At the outbreak of war the Luftwaffe had 1,180 bombers, 366 dive bombers, 771 single-engine fighters and 408 twin-engine fighters, 40 ground attack aircraft and 887 for reconnaissance. With 552 transport aeroplanes, its operational force totalled 4,204 machines.
Considering the greatly increased complexity of airframe and engine design and manufacture since 1918, this was an impressive strength for an arm that the peace treaty at the end of World War I had reduced from some 20,000 aircraft to fewer than 5,000, for defence only. Moreover, until Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, this reconstruction had to be done in secret. The armistice terms were impracticable to enforce on a nation that had been one of the leaders in the development of military flying. Germany was free to develop a civilian aircraft industry and airlines, so took advantage of this obvious opportunity to train a new air force under cover.
At the Ministry of Defence General Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the Army Command, appointed former Luftstreitkräfte officers – future Luftwaffe Field Marshals, Albert Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle, and General Hans Juergen Stumpf among them – to deal with aviation matters. The Director of Civil Aviation at the Ministry of Transport was a wartime pilot and the two Ministries set about forming the nucleus of a reborn Luftwaffe. Manufacturers of civil aircraft and aero engines began to design and build also for military purposes. In 1920 State-financed gliding clubs began the instruction of new pilots and by 1929 had 50,000 members. Crews flying for Deutsche Lufthansa, the national airline formed in 1926 under the chairmanship of Erhard Milch, who had commanded a fighter Geschwader in World War I, were training for future service in the air force.
Russia allowed Germany to set up a flying school at Lipesk, 200 miles (322km) southeast of Moscow, where, from 1924 to 1933, hundreds of air and ground crews were trained. Germany also did development work on aircraft and equipment in Russia.
In 1933, Adolf Galland, at the age of 19, was typical of the young glider pilots who were selected for conversion to powered flight in Lufthansa and then went to Lipesk to train as fighter pilots. Next they went to Italy for further experience with the Italian Air Force. By now his course of 20 had each logged some 300 hours in aeroplanes and were keen to practise air fighting. ‘Instead’, he says, ‘the Italians, ignoring that we were already trained fighter pilots, concentrated on aerobatics.’ Young Galland and his comrades convinced their instructors that there was more to air combat than performing elegant arabesques in the sky. ‘But there was little the Italians could teach us about actually fighting.’ The time spent in Italy was nonetheless considered to be of great value. Galland says, ‘We had the all-important opportunity to fly modern types of Italian aeroplanes. In addition to aerobatics and general training, we did target practice with live ammunition, which we weren’t able to do in Germany.’
They returned to Lufthansa to fly multi-engine types, perfect their instrument flying and navigation and travel the international air routes.
Hermann Goering, who had joined the Nazi Party in 1922, was appointed Air Minister in 1930 with Erhard Milch, another wartime Geschwader commander, as his Deputy. Goering had shot down 22 Allied aircraft in World War I and, in 1918 as a Hauptmann, commanded Jagdgeschwader I, whose first leader was Manfred von Richthofen. In 1923 he was wounded in the groin during the Munich Putsch, suffered excruciatingly for years, took heroin to ease the pain and became a lifelong addict. The habit sapped his concentration, unbalanced his mind and distorted his judgment, much to the detriment of his air force.
In 1935 the Luftwaffe, now comprising 1,888 aircraft and 20,000 officers and men, came out of concealment. Milch became Secretary of State for Air and set about a vigorous expansion of the Service. The production of military aircraft accelerated and by late 1935 averaged 300 a month. Among the new types were the Bf 109 and 110, the Ju 87 and 88, the Do 17 and He 111, all of which would be unleashed against Britain five years later. The anti-aircraft artillery – Flak – and the balloon defence units had always formed part of the German Air Force and were now incorporated in the new expansion. A Signals Service was formed and the Air Force Staff College was founded.
The man who is regarded as the father of strategic air power was an Italian, General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), first commander of the Italian Air Force. One of his theories was that decisions about air strategy must be made before decisions about land strategy. Many of his principles, expounded in his best-known work, ‘The Command of the Air’, were adopted before and during World War II by the major powers. Germany and Britain were among those that shared the belief that the bomber would always get through, however numerous the opposing fighter force and anti-aircraft guns. Despite this, the Luftwaffe was deprived of a long-range heavy bomber capable of 12 hours’ endurance and carrying a 13,000 to 22,000lb (5,897 to 9,980kg) bombload.
In 1936 General Wever, a pilot and a man of outstanding talent, was appointed the first Chief of Air Staff. Among his plans was the manufacture of a large number of four-engine bombers. Milch also became a general in the Luftwaffe. His exceptional ability as an administrator, organiser and planner had always rankled with Goering, whose jealousy drove him to open hostility. In consequence, another figure of seminal importance in the supply of equipment to the German Air Force came to prominence. This was Generalleutnant Ernst Udet, who had scored 62 victories as a young fighter pilot in 1917–18 and was the most popular man in German aviation circles. Goering promoted him to replace Milch as chief of the Technical Department. Although the two men were close friends, Milch said of Udet, ‘Hitler recognised in him one of our greatest pilots, and he was right. But he also saw him as one of the greatest technical experts, and here he was mistaken.’ This was true: Udet was far out of his depth. He floundered about at the head of an enormous bureaucracy, while exercising inadequate control over aircraft production. He indulged his enthusiasm for the Bf 109 and dive bombers by equipping the Luftwaffe as a tactical rather than a strategic air force. This, linked to Goering’s irrational appraisal of every changing facet of Gemany’s air campaign against Britain, and Hitler’s insanity that led to wild decisions and the issue of orders based on ‘intuition’, was a major factor in the Luftwaffe’s defeat.
An equally disastrous flaw was that the only four-engine bombers were the Focke-Wulf Kondors: converted airliners, used only for maritime reconnaissance and attacking ships on the Atlantic; they carried a mere 4,600lb (2,086kg) bombload (RAF twin-engine bombers carried from 4,000 to 7,000lb (3,175kg). General Wever’s foresight had come to nothing (he had been killed in an air crash in June 1936). Two four-engine prototypes, a Dornier and a Junkers, were test flown soon after. Wever’s successor, Kesselring, told Goering that two four-engine purpose-designed bombers could be built for the same cost and factory space as three twin-engine bombers. Goering retorted that Hitler would ask how many bombers there were, not how big they were, and decided to limit the Luftwaffe to fast medium bombers and dive bombers.
July 1936 presented Hitler and Goering with a welcome chance to display the aggressiveness of the resurgent Luftwaffe. Civil war broke out in Spain between the Nationalists, an apology for Fascists, led by General Franco, and the Republican Party, which was a euphemism for Communists. Within a month, 85 German air and ground crew volunteers, 20 Ju 52/3m transport aircraft and six He 51A-1 biplane fighters arrived to support Franco. During October and November, 30 more fighters of the same type, with 400 volunteers who travelled by sea under the guise of ‘strength through joy’ tourists, joined them to form the Legion Kondor under the command of General Hugo Sperrle. They included pilots from III/JG134 and JG234, 132 (‘Richthofen’, later JG2) and 26. Sperrle returned home the next year on promotion to General of Aviators and was replaced by General Wolfram von Richthofen.
Among those who had their first experience of air operations in the Legion Kondor and profited greatly by it in enhancing their skill, were future fighter aces Wilhelm Balthasar (47 victories, 7 in Spain), Herbert Ihlefeld (130 victories, 7 in Spain), Walter Oesau (125 victories, 8 in Spain), Werner Mölders (115 victories, 14 in Spain), and Adolf Galland ( 104 victories, none in Spain; but a thorough education in air cooperation with infantry and armour). Mölders was destined to become General of Fighters in November 1940, with the rank of Generalmajor, at the age of 28. When he was killed a few months later, Galland, aged 29 then, replaced him.
The Spanish Civil War was immensely useful to the Luftwaffe in gaining expertise at fighter-to-fighter combat and perfecting the technique of close support for ground troops, which culminated in 1939 and 1940 with the Blitzkrieg. It was in this role that Hauptmann Galland (who, like all officers posted to Spain, had been temporarily promoted one rank) had his baptism of fire, as commander of Jagdstaffel 3 in November 1936. The enemy was equipping with American Curtiss and Russian Polikarpov monoplane fighters, which compelled the antiquated He 51s to be relegated to ground attack. They flew in formations of nine, each carrying six 22lb (10kg) bombs that they released from a height of 495ft (150m) before strafing with their twin 7.92mm Rheinmetall machine guns.
Ju 87 and Hs 123 dive bombers arrived in the closing months of 1937, to practise the terrorist tactics that would defeat Poland, the Low Countries, Norway and France, and fail against Britain.
In April 1938 Werner Mölders took over from Galland and two months later the Staffel re-equipped with the new Bf 109B. Now, it could cover the low-flying He 51s from attacking fighters. Mölders soon found that the classic formation based on close Vs of three aircraft was unwieldy. When opposing fighters met, they broke formation and fought singly. But a pilot on his own had no one to watch his tail and warn him of an attack from astern. So he devised a new formation of which the basis was a loose pair, called a Rotte. Two Rotten operating together became a Schwarm and tactical freedom of manoeuvre was paramount.
As fighter pilots returned home on completing a tour in Spain, they became instructors in the new fighter tactics. Mock combat was not limited to dogfights between single aircraft. Rotte would fight Rotte, Schwarm would fight Schwarm, and even a whole Staffel would take on another. This typically Teutonic thoroughness was of inestimable value: no other air force in the world practised in this manner. Attacks in Staffel strength were made against bomber formations, and the escorting of bombers was also practised. These exercises again were generally neglected by other nations.
While the RAF was accumulating a varied experience in the 1920s and ’30s, Lufthansa’s 120 aeroplanes were flying up to four million miles (6,437, 200km) a year, operating by night as well as by day: an excellent training for future night-bomber pilots and navigators. From 1935 all Lufthansa crews became Luftwaffe reservists.
When Hitler came to power on January 1, 1933, the German aviation industry’s output of aircraft averaged 31 a month. One year later Milch presented his production schedule for the next 24 months: 4,021 aircraft with which to lay the foundation for six fighter, six bomber and six reconnaissance Geschwader. These in turn would complete the operational training of newly fledged aircrew and ground staff. Although 25 types of aircraft were involved, by the end of 1934, 164 a month were coming out of the factories, to a total of 840 operational types; and by December 1935, 265 a month were being produced, of which 1,923 were for the Luftwaffe. In 1937 the monthly average reached 467. In 1938 it fell to 436. For the war that Hitler intended to provoke, a minimum of 700 a month was necessary. Under Udet’s incompetent direction, German aircraft production struggled to attain a monthly 691 in 1939.
Another of Douhet’s precepts, that Germany did not fulfil and Britain did, was ‘Modern war is an industrial war, in the sense that the troops are no more than the workers in an immense factory for the destruction of men and objects. The value of any army depends on the worth, the perfection and the number of machines it possesses . . . war is a game of economics . . . it is necessary to have means suitable to the end that one wishes to attain.’
In electronics, Germany was in some ways ahead of Britain. For Lufthansa’s benefit – and that of the future bomber crews it was training – night flying and blind flying aids had received more attention than in any other country. As early as 1926 there were 13 radio stations and a chain of beacons. In the 1930s airports began to install the Lorenz beam approach system. Although radar had been invented in Germany in 1904 and neglected until development was resumed 30 years later, General Wolfgang Martini, Director of Luftwaffe Signals, was ignorant of the superiority of British equipment until it was too late, during the Battle of Britain.
The first demand for radar, in 1934, was not made by the Luftwaffe but by the German Navy for gun ranging, target search and air surveillance. In 1936 the Luftwaffe began to examine radar as a means of aircraft detection and ordered a dozen 240cm, 125MHz sets that could read range and azimuth. They were codenamed Freya, after the Norse Venus who sacrificed her honour for a magic necklace guarded by Heimdall, the watchman of the gods who could see a hundred miles by day or night. In fact the Freya’s range was 75 miles (120km). The first experimental site was being set up on the North Sea coast when war broke out. In July 1939, 200 more were ordered. At the same time work began on a 53cm, 566MHz type, the Würzburg, of which 800 were eventually ordered for the Flak arm and began to be delivered during the Battle of Britain. Their range was only 30 miles (48km) but they could estimate height. Although German scientists were competent, there was no central coordination of their work and no liaison between the flying and anti-aircraft branches of the Luftwaffe.
The German listening service was comparable with Britain’s and as effective. Lacking a control and reporting system as ingenious and mature as the RAF’s, the Luftwaffe had to resort to passing information to fighters by radio from listening posts.
For the guidance of bombers a beam system had been developed from the Lorenz blind landing equipment, codenamed Knickebein – Crooked Leg. The bomber received signals from Germany on its 30MHz Lorenz beam-approach landing sets. A continuous note indicated to the pilot that he was following the beam accurately towards his target. If he drifted to the left he heard dots; to the right, dashes. An additional note – accurate only to within 1,640ft (500m) – warned that he was over the target and should bomb. For a nation that did not care how many civilians it killed as long as its bombs were somewhere near the target, it served well enough.
The Luftwaffe intelligence organisation, Abteilung (Department) Five, was formed on January 1938 under Major Josef Schmidt, who was neither a pilot nor a linguist. His equivalent in the RAF was Air Commodore Goddard – a pilot who knew German and French – a disparity in rank which indicates the relative importance that the opposing Services placed on intelligence. Schmidt relied heavily on information from Air Attachés, particularly Oberst Wenniger in London, with whom Goddard was on most friendly terms although always guarded. Schmidt used occasions such as the annual air display at Hendon and Empire Air Day for a sight of British aircraft and military airfields, and counted on the press for general information. He had the benefit of further airfield and target intelligence obtained from photographic reconnaissance by Heinkel 111Cs with civil markings, based near Berlin and ostensibly carrying out proving flights on potential new European civil air routes.
Before and during the Battle of Britain little could be learned from interrogating prisoners of war, as viritually all British aircrew who were shot down landed in England or behind the Allied lines in France. Once the RAF abandoned France, the Luftwaffe also lost the ability to glean new technical intelligence from the wreckage of downed enemy aircraft. The basic business of espionage was also most ineptly performed: the majority of spies who landed in Britain by sea or parachute were quickly caught.
Schmidt’s first summary of comparative effectiveness, in early 1939, was ill-informed. He described the RAF as ‘much out of date’ and Britain’s defences as ‘still weak’. German aircraft, he claimed, were superior, with their advantage in armament, armoured fuel tanks and flying instruments. He calculated that the RAF had 200 first-line fighters. The actual strength was 608. He made a better guess about bombers: 500, only 36 short of the real number.
In November he delivered a plan for the attack on Britain, in which he gave as priority targets ports and supply lines. He named London, Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow and Hull as the most important objectives: not only to destroy shipping but also dockyards, food warehouses and oil storage tanks.
On July 16, 1940 he submitted a comparative survey of Luftwaffe and RAF striking power, in which he assessed the British bomber force as 400 Hampdens, 350 Wellingtons, 300 Whitleys and 100 Hudsons. The Air Ministry’s weekly ‘State of Aircraft’ dated July 14 shows 96 Hampdens and 55 in reserve; 128 Wellingtons and 28 in reserve; 96 Whitleys and 56 in reserve; 105 Hudsons with a further 11 in reserve.
About the quality of senior RAF officers, he was as fatuous. They were, he alleged, badly out of touch with modern conditions of air warfare and no longer in flying practice. The truth was that RAF Wing Commanders and Group Captains commanding stations flew often. When war came many of them took part in operations. Air Vice Marshal Park went up in his Hurricane to see the air battle over France for himself. The Luftwaffe’s leadership at all levels was inferior to the RAF’s. The outbreak of war found Goering as Commander-in-Chief, with General Hans Jeschonnek as Chief of Air Staff.
Instead of functional Commands, the Luftwaffe was organised in Air Fleets, each of which comprised fighter, bomber and reconnaissance functions. The biggest tactical formation was a Geschwader (G), consisting of three Gruppen. Within a Gruppe (Gr) there were three or four Staffeln. The Staffel, the equivalent of an RAF squadron, numbered 12 to 16 aircraft and 20 to 25 pilots. The smallest element in a fighter Staffel was a pair, or Rotte; the smallest element in a bomber squadron, was three aircraft, a Kette.
Other formations, which had no fixed establishment, were: Fliegerkorps (Flying Corps); Fliegerdivision (Flying Division); Luftgaukommando (Air District Command).
The system for identifying Staffeln, Geschwader and Gruppen was somewhat convoluted. A Gruppe’s number was shown in Roman numerals, a Geschwader’s and Staffel’s in Arabic numerals.
Kampfgeschwader (bomber), was abbreviated to KG; Jagdgeschwader (fighter) to JG; Stukageschwader (dive bomber) to StG; Zerstörergeschwader (destroyer, i.e. heavy fighter) to ZG; Nachtjagdgeschwader (night fighter) to NJG; Aufklärungsgruppe (Fern), (reconnaissance long range) to Aufkl Gr (F); Küstenfliegergruppe (coastal) to Kü Fl Gr; Lehrgeschwader (operational training) to LG; Erprobungs (proving or test) to Epr. A ground attack or close support formation was suffixed Schlacht (battle).
II JG 26 meant No. 2 Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 26, 2 JG 26 meant Staffel No. 2 of Jagdgeschwader 26.
A Gruppe Kommandeur’s staff (Stab) was the Gruppe’s Headquarters unit (Gruppenstab) and included an HQ Flight (Stabsschwarm) of four aircraft, which he led on operations. A Geschwader Kommodore had a similar HQ unit and flight.