Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.
Antichrist, xv, 86, 146, 156n22, 161n66, 183n66; as “deceiver as such,” 147; demand for, 60; as destroyer of slave-morality, 90; Dionysus and, xvii, xviii, 40, 46–51, 90, 103, 147; Heidegger and, xv; Jesus and, 75, 81; and the Katechon, xx, 138, 146; legitimacy of, xvii, 46–51, 90, 91, 143, 150; and original sin, 40; and return of Christ, 136; Schopenhauer and, 140, 142, 143; and science, 15, 40, 42; Socrates and, 81
art, xviii, xx, 124–130; and ascetic ideals, 124–125; Dionysian art/tragedy, 1–9, 21–23, 42, 75, 103; discontinuity of modern art with Christianity, 107; and Judaism, 30; Kant and, 125–126; and man as creature and creator, 128–129; naivety and Apollonian art, 95; Nietzsche’s “artistic conscience,” 93–94; and philosophy, 22, 126–128; Plato’s conception of tragic art, 22; redemption of the ugly, xx; Schopenhauer and, 125–127; and science’s need for an authentic lie, 124; Stendhal and, 125–126; tragic art, 5, 129–130
atheism, 101, 107; belief and atheism, skepticism and suffering, 52–60; and death of God as act of murder, 111; delay of, xx, 140, 141, 142; and Greek philosophy, 149; and guilt/debt, 96; Hegel and, 142; Löwith and, 149–150; and naivety, 113; and negation of God as Christianity’s God, 110; Nietzsche’s atheism as Christian, 150, 170n25; and Nietzsche’s personal history, 99–100; Schopenhauer and, 140–143; and second innocence, 96; skepticism as, 54; temporality of, 143; two types, 110–111. See also death of God
belief: belief and atheism, skepticism and suffering, 52–60; identity of belief in God and belief in “god on the cross,” 55–56; and instinct as faith or truth, 17–18. See also Christian faith; faith
Bible, the: Ecclesiastes, 148; New Testament, 49, 67–69, 78–80, 112; Old Testament, 29, 30, 40, 56; and paradisiacal science, 15, 40; Thessalonians, 137, 179–180n20
Buddhism, xviii–xix, 144, 176n32; and the Dionysian, 75; European Buddhism, 79; instrumentality of, 76, 79, 85, 98, 169n21; of Jesus, xix, 49, 58–60, 71, 73–76, 85, 98, 164–165n37, 169n21; Nietzsche’s conception of, 59–60, 79; of Pyrrho, 58–60, 75; and skepticism, 59–60
Christ, 145–146; the Jewish Christ and the Christian Christ, 72–74; as political anti-Dionysian man, xix, 49, 71–77; psychology of the Redeemer, 68; Resurrection, Judgment and Second Coming, 72–73, 136, 140–141; Strauss on, 167n72. See also Jesus
Christian faith: demand for, 52–66, 97; and faith in modern science, 116–117; genealogy of, 97–98; and “god on the cross,” 54–55; and hope, 18, 23; identity of belief in God and belief in “god on the cross,” 55–56; and illusory naivety, 97–98; as instinct, 16–18; other faiths labeled as atheism, 54–55; as the overcoming-preservation of Jewish law, 89, 91, 146; Paul’s dialectics of faith and law, xvi, 89; and Paul’s logic of legitimization, xvii, xviii, 49–51; relationship between Abraham’s faith and Christian faith, 89–90, 146; and sin and punishment, 60–66; and skepticism and suffering, xviii, 52–60, 97; as sublimation of Jewish law and repression of noble-morality, 92; and will to illusion, 117
Christianity: as antithesis of paradisiacal science, 57; audience addressed by, 16; conception of Judaism, 55–56; demand for, 52–66; and the Dionysian as the evil production of suffering as reality, 8, 16; and faith as instinct, 16–18; “god on the cross,” 18, 53–55, 94; and guilt/debt, 96; and illusory innocence and decadence, 93–98; instrumentality of, 76, 79–81; and Jewish law, 55–56; life-negating nature of, 18–19, 24; and “love your neighbor as yourself” commandment, 55, 65, 123; and Modernity, xix, 105–108, 130; morality as the purification of Christianity, xix–xx, 106, 121; nature of the Christian lie, 95, 97–98, 105, 117; as Nietzsche’s enemy, 16; opposition between religion and science/reason, 44, 79–80, 98, 99; overcoming-preservation of, 130, 141–143, 146; overcoming-without-preservation of, 141, 142; Paul’s Christianity as not the Christianity, 81; Plato as Christian before Christianity, xv, xviii, 9, 22–23; and Platonism, 16–24; and problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; as religion of pity, 122; secularization of, 108; and slave-morality, 57; and suffering as good/leading to salvation, 18–19, 21–24, 94. See also Antichrist; Christ; Christian faith; Christian love; death of God; Jesus; Paul; sacrifice; salvation; slave-morality
Christian love, xix, 65, 123; birth of Christian love from Jewish hatred as sublimation, 92; Jesus and, 69–70, 73; Paul and, 89; and sacrifice, 94; and will to power, 94
death of the God of Early Judaism, 158n54; event as not fully ended/as prophecy, 107–108; God murdered by the ugliest man, xx, 108–113, 124; and God’s pity, 108–109, 112, 113, 121; and Nietzsche’s experience of disappointment, 99; and will to illusion, 117
dialectics, xx; dialectics of good and evil, 7; dialectics of slave-morality and noble-morality, 87, 105–106, 146; “Dionysus versus the Crucified,” xv, xvii, 5, 22, 23, 87; Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance, xvi–xvii, 87–89, 91, 146; Nietzsche’s negative dialectics, xiv–xvi; and opposition between instruments of religion and reason, 79–80; Paul’s dialectics of faith and law, xvi, 89
Dionysian, the, 87, 145–150, 169n21, 179n6; and affirmation of life, xviii, 4–7, 21, 24; and Buddhism, 75; Christ as political anti-Dionysian man, xix, 49, 71–77; and comparison of Early Judaism and Greek religion, 26–30; Dionysian art/tragedy, 1–9, 21–23, 42, 75, 103; Dionysus and the Antichrist, xvii, xviii, 40, 46–51, 90, 103, 147; “Dionysus versus the Crucified,” xv, xvii, 5, 22, 23, 87; Dionysus vs. Apollo, 5, 8–9; and eternal recurrence of the same, 147–148; and evil, 7–8, 16, 42; as existing outside morality, 7–8; and faith, 134; and instrumentality of Jesus, 76; legitimacy of, xvii, xix, 98, 100–101, 103, 148; and Modernity, 106–107; Nietzsche’s return to as a return to a native origin, 98; and pessimism, 5, 7, 21, 42; and Platonism, 21, 22; science as hiding place of the Dionysian other, 120; and suffering, 4–7, 21, 36–38, 120; and unity of the Platonic and the Christian, 8
evil: and chasms between man and man, 34–35; depth and evil in the human soul, 35, 38–39, 111–112; and the Dionysian, 7–8, 16, 42; and meaning of history, 3; original sin and paradisiacal science, 39–46; and sin and punishment, 37, 39, 43, 61–66; and slave-morality, 35–36, 54; and suffering, 7, 21; and will to power, 94
faith: demand for Christian faith, 52–66; demand for faith as such, xviii, 53; and the Dionysian, 134; and eternal recurrence of the same, 134–135; faith in modern science, 115–117; naive faith of Greek religion and Early Judaism, 95; and problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; relationship between Abraham’s faith and Christian faith, 89–90, 146; relationship between faith and knowledge, 149; and return to nature, 134; and skepticism, 53. See also Christian faith
genealogy: and the Antichrist, 46, 48, 49; destructive nature of, 48–49, 104; of dual identity of Jews, 32; instrumentality of, 80; limits of, 48–49, 98–104; and Modernity, 105; and modern science, 114; of the morality of good and evil, 36; and the origin as an authentic lie, xix; and origin of Christianity, 48, 97–98, 146; of the priest, 31–39, 53, 93; and refutation of legitimacy of Paul’s origin, 90; and self-preservation, 135–136; of slave-morality, 36, 39, 48–49, 53, 93, 97; of the survivor, 46
God: and boredom, 41; and Christ, 72; “on the cross,” 18, 53, 54–55, 94; and Early Judaism, 26, 28–30; God’s sacrifice for the guilt of mankind, 96, 112; and nature, 28; and paradisiacal science, 40; and Platonism, 16–18; and Priestly Judaism, 61–64; and problem of instinct and reason, 16–17; and religions of thankfulness, 26; and salvation, 63; shadow of, xix, 108, 113, 134, 143; and sin and punishment, 61–66; and slave-morality, 63–64; and two types of atheism, 110–111. See also death of God
good and bad: and chasms between man and man, 34–35; and the Dionysian, 7; and God, 63–64; and the Katechon, 137; and “love your neighbor as yourself” commandment, 65; and man’s consciousness of the ugly, 111–113; and noble-morality, 33, 53; and pity, 122; and Priestly Judaism, 33–34; and slave-morality, 36, 53; and suffering, 36–37. See also evil; sin
Greek religion, xviii; and affirmation of life, 3–7; comparison of Early Judaism and Greek religion, 26–30; and Dionysian tragedy, 4–9; Greek path to Christianity, xviii–xix, 1–24, 40, 58–60, 145–150; and naive faith, 95; and pessimism, 5, 7, 21; polytheism, 29; as religion of thankfulness, 1–2, 27, 30; and skepticism, 54; and suffering, 4–7. See also Dionysian, the
Hegel, G. W. F., xv, xvi, 149; and Germans, 140; Hegelian philosophy as background of Nietzsche’s thought, 99–100; Jesus and the Hegelian synthesis, 68; as Katechon (delayer), xv, xx, 136, 140, 142, 162n66, 181n37; and overcoming-preservation, 88; and preservation-without-overcoming, 142
history: destructive nature of, 104; history of pessimism, 4; history of philosophy, 127–128; and man as the totality of man’s instincts, 100; and suffering, 3, 37–39; and will to illusion, 117
Jesus, 52–81, 154n22; abuse of Jesus’s Christianity by Paul, 81; as ahistorical, politically disinterested idiot, xix, 69–72; Buddhism of, xix, 49, 58–60, 66, 71, 73–76, 85, 98, 164–165n37, 169n21; and Christian love, 69–70, 73; compared to Socrates, 77–81, 156–157n31; construction of the Christ (see Christ); death of, 72–74, 136; deep instinct of, 75; as end of Judaism, 59, 69; the historical Jesus, 66–69, 71–73; instrumentality of, 76, 84, 89, 93, 97, 98; irony of, 167n72; misunderstanding of, xix, 72–76, 78, 80; naive depth of psychology of, 81; as the only Christian, 69; psychological type, 68–69, 71, 75–77; relationship between Jesus and Socrates, 79–81, 102; Renan and, 77, 79; Strauss and, 66–67; and suffering, 70; and symbolism, xix, 73–74, 77–79, 102; as turning point, xix, 60, 76, 78, 156n22; unity of life and death, 78; and the value of life, 70. See also Christ
Jewish law, 49–50, 55–56; Christian faith as sublimation of, 92; Christian faith as the overcoming-preservation of, 89, 91, 146; overcoming of noble-morality realized by negation of all laws, 103; Paul and, 82–84, 89, 124; and sin, 64–65
Judaism, xviii; and art, 30; Christian conception of, 55–56; dual identity of Jews, 32; Early Judaism (see Judaism, Early); and God, 28–30, 61–64, 158n54; history of Judaism and the historical Jesus, 66–68; Jesus as representing the purification/renewal of, 67, 74–75; Jewish law (see Jewish law); Jewish path to Christianity, xviii–xix, 4, 25–46, 56–66, 145–150; and legitimization of the Christian faith, xviii, 49–51; and monotheism, 28–29; Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism, 25, 164n33; and original sin, 39–46; Priestly Judaism (see Judaism, Priestly); as producer of suffering, 56; and tragedy, 30
Judaism, Early, 25–30; comparison of Early Judaism and Greek religion, 26–30; as life-affirming religion, xviii, 25–30, 61, 158n1; and naive faith, 95; as religion of thankfulness, 26
Judaism, Priestly, 30–46, 145; crisis of sin and punishment, 60–66, 73, 80, 89, 93; as life-negating religion, xviii, 62, 94, 158n1; and paradisiacal science, 39–46; priest as both aristocrat and slave, 38–39; priest’s invention of calamities, 43–45; and purity and impurity, 33–35, 37; as regression from Early Judaism, 30–31; revaluation of noble-morality, 89; and slave-morality, xviii, 31–39, 53, 57; and suffering, xviii, 36–39, 43–45
Katechon (delayer), xx, 136–146, 161–162n66; and the Antichrist, xx, 138, 146; and the Germans, 138–141; Hegel as, xv, xx, 136, 142, 162n66, 181n37
knowledge: and original sin, 39–46; problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; relationship between faith and knowledge, 149. See also reason; science
lie, xiii, xix; and the Antichrist, 147; authentic lie, xix, 95, 98, 120–121, 124; and the Dionysian, 98, 147; “holy” reasons vs. bad reasons for, 94–95; Löwith and, 149; Modernity’s unauthentic lie, 141; nature of the Christian lie, 97–98, 117; and philosopher’s instinct, 128; purification of Christianity as not an authentic lie, xx; and science, 117–118, 120, 121, 124
life, value of: absolute vs. relative value, 3; and Christianity, 3; and Early Judaism, 26–27, 30; and Jesus, 70; and slave-morality, 36–37; and suffering, 4, 107
life affirmation: as answer to question, 3; and Christian love, 94; and the Dionysian, xviii, 4–7, 21, 24, 36; and Early Judaism, xviii, 25–30, 61, 158n1; and gratitude, 2; and Greek religion, 3–7; and the human condition and the natural condition, 132; and Modernity, 131; and self-preservation, 131–132
man: becoming man and woman, 40–41; as blend of the slave and the noble, xviii, 38–39, 53, 93; boredom and the fall of man, 41–45; chasms between man and man, 34–35; consciousness of himself as finite, 3, 26, 41–42; consciousness of the ugly, 111–113; and guilt/debt/bad conscience, 96, 111–113, 118; higher man, overman, 143–145, 147, 175n32; the human condition, 132–134; human perfectibility, 145; man as both good and evil, 39, 62; man’s overcoming of man through man, 129; and original sin, 39–46; and pity, 121; plurality of man’s instincts, 100, 101; relationship between God and man, 61–66; repressed depth of, 100–101, 103, 111–112; self-sufficiency of, 41–43; and shame, 112–113; as survivor, 45–46; and teleological history of suffering humanity, xviii; as totality of man’s instincts, 100; unity as creature and creator, 128–129. See also ugliest man
metaphysics, xiii–xiv; and Jewish God, 62–63; Plato’s moral metaphysics, 20–21; religion and metaphysical need, 26–27; science’s metaphysical faith in the divinity of truth, 117
Modernity, xix–xx, 105–150; as accumulation of history, xx, 105–106; as age of disintegration, 101; continuity-discontinuity between Modernity and Christianity, xix, 106–108, 113, 130; definition, 106–107; and the Dionysian, 106–107; and the future, 100–101; and genealogy as an instrument, 80; Hegel and, 88, 100; and higher man and overman, 143–145; and idea of progress, 133, 143–144; and the Katechon, 136–145; legitimacy of, 129; meaninglessness of, 128–129; and Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity, 105–108; and overcoming-preservation of Christianity, 130, 141–143, 146; overcoming through return to nature, 133–134; Schopenhauer and, 59; and self-consciousness, 127–128, 131; and self-preservation, xx, 131–136, 145; and the will to power, 133; worldliness of, xx, 130, 131, 136. See also death of God
morality: and the Dionysian, 7–8; and Modernity, 105–106; modern morality as the overcoming-preservation of Christianity, 130, 141; and Nietzsche’s disappointment with modern ideal of Hegelian synthesis, xix; and Paul, 83; and pity, 123; and Platonism, 20–21; Priestly Judaism and the inversion of noble-morality into slave-morality, xviii, 31–39, 53, 56–57; problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; as the purification of Christianity, xix–xx, 106, 121; purity and impurity, 33–35; and science, 116; self-overcoming of, 91; sin and punishment, 37, 39, 43, 60–66, 73, 80, 89, 93. See also noble-morality; slave-morality
Nietzsche-Paul relationship, 85–91, 152–153n16, 170n25; and Buddhism, 76; Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance, xvi–xvii, 87–89, 91, 146; and Nietzsche’s self-reflection, 85–86; and overcoming-preservation, xvi–xvii; Paul as Nietzsche’s exemplar, 85; scholarship on, xvi–xvii, 87–88, 152–153nn14, 16, 17
noble-morality: Christian faith as repression of, 92; Christianity’s concealment of noble-slave dialectics, 105–106; concealment of noble-morality, xviii, 39, 62, 65, 90, 97, 144, 145; and evil/original sin, xviii, 38–39; inversion into slave-morality in Priestly Judaism, xviii, 31–39, 53, 56–57; and Manu Law-Book, 111; and natural values, 146; opposition to slave-morality, 91; overcoming-without-preservation of, xix, 89; Paul as revaluator of, xvi, 87, 91, 103, 146; and polemics, 86; Priestly Judaism as revaluator of, 89; and sin and punishment, 61–62; and skepticism, 53–55; values of, 33–34
other-world: and authentic lie, 94, 120; and Modernity, 136; nature interpreted as, 27–28; and Platonism, 23; and priest’s practice of purity, 35, 37; punishment of evil in life beyond this-life, 37; and religion and metaphysical need, 26–27; and suffering as good/leading to salvation, 18–19, 37
overcoming-preservation: Christian faith as the overcoming-preservation of Jewish law, 89, 91, 146; and Hegelian philosophy, 100; and higher man and overman, 145; Modernity’s overcoming-preservation of Christianity, 130, 142–143, 146; and modern science, 45; morality as overcoming-preservation of Christianity, 130, 141; and Nietzsche-Paul relationship, xvi–xvii, 88, 89, 91; and philosophy, 128; Schopenhauer and, 141, 142; of slave-morality, 145; and the will to power, xix
overcoming-without-preservation: and Hegel, 142; and Modernity, 130, 142; and Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance, 91; of noble-morality, xix, 89; and overman, 145; and the will to power, xix, 93
Paul, 82–104, 152–153nn14,16,17, 154n22, 162n73; abuse of Jesus, 81; and the body of Christ, 73; and Christian love, 89; compared to Socrates, 82–85; conversion, 85; and disappointment with perfect ideal, 83, 99; Jesus as instrument of, 84, 89, 93, 97; and Jewish law, xvi, 64–65, 82–84, 89, 93, 124; on Katechon, 137–139; letter to the Thessalonians, 137, 179–180n20; logic of legitimization, xvii, xviii, 49–51; Löwith and, 149; and moral despair, 84–85; Nietzsche-Paul relationship (see Nietzsche-Paul relationship); and Priestly Judaism, 89; as revaluator of noble-morality, xvi, 87, 91, 146; self-negation in sainthood of, 92–93; self-overcoming of, 83–84; and sin, 64–65, 93; on sin and suffering before the Jewish laws, 56; and slave-morality, 85, 89; and spirit, 73; and suffering, 84
pessimism: and the Dionysian, 5, 7, 21, 42; history of pessimism as the history of Christianity, 4, 5; and man’s bad conscience, 111; and paradisiacal science, 42; and Plato’s conception of tragic art, 22; and Socrates, 13, 15; and the ugliest man, 176n32
philosophy: and art, 22, 126–128; and asceticism, 126; and atheism, 149; contrast to tragedy, 10, 22; history of, 127–128; history of philosophy distinguished from history of Christianity, xv; and Löwith on Nietzsche, 149; overcoming-preservation of itself, 128; the philosopher as an ass, 10–11; the philosopher as such, 10, 125–126; and Platonic moral metaphysics, 20–21; Schopenhauer as example of the “great philosopher,” 125–126; and sublimation, 126
Platonism, xiii–xv; abuse of Socratic reason by Plato, 81; audience addressed by, 16; and Christianity, 16–24; and the Dionysian, 21, 22; the Dionysian viewed as evil, 7–8, 42; doctrine of identity, 21; and the good God, 16–18; and happiness, 20, 21; interpretation of Socrates’s death, 78; morality and living a good life, 20–21; and negation of life, xviii, 19, 21; Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism, xiii–xv, 16, 150; Plato as Christian before Christianity, xv, xviii, 9, 22–23; positive value not attributed to suffering, 19, 21; and problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; and skepticism, 57; and slave-morality, 57; and Socrates, 19, 78 (see also Socrates); and tragic art, 22; truth as instinct, 17–18, 20
preservation-without-overcoming: and the Katechon, 139, 141–142
reason: and demand for Christian faith, 52; history of Socratic reason, 102; instrumentality of, 16–18, 76, 79–81, 83–85, 87; opposition between instruments of religion and reason, xix, 79–80, 98, 99; and Platonism, 16–18; problem of instinct and reason, 16–18; Socrates and the fulfillment of reason, 83–84
religion, xvii–xviii; a-Christian, 110; and hope, 2; instrumentality of, xix, 76, 79–81, 85, 98, 99, 169n21; and loss of absolute immediacy of life, 3, 27, 28; and metaphysical need, 26–27; modern problem of, 79–80; opposition between instruments of religion and reason, xix, 79–80, 98, 99; religions of thankfulness, xviii, 1–2, 26–27, 61; two types of, 1–2
sacrifice, 53; and art, xx; and Christianity, xix, 94; God’s sacrifice for the guilt of mankind, 96, 112; and love of the other, 65, 94; Paul and, 124; and religions of thankfulness, 26; and self-preservation, 133–134; and suffering, 65
salvation, 137; and Early Judaism, 28; God and, 63; and Greek origin, 149; Jesus and, 136; and modern science, 44; suffering as condition for, xviii, 18–19, 21, 24, 37, 57–58
Schopenhauer, Arthur: as the Antichrist, 140, 142, 143; and art, 125–127; and atheism, 140–143; as end of Modernity, 59; Nietzsche’s distancing from, 25, 99; and overcoming-preservation of Christianity, 141–143; and pessimism, 5; and pity and the death of God, 121; and religion and metaphysical need, 26
science: and the Antichrist, 15, 42; and art, 124; and boredom, 41–45; Christianity as antithesis of paradisiacal science, 57; continuity-discontinuity of modern science with Christianity, 107, 116–117; contrast of modern science to paradisiacal science, 41–45; faith in modern science, 115–117; as hiding place of suffering, xx, 120; as hiding place of the Dionysian other, 120; as hiding place of the ugly, 118–120; inability of science to make the ugly beautiful, xx, 118; and morality, 116; need for an authentic lie, 124; Nietzsche’s definition, 45; as nonauthentic lie, 117–118, 120, 121; opposition between modern science and Christian religion, 44; opposition between paradisiacal science and priestly religion, 44; and original sin, 39–46; paradisiacal science, xviii, 15, 39–46; reduction of the natural condition to the human condition, 132; and the shadow of God, 113–124; and Socrates, 12–15, 19, 78; and suffering, xx, 15, 40–41, 43–44, 118–120; as a survivor, 131–132; and usefulness, 119; and will to truth, 115–117, 119
sin: and God, 61–66, 112; and Jewish-Christian Christ, 73; and Jewish law, 64–65; as a lack of love, 65; science and original sin, 39–46; sin and punishment, 37, 39, 43, 60–66, 73, 80, 89, 93; and unauthentic illusion, 98. See also evil
slave-morality: and the Antichrist, 90; Christianity’s concealment of noble-slave dialectics, 105–106; and concealment of noble-morality, xviii, 39, 62, 65, 90, 97, 144, 145; and demand for authentic lie, 95; and the Dionysian as evil, 8; and evil, 54; genealogy of, 36, 39, 48–49, 53, 93, 97; and God, 63–64; and the historical Jesus, 67; inversion of noble-morality into, in Priestly Judaism, xviii, 31–39, 53, 56–57; and Jesus, 76; man as blend of the slave and the noble, 53, 93; and natural values, 146; Nietzsche as revaluator of, xvi, 87, 91, 103, 146; opposition to noble-morality, 91; overcoming of realized by negation of all instincts, 103; overcoming-preservation of, 145; and Paul, 85, 89; and pity, 113; and Platonism, 57; priest as both aristocrat and slave, 38–39; and purity and impurity, 33–35; and ressentiment, 36, 38, 39; and sin and punishment, 39, 60–66; and suffering, 36–39, 53–54, 57, 62; and value of life, 36–37; values of, 33–36, 38–39; and will to power, 94
Socrates, 9–15, 19, 83–84, 167n72; abuse of Socratic reason by Plato, 81; compared to Jesus, 77–81, 156–157n31; compared to Paul, 82–85; and disappointment with perfect ideal, 99; and fulfillment of reason, 83–84; instrumentality of Socratic reason, 79–81, 87; and irony, xix, 77–79, 84, 102–103; meaning of his death, 9–14, 78; misunderstanding of, xviii, 12, 13, 14, 76, 78; Nietzsche’s reading of Socrates guided by reading of Paul, xix; and Platonism, 19; and problem of instinct and reason, 16, 80, 83, 84; relationship between Jesus and Socrates, 79–81, 102; and science, 12–15; secret conversion of, 85; self-overcoming of, 83–84; and suffering, 9–11; as turning point from Greek tragedy to Platonism, xviii, 9, 11, 14, 16, 76, 78; and the ugliest man, 175n32; unity of life and death, 9, 12–14
spiritualization of passion, 110–111
suffering, xvii–xviii; and boredom, 41–45; Christian view of, 18–19, 21–24, 94; as condition for salvation, xviii, 18–19, 21, 24, 37, 57–58; and differences between modern science and paradisiacal science, 41–45; and differences of Platonic and Christian view, 19, 21, 24; and the Dionysian, 4–7, 21, 24, 36–38; and evil, 7, 16, 21, 37; and forgiveness, 121–122; Jesus and, 70; and Judaism, xviii, 36–39, 43–45, 56; and meaning of history, 3; and original sin, 43–44; Paul and, 84; and pity, 122; Platonic-Christian meaning of, 7, 11; Platonic view of, 21; and sacrifice, 65; and science, xx, 15, 40–41, 118–120; and sin and punishment, 62; and skepticism, xviii, 52–60; and slave-morality, 36–39, 53–54, 57, 62; Socrates and, 9–11; and the value of life, 4, 107
truth, 152n16; and Christianity, 18, 29, 55, 56, 64, 138, 147; and the Dionysian, 9, 98, 103, 146; and the historical Jesus, 66–68; and Jesus as symbolist, 70, 74, 78; and Judaism, 29, 55, 56, 64; and naive faith, 95; and Platonism, 17, 19–20, 23, 29, 79–81; and Socrates, 12, 13; will to truth, xiii, 57–58, 115–117, 119–120, 127; and Zarathustra, 90–91. See also lie
will: to deception, 124; to illusion, xiii, 116, 117; to life, 132–134; to nothingness, 93, 120; to truth, xiii, 57–58, 115–117, 119–120, 127
will to power, xix, 183n66; and Christian love, 94; and difference, xiv; and Hegelian Aufhebung, 93; life as, 133, 134, 135; and Modernity, 133; and overcoming-preservation and overcoming-without-preservation, 92–93; and sainthood of Paul, 92–93; and self-preservation, xx, 133, 136; and slave-morality, 94; and sublimation, xix
Zarathustra, 86, 90–91, 108–110, 112, 121, 122, 124, 142, 144–145, 147, 175–176n32