ἐλεύθερον. ὅρα οὖν· πότερον οὐδὲν ἔχομεν, ὃ ἐϕ’ ἡμῖν μόνοις ἐστίν, ἢ πάντα, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐϕ’ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὰ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλοις ;—Πῶς λέγεις;—Τὸ σῶμα ὅταν θέλῃς ὁλόκληρον εἶναι, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἢ οὔ ;—Οὐκ ἐπ’ ἐμοί.—Ὅταν δ’ ὑγιαίνειν ;—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.—Ὅταν δὲ καλὸν εἶναι ;—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.—Ζῆν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ;—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.—Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀλλότριον, ὑπεύθυνον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου.—Ἔστω.—Τὸν ἀγρὸν δ’ ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἔχειν, ὅταν θέλῃς καὶ ἐϕ’ ὅσον θέλεις καὶ οἷον θέλεις ;—Οὔ.—Τὰ δὲ δουλάρια ;—Οὔ.—Τὰ δ’ ἱμάτια ;—Οὔ.—Τὸ δὲ οἰκίδιον ;—Οὔ.—Τοὺς δ’ ἵππους ;—Τούτων μὲν οὐδέν.—Ἂν δὲ τὰ τέκνα σου ζῆν θέλῃς ἐξ ἅπαντος ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ τὸν ἀδελϕὸν ἢ τοὺς ϕίλους, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ;—Οὐδὲ ταῦτα.
Πότερον οὖν οὐδὲν ἔχεις αὐτεξούσιον, ὃ ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἐστὶ σοί, ἢ ἔχεις τι τοιοῦτον;—Οὐκ οἶδα. —Ὅρα οὖν οὕτως καὶ σκέψαι αὐτό. μή τις δύναταί σε ποιῆσαι συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψεύδει ; —Οὐδείς.—Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῷ συγκαταθετικῷ τόπῳ ἀκώλυτος εἶ καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος.—Ἔστω.—
Ἄγε, ὁρμῆσαι δέ σε ἐϕ’ ὃ μὴ θέλεις τις δύναται ἀναγκάσαι ;—Δύναται. ὅταν γάρ μοι θάνατον ἢ δεσμὰ ἀπειλῇ, ἀναγκάζει μ’ ὁρμῆσαι.—Ἂν οὖν καταϕρονῇς τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ τοῦ δεδέσθαι, ἔτι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστρέϕῃ ;—Οὔ.—Σὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔργον τὸ καταϕρονεῖν θανάτου ἢ οὐ σόν ; —Ἐμόν.—Σὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρμῆσαι ἢ οὔ ;—Ἔστω ἐμόν.—Τὸ δ’ ἀϕορμῆσαι τίνος ; σὸν καὶ τοῦτο.—
Τί οὖν, ἂν ἐμοῦ ὁρμήσαντος περιπατῆσαι ἐκεῖνός με κωλύσῃ ;—Τί σου κωλύσει ; μή τι τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ;—Οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον.—Ναί, ὡς λίθον.—Ἔστω· ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ περιπατῶ.—
Τίς δέ σοι εἶπεν “ τὸ περιπατῆσαι σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκώλυτον ” ; ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔλεγον ἀκώλυτον μόνον τὸ ὁρμῆσαι· ὅπου δὲ σώματος χρεία καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτου συνεργείας, πάλαι ἀκήκοας, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι σόν.—Ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα.—Ὀρέγεσθαι δέ σε οὗ μὴ θέλεις τις ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ;—Oὐδείς.—Προθέσθαι δ’ ἢ ἐπιβαλέσθαι τις ἢ ἁπλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις ϕαντασίαις ;—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ ὀρεγόμενόν με κωλύσει τυχεῖν οὗ ὀρέγομαι.—Ἂν τῶν σῶν τινὸς ὀρέγῃ καὶ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, πῶς σε κωλύσει ;—Οὐδαμῶς.—Τίς οὖν σοι λέγει, ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρεγόμενος ἀκώλυτός ἐστιν;
Ὑγείας οὖν μὴ ὀρέγωμαι ;—Μηδαμῶς, μηδ’ ἄλλου ἀλλοτρίου μηδενός. ὃ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοὶ παρασκευάσαι ἢ τηρῆσαι ὅτε θέλεις, τοῦτο ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν. μακρὰν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐ μόνον τὰς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν ὄρεξιν· εἰ δὲ μή, παρέδωκας σαυτὸν δοῦλον, ὑπέθηκας τὸν τράχηλον, ὅ τι ἂν θαυμάσῃς τῶν μὴ σῶν, ᾧ τινι ἂν τῶν ὑπευθύνων καὶ θνητῶν προσπαθῇς. —Ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμή ;—Μέρος ἐστὶ σόν, ϕύσει δὲ πηλός, κωλυτόν, ἀναγκαστόν, δοῦλον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου. καὶ τί σοι λέγω χεῖρα ; ὅλον τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δεῖ ὡς ὀνάριον ἐπισεσαγμένον, ἐϕ’ ὅσον ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, ἐϕ’ ὅσον ἂν διδῶται· ἂν δ’ ἀγγαρεία ᾖ καὶ στρατιώτης ἐπιλάβηται, ἄϕες, μὴ ἀντίτεινε μηδὲ γόγγυζε. εἰ δὲ μή, πληγὰς λαβὼν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸ ὀνάριον. ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δέῃ, ὅρα, τί ἀπολείπεται περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα παρασκευάζεται. ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ὀνάριον ᾖ, τἆλλα γίνεται χαλινάρια τοῦ ὀναρίου, σαγμάτια, ὑποδημάτια, κριθαί, χόρτος. ἄϕες κἀκεῖνα, ἀπόλυε θᾶττον καὶ εὐκολώτερον ἢ τὸ ὀνάριον.
πάντα πανταχοῦ θνητά, εὐάλωτα, οἷς τισιν τὸν ὁπωσοῦν προσέχοντα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ταράσσεσθαι, κακελπιστεῖν, ϕοβεῖσθαι, πενθεῖν, ἀτελεῖς ἔχειν τὰς ὀρέξεις, περιπτωτικὰς ἔχειν τὰς ἐκκλίσεις. εἶτα οὐ θέλομεν τὴν μόνην δεδομένην ἡμῖν ἀσϕάλειαν ἐχυρὰν ποιεῖν ; οὐδ’ ἀποστάντες τῶν θνητῶν καὶ δούλων τὰ ἀθάνατα καὶ ϕύσει ἐλεύθερα ἐκπονεῖν ; οὐδὲ μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι οὔτε βλάπτει ἄλλος ἄλλον οὔτε ὠϕελεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων δόγμα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ βλάπτον, τοῦτο τὸ ἀνατρέπον, τοῦτο μάχη, τοῦτο στάσις, τοῦτο πόλεμος ;
Ἐτεοκλέα καὶ Πολυνείκη τὸ πεποιηκὸς οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τυραννίδος, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ ϕυγῆς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἔσχατον τῶν κακῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ϕύσις δ’ αὕτη παντός, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ϕεύγειν τὸ κακόν· τὸν ἀϕαιρούμενον θατέρου καὶ περιβάλλοντα τῷ ἐναντίῳ, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι πολέμιον, ἐπίβουλον, κἂν ἀδελϕὸς ᾖ, κἂν υἱός, κἂν πατήρ· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον οὐδέν. λοιπὸν εἰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, οὔτε πατὴρ υἱοῖς ϕίλος οὔτ’ ἀδελϕὸς ἀδελϕῷ, πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ μεστὰ πολεμίων, ἐπιβούλων, συκοϕαντῶν. εἰ δ’ οἵα δεῖ προαίρεσις, τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, καὶ οἵα μὴ δεῖ, τοῦτο μόνον κακόν, ποῦ ἔτι μάχη, ποῦ λοιδορία ; περὶ τίνων ; περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ; πρὸς τίνας ; πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς ἠπατημένους περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ;
Ἂνθρωπε, προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον ϕύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον . . .
δείξω σοι αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου. μή τίς σε κωλῦσαι δύναται ἐπινεῦσαι ἀληθεῖ; οὐδὲ εἷς. μή τίς σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται παραδέξασθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐδὲ εἷς. ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τὸ προαιρετικὸν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον; ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ ἄλλως ἔχει; καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή; τίς δ’ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις; “ἄν μοι,” ϕησί͵ “προσάγῃ θανάτου ϕόβον, ἀναγκάζει με.” οὐ τὸ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ποιῆσαί τι τούτων ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. πάλιν οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπάσας ὁ θεός, ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ’ ἂλλου τινὸς κωλυτὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν θεὸς οὐδ ἐπεμελεῖτο ἡμῶν ὃν δεῖ τρόπον. . . . ἐὰν θέλῃς, ἐλεύθερος εἶ· ἐὰν θέλῃς, μέμψῃ οὐδένα, ἐγκαλέσεις οὐδενί, πάντα κατὰ γνώμην ἔσται ἅμα τὴν σὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ.
Πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς ϕαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἆλλ’ ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δ’, οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν, οὐκέτι ταῦτ’ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου ϕύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν.
Ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάϕοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη. οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ· οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθητικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους.
Τί οὖν;
Ἐκείνων ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστ’ ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δ’ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δ’ ὥστε τυρὸν ϕέρειν, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν ταῖς ϕαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύνασθαι; τὸν δ’ ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐϕ’ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐϕ’ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ ϕύσις. κατέληξεν δ’ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμϕωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ ϕύσει. ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀϕορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἁπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἴκειν ἔχει καλῶς. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ϕύσει γενναῖον καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενόμενον ὁρᾷ, διότι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰ μὲν ἀκώλυτα ἔχει καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλοις· ἀκώλυτα μὲν τὰ προαιρετικά, κωλυτὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τούτοις μόνοις ἡγήσηται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ συμϕέρον, τοῖς ἀκωλύτοις καὶ ἐϕ’ ἑαυτῷ, ἐλεύθερον ἔσται, εὔρουν, εὔδαιμον, ἀβλαβές, μεγαλόϕρον, εὐσεβές, χάριν ἔχον ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ, μηδαμοῦ μεμϕόμενον μηδενὶ τῶν γενομένων, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλοῦν· ἂν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτοις, ἀνάγκη κωλύεσθαι αὐτό, ἐμποδίζεσθαι, δουλεύειν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν, ἃ τεθαύμακεν καὶ ϕοβεῖται, ἀνάγκη δ’ ἀσεβὲς εἶναι ἅτε βλάπτεσθαι οἰόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄνισον, ἀεὶ αὑτῷ τοῦ πλείονος περιποιητικόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι καὶ μικροπρεπές.
Ταῦτα τί κωλύει διαλαβόντα ζῆν κούϕως καὶ εὐηνίως, πάντα τὰ συμβαίνειν δυνάμενα πρᾴως ἐκδεχόμενον, τὰ δ’ ἤδη συμβεβηκότα ϕέροντα ; “ θέλεις πενίαν ; ” ϕέρε καὶ γνώσῃ, τί ἐστὶ πενία τυχοῦσα καλοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ. “ θέλεις ὰρχάς ; ” ϕέρε. θέλεις ἀναρχίαν ; ϕέρε. ἀλλὰ πόνους θέλεις ; ϕέρε καὶ πόνους. “ ἀλλ’ ἐξορισμόν ; ” ὅπου ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ μοι καλῶς ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ ἐνθάδε οὐ διὰ τὸν τόπον ἦν μοι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δόγματα, ἃ μέλλω μετ’ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀποϕέρειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναταί τις ἀϕελέσθαι αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μόνα ἐμά ἐστι καὶ ἀναϕαίρετα καὶ ἀρκεῖ μοι παρόντα, ὅπου ἂν ὦ καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῶ. “ ἀλλ’ ἤδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν.” τί λέγεις ἀποθανεῖν ; μὴ τραγῴδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ ὡς ἔχει “ ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν συνῆλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀποκαταστῆναι.” καὶ τί δεινόν ; τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τί γενέσθαι καινόν, παράλογον ; τούτων ἕνεκα ϕοβερός ἐστιν ὁ τύραννος ; διὰ ταῦτα οἱ δορυϕόροι μεγάλας δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰς μαχαίρας καὶ ὀξείας ; ἂλλοις ταῦτα· ἐμοὶ δ’ ἔσκπται περὶ πάντων, εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσαν ἔχει. ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται, καρπιστὴν ἔχω οἷον δεῖ, δικαστὰς οἵους δεῖ.
Ἀπόβλεψον εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις ἂς ἔχεις καὶ ἀπιδὼν εἰπὲ “ϕέρε νῦν, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἣν θέλεις περίστασιν· ἔχω γὰρ παρασκευὴν ἐκ σοῦ μοι δεδομένην καὶ ἀϕορμὰς πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐμαυτόν.” οὔ· ἀλλὰ κάθησθε τὰ μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέμοντες, τῶν δὲ συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες· εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκαλεῖτε. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἀκόλουθον τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀγεννείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀσέβεια; καίτοι ὅ γε θεὸς οὐ μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθ’ ἃς οἴσομεν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον μὴ ταπεινούμενοι μηδὲ συγκλώμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἦν ἀγαθοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πατρός, ἀκώλυτον τοῦτο ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐϕ’ ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν οὐδ’ αὑτῷ τινα πρὸς τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπών, ὥστε κωλῦσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι. ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα καὶ ὑμέτερα μὴ χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς μηδ’ αἰσθάνεσθε τίνα εἰλήϕατε καὶ παρὰ τίνος, ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες.