Chapter One
The Splendid Blond Beast
1.Nietzsche, Friedrich, Zur Genealogie der Moral, ch. 11, pp. 288–91, in Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (eds.), Nietzsche Werke. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1968, vol. 6, pt. 2. For a good popular introduction to Nietzsche, see Marc Sautet (with illustrations by Patrick Boussignac), Nietzsche for Beginners. New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, 1990; discussion of “Splendid Blond Beast” at p. 153. For an interpretation of Nietzsche from a leading German intellectual magazine of the Hitler era, see Kurt Liebmann, “Nietzsche und Das Reich,” Das Reich, July 21, 1940. For a recent, penetrating critique of the malevolent aspects of Nietzsche’s work, see Philippe Foot, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” New York Review of Books, June 13, 1991, p. 18.
2.Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide; State Power and Mass Murder. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, p. 73.
3.Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil; The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989.
4.For an extensive defense of German industrial leaders, see Henry Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985; on anti-Semitism issue, see pp. 252, 336–39. For a more critical view of the role of German business in what has come to be called the “prehistory of fascism,” see David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 2nd edition. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986, pp. 271–72.
5.Johannes Ludwig, Boykott, Enteignung, Mord; Die ‘Entjudung’ der deutschen Wirtschaft. Hamburg: Facta, 1989; Dieter Swatek, Unternehmenskonzentration als Ergebnis und Mittel nationalsozialistischer Wirtschaftspolitik. Berlin: Dunker & Humbolt, 1972, pp. 88–93ff.
6.Karl-Heinz Roth and Michael Schmid, Die Daimler-Benz AG, 1916–1948. Schlusseldokumente zur Konzerngeschichte. Nordlingen: Delphi (Greno), 1987; Hamburger Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts (ed.), Das Daimler-Benz-Buch. Ein Rustungskonzern im “Tausendiahrigen Reich.” Nordlingen: Echo (Greno), 1988.
7.Max Stein, Report on the Employment of Slave Work by the Siemens Concern During World War II, 1961, ms. in Benjamin Ferencz papers. Copy in author’s collection. I am grateful to Mr. Ferencz for permitting me access to this collection. For an excellent account of Jewish forced labor in Nazi Germany, see Benjamin Ferencz, Less Than Slaves. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979; on AEG, Telefunken, and Siemens, see pp. 105–27.
8.Artem Ohandjanian, Armenien. Der verschwiegene Volkermord. Vienna: Bohlau, 1989, pp. 84–119 passim; Hovannisian, Armenian Genocide, op. cit., p. 30; Vahakn Dadrian, “The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 1991, pp. 549–76; Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in Turkish Sources. Jerusalem, Israel: Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, 1991. For an extensive collection of archival evidence concerning the Armenian Genocide, see Rouben Adalian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in the U.S. Archives, 1915–1918, (microfiche collection). Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991–92.
9.For a summary and bibliography, see Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1990, pp. 195–203, 443–46.
10.Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. An American Tragedy. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970, pp. 19, 22.
11.Christian Streit, “The German Army and the Policies of Genocide,” in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), The Policies of Genocide. London: German Historical Institute and Allen & Unwin, 1986; Foreign Languages Publishing House, Documents on Adolf Heusinger’s Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962.
12.Roosevelt statement: Department of State Bulletin, vol. 1, 1939, p. 181, with British and German replies claiming cooperation at pp. 182–83. For German reply, see U.S. Department of State press release No. 369, September 2, 1939, 740 001 EW1939/252, box 2915, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. By the following May, the ratcheting escalation of British and German bombing raids led the British to state formally to the U.S. that they had abandoned their previous policy of refraining from bombing strictly civilian targets and that they would “reserve to themselves the right to take any action they consider appropriate in the event of bombing by the enemy of civil populations.” See Kennedy to Secretary of State, May 10, 1940, 740.00116 EW1939/216, box 2915, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. A good summary of this issue drawn from original sources can be found in Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1971, pp. 161–78.
For definition of war crimes found in footnote that follows, see Leon Friedman (ed.), The Law of War. A Documentary History, vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972 (original publisher: Random House), pp. 908–909.
13.Staub, op. cit., pp. xii–xiii, 6; author’s interview with Ervin Staub, March 20, 1991.
14.Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective. Seattle, WA: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978. This brief characterization of Bauer’s analysis is drawn from Helen Fein’s valuable overview, “Genocide: A Sociological Perspective,” Current Sociology (Sage, London), vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1990, p. 54.
15.Fein, ibid., pp. 51–78.
16.Basic books on the sociology and social dynamics of genocide, in addition to the Chalk and Jonassohn, Fein, Hovannisian, Ohandjanian, and Staub texts mentioned above, include Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1944; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Harper, 1961; Leo Kuper, Genocide, Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1981, and The Prevention of Genocide, New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1985; Vahakn Dadrian, “The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide,” in Israel Senderey and Emilio Viano (eds.), Victimology. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974, and “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,” Yale Journal of International Law, Summer 1989; Israel Charny (ed.), Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982; Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton, The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy and Genocide. New York: Kraus, 1980; Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The Final Solution in History. New York: Pantheon, 1988. For bibliographies, see Israel Charney (ed.), Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review, 2 vols. New York: Facts on File, 1988, 1991.
17.Richard Breiting (Edouard Calic, ed.), Secret Conversations With Hitler, The Two Newly Discovered 1931 Interviews. New York: John Day, p. 81; U.S., Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 3. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946, p. 753; Adolph Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, 1941–1944. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953, pp. 188, 317, 493.
18.U.S., Department of the Treasury, Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews, January 13, 1944, unpublished staff study, now found at Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Diaries, vol. 693, pp. 212–29, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
19.Robert Lansing, Diary, entry for May 25, 1915, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; cited in Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles. The Road to Power. New York. Free Press, 1982, p. 46.
20.Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974, p. 185; U.S., Department of Commerce, American Direct Investment in Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: USGPO, Trade Information Bulletin No. 731. Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York & London: Moody’s, 1939, pp. 1798, 1800, 1801, 1804, a113–a117: “Six-Year Price Range of Foreign Industrials” (blue section).
21.See, for example, Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder. London: Granada, 1983, pp. 47–51, or more detailed discussion below.
22.Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, “What Genocide? What Holocaust? News from Turkey 1915–1923, A Case Study,” in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1986, pp. 97–110; Bernard Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the [Versailles] Treaty. New York: Harper, 1920; particularly speeches by John Foster Dulles and Australian Prime Minister W. M. Hughes at pp. 289–315; see also more detailed notes in the chapters below.
23.Murphy to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/8-1147 (Top Secret, No Distribution), August 11, 1947; Robert Joyce (Central Intelligence Group) to Walter Dowling, “Subject: Former SS Colonel Dollmann” (Top Secret), December 1, 1946 (sanitized), 740.00116EW/12-146; Leghorn to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/5-1547 (Top Secret), May 15, 1947; Jack Neal, “Memorandum for the Files” (Top Secret), September 16, 1947, found at 740.00116 EW/8-1147. These records, which had been previously withheld from the State Department files in the National Archives, were obtained by the author through the Freedom of Information Act and are now available at RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also “Interrogation Report on SS Standartenfuehrer Rauff, Walter,” May 15, 1945 (Confidential), in U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps file No. D-216719, Rauff, Walter, obtained via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD; and “Summary Prepared by W. M. Chase on ‘The Role of the Wolff Group in Operation Sunrise,’” March 10, 1947 (Top Secret), 740.00116EW/11-1047, box 3625, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For Dulles’s account of his encounter with Rauff, see Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper, 1966, pp. 66, 83, 102, 107, 158, 188, 192–93.
24.See State Department records described in previous source note and Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise. New York: Basic Books, 1979, pp. 189–90.
25.FBI file No. 100-380802, Ivan Kerno, obtained via Freedom of Information Act; Department of State records on Kerno: Maney to Bender, Department of State July 20, 1954, in Department of State FOI Case No. 8901702. The Kerno affair was first brought to light by historian and author Alti Rodale in an unpublished paper, “Canadian and Allied Governments’ Policies with Regard to Nazi War Crimes.” I am grateful to Dr. Rodale for sharing a draft of this paper with me.
Chapter Two
“The Immediate Demands of Justice”
1.H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. 1. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 137–38. Temperley and many others underestimate the number of U.S. dead; for a discussion, see Gary Putka, “Readers of Latest U.S. History Textbooks Discover a Storehouse of Misinformation,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1992, p. B-1.
2.Some scholarly estimates place the number of Armenian dead at 1.5 to 2 million. For discussion concerning the number of fatalities, see Leo Kuper, “The Turkish Genocide of Armenians, 1915–1917,” in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1986, pp. 43–59. The interior minister of the postwar Turkish government, citing Turkey’s own records, admitted some 800,000 Armenian deaths in connection with the deportations as of 1919, though this total excluded several categories of fatalities; see Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, August 1986, pp. 342 and 358–59, fn111.
3.Temperley, op. cit., p. 162.
4.William McNeill, Plagues and Peoples. Garden City, NY: Doubleday/Anchor, 1977, pp. 195, 252, 255.
5.Temperley, op. cit., p. 139. Estimate has been converted from pounds sterling to dollars at contemporary exchange rate. Later estimates were higher and probably more accurate; see Eugene Meyer testimony at U.S. Congress, War Policies Commission, Hearings, March 5–18, 1931. Washington, DC: USGPO, p. 222.
6.David Albert Foltz, The War Crimes Issue at the Paris Peace Conference. Washington, DC: American University, Ph.D. thesis, 1978, pp. 10–37; Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime. New York: Dutton, 1928; Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the [First] World War. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971. On “symbiotic relationship”: George Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire. New York: Arno, 1972, pp. 86–91, 194–201. On Lippmann’s role as an intelligence specialist and propagandist, see Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. New York: Vintage, 1981, pp. 128–70 passim.
7.James Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982, pp. 37–64; Foltz, loc. cit.
8.Perhaps the most complete explanation of how the Hague conventions were viewed in 1919 can be found in a series of handbooks prepared for the U.S. delegation at Paris concerning issues involved in establishing culpability for war crimes, reparation policy, and related matters. These have been republished as: U.S., American Commission to Negotiate Peace (The Inquiry), The Inquiry Handbooks. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1974. See particularly vol. 2 (Laws of Land Warfare), vol. 3 (Selected Topics in the Laws of Warfare), vol. 7 (Neutrals’ Person and Property Within Belligerent Territory), vol. 8 (Maritime Warfare, Land Warfare), and vol. 9 (Blockade). For note concerning British sponsorship of the formulation of the maritime provisions, see Alfred de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939–1945. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1989, p. 123.
9.The Hague, International Peace Conference, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, vol. 2. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1920, pp. 329, 698–700. Of particular interest in this context are the brutal suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China and of a Philippine nationalist insurrection during the course of the second Hague conference itself, see Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1975, p. 37; and Leon Friedman, The Law of War. A Documentary History, vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972, pp. 799–841.
10.For contemporary disputes concerning Belgian “peoples war” (civilian resistance), see Jules Valery, Les Crimes de la Population Beige; Réplique à un Plaidover pour le Gouvernement Allemand. Paris: Fontemoing/Libraires des Écoles Françaises, 1916; Belgium, Reports on the Violations of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium (2 vols.). London: HMSO, n.d. (1916?); Fernand Passelecq, Deportation et Travail Force des Ouvriers et de la Population Civile de la Belgigue Occupée 1916–1918. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires, n.d. (1927?). For general problem of “legalized” slaughter of rebels, insurgents, guerrillas, and other irregulars, see Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: St. Martin’s, 1984, pp. 1–19, 175–85; and Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1971, pp. 1–44.
For more recent reflections on the persistence of this structural problem in international law, see Noam Chomsky, “The Role of Force in International Affairs,” in For Reasons of State. New York: Pantheon, 1973, pp. 212ff; Jean-Paul Sartre, “On Genocide,” in John Duffett (ed.), Against the Crime of Silence. New York: O’Hare, 1969, pp. 612ff; Donald Wells, War Crimes and Laws of War. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984; and Joseph Weiler, Antonio Cassese, and Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989. Philip Thienel, Special Operations Research Office, The Legal Status of Participants in Unconventional Warfare, Washington, DC: American Univ. Press, 1961.
11.The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 5. For a profile of the delegations, see Davis, op. cit., pp. 178–85.
12.Bernard Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the [Versailles] Treaty. New York: Harper, 1920; see particularly speeches by John Foster Dulles and Australian Prime Minister W. M. Hughes at pp. 289–315.
13.Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Free Press, 1982, pp. 1–13; see also Leonard Mosely, Dulles. New York: Dial, 1978, pp. 13–27.
14.Pruessen, ibid., pp. 16–17.
15.Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and Cromwell. New York: William Morrow, 1988, pp. 39–57.
16.Ibid., pp. 61–64; Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 17–20.
17.Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 23–44.
18.Richard Harris Smith, The OSS. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1972, p. 204.
19.Charles Seymour (Harold Whiteman, ed.), Letters from the Paris Peace Conference. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 61–62, 174n, 176–77; see also Mosely, op. cit., pp. 44–45, 48. On Kerno: FBI file no. 100-380802, Ivan Kerno, obtained via the Freedom of Information Act; and Department of State FOI case no. 8901702.
20.Baruch, op. cit., p. 18, with transcripts of Dulles’s speeches at pp. 289–97, 323–37. See also: Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. New York: Norton, 1986, p. 21fn; Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 30–31.
21.Seymour op. cit., pp. 65, 86, 92. See also: U.S., American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Minutes July 1–September 4, 1919, from collection of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, now at George Washington University Gellman Library, Washington, DC.
22.Allen Dulles, “The Present Situation in Hungary: Action Recommended by A. W. Dulles,” March 24, 1919, Woodrow Wilson papers, VIII A:27, cited in Arno Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919. New York; Knopf, 1967, pp. 576–78.
23.Walworth, op. cit., p. 214.
24.Edward M. House, Diary, entry for July 24, 1915. Yale University Library, New Haven; Willis, op. cit., p. 41.
25.Willis, loc. cit.
26.Robert Lansing, Diary, entry for May 25, 1915, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, cited in Pruessen, op. cit., p. 46.
27.Willis, loc. cit.
28.United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Laws of War. London: HMSO, 1948, pp. 32–36, with quote concerning charges at pp. 33–34. This text is cited hereafter as UNWCC and the Laws of War.
29.Ibid., pp. 35–38.
30.Foltz, op. cit., pp. 165–71; Walworth, op. cit., pp. 214–15.
31.Foltz ibid., pp. 219–23; Willis, op. cit., p. 86.
32.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 36–41.
33.Walworth, op. cit., p. 215.
34.Willis, op. cit., p. 79.
35.Walworth, op. cit., p. 216.
Chapter Three
Young Turks
1.Vahakn Dadrian, “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law,” Yale Journal of International Law, Summer 1989, pp. 230–45.
2.For an overview, see Artem Ohandjanian, Armenien. Der Verschwiegene Völkermord. Vienna: Bohlar, 1969, pp. 84–124; Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents” and “Genocide as a Problem …” op. cit.; and Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1986. For an extensive documentary collection, see Adalian, The Armenian Genocide in U.S. Archives, 1915–18 (microficle collection). Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991–92. For a smaller collection of key U.S. government documentation concerning the genocide, see Armen Hairapetian, “‘Race Problems’ and the Armenian Genocide: The State Department File,” and Armen Hovannisian, “The United States Inquiry and the Armenian Question, 1917–1919 Archival Papers,” both with accompanying selections of archival records, Armenian Review, Spring 1984, pp. 41–202. For a British collection of detailed contemporary reports, see Arnold Toynbee (ed.), The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–1916. London: HMSO, 1916. For a German collection, see Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien 1914–1918, Sammlung Diplomatischer Aktenstücke. Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919. For a discussion of Turkish records, see Vahakn Dadrian, Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in Turkish Sources. Jerusalem, Israel: Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, 1991.
3.On seizure of Armenian property, see Dadrian, “Genocide as a Problem …,” op. cit, pp. 267–72.
4.Christopher Simpson, “Women and the Armenian Genocide,” paper presented at the Seventh Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, Wellesley College, June 19, 1987. In some cases, Turks protected Armenian girls by announcing their religious conversion and taking them into their families; see Donald Miller and Lorna Miller “An Oral History Prespective on Responses to the Armenian Genocide,” in Hovannisian, op. cit., p. 190.
5.See, for example, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Nr. 906 (Bern, October 19, 1915), in which the German ambassador reports to Berlin concerning confidential discussions with Turkish representatives. Turkish ambassador Salioh Bey Gourdji indicates that “If Turkey wishes to be a vital force, it must cut out, eliminate (auschalten) the Armenians in some way … the government has chosen the path marked by violence … even if we cannot find another way of moving the Armenians, the way that this is portrayed to the outside world must be different”; National Archives microfilm publication T-139, captured German records, reel 463, band 39.
6.For a useful summary of Morgenthau’s role, see Henry Morgenthau, Sr., “Ambasssador Morgenthau’s Story,” The World’s Work, November 1918.
7.Virtually all Western news coverage of the massacres included the theme of Muslims persecuting Christians. For examples, see Rev. Robert Labaree, “The Jihad Rampant in Persia,” Missionary Review of the World, July 1915; “Several American Missionaries Dead,” New York Times, September 18, 1915; “Spare Armenians, Pope Asks Sultan,” New York Times, October 11, 1915; “The Greatest of the Religious Massacres,” The Independent, October 18, 1915; “Assassination of Armenia,” Missionary Review of the World, November 1915. For a content analysis of contemporary reporting, see Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, “What Genocide? What Holocaust? News from Turkey 1915–1923, A Case Study,” in Hovannisian, op. cit., pp. 97–110. For a large collection of typical newspaper and magazine articles concerning the genocide, see Richard Kloian, The Armenian Genocide: News Accounts from the American Press 1915–1922. Richmond, CA: ACC Books, 1985.
8.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 35.
9.David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace. New York: Avon, 1989, pp. 214–15; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917–1921. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. 27–30.
10.Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents” and “Genocide as a Problem …,” op. cit. A number of the Takyimi Vekayi documents are reproduced in English translation in Kloian, The Armenian Genocide, op. cit., pp. 309–32.
11.Dadrian, ibid., pp. 311ff.
12.Dobkin, op. cit., pp. 97–110; H. M. V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. 6. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 178–92.
13.Temperley, ibid.; “Chronology of Events Relating to Development of Oil in Iraq, Compiled by the Library of Congress,” in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, pt. 8. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1975, pp. 497–99.
14.Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters. New York: Bantam, 1975, p. 72.
15.On Treaty of Sèvres: UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 45; Temperley, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 184; Dadrian, “Genocide as a Problem …,” op. cit., pp. 288–91, 314; Hovannisian, op. cit., p. 36; Sampson, op. cit., p. 70–82; Leonard Mosley, Powerplay: Oil in the Mideast. New York: Random House, 1973, pp. 41–50.
16.Dobkin, op. cit., p. 105.
17.Loc. cit.
18.Ibid., p. 106; Allen Dulles to Mark Bristol, April 21, 1922, Bristol Papers, RG 45, National Archives, Washington, DC.
19.Henry Morgenthau, Sr., op. cit.; or Adalian, op. cit.
20.Dobkin, op. cit., pp. 97ff.
21.For a large collection of news accounts of this activity, see Kloian, Armenian Genocide, op. cit.
22.Dobkin, op. cit., p. 104.
23.Colby Chester, “Turkey Reinterpreted,” Current History, September 1922, pp. 939–47.
24.Dobkin, op. cit., p. 105.
25.For selected U.S. documentation concerning U.S. representatives at Lausanne, including the roles of Joseph Grew, Allen Dulles, Green Hackworth, and others, see: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, vol. 2, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1938, pp. 879–1258. See particularly pp. 879, 972, 974–80 (Dulles); pp. 889, 900ff (Grew); 901, 926–27, 949, 954, 958, 991, and passim (oil).
26.On war crimes aspects of Treaty of Lausanne: Willis, op. cit., pp. 162–63; Dadrian, “Genocide as a Problem …,” op. cit., p. 310. On oil aspects of same treaty: Temperley, op. cit., vol. 6, pp. 178–92; “Chronology of Events Relating to Development of Oil in Iraq,” op. cit., pp. 497–99. For a collection of articles opposing the treaty, see American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, np: American Committee, 1928; and Eugene Borell, Sentence Arbitrate, Repartition des Annuites de la Dette Publique Ottomane, Article 47 de Traite de Lausanne, Geneva: Albert Kundig, 1925.
27.Dadrian, ibid., p. 310; Jacques Derogy, Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990.
28.For example, Embassy of Turkey, Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda against Turkey. Washington, DC: 1982.
29.James Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982. pp. 82–85.
30.Ibid., p, 83.
31.Ibid., p. 84; David Albert Foltz, The War Crimes Issue at the Paris Peace Conference. Washington, DC: American University, Ph.D. thesis, 1978, pp. 219–23.
32.Willis, ibid., p. 85.
33.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 46–49.
34.Ibid., pp. 46–47.
35.Loc. cit.
36.Ibid., p. 48.
37.Ibid., p. 44; Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers. American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. New York: Norton, p. 216. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Foltz, op. cit.
38.Willis, p. 86.
Chapter Four
Bankers, Lawyers, and Linkage Groups
1.Ronald Preussen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Free Press, 1982, p. 33.
2.Ibid., p. 42.
3.Ibid., p. 46.
4.Ibid., p. 48. On stabilization politics in Continental Europe during this period, see Charles Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975, esp. pp. 579–94.
5.Bernard Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the [Versailles] Treaty. New York: Harper; 1920, pp. 294–95, with text of Dulles speeches at pp. 289–97, 323–37.
6.Karl Bergmann, The History of Reparations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927, pp. 69–77.
7.For a concise summary of the terms of Dawes Plan loans, see Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments: Foreign and American Government Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1925, p. 422; see also Preussen, op. cit., pp. 87–88.
8.U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. Sale of Foreign Bonds and Securities in the United States. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1931.
9.Martin Wolfson, Financial Crisis: Understanding the Postwar US Experience. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharp, 1986; Anthony Sampson, The Money Lenders. New York: Penguin, 1983, pp. 148–96; Martin Mayer, The Bankers. New York: Ballantine, 1974, pp. 449–503.
10.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit. See also: Bernhard Menne, “How Germany Used Her Foreign Loans,” Prevent World War III, No. 18, December 1946; Paul Einzig, Germany’s Default: The Economics of Hitlerism. London: Macmillan, 1934. For details concerning German reparation loans, state debt, and municipal debt, see Moody’s Investors Service, “Deutsches Reich,” Moody’s Manual of Investments, Governments. New York: Moody’s, 1927, pp. 496–555.
11.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit.
12.International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, “Memorandum Concerning ‘External Assets’ of German Subsidiaries” (with December 1945 balance sheet], at OMGUS Legal Division, Legal Advice Branch, box 58, file “Property and External Property Commission—LA 64,” RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. This ITT memo reports that the company’s properties included Conrad Lorenz (98.7 percent owned) and Lorenz’s subsidiaries; Focke-Wulf aircraft (percentage of ownership not disclosed); Telegrafia Ceskoslovenska (acquired in 1940) and an unnamed electric tube factory at Vrchlabi, Czechoslovakia; Standard Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft AG (100 percent owned) and its subsidiaries—Ferdinand Schuchardt Berliner Fernsprech- und Telegraphenwerk (99.5 percent), Mix & Genest AG (94 percent), Suddeutsche Apparatefabrik GmbH (100 percent), Telephonfabrik Berliner (99 percent), Telefongyar r.t. (Budapest), total 75 percent ownership through two different ITT subsidiaries; and Gesellschaft für Telephon- und Telegraphenbeteiligungen (100 percent). James Stewart Martin of the OMGUS Finance Division reports that Conrad Lorenz owned 25 percent of Focke-Wulf and that the chairman of all three of ITT’s major German subsidiaries was Gerhardt A. Westrick, Heinrich Albert’s partner in the Albert and Westrick law firm mentioned in the text; see James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, p. 209.
13.U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, The Industrial Reorganization Act: “American Ground Transport.” Washington, DC: USGPO, 1974, p. A-17; Alfred Sloan, My Years With General Motors. New York: Macfadden, 1965, pp. 321–29. On Fritz Opel as General Motors director: Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1937, pp. 2192, 3204.
14.Moody’s Investors Service, op. cit, 1936, pp. 1283–84.
15.Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of IG Farben. New York: Free Press, 1978, p. 51. See also: U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on War Mobilization, Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels (report by Corwin Edwards, U.S. Department of Justice). Washington, DC: USGPO, 1944; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
16.On General Electric: National Industrial Conference Board, Rationalization of German Industry. New York: National Conference Board, 1931, pp. 110–17. For footnote: the list here was developed from data presented in Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise. American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1917. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974. pp. 41, 67–68, 71–73, 103, 111, 143–45, 186–87. By 1940, the direct investments of Americans in Germany and Austria were estimated as approximately $225 million (book value) of branch plants of U.S. corporations and $400 million in U.S. owned German bonds. Estimates of the value of U.S. ownership of shares in German companies were not immediately available. See Martin Domke, Trading With the Enemy. New York: Central Books, 1943, pp. 294–95.
17.The terms “business elite” and “financial and industrial elite,” as used in this book, refer to the boards of directors and most senior management of the largest and most powerful banks and companies based in a given country, plus the senior partners in law firms that cater to such clients. A convenient listing of the names, addresses, and economic roles of about 600 German personalities meeting this description can be found in: U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks (1946), box 54, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. No comparable consolidated list for U.S. personalities is known to exist, but such individuals can be readily identified through their status as directors or senior management of the fifty largest U.S.-based banks and industrial corporations filing annual reports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A small number of privately held companies and law firms based in the U.S. are not required to file annual reports with the SEC; personalities connected with such institutions can often be traced through the Martindale and Hubble law directories, Who’s Who in America, press reports, and similar sources. See David Brownstone and Gorton Carruth, Where to Find Business Information. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1979, for an extended presentation of informamtion sources for research into U.S.-based business affairs.
18.Sale of Foreign Bonds … op. cit, for a table of specific Dillon, Read loans, see pp. 501–506. See also: “Dillon, Read: Senate Inquiries Into the Formation and Operation of Two of the Firm’s Trusts,” Newsweek, October 14, 1933; “Easy Money,” The Nation, October 18, 1933. Dillon, Read recently cooperated in the preparation of a high-quality, authorized history of the firm; see Robert Sobel, The Life and Times of Dillon, Read. New York: Dutton, 1991, pp. 92–118, for discussion of foreign banking activities in the 1920.
19.For data on postwar careers of senior Dillon, Read executives, see: “Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper,” January 11, 1972, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO (on Draper); Current Biography 1942, p. 267, and Current Biography 1948, p. 223 (on Forrestal); Current Biography 1962, p. 322 (on Nitze); and Current Biography 1942, p. 230, and Who Was Who, vol. 5, p. 206 (on Eberstadt).
20.John Kouwenhoven, Partners in Banking: Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., 1918–1968. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968, 1983. Harriman and Lovett became two of the six so-called “Wise Men” widely regarded as the core of the U.S. foreign policy establishment from 1945 until the collapse of the U.S. campaign in Vietnam. Their colleagues in this role included John McCloy, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson; see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. For a more critical analysis of the same phenomenon, see G. William Domhoff, “Who Made American Foreign Policy 1945–1963?” in David Horowitz (ed.), Corporations and the Cold War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 25ff.
21.Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 76–152; Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and Cromwell. New York: William Morrow, 1988, pp. 77–159. On Sullivan & Cromwell representation of HAPAG: Eleanor Lansing Dulles interview, Columbia University Oral History Project, pt. 2, p. 57.
22.Pruessen, ibid., p. 66.
23.Ibid., pp. 69–72.
24.Dulles address, “The Power of International Finance,” March 24, 1928, Dulles papers, Princeton University.
25.Paul Nitze with Ann Smith and Steven Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. xvii.
26.Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service. New York: Norton, 1978, p. 47.
27.Ibid., p. 48.
28.Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 17–41.
29.Frederic Propas, “Creating a Hard Line Towards Russia: The Training of State Department Soviet Experts 1927–1937,” Diplomatic History, Summer 1984, pp. 209–26.
30.Weil, op. cit.
31.John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change. New York: Harper, 1939; Pruessen, op. cit., pp. 175–77; John Foster Dulles, War or Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 5–16. Forrestal and Nitze: Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking, 1951, pp. 135–41; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, op. cit., pp. xx–7; Wilson, Reed, and du Pont empire: Gerald Colby (Zilg), Du Pont Dynasty. Behind the Nylon Curtain. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1984, pp. 291–451 passim. Also, following much the same ideological development as Kennan and other “Riga Axioms” advocates were W. Averell Harriman and Robert Lovett; see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, op. cit.
32.Yergin, op. cit., p. 26.
33.On Albert’s role at Ford: Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1936, pp. 1283–84; and “The Right Men in the Right Places,” Prevent World War III, no. 25, May 1948. For ITT role of Gerhardt Westrick, see U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier “Westrick, Gerhardt” (file number has been suppressed), and OSS report “Request for Information about certain German business figures,” May 2, 1945, available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD. See also Martin, op. cit., p. 209; for Texaco role, see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters. New York: Bantam, 1975, p. 98.
34.U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier no. XE01156116D016 “Westrick, Ludger” available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.
35.Das Deutsche Führerlexicon, 1934–1935. Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1935, p. 279. Lindemann’s NSDAP membership record (no. 5453455) is available via the Berlin Document Center. See also: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Elimination of German Resources for War, pt. 5, July 2, 1945, pp. 819–20; and U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) dossier no. XE000915 Karl Lindemann and USFET Military Intelligence Service Center, Preliminary Interrogation Report: Karl Lindemann, September 12, 1945, available through the Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft. Meade, MD.
36.National Industrial Conference Board, The Rationalization of German Industry. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1931.
37.Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks, op. cit.
The German system divides corporate boards into the Aufsichtsrat, which is roughly similar to a U.S.-style board of directors, and the Vorstand, or senior management committee. At Deutsche Bank, for example, the Aufsichtsrat was elected by the general stockholders’ meeting, served four-year terms (and was frequently re-elected), met twice annually, and was responsible for overall bank policy. The Aufsichtsrat’s working committees met monthly and provided much more direct supervision, including approval authority over all loans of 1 million RM or more. There were typically between twenty and thirty members of the Aufsichtsrat at Deutsche Bank, though most German corporations had much smaller boards. The Aufsichtrat appointed the Vorstand, which is similar to the president’s committee or similar senior management body in many American companies. The Vorstand at Deutsche Bank typically had between seven and eleven members. It met almost daily and directed the day-to-day affairs of the bank. Deutsche Bank and many other German companies also created a Bierat, or advisory board, which facilitated greater input into decision-making by the bank’s regional and district executives. At some companies, the Bierat included representatives of cartel partners, major suppliers or customers, the German government, or other outside groups. For details, see U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Report on the Investigation of the Deutsche Bank, November 1946, pp. 21–27, in file: “Deutsche Bank,” box 229, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. This is cited hereafter as OMGUS Deutsche Bank. For a Germanlanguage edition and commentary on this study, see OMGUS, Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank. Nordlingen: Greno, 1986.
38.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, ibid., p. 2.
39.The data concerning banking interlocks are calculated from OMGUS Deutsche Bank, ibid., table 11 (n.p.).
40.On interlocks with Allianz Insurance: ibid., table 10 (n.p.). See also: U.S., Office of Military Government (U.S.) [OMGUS), Finance Division, Financial Intelligence Section, Report on the Investigation of Dr. Kurt Schmitt, January 1948, file: “Investigation: Kurt Schmitt,” box 233, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
41.On interlocks with Daimler Benz, BMW, etc.: OMGUS Deutsche Bank, table 12 (n.p.). On ownership of company stock: ibid., pp. 108–109 and table 12.
42.On interlocks with Siemens group of companies: ibid., pp. 109–13. The relationship between Deutsche Bank and Siemens began in 1870, when Georg Siemens—already a major industrialist—helped found the bank and became its leading manager. Before two decades were out, Deutsche Bank became the Siemens empire’s principal banking house and source of loans for new investment. Among its early projects was the establishment of Mannesman, a major manufacturer of the steel pipe used in the oil and natural gas industries. All three institutions have operated for decades as closely integrated branches of a single financial entity.
43.On Dresdner Bank, see: U.S., Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Report on the Investigation of the Dresdner Bank, 1946, box 235, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD, pp. 35–41, 71–75. This report is cited hereafter as OMGUS Dresdner Bank. A German-language edition and commentary is available: OMGUS (Hans Magnus Erzensberger, ed.), Ermittlungen gegen die Dresdner Bank, Nordlingen: Greno, 1986. Additional OMGUS studies in U.S. archives include profiles of Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (RG 260, OMGUS Office of Economic Affairs, OMG Berlin Sector, Finance Division, box 461, National Archives, Suitland, MD), Baron Kurt von Schroeder (box 230—available as offset printing plates), Kurt Schmitt—Allianz Insurance (box 233), Hjalmar Schacht (box 236), among others.
44.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit, p. 79; OMGUS Dresdner Bank, op. cit., p. 41.
45.On Allen Dulles: Allen Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can We Be Neutral? New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper, 1936; reissued in an updated volume, 1939. On Warburg: Eric Warburg, Zeiten und Gezeiten. Hamburg: Hans Christians Druckerei, 1982.
46.For Schippel comment, U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier no. XE14864–16D044, Hans Schippel, document 27, available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.
47.Gabriel Kolko, “American Business and Germany, 1930–1941,” Western Political Quarterly, December 1962, pp. 713ff.
48.United Fruit trade in strategic materials with Germany: Caspar Menke to Reichswirtschaftsministerium, “Betr.: Sonderkonto der United Fruit Comp., Boston.” Records of the Reich Ministry of Economics, microfilm publication T-71, roll 79, RG 242, National Archives, Washington, DC, frames 580823-37. See related correspondence at frames 580731-88, 580808-10, 580926.
49.Sullivan & Cromwell role in attempted purchase of American Potash and Chemical, relations with IG Farben subsidiary GAF, Lisagor and Lipsius, op. cit., pp. 136–39. John Foster Dulles represents Metallgesellschaft: Borkin, op. cit., pp. 168–70. Chester Lane comment: Chester Lane, Oral History, New York: Columbia University, pp. 435–38. For a summary by John Foster Dulles of the scope of, and loopholes in, U.S. regulation of foreign businesses during wartime, see John Foster Dulles, “The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian,” Cornell Law Quarterly, March 1943, pp. 245ff. On the seizure of corporate properties in U.S.-German relations, see Hans-Dieter Kreikamp, Deutsches Vermogen in den Vereinigten Staaten, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1979, pp. 20–43.
50.Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–1932. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970, pp. 562–74.
51.See, for example, Charles Maier, Stanley Hoffman, and Andrew Gould, The Rise of the Nazi Regime, Historical Reassessments. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986; Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow. West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past. New York: Pantheon, 1989; or the well-known controversy between David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 2nd ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986, and Henry Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985.
Chapter Five
The Profits of Persecution
1.“Gesetz zur Wiederbestellung des Berufsbeamtentums,” Reichsgesetzblatt (Berlin), April 7, 1933, teil 1, p. 175; “Erste Berordnung zur Durchfuhrung des Gesetz zur Wiederbestellung des Berufsbeamtentums,” Reichsgesetzblatt (Berlin), April 11, 1933, tiel 1, p. 195. Summaries and commentary available in English at: World Jewish Congress et al., The Black Book. The Nazi Crime Against the Jewish People. New York: Nexus, 1981, pp. 470–80.
2.For example, Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Harper, 1961. pp. 285–89, 323–45, 586–600, and passim.
3.Ibid., p. 60.
4.Ibid., pp. 60–90.
5.Ibid., p. 60.
6.Interview with Benjamin Ferencz, July 9, 1988.
7.Anne Bloch, “The Law,” in World Jewish Congress et al., op. cit., pp. 88–89.
8.OMGUS Dresdner Bank, op. cit., p. 78.
9.Ibid., p. 79.
10.Rasche became a defendant in the “Ministries Case” at Nuremberg; see Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949, vols. 12, 13, 14 passim, for extensive discussion of his case. On Pleiger, see: U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany (US) [OMGUS], Finance Division, Financial Investigation Section, Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program to Banks, box 54, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD, entry for Paul Pleiger (n.p.).
11.“Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” Frankfurter Handelsblatt—Handelsteil der Frankfurter Zeitung, June 21, 1936.
12.Ibid. On Freudenberg, see OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 297–99.
13.“Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” op. cit. On Siemens Aryanizations discussed in footnote, see OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 155–56. The sector of the Siemens empire specializing in various aspects of electronics production is organized into two main divisions, Siemens & Halske AG and Siemens-Schuckert AG, which between them controlled at least twelve major subsidiaries during the 1920s and 1930s. On the Siemens companies’ use of forced labor: Max Stein, “Report on the Employment of Slave Work by the Siemens Concern During World War II,” February 1961, in Benjamin Ferencz papers.
14.Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments. American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1936, p. 3028.
15.“Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” op. cit.
16.Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism. Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990, p. 113.
17.For an extensive discussion on Ford’s complex activities in Nazi Germany, see ibid., pp. 111–46, with Diestel dismissal at p. 114. On directors of Ford Motor Company AG (Germany), see Moody’s Manual of Investments, 1936, op. cit., pp. 1283–84. On Bosch Aryanization: “Industrielle Besitzverlagerungen,” op. cit.
18.Reich, op. cit., pp. 113–14.
19.Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise. American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974. pp. 186–87.
20.Moody’s Manual of Investments, 1939, op. cit., pp. 1798, 1800, 1801, 1804, a113–a117, “Six-Year Price Range of Foreign Industrials” (blue section).
21.On Draper, see James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, p. 206; on German Credit and Investment Corps’ role at Dillon, Read, see Robert Sobel, The Life and Times of Dillon, Read. New York: Dutton, 1991, pp. 89, 105–106.
22.Wilkins, op. cit., p. 187 & fn.
23.Ibid., p. 185; and U.S. Department of Commerce, American Direct Investment, op. cit.
24.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., p. 151.
25.Erhardt Schmidt testimony, exhibit 148; OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit.
26.For material quoted in footnote, see Hjalmar Schacht (Diana Pyke, trans.), Confessions of the Old Wizard. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974, pp. 325–26, 415; for related comments see p. 427. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command has released a small collection of materials concerning Schacht; see INSCOM file 528H075/1381 “Schacht, Hjalmar,” available via Freedom of Information Act. The released INSCOM material is fragmentary, however, and fails to report much that is on the record concerning Schacht’s trial for war crimes and business activities. The available material is so scanty that it suggests that INSCOM’s main collection of intelligence on Schacht has thus far been lost or suppressed.
27.U.S., Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (the “red” series). Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946, vol. 2, p. 739; for Schacht’s defense, see supplement B, pp. 501–43. Schacht was eventually acquitted by the tribunal (over objections by the USSR) largely on the grounds that his most important service to the Nazi state had predated the outbreak of war in 1939, and was thus regarded as largely outside the purview of the tribunal.
28.Guenter Keiser, Der Juengste Konzentrationsprozess, vol. 2 of Die Wirtschaftskurve, published by Frankfurter Zeitung, 1939. Translation is by Anne Bloch in The Black Book, op. cit., pp. 93–94. For a detailed recent discussion of the Aryanization process, including several case studies, see Johannes Ludwig, Boycott Enteignung Mord, op. cit.
29.Keiser, ibid.
30.Walther Funk speech as published in Frankfurter Zeitung, November 17, 1938; see Nuremberg document no. 3545-PS, RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC.
31.“The Deutsche Bank served as the main collecting agency for a special levy imposed upon the Jewish population of Berlin after the November 1938 pogroms. This account held in the branch office ‘H’ of the Deutsche Bank was called ‘Wiedergutmachungskonto für die Schaeden Berlins’ (Compensation account for the damages of Berlin). This account was opened by Werner Waechter and Erwin Koehnen, who served as trustees of the Reich for the collection of this fine.” OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., p. 154.
32.Nora Levin, The Holocaust. New York: Schocken, 1973, pp. 86, 90.
33.Military spending estimate is from Burton Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959, p. 14 (table 5, group I).
34.Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments. American and Foreign Banks. New York: Moody’s, 1940, p. 801.
35.Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments. American and Foreign Industrial Securities. New York: Moody’s, 1939, p. 1804.
36.Nuremberg document no. PS-5375, RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC, cited in Levin, op. cit., p. 723, n6. For more detailed discussion of the economics of German rearmament, see Klein, op. cit., and Barton Whaley, German Covert Rearmament 1919–1939: Deception and Misperception. Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1984.
37.Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964, p. 86.
38.Henry Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985, p. 252.
39.Eric Warburg, Zeiten und Gezeiten. Hamburg: Hans Christians Druckerei, 1982, pp. 292–93.
40.Wilhelm Treue, “Widerstand von Unternehmern und Nationalokonomen,” in Jürgen Schmadeke and Peter Steinback, Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Munich: Piper, 1986, pp. 917–37.
41.Simon Wiesenthal Center (Los Angeles), “Wiesenthal Center Demands Resignation of Hermann J. Abs, Hitler’s Leading Banker, from Vatican Bank,” press release with documentary exhibits, December 29, 1982; copy in author’s collection. For typical news coverage: Jay Mathews, “Vatican Advisor Accused by Center of Nazi Links,” Washington Post, December 30, 1982. Abs was eventually barred by the U.S. Justice Department from traveling to the United States; see: “Abs darf nicht in die USA,” Frankfurter Abendpost, May 7, 1990.
42.On Austrian measures as a model for Nazi persecution; see Hans Safrian and Hans Witek, Und keiner war dabei: Dokumente des alltaglichen Antisemitismus in Wien 1938. Wien: Picus Verlag, 1988, pp. 95–157 passim; Levin, op. cit., pp. 101–10; Christopher Simpson, Blowback. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988, pp. 348–49, sn22.
43.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., p. 187. On Deutsche Bank’s earlier attempts to take control of Creditanstalt, see David Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980, pp. 35–41.
44.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 189–90; OMGUS Deutsche Bank Annex, op. cit., pp. 23–25.
45.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 189–93.
46.On ideological struggle: OMGUS, Ermittlungen gegen die Dresdner Bank, op. cit., pp. xlii–xlv; Klein, op. cit., pp. 35–55 passim; Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 156–57.
47.OMGUS Deutsche Bank Annex, op. cit., p. 23; quotation is from the language of the report.
48.Loc. cit.; quotation is from Keppler.
49.Ibid., p. 24.
50.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 53–54. One noteworthy new Creditanstalt director was Hans Fischböck, the German-appointed finance and economics minister of post-Anschluss Austria. Fischböck went on to make a career in expropriations in Austria and the Netherlands, where he was eventually charged with war crimes by the Dutch government. For background, see Safrian and Witek, op. cit., pp. 97–98; Dietrich Orlow, The Nazis in the Balkans. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pp. 31–32, 187.
51.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., pp. 53–54.
52.“Übersicht über die von der Kontrollbank durchgefuhrten Arisierungsfalle,” reproduced in Safrian and Witek, op. cit., pp. 143–57. Thanks to Hans Safrian for bringing this document to my attention.
53.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., p. 191; see also pp. 49–50, 171–74, 187–95. For data concerning Aryanizations in Vienna discussed in footnote, see “Übersicht über die von der Kontrollbank …” in Saf rian, op. cit.
54.Cited in Levin, op. cit., p. 99.
55.Ibid., pp. 97–98.
Chapter Six
“Who Still Talks of the Armenians?”
1.Martin Weinmann (ed.), Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem. Frankfurt a/M: Zweitausendeins, 1990, pp. xiii–xvi; Joachim Remak (ed.), The Nazi Years, A Documentary History. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, pp. 133–43; Nora Levin, The Holocaust. New York: Schocken, 1973, pp. 301–305.
2.Poland, Ministerstwo Informacji (Polish Ministry of Information, London), The German New Order in Poland. London: Hutchinson, 1942, pp. 71, 79–80.
3.Ibid., pp. 28–75, 219–21, 235–36. See also: Poland, Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, German Crimes in Poland. New York: Howard Fertig, 1982.
4.Biddle to Secretary of State, August 13, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/527, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5.Richard Breiting (Edouard Calic, ed.), Secret Conversations with Hitler. The Two Newly Discovered 1931 Interviews. New York: John Day, 1971, p. 81.
6.U.S., Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 3. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946, p. 753.
7.Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations 1941–1944. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953, pp. 188, 317, 493.
8.Gerhard Hirschfeld, “Chronology of Destruction” in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), The Policies of Genocide. Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany. London: Allen & Unwin/German Historical Institute, 1986.
9.Yehuda Bauer, “When Did They Know?” Midstream, April 1968, pp. 51–58.
10.John Mendelsohn (ed.), The Holocaust: The Wannsee Protocol and a 1944 Report on Auschwitz. New York: Garland, 1982, reproduces Nuremberg document no. NG-2586, a reporter’s summary of the gathering.
11.Ibid.
12.For Eichmann’s recollections of the Wannsee Conference: Life, November 28, 1960, pp. 24, 101.
13.See for example, “Terror Against Jews,” Times (London) December 7, 1942, which reports in part that “In all parts of Europe the Germans are calling meetings, or issuing orders, to bring about what they call ‘the final solution of the Jewish problem.’” The Times report is discussed in: Winant to Secretary of State, December 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/692, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. Eichmann discusses use of term “Final Solution” in Jochen von Lang (ed.), Eichmann Interrogated. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983, pp. 73, 131.
14.Nurenberg document no. NG-2586, RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC.
15.Gerhard Hirschfeld, “Chronology of Destruction” op. cit., pp. 150–53.
16.Ibid.
17.Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Harper, 1961, p. 623.
18.Walter Lacqueur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp. 106–13.
19.Ibid., pp. 67, 72–73, 101.
20.“Memorandum of Conversation,” September 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/543 (attachment), box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
21.Biddle to Secretary of State, August 13, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/527, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also The German New Order in Poland, op. cit.
22.Harvey Sachs, “Der Ordinare,” New Yorker, June 4, 1990.
23.Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, band II. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985, pp. 220–22; see also pp. 187, 189, 225.
24.Sachs, op. cit. There were reportedly about 8,000 prisoners in Auschwitz in late 1940, most of them Poles and Polish Jews. See Gerhard Hirschfeld, op. cit., pp. 150–51.
25.Albert Speer (Joachim Neugroschel, trans.), Infiltration. New York: Macmillan, 1981, p. 23. See also Eichholtz, op. cit., p. 225. See Joseph Billig, Les Camps de Concentration dans l’Ecoriomie du Reich Hitlerien. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973, pp. 136–221, for an extensive report concerning SS economic enterprises. In addition to providing labor for the private sector, the SS in-house companies produced war materiel for SS troops and engaged in mining, heavy construction, brickmaking, and cement work associated with prisons, civil defense, and military installations. The SS companies also provided most of the labor for building the concentration camps, including the installation of gas chambers. For an excellent resource for locating forced labor centers, see Weinmann, Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem, op. cit.
26.Rudolf Hoess (Auschwitz commandant) affidavit, March 12, 1947, Nuremberg document no. NI-4434-A, RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC. Also available at Benjamin Ferencz, Less Than Slaves. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979. pp. 202–204.
27.Eichholtz, op. cit., p. 225.
28.Ibid., pp. 225–26.
29.Karl Sommer affidavit, October 4, 1946, Nuremberg document no. NI-1065, National Archives microfilm collection T-301, roll 10, frames 001126ff.
30.U.S., Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, reports on the European War, no. 3. Washington, DC, October 31, 1945, p. 214, table 12; and Eichholtz, op. cit., pp. 245–47.
For data in footnote, see Edward Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967, pp. 152–53. For an important early work on this subject, see John Fried, The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by Germany. Montreal: International Labor Office, 1945. Probably the most complete discussion of the subject thus far is Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des ‘Auslander-einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches. Berlin: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 1985.
For examples of corporate evasion and suppression of evidence concerning exploitation of forced laborers, see Karl-Heinz Roth and Michael Schmid, Die Daimler-Benz AG 1916–1948. Schlusseldokumente zur Konzerngeschichte. Nordlingen: Delphi, 1987, doc. no. 143, 145, 146, 147, pp. 374–91; and Hamburger Stiftung zur Foerderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur, Industrie, Behoerden und Konzentrationslager 1938–1945. Reaktionen 1988–1989. Hamburg: Hamburger Stiftung zur Foerderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur, 1989. In English, see Benjamin Ferencz, op. cit., for detailed discussion of efforts to obtain restitution for Jewish forced laborers, usually in the face of intense corporate opposition. IG Farben, which was particularly notorious for destroying records, was discovered to have pulped “tons of documentary evidence … principally concerned with various phases of the administration of the Oswiecim (Auschwitz) concentration camp” when several IG Farben directors were on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 1947; see John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971, p. 179.
31.Ferencz, op. cit., pp. 56–57.
32.Edward Zilbert, Albert Speer and the Nazi Ministry of Arms. London: Associated Univ. Presses, 1981, p. 111. See also Zilbert’s study: RAND Corporation (Edward Zilbert), The Development of Hauptausschusse und Ringe in the German War Economy. RAND publication P 3649. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1967.
33.Ferencz, op. cit.
34.International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg: 1947, vol. 3, p. 440. This is cited hereafter as International Military Tribunal.
35.Bohdan Wytwycky, The Other Holocaust. Washington, DC: Novak Report, 1980, p. 49.
36.Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The Final Solution in History. New York: Pantheon, 1988. pp. 310–12.
37.For a vivid example of this structure at the network of Krupp factories at Essen, see William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp. New York: Bantam, 1970, pp. 535–66. For contemporary German documentation in which Speer’s ministry advertises the use of foreign labor in publications designed for German industrialists and economists, see Hauptausschuss Maschinen (ed.), Einsatz von Östarbeitern in der deutschen Maschinenindustrie. Essen: Bucherverlag W. Girardet, 1943; captured German records collection T-73 (Records of Reichsministerium für Rustung und Kriegsproduktion), roll 187, frame 3400898 ff. See Christa Rotzoll, “Östarbeiter im Lager und in der Fabrik,” Das Reich, November 21, 1943, for a glowing presentation of “guestworkers” as they appeared in Nazi propaganda; contrast this with “Die Juden mussen arbeiten!” Illustrierter Beobachter, October 12, 1939, with photos depicting obviously sadistic penal labor for Jews in Poland in the wake of the Nazi invasion.
38.International Military Tribunal, vol. 3, p. 435.
39.For shipment of women, see International Military Tribunal, vol. 3, pp. 436–37. On murder of Ukrainian children, see Homze, op. cit., pp. 160–61. For material in footnote, see ibid., pp. 165–67, and Edgar Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944. Department of the Army pamphlet 20–244, 1956, p. 107.
40.The estimate of casualties among forced laborers is the author’s. No complete statistics are known to exist, but some indication of the level of the carnage can be gleaned from the difference between the Sauckel and the Speer statistics discussed in the text. If they are roughly accurate, about three million forced laborers were “replaced” between 1942 and 1944 alone. Some of these workers escaped, and a small number were returned home or disappeared from government rolls in other ways. Considering, however, that particularly brutal forced labor had been under way in the occupied Eastern territories since 1939, and that the death rate among forced workers sharply escalated during the winter of 1944–45, the estimate of three million deaths among laborers seems conservative. For notes on sources for estimates, see Homze, op. cit., pp. 152–53.
41.Internationaler Suchdienst (International Red Cross), Verzeichnis der Haftstatten unter dem Reichsführer-SS 1933–1945. Geneva: International Red Cross, 1979, p. xx. An excellent and more easily available resource on this subject is Weinmann, op. cit. For a valuable study of forced labor in the Berlin region, with emphasis on the role of AEG, Siemens, and other electrical manufacturers, see Laurenz Demps and Reinhard Holzer, “Zwangsarbeiter und Zwangsarbeiterlager in der faschistischen Reichshauptstadt Berlin 1939–1945,” Miniaturen zur Geschichte, Kultur und Denkmalpflege Berlins, no. 20/21, Berlin 1986.
42.Internationaler Suchdienst, ibid.; for Pohl report to Himmler on structure of the camp system, see Nuremberg documents no. NO-020(a) and NO-020(b), RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC. For Pohl’s April 1942 estimate of the number of prisoners in the six largest camps and his plans for further expansion, see Nuremberg document no. R-129.
43.Manchester, op. cit., pp. 535–664, with discussion of Krupp police at 538–40 and passim, and of numbers of camps at p. 553.
44.Ibid., p. 554.
45.Jaeger quote: International Military Tribunal vol. 3, p. 443.
46.Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 368–70; “Nazis Blame Jews for Big Bombings,” New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 7; Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich, (Berlin), June 14, 1942.
47.George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima. The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy. New York: John Wiley, 1966, p. 142. Widely accepted estimates put German fatalities from Allied bombing at about 500,000; see James Taylor and Warren Shaw, Dictionary of the Third Reich. London: Grafton, 1987, p. 322.
48.Roosevelt statement: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 1, 1939, p. 181.
For discussion of the development of international law and custom concerning aerial warfare, see Inquiry Handbooks, vol. 3, Selected Topics Connected with the Laws of Warfare as of August 1, 1914, pp. 580–609, including excerpts from the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, with commentaries; “1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare,” in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989, pp. 121–35, with historical commentaries; J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights. London: Longmans, Green, 1924; M. W. Royce, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare. New York: Harold Vinal, 1928.
49.Jay Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939–1945. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1974, pp. 101, 120–29, 134–35. Baird stresses German pledges to retaliate against Britain as such, but note Goebbels’s use of British attacks to pledge extermination of Jews: Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich (Berlin), June 14, 1942.
50.John Kenneth Galbraith lecture, “Sifting the Rubble: The Strategic Bombing Surveys.” National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, September 6, 1990. Galbraith was the director of the economic aspects of the Strategic Bombing Survey research.
51.Ibid.
52.Comments by Ramsey Potts, Lord Solly Zuckerman, and David Mac-Isaac, “Sifting the Rubble …, op. cit.
53.Joseph Goebbels, “Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,” Das Reich, (Berlin), June 14, 1942; “Nazis Blame Jews for Big Bombings,” New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 7.
54.Ohlendorf, cited at Hilberg, op. cit., p. 695. Roughly similar defenses against Allied war crimes charges were offered by dozens of Nazis and SS men after the war but were consistently rejected by Allied tribunals.
55.See, for example, Nicolas Nazarenko speech quoted in Simpson, Blowback, op. cit., pp. 274–75.
56.Kershaw, op. cit., p. 369.
57.Loc. cit.
58.Ibid., pp. 369–70.
59.See, for example, Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, pp. 299–311.
60.On air raid deaths among prisoners at Krupp: Manchester, op. cit., pp. 561–64; deaths at Heinkel: Gerhard Finn, Sachsenhausen 1936–1950. Bonn: Urheber, 1985, p. 22.
61.Martin Caidin, The Night Hamburg Died. New York: Ballantine, 1960, pp. 25–26.
62.Hamburger Stiftung zur Foerderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur, Industrie, Behoerden und Konzentrationslager 1938–1945, Reaktionen 1988–1989, op. cit.; Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 93, 492–94.
63.Weinmann, loc. cit.
64.Ibid., pp. 199–203, 223–29, 260, 564.
65.Ford plant at Cologne (Köln): Bundesgesetzblatt, September 9, 1977; and Karl Sommer affidavit, October 4, 1946, Nuremberg document no. NI-1065, National Archives microfilm collection T-301, roll 10, frames 001126ff. The GM-Opel plant at Russelsheim was converted to aircraft engine production for Junkers JU-88 bombers. Buchenwald supplied prison labor for all such production; see Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 923–24.
66.The GM-Opel plant at Brandenburg built three-ton “Blitz” trucks: see “American Ground Transport” and GM’s reply, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, The Industrial Reorganization Act, S, 1167, part 4A, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974. Washington, DC: USGPO, p. A–21. The Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück concentration camps appear to have supplied labor for the principal armament plants in Brandenberg; see Weinmann, op. cit., pp. 259, 576. On Ford’s role in Germany: Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism. Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990, pp. 117–46, with discussion of use of POWs at pp. 121–22, 127.
67.Christian Streit, “The German Army and the Policies of Genocide,” in Hirschfeld, Policies of Genocide, op. cit., pp. 15–29. The invasion of the USSR appears to have been the transit point where earlier Nazi policies of persecution and “cold pogroms” became a campaign of more direct and modern forms of extermination. It was here that the Nazis’ ideology of extreme anticommunism became a seemingly acceptable rationale for tens of thousands of people to participate in the anti-Semitic mass murder programs that have come to be known as the Holocaust. “The infamous mobile execution units, the Einsatzgruppen, spearheaded the racial warfare in East Central Europe,” writes Wolfgang Mommsen. At the same time, “the German Army allowed itself to become increasingly implicated in the sinister activities of the Einsatzgruppen. An important factor in this was that the military leadership in general accepted the National Socialist propaganda regarding the Soviet people … especially the radical anti-Semitic message that the Jews were largely responsible for communism. The Wehrmacht therefore put up little, if any, resistance to the idea that the war against Soviet Russia should be conducted as a racial war with the virtual annihiliation of the enemy, or at least of its leadership cadres, as a ‘legitimate’ objective.” See Wolfgang Mommsen, ibid., p. xii.
68.For discussion of attitudes of the “Riga Axioms” group toward the USSR, see Yergin, op. cit., pp. 17–41. For a sophisticated Western view of Soviet attitudes concerning international law during this period, particularly on war crimes and related issues, see T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law. New York: Macmillan, 1935 (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1972), pp. 311–42. See also author’s interview with John Hazard, June 7, 1991. In general, Taracouzio and other Western legal observers saw Soviet critiques and reservations on international law (which were based largely on Leninist doctrine) as indications of Soviet dishonesty, ill-intent, or at best unpredictability. Most Western commentators saw the reservations raised by the U.S. and other more conventional powers (which were based largely on contemporary versions of “realist” doctrines) as much less threatening—and, in fact, to be expected. Soviet commentaries suggest roughly parallel but opposite attitudes. See ibid., pp. 411–22. For similar Soviet arguments from a later period, see Ivan Artsibasov, In Disregard of the Law. Moscow: Progress, 1982, pp. 9–61.
69.Quoted at Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, p. 40.
Chapter Seven
No Action Required
1.On Breckinridge Long: U.S. Department of the Treasury (Randolph Paul), Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in the Murder of the Jews, Jan. 13, 1944, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 693, pp. 212–29 passim, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. New York: Pantheon, 1984, pp. 80, 153, 190–98; David Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941. New York: Pantheon, 1985, pp. 146, 173–74; Arthur Morse, While Six Million Died. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1983, pp. 32–33, 38–42.
2.On James Clement Dunn: see Randolph Paul, ibid., p. 224. Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945. Department of State publication no. 3580. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949.
3.Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964; on Murphy’s rivalry with Morgenthau: John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of War 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 417–19 passim.
4.On Joseph Grew: Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 18, 87–96.
5.On Green Hackworth: for a biographical summary, see National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 57, p. 110, Current Biography 1958, pp. 181–82, and the introductory notes to Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, Department of State publication no. 1506, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1940; reprint, New York, Garland Publishing, 1973. For a critical assessment of Hackworth’s role in the development of U.S. war crimes policy, see Herbert Pell, Oral History, Columbia University, 1951, pp. 584–603. For Hackworth’s role in vetoing an OSS psychological warfare plan against Nazi atrocities, see Hackworth to Berle, February 10, 1943, and Berle to Wilson (OSS), February 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/794, box 2917; Stettinius to FDR, November 4, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1143, with attachments, box 2920; both in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
6.On Loy Henderson: Yergin, op. cit., pp. 26–27, 29; Loy Henderson, Oral History, Columbia University, 1972, pp. 1–6.
7.On Matthews: Yergin, op. cit., pp. 170, 443, sn21; H. Freeman Matthews, Oral History Interview, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO, 1976.
8.On John Hickerson: see Randolph Paul, op. cit., p. 224; John Hickerson, Oral History, November 10, 1972, January 26, 1973, and June 5, 1973, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO; “John Hickerson, Ambassador to 2 Nations, Dies,” Washington Post, January 19, 1989.
9.On R. Borden Reams: Reams to Hickerson, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/694, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., pp. 73–75, 99, 112–13.
10.On Elbridge Durbrow: see Randolph Paul, op. cit., p. 224; Hull to Biddle, 740.00116 EW 1939/1052, box 2920, and Durbrow to Hackworth, December 14, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1187, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; see also Elbridge Durbrow, Oral History, May 31, 1973, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.
11.Harvey diary cited in Tom Bower, Blind Eve to Murder. London: Granada, 1983, p. 44.
12.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 87–88.
13.Ibid., pp. 89–92.
14.Ibid., p. 92.
15.Cited in Bower, op. cit., p. 46.
16.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit.
17.Bower, op. cit., pp. 47–51.
18.Ibid.
19.Ibid., p. 46.
20.The account of the Riegner telegram that follows is indebted to studies by Walter Lequeur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp. 143–63; Arthur Morse, Six Million, op. cit., pp. 3–36; Bower, op. cit., pp. 46–52; David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., pp. 42–58.
21.Durbrow memorandum, August 13, 1942, 862.4016/2235, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
22.Winant to the President, August 5, 1942 (Secret), can be located as an attachment to December 9, 1942, Stanton memo, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
23.Berle to Secretary of State, June 22, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/502, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
24.Bower, op. cit., pp. 49–51. On Lippmann and Sweetser’s earlier role: Walter Lippmann, “The Peace Conference,” Yale Review, July 1919, pp. 711ff, and Walworth op. cit., p. 138, 69n; and Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, op. cit., pp. 128–70.
25.Bower, op. cit., pp. 47–49.
26.Loc. cit.
27.“A Proposal for a United Nations Commission on Atrocities” (Secret), attached to December 9, 1942, Stanton memo, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also Aide Memoire, September 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/557, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
28.Winant to Secretary of State, October 6, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/574, box 2916, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
29.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 105–106; Bower, op. cit., p. 58.
30.Bower, op. cit., p. 80.
31.Hilberg, op. cit., p. 266; Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 53.
32.Winant to Secretary of State, December 7, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/692, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
33.“Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942” and “Himmler Order Reported,” New York Herald Tribune, November 25, 1942.
34.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 94–99.
35.Ibid. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is a traditional exception to the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states over their nationals that can be traced to the seventeenth-century legal theorist Hugo Grotius, among others. As a practical matter, however, by 1939 this precedent had been so widely abused as a pretext for military aggression that very few of the international-law experts of the day considered the doctrine to be sufficiently robust to provide an effective foundation for prosecution of the types of crimes central to Nazi rule. For background, see Raymond Robin, Des Occupations Militaires en Dehours des Occupations de Guerre. Paris, 1913, and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1942. For examples of continuing controversy over the legal utility of theories of humanitarian intervention, see Ian Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” and Richard Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie,” in John Norton Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974; and Richard Falk (ed.), The International Law of Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1971.
36.Ibid., p. 99–104. For background on Glueck, see Contemporary Authors, vol. 5, pp. 445–46; Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment. New York: Knopf, 1944, and The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War. New York: Knopf, 1964. In addition to his work concerning war crimes, Glueck’s specialty was the study of juvenile delinquency.
37.UNWCC and the Laws of War, pp. 100–104; Glueck, op. cit., Criminals, pp. 11–18.
38.UNWCC and the Laws of War, pp. 100–104.
39.Loc. cit.
40.Ibid., p. 100.
41.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 44; Hull to Bern August 17, 1942, 862.4016/2235, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
42.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, op. cit., p. 51.
43.Loc. cit.; also, “Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942” and “Himmler Order Reported,” New York Herald Tribune, November 5, 1942.
44.McDermott (Division of Current Information) to Editor, Christian Century, Chicago, November 25, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/656, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
45.British record: British Foreign Office FO 371 30923/C11923, December 2, 1942, Public Record Office, London; and Bower, op. cit., p. 63. U.S. record: Clattenberg to Breckinridge Long, November 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1249 (cover note), box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
46.Reproduced at Bower, op. cit., p. 64.
47.Reams memorandum to Hickerson and Atherton, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/694, with attachments, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
48.Reams memorandum to Hickerson and Atherton, December 10, 1942, attached to ibid.
49.Reams to Hickerson and Atherton, ibid.
50.“Practical measures”: UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 111.
51.Achilles comment: Stanton memo, December 9, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/693, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also Theodore Achilles, Oral History, November 13 and December 18, 1972, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Chapter Eight
Katyn
1.See, for example, Sergo Mikoyan comments to Smithsonian Institution Wilson Center Colloquium, June 10, 1991; or Eva Seeber, Die Machte der Antihitlerkoalition und die Auseinandersetzung um Polen und die CSR 1941–1945. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1984, pp. 35–43. A similar trend is clearly manifest in the Anglo-Russian agreements of June 1942; see “Text of British White Paper, Including the Anglo-Russian Twenty-Year Treaty,” New York Times, June 12, 1942.
2.Germany, Massenmord in Winniza, n.d.; Alfred de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1989, pp. 162–80, 240–44.
3.Turner Catledge, “Our Policy Stated in Nazi-Soviet War,” New York Times, June 24, 1941. For Wall Street Journal editorial cam paign opposing aid to the USSR in the wake of the German invasion: “When Thieves Fall Out” (June 24), “Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee” (June 25), “Aid for the Comrades” (June 26), “Here We Can Be Practical” (June 28), “Tweedledum and Tweedledee” (July 2), all in 1941.
4.Henderson to Secretary of State, October 20, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/616, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5.See, for example, Henderson to Secretary of State, November 26, 1942, 740.00116 EW 1939/655, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
6.Loc. cit.
7.Loc. cit.
8.For the “official” version of the Darlan affair, see Murphy, op. cit., pp. 109–43. For a more critical perspective, see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War. New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 64–69. On the psychological warfare aspects of the Darlan affair, the unconditional surrender pledge, and their linkage to East-West confidence building, see Richard H. S. Crossman, “Supplementary Essay,” in Daniel Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 (reissue of 1949 text titled The Sykewar Campaign).
9.Richard Harris Smith, OSS. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1972, pp. 36–67 passim.
10.Kolko, op. cit., p. 110.
11.Richard Harris Smith, OSS op. cit., p. 214.
12.Ibid., p. 213.
13.“Aufzeichung über Aussprachen mit Mr. Bull [Dulles] und Mr. Roberts [Edmond Taylor],” National Archives microfilm of captured German records T-175, reel 458, frames 2975007–2975043.
Western historians have typically ignored or played down the significance of the Dulles/Hohenlohe encounters. A copy of Hohenlohe’s reports was captured and eventually made public by the Soviets in an effort to discredit Dulles after the war, and for that reason it has been occasionally denounced in the West as a forgery. In fact, however, the Hohenlohe reports are authentic; the U.S. Army captured its own set of the same documents, and those papers are today available in U.S. archives at the citation above.
14.Ibid.
15.Edmond Taylor, The Strategy of Terror. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940. See pp. 40–41 for Taylor’s published views on anti-Semitism and pp. 111–13 on German use of “peace offensive” tactics. Taylor’s book was republished in an updated version in 1942 by Pocket Books; see pp. 270–71 for Taylor’s views on factions within U.S. government.
16.Dulles’s claim of splitting tactics: OSS Headquarters to Bern, April 26, 1943 (Secret), file “D27 Bern Out June 42–Oct. 43,” Wash Reg. R&C-56, box 165, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC. Hohenlohe and Schellenberg’s claims: “Aufzeichung über Aussprachen mit Mr. Bull [Dulles] und Mr. Roberts [Edmond Taylor],” op. cit., and Walter Schellenberg, Hitler’s Secret Service (originally titled The Labyrinth). New York: Pyramid, 1958, pp. 369–83 passim.
17.See, for example: Dulles to OSS Headquarters and to Secretary of State, April 7, 1943 (Secret), IN D27 #1 June 42–July 43, box 171, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC. Dulles’s most frequent argument was that if the U.S. failed to act, there were “powerful elements” among the Nazis who “are prepared to cast their lot with Russia on the theory that a Communist Germany eventually could reestablish itself as a great power by aligning itself temporarily with Russia, whereas were Germany to be defeated and be subjected to occupation by the powers of the West, it would, for generations to come, be reduced to a power of secondary position” (loc. cit.).
18.OSS Headquarters cabled to Bern on March 10, 1943: “In reference to the [Hohenlohe] situation, your discussions and contacts have been brought to Adolf’s attention [Adolf Berle, then in charge of special war problems at the State Department]. Adolf is taking them across the street [to the White House].… The general reliability of the Max [Hohenlohe] referred to in our cable … has been confirmed through further information from Zulu sources [British intelligence]. Perhaps you will want to investigate this contact should we decide to begin the negotiation phase”; file “To Bern June 23, 1942—October 30, 1943, CD 1366-out 4438,” box 165, entry 134, RG 226 National Archives, Washington, DC. See also OSS to Bern, March 15, 1943 (Secret), loc. cit.
19.See, for example, Dulles writing on November 21, 1943: “There is a high degree of possibility that Himmler might use Max [Hohenlohe] for feelers of major importance … he can be of use to us.… His property interests are his main concern. He is aware that these interests are better guarded if he plays with our side than if he is too closely identified with the Nazis”; in Bern to OSS Headquarters, November 21, 1943 (Secret), Wash RG-RC-60-61, box 170, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
20.OSS Headquarters to Bern, April 26, 1943 (Secret), file “D27 Bern Out June 42–Oct. 43,” Wash Reg. R&C-56, box 165, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
21.Heinz Hohne (Richard Barry, trans.), Order of the Death’s Head. New York: Ballantine, 1971, pp. 591–609 passim; Schellenberg, op. cit., pp. 369–83 passim.
22.See, for example, Harry Rositzke, The KGB. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981; or more recently, Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy; The Story of Kim Philby. New York: Knopf, 1989.
23.The Hungarian secret service, for example, is said to have succeeded in intercepting and decrypting Dulles’s radio transmissions; see Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front. New York: Praeger, 1954, p. 285.
24.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Correspondence, op. cit., pp. 198–214.
25.Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens; Deutschsowietische Geheimgesprache 1941–1945. Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986.
26.A. Poltorak, Retribution; Notes of an Eye-witness of the Nuremberg Trial. Moscow: Novosti, 1976.
27.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 123. My special thanks to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum for permitting me access to their microfilm collection of records from the Extraordinary State Commission.
28.Matthews to Secretary of State, March 5, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/813, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; Hackworth to Welles, March 16, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/817, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
29.U.S. hears of German charges: Harrison to Secretary of State, April 15, 1943, 740.0011 EW 1939/29008, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For data on Katyn from the point of view of German propaganda and war crimes investigators, see de Zayas, op. cit., pp. 228–39, or Felix Lutzkendorf, “Das Waldchen von Katyn,” Das Reich, May 2, 1943.
30.J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre. Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1962, pp. 3–28. For later Soviet reversal discussed in footnote, see “Soviets Admit Blame in Massacre of Polish Officers in World War II,” New York Times, April 13, 1990.
31.Zawodny, ibid.
32.Ibid., pp. 31–41. For accounts of the complexities of Soviet-Polish relations during this period, see also Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1964, pp. 582–612, and Gabriel Kolko, op. cit., pp. 99–122.
33.Zawodny, op. cit., pp. 34–41.
34.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 112, 158–59; Durbrow to Hackworth, December 14, 1943 (with attachment), 740.00116 EW 1939/1187, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
35.Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986; U.S., Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988.
36.FDR to Secretary of State, April 9, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/994, box 2919, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. Pell’s letter to FDR concerning the lunch is attached to this note.
37.FDR to MacIntyre, December 14, 1942, and Welles to MacIntyre, December 17, 1942, FDR papers, Pell file, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; Kenneth Schwartz, “The United States and the War Crimes Commission: Stalemate and Checkmate,” April 1977, p. 16, now in the Herbert Pell papers, collection of Senator Claiborne Pell.
38.Hackworth to Secretary of State, March 16, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/817, box 2918, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; Hull to FDR, May 21 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/949A, box 2919, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
39.Dunn’s action: FDR to Secretary of State (with attachments), April 9, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/994, op. cit. Pell’s appointment: FDR to Pell, June 14, 1943 740.00116 EW 1939/1275, box 2922, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Chapter Nine
Silk Stocking Rebel
1.For background on Herbert Pell, see Leonard Baker, Brahmin in Revolt. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972; Michael Blayney, Democracy’s Aristocrat: The Life of Herbert Pell. Lanham, NY: University Press, 1986; Herbert Pell, Oral History (1951), Columbia University, NY; Herbert Pell, Commission and Omission (1945), unpublished manuscript, Pell papers, collection of Senator Claiborne Pell. I am grateful to Senator Pell for permitting me access to these papers and sharing with me his recollections of his father.
2.Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr. Crisis of the Old Order, 1919–1933. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957, p. 397; and E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Class in America. New York: Random House, 1964, p. 241. For similar sentiments, see Herbert Pell, “The Bankers Have Failed” Plain Talk magazine, December 1932, or Herbert Pell, “Muzzling the Ox,” Yankee magazine, both republished in pamphlet form in Pell papers.
3.Herbert Pell, Oral History, op. cit.; Baker, op. cit., pp. 176–237.
4.“‘Ah, Sweet Intrigue!’ Or, Who Axed State’s Prewar Soviet Division?” Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene, October 1984, p. 1; see also Frederic Propas, “Creating a Hard Line Towards Russia: The Training of State Department Soviet Experts 1927–1937,” Diplomatic History, Summer 1984, pp. 209–26; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 17–41.
5.Herbert Pell, Oral History, op. cit., p. 587.
6.On Green Hackworth: for a biographical summary, see National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 57, p. 110, Current Biography 1958, pp. 181–82, and the introductory notes to Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, Deparatment of State publication no. 1506, 1940; Washington DC: USGPO; reprint, New York: Garland Publishing, 1973.
7.Hackworth, ibid.
8.Ibid., vol. 6.
9.Pell, Oral History, op. cit., pp. 584–85. Hackworth suggested Preuss, a professor in international law, to Pell sometime in June 1943. Pell formally requested Preuss later that month, and evidently only later concluded that Preuss was cooperating with Hackworth in opposition to Pell; see Hackworth to Welles, June 29, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1003, box 2919, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
10.Herbert Pell, Commission and Omission, op. cit., pp. 2–3. For State Department correspondence on this issue: Pell to Welles, July 3, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1083; Shaw to Pell, July 10, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1004; Winant to Secretary of State, July 13, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/991; Hull to U.S. Embassy London, July 17, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/991; Hull to U.S. Embassy London, August 5, 1943 (draft), 740.00116 EW 1939/991; Kelchner to Shaw, August 12, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1036; all in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
11.Gerhard Hirschfeld, “Chronology of Destruction,” in Gerhard Hirschfeld, The Policies of Genocide. Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany. London: Allen & Unwin/German Histsorical Institute, 1986, pp. 153–55.
12.Schwartz, op. cit., p. 18.
13.FDR to Secretary of State, September 2, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1084, box 2920, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
14.Kelchner to Hackworth, September 10, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1079, box 2920, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
15.Schwartz, op. cit., p. 20.
16.Ibid. For details concerning the personnel and administrative structure of the UNWCC established at this time, see UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 113–27.
17.UNWCC and the Laws of War, p. 113.
18.Memorandum of conversation, November 9, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1178, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
19.Pell to Secretary of State, November 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1218, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
20.Hans Frank diary, Nuremberg document no. PS-2233, National Archives, Washington, DC.
21.Wilson (OSS) to Berle, February 4, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/794, box 2917, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
22.David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. New York: Pantheon, 1984, p. 44.
23.For State’s vetoes of OSS psychological warfare plan against Nazi atrocities, see Hackworth to Berle, February 10, 1943, and Berle to Wilson (OSS), February 11, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/794, box 2917, and Stettinius to FDR, November 4, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1143, with attachments, box 2920; both in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
24.Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957, pp. 206–34.
25.Churchill to Eden, October 21, 1943, British Foreign Office 371 34376/C12918, Public Record Office, London.
26.Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, p. 159.
27.Anthony Eden, Prime Minister’s papers, October 9, 1943, PREM 4 100/9, Public Record Office, London.
28.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 107–108.
29.Feis, op. cit.
30.Ibid., pp. 220–21.
31.Harriman to Secretary of State, November 16, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1157, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
32.Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder. London: Granada, 1983, p. 70.
33.Algiers to Secretary of State, November 23, 1943, 740.00116EW 1939/1169, and Secretary of State (vis. Bernard Guffler) to Amrep. Algiers, November 26, 1943, 740.00116EW 1939/1159, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
34.Ibid.
35.Randolph Paul, Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews, Jan. 13, 1944, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 693, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, pp. 212–29.
36.Morgenthau Diaries, op. cit., vol. 688–II, pp. 156–57; Wyman, op. cit., p. 185.
37.Wyman, op. cit., pp. 179–80ff.
38.Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed. Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 115–16.
39.Wyman, op. cit., p. 182.
Chapter Ten
“The Present Ruling Class of Germany”
1.Author’s interview with Bernard Bernstein, February 24, 1989.
2.Ibid.
3.Charles Burdick, An American Island in Hitler’s Reich. The Bad Nauheim Internment, Menlo Park, CA: Markgraf, 1987.
4.George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 175, 179.
5.Loc. cit.
6.Ibid., pp. 175–77.
7.On Durbrow, Hickerson, and Reams: David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. New York: Pantheon, 1984, p. 81; on Durbrow and Hickerson: Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 28–29, 301; and Weil, A Pretty Good Club. New York: Norton, 1978, op. cit., pp. 53–54, 84, 120 and passim.
8.Algiers to Secretary of State, November 23, 1943, 740.00116EW 1939/1169, and Secretary of State (vis. Bernard Guffler) to Amrep. Algiers, November 26, 1943, 740.00116EW 1939/1159; both in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also P. H. Gore-Booth to Hackworth and attached documents, in Committee on Europe, box 138, SWNCC/SANACC Committee files, RG 353, National Archives, Washington, DC (rejection of prosecutions for crimes against humanity, or for offenses against Jews inside Axis countries); Le 740.00116EW/4-1945 in file: “Surrender,” box 1, lot 61 D 33, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC (refusal to turn over war crimes suspects); “For Springer”: November 21, 1946, 740.00116EW/11-1446 and attachment (Aryanizations in Belgium not a war crime).
9.See Kennan’s comments, for example, in Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 176–77.
10.Ibid., p. 118.
11.For example, ibid, p. 123.
12.US Army Counter Intelligence Corps dossier XE000318-I6A009 Henschel, Oscar R., available via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft. Meade, MD.
13.Oswald Pohl affidavit, October 7, 1946, Nuremberg document no. NI-1064, National Archives microfilm T-301, roll 10, frame 001112; Kranefuss to Himmler, April 21, 1943, at Berlin Document Center; copy in author’s collection.
14.Ibid.
15.Eichholtz, Kriegswirtschaft, op. cit., p. 221.
16.Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Amstalt, 1982, pp. 383–409; Wolfgang Schumann, “Politische Aspekte der Nachkriegsplanungen des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus in der Endphase des zweiten Weltkrieges,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 1979 no. 1, pp. 395–408; Wolfgang Schumann, “Nachkriegsplanungen der Reichsgruppe Industrie im Herbst 1944, Ein Dokumentation,” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Berlin: Akademie, 1972, pp. 259–96.
17.Lindemann, in a postwar interrogation by U.S. intelligence, discusses a factional split in the Himmlerkreis over these issues, apparently leading to the establishment of the industry planning groups discussed in the previous source note. See “Preliminary Interrogation Report: Lindemann, Karl,” September 12, 1945, in Lindemann INSCOM dossier.
18.Tabitha Petran, “Key Names in Nazi Peace Plot and British Banking Contacts,” New York Post, February 3, 1944; Heinz Pol, “IG Farben’s Peace Offer,” The Protestant, June–July 1943, p. 41; Jonathan Marshall, Bankers and the Search for a Separate Peace During World War II, unpublished monograph, 1981; Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and Cromwell. New York: William Morrow, 1988, p. 144.
Schumann reports that German industrialists placed special emphasis on contacts through the Bank for International Settlements; see Wolfgang Schumann, “Die Wirtschaftspolitische Überlebensstrategie des deutschen Imperialismus in der Endphase des zweiten Weltkrieges,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, no. 6, 1979, p. 508.
19.Richard Harris Smith, OSS. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1972, pp. 204–41; Anthony Cave Brown (ed.), The Secret War Report of the OSS. New York: Berkeley, 1976, pp. 250–55.
20.Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens; Deutschsowietische Geheimgesprache 1941–1945. Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986.
21.On terms of the “peace” offers, see Heinz Hohne, The Order of the Death’s Head. New York: Ballantine, 1969, pp. 591–99 (in original German as Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Hamburg: Verlag der Spiegel, 1966). See also Bernd Martin, “Deutsche Oppositions- und Widerstandkreise und die Frage eines separaten Friedensschlusses im zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Klaus-Jürgen Müller (Hrsg.), Der deutsche Widerstand 1933–1945. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1986.
22.Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 110.
23.Turner Catledge, “Our Policy Stated in Nazi-Soviet War,” New York Times, June 24, 1941.
24.Raymond G. O’Connor, Diplomacy for Victory; FDR and Unconditional Surrender. New York: Norton, 1971, pp. 33–35, 41–43, 50–54; Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, op. cit., pp. 217–34.
25.Albert Speer, Infiltration. New York: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 117–32.
26.Weinmann, Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem, presents data in tabular form concerning the liquidation of hundreds of business projects in the East in which the surviving prisoners were transferred to extermination camps.
Chapter Eleven
The Trials Begin
1.On Krasnodar trials and filming of executions: Standley to Secretary of State, September 9, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1086, box 2920, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. On gas vans: Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Harper, 1981. p. 219; Ohlendorf affidavit, November 5, 1945, Nuremberg document no. PS-2620; Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945. New York: Avon, 1964 pp. 641, 669–70.
2.The People’s Verdict, A Full Report of the Proceedings at the Krasnodar and Kharkov German Atrocity Trials. London, 1944, pp. 45–124; “Gallows for Germans Are Raised in Kharkov,” Daily Express (London), July 6, 1944.
3.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 107–108.
4.Harriman to Secretary of State (reporting Morgenthau comments), November 16, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1157, with attached notes by Dunn and Stettinius, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5.“USA.-Luftgangster nennen sich selbst ‘Mordverein’,” Völkischer Beobachter, December 21, 1943. See also Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 539–45. For Western intelligence analysis of German announcements concerning Allied war crimes, see Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis, White Plains, NY: Row Peterson & Co., and Rand Corporation, 1959, pp. 161–70. For captured World War I–era German documentation concerning war crimes issues, see U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945 from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949, p. 1025, entries 47, 48, and 49.
6.Hull to American Legation Bern, December 24, 1943, attached to 740.00116 EW 1939/1159, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. The cover note clearly links the announcement to the Kharkov trial: Hull “refers to press and radio reports that German authorities intend to try as war criminals American aviators held as prisoners of war by Germany, allegedly upon a basis of a precedent established by the Soviet authorities. Request Swiss [government] to report fully by telegraph regarding this matter. You may assure Swiss that this [U.S.] Government is not (repeat not) proceeding against German prisoners of war along lines similar to above reports.…” The Swiss government was serving as an intermediary between the U.S. and German governments, and was expected to pass this message to Berlin.
7.Hull to American Embassy Moscow, December 31, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1249A, and Hull to American Embassy London, January 4, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1249B, both in RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
8.Stettinius to Dunn and Matthews, January 28, 1944, and Dunn to Stettinius, February 1, 1944; attachments to Harriman to Secretary of State, November 16, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1157, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
9.Algiers to Secretary of State, November 23, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1169, and Secretary of State (via. Bernard Guffler) to Amrep. Algiers, November 26, 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1159, both in box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
10.Ibid. 740.00116 EW 1939/1249B. For materials on death of Stalin’s son, see “Abschrift an den Lagerkommandant,” April 14, 1943 (reporting on incident, with photos and accompanying German correspondence), now at 840.414/8-145, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; Svetlana Alliluyeva (Priscilla Johnson McMillan, trans.), Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper, 1967, pp. 157–63.
11.Herbert Pell, Oral History (1951), Columbia University, pp. 538–39.
12.Loc. cit.
13.Ibid., pp. 569–70.
14.Gallman to Secretary of State, October 26 1943, 740.00116 EW 1939/1150, box 2921, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC, reports on a British Institute of Public Opinion poll released on October 25. In response to the question, “At the end of the war, what do you think should be done with the Axis leaders?” respondents answered:
Percent | |
Let them go, ignore them |
1 |
They won’t be found |
1 |
Leave them to their own peoples |
1 |
They should be put on trial |
18 |
Exile them, imprison them, put them in solitary confinement |
11 |
Hand them over to the Jews, the Poles and others who have suffered |
4 |
Shoot them |
40 |
Nothing is horrible enough, torture them |
15 |
Miscellaneous or no opinion |
9 |
100 |
15.Pell to FDR, January 27, 1944, with a cover note from Roosevelt to Hull requesting that State draft a reply for FDR’s signature, 740.00116 EW 1939/1305, box 2922, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
16.Pell to Hull, January 28, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1306, box 2922, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
17.FDR to Pell, February 12, 1944, attached to 740.00116 EW 1939/1305 (ibid.).
18.Pell, Oral History, op. cit., passim.
19.FDR to Pell, February 12, 1944, attached to 740.00116 EW 1939/1305 (ibid.).
20.See Hull to Pell, February 10, 1944 (Hull’s reply to Pell’s January 28 letter), attached to 740.00116 EW 1939/1306 (ibid.); Stettinius to Pell, February 15, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1299; FDR to Pell March 1, 1944, attached to 740.00116 EW 1939/1340; and Hull to Pell, March 15, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1315; all at box 2922, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
21.UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., p. 141.
22.Stettinius to Pell, February 15, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1299; and Hull to Pell, March 15, 1944, 740.00116 EW 1939/1315; both at box 2922, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
23.Pell, Oral History, op. cit., p. 584.
24.Pell, Omission and Commission, op. cit., (see Chap. 9), pp. 15–17, 27; Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 31–33; Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder. London: Granada, 1983, p. 81.
25.Bower, ibid., p. 78.
26.British Foreign Office, Hurst to Simon, April 1, 1944, FO 371 38993/C4637, Public Record Office, London; Bower, op. cit., p. 78.
27.Gerhard Hirschfeld, “Chronology of Destruction,” in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany. London: Allen & Unwin/German Historical Institute, 1986.
28.Bower, op. cit., pp. 84, 476.
29.Ibid., pp. 85–86.
30.Werth, Russia at War, op. cit., pp. 806–15.
31.Ibid., p. 814.
Chapter Twelve
Morgenthau’s Plan
1.John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of War 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917, pp. 329–33, 338–40. For Kennan’s version: George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 164–87.
2.Harley Notter (U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Affairs), Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945. Washington, DC: USGPO/Department of State, 1950, pp. 207–27 passim. Policy slogan: Blum, ibid., p. 332. Kennan presents his point of view concerning war crimes as a direct response to Morgenthau’s (and apparently Roosevelt’s) “pipedreams of collaboration with the Russians” in postwar reconstruction of Germany; see Kennan, op. cit., p. 178.
3.Blum, op. cit., pp. 338–40.
4.Ibid., p. 346.
5.Fred Kaplan, “Scientists at War. The Birth of the RAND Corporation,” American Heritage, June–July 1983, p. 53.
6.Blum, op. cit., pp. 333–43.
7.Ibid., pp. 340–41.
8.Schwartz, The United States and the War Crimes Commission, op. cit.
9.Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg. New York: New American Library, 1977, p. 22; Blum; op. cit., p. 334.
10.Smith, ibid., p. 23.
11.Franklin Roosevelt, “Memorandum for the Secretary of War,” August 26, 1944. Lot: Central European Division, box 4, file “German Handbook—SHAEF,” RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
12.Ibid.
13.Henry Morgenthau, Diaries, vol. 768, pp. 157–65, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
14.Ibid.
15.Blum, op. cit., p. 343.
16.David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. New York: Pantheon, 1984. p. 258; Schwartz, op. cit., p. 37.
17.Frederick Kuh, “War Crimes Group Lists But 350 Names: Hitler, Himmler, Other Nazi Bigwigs Omitted by Commission in London,” Washington Post, September 17, 1944. Hull quickly (and inaccurately) denied the report: “Hitler on List of Criminals, Hull Declares,” Washington Post, September 19, 1944; but see Drew Pearson column “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Atlanta Journal (and many other papers), October 8, 1944. See also “Nine Months Work on War Crimes: Case Against Hitler Not Yet Being Prepared,” Daily Telegraph (London), August 31, 1944.
18.Kuh, “War Crimes Group …,” ibid.
19.Pell, Oral History, op. cit., p. 590.
20.Smith, op. cit., p. 26.
21.Ibid., pp. 12–19 and passim.
22.On Glueck and Roosevelt precedents prior to Bernays: Glueck, War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment. New York: Knopf, 1944. pp. 37, 39; Franklin Roosevelt, “Memorandum for the Secretary of War,” August 26, 1944. Lot: Central European Division, box 4, file “German Handbook—SHAEF,” RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For discussion of significance of conspiracy charges to Nuremberg prosection: Smith, loc. cit., and “War Crimes Prosecutions: Planning Memorandum” (Secret), May 17, 1945, 740.00116EW/S-2445, box 3599, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
23.Blum, op. cit., pp. 378–79.
24.Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 45–50; Michael Blayney, “Herbert Pell, War Crimes and the Jews,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly, June 1976, pp. 347–49.
25.Schwartz, op. cit., p. 45.
26.Blayney, op. cit., p. 348.
27.P. H. Gore-Booth to Hackworth, with attachments, December 21, 1944, box 138, Committee on Europe, SWNCC/SANACC Committee files, RG 353, National Archives, Washington, DC. Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Obligations of Theater Commanders in Relation to War Crimes,” CCS 705/1, December 17, 1944, attached to Gore-Booth; and enclosure A, p. 8.
28.For Department of Justice opposition and reversal, see Smith, op. cit., pp. 33–34.
29.Gore-Booth to Hackworth, op. cit.
30.Ibid.; and attachment, Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Obligations of Theater Commanders …,” op. cit.
31.Pell, Oral History, op. cit., pp. 589–90.
32.Blayney, op. cit., p. 351; Victor Bernstein, “Who Are the U.S. Officials Seeking to Sabotage Trial of Nazi Killers?” PM, January 28, 1945.
33.Blayney, op. cit., pp. 351–52.
34.Loc. cit.
35.Saul Padover, Experiment in Germany. The Story of an American Intelligence Officer. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, pp. 222–25.
36.Loc. cit.
37.Loc. cit.
38.Cedric Belfrage, Seeds of Destruction. New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1954, p. 38. Belfrage, a dedicated man of the left who was also a U.S. military government officer in Aachen specializing in newspapers, propaganda, and public opinion, offers an anecdotal account of the same events discussed by Padover. He describes his account as “factbased” fiction, so obviously this text can be used by historians only with great caution. The public opinion statistics are accurate, however. For more on Belfrage’s important role in encouraging the German left during the early occupation years in Germany, see Emil Carlebach, Zensur ohne Schere. Die Grunderiahre der ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ 1945–1947. Frankfurt: Roderberg-Verlag, 1985.
39.Padover, op. cit., pp. 249–52.
40.Loc. cit.
41.Loc. cit.
“This Needs to Be Dragged Out Into the Open”
1.Bern to OSS headquarters and division chiefs, December 26, 1944 (Secret); Bern November 1, 1944–January 31, 1945, Wash Sect R&C 78, folder 19, box 278, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2.Ibid.
3.See, for example, Robert Joyce (Central Intelligence Group) to Walter Dowling (State Dept.), “Subject: Former SS Colonel Dollmann,” December 1, 1946 (Top Secret), 740.00116EW/12-146; or Robert Murphy to Secretary of State, August 11, 1947 (Top Secret), 740.00116EW/8-1147; both obtained via Freedom of Information Act. For details concerning Dulles’s denials, see the source notes in chapter 14.
4.Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944. New York: Knopf, 1972, p. 242.
5.John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of War 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. p. 394.
6.Ibid., pp. 416–18.
7.Ibid. Robert Murphy helped sponsor General Lucius Clay’s appointment as Dwight Eisenhower’s chief deputy for military government in March 1945. Clay soon rose to become the military governor in the U.S. occupation zone of Germany and the commander of U.S. forces in Germany; see Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950.
8.Washington Post, January 31, 1945.
9.JCS 1067 4.c., quoted in “Statements of policies and directives relating to foreign and domestic cartels,” file: “Cartels, Decartelization,” box 55, Legal Advice Branch, OMGUS Legal Division, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
10.Loc. cit.
11.For example, German banking had fewer structural restrictions on its activities than those provided for in the U.S. under the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), although theoretically the occupation government could have remanded any particular banking action. See “Removals of Officials from German Banks and Companies: [Legal] Opinion,” n.d. (Spring 1945), in file: “Denazification,” box 229, OMGUS/FINAD, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. For an overview of U.S. postwar banking policy in Germany up to 1952, see U.S., Office of the High Commission for Germany [HICOG], Historical Division (Rodney Loehr), The West German Banking System (Restricted), n.p. (HICOG Historical Division, Bad Godesberg-Mehlem), 1952.
12.“Removal of Undesirable Personnel from the German Financial System—Denazification,” March 19, 1945 (Secret), and “Schedule of Financial Personnel” (Secret), n.d., in file: “Denazification,” box 229, OMGUS/FINAD, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
13.Ibid.
Chapter Fourteen
Sunrise
1.See, for example, Robert Joyce (Central Intelligence Group) to Walter Dowling, “Subject: Former SS Colonel Dollmann” (Top Secret), December 1, 1946, obtained in sanitized form via the Freedom of Information Act, 740.00116EW/12-146, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC; copy in author’s collection; Murphy to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/8-1147 (Top Secret, No Distribution), August 11, 1947, RG 59, National Archives, obtained via Freedom of Information Act in 1990.
2.Ildefonso Cardinal Schuster, Gli ultimi tempi di un regime. Milan, 1946, p. 35, as reported in Eugen Dollmann (J. Maxwell Brownjohn, trans.), The Interpreter; Memoirs of Doktor Eugen Dollmann. London: Hutchinson, 1967, pp. 340–41.
3.For a discussion of the “dual containment” thesis, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany; John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991.
4.Dollmann, op. cit., p. 340.
5.Ibid., p. 241.
6.Ibid., p. 342. For Parilli’s own account, see Ferruccio Lanfranchi, La Resa Degli Ottocentomila, con le Memorie Autografe del Barone Luigi Parrilli. Milano: Rizzoli, 1948.
7.Dollmann, op. cit., p. 342.
8.See Allen Dulles’s self-congratulatory account, The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper, 1966. For more reliable accounts, see Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Die Operationszonen “Alpenvorland” und “Adriatisches Kustenland” 1943–1945. Wien: Verlag Bruder Hollinek/Österreichischen Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, 1969 (based mainly on German records); Jochen Lang, Der Adjutant: Karl Wolff, Der Mann zwishen Hitler und Himmler, Berlin: Herbig, 1985, pp. 259–306; and particularly Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise; The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 190. Gabriel Kolko was among the first Western historians to recognize the pivotal importance to the Soviets of the Italian surrender negotiations; see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War, New York: Random House, 1978. pp. 375–79.
9.Nuremberg doc. no. 2207, cited in Smith and Agarossi, loc. cit; see also “Summary Prepared by W. M. Chase on ‘The Role of the Wolff Group in Operation Sunrise,’” March 10, 1947 (Top Secret), 740.00116EW/11-1047, box 3625, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
10.Smith and Agarossi, op. cit., p. 91.
11.Molotov letter to Harriman, March 16, 1945, published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Correspondence, op. cit., pp. 296–97, 78n.
12.“Personal and Top Secret for Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt” (received March 25, 1945), ibid., pp. 198–99.
13.“Personal and Secret from Marshal J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr. F. Roosevelt,” March 27, 1945, and second Stalin note of March 29, 1945, ibid., pp. 199–201.
14.Two notes marked “Personal and Top Secret for Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt” (both received April 1, 1945), ibid., pp. 201–205.
15.“Personal, Most Secret from J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr. Roosevelt,” April 3, 1945, ibid., pp. 205–206.
16.See, for example, German proposal outlined in OSS cable Suhling to Glavin and Ryan, March 6, 1945 (Top Secret), OSS Sunrise I-XXX, entry 110, folder e2, box 2, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
17.“Personal and Top Secret for Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt,” received April 13, 1945, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 214.
18.Key observers convinced that Dulles offered de facto amnesty to the Wolff group: Murphy to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/8-1147 (Top Secret, No Distribution), August 11, 1947, RG 59, National Archives, obtained via Freedom of Information Act. “Interrogation Report on SS Standartenfuehrer Rauff, Walter,” May 15, 1945 (Confidential), in U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps file no. D-216719, Rauff, Walter, obtained via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD. Soviet comments: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Correspondence, op. cit., pp. 198–99, 296–97, sn78.
19.Smith and Agarossi, op. cit., p. 145.
20.Ibid., p. 214, 103n.
21.Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. op. cit., p. 89.
22.Ibid., pp. 90–91.
23.Loc. cit.
24.Loc. cit.
25.For a good summary of early Yugoslav requests, see Carmel Offie to Secretary of State, “Alleged Yugoslav War Criminals” (with attachments), August 28, 1945, 740.00116EW/8-2845, box 3602, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
26.For a partisan but nonetheless well-documented discussion, see Vladimir Dedijer, Jasenovac, der jugoslawische Auschwitz und der Vatikan. Freiburg: Ahriman-Verlag, 1988.
27.Vincent LaVista, “Illegal Immigration Movements in and Through Italy,” with appendixes (Top Secret), FW 800.0128/5-1547, National Archives, Washington, DC.
28.For incident discussed in footnote, see Serbian Benevolent Society to Secretary of State, September 1, 1945, with attached routing slip to Military Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, etc., 740.0016EW/9-145, box 3602, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
29.Supreme Commander Allied Forces, HQ Caserta, Italy, to War Department, July 27, 1945, in CCAC 193/4, Committee on Europe, SWNCC/SANACC Committee files, box 138, RG 353, National Archives, Washington, DC.
30.Combined Civil Affairs Committee, “Policy as to Disposition of War Criminals, Renegades, and Quislings,” with enclosures, August 19, 1945, in CCAC 193/5, Committee on Europe, SWNCC/SANACC Committee files, box 138, RG 353, National Archives, Washington, DC.
31.Cabot to Secretary of State, June 12, 1947 (Top Secret), 740.00116EW/6-1147, box 3623, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For a second, similar Cabot protest, see 740.0016 EW/6-2547 in the same box.
32.State action: cover note attached to June 12 protest, ibid. Formal protests on related disputes to the U.S. State Department from other governments include: 740.00116EW/12-547 (Netherlands), 740.00116EW/2147 (Poland), 740.00116EW/11-1447 (Czechoslovakia), 740.00116EW/1-848 (Poland), 740.00116EW/10-3147 (France), 740.00116EW/12-1947 (Netherlands), 740.00116EW/6-2449 (France), 740.00116EW/6-16-49 (Belgium), all at RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
33.“Yugoslav War Crimes Extradition Request: Dr. Nikola Rusinovic,” September 9, 1947 (Secret), 740.00116EW/9-947, box 3624, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For a detailed and well-documented discussion of the problem of escaped Yugoslav war criminals, including their postwar role, see Mark Aarons, Sanctuary. Nazi Fugitives in Australia. Port Melbourne: Mandarin-Australia, 1989.
34.Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
35.Ibid., p. 4.
36.Ibid., p. 9.
37.Ibid., p. 20.
38.Ibid., pp. 23–27.
39.Loc. cit.
40.Bethell, op. cit., pp. 31–34.
41.Jackson to Byrnes, July 4, 1945, 740.00116EW/7-445 (Confidential), box 3600, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
42.Loc. cit.
Chapter Fifteen
White Lists
1.Bern to OSS headquarters and division chiefs, November 3, 1944 (Secret), Bern, November 1, 1944–January 31, 1945, Wash. Sect. R&C 78, folder 19, box 278, entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2.Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: The OSS and the Origins of the CIA. New York: Basic Books, 1983, pp. 222–26, provides what is perhaps the most balanced and thorough evaluation of Dulles’s effectiveness as a source of intelligence. For internal OSS criticisms of Dulles cited in footnote, see OSS HQ to Bern, January 22, 1944 (Secret), Washington Register R&C 56, box 165; Ustravic (London) to OSS HQ and to Bern, May 26, 1944 (Secret), Bern-London May-October 1944 in B. L. London, box 157: both in entry 134, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC. For OSS War Diary comment: European Theater of Operations, Secret Intelligence War Diary, Reports Division, p. 314, vol. 8, book 11, entry 91, box 14, RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC. For Dulles’s version, see Allen Dulles, Germany’s Underground. New York: Macmillan, 1947, and The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper, 1966. For a well-informed eyewitness’s reply to Dulles’s claim that he was effective in bringing about a German surrender, see Max Corvo, The OSS in Italy 1942–1945. New York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 242–72 passim.
3.Probably the best overall source on the official aspects of the Bank for International Settlements’ activities during this period is the Bank for International Settlements Annual Reports, 1938–1943. Basle: BIS.
4.Eleanor Lansing Dulles, The Bank for International Settlements at Work. New York: Macmillan, 1932.
5.For a careful dissection of the Dulles business ties to European companies, see Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Free Press, 1982, pp. 123–32.
6.On McKittrick: see, for example, Robert Joyce to Lewis Gable (OSS commander for France, 1945), August 20, 1945, entry 148, folder 2046, box 119, “500 fides,” RG 226, National Archives, Washington, DC.
7.Confidential source; author’s collection.
8.See BIS, Annual Reports, 1938–1939, op. cit., Annex 1, “Central Banks or Other Banking Institutions Possessing Right of Representation and of Voting.”
9.“World Bank [sic] to Release Gold Looted by Germany,” New York Times, May 15, 1948; “The Case of Thomas McKittrick,” Prevent World War III, September-October 1948.
10.United Nations War Crimes Commission case no. 7347 (Polish case No. 1366), Poland v. Dr. Paersch, Reichsbank Berlin, et al. A copy of this case is available at the UNWCC archives in New York, or at Springer to Secretary of State, February 27, 1948, 740.00116/EW 2-2748, box 3628, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
11.Ibid. On currency clearing, see Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1944, pp. 58–63, 127–28; Thomas Reveille (Rifat Tirana), The Spoil of Europe. New York: Norton, 1941, pp. 89–101, 121–29, 138–47; Henry Bloch and Bert Hoselitz, Economics of Military Occupation. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. 5–27.
12.Reveille, loc. cit.; Bloch and Hoselitz, loc. cit.
13.UNWCC case no. 7347, Poland v. Dr. Paersch, Reichsbank Berlin, et al, op. cit. For estimate of German war budget: Klein, op. cit., p. 256, table 65.
14.For British estimate of scope of looting: “Big Sums Exacted of Occupied Lands,” New York Times, October 29, 1943. The estimate is based on wartime exchange rates.
15.The indictment’s extended discussion of the complex clearing process in Poland has been simplified slightly here for clarity’s sake. German Finance Minister Funk eventually admitted his role in the expropriation via the clearing system, then retracted this confession. See “Testimony of Walter Funk,” October 22, 1945, pp. 19–22, Nuremberg doc. no. PS-3545, RG 238, National Archives, Washington, DC. “World Bank [sic] to Release Gold Looted by Germany,” New York Times, May 15, 1948.
16.Allen Dulles to Joseph M. Dodge, September 20, 1945, file: “Johannes Tuengeler,” OMGUS-FINAD, box 237, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
Also on Dulles’s list was Robert Pferdemenges, a Cologne banker with a reputation for hostility to Nazism who ended up as German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s most powerful advisor and confidant. Dulles said that Pferdemenges had “made such compromises during the Nazi regime as were necessary to maintain his business” and ran an Aryanized banking house, but he had helped Jewish friends at the time he took over their businesses. The most important of these appears to have been Eric Warburg, who eventually reentered a banking partnership with Pferdemenges after the war.
17.“Victor Over Inflation; Dr. Karl Blessing,” New York Times, January 3, 1970.
18.Affidavit of Oswald Pohl, October 7, 1946, Nuremberg document no. NI-1064, National Archives microfilm T-301, roll 10, frames 001112-001114.
19.Kranefuss to Himmler, April 21, 1943, Berlin Document Center; copy in author’s collection.
20.Karl Blessing, Fragebogen, August 31, 1946, in U.S. Army CIC dossier no. XE 170459 89291-3410, “Blessing, Karl,” obtained via Freedom of Information Act, U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD. Blessing’s NSDAP record is in the Berlin Document Center, no. 5917306.
21.Ibid.
22.Ibid.
23.Berthold Gerber, Staatliche Wirtschaftslenkung in den besetzten und annektierten Östgebieten waehren des zweiten Weltkrieges. Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungfragen, 1959, pp. 118–20; Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981, pp. 242–43; Timothy Patrick Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire. German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union 1942–1943, New York: Praeger, 1988, p. 29; Reveille, op. cit., pp. 250–53; Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, op. cit., pp. 407–11, 477–87, with table of Kontinentale Öl subsidary companies at p. 480; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987, pp. 253–65. For the role of Hermann Abs in Kontinentale Öl, see OMGUS Deutsche Bank, pp. 246–51; for an account of Hitler’s direct sponsorship of the enterprise, see OMGUS Dresdner Bank, pp. 66–70. For an overview of the significance of petroleum in German war strategy, see Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, Oil and War. New York: William Morrow, 1987; Nahostliches Erdöl, zur Geopolitik der Europaischen Erdolversorgung,” Das Reich, September 1, 1940; Walter Greiling, “Öl—Mettgesetzte Weltmacht,” Das Reich, June 23, 1940.
24.Dallin, op. cit., p. 243.
25.International Tracing Service, Verzeichnis der Haftstatten unter der Reichsführer-SS 1933–1945. Geneve: Red Cross International Committee, 1979; copy in author’s collection. For an excellent and easier-to-access source, see Martin Weinmann with Anne Kaiser and Ursula Krause-Schmitt (eds.), Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem. Frankfurt: Ausgabe bei Zweitausendeins, 1990.
26.“Re: Solution of the Jewish Question in Galicia,” June 30, 1943, with enclosed report, translated as International Military Tribunal prosecution document no. L-18, U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (red series), vol. 7. Washington: USGPO, 1946, pp. 755–70. See particularly Hoffman correspondence concerning terms for use of Jews in forced labor, October 23, 1942 (Secret), pp. 761–63; quote in text is from p. 762.
27.Bohdan Wytwycky, The Other Holocaust. Washington, DC: Novak Report, 1980, p. 49. The Nazis eventually executed many of the laborers who survived the camps. According to International Red Cross reports, for example, of about 800 prisoners surviving at Kontinentale Öl’s Borisow camp when it closed in March, 1943, “about 80 men and 20 women were evacuated to Smolensk, the rest were shot.” The Smolensk center was also a forced labor camp. See International Tracing Service, Catalogue of Camps and Prisons in Germany and German-Occupied Territories, 1939–1945, (first issue). Arolsen: International Tracing Service Records Branch, 1949; reproduced in Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem, op. cit., p. 699.
28.Nuremberg doc. no. NG-2586, op. cit.
29.Spezial-Archiv der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Wer Leitet? Die Männer der Wirtschaft und der einschlagigen Verwaltung 1941–1942. Berlin: Hoppenstedt, 1942, p. 77; see also Karl Blessing, Fragebogen, August 31, 1946, in U.S. Army CIC dossier no. XE 170459 89291–3410, “Blessing, Karl,” obtained via Freedom of Information Act, U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.
30.See Kontinentale Öl’s 1943 correspondence with the SS’s Deutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe GmbH on this project, National Archives microfilm T-976, roll 6, frames 001080–001110.
31.“Karl Blessing Is Dead at 71; Led West German Central Bank,” New York Times, April 27, 1971, and “Who’s Who in Foreign Business,” Fortune, February 1958.
32.Ibid.
33.Ibid. For data in footnote, see Blessing, Fragebogen, op. cit. Not all of Dulles’s interventions on behalf of favored Germans were so successful, particularly when outsiders raised questions about his judgment. Several of his key agents fell afoul of postwar denazification authorities. See Laqueur and Breitman, Breaking the Silence, op. cit., pp. 231–39.
34.John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971, pp. 177–83.
35.Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg. New York: New American Library, 1977, pp. 266–84.
36.Murphy to Secretary of State, December 10, 1945, Harrison to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945; both at file “War Crimes—International Military Tribunal, folder a#1,” lot 61 D 33, box 1, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
37.On Gisevius’s role, see Smith, op. cit., p. 271.
38.On Gafencu’s role; see Davidson, Trial of the Germans, op. cit., p. 34.
39.Smith, op. cit., pp. 270–72. Schacht’s attorney told the media that U.S. Consul Sam Woods (who also played a role in the later Horthy affair) offered Schacht a deal in 1939 under which the banker would resign from Hitler’s government “with a promise he would be restored to power as post-war German official”; see Acheson to U.S. Legation, Bern, May 7, 1946 (Top Secret), 740.00116 EW/5-746, box 3615, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
40.See, for example, Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986.
41.For documentary background concerning Horthy’s role in aggression and war crimes, see Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, op. cit., pp. 361–67.
42.Hodgson (UNWCC) to Secretary of State transmitting copy of the Yugoslav case against Horthy, January 15, 1946, in file “War Crimes—Horthy,” lot 61 D 33, box 4, RG 59, National Archives; and Schoenfeld to Secretary of State, September 10, 1945 (Secret), in file: “War Crimes—Horthy,” lot 61 D 33, box 4, RG 59, National Archives. For U.S. agreement concerning return of criminals, see UNWCC and the Laws of War, op. cit., pp. 107–108.
43.Unsigned U.S. Embassy message to Secretary of State, November 29, 1945 (Secret), in file: “War Crimes—Horthy,” lot 61 D 33, box 4, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Chapter Sixteen
Prisoner Transfers
1.Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews. New York: Bantam, 1975, pp. 512–17. For the events surrounding Horthy’s belated order halting deportations to Auschwitz after some 430,000 Jews had been shipped to the camp, see Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, pp. 262–66. For an unusually detailed, Ceauşescu-era indictment of Horthy drawn from what would otherwise be unavailable Romanian documentation, see Mihai Fatu and Mircea Musat (eds.), Horthyist-Fascist Terror in Northwestern Romania 1940–1944, Bucharest: Meridiane, 1986.
2.Murphy to Secretary of State, with attached reply, September 1, 1945 (Secret), 740 00116 EW/9-145, box 3602, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
3.AE Donovan (Legal Advisor’s staff) to U.S. Embassy, Moscow, October 31, 1945, 740.00116EW/10-3145, box 3606, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
4.Murphy to Secretary of State, with attached reply, September 1, 1945 (Secret), 740.00116 EW/9-145, box 3602, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. Note role of Army intelligence (G-2) in this exchange. Schoenfeld to Secretary of State, September 10, 1945 (Secret), in file “War Crimes—Horthy,” lot 61 D 33, box 4, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5.Schoenfeld to Secretary of State, September 10, 1945; ibid.
6.Murphy to Secretary of State, January 8, 1946 (Secret), 740.00116EW/1-845, box 3610, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
7.U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, “Surrender of Nicholas Horthy to Yugoslavia for Trial as a War Criminal” (Secret), January 22, 1947, 740.00116EW/1-2247, box 3621, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
8.Fite to Fahy, October 11, 1946, in file: “War Crimes—Horthy,” box 4, D 33 lot 61, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
9.Medical report attached to U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, “Surrender of Nicholas Horthy to Yugoslavia for Trial as a War Criminal” (Secret), January 22, 1947, op. cit.
10.Hodgson to Secretary of State, March 6, 1946 (report on February UNWCC activities), 740.00116EW/3-646, box 3613, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. For material in footnote, see, for example, Fite to Fahy, October 11, 1946, in file: “War Crimes—Horthy,” box 4, lot 61 D 33, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
11.U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, “Surrender of Nicholas Horthy to Yugoslavia for Trial as a War Criminal” (Secret), January 22, 1947, op. cit.
12.Embassy of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia to U.S. Secretary of State, March 3, 1948, with State’s reply of March 15, 740. 00116EW/3-348, box 3628, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
13.Ibid.
14.OSS reports quoted in Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 188.
15.Murphy to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/8-1147 (Top Secret, No Distribution), August 11, 1947, obtained via Freedom of Information Act, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
16.For a summary, see Simon Wiesenthal Center (Los Angeles), SS Col. Walter Rauff. The Church Connection, 1943–1947—the first to plausibly link Dulles and Bicchierai to Rauff’s escape. Despite the overall good quality of this study, it erroneously concluded that Dulles had been Rauff’s U.S. interrogator on the basis of the initials “A.J.D.” appearing in an Army Counter Intelligence Corps report. Dulles’s initials are A.W.D. See particularly “Interrogation Report on SS Standartenfuehrer Rauff, Walter,” May 15, 1945 (Confidential), in U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps file no. D-216719, “Rauff, Walter,” obtained via Freedom of Information Act from U.S. Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade, MD.
17.Smith and Agarossi, op. cit., p. 189.
18.Loc. cit.
19.For correspondence concerning Jackson’s resignation and Taylor’s appointment, see SWNCC 237: Further Proceedings Against Axis War Criminals, December 1945-January 1947, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Records, available via microfilm from Scholarly Resources.
20.John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971.
21.Ibid., data summarized.
22.Robert Joyce (Central Intelligence Group), to Walter Dowling, “Subject: Former SS Colonel Dollmann” (Top Secret), December 1, 1946, obtained in sanitized form via Freedom of Information Act, 740.00116EW/12-146, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
23.Rauff version: “Interrogation Report on SS Standartenfuehrer Rauff, Walter” May 15, 1945, op. cit. Dulles’s version: Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper, 1966. pp. 66, 83, 102, 107, 158, 188, 192–93.
24.For Rauff’s testimony on this point to a Chilean immigration court, see Simon Wiesenthal Center, SS Col. Rauff, op. cit.
25.Ibid.
26.Ibid.
27.Leghorn to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/5-1547 (Top Secret), May 15, 1947, obtained in sanitized form via Freedom of Information Act, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Wenner, it should be noted, also often served as Wolff’s personal representative in negotiations between major German companies and the SS; see “Geschaftsanweisung” (an SS-Dresdner Bank contract regarding Ostindustie accounts, July 9, 1943), National Archives microfilm no. T-976, reel 6, frame 001074.
28.Leghorn to Secretary of State, ibid.
29.Murphy to Secretary of State, 740.00116EW/8-1147 (Top Secret, No Distribution), August 11, 1947, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
30.Jack Neal, “Memorandum for the Files” (Top Secret), September 16, 1947, found at 740.00116 EW/8-1147, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. This record, which had previously been withheld from the State Department files in the National Archives, was obtained by the author via the Freedom of Information Act.
31.Ibid.
32.Smith and Agarossi, op. cit., pp. 189–90.
33.Loc. cit.
34.Loc. cit.
35.Loc. cit.
36.“SS-General Wolff gestorben,” Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 17, 1984; Jochen Lang, Der Adjutant; Karl Wolff: Der Mann zwischen Hitler und Himmler, Munchen: Herbig, 1985.
37.For an overview of Grombach’s employment by, and rivalry with, the CIA, see Christopher Simpson, Blowback. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988. pp. 235–38.
38.John Valentine Grombach, “The Case of Dr. Eugen Dollmann”; (Annex “D”) in The Otto John Case, unpublished manuscript, n.d. (1954?); copy in author’s collection.
39.Eugen Dollmann, The Interpreter: Memoirs of Doktor Eugen Dollmann. London: Hutchinson, 1967.
40.On Bicchierai’s work with U.S. intelligence, see Simpson, op. cit., pp. 92–94.
41.“Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945,” in U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985. Department of State publication no. 9446. Washington, DC: USGPO, pp. 54–65.
Chapter Seventeen
Double-Think on Denazification
1.“Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference,” op. cit. For an orthodox Soviet collection of documents from the same conference that reveals important differences in tone and interpretation from the latter-day official U.S. position, see Ministerium für Auswartige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, Die Potsdamer (Berliner) Konferenz der hochsten Reprasentanten der drie alliierten Machte. Moskau/Berlin: Verlag Progress (DDR state publishing house), 1984, pp. 375–98.
For a detailed discussion of the often-pivotal role of the reparations issue in U.S.-Soviet relations of the period, see Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1972; and Thomas Peterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 235–67. See also Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, Report of the Assembly of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency to its Member Governments. Brussels: Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, 1951. For an overview of the reparations issue at the Potsdam Conference, see Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, pp. 56–61, 232–44, 253–65, with a text of the treaty at pp. 338–54.
For a good summary of the legal implications for war crimes enforcement of the Potsdam agreements as seen by contemporary observers, see Joseph Hodgson (then U.S. Commissioner on the UNWCC) to Secretary of State, “Forwarding Data Concerning the United Nations War Crimes Commission” (Confidential), August 6, 1945, 740.001166EW/8-645, box 3601, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2.“Protocol of the Proceedings …,” ibid.
3.Ibid.
4.Ibid.
5.Ibid. There is no single list of those who were to be regarded as “key men” in the German economy in the sense that this term was used at Potsdam. Hodgson of the UNWCC refers to the UNWCC lists no. 7 and no. 9 as models; copies of each of these are today available at the United Nations archives in New York. But the UNWCC’s early effort was never viewed as comprehensive, and the Western adherence to this aspect of the Potsdam agreement collapsed before any serious effort was made to prepare a complete list of “key men.” One of the more comprehensive efforts along these lines was “Names of Persons and Industrial Groups Affected by the Application of the Denazification Program to Banks,” n.d. (1947?), box 54, OMGUS/FINAD, Finance Division/Investigations, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
6.“Criticism of Denazification Program,” August 25, 1945, file: Special Reports, box 237, OMGUS/FINAD, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
7.Gabriel Almond and Wolfgang Kraus, “The Social Composition of the German Resistance,” in Gabriel Almond (ed.), The Struggle for Democracy in Germany. Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949, pp. 65–67.
8.U.S. Government, OMGUS, Internal Affairs and Communication Division, Public Safety Branch (Berlin), Report on Effect of Denazification upon Industry in US Zone of Occupation, Germany, with exhibits and company reply forms, October 9, 1947, in file: “Survey of the Effects of Denazification on Industry,” Public Safety Branch S-17, box 334, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. For a detailed and sophisticated discussion of the complex evolution of the Betriebsrats, see Michael Fichter, Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften. Berlin: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982; and Michael Fichter, Von Stalingrad zur Wahrungsreform. München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988.
9.Almond and Kraus, op. cit., p. 68.
10.James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, p. 206.
11.The Drapers have been leading Republican party fund-raisers for at least four generations, and remain so today. On Draper family and Draper mills history: Orra Stone, History of Massachusetts Industries, vol. 2. Boston: S. J. Clarke, 1930, pp. 1910–16; John Garner, The Model Company Town. Amherst, MA: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1984, pp. 183ff; “Strikers’ Demands Today Not Granted by Draper Company,” Milford Daily Journal, April 3, 1913. I am grateful to the Museum of American Textile History, North Andover, MA, for their assistance in researching Draper Mills.
12.General William H. Draper, Jr., Oral History Interview, January 11, 1972, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO., pp. 32–33.
13.Martin, op. cit., passim; Draper, ibid., pp. 40–42.
14.Martin, op. cit., pp. 164, 173.
15.Draper, op. cit., pp. 40–42.
16.Lucius Clay, Oral History Interview, July 16, 1974, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO, pp. 15–16 (on JCS 1067] and p. 13 (on Truman); see also “Was the Decartelization Program Sabotaged? Profile No. 3: General Lucius D. Clay,” Prevent World War III, no. 38 Summer 1951. Elsewhere, Clay has commented that he regarded the JCS 1067 order as having had a “devastating effect” on the morale of his supporters in the U.S. Group Control Council, apparently as early as the summer of 1945; see Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950, p. 8.
17.U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Elimination of German Resources for War, Part 11 (Russell Nixon testimony), pp. 1545–46. Senator Kilgore’s intervention ensured that a limited study of the German financial elite did take place, despite considerable harassment from Draper and his supporters. In the end, Draper succeeded in pushing the rebellious aides out of his administration and in burying the reports of their investigations in classified files, where they have lain undisturbed and largely unread for more than forty years. They were finally published in 1986 in German translation by the Hamburger Dokumentationsstelle zur NS-Sozialpolitik; they have never been published in English.
On “double-think” phenomena and its treatment in U.S. historical accounts, see Gabriel Kolko, “American Business and Germany, 1930–1940,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, December 1962, pp. 713ff.
18.Martin, op. cit., pp. 163–64.
19.“Potsdam Mandate Is Seen Softened,” New York Times, November 25, 1945, p. 32. On Kilgore’s efforts, see also C. P. Trussell, “German Industry Grew Under Raids,” New York Times, August 8, 1945, p. 15; Harley M. Kilgore, “Germany Is Not Yet Defeated,” New York Times Magazine, August 12, 1945, pp. 10ff; “Kilgore Criticized U.S. Reich Chiefs,” New York Times, October 4, 1945, p. 7; “AMG in Germany Scored by Kilgore,” New York Times, December 22, 1945, p. 7. For Allen Dulles’s economic analysis of Germany during the first years after the war, see Allen Dulles, “Alternatives for Germany,” introduction to Hoyt Price and Carl Schorske, The Problem of Germany, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947.
20.On Clay and Draper: their oral histories, cited above. On FTC investigation: U.S. Government, Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Committee Appointed to Review the Decartelization Program in Germany to the Honorable Secretary of the Army, April 15, 1949, (often known as the Ferguson Committee Report), box 1, entry 131, RG 335, National Archives, Suitland, MD. See also: U.S. Government, OMGUS, Economics Division, Decartelization Branch, Report on Progress of the Decartelization Branch, June 14, 1947, and Report to the Secretary of War on the Decartelization Program in Germany, September 24, 1947, and Decartelization in the U.S. Zone of Germany, December 1948, each of which is found at box 1, entry 131, RG 335, National Archives, Suitland, MD. The December 1948 report is also available in more accessible form at the Law Library of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
Chapter Eighteen
“It Would Be Undesirable if This Became Publicly Known”
1.See, for example, Matthews memorandum, February 28, 1946, 740.00116EW/2-2846, and Riddleberger to Matthews, February 28, 1946, 740.00116EW/2-2846; both at box 3612, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2.Loc. cit.
3.Hodgson to Secretary of State, November 2, 1945, 740.00116EW/11-245, box 3607, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
4.War Department Adjutant General to Department of State, February 18, 1946, 740.00116EW/2-1846, box 3612, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. See also Byrnes (Fite) to Hodgson, March 21, 1946, 740.00116EW/3-2146, box 3613, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5.Extract from Hodgson letter to Hackworth, which appears as an attachment to Matthews memorandum, February 28, 1946, ibid., Wolff to Secretary of State, April 25, 1946, 740.00116EW/4-2546, box 3614, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
6.Matthews memorandum of February 28, 1946, ibid.
7.Riddleberger to Matthews, February 28, 1946, 740.00116EW/2-2846, op. cit.
8.Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans. New York: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 553ff.
9.Leon Friedman (ed.), The Law of War. A Documentary History, vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972, pp. 908–909.
10.U.S., OMGUS, “Report of the Denazification Policy Board to the Deputy Military Governor” (Restricted), January 15, 1946, pp. 6–7, in file: “Denazification Publications,” box 326, entry S-17, OMGUS Public Safety Branch, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
11.Ibid., p. 12.
12.Ibid., pp. 5–6.
13.Loc. cit. For recent scholarship concerning the number and treatment of German POWs in Western hands at the end of World War II, see two papers presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 1992 Conference (Vassar College and Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, New York): Gunter Bischof, “American Treatment of German POWs During and After World War II in Light of Recent Historiography” (1992), and Richard Wiggers, “The United States and the Denial of Prisoner of War Status at the End of the Second World War” (1992). For prosecutors estimates of “Number of (Nazi) Politische Leiter Being Prosecuted Compared to Number of Nazi Elements in Germany and Entire German Population,” see Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946, vol. 8, chart 14.
14.See, for example, the various “schedules” of financial personnel listing specific companies, offices, enforcement priorities, etc., found at file: “Denazification,” box 229, OMGUS/FINAD, RG 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
15.U.S., OMGUS, “Report of the Denazification Policy Board,” op. cit., pp. 8–11.
16.Ibid., p. 10.
17.U.S., OMGUS/FINAD, Financial Intelligence and Liaison Branch Field Investigation Section, Report on the Investigation of Law 52 in the US Zone (Restricted), May 1946; copy in author’s collection. My special thanks to Louis Madison for his comments concerning denazification, and for bringing these records to my attention. See also: U.S., OMGUS, “Law No. 52: Blocking and Control of Property,” (n.d.), four pages, in the same collection.
18.U.S., OMGUS, “Report of the Denazification Policy Board,” op. cit., p. 1.
19.James Stewart Martin, Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, pp. 184–85.
20.Lewis H. Brown, A Report on Germany. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947.
21.Milton Moskowitz, Michael Katz, and Robert Levering. Everybody’s Business. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980, pp. 163–65.
22.Brown, op. cit., p. ix.
23.Ibid., pp. v–xii passim.
24.Ibid., pp. 17–18, with quote from p. 18.
25.Ibid., p. x.
26.Martin, op. cit., pp. 193–94, 223.
27.Ibid., pp. 226–27.
28.National Industrial Conference Board, Rationalization of German Industry, op. cit., pp. 110–11.
29.Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich. New York: Bantam, 1969, pp. 141–44. For a recent example of somewhat similar behavior by General Electric, see Steven Pearlstein, “GE Told to Toughen Fraud Case Penalties,” Washington Post, June 3, 1992, p. F-1.
30.Martin, All Honorable Men, op. cit., p. 185.
31.Harley M. Kilgore, “Germany Is Not Yet Defeated,” New York Times Magazine, August 12, 1945, pp. 10ff.
32.Ibid.
33.Michael Wala, “Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery,” Diplomatic History, Summer 1986, pp. 221ff. On Dubinsky, see p. 261. On James Carey, see Blowback, p. 126. Carey, who also served on the board of the National Committee for a Free Europe and a number of similar organizations with unacknowledged ties to the CIA, told the New York Herald Tribune in June 1950 that “in the last war we joined with the Communists to fight the Fascists. [In the next], we will join the Fascists to defeat the Communists.”
34.Wala, ibid., p. 252.
35.Lucius D. Clay, Oral History Interview, op. cit., pp. 25–26. Abs’s name is mistranscribed in this publication as Hermann Epps, though it is in fact Abs that Clay is discussing.
36.“International Outlook,” Business Week, February 1, 1947, pp. 99–100.
37.Wala, op. cit., pp. 253–58, with Plumley quote on p. 264.
38.Ibid., p. 264.
Chapter Nineteen
The End of the War Crimes Commission
1.OMGUS Deutsche Bank, op. cit., p. 1; “Hermann J. Abs,” in file: Nazis Dismissed from German Banking, n.d. (1946?), OMGUS/FINAD, box 234, RG, 260, National Archives, Suitland, MD. Abs was eventually barred from entry into the United States; see “Abs darf nicht in die USA,” Reuter news dispatch, May 7, 1990.
2.For an excellent and convenient summary of the Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings, see John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971; Frank Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946–1955. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989; Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1949.
3.See U.S. filings now held at the United Nations War Crimes Commission Archives, New York, NY.
4.Author’s interview with Telford Taylor, July 14, 1988; see also author’s interview with former Nuremberg prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz, July 9, 1988.
5.Ibid., and Appleman, op. cit., p. 174.
6.Ibid. For a concise presentation of how the defense of necessity was perceived prior to the Flick case, see “Exhibit B: In Connection with General MacArthur’s Talk Before the War Policies Commission,” War Policies Commission, Hearings, op. cit., pp. 474–75. The discussion there, prepared by the U.S. Department of War, indicates that the legal claim of “necessity” had up to that time been employed primarily by the government in cases stemming from military damage to private property and/or seizure of private goods during the course of a war. Further, the circumstances in which the defense could be raised were quite narrow: “The necessity must be immediate, imperative, and in some cases extreme and overwhelming [in order to be accepted as a defense], mere expediency or utility will not suffice” (p. 475). The court’s extension of this defense to Flick, a corporate officer, seems to have stood precedent on its head.
7.Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of Public Affairs, “Landsberg: A Documentary Report,” Information Bulletin, February 15, 1950.
8.For a biographic summary, see National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 57, p. 110, Current Biography 1958, pp. 181–82, and the introductory notes to Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, Department of State publication No. 1506, 1940, reprinted by Garland Publishing (New York), 1973.
9.Walter Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking, 1951; and Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot, The Life and Times of James Forrestal, New York: Knopf, 1992.
10.It has not been possible in this volume to discuss the postwar reconstruction of Japan’s major business cartels during Draper’s tenure there. However, Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York: Oxford, 1985, pp. 107–140, makes an important contribution to understanding this subject. For reviews of the war crimes trials in Japan, see R. John Pritchard, Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial. Oxford: Nissan Occasional Papers, 1987, or Richard Minear, Victors’ Justice. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971.
11.John Martin Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of War 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.
12.Author’s interviews with Senator Claiborne Pell.
13.See for example, John Gillingham, Industry and Politics in the Third Reich. London: Methuen, 1985 (re: Ruhr coal); Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990. (re: auto industry); Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987 (re: IG Farben).
14.United Nations War Crimes Commission Archives, New York, NY. Cases include, for example, Netherlands vs. Ludwig Nolte (formerly of the Netherlands-based Philips corporation), charged with murder and pillage; UNWCC vs. Ernst Poensgen (of Vereinigte Stahlwerke—United Steelworks); Luxembourg vs. Gunther Quandt (Akkumulatorenfabrik—batteries, Daimler Benz autos, and other companies), charged with complicity in arrests and deportations; France vs. Dr. Karl Ritter (German Foreign Ministry), charged with murder; Poland vs. Alfons Wagner (prominent mining industrialist), for confiscation of property; UNWCC vs. Wilhelm Zangen (Deutsche Bank, AEG, etc.), for crimes against peace and crimes against humanity; and many others.
15.Benjamin Ferencz, Less Than Slaves. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979. pp. 179–81; Ferencz interview.
16.Ferencz interview with author.
17.Reported in “The Suppressed Dulles Story,” In Fact (New York), no. 472, October 24, 1949.
18.John Foster Dulles to Secretary of State, with attachment, March 10, 1948 (Confidential), 861 20211/3-1048, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
19.Quoted in Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Free Press, 1982, p. 124. Pruessen presents what is probably the most complete and cautious examination of the evidence still extant on John Foster Dulles’s business affairs in Germany; see particularly pp. 123–32. See also Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and Cromwell. New York: William Morrow, 1988, pp. 119–59.
20.See Fite (legal advisor’s office) to Secretary of State, with attachments, August 6, 1947, f/w 740.00116EW/6-1847; Henderson to Fite, June 18, 1947, 740.00116EW/6-1847; and Solly-Flood to Barbour, June 21, 1947, 740.00116 EW/6-2147; all in box 3623, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
21.Robert Patterson (Secretary of War) to Secretary of State, July 22, 1947 (Top Secret), 740.00116 EW/7-2247, box 3624, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. “Exceptions” discussed in Fite memo to U.S. Political Advisor, Berlin (Murphy), June 9, 1947: “[State] does not consider that US constitutional definition treason can be accepted as standard for judging surrender requests … more rigid standard should be required,” in file: “US POLAD,” lot 61 D 33, box 2, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
22.740.00116EW/12-547 (Netherlands), 740.00116EW/11-2147 (Poland), 740.00116EW/11-1447 (Czechoslovakia), 740.00116EW/1-848 (Poland), 740.00116EW/10-3147 (France), 740.00116EW/12-1947 (Netherlands), 740.00116EW/6-2449 (France), 740.00116EW/6-16-49 (Belgium); all at RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
23.U.S. diplomatic note to French ambassador, July 20, 1949, 740.00116 EW/6-2449, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
24.UNWCC case no. 7593, United Nations War Crimes Commission Archives, New York, NY; or copy at 740.00116EW/2-2748, box 3628, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
25.UNWCC case no. 7347, Poland vs. Dr. Paersch, Reichsbank Berlin, et al, op. cit.
26.Alti Rodale, “Canadian and Allied Government’s Policies with Regard to Nazi War Crimes,” (unpublished paper, courtesy of Dr. Rodale).
27.“Israel Urges Public Access to U.N. War Files,” New York Times, May 2, 1986; Ruth Marcus, “Nazi-Hunters Gain Access to U.N. Documents,” Washington Post, November 23, 1987.
28.Alti Rodale, op. cit.
29.FBI file No. 100–380802, Ivan Kerno, and Department of State records on Kerno obtained via Freedom of Information Act.
30.Ibid., and Maney to Bender, Department of State, July 20, 1954, in Department of State FOI case no. 8901702.
31.Ibid.
Chapter Twenty
Money, Law, and Genocide
1.Sergo Mikoyan comments, June 10, 1991, Smithsonian Institution, Wilson Center Colloquium. Mikoyan is the son of Anastas Mikoyan, who played a prominent role in the foreign affairs of the Stalin and Khrushchev governments in the USSR. The younger Mikoyan, also a foreign policy professional from the former USSR, is editor of Latinskaia Amerika. See also Michael McGwire, The Genesis of Soviet Threat Perceptions. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution monograph, 1987 (contractor’s report No. 800–5 to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research). For an example of contemporary Soviet writing about these issues, see Sovinformburo, Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey). Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951.
New evidence underlining Mikoyan’s point arrived from recently opened Soviet archives as this book was in preparation. On September 27, 1946, Soviet ambassador to the United States Novikov sent a long dispatch to Stalin summarizing the factors that he saw as central to understanding U.S. intentions. The Novikov dispatch reads in part: “One of the most important elements in the general policy of the United States … is the policy with regard to Germany.… The American occupation policy does not have the objective of eliminating the remnants of German Fascism and rebuilding German political life on a democratic basis, so that Germany might cease to exist as an aggressive force. The United States is not taking measures to eliminate the monopolistic associations of German industrialists on which German Fascism depended … neither is any agrarian reform being conducted.… One cannot help seeing that such [policies have] a clearly outlined anti-Soviet edge.…” (translation by Ken Jensen and John Glad). The point here is Novikov’s interpretation, not whether or not he accurately portrayed U.S. intentions. Given the context of the time, Novikov’s perception almost certainly mirrored Stalin’s own. The Novikov telegram is widely regarded by historians today as “in some ways parallel,” as Vladimir Shustov put it, to George Kennan’s famous Mr. X telegram of roughly the same period in that it frankly summarizes the dominant interpretation of the actions of rivals. See Ken Jensen, U.S. Institute of Peace, “Memorandum,” August 15, 1990.
2.United Nations, Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments. New York: United Nations, n.d.
3.Important exceptions to the usual silence concerning bombing include: Seymour Melman, In the Name of America. Annandale, VA: Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, 1968, pp. 173–268; and Duffett, Against the Crime of Silence, op. cit. For discussion of the issue of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1991 “Desert Storm” bombardment of Iraq, see Middle East Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War. Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991; William Arkin, Damian Durrant, and Marianne Cherni, On Impact: Modern Warfare and the Environment. Washington, DC: Greenpeace, 1991; San Francisco Commission of Inquiry, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: U.S. War Crimes in the Persian Gulf. San Francisco, International War Crimes Tribunal, 1991.
For discussion of the use of atomic bombs as a prima facie war crime due to the indiscriminate destruction resulting from an atomic attack, see Leon Friedman, “The Shimoda Case,” in The Law of War. A Documentary History, vol. 2. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972, pp. 1688–1702.
4.Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights. St. Paul, MN: West, 1988, pp. 213, 221–22, 230. For concise background on the Genocide Convention, see Vita Bite, Genocide Convention, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service publication IB74129, 1987; and Barbara Harff, Genocide and Human Rights: International Legal and Political Issues, University of Denver School of International Studies, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 20, book 3, 1984.
5.Neil Lewis, “Sorting Out Legal War Concerning Real War,” New York Times, November 15, 1990, p. A-18. The comment from Acheson was reported by Harvard professor Abram Chayes, the legal advisor to President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, who sat in on Acheson’s session with Kennedy at the height of the crisis.
For a concise presentation of the various trends of thought in ongoing debates among specialists concerning international law and human rights, see Tom Farer, “Human Rights in Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence War,” American Journal of International Law, January 1991, pp. 117ff.
6.For recent articles on U.S. lawlessness, see Noam Chomsky, “Letter from Lexington, December 8, 1991,” Lies Of Our Times, January–February 1992, pp. 11ff; Richard Falk, “The Extension of Law to Foreign Policy: The Next Constitutional Challenge,” in Alan Rosenbaum’s (ed.) Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988; Richard Falk, “Preface,” Vietnam and International Law, Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press, 1990; Marcus Raskin, “American Idealism, War Crimes, and a Law of Personal Accountability,” in Essays of a Citizen, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991, pp. 139–66; Daniel Ellsberg, “The Responsibility of Officials in a Criminal War,” in Papers on the War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, pp. 275ff. For overviews, see Lori Damrosch (ed.) The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers/American Society of International Law, 1987; H. W. A. Thirlway, Non-Appearance Before the International Court of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985.
7.United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The State of the World’s Children 1989. New York: Oxford Univ. Press/UNICEF, 1989 (annual); and Lori Heise, “Killing the Children of the Third World,” Washington Post, April 21, 1991, p. B-1.