NOTES

Abbreviations

The abbreviations employed for the names and works of ancient authors are customary or easy to recognize. Thus by “Andok.” I mean Andokides, by “Ant.” Antiphon, and by “Isai.” Isaios. I use “AP.” for the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia or Constitution of the Athenians. I call Aristotle “Ar.” but Aristophanes “Aristoph.,” Aischylos “Aisch.” but Aischines “Aischin.”

Works extant only in fragmentary form are cited from standard collections, including the following:

H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols. (Berlin, 7th ed., 1954)

F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, I—II (Berlin, 1923–26), III (Leiden, 1940–58), cited as “F. Gr. Hist.”

A. Nauck, Aristophanis Byzantii Alexandrini fragmenta (Halle, 1848)

S. Riccobono, Fontes iuris Romani antejustiniani (Florence, 1941)

E. Ruschenbusch, Solonos Nomoi: Die Fragmente des solonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte (Historia Einzelschriften 9, 1966), cited as “Solonos Nomoi” or “SN.”

M. L. West, Iambi et elegi Graeci, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1971–72)

The abbreviations employed for titles of journals mostly conform to L’Année Philologique Others will be easy to recognize, for example, “CA.” = Classical Antiquity, “C et M.” = Classica et Mediaevalia, “SO.” = Symbolae Osloenses By “ZSS.” I mean the Romanistische Abteilung of the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte.

The following abbreviations are used for modern works.

Beloch, Gr. Gesch. = K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 4 vols. in 8 (Strassburg, Berlin, and Leipzig, 2d ed., 1912–27)

Blass, Att. Bered. = F. W. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1887–93)

Bonner and Smith = R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1930–38)

Cohen, Theft = D. Cohen, Theft in Athenian Law (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte 74, 1983)

Davies, APF. = J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford, 1971)

Day and Chambers, Aristotle’s History = J. Day and M. Chambers, Aristotle’s History of Athenian Democracy (University of California Publications in History 73, 1962)

Hansen: M. H. Hansen’s six volumes under the general title Det athenske demokrati i 4. arhundrede f. Kr (Opuscula graecolatina 15, Copenhagen), are referred to by the titles of the single volumes:

1. Staten, folket, forfatningen (1978)

2. Folkeforsamlingen (1977)

3. Nomotheterne (1977)

4. Folkedomstolen (1979)

5. Embedsmaendene (1979)

6. Politikerne og guldalderdemokratiet (1981)

Hansen, Apagoge = M. H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes: A study in the Athenian Administration of Justice in the Fourth Century B.C. (Odense University Classical Studies 8, 1976)

Hansen, Eisangelia = M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians (Odense University Classical Studies 6, 1975)

Hansen, Sovereignty = M. H. Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposals (Odense University Classical Studies 4, 1974)

Hansen, Volksversammlung = M. H. Hansen, Die athenische Volks-Versammlung im Zeitalter des Demosthenes (Xenia 13, Constance, 1984)

Harrison, Law 1 = A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens: The Family and Property (Oxford, 1968)

Harrison, Law 2 = A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens: Procedure (Oxford, 1971)

Hignett, HAC. = C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952)

Lipsius, AR. = J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1905–15)

MacDowell, Law = D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1978)

Meiggs/Lewis = R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford, 1969)

Rhodes, Comm. = P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981)

Rhodes, Boule = P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford, 1972)

Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik = E. Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Bamberg, 1979)

Sealey, Essays = R. Sealey, Essays in Greek Politics (New York, 1967)

Sealey, History = R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States ca. 700–338 B.C. (California, 1976)

Stroud, Drakon’s Law = R. S. Stroud, Drakon’s Law on Homicide (University of California Publications in Classical Studies 3, 1968)

Tod II = M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, volume II: From 403 to 323 B.C. (Oxford, 1948)

Wade-Gery, Essays = H. T. Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958)

Wolff, Normenkontrolle = H. J. Wolff, “Normenkontrolle” und Gesetzesbegriff in der athenischen Demokratie (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, philologisch-historische Klasse, 1970)

Chapter 1

  1. The metabolai are listed at AP. 41. The influence of Aristotle’s classificatory approach on his understanding of Athenian development has been studied by Day and Chambers, Aristotle’s History. For reflections on the question of authorship, see ibid., 2–4, and Rhodes, Comm., 61–63. Four forms of democracy are distinguished by Ar. Pol 4.1292b25-1293a10 and 6.1318b6-1319b32. Five are distinguished at 4.1291b30–1292a6, but see Day and Chambers, 55 n. 94.

  2. Cf. Wolff, Normenkontrolle, 80.

  3. For example, H. J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Oklahoma, 1951), 63: “The Romans, like the English, retained a remarkable spirit of traditionalism.”

  4. I am much indebted to the Roman chapters (pp. 251–810) of J. Gaudemet, Institutions de l’Antiquité (Paris, 1967). See Gaudemet, p. 395, on the fruitful significance of the procedural sanction in Roman law.

Chapter 2

  1. Diod. 18.18.4–5. The manuscripts of Diodoros give 22,000 as the number of those disfranchised, but Plutarch (Phok. 28.4), recording the same event, gives 12,000. The report of Ktesikles on the census taken by Demetrios of Phaleron suggests that the lower figure is right. A total of about 20,000 citizens in the middle and later part of the fourth century is suggested by Plat. Kritias 112d, [Dem.] 25.50–51, [Plut.] Ten Orators 843d-e. The higher figure for 322 is defended by P. J. Rhodes, “Ephebi, Bouleutae and the population of Athens,” ZPE. 38 (1980): 191–202. E. Ruschenbusch has discussed the population of Athens in a series of articles appearing in ZPE. since 1979; they conclude with “Zum letzten Mai: die Bürgerzahl Athens im 4. Jh. v. Chr.,” ZPE. 54 (1984): 253–69. Among older discussions, that by K. J. Beloch in Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (Leipzig, 1886), 57–60, is the most useful.

  2. Thuc. 8.65.3; 8.97.1.

  3. [Lys.] 20.13.

  4. Cf. Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik 133–52, esp. 149.

  5. Harpok. s.v. metoikion; Poll. 3.55.

  6. D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (=Cambridge Philological Society, Supplementary Volume 4 [1977]), 7–10. Whitehead argues from IG. II², 141 = Tod 139, lines 30–36 (granting exemption from the metoikion to Sidonian merchants who reside in Sidon and sojourn in Athens), in support of Aristoph. Byz. fr. 38 Nauck (a specific number of days) against Harpok. s.v. metoikion (an intention of permanent residence).

  7. On Kephalos: Lys. 12.4–8; Plat. Rep 329e-331b; cf. K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (California, 1968), 29. The affairs of Pasion are known from Isok. 17, Dem. 36 and 45, [Dem.] 46, 49, 52, and 53; cf. Davies, APF., 427–31.

  8. Harpok. s.v. metoikion; cf. Hesych. s.v. isotelēs; Whitehead (note 6 above), 16-17. At 114–16 Whitehead argues, mainly from [Xen.] 1.10, that freedmen were regarded primarily as freedmen, not as metics, but he recognizes that one cannot tell what proportion of metics were freedmen.

  9. Isai. 6.19–21.

10. That it was so considered is the main thesis of Whitehead (note 6 above); see esp. 69–108.

11. This method was followed by Beloch (note 1 above, 84–99) and A. H. M. Jones (Athenian Democracy [Oxford, 1957], 76–79). Beloch suggested c. 75,000 for the total of slaves; Jones suggested c. 20,000.

12. M. I. Finley (The Ancient Economy [California, 1973], 24) dismisses the figure as “no more than a guess.” W. L. Westermann (“Athenaeus and the slaves of Athens,” HSCP., Supplementary Volume 1 [1940], 451–70) attached more weight to the figure given by Thucydides than to those of Hypereides and Ktesikles; he concluded that slaves were not more than a third or a quarter of the total population.

13. E. Wood, “Agricultural slavery in classical Athens,” AJAH 8 (1983). The more noteworthy presentation of the view which Wood challenges is M. H. Jameson, “Agriculture and slavery in classical Athens,” CJ. 73 (1977–78): 122–45. On the scattered holdings of rich men, see J. K. Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (Salem, N.H., 1981), 53–54.

14. [Dem.] 46.18; this law specifies which relatives could give a woman in marriage.

15. Athenian thought on homicide was somewhat preoccupied with cases where a woman gives her husband a fatal draught but believes that it is a love-philter: Soph. Trach 727–28; Ar. Mag. Mor 1.1188b31–37. Since women could be tried for homicide and could claim property, it is mistaken to say, as some have done (for example, Eva C. Keuls, The Reign of the Phallus [New York, 1985], 6), that their condition was similar to that of slaves. I hope to develop elsewhere the hypothesis that the disabilities of women sprang from the fact that they did not bear arms; hence they could not engage in self-help or consequently in litigation.

16. [Dem.] 59.66; cf. Dem. 23.53. The procedure was complex because of its historical development. It has been elucidated by E. Ruschenbusch, “Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits bei den Griechen,” Symposion 1977 (Cologne and Vienna, 1982), 1–8, at 5–7.

17. [Dem.] 59.87. The aggrieved husband was required to divorce his wife under pain of atimia. As the provision of this penalty suggests, the requirement of divorce was designed to prevent a man from prostituting a woman and blackmailing the customer by calling her his wife.

18. Ar. Pol 1.1260a9–14. Cf. Gaius 1.144 = The Twelve Tables V, 1 (Riccobono): “Veteres enim voluerunt feminas, etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint, propter animi levitatem in tutela esse.”

19. [Hdt.] 6.122.2.

20. This observation of R. Merkelbach is reported by S. B. Pomeroy, “Infanticide in Hellenistic Greece,” in A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt, eds., Images of Women in Antiquity (London and Canberra, 1983), 207–22, at 212 with n. 6.

21. The theory stated here is based on two studies by A. Andrewes, “Phratries in Homer,” Hermes 89 (1961): 129–40, and “Philochoros on Phratries,” JHS. 81 (1961): 1–15. The inscription giving the regulations of the Dekeleieis is IG. II², 1237. Andrewes draws on the study of that inscription by H. T. Wade-Gery, “Studies in the structure of Attic society: I. Demotionidae,” CQ. 25 (1931): 129–43 = Essays, 116–34. The alternative view was defended by Hignett, HAC., 55–57, 313–15, and 390–91. Two recent studies call for note: D. Roussel, Trihu et Cité (Paris, 1976), and F. Bourriot, Recherches sur la nature du génos: étude d’ histoire sociale athénienne—périodes archaïque et classique (Lille, 1976); cf. N. R. E. Fisher, JHS. 99 (1979): 193–95 (review of Bourriot), and R. C. Smith, “The clans of Athens and the historiography of the archaic period,” EMC. NS. 4 (1985): 51–61. The trend of these works has been away from the rigid patterns which nineteenth-century scholars professed to find in Rome and imposed on Athens.

22. [Dem.] 59.59–61.

23. For example, IG. I³, 102 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 85, liness 15–17; IG. II², 17 line 26; 19b lines 7–8; 25 lines 4–7; 109b lines 11–13.

24. IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, lines 13–19; the text is restored securely from [Dem.] 43.57.

25. The social and legal significance of these rituals has been expounded by J. Rudhardt, “La reconnaissance de la paternité, sa nature et sa portée dans la société athénienne,” MH. 19 (1962): 39–64. The following is a sample of illustrative texts. The gamēlia is mentioned by Isai. 3.76, the dekatē for a boy by Dem. 39.22 and [Dem.] 40.28 and 59, and the dekatē for a girl by Isai. 3.30–34. The regulations of the Dekeleieis are IG. II², 1237 (cf. note 21 above), mentioning the meion and the koureion. The same inscription (lines 109–11) states the oath to be sworn by witnesses when a son is introduced to the phratry. The formal introduction and the koureion are simultaneous in Isai. 6.21–22. For the oath sworn by the father at the formal introduction, see Isai. 8.19; Dem. 57.54; [Dem.] 59.59–60 (introduction to phratry and genos); Andok. 1.127 (introduction to genos). At [Dem.] 43.11–14 and 82 a sacrifice, probably the koureion, is mentioned as offered on the occasion of the formal introduction. At Isai. 8.19 the formal introduction appears to take place shortly after birth of the son.

26. Dem. 39.23–25.

27. Ar. AP. 42.1–2. There has been controversy on the question, whether admission took place when the applicant was eighteen years old or when he was in his eighteenth year (and thus seventeen years old). Useful contributions have been made by J. M. Carter, “Eighteen years old?” BICS. 14 (1967): 51–57, and by M. Golden, “Demosthenes and the age of majority at Athens,” Phoenix 33 (1979): 25–38. I hope to defend elsewhere a solution suggested to me by the Endnote (35–38) to Golden’s article: promptly after admission the young men paraded as ephēboi for the first time at the beginning of Boedromion (W. Dittenberger, De ephebis atticis [Göttingen, 1863], 22–23), so when they were admitted about the beginning of the Attic year eighteen archons were named in reviewing their past lives; that is, they were admitted when they were in their eighteenth year.

28. It is remarkable that in the procedure described by Aristotle (AP. 42.1) the only alternatives are citizenship and slavery; the possibility is not envisaged that the applicant may be a free alien. For the implications of this, see R. Sealey, “On lawful concubinage in Athens,” CA. 3 (1984): 111–33, at 114–15.

29. Inscriptions of Hellenistic and Roman date show that the ephebic year began at or about the beginning of Boedromion: IG. II², 1006, 1008, 1009, 1011, 1027–30, 1039, 1043, 2004, 2022, 2037, 2044, 2046, 2050, 2052, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2068, 2085, 2097, 2103, 2111–13, 2119, 2125, 2208, 2231, 2239, 2243. Dittenberger (note 27 above) argued from a smaller selection of inscriptions. It is a reasonable, though not quite a necessary, inference that the ephebic year began with Boedromion already in the classical period. Cf. C. Pélékidis, Histoire de l’ éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ (Paris, 1962), 215.

30. Isai. 7.16.

31. Isai. 6.18–24; cf. page 8 above.

32. Dem. 57; Aischin. 1.77–78, 86; 2.182; Androtion, F. Gr. Hist. III B 324 F 52; Philochoros, F. Gr. Hist. III B 328 F 52.

33. This argument was developed with more care by A. Ledl, “Das attische Bürgerrecht und die Frauen I,” WS. 29 (1907): 173–96; he dismissed Isai. 3.73–76 as hypothetical. Hignett (HAC. 56, 60, 144) said that women were registered in phratries, but the only evidence he offered (60 n. 2) was Isai. 3.73, discussed below.

34. Isai. 8.19; cf. 3.80; 6.49–50.

35. In addition to the study by Ledl (note 33 above, continued in WS 29 [1907]: 197–227 and 30 [1908]: 1–46), fundamental importance attaches to H. J. Wolff, “Marriage law and family organization in ancient Athens: A study on the interrelation of public and private law in the Greek city,” Traditio 2 (1944): 43–95. An informative survey is provided by Harrison, Law 1.1–60.

36. A contract of engyesis is made and then revoked at Isai. 6.22–24. The form of words employed in engyesis is known from Hdt. 6.130; Menander, Dys. 842–43.

37. Isai. 3.35; cf. 5.26, where a house is said to be given “in place of the dowry.”

38. Wolff (note 35 above), 51–53.

39. [Dem.] 43.51 (the order of the relatives, cf. Isai. 3.72–73; 10.4–5); Ar. AP. 43.4; 56.6–7; [Dem.] 46.22. Brief accounts of the epiklēros are to be found in standard handbooks, for example, Lipsius, AR., 543–47; Harrison, Law 1.9–12. For a full account, see J. E. Karnezis, The Epikleros (Heiress) (Athens, 1972).

40. [Dem.] 46.20; Isai. 8.31; 10.12; Harpok. s.v. epi dietes hēhēsai.

41. Isai. 3.42, 68; 10.13.

42. Isai. 6.14.

43. [Dem.] 46.20.

44. Dig. 35.1.15, 50.17: “nuptias enim non concubitus sed consensus facit.”

45. Isai. 3.39; Dem. 23.53.

46. L. Casson, “The Athenian upper class and New Comedy,” TAPA. 106 (1976): 29–59, at 54–56.

47. [Dem.] 43.51.

48. Thus D. M. MacDowell, “Bastards as Athenian citizens,” CQ. NS. 26 (1976): 88–91, enlarging on a suggestion of Harrison, Law 1.61–68. MacDowell’s argument is challenged by P. J. Rhodes, “Bastards as Athenian citizens,” CQ. NS. 28 (1978): 89–92.

49. “On lawful concubinage in Athens,” CA. 3 (1984): 111–33. The case rests mainly on the fortunes of Pamphilos, the son of Mantias, whose affairs are known from Dem. 39 and [Dem.] 40. Pamphilos was born several years after the marriage of his parents had been dissolved, but once the identity of his father had been established he became entitled to an equal share in the estate with his two brothers.

50. The law about the impoverished epiklēros ([Dem.] 43.54; cf. Isai. 1.39) does not conflict with these conclusions, since the relatives required to marry her or dower her are assumed to have property.

51. For example, IG. I³, 81 line 22; 102 lines 30–31; II², 8; 80; 86; 180.

52. Ar. AP. 26.4; Plut. Per. 37.2–3 (the measure of 451/50). Schol. Aischin. 1.39 (the measure of Nikomenes); cf. Dem. 57.30. Athen. 13.577c (the measure of Aristophon). K. R. Walters, “Perikles’ citizenship law,” CA. 2 (1983): 314–36, at 316–20, maintains that the measure of 451/50 did not declare children of mixed parentage to be nothoi. But if they were not citizens, they could not inherit immovable property; so they incurred the main disability of nothoi.

53. Megakles married a Sikyonian woman and their son was Kleisthenes (Hdt. 6.130–31). Peisistratos had an Argive wife for a time (Hdt. 5.94.1; Ar. AP. 17.3–4). Herodotos calls their son nothos, but that may be anachronistic, as he wrote after 451/50. Miltiades married a Thracian woman and she bore him Kimon (Hdt. 6.39.2; Plut. Kim. 4.1). The mother of Themistokles was probably an alien (Davies, APF., 213–14).

54. S. B. Pomeroy, “Charities for Greek women,” Mnemosyne 35 (1982): 115–35, at 128–29.

55. Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik, 83–87.

56. These ideas are drawn from J. K. Davies, “Athenian citizenship: The descent group and the alternatives,” CJ. 73 (1977–78): 105–21.

57. Dem. 27. 5, 6, 10, 13, 16, 25, 46; 28.14; 29.3 bis. Of the dwelling-house of Aphobos: Dem. 30.35; 31.1, 3 bis, 4, 5, 6, 7 bis.

58. Dem. 27.15, 40, 42, 43, 58 bis, 59, 60; 28.1, 5, 6, 7, 15; 29.29, 42, 43, 57, 59; 30.6.

59. Dem. 27.4.

60. Dem. 27.64; 28.1.

61. Dem. 27.64; 28.11.

62. H. S. Maine, Ancient Law (London, 15th ed., 1894), 178.

63. 1252b9–10. For a fuller account of the Greek oikos, see W. K. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece (London, 1968), chap. 1.

64. The following are a small sample of this frequent phrase: [Dem.] 43.11; 44.2; Isai. 2.35, 43; 7.30, 31, 43, 44. The speaker of Isaios 7 says that the law requires the archon to ensure that oikoi do not become empty (7.30; cf. Ar. AP. 43.4); he says that his adversary has made empty an oikos which previously performed the liturgy of the trierarchy.

65. Isai. 6.25; cf. Dem.39.6, [Dem.] 40.2.

66. [Dem.] 40.19.

67. Isai. 11.1–3. The women mentioned as possible heirs would be represented by their kyrioi Parts of the same order are confirmed by [Dem.] 43.51; Isai. 7.20, 22. In the case where Isaios 7 was spoken, the estate of Apollodoros was to pass to his female cousin on his father’s side, if the court did not uphold his adoption of the speaker. Cf. Lipsius, AR., 540–61; Harrison, Law 1.130–32, 138–49; MacDowell, Law, 92–95, 98–99.

68. Isai. 11.3; cf. [Dem.] 44.2. IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, lines 20–21, cf. 13–16; cf. [Dem.] 43.57.

69. [Dem.] 46.14; cf. 44.68; Dem. 20.102; Ar. AP. 35.2; Plut. Sol 21.3. “So as neither to disclaim or claim the inheritance”: sons, including adoptive sons, entered directly on an inheritance without awaiting the word of the archon. Sons could not disclaim it and could not disclaim any debts burdening the inheritance. Other heirs could claim or disclaim the inheritance before the archon (Lipsius, AR., 540–42; cf. Ar. AP. 56.6 fin.). There has been controversy on the question whether this law envisaged bequest or adoptio inter vivos That it envisaged adoptio inter vivos was maintained by L. Gernet, Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne (Paris, 1955), 121–49, and accepted by Harrison, Law 1.82–84 and 149–50, by MacDowell, Law, 100, and by Rhodes, Comm., 442–43. But the arguments offered by E. Ruschenbusch (“Diatithesthai ta heautou. Ein Beitrag zum sogenannten Testamentsgesetz des Solon,” ZSS 79 [1962]: 307–11) seem decisive for the older view: the law of Solon dealt with bequest, but litigants drew from it principles about adoptio inter vivos (for example, Isai. 2.13–14).

70. Cf. Ruschenbusch, n. 69 above. Solon’s archonship is mentioned as a terminal date in Solon F 70 (Plut. Sol 19.4) too.

71. Ar. AP 35.2; Isai. 2.1; 4.16; 6.9; 9.37; [Dem.] 46.16.

72. [Dem.] 44.63–68. The speaker of Isaios 2 was adopted by Menekles, who had no sons. After the adoption the speaker behaved as a dutiful son. With the encouragement of Menekles he took a wife (2.18), and when a son was born to him, he gave him the name Menekles (2.36).

73. Isai. 3.42, 68; 10.13; cf. page 20 above.

74. For example, Isai. 7.14–15; Dem. 27.4; Plat. Laws 922a-923c; cf. Isai. 2.14.

75. [Dem.] 46.24.

76. Lys. 19.39. Gernet (note 69 above, 143–45) would explain the possibility of large legacies, as in the will of Konon, by distinguishing between the patrimony of the family, which had to pass to the sons, and assets acquired by the testator through his own efforts; supposedly he could dispose of the latter by will. That may be sound. But the decisive fact is that a son will not challenge his father’s will if he is satisfied with what it assigns to him or does not wish to antagonize other beneficiaries.

77. Dem. 27.4–5. The will of Aristotle, a metic (Diog. L. 5.11–16), consists of provisions for the dependents, including the widow, the children, and the slaves, and for dedications. The terms of the will of Pasion (Dem. 36.33–35; 45.27–28) were disputed but evidently provided for the widow and the children. The flexibility of the Athenian will is illustrated by the testament of Epikouros (Diog. L. 10.16–21). It provided for the continuation of the school under Hermachos of Mytilene as head. Since Hermachos was an alien, he could not inherit immovable property in Attica. So the will inserted two Athenians as heirs but told them to ensure use of the garden and the house to Hermachos and the other members of the school.

78. Gaius 1.55 (of the authority of Roman fathers over sons): “quod ius proprium civium Romanorum est (fere enim nulli alii sunt homines, qui talem in filios suos habent potestatem, qualem nos habemus).” Gaius notes that only the Galatians had a similar institution.

79. This version and a variant are given by Suet. Tib. 1. For the many other sources of the main version and for discussion, see Münzer, RE., 3.2663.

80. In choosing someone to adopt as a son one searched among one’s relatives first: Isai. 2.20–22.

81. Dem. 24.105–14; Cohen, Theft, 62, 68, 74–76. Cf. page 56 below.

82. D. Cohen, “Work in Progress: The enforcement of morals,” Rechtshistorisches Journal 3 (1984): 119–20; idem, “The Athenian law of adultery,” RIDA., 3d ser., 31 (1984): 147–65.

83. Dem. 18.132.

Chapter 3

  1. M. Fränkel, “Der attische Heliasteneid,” Hermes 13 (1878): 452–66.

  2. M. H. Hansen, “Did the Athenian ecclesia legislate after 403/2 B.C.?” GRBS. 20 (1979): 27–53, at 27–31. The provision mentioned by Andok. 1.87 will receive attention below (page 38).

  3. Hansen, note 2 above. Hansen presents a strong case, but possibly the question would repay further scrutiny. Some measures, such as IG. II², 125 and 204, were passed as decrees and took temporary steps to deal with a transitory situation but also stated general and permanent rules. Even so, it follows from Hansen’s study that one should not endorse the fourth-century allegation that the Athenians determined everything by decrees without regard to the laws (Dem. 20.91–92; Ar. AP 41.2; cf. Ar. Pol 4.1292a4–7, 23–25, 32–37; 1293a9–10; 1298b14–15; 5.1305a28–32; 1310a3–4; 6.1317b28–30). That was evidently one of the stock grounds for scolding the Athenians.

  4. Lys. 30.4. It is not clear whether in this his second term of service Nikomachos was a mere “recorder” (anagrapheus) of laws or a nomothetēs. Lysias tries to suggest the latter at 30.27–28, associating him with Teisamenos, but the suggestion may be merely a prosecutor’s attempt to make the alleged outrage seem worse. The language of 30.4 suggests a “recorder.”

  5. Andok. 1.82 and 85 (the wall in the stoa basileios). The largest fragment was published by J. H. Oliver, “Greek inscriptions,” Hesperia 4 (1935): 1–32. Several more fragments were published by S. Dow, “Greek inscriptions,” Hesperia 10 (1941): 31–37. Among further epigraphic studies, two by Dow conclude work of many years: “The Athenian calendar of sacrifices: The chronology of Nikomachos’ second term,” Historia 9 (1960): 270–93, with bibliography, and “The walls inscribed with Nikomachos’ law code,” Hesperia 30 (1961): 58–73. Historical conclusions have been drawn by Dow, “The law codes of Athens,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 71 (1953–57; published 1959): 3–36.

  6. Plut. Arist 7.6; cf. Philochoros, F. Gr. Hist III B 328 F 30. G. A. Lehmann (“Der Ostrakismos-Entscheid in Athen: von Kleisthenes zur Ära des Themistokles,” ZPE. 41 [1981]: 85–99) has revived the view that for validity ostracism required, not a quorum of 6,000 voters, but at least 6,000 votes against one candidate. But his argument depends on a note of doubtful value in a late manuscript (cf. J. J. Keaney and A. E. Raubitschek, “A Byzantine account of ostracism,” A JP 93 [1972]: 87–91).

  7. The first statue of a living man set up by the Athenians in the agora was that of Konon (Dem. 20.70; cf. IG. II², 3774). Later they set up a statue of Chabrias and voted him a crown (Aischin. 3.243; Dem. 24.180, cf. 20.84; A. P. Burnett and C. Edmonson, “The Chabrias monument in the Athenian agora,” Hesperia 30 [1961]: 74–91). Others receiving honors included Iphikrates, Timotheos, Lykourgos, and Demosthenes (Dem. 20.84; [Plut.] Ten Orators 850f–851c, 851f–852e).

  8. In 411 the revolutionaries said that the assembly had never drawn an attendance as high as 5,000 (Thuc. 8.72.1). The fact that ostracisms had sometimes taken place suggests that they were not telling the truth. But the failure to complete an ostracism after that of Hyperbolos (Plut. Nik 11; Arist 7; cf. Alk 13) is more suggestive of the numbers who attended the assembly in the fourth century. The prytaneis continued to ask the assembly once each year whether it wished to hold an ostracism (Ar. AP. 43.5); perhaps the answer was sometimes negative, and perhaps sometimes it was not possible to bring 6,000 voters together. M. H. Hansen (Volks-Versammlung, 24–26) has argued that a large attendance, about 6,000, was frequent in the fourth century; for grants of citizenship were frequent, and [Demosthenes] 59.89–90 says that for such a grant the law required a second meeting of the assembly and a quorum of 6,000. The argument is persuasive, because [Demosthenes] is fully explicit in his assertion. Yet the orator has just said that a law provides that citizenship should be granted only on grounds of “merit” (andragathia). This assertion makes it difficult to believe that the orator is telling the plain truth.

  9. Thuc. 2.37.3. Nothing need be said here about the “unwritten nomima of the gods,” mentioned by Antigone (Soph. Ant., 454–55). They are not laws but the traditional practice of performing funeral rites for one’s deceased relatives; see B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (California, 1964), 94–98.

10. Lys. 6.10. Blass (Att. Bered., 567–70) argued that the speech was not by Lysias. If the view developed by K. J. Dover is right (Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum [California, 1968]), it is prudent to suspend judgment on the authorship of most of the speeches attributed to Lysias. But there is no good ground to doubt that speech 6 was delivered at the trial in 400/399. The date of the trial is inferred from Andok. 1.132.

11. If my memory is accurate, this suggestion was made orally by the late H. T. Wade-Gery. The Megarians were alleged to have encroached on the sacred land at Eleusis (Thuc. 1.139.2).

12. Athenian law also had a nonpositivist element, contained in the oath of dikastai (note 1 above): “I will vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees of the people of Athens and of the council of five hundred, and on matters where there are no laws, I will vote in accordance with the most just opinion.” No system is wholly positivist, since the law cannot foresee the variety of human ingenuity and human malice. If a wholly positivist system were attained, there would be nothing left for judges to do.

13. Andok. 1.87. The same measure is quoted by Dem. 23.87, cf. 24.30.

14. For example, Dem. 20.91; 22.5.

15. Lys. 6.29. From 6.24 and 52 it appears that the measure thus confirmed was the sentence of atimia which had been inflicted on Andokides.

16. For example, Lys. 6.52; Andok. 1.82–89; Dem. 20.89–91; 23.25, 27, 29, 37; 24.17, 25, 30, 33, 51, 59, 62; Ar. AP. 7.1, cf. 12.4; Xen. Hell 2.3.2 and 11.

17. Xen. Mem 1.2.42, discussed below (page 46).

18. The total of dikastai, revised each year, was 6,000. The figure is attested for the fifth century (Aristoph. Wasps 662; Ar. AP. 24.3; cf. Andok. 1.17). That the same total, with annual revision of the list, was maintained in the fourth century has been argued by J. H. Kroll, Athenian Bronze Allotment Plates (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 69–90; Krolľs argument is summarized and accepted by Hansen, Folkedomstolen, 16–18. The coincidence of the quorum for privilegia with the total of dikastai might suggest that the measure restricting privilegia envisaged a meeting, not of the assembly of citizens, but of the whole body of dikastai But the similarity of privilegia to votes of ostracism by the assembly points to the opposite conclusion. It is doubtful whether the 6,000 dikastai ever sat as a single body (in spite of Andok. 1.17, which may be tendentious); the largest court known to have sat numbered 2,500 dikastai (Dein. 1.52). Probably 6,000 was stated as the quorum for privilegia, as for votes of ostracism, because it was the largest assemblage of citizens that could be hoped for.

19. Plentiful information on the activities of the council and the assembly is collected by Rhodes, Boule.

20. Earlier inquiries were superseded by U. Kahrstedt, “Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden II: die Nomotheten und die Legislative in Athen,” Klio 31 (1938): 1–32. Other important studies include Wolff, Normenkontrolle; F. Quass, Nomos und Psephisma. Untersuchungen zum griechischen Staatsrecht (Zetemata 55, Munich, 1971); M. H. Hansen, “Nomos and Psephisma in fourth-century Athens,” GRBS 19 (1978): 315–30. An up-to-date account is provided by Hansen, Nomotheterne D. M. MacDowell, “Law-Making at Athens in the fourth century B.C.,” JHS. 95 (1975): 62–74, offers a useful collection of texts; part of his thesis has been criticized by Hansen, “Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century B.C. and Demosthenes’ speech against Leptines,” C et M. 32 (1980): 87–104.

21. Dem. 20.89–100; 24.20–38; Aischin. 3.38–39. The most informative of these passages is the one in Dem. 24. Our manuscripts of that passage include the texts of some laws and a decree. The authenticity of these is guaranteed in part by the comments of Demosthenes. The authenticity of the documents given in our manuscripts of the orators was discussed by E. Drerup, “Über die bei den attischen Rednem eingelegten Urkunden,” Jahrbücher fur classische Philologie, Supplementband 24 (1898): 221–366. There do not appear to be grounds to add seriously to Drerup’s findings.

22. In approximately chronological order: SEG. 26.72 (first published by R. S. Stroud, “An Athenian law on silver coinage,” Hesperia 43 [1974]: 157–88); IG. II², 140; SEG. 30.61 (first published by K. Clinton, “A law in the city Eleusinion concerning the mysteries,” Hesperia 49 [1980]: 258–88); IG. II², 244; SEG. 12.87; 18.13; IG. II², 333; 412 (republished with improved readings by M. H. Hansen, “IG. II² 412: A fragment of a fourth-century Athenian law, C et M 33 [1981–82]: 119–23).

23. IG. II², 222 lines 41–46; 330 lines 18–23; VII, 4254.

24. M. H. Hansen, “Initiative and decision: The separation of powers in fourth-century Athens,” GRBS 22 (1981): 345–70, at 347–51.

25. Dem. 24.20–25. Evidently at the time of this speech (353/52) there were three meetings of the assembly in each prytany. There were four at the time when Aristotle wrote AP. 43.4–6. The change has been studied by M. H. Hansen and F. Mitchel, “The number of ecclesiai in fourth-century Athens,” SO 59 (1984): 13–19.

26. Dem. 24.27.

27. Dem. 24.33.

28. Ar. AP. 44.2–3; D. M. Lewis, “Notes on Attic inscriptions,” ABSA 49 (1954): 17–50, at 31–34; W. K. Pritchett, “Lucubrationes Epigraphicae,” CSCA. 5 (1972): 153–81, at 164–69.

29. Dem. 24.33; SEG. 12.87 line 3; IG. II², 140 lines 4–5.

30. That the proedroi in the two tasks were different is the opinion of Rhodes (Boule, 28) and MacDowell (note 20 above, 63). Hansen argued that they were the same in “Hoi proedroi ton nomotheton A note on IG II² 222, 41–52,” ZPE. 30 (1978): 151–57. Later (Embedsmaendene, 95–96, n. 85) he concluded that they were different, because at Dem. 24.71 the epistatēs of the proedroi of the lawgivers has the demotic Myrrinousios and therefore belongs to the phylē Pandionis, which supplied the current prytaneis But it is easy to emend “Myrrinousios” to “eg Myrrinouttēs,” as Drerup suggested; cf. Lewis (note 28 above), 32.

31. Dem. 24.27 fin. (cf. Andok. 1.84; page 36 above). Although the principle is only attested here, the brevity of the reference to it shows that it was generally understood.

32. SEG. 26.72 line 1; IG. II², 140 lines 7–8; 244 line 6; SEG. 12.87 lines 6–7; 18.13 line 7. As observed by Clinton (note 22 above, 260), the fact of publication on stone may in some cases have been sufficient evidence of validity without a ratificatory prescript, but this possibility does not bear on the question of the source of authority.

33. I tried to follow up this suspicion in “On penalizing Areopagites,” AJP. 79 (1958): 71–73 = Essays, 183–85.

34. Note 20 above, 4–5; cf. Hansen, note 2 above, 39–43.

35. Ar. AP. 59.2 notes both procedures. The distinction between them has been clarified by Hansen, Sovereignty

36. Dem. 24.138.

37. Dem. 24.33–35; cf. 20.93.

38. Liv. 7.17.12 (=Twelve Tables 12.5); cf. 9.34.6–7. The principle is illustrated by the tradition on conubium between patricians and plebeians. Allegedly this was forbidden by the Twelve Tables (11.1) but allowed a few years later by the lex Canuleia (Cic. de re p 2.63; Liv. 4.1.1; 4.4.5; 4.6.3–4; Dion. Hal., Antiq. Rom. 10.60.5). Whether the tradition was historically accurate is a question that need not be asked here. The tradition reflected Roman belief about the validity of laws.

39. Lys. 30.2.

40. IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86; Stroud, Drakon’s Law

41. Hes. Works 276–85. For sophistic views, see, for example, Thrasymachos in Plat. Rep 1.338c-339a; Kallikles in Plat. Gorg 482e-484c; Antiphon Sophista B 44 (Diels/Kranz⁷).

42. Recognized by Kahrstedt (note 20 above, 6); cf. M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1969), 2.

43. For example, about the middle of the fifth century the Athenians exacted oaths from the Erythraians (IG. I³, 15; cf. R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire [Oxford, 1972], 421–22), from the Milesians (IG. I³, 21 lines 69–71), and from the Kolophonians (IG. I³, 37 lines 43–56 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 47, lines 42–55). They exacted an oath from the cities of Keos toward 363 (IG. II², 111 = Tod II No. 142, lines 69–81). Unlike the usual oaths ratifying treaties, these oaths were part of a settlement of strife within the city.

44. For example, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961).

45. Solon fr. 36 (West), lines 18–20 (apud Ar. AP 12.4). Ostwald (note 42 above, 12–56) offers further reflections on the terms thesmos and nomos

46. Ar. AP 29.3.

47. Andok. 1.17 and 22. It is odd that the only argument known to have been employed in this trial bore, not on the question of the legality of the decree, but on a separate question of fact (whether Leogoras had been present at the profanation of the mysteries). Wolff (Normenkontrolle, 45–54) explains this, perhaps rightly, by supposing that in 415 the practice of legal argument was less well developed than in the time of Demosthenes. Another case of graphē paranomōn is known from 414 or earlier: Demosthenes the general indicted someone and Antiphon composed a speech for his defense ([Plut.] Ten Orators 833d; Harpok. s.v. keleontes; Antiph. frr. 8–14 Blass). But too little is known about this case to indicate anything more about the institution.

48. Thuc. 8.67; cf. Ar. AP. 29.4–5.

49. Xen. Hell 1.7.12–13 and 20–23.

50. In “On the Athenian concept of law,” CJ 77 (1981–82): 289–302, at 300, I tried to place the creation of the graphē paranomōn between 427 and 415. Many of the views expressed in the present chapter were first presented in that article. I thank the editors of The Classical Journal for permission to draw on that material again.

51. For example, Thuc. 3.37.3; Dem. 24.139–43.

Chapter 4

  1. Harpok. s.v. anakrisis. For the standard sizes of dikastēria: Ar. AP. 53.3; 68.1; Dem. 24.9; Poll. 8.123; Harpok. s.v. hēliaia. Only one extant inscription (IG. II², 1641 lines 25–33) preserves the number of dikastai who voted at a trial. This says that 100 voted for the plaintiff and 399 for the defendant.

  2. Isok. 18.1–3. Good accounts of the paragraphē are offered by Lipsius, AR., 846–56, and Harrison, Law 2.106–24. For a full study, one should consult H. J. Wolff, Die attische Paragraphe (Graezistische Abhandlungen, Band 2, Weimar, 1966), passim, esp. 119–21. D. M. MacDowell (“The chronology of Athenian speeches and legal innovations in 401–398 B.C.,” RIDA., 3d ser. 18 [1971], 267–73, at 269) offers strong reasons to believe that the law of Archinos was passed in 401/0.

  3. Poll. 8.41; cf. Lys. 1.44; Isai. 11.28.

  4. Lipsius, AR., 344–49. The same reasoning applies to the graphē adikōs heirchthēnai hōs moichon (the plea that someone had been unjustly seized as an adulterer, [Dem.] 59.66); the man who had been seized was for that reason unable to initiate action (cf. E. Ruschenbusch, “Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits bei den Griechen,” Symposion 1977 [Cologne and Vienna, 1982], 1–8, at 5–7).

  5. Ar. AP 3.4.

  6. Isai. 11.34. The traditional distinction has been defended against critics by E. Ruschenbusch, “Dikē kata tinos und pros tina,” ZSS 86 (1969): 386–94.

  7. Accounts may be found in standard handbooks; for example, Lipsius, AR., 176–219, 299–338, and Harrison, Law 2.49–64, 211–32. G. M. Calhoun (The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece [Berkeley, 1927], 57–62) compared the special procedures with the graphē and inclined to suggest that they had an earlier origin.

  8. Ar. AP 52.1; Lys. 13.85–86; Dem. 24.113–14; Aischin. 1.91. The material has been collected and discussed by Hansen, Apagoge Some of Hansen’s views are criticized by Cohen, Theft, 52–61.

  9. Dem. 24.113; Cohen, Theft, 74–75. As Cohen argues, these provisions apply to the thief who breaks into the house. Cf. page 30 above.

10. Information about the scandal comes from four speeches: Hyper 5 (Kenyon), Dein. 1, 2, 3. On the procedure, see especially Hyper 5.2–5; Dein. 1.45. Up-to-date discussion is provided by J. A. Goldstein, The Letters of Demosthenes (New York and London, 1968), 35–44.

11. Cf. Hansen, Eisangelia, 9–11. The cases of Antiphon and others (Dem. 18.132–34; Dein. 1.62–63) may illustrate apophasis, perhaps in its early development. They are often dated 346–343 (Hansen, Eisangelia, 56), but a date as late as 340 is possible and indeed defensible (R. Sealey, “On penalizing Areopagites,” AJP. 79 [1958]: 71–74 = Essays, 183–85).

12. MacDowell (note 2 above), 270–71. The law instituting public arbitrators is mentioned by Lys. fr. 16 Thalheim = fr. XXXVII, 1 Gernet/Bizos. Cf. Bonner and Smith, 1.353.

13. Ar. AP 26.3. Aristotle says that they were instituted “again” in 453/52. He has said (16.5) that they were instituted by Peisistratos. Many have accepted this, perhaps rightly. It is a little troublesome that Aristotle does not say anything about their being abolished in the meantime. It is also troublesome that no good reason for abolishing them can be conjectured. For contrasting views, see Day and Chambers, Aristotle’s History, 95–96, and Rhodes, Comm., 215 and 331.

14. Aristoph. Wasps 156–57, 240–44, 288–89, 303–6; Ant. 6.21 and 23. Likewise, each courtroom was assigned to a specific magistrate for the whole year (at least): Aristoph. Wasps 1107–11; Ant. fr. 42 (Blass/Thalheim) apud Harpok. s.v. parabyston Probably a larger number of dikastai was assigned to each court than it required, so men arriving late did not serve or receive pay: Aristoph. Wasps 686–90, 774–75. Annual revision of the list of 6,000 is inferred from Aristoph. Wasps 400. Good accounts of the three successive methods of assigning dikastai to courts are provided by Bonner and Smith, 1.224–50, 370–78; Harrison, Law 2.45–46, 239–41; Lipsius, AR., 136–50; Hansen, Folkedomstolen, 19–20.

15. Aristoph. Ekkl. 681–92; Plout. 277—7S, 972, 1166–67. The Ploutos was produced in 389/88 according to its fourth hypothesis. The possible dates for the Ekklesiazousai are 393–92 and 392/91; see P. Funke, Homonoia und Arche (Historia Einzelschriften 37 [1980]), 168–71. A. L. Boegehold (“Many Letters: Aristophanes Plutus 1166–67,” in Studies Presented to Sterling Dow [Durham, N.C., 1984], 23–29, at 24–25) suggests that this mode of assigning dikastai to courts was introduced not in 403/2, as often supposed, but about 409.

16. See Ar. AP. 63–69 for this method of assigning dikastai to courts; cf. 53.2–3 on written testimony. For the date, see G. M. Calhoun, “Oral and written pleading in Athenian courts,” TAPA 50 (1919): 177–93. Calhoun suggested associating the changes with the creation of the Second Athenian League in 378 and with the attendant military and naval measures. Although the chronology is good, it is difficult to see a connection of policy beyond a need to direct man power more economically. See also page 177, note 88, below.

17. Ar. AP. 27.3; Pol. 2.1274a8–9; cf. Plut. Per 9.3. Attempts to date the introduction of dikastic pay (notably by H. T. Wade-Gery, “Two notes on Theopompos,” AJP 59 [1938]: 129–34, at 131–34 = Essays, 235–38) have not been decisive (see Rhodes, Comm., 339–40).

18. Dem. 24.148; Hyper. 4.40 (Kenyon).

19. Knights 798; Wasps 195, 772, 891; Lys 380.

20. Dem. 23.28. The same word usage, with the distinction between “judging” (dikazein) and “deciding” (diagnōnai), is observed in the law of Drakon as reinscribed in 409/8 (IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, lines 10–12). There the kings are to “judge,” but the ephetai are to “decide.” Cf. note 47 below.

21. (a) IG. I³, 40 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 52, lines 75–76. The probable date is 446/45, although a date in 424/23 has been defended by H. B. Mattingly, “Athens and Euboea,” JHS. 81 (1961): 124–32. (b) Ant. 6.21. Here hēliaian is a very probable emendation for hēliakēn. The date 419/18 for this speech has been reached by identifying the Aristion of 6.35 with the archon of 421/20; cf. K. J. Dover, “The chronology of Antiphon’s speeches,” CQ. 44 (1950): 44–60, at 44.

22. A particularly persuasive statement of the “older” theory is provided by H. T. Wade-Gery, Essays, 171–200 (the earlier of these two chapters, “Themistokles’ Archonship,” was previously published in ABSA. 37 [1936–37; published 1940]: 263–70). For a briefer statement, see Lipsius, AR., 27–30, and for recent reiteration, MacDowell, Law, 30–32. The “newer” theory has been developed by Ruschenbusch in two articles (“Ephesis. Ein Beitrag zur griechischen Rechtsterminologie,” ZSS. 78 [1961]: 386–90, and “Hēliaia: Die Tradition über das solonische Volksgericht,” Historia 14 [1965]: 381–84), and by M. H. Hansen (“The Athenian Heliaia from Solon to Aristotle,” C et M. 33 [1981–82]: 9–47).

23. Nemea (IG. IV, 479 line 1); Mykenai (IG. IV, 497 line 2; Schwyzer, Dialectorum graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora [Leipzig, 1923], 99 line 2); Argos (Schwyzer 83 B line 25; 90 line 2; 91 line 2; 92 line 2; W. Vollgraff, “Novae inscriptiones Argivae,” Mnemosyne 44 [1916]: 217–38, at 221); Orchomenos (Schwyzer 666 line 6); Epidamnos (Ar. Pol 5.1301b23). Aliastai are attested as a court at Tegea (Schwyzer, 656 line 24).

24. Kerkyra (IG. IX [1], 682 line 5), Akragas (IG.XIV, 952 line 10), Rhegion (IG XIV, 612 line 1), Heraclea in Lucania (IG. XIV, 645, I line 118 and II line 10), Byzantion (Dem. 18.90).

25. Hdt. 1.125.2; 5.29.2; 5.79.2; 7.134.2.

26. An act is only an appeal if there is an authoritative judgment to be appealed. In cautious language Wade-Gery (note 22 above, Essays, 192) maintained that ephesis is always “the act of a ‘litigating party’ who, being dissatisfied with an authoritative pronouncement made about his case, appeals against it to some other authority” (his italics).

27. Arguing against Lipsius and others, Wade-Gery (note 22 above) attributed the change to Ephialtes. Many years ago the present writer accepted the “older” theory and thought that the change was not brought about by anyone’s enactment but came about as a change of custom, when archons, chosen by lot since 487, ceased to assert themselves (“Ephialtes,” CP 59 [1964]: 11–22 = Essays, 42–58).

28. Pollux 8.62 has an explanatory note beginning thus: “Ephesis occurs when someone transfers a case from arbitrators or archons or fellow-demesmen to dikastai (?), or from the council to the demos, or from the demos to a dikastērion, . . .” Pollux’s note appears erudite. One of the illustrations, ephesis from the demos to a dikastērion, poses a difficulty for holders of the “older” view, since they believe that the classical dikastēria derived their authority from the supposed judicial competence of the assembly; for appeal should be from the lesser body to the greater. But not much confidence can be placed in Pollux’s note, since the text has corruptions and he wrote at a time late enough to be influenced by Roman practices of appeal.

29. Ar. AP 53.2; Dem. 29.59; [Dem.] 40.31.

30. Dem. 57.6; Isai. Lost speech VII (Forster).

31. [Dem.] 34.21. For the date, see Blass, Att. Bered III², 1,578.

32. For recent discussion, with reference to predecessors, see J. M. Balcer, The Athenian Regulations for Chalkis (Historia Einzelschriften Heft 33 [1978]), 102–18, esp. 108–9. Balcer decides against a mere right of appeal.

33. J. Gaudemet, Institutions de l’antiquité (Paris, 1967), 646–47; cf. 627–28 on the collaboration of the parties. It is also to be noted that in the monarchical conditions of the third century A.D. and later appeal was important in the procedure of cognitio extra ordinem (ibid., 802–3).

34. Ar. AP 63.3.

35. I owe this solution to Mr. Dennis L. Anderson. He is not responsible for any defects in my account of it. In AP. 3.5 the crucial word, rendered above as “to decide,” is partly missing at a lacuna in the London papyrus and has been restored in the light of Ar. Pol 4.1298a30. For the usual way of understanding AP. 3.5, see Rhodes, Comm., 106.

36. M. H. Hansen, “Demos, Ecclesia and Dicasterion in classical Athens,” GRBS. 19 (1978): 127–46. Historians and philosophers often, on the other hand, and very rarely orators (for example, Aischin. 1.141) use demos of “the common people” and insist that the dikastērion is an organ of the common people.

37. E. Ruschenbusch, “Dikastērion pantōn kyrion,” Historia 6 (1957): 257–74, at 263–67.

38. Hellanikos, F. Gr. Hist. III B 323a FI; Eurip. El 1258–63; I.T. 945–46. Cf. R. Sealey, “The Athenian courts for homicide,” CP. 78 (1983): 275–96, at 288–89. Many of the views expressed in this section are developed more fully in that article. I thank the editors of Classical Philology for permission to draw on the material anew. The article drew in turn on the arguments of E. Ruschenbusch, “Phonos Zum Recht Drakons und seiner Bedeutung für das Werden des athenischen Staates,” Historia 9 (1960): 129–54.

39. Poll. 8.117; Etym. Mag. 131.13 s.v. apophrades; Etym. Gud. s.v. apophrades. For discussion, see W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part III: Religion (California, 1979), 209–29.

40. Solon F 70 = Plut. Sol 19.4. The explanation followed here was proposed and defended more precisely by Ruschenbusch (note 38 above), 132–35.

41. I am indebted to D. Cohen for the suggestion that the categories of justifiable homicide, though disparate to the modern mind, may all be analyzed as killing in places where violence is permitted. He is not to blame for any inadequacies of my formulation.

42. Il. 9.632–36; 13.659; 16.398; 18.498.

43. Il. 14.483. Likewise, “recompense” is the root sense in the more puzzling sentence at Il. 17.206–8.

44. For example, ransom for the living captive: Il 1.13; 1.95; 1.111; 2.130. For the corpse: Il. 24.137 and 139. On the battlefield: Il. 6.46; 10.380.

45. Il. 9.120; 19.138. On the moral and psychological ideas involved, reference may be made to E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (California, 1951), 2–8.

46. Solon F 12 = Bekker, Anec 428.9 s.v. apoina, Suda A 3716 s.v. apoina

47. Dem. 23.28 = Solon F 16. The wording shows that the law is early (note 20 above). The text refers to an axōn, but this reference does not show what the relation of this law was to the axones of Solon (or Drakon).

48. Photios s.v. poinān kai apoinān = Solon F 11.

49. Poll. 9.61 = Solon F 10.

50. Ruschenbusch (note 38 above), 139.

51. IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, lines 10–16 and 20–21; Ruschenbusch (note 38 above), 137–38.

52. The text as reinscribed (IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86) opens with provisions about involuntary homicide. Cf. Ruschenbusch (note 38 above), 142–43 and passim. The surprising manner in which the text opens has prompted several hypotheses; for discussion, see Sealey (note 38 above), 291–92 and 294 n. 40. On the inscribed text only one observation need be added here. Stroud’s study {Drakon’s Law) has shown that the text was a good deal longer than the part which can be read and reconstructed. Even that part includes rulings on several different issues, including who is to judge the charge of involuntary homicide, who is authorized to take part in aidesis, whether the provisions are to be retroactive, who is to take part in the opening proclamation against the killer, who is to join in the prosecution, under what conditions the killer’s life shall be spared, and under what conditions killing in self-defense is allowed. It is most unlikely that all these issues first came to require statutory regulation at the same time. Therefore the text of 409/8 is in all probability a compendium of laws which had been issued at different times. Greek chronographers assigned the work of Drakon to 621/20. The tradition is uniform (Stroud, Drakon’s Law, 66–70) but late; it may rest wholly on Apollodoros. If the different laws of homicide arose at different dates, one cannot tell which of them was issued in 621/20. At least those historians who believe that the whole code, as reinscribed in 409/8, had been issued in 621/20 may be challenged to say precisely what difference that legislation made in 621/20 (cf. page 115 below).

53. Soph. Trach. 727–28; Ant. 1.3, 5, 19–20, 26; 6.19; Dem. 21.42–43; Ar. Mag. Mor 1188b31–37.

54. IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, line 17 (cf. 24–25), restored from the law in [Dem.] 43.57; Poll. 8.125. Androtion F. Gr. Hist. 324 F 4a and Philochoros 328 F 20b are preserved only by Maximus in commenting on Dionysios Areiopagita; Maximus says that the Areopagos numbered fifty-one, because he confuses it with the ephetai; cf. Jacoby, F. Gr. Hist III b (Supplement) I, 114. Neither the figure nor probably the word ephetai is given in Ar. AP. 57.4; on the reading, see M. Chambers, “Notes on the text of the Ath. Pol.,” TAPA. 96 (1965): 31–39, at 38–39.

55. M. Gagarin, “Hesiod’s dispute with Perses,” TAPA 104 (1974): 103–11, at 105.

56. Il. 23.573–80. At 23.542 dikē is an objection or plea uttered by one of the disputing parties. Dikē as a settlement imposed by a judge is illustrated by Od. 11.568–70; Il. 16.542. So a man who gives judgments is dikaspolos: Il. 1.238; Od. 11. 184–87. The verb dikazein is used of the judge who gives judgments: Od. 11.547; Il. 8.431; 1.542. Correspondingly, dikazesthai in the middle is used of the party who seeks a judgment from a judge: Od. 11.545; 12.439–40.

57. My ideas have been stimulated by the following: H. S. Maine, Ancient Law (London, 15th ed., 1894), 377; W. Leaf, The Iliad (London, 2d ed., 1902), II, 610–14; H. H. Pflüger, “Die Gerichtsszene auf dem Schilde des Achilleus,” Hermes 77 (1942): 140–48; H. J. Wolff, “The Origin of judicial litigation among the Greeks,” Traditio 4 (1946): 31–87, esp. 34–49; M. Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law (New Haven, 1981), 13–16; E. Ruschenbusch, note 4 above.

58. Gaudemet (note 33 above), 627–28.

59. On the negatives in Homeric Greek, reference may be made to P. Chantraine, Grammaire homérique, II Syntaxe (Paris, 1953), 330–39; at 335 n. 1 Chantraine discusses this passage. The interpretive arguments offered here have been presented by Gagarin (note 57 above), except for the argument from the negative, which was presented by Leaf (note 57 above). The solution adopted here is Gagarin’s, although he is not responsible for the further inference about the rudimentary character of the procedure.

60. Litis contestatio, cf. Gaudemet (note 33 above), 637–39. In the legis actio sacramento (Gaius 4.13–17) the issue was joined on the question, which of the wagers offered by the parties was valid. In the earliest Athenian procedure for homicide the issue was probably joined on the question whether the act had been involuntary (pages 76–77 above).

61. Xen. Lak. Pol 10.2.

62. Solon F 70 = Plut. Sol 19.4; page 73 above. Whether the jurisdiction of the Areopagos concerning sacred olives (Lys. 7; Ar. AP. 60.2; Lipsius, AR., 128–29) is early cannot be determined and is not important.

63. For example, an inscription found at Delphi and probably to be dated between 262 and 251 gives a treaty between Delphi and Pellana for deciding disputes between citizens of the two communities. It distinguishes between two organs. The plaintiff is to address himself first to “the magistracy” (ha archa). The case will then be decided by dikasteres. See B. Haussoullier, Traité entre Delphes et Pellana (Bibliothèque de l’école des hautes études, fasc. 222, Paris, 1917).

64. Hes. Works 39, 221, 264; cf. Gagarin (note 55 above), 109.

65. Hes. Works 9, 263.

66. Hes. Works 202–12, 225–73; Theog 84–87; cf. Wolff (note 57 above), 57–62.

67. Rhodes, Boule, 147–62; Hansen, Eisangelia; P. J. Rhodes, “Eisangelia at Athens,” JHS. 99 (1979): 103–14; M. H. Hansen, “Eisangelia in Athens: A reply,” JHS 100 (1980): 89–95; R. Sealey, “Ephialtes, Eisangelia and the Council,” in G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar, eds., Classical Contributions: Studies in Honor of M. F. McGregor (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1981), 125–34.

68. Hyper. 4.4–8 (Kenyon) mentions an eisangeltikos nomos and gives a limited list of offenses for which the procedure was available. The eisangeltikos nomos is mentioned in the law apud Dem. 24.63. Those who hold that the list of offenses for which eisangelia was available was limited are represented in recent discussion by Hansen (note 67 above). The other view, that the law of eisangelia had a “nonspecific strand,” is held by Rhodes. Those who would restrict the procedure to a limited list have had to extend the list; see notably T. Thalheim, “Zur Eisangelie in Athen,” Hermes 37 (1902): 339–52.

69. Ar. AP 8.4; cf. page 73 above.

70. Ar. AP. 45.2; 59.2–4; cf. law apud Dem. 24.63. The distinction is developed by Hansen, Apagoge, 21–28. A different classification is offered by Rhodes (note 67 above; 1979, 106–14).

71. [Dem.] 47.43; cf. IG. I³, 78 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 73, lines 57–59.

72. Andok. 1.11; cf. Hansen, Eisangelia, 77–79.

73. IG. I³, 40 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 52, lines 4–10. On the date, see note 21 above.

74. Ar. AP. 22.4 for the date of the ostracism of Hipparchos. Cf. A. E. Raubitschek, “Theophrastus on ostracism,” C et M. 19 (1958): 73–109, at 107–8.

75. This date is defended by Funke (note 15 above), 96 n. 91. The alternative is 388.

76. Xen. Hell 5.1.25–28, esp. 26–27.

77. [Dem.] 49.10 says explicitly that the Athenians were persuaded to acquit Timotheos. Pseudo-Plutarch (Ten Orators 836d = Lys. fr. 228 Sauppe) says that Iphikrates prosecuted Timotheos successfully in a trial which must be this one. Hansen (Eisangelia, 91) concludes that Timotheos was convicted. But [Dem.] 49, delivered eleven years after 373, is better evidence than the Lives of the Ten Orators, composed many centuries later.

78. Dem. 19.31, cf. 137, 191. Xenophon (Hell. 7.1.38) says that the Athenians executed Timagoras; the expression does not indicate whether Xenophon meant a decision of the assembly or one of a dikastērion.

79. Xen. Hell. 1.7.20 and 22. On the offense of hierosylia, see Cohen, Theft, 93–115.

80. Hansen, Eisangelia, 53–57. Hansen suggests associating the change with the introduction of apophasis (pages 56–57 above); this is attractive. In Volksversammlung, 117–18, Hansen proposes two reasons for the change: economy, since the rate of pay for attendance at the assembly was higher than for attendance at a court (cf. Rhodes, note 67 above, 1979, 108), and a desire to moderate the democracy in the direction of the supposed ancestral constitution. Different Athenians may have been swayed by different reasons, but surely they were generally alive to the juridical principle involved, as Aristotle (AP. 9.1) was, even though he viewed that principle unfavorably.

Chapter 5

  1. Among many possible illustrations two may be mentioned as significant. W. G. Forrest entitled his thoughtful book on the early history of Greece The Emergence of Greek Democracy (London, 1966). P. J. Rhodes (“Athenian Democracy after 403 B.C.,” CJ. 75 [1979–80]: 305–23, at 320–23) concludes a thorough study of fourth-century developments by asking whether the changes were democratic. His conclusion is mentioned here, not with a view to disputing his answer, but in order to note that he attaches importance to the question.

  2. For example, following Thucydides (5.29.1; 5.31.6; 6.39), D. Kagan (The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition [Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1981], 40, 44, 222; cf. 49) speaks of democracy at Argos, Mantinea, and Syracuse. Democracy, or dēmokratia, is a key word in Thucydides 5–6 and in Kagan’s book. Both the ancient and the modern historian assume that the reader knows what is meant.

  3. J. A. O. Larsen, “Cleisthenes and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens,” in M. R. Konvitz and A. E. Murphy, eds., Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine (Ithaca, N.Y., 1948), 1–16, at 1.

  4. For example, V. Ehrenberg, “Origins of democracy,” Historia 1 (1950): 515–48, at 547: “the typical feature of early democracy was the majority vote of the people.”

  5. For example, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “The character of the Athenian Empire,” Historia 3 (1954): 1–41, at 41: “The dividing line between oligarchy and democracy must be drawn somewhere. Surely the essential criterion is whether or not there is a property qualification for voting in the sovereign Assembly (see Busolt, Gr. Staatsk. I: 444 n. 1, 572).” A dividing line, such as Ste. Croix seeks, must be drawn only if dēmokratia and oligarchia were descriptive terms, capable of definition.

  6. Il. 1.54–305; 2.48–399; 9.9–174; 20.4–40; Od. 2.1–257; 8.1–45.

  7. Hell. Oxy. 16; J. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History (California, 1955), 31–40.

  8. For recent discussion of this topic, see G. L. Cawkwell, “The decline of Sparta,” CQ. NS. 33 (1983): 385–400, at 385–90.

  9. Nik. Dam. F. Gr. Hist. II A 90 F 60; interpreted by G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte I² (1893), 657–58. A phrase of Diodoros (14.86.1) is sometimes emended to indicate that in 392 some Corinthians desired dēmokratia; even if Diodoros wrote that, he did not pause to say what he meant.

10. For example, Thuc. 1.67–85; Xen. Hell. 2.2.19–20; 5.2.11–20; 6.4.2–3; cf. A. Andrewes, “The Government of Classical Sparta,” in E. Badian, ed., Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to V. Ehrenberg (Oxford, 1966), 1–20.

11. The only incident of the classical period which may illustrate such invalidation is Diod. 11.50; the evidence of Diodoros on such a matter is not good. Study of the rhetra can best start from H. T. Wade-Gery, “The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch, Lycurgus VI,” CQ. 37 (1943): 62–72; 38 (1944): 1–9 and 115–26 (= Essays in Greek History [Oxford, 1958], 37–85). I discussed the rhetra, with references, in “Probouleusis and the sovereign assembly,” CSCA. 2 (1968): 247–69, at 250–56 and 266, and in “The origins of demokratia,” CSCA. 6 (1973): 253–95, at 270–71, reaching somewhat different views. I remain puzzled.

12. Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, 20, 51; 2.4.1, 2; Ar. AP 36–37.

13. Thuc. 3.62.3. The word is used of the rule of the Thirty by Ar. AP. 36.1.

14. P. 2.86–88; cf. Sealey (note 11 above, 1973) 273. J. Bleicken (“Zur Entstehung der Verfassungstypologie im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.,” Historia 28 [1979]: 148–72, at 150) maintains that Pindar refers, not to forms of constitution, but to the rival forces conflicting in the archaic city. But where there is good evidence on conflicts within the archaic city, notably on the rise of Peisistratos (Hdt. 1.59–64; cf. page 119 below), the rival forces do not resemble anything in Pind. P. 2.86–88 but are of an utterly different kind.

15. To kyrion is a key idea in the Politics of Aristotle; see, for example, 3.1281a11–1282b13; 4.1290a30–33; 4.1297b35–1298a9.

16. M. H. Hansen, “Demos, ecclesia and dicasterion in classical Athens,” GRBS. 19 (1978): 127–46; cf. page 69 above.

17. Inquiries into Athenian politics have often drawn their basic ideas from Greek political theory. Recent examples include C. Meier, Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1980), and M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge, 1983). Finley (p. 1) opens by citing with approval Aristotle’s belief that democracy is the rule of the poor and oligarchy the rule of the rich. He adds: “Aristotle gave systematic formulation to a common but still rather loose notion that was widely (perhaps universally) shared by the classical Greeks. It pervades their literature, among poets, historians and pamphleteers as well as political philosophers.” Again, Meier’s study assumes that “democracy” in a Greek context had a recognizable and constant meaning. The next two sections will show that the words dēmokratia and oligarchia did not have clear or constant meaning. Their behavior among people close to politics, orators and to some degree historians, was not so tidily predictable as among political philosophers.

18. For example, Thuc. 3.62.3; 5.31.6; 6.39.1–2; 8.47.2; 8.76.1; [Xen.] 2.20.

19. Thuc. 1.19; 5.31.6; 6.11.7; cf. [Xen.] 1.11. From Thuc. 5.31.6 it appears that Boiotia and Megara were called oligarchic. But judging from the passages referred to in this note, Lakedaimon was the oligarchia par excellence

20. Ant. 6.45. I am indebted to M. H. Hansen (Staten, Folket, Forfatningen, 55) for drawing my attention to this passage.

21. M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1969), 96–136; the quotation is from page 97. The views presented in this section were set out in a fuller and more argumentative manner in my article of 1973 (note 11 above), especially at 272–90; I thank the editors of Classical Antiquity for permission to draw on them anew.

22. Athen. 15.695a-b. Whether the authors of the song told the plain truth is not the question here at issue. The present concern is solely with what they meant. Cf. Alkmaion of Kroton B4 (Diels/Kranz: health is isonomia of the powers, and disease is monarchia among them).

23. Thuc. 4.78.3.

24. Thuc. 3.62.3.

25. Hdt. 6.131.1; cf. Ar. AP 29.3. Fifth-century usage, which accepted dēmokratia as the name for the current condition of the Athenians, probably identified Kleisthenes as the author of that condition; cf. E. Ruschenbusch, “Patrios Politeia. Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.,” Historia 7 (1958): 398–424, at 418–21.

26. Hdt. 5.78. On the meaning of this word, see J. D. Lewis, “Isegoria at Athens: When did it begin?” Historia 20 (1971): 129–40, superseding earlier discussions.

27. From Thuc. 8.64.3 it appears likely that the publicly professed slogan of the revolutionaries in 411 was aristokratia; cf. 3.82.8. Among themselves they could speak bluntly of dēmokratia and oligarchia, as at 8.47.2 and 8.48.4–5.

28. The correct interpretation of the passage was offered by R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig, 1907), 263 with n. 8. It has been defended by J. R. Grant, “Thucydides 2.37.1,” Phoenix 25 (1971): 104–7.

29. For example, Il. 2.198–206; Theognis 233–34, 847–50. A beginning has been made in studying the development of this word by W. Donlan, “Changes and shifts in the meaning of demos in the literature of the archaic period,” La Parola del Passato 135 (1970): 381–95.

30. Andok. 1.96–98; cf. M. Ostwald, “The Athenian legislation against tyranny and subversion,” TAPA. 86 (1955): 103–28, at 111–14.

31. For example, the law on hybris, Dem. 21.47; cf. E. Ruschenbusch, “Hybreōs graphē Ein Fremdkörper im athenischen Recht des 4. Jh. v. Chr.,” ZSS. 82 (1965): 302–9. Aristotle Rhet. l.l373b38-l374al7 probably had the Athenians in mind as target of his criticism when he called for definition of theft and other offenses; cf. Cohen, Theft, 88–91.

32. SEG. 28.46, lines 5–6; first published by R. S. Stroud, “Greek inscriptions, Theozotides and the Athenian orphans,” Hesperia 40 (1971): 280–301.

33. Andok. 1. 87–88; cf. page 37 above.

34. Dem. 22.51; cf. 24.51, 69, 163, 170, 190, 192. Aristotle (AP. 22.4) invokes the “gentleness” of the Athenian demos to explain why it allowed friends of the Peisistratidai to stay in Athens until the ostracism of Hipparchos. Evidently the “gentleness” of the dēmokratia was a current catchword. It is also to be noted that in writing about the ostracism of Hipparchos Aristotle chose words similar to those of Androtion (F. Gr. Hist. III B 324 F 6; cf. J. J. Keaney, “The text of Androtion F 6 and the origin of ostracism,” Historia 19 [1970]: 1–11), and the boast about gentleness occurs in the two speeches composed by Demosthenes against Androtion and against the latter’s ally, Timokrates. A literary connection may be suspected.

35. Dem. 20.108.

36. Isok. 7.60–61, noted further below.

37. In a similar but less verbose manner Demosthenes (10.11–15) maintained ten years later that Philip of Macedon was resolutely opposed to the constitution and dēmokratia of the Athenians.

38. Isok. 7.60–61. Different views on the date of composition are offered by W. Jaeger, “The date of Isocrates’ Areopagiticus and the Athenian opposition,” Athenian studies presented to W. S. Ferguson = HSCP, Supplementary Volume 1 (1940), 409–50, and K. Bringmann, Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates (= Hypomnemata 14 [Göttingen, 1965]), 73–81. For present purposes it suffices that the pamphlet was composed in the 350s.

39. Finley (note 17 above, 136 n. 39) writes: “The denial by Demosthenes (24.75–76) and Aeschines (3.6) that oligarchies were ruled by law merely reveals that truth was not a necessary condition in political oratory.” When Demosthenes and Aischines agree, it is more prudent to suppose that Finley is mistaken about linguistic usage of the fourth century.

Chapter 6

  1. A. M. Snodgrass, Archaeology and the Rise of the Greek State (Inaugural lecture, Cambridge, 1977), 10–18, 29–30; idem, Cambridge Ancient History III², 1 (1982), 687; A. Andrewes, Cambridge Ancient History, III², 3 (1982), 380.

  2. Hdt. 5.66.2; 5.69.1; Hignett, HAC., 51.

  3. Pherekydes, F. Gr. Hist. I 3 F 2 = Markellinos, Life of Thucydides, 3.

  4. L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin, 1932), 70–91.

  5. A. Boethius, Die Pythais (Uppsala, 1918), 107.

  6. Hdt. 6.108; cf. G. S. Shrimpton, “When did Plataea join Athens?” CP. 79 (1984): 295–303.

  7. Cf. P. B. Manville, “The Evolution of Athenian Citizenship: Individual and Society in the Archaic Age” (Ph.D. diss., Yale, 1979), 7–32. (“Eighth-century Athens had no citizenship but only a hierarchy of statuses within the larger membership of the tribes, phratries, gene,” 17.)

  8. Od. 2.26–27.

  9. Il. 2.48–399. Other meetings of assemblies are described at Il. 1.54–305; 9.9–174; 19.40–237; 20.4–40; Od. 2.1–257; 8.1–45. For a fuller statement of the views presented in these paragraphs, see R. Sealey, “Probouleusis and the sovereign assembly,” CSCA 2 (1968): 247–69, at 258–69. I thank the editors of Classical Antiquity for allowing me to draw on those arguments again.

10. Xen. Hell 6.5.6–7. The other party too brought out their weapons and proved to be no less in number; a fight followed.

11. The law of Drakon as reinscribed in 409/8 (IG. I³, 104 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 86, lines 18–19) says that members of the victim’s phratry are to be chosen aristindēn for the purpose of reconciliation with the killer. The word aristindēn can be translated with honesty as “according to merit” or “according to worth,” and one must then admit that the criteria of merit or worth are not known. To say, as some have done (Hignett, HAC., 55), that the men were to be “chosen aristindēn, that is, from the aristocratic members of the phratry,” is merely a pretentious disguise for ignorance.

12. It used to be held that dikastai replaced ephetai in the homicide courts, the change coming perhaps in the time of Perikles, although the title of ephetai was kept; see G. Smith, “Dicasts in the ephetic courts,” CP 19 (1924): 353–58. This view has been challenged by D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester, 1963), 52–57, and Harrison, Law 2.40–42. On the view followed here the dikastēria were modeled on the ephetic courts, so material differences were probably small, but at least the title of ephetai was preserved.

13. Aristotle (AP. 3.4) says that the thesmothetai were instituted “to write down the thesmia and preserve them for judging disputes.” That may be merely an inference from their name. If thesmia, as distinct from thesmoi, were verdicts as distinct from laws, Aristotle’s statement of the original task of the thesmothetai is improbable, since Athenian practice shows no hint of the Anglo-American recognition of precedent as a source of law. If on the other hand thesmia were the same as thesmoi and were laws (cf. Ar. AP. 16.10), it is difficult to see what there was left for Solon to do, after the thesmothetai had been writing laws down for many years.

14. E. Ruschenbusch, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts (Graezistische Abhandlungen 4 [Cologne, 1968]), 11–15.

15. Od 6.207–8.

16. For example, Il 9.432–95 (Phoinix); 23.83–92 (Patroklos); Od 13.256–86 (Odysseus pretending to be a Cretan); Hdt. 1.35 (Adrastos); cf. P. A. L. Greenhalgh, “The Homeric Therapon and Opaon and their historical implications,” BICS 29 (1982): 81–90.

17. Solon F 70 apud Plut. Sol. 19.4. For interpretation, see E. Ruschenbusch, “Phonos Zum Recht Drakons und seiner Bedeutung für das Werden des athenischen Staates,” Historia 9 (1960): 129–54, at 132–35.

18. Cf. Ar. AP. 8.4.

19. Ar. Pol 2.1274a22–25 (Zaleukos and Charondas); Hdt. 1.65. The Delphic oracle, quoted by Herodotos, inclined to think that Lykourgos was not a man but a god. The opinion of the oracle of Apollo deserves some respect.

20. Solon F 3, 4, 5cd, 7, 11, 12; cf. Appendix, page 142.

21. Stroud, Drakon’s Law, 66–70.

22. AP. 4.1; 5.2; cf. R. Sealey, “Zum Datum der solonischen Gesetzgebung,” Historia 28 (1979): 238–41.

23. 23.51; cf. 20.158; [Dem.] 47.71–72. Strictly speaking, the remark at 23.51 only says that the laws discussed hitherto in the speech are laws of Drakon; it need not apply to the laws still to be discussed. The difficulty remains great.

24. The hypothesis was proposed by Beloch, Gr. Gesch I², 2, 258–62. Lately it has been given less consideration than it deserves. For example, M. Gagarin (Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law [New Haven, 1981], In. 1) writes: “the supposition of a religious source and a long period of development behind the homicide law, even if true, is not incompatible with the existence of a single human lawgiver.” That is true. But the supposition of a religious source and of a long period of development serves to explain the complexity of the classical laws on homicide; it is not clear that the supposition of a single human lawgiver explains anything. That the snake was imaginary is a likely inference from Hdt. 8.41.2–3. From Ar. Rhet 2.1400b20–23 it appears that Prodikos (if that is the right emendation of the text) took Drakon to be a man and made a joke about the ambiguity of his name. Certainly the hypothesis initiated by Beloch recognizes that by the classical period “the law of Drakon” was taken to mean a law issued by a gentleman of that name.

25. Thus the studies by Andrewes and Stroud, noted in the Appendix. A healthily skeptical approach to the biographical tradition on Solon is advocated by M. F. Lefkowitz, “Patterns of fiction in ancient biography,” The American Scholar 52 (1983): 205–18, at 206–8.

26. Dem. 20.89–90; cf. page 47 above. The passage of Demosthenes is difficult to interpret (see notably M. H. Hansen, “Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century B.C. and Demosthenes’s speech against Leptines,” C et M 32 [1980]: 87–104), but the attribution of current practice to Solon is clear.

27. On weights and measures, see the studies by Crawford and Chambers, mentioned in the Appendix, page 144. The earliest Athenian coins were not struck before the middle of the sixth century and perhaps not until appreciably later; see J. H. Kroll and N. M. Waggoner, “Dating the earliest coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina,” AJA 88 (1984): 325–40, for a survey of the hoards with references to earlier views.

28. On the content of the seisachtheia, see now A. Andrewes, Cambridge Ancient History III², 3 (1982), 377–82; cf. idem, The Greeks (London, 1967), 104–10.

29. The difference is the basis for the thesis of M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1969). For criticism, see E. Ruschenbusch, Gnomon 43 (1971): 414–16.

30. Andok. 1.83–84; page 35 above.

31. For a fuller exposition of these arguments, see Sealey, History, 114–21. On the supposed council of four hundred, see Day and Chambers, Aristotle’s History, 200–201. The belief that the Solonian property-classes were an innovation is part of a theory of which the other part says that before Solon Athenian society was divided into hereditary castes. Arguments against the latter thesis are included in the study by T. J. Figueira, “The ten archontes of 579/8 at Athens,” Hesperia 53 (1984): 447–73.

32. Those adhering to the view include U. Kahrstedt, Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen: Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens, Teil I (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1934), 5. It is rejected by Hignett, HAC., 98, and by Andrewes (note 28 above), 1982, 387.

33. Ar. Pol. 2.1273b41–1274a2; cf. AP. 9.1; page 67 above.

34. Aristotle (AP. 3.4) puts their origin before the work of Solon, and Thucydides (1.126.8) implies as much when he says that the nine archons received charge of the operations against Kylon.

35. [Plat.] Hipparch 228b; Plut. Sol 10.3.

36. The regionalist hypothesis starts from an observation of H. T. Wade-Gery, JHS 71 (1951): 219 n. 40 = Essays, 167 n. 2. It has been developed by R. Sealey, “Regionalism in archaic Athens,” Historia 9 (1960): 155–80 = Essays, 9–38, and idem, History, 123–28, 141. Those who find it disagreeable have evidently been unable to furnish objections, for they have had recourse to abuse, for example, “cette étrange parodie” (P. Lévêque, “Formes de contradictions et voies de développement à Athènes de Solon à Clisthène,” Historia 27 [1978]: 522–49, at 526).

37. Thuc. 1.126.3–7.

38. Hdt. 1.59.6; Thuc. 6.54.6.

39. On Delos, see Hdt. 1.64.2; Solon fr. 4a (West) apud Ar. AP. 5.2. The policies of Peisistratos and his sons are known from Hdt. 1.59–64; 5.94–95; 6.34–40; 6.103–4; Thuc. 6.54–59; Ar. AP. 16–19. The informative fragment of an archon list, illustrating cooperation among leading families, is accessible as Meiggs/Lewis No. 6. The policies of the Athenian tyrants, once in power, are mostly noncontroversial; one may consult general handbooks such as J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, History of Greece (New York, 1975), 128–32. For a suggestive study, see H. T. Wade-Gery, “Miltiades,” JHS 71 (1951): 212–21 = Essays, 155–70.

40. On the poets, see Hdt. 7.6.3; [Plat.] Hipparch 228c. The present state of archaeological research is assessed by F. Frost, “Towards a History of Peisistratid Athens,” in J. W. Eadie and J. Ober, eds., The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr (Lanham, 1985), 57–78, esp. 60–67. On Thespis and the beginnings of tragedy, see Ar. Poet. 1449a10–19 with the notes of D. W. Lucas in his edition (Oxford, 1968); for a full study, see A. Pickard-Cambridge, Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy (Oxford, 2d ed., revised by T. B. L. Webster, 1962), 60–131. On the City Dionysia, see Kolb (note 41 below).

41. F. Kolb, “Die Bau-, Religions- und Kulturpolitik der Peisistratiden,” JDAI. 92 (1977): 99–138, at 124–30. Kolb’s study as a whole stresses the personal character of the focus which Peisistratos and his sons provided for Athenian loyalty.

42. On the date of the reforms I adhere to the view expressed in History, 150–51. As far as I know, no historian has offered arguments against that view, although some have declined to follow it.

43. G. R. Stanton (“The tribal reform of Kleisthenes the Alkmeonid,” Chiron 14 [1984]: 1–41) collects information on the location of many demes and probes the question, how the composition of the phylai helped the Alkmaionidai. For more general considerations, see Sealey, History, 151–57, 161–64, with discussion of the thoughtful inquiries of D. M. Lewis (“Cleisthenes and Attica,” Historia 12 [1963]: 22–40) and P. J. Bicknell (“Kleisthenes as politician: An exploration,” Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy = Historia Einzelschriften 19 [1972], 1–53). Bicknell’s suggestions gain in force, if the division into prytaneiai was instituted by Kleisthenes.

44. For example, H. van Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation,” REG 89 (1976): 1–17; P. Siewert, Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes (Vestigia 33, Munich, 1982). Siewert would explain the tripartite structure of the phylai solely by military considerations. His thesis is criticized trenchantly in the review by W. Schuller, Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 236 (1984): 11–21, and by Stanton (note 43 above), 3–7.

45. F. J. Frost, “The Athenian military before Cleisthenes,” Historia 33 (1984): 283–94. Frost’s thesis gains in credibility if the Plataian incident of Hdt. 6.108 took place after the reforms; a strong argument for that view on this long-disputed question has been offered by Shrimpton (note 6 above). But for an erudite defense of the date 519 for the Plataian incident, see Frost (note 40 above), 69–70.

46. Plut. Sol 24.4 = Solon F 75. I discuss the growth in content of citizenship more fully in “How citizenship and the city began in Athens,” AJAH (forthcoming). I am indebted to the editor for permission to draw anew on views presented in that paper.

47. J. K. Davies, “Athenian citizenship: The descent group and the alternatives,” CJ 73 (1977–78): 105–21, at 115.

48. Hdt. 5.77.

49. A corrupt passage of Aristotle (Pol 3.1275b36–37) says that Kleisthenes included many aliens and slaves in the phylai Interpretation is difficult. The passage can be made to agree with the view adopted here.

50. Aisch. Pers 319; Seven 548; Supp 994; Agam 57; Cho 971; cf. Supp 609; Eum 1018. IG. I³, 244C line 8.

51. Sources for events noted in this paragraph include Hdt. 5.97–103 (Athenian aid to the Ionian Revolt); 6.94–120 (the campaign of Marathon); 5.81, 5.89, 6.85–93 (the Aiginetan War); 7.144, cf. Ar. AP 22.7 (the increase in the fleet). The figures for the Greek fleet of 480 are discussed by C. Hignett, Xerxes’ Invasion of Greece (Oxford, 1963), 155–57, 209–10. I am much indebted to the article by J. Martin, “Von Kleisthenes zu Ephialtes,” Chiron 4 (1974): 5–42; he argues successfully that the constitutional developments studied were not inspired by the desire for a distinctive form of government but were due to activities of which the criterion was the power of Athens. The thesis of the primacy of foreign policy is defended further by Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik.

52. Thuc. 1.96.1. The circumstances of the foundation and the original character of the Delian League are somewhat obscure. Recent discussions include K. Raaflaub, “Beute, Vergeltung, Freiheit,” Chiron 9 (1979): 1–22, and N. D. Robertson, “The true nature of the ‘Delian League’ 478–461 B.C.,” AJAH 5 (1980): 64–96, 110–33.

53. Thuc. 1.100.1; for the date, see F. Jacoby, “Some remarks on Ion of Chios,” CQ 41 (1947): 1–17, at 3n. 1.

54. Ar. AP 22.2; cf. 61.1.

55. This phenomenon has had much discussion. Recent studies include C. W. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 (Historia Einzelschriften 16 [1971]): 11–27; P. J. Bicknell, “Double representation in the strategia at Athens,” Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy (Historia Einzelschriften 19 [1972]): 101–12; E. Ruschenbusch, “Die Wahl der Strategen im 5. und 4. Jh. v. Chr. in Athen,” Historia 24 (1975): 112—14; Rhodes, Comm., 265–66.

56. Aischin. 1.27.

57. Xen. Mem 3.4.1.

58. Ar. AP. 22.5; Hignett, HAC., 321–26.

59. E. Badian, “Archons and Strategoi,” Antichthon 5 (1971): 1–34, at 22–26.

60. Ar. AP. 13.1–2.

61. This requirement of age is attested for councillors (Xen. Mem 1.2.35; cf. IG. I³, 14 = Meiggs/Lewis No. 40, lines 8–9) and for dikastai (Ar. AP. 63.3; cf. Dem. 24.150); cf. Hansen, Embedsmaendene, 15.

62. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom 7.3.1 (archonship); Hdt. 6.34–41 (sojourn in the Chersonese; cf. H. T. Wade-Gery, “Miltiades,” JHS 51 [1971]: 212–21, at 216–17 = Essays, 155–70, at 161–63); 6.103–10 (Marathon); 6.132–36 (Parian campaign).

63. Meiggs/Lewis No. 6 (archonship). Three other cases, though somewhat open to dispute, may illustrate the same principle: (1) Solon was archon in 594/93, but it has been argued that he carried out his public work about 580–570 (Hignett, HAC., 316–21; S. S. Markianos, “The chronology of the Herodotean Solon,” Historia 23 [1974]: 1–20). (2) Isagoras was archon in 508/7 (Ar. AP. 21.1), but it has been argued that the rivalry between him and Kleisthenes became acute about 503 (Sealey, History, 150–51). (3) Themistokles was archon in 493/92 (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom 6.34.1), but he first came to prominence shortly before 480 (Hdt. 7.143.1; cf. Sealey, History, 184–86; on the ostraka naming Themistokles and Megakles, see D. M. Lewis, “The Kerameikos ostraka,” ZPE. 14 [1974]: 1–4).

64. Badian, note 59 above. It is reasonable to take the study no further than 457/56, when zeugitai were declared eligible for the archonship (Ar. AP. 26.2). The conclusions drawn by Badian are markedly different from those advocated here. For my own views I am much indebted to H. T. Wade-Gery, “Eupatridai, archons, and Areopagus,” CQ. 25 (1931): 1–11, 77–89, at 80–81 = Essays, 86–115, at 104–6.

65. Hipparchos was archon in 496/95 (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom 5.77.6; 6.1.1) and was ostracized in 488/87 (Ar. AP. 22.3–4). For the archonship of Themistokles, see note 63 above; for his ostracism, see Thuc. 1.135.3; Plut. Them 22.4. Among the twenty-eight known archons of 486/85–457/56, only one can be identified plausibly with a man who, “some say” (Hesych. s.v. Menonidai), had been ostracized. That is Menon, archon in 473/72 (Diod. 11.52.1). If he is Menon of Pharsalos, he had received Athenian citizenship, and his ostracism was not due to his own qualities but to a change in the relations between Athens and Thessaly (E. Vanderpool, Ostracism at Athens [Cincinnati, 1970], 26–27).

66. E. Ruschenbusch, “Ephialtes,” Historia 15 (1966): 369–76. Better evidence would be available on Ephialtes if one could believe the statement of Aristotle (AP. 35.2) that the Thirty early in their activities took down from the Areopagos the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratos about the Areopagites. But the decree of Teisamenos (Andok. 1.83–84), carried during the restoration of 403/2 after the overthrow of the Thirty, provides that “the council of the Areopagos is to take charge of the laws, so that the offices observe the current laws.” It follows that an Areopagite guardianship of the laws accords with the spirit of the traditional constitution (the dēmokratia). Therefore, Aristotle’s statement about the Thirty and the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratos, with its implication that the Thirty brought about an Areopagite guardianship of the laws, should be dismissed as a later and propagandist invention (cf. Ruschenbusch, ibid., 371–72). See also E. Ruschenbusch, “Patrios Politeia Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in Publizistik und Geschichts-Schreibung des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.,” Historia 7 (1958): 398–424, esp. 399–408.

67. A careful reconstruction of the first type, attributing extensive measures to Ephialtes, is offered by Rhodes, Boule, 144–207. Attempts to reconstruct a reform of a limited kind may claim inspiration from H. T. Wade-Gery, “The judicial treaty with Phaselis and the history of the Athenian courts,” Essays, 180—200. I have discussed the problem previously in “Ephialtes,” CP. 59 (1964): 11–22 = Essays, 42–58, and “Ephialtes, eisangelia, and the council,” in G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar, eds., Classical Contributions: Studies in Honor of M. F. McGregor (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1981), 125–34.

68. W. S. Ferguson, “The oligarchic revolution at Athens of the year 103–2 B.C.,” Klio 4 (1904): 1–17, at 5.

69. I thank R. Kallet-Marx for pointing this out to me. Some statements of Aristotle (AP. 3.6; 8.4) can with a good deal of imagination be interpreted to reveal trial of euthynai But the vagueness of the statements is probably a cover for their author’s ignorance.

70. Aischin. 3.14–15; Lys. 15.2; [Dem.] 40.34; cf. Lipsius, AR., 271–77.

71. Ar. AP 45.3; 55.2; cf. pages 63–64 above.

72. The trial of Kimon in 463 is known from Ar. AP. 27.1; Plut. Kim. 14.3–5; Per 10.6. For the expedition of Kimon to Ithome and the change in Athenian alliances, see Thuc. 1.102; Plut. Kim. 15–17; cf. Per. 9.5. The opposition of Ephialtes to sending the expedition to Ithome is known from Plut. Kim. 16.9. His naval expedition beyond the Chelidonian islands is known from Plut. Kim. 13.4. It is possible that in 462 Kimon led an expedition to Cyprus, presumably before he was sent to Ithome (J. Barns, “Cimon and the first Athenian expedition to Cyprus,” Historia 2 [1953–54]: 163–76). The conclusion offered in this paragraph has been prompted in part by Martin (note 51 above), 29–40, and Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik, 57–65.

73. [Xen.] 1.16–18. Athenian encroachment on allied jurisdiction is studied by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Notes on jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire,” CQ. NS. 11 (1961): 94–112 and 268–80.

74. Dem. 24.21; Ar. AP. 43.4–6; cf. M. H. Hansen and F. Mitchel, “The number of ecclesiai in fourth-century Athens,” SO. 59 (1984): 13–19.

75. AP. 24.3; M. H. Hansen, “Seven hundred archai in classical Athens,” GRBS. 21 (1980): 151–73.

76. Ar. AP. 27.3; cf. Rhodes, Comm., 338–40.

77. Suggested dates are reviewed by R. Sealey, “The origins of demokratia,” CSCA. 6 (1973): 253–95, at 257–59. The statement at 2.18 was probably written before the Knights of Aristophanes (425/24). At 2.16 the author says that the Athenians deposit their property in the islands and look on while the land of Attica is ravaged. This was the strategy which they practiced during the Archidamian War and contemplated for some years before its outbreak.

78. Thuc. 8.65.3. The main sources for the revolution are Thuc. 8.47–98; Ar. AP. 29–33; Lys. 20. As a reconstruction of the course of events the study by Hignett, HAC., 268–80 and 356–78, has not been superseded.

79. The latter view was propounded by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “The constitution of the five thousand,” Historia 5 (1956): 1–23; cf. R. Sealey, “The revolution of 411,” Essays, 111–32, and “Constitutional changes in Athens in 410 B.C.,” CSCA 8 (1975): 271–95. Its critics include P. J. Rhodes, “The five thousand in the Athenian revolutions of 411 B.C.,” JHS. 92 (1972): 115–27, and Ruschenbusch, Athenische Innenpolitik, 167–69.

80. Xen. Hell. 1.1.11–22. On the chronology, see Sealey (note 79 above, 1975), 273–75.

81. IG. I², 304A = Meiggs/Lewis No. 84; cf. K. J. Beloch, “Zur Finanzgeschichte Athens IV,” RM. 39 (1884): 239–44; idem, Gr. Gesch II², 1, 397–98. The diōhelia may have continued as late as 404/3: A. M. Woodward, “Financial documents from the Athenian agora,” Hesperia 32 (1963): 144–55, at 150.

82. Xen. Hell. 2.3.2 and 11.

83. Ar. AP. 35.3; Lys. 12.5 (virtue and justice). The words kaloi k’agathoi occur repeatedly in Xenophon’s account of the rule of the Thirty (Hell. 2.3) and at Diod. 14.4.1.

84. This story has been told brilliantly by P. Funke, Homonoia und Arche (Historia Einzelschriften 37 [1980]): 1–26, 57–70.

85. AP. 41.3; 62.2; cf. Aristoph. Ekkl. 289–93; Rhodes, Comm., 492.

86. Ar. AP. 43.4–6; note 74 above.

87. Polyb. 2.62.7 provides the figure of 5, 750 talents for the assessment of 378/77; cf. Dem. 14.19, 27, 30. The thesis that the proeisphora was instituted in 378/77 was presented by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Demosthenes’ TIMHMA and the Athenian eisphora in the fourth century B.C.,” C et M. 14 (1953): 30–70. See also R. Thomsen, Eisphora (Copenhagen, 1964). The levy of 428/27 is known from Thuc. 3.19.1, but it is not clear whether Thucydides’ remark excludes earlier levies; see J. G. Griffith, “A note on the first Eisphora at Athens,” AJAH. 2 (1977): 3–7.

88. An earlier date (about 390) for the introduction of written pleadings and testimony and a reason for the change have been proposed, perhaps rightly, by E. Ruschenbusch, “Drei Beiträge zur öffentlichen Diaita in Athen,” Symposion 1982 (Valencia, 1985): 31–40, at 34–35.

89. Ar. AP. 54.3; Rhodes, Boule, 134–38.

90. The contemporary source is Aischin. 3.25. Previous inquiries into the work of Euboulos have been superseded by G. L. Cawkwell, “Eubulus,” JHS. 83 (1963): 47-67.

91. [Plut.] Ten Orators 841b–c, 852b. Constitutional developments from 403 to 322 are surveyed, more fully than here, by P. J. Rhodes, “Athenian democracy after 403 B.C.,” CJ. 75 (1979–80): 305–23; he discusses Lykourgos at 313.

92. Ar. AP. 61.1; cf. Rhodes, Comm., 678–79, 682. Specialization is reflected in inscriptions, for example, IG. II² , 204 lines 19–20; 556 line 14; 682 lines 5, 15, 22–24, 30–31, 44; C. Michel, Recueil ďInscriptions Grecques, Supplement II (Brussels, 1927), 156–58, no. 1704.

Chapter 7

  1. A contrasting view has been developed by D. P. Maio, “Politeia and adjudication in fourth-century B.C. Athens,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 28 (1983): 16-45. He maintains: “The empty myth of the modern Anglo-American and Continental legal cultures, that adjudication is or can be independent from the basic political ordering of society, had no acceptance at all in fourth-century B.C. Athens.” His thesis depends on the notion of a “democratic politeia, as political culture” (p. 18), but “democratic” is only described in vague terms such as “freedom.”

  2. Cf. H. J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Oklahoma, 1951), 193-206.

  3. Lietuvių Enciklopedija (Lithuanian Encyclopedia), XXVIII (Boston, 1963), 335 (K. J. Čeginskas).