At 0445hrs on September 1, 1939, the first shots of World War II were fired when the Luftwaffe attacked Poland. An hour later German ground forces crossed the Polish frontier. A new style of warfare devised by Germany had been unleashed: der Blitzkrieg, the lightning war, synchronising simultaneous massive assaults by dive bombers and tanks.
Why was the German invasion of Poland of consequence to France and Britain? Because on April 1, 1939, Britain and France had guaranteed to defend Poland against any threat by Germany.
On August 24, 1939, Germany had signed a non-aggression pact with Russia. The British General Staff was sceptical about this, knowing that Nazism was the avowed enemy of Communism and expecting Hitler to turn on his new ally as soon as he felt strong enough. The British made two appreciations of the situation. One was that, as Hitler had no strategic need to enter Poland, he would, faced with the certainty of British and French intervention, attack the Ukraine as a first step towards the conquest of Russia. The other was that Hitler would take on Poland, France and Britain, that the first two would quickly succumb, that Britain was his main objective and he would immediately order the Luftwaffe to obliterate London and its docks, then send his Army to invade England.
In fact, Hitler did not expect to have to fight the British at all. Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had been Ambassador in London before becoming Foreign Minister in 1938, had constantly assured him that the British were effete and would not go to war. Hitler himself thought that Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, had made an empty promise to Poland merely to frighten Germany. The British Government had been pusillanimous and appeasing throughout Hitler’s time as Chancellor and dictator. He had easily deceived Chamberlain at their meetings in Munich in September 1938. All this made him certain that once again the British Cabinet would prove too cowardly to face war with Germany.
Immediately on the invasion of Poland, the British and French Governments demanded German withdrawal. Hitler ignored them. The next day there were frantic talks in Paris and London. As usual, Chamberlain and his Ministers took a passive line. The French Government showed no more courage or sense of honour than the British. But the British Parliament felt differently and prevailed on the Government to give Germany an ultimatum. France followed suit. At 1100hrs on September 3, 1939, Britain declared war, and France did so at 1700hrs. Thus, while the Germans were conquering Poland, a British Expeditionary Force and units of the RAF were establishing themselves in France.
In anticipating the German conquest of Poland, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, to whom Hitler had given responsibility for the campaign, summarised his objective as ‘To anticipate an orderly mobilisation and concentration of the Polish Army and to destroy the main bulk of it west of the Vistula-Narev line by concentric attacks from Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia’. The plan was intended to squeeze most of the Army in a pincer-grip and prevent it from escaping over the Vistula. This meant that the Luftwaffe must first establish air superiority. On a vast scale, never attempted before, bombers would disrupt road and rail traffic deep in Poland; and, the more significant tactic, bombers and fighters would maintain constant bombing and strafing of ground troops.
The latter is invariably described as a total innovation. It was nothing of the sort. Britain’s Royal Flying Corps introduced it on the Somme in 1916 with terrifying effect described by a German infantryman, who wrote home: ‘One can hardly calculate how much additional loss of life and strain on the nerves this cost us.’ By 1918 it was standard practice on both sides, for which purpose-designed aircraft were built. What the Germans did do, with their traditional thoroughness, was to develop air-to-ground attack to its ultimate potential.
The resolution of these and all the other associated problems, by preliminary theory and by practical experience in Poland, was the rehearsal for what was to follow eight months later in Belgium, Holland and France; and would have been inflicted on the British if RAF Fighter Command had not won the Battle of Britain. The first purpose, to destroy the Polish Air Force, if possible on the ground, also foreshadowed Goering’s design in July, August, September and October 1940.
The Polish General Staff was old-fashioned, the Army was inadequately equipped and poorly deployed to defend the 1,750 miles (2,815km) of frontier adjoining East Prussia and Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia. No defences had been built, the armoured force was small, and the cavalry was the Army’s pride. The Poles, with their traditional dash, relied on the efficacy of counter-attacks. When the German tanks rolled across the Polish plains they were met by cavalry charges.
The Germans sent in two Army Groups: one comprising the Third and Fourth Armies, the other the Eighth, Tenth and Fourteenth.
The Luftwaffe Order of Battle for this campaign numbered 648 bombers, 219 dive bombers, 210 single- and twin-engine fighters, 30 ground attack aircraft and 474 reconnaissance and transport types.
The Polish Air Force was organised in regiments, wings and squadrons. The strength on September 1, 1939, was 159 PZL P7 and PZL P11 single-seat fighters, all three to seven years old, 154 PZL 37 and PZL 23B bombers and light bomber/recce aircraft capable of offensive operations, and 84 observation aircraft.
German intelligence mistakenly estimated the Polish Air Force frontline strength as more than 900, including 150 bombers, 315 fighters, 325 reconnaissance, 100 liaison and 50 naval aircraft.
The Polish combat aircraft were nowhere near as capable as those of the Luftwaffe. From the Luftwaffe strength given above and the specification of its aircraft given in a later chapter, it is clear that the Polish Air Force was at a huge disadvantage in numbers and in aircraft performance and armament.
The Polish War Plan and General Directive for Air Operations, issued on July 28, 1939, laid down that fighter squadrons were to be used as an integral part of the Armies, with the exception of the Pursuit Brigade, consisting of five squadrons, which was to be under the control of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Forces. The tasks for the Army fighter squadrons (known as the Army Air Force) were: interception of enemy aircraft over the Army sector, air cover of Polish aircraft operating over the Army sector, and in critical situations, air attacks on enemy ground forces. The task of the Pursuit Brigade was air defence of the country.
The eight squadrons operating with the four Armies covered large sectors but had no radio, and therefore no co-operation with, or information from, the ground when airborne. Enemy activity was so intense, however, that most take-offs were followed by combat. The rapid advance of the German Army and the Luftwaffe’s attacks on airfields necessitated frequent changes of base. Heavy losses of aircrew and aircraft were suffered on the ground and in the air.
After 12 days the Army Air Force ceased to operate effectively and was withdrawn to join the remnants of the Pursuit Brigade. There was one exception: the Poznan Army Wing, commanded by Major M. Mumler, fought until September 16, 1939. It shot down 31 enemy aircraft, lost two pilots killed, four wounded and six missing, and lost all but one of its aircraft. This last, flown by the commanding officer, landed in Romania on September 18 – all that remained of an initial strength of 22.
The Pursuit Brigade was based on airfields near Warsaw to defend the capital and its environs. Eight radio stations provided a means of communication and control, although the radio range was only 9 to 12 miles (15 to 20km). The Warsaw surveillance centre provided information on the enemy. On September 7 the Brigade, with 16 serviceable aircraft, was moved to the Lublin area, to be joined later by the surviving pilots and aircraft of the Army squadrons. The combined fighter force, short of fuel and deprived of adequate communication, shot down only five enemy aircraft between September 7 and 17, after which the Polish Air Force ceased to operate. The Polish Army fought on until October 3.
It is customary to dismiss the performance of the Polish Air Force with the statement that it was wiped out on the ground before it could put up a fight. As the foregoing proves, this is wildly inaccurate and a calumny on brave men who died disproving it, and on those who survived to fight on in the RAF.
The Luftwaffe suffered 285 aircraft destroyed and 279 severely damaged; 189 Luftwaffe aircrew were killed, 224 missing and 126 wounded.
Out of 435 aircraft engaged, the Polish Air Force lost 327 from all causes, of which 264 were by direct enemy action, destroyed in combat or on the ground; at least 33 were shot down by their own anti-aircraft gun fire and 116 escaped to Romania. Aircrew killed and missing numbered at least 234.
The experience of 18 days’ hard air fighting contributed nothing to help the RAF in the Battle of Britain. The German aircraft destroyed and aircrew killed or disabled were more than replaced by then. The disparity between the quality and quantity of the Polish and British fighters was obvious: the Polish PZL P7s and P11s had been at a crippling disadvantage, but if Germany had attacked Britain then, Hurricanes and Spitfires would have mauled the Luftwaffe.
Although scores of Polish fighter pilots managed to reach France and Britain and were interrogated by French and British intelligence officers, no conclusions were drawn from the fact that the Luftwaffe fighter formation based on loose pairs was obviously more effective than the conventional threes of the Polish and French Air Forces, and the RAF. Nothing was deduced about how defending fighters should deal with formations of 50 to 100 bombers accompanied by an equally large fighter escort, or the best technique for shooting down dive bombers.
The Luftwaffe, on the contrary, benefited from a tremendous boost to its morale, the satisfaction of knowing that it had made devastatingly effective use of what it had learned in the Spanish Civil War, and the combat knowledge gained by its pilots and crews.
At the time of France’s declaration of war against Germany, her air force was poorly equipped to conduct either a defensive or an offensive campaign. Despite the warnings of General Vuillemin, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and Captain Stehlin, the Air Attaché in Berlin, the French High Command had refused in the 1930s to recognise Germany’s aerial rearmament. No pressure was put on indigenous aircraft manufacturers to design and build fighters or bombers that would meet realistic modern requirements. Little air-to-air firing was done; gunnery training was almost totally limited to camera gun practice. Fighter pilots were trained to make beam attacks ending with a full deflection firing pass at 820ft (250m). These were to prove mostly abortive against the Luftwaffe because the French aircraft lacked sufficient performance.
The total fighter strength of aircraft considered to have a performance capable of taking on the Messerschmitt 109 was 250 Morane 405/406 and 120 Curtiss H75 (US-supplied Curtiss P-36). The bomber and reconnaissance strength consisted of 120 Bloch 151/152, 85 Potez 630 and 205 Potez 631.
Regular officer pilots were trained at l’Ecole de l’Air and NCOs at l’Ecole d’Istres. Pilots and observers on the Reserve were trained during their compulsory military service. Pilot candidates aged 18 could, on passing an examination, be trained initially as civilians at a civil flying school. They would then sign on for three years and complete their training at Istres, after which they joined a squadron. At the end of the contract period they were put on the Reserve, in which there were two classes. Class A reservists were assigned to a squadron, with which they did about 10 hours’ flying a year. Class B did no continuation flying and were sent on a refresher course in the event of mobilisation.
The Organisation of France’s Air Force, l’Armée de l’Air, in 1939 was: groupements comprising several groupes; escadres comprising two groupes (until May 1939, when some were increased to three); groupes comprising two escadrilles (squadrons); escadrilles comprising three patronilles (patrols) of three aircraft in each.
In addition, there was one unit similar to a British Auxiliary Air Force squadron: l’Escadrille de Paris, based at Villacoublay.
The normal aircraft establishment for a groupe was 25, but for those flying the Curtiss it was 30. The pilot establishment for all groupes was 30.
On August 28, 1939, fighters were based as follows: at Etampes: 1st Escadre, comprising two groupes of obsolescent Dewoitine 510; Escadrille 1/13, night fighter, equipped with Potez 631. At Chartres: 2nd Escadre, three groupes of Morane 406; 6th Escadre, two groupes of Morane 406. At Dijon: 3rd Escadre, three groupes of Morane 406; 7th Escadre, two groupes of Morane 406. At Reims: 4th Escadre, two groupes of Curtiss H75; 5th Escadre, two groupes of Curtiss H75; Escadrille 2/13, night fighter equipped with Potez 631. At Marignane: 8th Escadre, comprising two groupes, one with Dewoitine 510, the other with Potez 631.
By August 1939, these were dispersed on active service aerodromes that were mostly bare fields among woods or forests far from a town. The aircraft were kept in the open air. The pilots were often billeted with civilians if a village were near enough. The ground troops lived in barns and slept on straw.
The standard fighter formation was three aircraft, with the leader in the centre and his wing men laterally separated by 220 yards (200m) from him, one 55 yards (50m) below him, the up-sun aircraft taking the higher position.
The control and reporting system was, by British standards, ramshackle. Warning of hostile aircraft was based on the Système de Guet, the Look-Out System, similar to the Observer Corps in Britain but less reliably served by the telephone lines on which it depended. This was weakly supported by a radio method of detection, détection électromagnétique or D.E.M., consisting of a chain of alternate transmitters and receivers. These gave a rough plan position of aircraft by observations on the bearing produced between the direct wave from the transmitter to the receiver and the reflected wave from the aircraft. It had a range of approximately 50km and did not give satisfactory results on more than one aircraft.
Fighter control was handicapped by poor radio equipment. Aircraft sets needed frequent retuning in the air. Their air-to-ground range was 93 miles (150km) at heights above 3,280ft (1,000m), and air-to-air 31 miles (50km)
This small Regular air force and inchoate Reserve, with its scanty supply of modern fighters and enduring hard living conditions, nevertheless entered the war with high morale.
The entire nation felt secure behind the Maginot Line, the most impressive fortification ever built, consisting of three lines of reinforced concrete outposts, blockhouses and forts with underground arsenals, living quarters and hospitals. Defended by enormous artillery pieces and tens of thousands of infantry, it stretched along the German frontier from Belgium to Switzerland. The French believed it was impregnable.
The first units of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), under the command of Field Marshal Lord Gort, began to land in France on September 10, 1939, Two RAF formations had preceded them. The Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) was commanded by Air Vice Marshal P. H. L. Playfair, CB, CVO, MC, who had joined the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 from the Royal Artillery and won his Military Cross in France during World War I. His headquarters was near Reims, around which his squadrons were based. Their task was to work with the French Army along the German frontier. The Air Component of the BEF, under Air Vice Marshal C. H. B. Blount, CB, OBE, MC, with his headquarters near Arras, was based in the Pas de Calais. Its function was to operate with the BEF, which went into the line along the Belgian frontier, and to patrol Channel convoys. Blount, who transferred from the Surreys to the RFC in 1913, had also won his gallantry decoration in the Great War, when commanding No. 34 Squadron in France and Italy.
The Advanced Air Striking Force consisted of 10 bomber and two fighter squadrons. Nos. 12, 15, 40, 88, 103, 105, 142, 150, 218 and 226 flew the Fairey Battle. This was an obsolescent three-seater type with a single 1,030hp Rolls-Royce Merlin engine and armed with one fixed .303in Browning gun forward and one .303in Vickers K aft. Its maximum speed was 241 mph (388km/h) at 13,000ft (3,960m) and its ceiling 23,500ft (7,160m). The bombload was 1,000lb (453kg). Nos. 85 and 87 had Hurricanes, whose specification is given elsewhere. The Battles landed in France on September 1 and the Hurricanes on the 7th.
The Air Component, whose records were almost totally destroyed during the hasty retreat of the British forces in June 1940, comprised the following: Four corps squadrons, whose function was army cooperation: Nos. 2, 4, 13 and 26, flying Lysanders. These were two-seater, single-engined, high-wing monoplanes with 890hp Bristol Mercury XII engines and armed with two fixed .303in Brownings firing forward and one .303in Vickers or Lewis in the rear cockpit firing aft; maximum speed 219mph (352km/h) at 10,000ft (3,050m); ceiling 26,000ft (7,925m).
Four army squadrons. Nos. 18, 53, 57, 59, flying Blenheims, whose specification is given elsewhere.
Six fighter squadrons. Those equipped with Hurricanes were Nos. 1, 17, 85 and 87. Those with Gladiators were 607 (County of Durham) and 615 (County of Surrey), both of the Auxiliary Air Force.
None of the 12 airfields designated for the Air Component was in the area allotted to the British Army, which was supposed to supply them with rations, tents, fuel, pay, works, postal service, furniture, billets, etc. The French Army proved helpful and supplied rations, wine and petrol. All these airfields were covered in clover, not grass, and would become soggy and non-operational in wet weather. None had hangars or had been provided with any other resources. The RAF did not know this before-hand, because Britain had made a gentlemen’s agreement with France not to do any intelligence studies there.
The British Army came to the rescue of the Air Component in the person of an officer on Gort’s staff. He was Brigadier Appleyard of the Territorial Army, who was chief engineer of a major road-construction company and undertook to provide 20 proper airfields by the spring. He returned to England and visited the managing directors of his own employers and four other leading road contractors. With their wholehearted cooperation he raised five companies for the Royal Engineers, each bearing the name of the firm that it represented and by which it was provided with all the necessary equipment needed for earth moving, road construction and the building of accommodation. Having been vested with virtual omnipotence in achieving his objective, he obtained commissions in the rank of major for company directors and captain for managers. Foremen became instant sergeants and charge hands were enlisted as corporals. Uniforms were supplied immediately. Swiftly they were in France, putting up huts for themselves and sowing grass seed on the ploughland that had been selected for conversion (it is appropriate to confirm here that by the spring they had indeed rolled the new grass and laid down concrete runways on nearly all their 20 sites.)
The war began with a period of comparative inactivity that was, in comparison with the eventual Blitzkrieg that came in 1940, retrospectively known as the Sitzkrieg. The French refer to it as La Drôle de Guerre – The Joke War. The Allied land and air forces stagnated. Their armies patrolled in front of the Maginot Line and fought occasional skirmishes. Their air forces were forbidden to bomb Germany for fear of reprisals. The Luftwaffe was under the same restrictions over Britain and France. The BEF’s artillery did gunnery practice for which the Air Component’s Lysanders spotted as they used to on Salisbury Plain. They also did some close reconnaissance and photography. The Blenheims were interestingly employed on photographic reconnaissance over Germany.
The only sector of the Franco-German frontier across which the Allies or the Germans could attack was the 90 miles (146km) between the Rhine and the Moselle. Well within her own territory, Germany had built strong defences, the Siegfried Line or West Wall. The Blenheims photographed the whole of it, as well as more distant objectives. Nos. 1 and 73 Squadrons filled their time with convoy patrols and the normal practice flying.
The RAF squadrons based at home had meanwhile been more active than those in France. On the night of September 3, Whitley bombers flew the first of many leaflet raids – codenamed Nickel – and dropped six million copies of an exhortation to Germany to abandon the war. Not only was the penalty for reading them severe, which ensured that few would be picked up, but also this was psychologically an absurd time at which to spread propaganda. German morale was at its height with the invasion of Poland going so much in Germany’s favour. The time to spread propaganda is when one has the upper hand and the enemy’s resolve is wilting. Casualties among the crews who flew these sorties were, like those of the crews who carried bombs across the North Sea or made daylight sorties in Battles and Blenheims from France, particularly sad in their wastefulness. All three activities were futile. At Air Ministry and in Bomber Command HQ was a theory that casualties on leaflet raids could have been heavier, because the enemy hesitated to betray the siting of his flak and searchlights when he knew that neither bombing nor photography was their purpose. This was not shared by the men who actually did the job. What was true was that the elementary radar was of scant help in controlling night fighters which were therefore less lethal than they might have been.
On September 1 President Roosevelt of the USA had appealed to the German and Polish Governments to limit bombing to legitimate military objectives. On the same date Hitler said in the Reichstag: ‘I will not war against women and children. I have ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives.’ On that very day, the Luftwaffe bombed 60 towns and villages in Poland. On September 3 Hitler replied to Roosevelt: ‘It is a precept of humanity in all circumstances to avoid bombing non-military objectives, which corresponds entirely with my own attitude and has always been advocated by me.’ On September 13 he attempted to justify his savage bombing of Polish civilians by claiming that it was legitimate because the Polish Government had incited its citizens to fight the Germans as franc-tireurs.
Although bombing the German mainland was forbidden and German bombers were under orders not to attack mainland Britain or France, shipping in port was a permitted target. Flying Officer A. MacPherson of No. 139 (Blenheim) Squadron flew a reconnaissance off Wilhelmshaven on September 3 but his wireless report was too distorted by atmospherics to read. On September 4 he took off again at 0835hrs to repeat the sortie. Despite low cloud and rain squalls he obtained photographs of ships in Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven and the Schilling Roads, including the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and training cruiser Emden. Once more his message was unreadable. After he reported verbally on landing, 15 Blenheims of Nos. 109, 110 and 139 Squadrons set out to bomb Wilhelmshaven and 14 Wellingtons from Nos. 9 and 149 Squadrons to bomb two battleships in Brunsbüttel.
With cloud base at 500ft (150m), only three Blenheims of 110 were able to attack. One hit the Admiral Scheer but the 500lb (227kg) bombs were too light for the task and the 11-second fuse did not detonate it until after the bomb had bounced off the warship’s deck. Another Blenheim crashed on the Emden, fatally for the crew. Only one Blenheim of No. 107 Squadron returned and there is no record of any hits. No. 139 Squadron could not find its target in the adverse weather and returned unscathed without having bombed anything. None of the Wellingtons claimed hits. Most failed to find the target or turned back early because of bad weather. Two did not return. All aircraft met accurate and heavy flak and the Wellingtons were attacked by Bf 109s.
On September 29, 12 Hampdens of Nos. 61 and 144 Squadrons took off for Heligoland and the Frisian Islands. One turned back. Six saw two destroyers, which three attacked unsuccessfully and three could not get in position to attack. Five were attacked by Bf 109s and all were shot down.
These heavy losses did not shake the sacred Bomber Command axiom that a section of three bombers in close formation in broad daylight had the combined defensive fire power to drive off any number of heavily armed attacking fighters.
In France, by mid-September two Blenheim squadrons, Nos. 114 and 139, had joined the AASF. From the outset both the Allies and Gemany had been making several daily photo reconnaissance sorties. While the Germans evaded anti-aircraft fire and fighters, the Battles and Blenheims constantly suffered casualties from both. Flak over Germany was heavy and accurate. The information gained was not worth the loss of one or two Blenheims day by day, so daylight sorties stopped and night reconaissaissance began. Taking off by the light of six blue glim lamps at 200-yard (183m) intervals was inherently hazardous. Over Germany not only were German searchlight crews highly efficient but, in order to take photographs, flares were used which attracted flak and night fighters. Heavy losses continued.
It was No. 1 Squadron that scored the first British success, on October 30, a sunny day with no low cloud. Flying Officer P. W. ‘Boy’ Mould, who had joined as a Halton apprentice in 1934 and been selected for Cranwell in 1937, had barely refuelled after a patrol when a Dornier 17 flew high over the airfield. He took off without awaiting orders, caught up with the Dornier at 18,000ft (5,485m) and attacked from astern. It caught fire and spun vertically until it crashed into the ground.
On October 31 a member of 73 Squadron who was destined to become the best-known pilot in the Battle of France destroyed his first enemy aircraft, Flying Officer Edgar James Kain, known as Cobber, was a New Zealander who had come to England in 1936 to join the RAF. He gave an acrobatic display at the Empire Air Day show in 1938.
On patrol in a Hurricane he saw anti-aircraft shells bursting and headed towards them. At 27,000ft (8,230m) he intercepted a Do 17 and fired at it. Its port engine began to smoke and its rear gunner returned his fire while its pilot took evasive action. Kain gave the Dornier a long burst with the remainder of his 14.8 seconds’-worth of ammunition and it fell into a vertical dive. His Hurricane could not keep up with it and he pulled out at 400mph (643km/h). The Dornier crashed in a village street. This combat set an altitude record for air fighting. On November 23 Kain shot down another Do 17.
On November 7 Germany’s assault on the Low Countries was postponed on account of the weather. It was put off 13 times more and the last definite date Hitler chose was January 16, 1940.
The best day of 1939 for the RAF fighters was November 23, when several enemy aircraft were plotted on the map in the Operations Rooms of Nos. 1 and 73 Squadrons, and Hurricanes were scrambled. Sqn Ldr ‘Bull’ Halahan and Flying Officer ‘Hilly’ Brown, a Canadian, intercepted a Do 17 and shot it down in flames. A section led by Flt Lt ‘Johnny’ Walker caught an He 111, which they set on fire. While it was going down out of control a formation of Moranes came dashing in, one of which collided with Sgt ‘Darky’ Clowes’s Hurricane and tore off an elevator and half the rudder. The French pilot’s aeroplane was even more badly damaged and he baled out. Clowes landed at 120mph (193km/h), overshot and nosed in, but was unhurt. Another section of No. 1 Squadron, led by Flt Lt ‘Pussy’ Palmer, attacked a Do 17, set it alight and saw the rear gunner and navigator bale out. Palmer flew alongside to ensure that the pilot was dead. He found out that the German was not when the bomber swerved onto his tail and riddled his Hurricane with 43 bullets. His engine stopped with coolant smoke issuing from it but he made a force-landing, while FO Kilmartin and Soper resumed shooting at the Dornier, which in turn force-landed with both engines on fire. The German pilot waved at them as they circled the wreckage. No. 73 Squadron destroyed three Do 17s, one of which fell to Cobber Kain.
The first Czech pilots arrived in France after long circuitous journeys and were distributed among the Morane groupes. They were soon followed by Poles, who were given their own groupe, No 1/45, under the command of Major Kepinski and equipped with Moranes.
By the end of the month an exceptionally severe winter had the Continent in its grip. On December 10 the temperature fell to minus 26 degrees Fahrenheit (-32 degrees Centigrade) and on the 12th to minus 29. Air activity by both sides greatly diminished. It would be March before the Luftwaffe resumed large-scale operations.
Throughout the four months from the outbreak of war to the end of 1939, Coastal Command, which attracted the least attention from the press, had been going about its business over the Atlantic and the North Sea, achieving successes that indirectly contributed to the RAF’s victory in the Battle of Britain. Oil, petrol and raw materials of every kind were as necessary to maintain Fighter Command’s operational strength as were aircraft and pilots. Coastal Command constantly made reconnaissance sorties in search of enemy warships and, with the Royal Navy, protected merchant shipping bound for Britain and limited the depredations of the U-boats. In the first fortnight of the war the enemy sank 21 British merchant ships with a total tonnage of 122,843. During the two weeks ending October 9, 1939, only 5,809 tons of shipping were lost, and on November 14 it was announced that 3,070 ships had been convoyed with a loss of only seven.
General Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, had been insisting that there should be an RAF chief responsible for both the AASF and the Air Component of the BEF. Accordingly, on January 9, 1940, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Air Forces in France. He made his HQ at Coulommiers, where the French Air Force C-in-C had his. Barratt, known as ‘Ugly’, had adequate credentials. He served in France during the Great War and immediately before his new appointment was Principal RAF Liaison Officer with the French forces.
On January 16, Hitler postponed his advance through the Low Countries until the spring.
The scale of air fighting over France began to increase in March 1940. Most combats developed to the same pattern: British and French fighters patrolling above 20,000ft (6,010m), seeking German bombers escorted by fighters, the opposing fighters each striving to have the height advantage at the moment of interception.
Kain made his third kill, a Bf 109, on March 3, but his Hurricane was hit and he had to bale out. He got his fourth, another 109, on March 26, but his aircraft was set on fire. Despite this he destroyed one more 109 before baling out. His score of five qualified him as an ‘Ace’, the first Allied pilot of this war to achieve this, and he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was now the most famous pilot in the RAF, as well-known to the public as ‘Sailor’ Malan, Douglas Bader and Bob Stanford Tuck were destined to become.
Another Commonwealth pilot who had spectacular success in France was an Australian, Flying Officer Leslie Clisby of No. 1 Squadron. He opened his score with a Bf 110 on March 31. Flying Officer Newell ‘Fanny’ Orton, who had been in No. 73 Squadron since 1937, also shot down a lot of Germans, starting with two Bf 109s on March 26.
In April the pace, like the weather, became warmer in patches interspersed with rain that hampered flying. Clisby bagged a Bf 109 on April 1 and another next day. Peter ‘Johnny’ Walker, commanding A Flight of No. 1 Squadron, had joined the Service in 1935 and performed in the squadron aerobatic team at the Hendon Air Pageant in 1937. Having shot down a Bf 110 on March 29 he added a Bf 109 on April 20. Orton got a Ju 88 on April 8 and on the 21st a 109 and a 110. ‘Boy’ Mould had accounted for a 110 on March 31, and on April 1 he shot down another. Sergeant Harold ‘Ginger’ Paul of No. 743 Squadron made his first kill on April 21, a Bf 109. Flt Lt Peter Prosser Hanks, known by his second forename, commander of B Flight, No. 1 Squadron, another member of the aerobatic team, had sent a 110 down on March 31 and got an He 111 on April 20.
While the Allies awaited Hitler’s spring offensive in Western Europe, Germany carried out a lightning invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9. Two divisions under General Kaupitsch and an air force of some 500 combat aircraft, and nearly 600 transports, made the assault on both countries simultaneously. Both victims of the Nazis’ latest aggression had only token air forces that were given no time to make even a gesture in defence of their countries. The Danish Army numbered only 15,000. Resistance was pointless.
At 0530hrs the Ju 52 transports carrying paratroops took off, but the approaches to both Oslo and Stavanger were obscured by fog from sea level to 2,000ft (610m). Low-level flight was impossible, and from above cloud the aerodromes on which the paratroops were to drop and the aircraft to land could not be seen. The first objectives of the paratroops were the airfields at Aalborg East and Aalborg West in Denmark, and Oslo-Fornebu and Stavanger-Sola in Norway. The first two were attacked at 0700hrs. Twelve hours later Copenhagen had been taken and the conquest of Denmark completed.
As with the Polish invasion, writers about this operation habitually state that the Norwegian Air Force, which comprised about 100 aeroplanes, nearly all fighters and reconnaissance types, was obliterated on the ground before it could put up a fight. That is not true either. While the Ju 52s were trying to land at Fornebu, Oberleutant Hansen, commanding I/ZG76 (Bf 110s), was giving them fighter cover. At 0838hrs his eight 110s were attacked out of the sun by nine Norwegian Gloster Gladiators, which shot down two of them.
The German landings by air and sea went ahead despite delays caused by weather, in the face of a brave defence by the Norwegian Army, Navy and what was left of the Air Force after the swift capture of the airfields. The Luftwaffe occupied the airfields and provided all the forms of air support essential for success in modern warfare. The fighting spread throughout the country.
Both Britain and France sent expeditionary forces but, to quote the archives, ‘With regard to air forces it was decided that none should accompany the expedition in the first instance.’ Critics have always deplored this as indicative of the backwardness of military thinking in Britain and France. Admittedly, the General Staffs in both countries were still imbued with out-dated notions about the use of air power, but one wonders where their critics suppose the aircraft could have come from? Neither the RAF nor l’Armée de l’Air could spare an adequate number of fighters from home defence. The French bombers were too poor in performance, bombload and armament to be effective or to protect themselves. From the first day of this campaign RAF Bomber and Coastal Commands were doing the best they could by sparing aircraft from other tasks to reconnoitre the Norwegian coast, to sow mines and to bomb. Even long-range Blenheim fighters were sent all the way to hunt enemy aircraft in the region of Stavanger and Bergen. Bombing raids were carried out against the two German-occupied airfields at Aalborg, Denmark.
On April 15, Britain’s 24th Guards Brigade arrived at Harstad. Next day, 146 Brigade landed at Namsos. On the 18th, 148 Brigade landed at Andalsnes and part of the 5th Demi-Brigade Chasseurs Alpins landed at Namsos.
On April 21, No. 263 (Gladiator) Squadron sailed for Norway in the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious. None of its 18 pilots had ever done a deck landing or take-off, so Fleet Air Arm pilots flew the 18 Gladiators on board for them. At 1700hrs on April 24, 50 miles (80km) to seaward of Trondheim, the RAF pilots flew them off, each flight of nine led by a naval Skua two-seater, which carried a navigator, to guide them in the threatening weather. By 1900hrs all the fighters had landed on the frozen Lake Lesjaskog. During the night the carburettors and controls of the aircraft froze. The only way to warm an engine was to run it, which was done with some aircraft in readiness for dawn. The ground crews were not at full strength, so pilots had to share in guarding the aircraft.
At 0445hrs on the 25th two Gladiators took off on patrol and shot down an He 115. At 0745hrs the Luftwaffe began dive-bombing and strafing the lake. By 1230hrs bombs had destroyed eight Gladiators, four of which had not even flown. At 1305hrs bombs destroyed four aircraft and wounded three pilots. All day, aircraft took off whenever they could, harassed by bombers. There were several combats and two He 111s were destroyed. By the evening, 11 Gladiators had been burned out and two, beyond repair, were set alight. The squadron moved to Setnesmoen. On the 26th only three Gladiators were left. Next day there was none. The squadron had flown 49 sorties and made 37 attacks against enemy aircraft. Six victories were confirmed by the finding of wreckage, and eight claims remained unconfirmed. On April 28 the squadron personnel embarked in a cargo vessel and arrived in England on May 1.
On May 20 the re-formed No. 263 Squadron flew their new Gladiators off the aircraft carrier HMS Furious, 100 miles (160km) from Bardufoss, led by two Fleet Air Arm torpedo/reconnaissance Swordfish. In low cloud and mist, two fighters crashed, killing one pilot and severely injuring the other. On the 21st the squadron flew 40 standing patrols. On the 22nd it flew 54 sorties. One pilot was killed in action against He 111s. An airfield had been prepared at Bodø with shelters and underground accommodation. On May 26 three Gladiators began operating from there.
No. 46 (Hurricane) Squadron had been sent to join No. 263. On May 26 the new arrivals took off in their Hurricanes from HMS Glorious, to attempt a landing on the Skånland airstrip where a wire mesh runway had been laid. Ten landed but sank four inches (10cm) through the soft ground, and two pitched onto their noses. The remaining eight were diverted to Bardufoss. Next day another Hurricane stood on its nose at Skånland, so the remaining seven also moved to Bardufoss.
In bad weather and under heavy bombing, the two squadrons slogged on until June 7. By then 263 had flown 389 sorties over 12 days, been in combat 69 times and claimed 26 successes. No. 46 had also operated on 12 days to take part in 26 fights and claim 11 kills and eight probables. No. 263 landed their remaining eight Gladiators on Glorious during June 7. No. 46, none of whom had yet attempted a deck landing, followed with their 10 Hurricanes.
On June 8 the German battle cruiser Scharnhorst sank Glorious with 1,474 of her ship’s company and 41 officers and men of the RAF. Only two of the pilots who had fought so bravely and endured so much hardship in Norway survived.
This brief campaign contributed nothing that directly was of any help to Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain. On the contrary, it deprived the RAF of 30 experienced fighter pilots and 36 aircraft. The operating conditions bore no resemblance to those in the coming Battle. Altogether, it was an entirely wasteful venture except for one significant indirect influence it had on the Battle of Britain, in Britain’s favour. Luftwaffe losses were 79 bombers and 68 Ju 52 transport aircraft. Among the Luftwaffe crews lost were several that were experts at blind bombing by radio beam. Training replacements greatly delayed introduction of this highly effective technique to night bombing against British industry and seaports, and cities such as London, Coventry and Liverpool, where the prime target, though denied by Germany, was the civilian population.
While this brief and hopeless campaign was being waged, the Blitzkrieg had burst upon Holland and Belgium as the first move in Germany’s long-awaited attack on France. The most important weeks of the whole prelude to the Battle of Britain were imminent. L’Armée de l’Air has always maintained that the Battle of Britain really began in May 1940, and that it has never been given due credit for the part it played in Fighter Command’s victory six months later by the damage the French inflicted on Luftwaffe aircraft and air crews in May and June.
The delay in making the assault had not been caused by the weather alone. On January 10 a Luftwaffe major flying from Münster to Bonn with the detailed operational plan for the attack was blown off course in bad weather and force-landed in Belgium. The Belgians handed the documents to the Allies and Germany had to make a new plan.
At dawn on May 10 the Luftwaffe struck. Ignoring the Maginot Line, the Germans simply went around its northern end. In addition to the brilliant use of aircraft and armour in cooperation they exploited their other new technique, the spearhead of paratroops and airborne infantry, both carried in Ju 52s. The first targets in Holland were its capital, The Hague, its main port, Rotterdam, the military airfields, and the bridges across the Rhine at Dordrecht and Moerdijk, which had to be kept intact for the advancing ground forces. In Belgium, the objectives were the two Albert Canal bridges, and Fort Eben Emael on the frontier. Paratroop engineers landed on the fort and blew up the anti-aircraft guns and artillery emplacements, with a new high explosive and equipment carried in another innovation, towed gliders. The garrison held out for 24 hours.
With 136 divisions, the Germans were outnumbered by the 149 divisions of the BEF, the French, Belgians and Dutch. But their air force was bigger than the four opposing ones combined, their tactics were dazzling and their High Command was cleverer than those of Britain and France. They also had the supreme advantage of unity, whereas communication in every respect between the British and French ground and air commands was poor. The German tanks were concentrated in armoured divisions, which gave them maximum effectiveness. The British were similarly organised, but had not sent any armour to France. The powerful French tank force was mostly fragmented in support of the infantry.
The Luftwaffe had at its disposal 860 Bf 109s, 350 Bf 110s, 380 dive bombers, 1,300 long-range bombers, 300 long-range recce aircraft, 340 short-range recce aircraft, 475 Ju 52 transports and 45 gliders.
The British Air Forces in France had seen little change since their arrival. In the Air Component, Nos. 607 and 615 Squadrons were converting from Gladiators to Hurricanes. The AASF had gained two Blenheim squadrons in place of two Battle squadrons and on the afternoon of May 10 was joined by No. 501 (Hurricane) Squadron of the Auxiliary Air Force, with which Sergeant J. H. ‘Ginger’ Lacey was serving.
The air forces of the Low Countries were rapidly swamped and their airfields captured. The Dutch Air Force, De Luftvaartafdeling, numbered 124 aeroplanes. The 1st Regiment had one reconnaissance squadron, one medium bomber squadron, and four fighter squadrons with a strength of 20 Fokker D31s and 23 Fokker G1As. The 2nd Regiment had four reconnaissance squadrons, and two fighter squadrons flying Fokker D31s and Douglas DB8s.
L’Aéronautique Belge mustered 157 aeroplanes. The 1st Regiment consisted of 59 reconnaissance types. The 2nd Regiment comprised 78 fighters: 11 Hurricanes, 13 Gladiators, 30 Fairey Foxes and 24 Fiat CR423. The 3rd Regiment had 40 reconnaissance and light bomber types.
There had been little growth in the French Air Force; indigenous manufacture was slow and deliveries were awaited from the United States. The first Bloch 151 and 152 single-seater fighters had been delivered. These had a 1,080 hp Gnome-Rhône engine, two 20mm cannon and two 7.5mm machine guns. Their top speed was 323mph (520km/h) and ceiling 32,810ft (10,000m). From February the Potez 631 had six additional 7.5mm machine guns, under the wings.
On May 10, 1940, which is when the French insist that the Battle of Britain began, l’Armée de l’Air fighter groupements and groupes had available to them 828 combat aircraft, of which 584 were serviceable. Of these serviceable aircraft, 293 were Morane Saulnier MS 406s, and 121 were Bloch 151 and 152; the others were Curtiss 75s, Dewoitine 520s and Potez 630s and 631s.
Operationally, l’Armée de l’Air basic organisation was territorial, with four Zones d’Opérations Aérienne: Nord (ZOAN), Est (ZOAE), Sud (ZOAS) and Alpe (ZOAA).
While the Dutch and Belgian Air Forces were being knocked out and the vagaries of the rudimentary control and reporting system were starving the British Air Forces in France of information, both the AASF and Air Component were hectically embroiled in the air battle. Nos. 85, 87, 607 and 615 Squadrons had seen little action hitherto. No. 1 Squadron had shot down 26 enemy aircraft, and No. 73 Squadron 30 during their first eight months in France. From May 10 onwards all the fighter squadrons were fully stretched from dawn to sunset.
On the first day of the Blitz, Kain bagged a Do 17. On the following day he shot down another and a Bf 109. On the 12th, an HS 126. Orton, who by now also had a DFC, was shot down on the 10th but got his own back the next day by destroying a Ju 88 and a Do 17. Clisby, the fiery and aggressive Australian, made two kills on the 10th, both Do 17s, before being hit by French anti-aircraft fire. On the 11th he brought three Bf 109s down, followed on his last sortie that day with an He 111. This landed in a field and Clisby lobbed in beside it to make sure none of the crew got away. One of them did run for it, but Clisby sprinted after him and brought him down with a rugby football tackle.
Three more Hurricane squadrons arrived to join the Air Component: No. 504 on the 10th, Nos. 3 and 70 on the 11th. By then No. 501 had settled in and Flying Officer Pickup had recorded its first kill, a Do 17. ‘Ginger’ Lacey flew two sorties that day but did not encounter the enemy. Six of his comrades were luckier: Pilot Officer C. L. Hulse and Sgt P. Morfill each got a Bf 110; Flying Officer C. E. Malfroy, a New Zealand Davis Cup player, and F/Sgt A. D. Payne each shot down an He 111 and Flt Lt E. S. Williams and Sgt R. C. Dafforn destroyed Do 17s. The day after that, Lacey flew patrols totalling 3 hours and 45 minutes without result. Others on the squadron destroyed 12 of the enemy. The first hours of the Germans’ surprise attack had brought disaster to the Fairey Battle squadrons. Nos. 12, 103, 105, 142, 150, 218 and 226 were all ordered to make a low-level attack on a German column in Luxembourg strongly protected by 20mm and 37mm flak. Thirty-two bombers went in at 250ft (75m) and 13 were shot down. All the others were damaged. On May 11, Do 17s bombed Condé-Vraux airfield, where they destroyed six of No. 114 Squadron’s Blenheims and left all the remainder unserviceable. Enemy troops on the move in Luxembourg were again a target for eight Battles, of which only one, severely damaged, returned.
May 12, incongruously Whit Sunday, witnessed one of the most tragic and bravest ventures of the war as well as one of the most crass. This unholy day began with the loss of seven out of nine Blenheims from No. 139 Squadron during an attack against one of the ubiquitous German columns, this time near Maastricht. It was succeeded by an attack that 24 Blenheims based in England carried out on Maastricht town, where they lost 10.
The second sacrificial slaughter by the AASF occurred over the two Albert Canal bridges, for which six volunteer crews of 112 Squadron were required. Every crew stepped forward, so the first six captains’ names on the squadron’s daily battle order were called. The wireless in one aircraft was found to be unserviceable and when the crew transferred to another its hydraulic system was proved faulty. Of the five that took off, two were shot down and their crews taken prisoner. Another crash-landed at base, full of holes. Two were destroyed, but one damaged the bridge at Weldwezelt with bombs. The leader of the formation, Flying Officer ‘Judy’ Garland and his observer, Sgt T. Gray both won the Victoria Cross. With callous injustice, the air gunner, Leading Aircraftman L. R. Reynolds, was ignored.
On May 11 two of the AASF’s Blenheim squadrons had been obliterated by bombs, and now, on this darkest of days yet, No. 139 Squadron lost seven more Blenheims out of nine that made an attack on German troop concentrations near Maastricht.
Lacey had his first success on the 13th. Detailed for dawn patrol with two other sergeants, he could not start his engine and took off after they were out of sight. No thought of the folly of flying alone on an offensive patrol occurred to him: he was too inexperienced. At 20,000ft (6,096m), enjoying a BBC programme of dance music that was all his radio would pick up, he saw ‘. . . a big, fat Heinkel all on its own’. A moment later a Bf 109 came in sight 5,000ft (1,525m) below and between him and the Heinkel. Lacey dived, shot it down at 50 yards (45m) range, then gave the He 111 the same treatment. Hardly had he landed when he was ordered on another patrol and destroyed a Bf 110.
On the 14th, 35 Battles out of 63 that took off, and 10 Blenheims out of 15, were destroyed. The Air Component lost 11 Hurricanes and the AASF lost five. Against this, 12 enemy aircraft were brought down.
A momentous change in Britain’s outlook on the war had coincided with the German onslaught: the dynamic and optimistic Winston Churchill had replaced the torpid and doleful Chamberlain as Prime Minister. At a meeting of the War Cabinet that morning two cardinal decisions were taken: to bomb the oil refineries and marshalling yards in the Ruhr; and not to post any more valuable and irreplaceable fighter squadrons to France.
Fighter reinforcements were, however, being provided. Each morning one flight from each of six Hurricane squadrons flew to a French base, where it joined a flight from another squadron to make up a composite unit of 12, and operated from there throughout the day. Air Commodore P. M. Brothers, CBE, DSO, DFC, then a flight lieutenant on No. 32 Squadron, recalled the fatigue this imposed. It meant being woken at 0230hrs and landing back at Biggin Hill as late as 2230hrs. But he was a flight commander and that wasn’t the end of his day. The ground crews were as much a part of the squadron as the pilots, so he would visit them, probably taking a crate of beer, and tell them how the flight had fared. He made his first kill on May 19 over Dunkirk: a Bf 109.
Flights from eight other squadrons were sent for periods of a few days. Wing Commander F. W. ‘Taffy’ Higginson, OBE, DFC, DFM, was a flight sergeant on No. 56 Squadron when he landed at Vitry-en-Artois on the 17th for what turned out to be a brief but turbulent spell. On the first day he shot down a Do 17 and an He 111; on the next a Bf 110. On the 19th what was left of the flight moved westwards before the rapid enemy advance, to a temporary landing ground. He was ordered to return by road to Vitry and destroy any Hurricanes and petrol that remained. He drove there through a tide of refugees, to find the Germans so close that small arms fire was audible. His only means of destroying the three or four abandoned Hurricanes was to shoot holes in the petrol tanks with his revolver and throw a match at the vapour. It was not as easy as it sounded and as soon as he had the fires raging he dashed back to his own aeroplane, the only one left at the other field. He arrived in time to see a strange pilot clambering into the cockpit. His reaction was instantaneous, irrespective of the other’s rank. Taffy, a trifle under middle height, but a boxing champion and a tough rugger player, ‘. . . grabbed him by the collar and dragged him off the wing’, he remembers, and asked, ‘Where d’you think you’re going?’
‘To England,’ was the reply. ‘Not in my **** aeroplane, you’re not!’ said Taffy. Of the six pilots of No. 56 Squadron who had come to France, only two returned: Taffy Higginson and one other.
The fighter pilots who achieved high scores during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain modestly attribute the RAF’s victory to their comrades who grafted away day after day exactly as they themselves had done, repeatedly met the enemy and engaged in many combats, but had only two or three confirmed victories to show for it; some claimed none at all. Forty per cent of enemy aircraft destroyed were attributable to only five per cent of pilots.
Like the Poles, Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians before them, the British and French armies had been reeling back under the weight of the German avalanche of tanks and dive bombers, supplemented by a horde of conventional bombers and swarms of fighters. With the Allied soldiery, perforce, went their air forces, stumbling in the direction of the Channel coast.
The German General Staff had remembered, while the British and French had forgotten, the basic tactical lesson of the Great War: that air power is not merely a matter of numbers of aircraft; it is the power to establish air superiority applied to conquest. The nation unable to establish air superiority over the vital area must fail to frustrate the enemy’s major plans and cannot hope to influence decisively the course of the land battle to gain and hold territory. The British had proved in 1918 that they understood this, when the Royal Air Force was created as an entity independent of the Army, instead of a mere branch of it as the Royal Flying Corps had been. Trenchard, who had commanded the RFC in France, and Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, had learned that while one army can overcome another by attrition, the modern way must be first to blind the enemy by eliminating his aerial reconnaissance and then to defeat his bombers and fighters.
The Germans had blasted their way across Belgium and France along five parallel routes. From north to south, the 39th Panzer Korps under Schmidt, the 16th under Höppner, the 15th under Hoth, the 41st under Reinhardt and the 19th under Guderian had surged ahead at such speed that the British and French forces that had advanced into Belgium began retreating on May 16. On the 18th St Quentin and Cambrai were taken; Amiens and Abbeville fell on the 20th and German advanced units reached the Channel coast at Noyelles. From there the whole of Guderian’s attack turned northwards towards Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk.
Kain still figured in the headlines. On May 19 he accounted for a Ju 88, a Do 17 and a Bf 110; on the 20th an Hs 126 and, his 17th victory, a Do 17. By now he was one of the last two original pilots still with No. 73 Squadron, and was kept on to train new pilots before being sent to England on leave in early June. Taking off, he did a farewell slow roll over the airfield, crashed and was killed.
Clisby took his score to 16 by May 15, before being killed in action. Orton, who in one action fought 27 Bf 109s and took out two of them, had been credited with 15 confirmed kills and three strong probables before being shot down, burned on the face and returned to England by the end of the month. No. 87 Squadron, which had been marking time until May 10, soon produced some outstanding performers, one of whom was Flying Officer R. M. S. ‘Roddy’ Rayner. He opened his score with a Bf 109, an He 111 and a Do 17 on May 19 and went on to shoot down two more before being wounded in the leg and repatriated. He fought again in the Battle of Britain.
One of the least-known episodes of the air fighting over France occurred on June 5. At 1700hrs eight Dewoitines of Groupe 2/7 took off to patrol the d’Athis-Péronne area. Within 15 minutes 15 Bf 109s bounced them out of the sun. A bigger formation of 109s was covering the attackers. Warrant officer Ponteins was shot down in flames. Sergeant Bret broke away from an attack so violently that he suffered a severe heart lesion and barely managed to land. Second Lieutenant Louis was the next to go down in flames. Three others got away unharmed. Second Lieutenant Pommier Layrargues set his sights on a 109 and gave it a burst from 45 degrees off head-on. Bits flew off it and its pilot parachuted out and hid in a corn field but was seen by some infantry who caught him and took him to be interrogated.
He was the great Werner Mölders, who already had 25 confirmed victories and was destined to precede Galland as Commander of the Luftwaffe fighter arm. (The French Air Force records claim that he had 34 victories then, eight in France and the rest in the Spanish Civil War.) He asked to meet the pilot who had vanquished him, but Pommier Layrargues never knew how eminent was his adversary: he was killed in a fight with three Bf 109s a few minutes after having taken Mölders out. He was 24 years of age and considered to have a brilliant career in prospect. Mölders was in captivity for less than three weeks: France surrendered on June 22.
Some leading exponents of fighter combat and leadership who won fame in the Battle of Britain emerged from obscurity at this period. Douglas Bader, a flight commander on No. 222 Squadron, shot down his first Hun on June 1: a Bf 109 over Dunkirk. Also over Dunkirk, Robert Stanford Tuck, a flight commander on 92 Squadron, drew blood for the first time when he destroyed a 109 on May 23. A day later he added two Bf 110s to his score and on the next two Do 17s. He had a third share in a Do 17 on the 25th and destroyed an He 111 and a Bf 109 on June 2. A. G. ‘Sailor’ Malan, whom his comrades of the time regard as the outstanding leader in the Battle of Britain, shot down a Ju 88 and an He 111 on May 21, and a Ju 88, an He 111 and a Bf 109 during the next six days.
It is fitting at this point to pay tribute to the least-known fighter pilots and their air gunners who took a massive toll of the enemy over a period of a few weeks during the spring of 1940: the air crews of 264 Squadron, who flew two-seater Defiant fighters, that are always eclipsed by the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The first Defiant squadron, No. 264, commanded by Sqn Ldr Philip Hunter, a greatly liked and admired leader, had made a encouraging début on May 12 on a patrol near The Hague. A Ju 88 was seen over the sea, bombing two British ships. Hunter and two others went after it and Hunter’s air gunner, Leading Aircraftman F. H. King, shot it down. On May 20, 264 Squadron shot down 17 Bf 109s without loss and 11 Ju 87s and 88s which established an unbroken record for the number of aircraft destroyed by any squadron in one day.
The reason for this success, it appears, was that the enemy mistook the Defiant for a Hurricane. Bf 109 pilots thought they could attack it from astern with impunity but were disabused when the four guns in its rotating turret blasted them to oblivion. Bomber crews were unperturbed when a Defiant flew in front of them for the same reason and were equally astonished to find themselves under fire. The ideal attack by a Defiant was to cross ahead of its target at 90 degrees, so that the air gunner could swing his guns to point over the beam. The guns could not fire forward, so a Defiant was defenceless against a head-on attack.
On May 27 over Dunkirk 264 Squadron met Bf 109s for the first time. Seeing eight of these, Hunter ordered the squadron to form line astern. LAC King sent a 109 down in flames. Two other Defiants shared another 109 destroyed. The squadron landed, refuelled and returned to the Dunkirk area. This time they saw 12 He 111s of which they bagged three. By May 31 the squadron’s total victories stood at 65.
The evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force, and Allies, is one of the epic and best-recorded accomplishments of the war, and needs no full and detailed account here. The evacuation, mainly through Dunkirk, began on May 26 and continued under extreme pressure until June 4. Altogether 338,226 men were taken off the Dunkirk beaches to safety in Britain, among them 112,000 Frenchmen who wanted to keep on fighting. Remnants of the British and French armies fought on in France until the last were rescued from St Malo, Brest, St Nazaire, Nantes, Bayonne and St Jean-de-Luz by June 19.
No. 501 Squadron was the last of the RAF units to depart. It continued patrolling until June 18, first from Le Mans, then Caen and finally Dinard. On June 18 Ginger Lacey left France with five victories to his name.
What of the effect of those nine months of prelude to the Battle of Britain? At the outset the RAF had less knowledge of air fighting than the Luftwaffe, which had learned much in the Spanish Civil War. It returned from France enriched by new knowledge: the fighters’ guns were now harmonised at 250 yards (228m) instead of 400 (365m); the tight V formation was being abandoned in favour of the flexible pairs of the Luftwaffe; the set pattern attacks had been discarded and pilots had adapted themselves to the realities of action, in which the formations of attackers and defenders split into individual combats.
Dowding, who had resisted constant demands from the French and pressure from Churchill to base more fighter squadrons in France during May and June, had proved himself right and a Commander-in-Chief of genius. Park, from whose Group the majority of the fighters that were detached to France for one or a few days belonged, demonstrated his unequalled worth as a tactical commander, and the harmony between these two men, essential to Britain’s survival in the coming months, was made clear. The Battle of France was, in fact, a perfect rehearsal for the Battle of Britain.
Fighter Command, however, was weakened by the loss of many pilots and aircraft, but so was the Luftwaffe. The consequence of pilot casualties was that many British fighter squadrons were under-strength during the coming months, but the same applied to the Germans. Britain had the better of it in that her aircraft production under Lord Beaverbrook exceeded Germany’s, and losses of Spitfires and Hurricanes were made good more quickly than Messerschmitts were replaced.
The RAF’s morale had always been high and was even higher after its success against an air force that greatly outnumbered it. The morale of the Luftwaffe after Poland, Norway, Holland and Belgium had been hugely inflated by complacency, conceit and arrogance. Its experience in France left it severely shaken.
One final question remains: why didn’t Hitler invade Britain immediately he had sent the BEF and its accompanying RAF formations packing?
The answer seems to lie partly in the fact that he could not resist halting his advance at the coast in order to focus world attention on the signing of the French instrument of surrender. Another is his admitted reluctance to smash Britain because it would lead to the disintegration of the British Empire, to the benefit of the USA and Japan at the cost of German blood.
A third and highly convincing reason is that the Luftwaffe had never been properly equipped for such an operation and neither it nor the Army had been suitably trained, The Luftwaffe and Army generals were experts in Blitzkrieg warfare. They were tactical geniuses and brilliant exponents of land warfare conducted by the Army and Luftwaffe in cooperation. But an assault on the British Isles would have entailed strategic planning that was entirely strange to them: they were simply not up to the task. It is true that Holland and Belgium had been taken at devastating speed by the use of paratroops. But at that time Germany possessed only 4,500 of these, and by June 1940 this force had scarcely increased in size. It was far too small to take and hold an adequate area of southern England, let alone cope with the difficulty of transporting an invading army across the Channel, when the Royal Navy dominated the seas and would have seen the German Navy off in quick time. Anyway, barges towed at an average of four knots against a current that runs at times at five knots would have been at a ludicrous disadvantage even without a determined opposition.
The most convincing reason of all is clear to anyone who has read Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf. In it he declares that his mystical intuition always warned him that any war waged against Britain must end in disaster for Germany.