Before we can study the air fighting tactics of both sides during the Battle of Britain, we need to look at the state of the art during the high summer of 1940. One of the most important lessons from the air fighting of the Kaiser’s War was that the best formation for combat was the open abreast style, with a spacing of 50 or 60 yards (45-55m) between each scout, so that pilots could keep station with each other, fly near their leader without the risk of collision, search the surrounding sky against the possibility of surprise attack, and turn inside each other to face an astern attack. This formula, learned by both British and German pilots under the constant and unforgiving hammer of battle, was recorded in a thousand memoirs and memoranda, and seemingly lost with the cease fire. For when the Messerschmitts began to fight in Spain they flew in close wing-tip to wing-tip formation totally unsuited for combat because of the lack of manoeuvring space and the absence of cross-cover.
However, German fighter pilots like Werner Mölders and Adolf Galland soon realised that their close formations were vulnerable and they adopted a far better style of air fighting. This perfect formation – for it is still flown today – was based on the Rotte, the element of two fighters. Some 200 yards (180m) separated a pair of fighters, and the chief responsibility of number two, or wingman, was to guard his leader from attack; meanwhile the leader navigated and covered his wingman. The Schwarm, of four fighters, simply consisted of two pairs and was exactly the same abreast pattern as that devised by Oswald Boelcke, the leading tactician of air fighting in World War I, except that the spacing between aeroplanes had increased from about 60 yards (55m), the turning radius of Boelcke’s Albatros, to some 300 yards (275m), the turning radius of a Messerschmitt 109.
There was an important difference of principle, however, between the old and new formations, since the number of machines in the former varied between three and six, according to aeroplane serviceability, while in Spain the Messerschmitt pilots found that owing to their increased speeds, greater turning radii and the restricted view from their enclosed cockpits, especially behind, it was essential to build their formations around the smallest fighting unit, the pair, for a lone pilot was more vulnerable than ever before. Flying in this fashion, a Messerschmitt squadron of 12 fighters stretched some mile and a half (2.5km) across the sky, and each Schwarm flew at varying heights, so that the starboard group, deployed down-sun from the leader, could search into the sun and guard the rest from surprise attack. These staggered heights gave cross-cover in all directions, and also made the fighters far less conspicuous in the sky.
The Messerschmitts carried radio telephones and, for the first time, fighter pilots could receive and transmit clear and distinct speech. When he manoeuvred before attacking, Mölders could keep his team fully in the picture – a tremendous improvement over the previous methods when a leader signalled his intentions by rocking his wings or firing coloured lights. So far air fighting had been inarticulate. In Spain it became articulate; this made for better teamwork in the air, and closer control from the ground. For the air fighters it was a big step forward.
Victory for Franco ended the Spanish Civil War, and the Condor Legion returned to Germany, where the lessons of air warfare were carefully studied. The radius of action of the Messerschmitt 109 was considered insufficient, and drop tanks, which could be jettisoned before a fight, were ordered. The three light machine guns were found to be inadequate for modern air combat and the 20mm Oerlikon cannon was developed for the Messerschmitt. Experienced German fighter pilots thought the salient features of the ideal fighter to be (in order of precedence): a high speed and a good climb to engage, manoeuvrability to get out of trouble, fire power to knock down an opponent in a few seconds, and a good radius of action so that the fighter could be used offensively.
In Spain, for the first time in history, an army and an air force fought to a joint air-ground plan, where centralised control gave the Condor Legion such flexibility that it was able to concentrate its striking power and paralyse the opposing ground forces. General Wolfram von Richthofen, the driving force, had fashioned his command into a highly successful tactical air force and, once back in Berlin, he argued his case for more tactical air forces to fight not in air battles but jointly with the ground forces in air-ground battles. He was opposed by those high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe who foresaw that more tactical air forces would inevitably mean less resources for the strategic bomber force, but Richthofen so won the day that the Luftflotten were formed, consisting of bomber, reconnaissance, fighter and ground-attack squadrons.
Strategic bombing came to be regarded as a short-term and often short-range affair. Influenced by success in Spain, the German concept of modern war was for bombers to attack enemy airfields and industrial centres as the immediate prelude to air-ground operations, which would consist of great masses of armour rolling deeply into enemy territory, supported by fighters to cope with the remnants of an opposing air force, more fighters to scout ahead of and on the flanks of the armoured columns, dive bombers to reduce the ground opposition and attack all road and rail communications and to terrorise the civilian population, fighter-bombers to quarter and harass the surrounding countryside, taking out practically anything that dared move, paratroops to secure the flanks, and for all these violent, irresistible thrusts to be actively supported by Quislings and a Fifth Column. This was a new type of mechanised war, and it was known by a new and appropriate name – Blitzkreig: Lightning War.
On May 10, 1940, this combination of armour and aeroplane blasted through the Ardennes with such awesome power that Holland surrendered in five days, Belgium in a further ten days and France on June 17.
Now Hitler was master of Europe. German grand strategy depended on Operation ‘Sealion’ with which Hitler aimed to conquer Britain within the following few months. There would be massive attacks against the Royal Air Force, the Channel would be a major river crossing, and the German armies well supported by the Luftwaffe would, as before, carry all before them.
By the end of July, the Luftwaffe forces that were deployed to conquer Britain comprised some 2,600 aeroplanes, of which there were 120 bombers, 280 Stukas and 980 fighters, and they were based on operational airfields stretching from Norway to Brittany so that attacks against England could be made from this wide geographical arc. This was a formidable force, manned by experienced aircrews whose morale, flushed by their recent victories, was high. But as we shall see, it had three flaws – lack of a sophisticated radar system on the Channel coast, the very limited range of the Bf 109s and Goering’s appalling leadership.
What of its adversary – RAF Fighter Command?
Unfortunately, Fighter Command’s tactical training was based on the theory that the air threat to Britain would be hordes of German bombers flying in close formation and not escorted by fighters, since the Messerschmitt 109 could not reach our shores from airfields in Germany. Apparently those who assessed the threat did not take into account either more adjacent airfields becoming available to the Luftwaffe, or that Willy Messerschmitt might double the range of his angular-looking fighter by fitting long-range drop tanks under the fuselage and wings. Dog-fighting was considered a thing of the past, and rigid air fighting tactics were introduced which, by a series of complicated and time-wasting manoeuvres, aimed at bringing the greatest number of guns to bear against the bombers.
The RAF’s tactical unit was the tight vie of three fighters and using this as a basis the Air Fighting Establishment worked out six types of formation attacks against unescorted bombers on which training was based. For example, Fighter Command Attack Number Six was the prescribed drill when a squadron of fighters attacked nine bombers.
Having sighted the bombers, the squadron commander ordered ‘Sections astern, GO’ and closed to a position about 800 yards (730m) astern and slightly below the bombers. From here he ordered ‘Number Six attack, deploy, GO’, whereupon Yellow and Green Leaders took their sections to port of their flight leaders. The squadron commander then ordered ‘Number Six attack, GO’ and Red and Yellow Sections simultaneously attacked the starboard and port sections of the bomber formation. Care, said the manual, must be taken not to lose sight of adjacent fighters when firing. At the conclusion of the attack, the squadron commander ordered ‘Break away, GO’ whereupon sections dived away outwards from the bombers. Meanwhile, B Flight, having waited patiently in the queue, attacked after A Flight.
Some of the other prescribed attacks were even more complicated and time-wasting than Number Six, and all were based on tight vic formations and opening fire together, so that a wingman found it impossible to keep a good lookout and to watch both his leader and his target.
The rigid, outmoded vic of three was flown by Fighter Command throughout the Battle of Britain. Luftwaffe ace Galland thought that RAF fighters were at a great disadvantage because of their rigid formations. Although some squadrons discarded the time-wasting fighter attacks, my logbook records that in January of 1941, we of 616 Squadron were still practising those wretched attacks. Eventually in the spring of 1941, Fighter Command got back to a sensible style of air fighting, but the last words many a splendid fighter pilot heard were ‘Number . . . Attack, GO’.
In the summer of 1940, Fighter Command had good aeroplanes, a sophisticated radar system, an excellent chain of command and a highly respected leader of impeccable integrity, but our main weakness was our abysmal fighter tactics.
Dowding saw clearly that during the July attacks against shipping, Goering was far less interested in sinking ships than in bringing our fighters to battle and the hitherto invincible Stukas were the bait. But the Commander-in-Chief refused to be drawn by these attacks and only reinforced, when the need arose, our small convoy patrols of two or three fighters from his forward airfields. Indeed (Dolfo) Galland who had hoped for bigger battles over the convoys told me later how elusive our fighters seemed to be. Nevertheless because the sleek 109s, having no air brakes, could not stay alongside the steeply diving Stukas with their extended air brakes, the dive-bombers were very vulnerable when they pulled out of their dives and consequently received some harsh treatment from our fighters, who were always on the alert for a ‘Stuka Party’.
Unhappy with their lot, the Stuka pilots called for more and closer fighter escorts and so, after a month on the Channel coast, both Galland and Mölders were summoned to Goering’s estate at Karinhall where they were both decorated; but after this ceremony the Reichsmarschall let them know, in plain terms, that he was not satisfied with the performance of the Fighter Arm escorts and wanted to see a more aggressive spirit.
On August 12 Goering launched the type of attack Britain had most reason to fear when his bombers struck at five radar stations on the south coast. All suffered damage but only one was wrecked, and on the following day four radars were repaired and helped to identify German bombers at a range of 110 miles (177km).
August 13 saw heavy raids against our southern ports and airfields. The Luftwaffe ‘beehive’ attack usually consisted of one bomber wing of between 50 and 80 aeroplanes, escorted by a fighter wing with other fighters free-lancing on the flanks of the bombers. Sometimes two or more bomber wings joined together and, later during the Battle, more than one thousand aeroplanes – the largest formation ever assembled in the history of air fighting – joined together over the French coast and set course for the London Docks. Crossing the English coast this great German legion of bombers, Stukas and fighters formed a phalanx in the sky some 20 miles long, 10 miles wide (32 × 16km) and was stacked-up in layers from 21,000 to 33,000 feet (6,400-10,060m). As Al Deere aptly remarked, ‘It was like looking up the escalator at Piccadilly Circus’.
To try to shield the hard-pressed Stukas, it was decided that the proportion of escorting fighters to bombers should be doubled; in addition, a wing of 109s, called a reception escort, was to patrol in mid-Channel to protect the harassed Stukas, and free-lance fighter sweeps would trail their coats off Dover.
The high summer began to fade: July passed, and during early August it was time for Goering to take stock. Four weeks, sufficient time to conquer half Europe, had gone since the beginning of the Channel fighting and, although his bombers ranged over England almost every night, causing protracted air-raid alarms, some loss of production and a few casualties, Goering must have known that the daytime struggle was not going according to plan. The much vaunted Messerschmitt ‘Destroyer’ fighter, the 110, was proving a failure as an escort fighter, being vulnerable to the more manoeuvrable Spitfire and Hurricane, and 109s frequently had to help the twin-engined fighters out of a tight spot.
Visiting the Channel coast the Reichsmarschall could not understand how his all-conquering Luftwaffe, his hitherto shining sword, was losing its cutting edge, and vented his anger on the Kommodoren; the great man wanted closer, and more rigid protection for the bombers and rejected his fighter leaders’ thoughts about freedom of action for their fighters. There were more harsh words, but, as time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked the Kommodoren what they would like for their squadrons and, when Galland’s turn came, he half-jestingly made his famous and oftquoted remark: ‘I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group!’
During the following days, Luftflotte 2 attacked airfields in the southeast of England, Luftflotte 3 operated against the south, while Luftflotte 5 spread the RAF defences in the north-east. The majority of these attacks fell on targets within five miles (8km) of the coast, between the Solent and the Thames Estuary, where every airfield was attacked, regardless of whether or not it operated fighters, including heavy raids on the Coastal Command airfield at Gosport and the Fleet Air Arm bases at Ford and Lee-on-Solent. The airfields at Croydon, Detling, Eastchurch, Hawkinge, Lympne, Manston, Martlesham, Thorney Island and West Malling were attacked, sometimes frequently. Occasionally the Luftwaffe ranged well inland and bombed the flying training airfields at Brize Norton and Sealand, near Chester, the bomber airfield at Driffield in Yorkshire, the maintenance airfield at Colerne, and Fighter Command’s vital sector stations at Middle Wallop, Tangmere and Biggin Hill.
Kenley was hit by a low-level raid of nine Dorniers, followed immediately by a bombing attack from 12,000 feet (3,660m). The high attack was intercepted, and some bombers were brought down. However, the low attackers, who flew just above the tree-tops, reached their target without loss and proceeded to carry out some extremely effective low bombing and strafing, during which a Dornier was brought down by the ground defenders. In all about one hundred bombs were dropped on this sector station, which cratered the runways and destroyed hangars, workshops and sick quarters, badly damaged many other buildings, wrecked several fighters, lorries, refuellers and transports, and killed some personnel.
Between August 13 and 18 some 34 airfields and five radar stations were attacked and some, such as Manston and Hawkinge, were bombed several times. Raids on the forward airfields were often made by Stukas, which approached at their usual height, flew once round the circuit for a quick survey, peeled-off, and made steep attacks from the sun. Dorniers, and Junkers 88s, escorted by fighters, penetrated farther inland and released their bombs from medium altitudes.
In mid-August, owing to their heavy losses, the Stukas were temporarily withdrawn from the Battle. Concentrating against the twin-engined bomber raids, which usually came in between 11,000 and 18,000 feet (3,350-5,490m) according to cloud cover, RAF fighters exploited the gap of a few thousand feet between the bombers and their escorting Messerschmitts, and sometimes trounced the bombers before the higher 109s could interfere.
RAF fighter tactics were slowly improving and 54 Squadron were flying in a wider formation – still a vic of three but no longer wing-tip to wing-tip with about fifty yards (45m) between fighters; and the admirable ‘Sailor’ Malan, our greatest Battle of Britain pilot, was beginning to lead 74 Squadron in a more flexible line-astern formation.
As Fighter Command’s tactics gradually improved, enemy bomber casualties increased, and the bomber crews were highly critical of their Fighter Arm because they wanted their escorting fighters to fly close to the bombers where they could be seen. The Kommodoren of course, were totally opposed to such suicidal tactics, and the dispute once again came to Goering’s notice. He called Kesselring of Luftflotte 2 and Sperrle of Luftflotte 3 to Karinhall; thus on August 20 the Reichsmarschall issued more instructions about the conduct of the air battle.
A bomber wing had always to be supported by three fighter wings, he instructed, one of which would fly ahead and clear the target area, while the second and third carried out the duties of close escort and high escort respectively. But only part of the Fighter Arm was to be employed as escort to the bombers: the remainder were to fly free-lance operations so that they would engage British fighters on favourable terms and indirectly protect the bombers.
Whenever possible fighters were to attack RAF aircraft on the ground, and these low-level attacks were to be protected by other fighter formations. Attacks by single aircraft using cloud cover were to be flown only by highly trained volunteers. Fighter pilots were to pay less attention to the shooting down of balloons. New pilots, led by veterans, were to gain experience over the Channel before flying over England.
Luftwaffe stocks of twin-engined fighters were low, and they were only to be used when the range of single-engined fighters was inadequate or to cover 109s during their withdrawal. There must never be more than one officer in any crew.
No radar site, the Reichsmarshall instructed, had yet been put out of action, and the attacks were to cease.
Because of their limited range the 109s sometimes had to leave the bombers escorted only by the vulnerable 110s until the ‘beehive’ was met over the Channel by the reception escorts. Thus more bombers fell to the guns of RAF fighters, and their crews were far from happy: they foresaw heavier losses as the air battles moved farther inland, and their fears were justifted when, on August 26, 19 bombers failed to return from raids against Folkestone, the sector stations at Hornchurch, Debden, and North Weald and, once more, Portsmouth town and dockyard. Further, many bombers returning to France were well shot-up and several contained badly injured crews. Thus the recent ugly dispute about escort tactics again flared up, the bomber commanders alleging that the fighter pilots were failing in their clear and first duty to protect the bombers.
Goering supported the bomber commanders and ruled that in future the bombers would have close, high, and top fighter escorts – three fighters for every bomber – and the fighter escorts were ordered to fly closer to the bombers. This increased the gulf between Goering and his Kommodoren who firmly believed in Manfred von Richthofen’s doctrine . . . ‘The fighter pilots have to be able to rove in the area allotted to them in any way they like!’ The Kommodoren wanted freedom of action for their fighters – just as we had in the great daylight battles over Germany, later in the war. For the fighter must not wait until it is attacked – it must be used offensively where it can seek and destroy its opponents.
During the following days the bombers hammered at RAF sector airfields (Biggin, Hornchurch, Kenley, Northolt, North Weald and Tangmere) with their vital operations rooms and communications, and the Luftwaffe’s strong fighter formations made life much more difficult for RAF fighters.
Park’s squadrons usually fought singly because he did not have time to form his squadrons into wings. However, the genial Leigh-Mallory, with bases in Cambridgeshire, did have the time, and well-supported Douglas Bader’s strong views about meeting strength with strength. And so it was that Douglas, aching to get at the ‘Krauts’ (his words), often headed south from Duxford leading three, four and sometimes five fighter squadrons and inflicted much damage on the bombers.
This bombing of RAF sector airfields was the most critical phase of the Battle. Between August 24 and September 7 there were 33 major bombing attacks, and 23 were concentrated against the RAF’s vital nerve centres – the fighter airfields and sector stations of 11 Group whose job was to defend London and the south-east. By September 5 Park was reporting to Dowding that the damage by bombing was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of his group.
Thanks to their large fighter escorts the enemy bombers were getting through to RAF airfields and their casualties were reduced. During a four day period of fighting the RAF shot down 106 enemy aeroplanes, including a small proportion of bombers, and lost 101 fighter pilots.
During the first three days of September the bombing attacks, with packs of escorting fighters, continued and 90 enemy aeroplanes were shot down with the loss of 85 pilots. The total wastage in RAF fighter pilots was about 120 pilots each week. The RAF’s operational training units produced 65 inexperienced pilots each week and it was quite apparent to Dowding and Park that they were fighting a battle of diminishing returns. They realised that if the Luftwaffe kept up the pressure the control and reporting system would gradually disintegrate, and it would be only a question of time before the Germans dominated the air over southern England.
Fortunately at this time the conduct of the Battle changed. On the night of August 24/25 the first bombs fell on central London. Winston Churchill ordered a retaliation raid against Berlin, and during the next week there were four more. Hitler demanded immediate reprisals and shouted in an hysterical broadcast: ‘If they attack our cities, we will rub out their cities from the map. The hour will come when one of us two will break, and it will not be Nazi Germany.’
Goering eagerly responded and, late in the afternoon of Saturday September 7, sent over 372 bombers and 642 fighters to make two concentrated attacks against London in rapid succession. Dowding, however, anticipating daylight attacks against the capital, made more use of the big wings from 10 and 12 Groups, and Park instructed that whenever time permitted his squadrons were to be used in pairs.
The attacks on London and its suburbs continued with little respite from September 7 until October 5. It was the crux of the Battle and its turning point, for it gave Park the opportunity to repair his battered airfields and restore his communications.
On Sunday September 15, Goering provided the strongest escort so far, five fighters for every bomber, to try and saturate Britain’s defences. These big enemy formations took a long time to assemble; the RAF’s radars gave ample warning, and Park had the precious time to form his squadrons into wings and to ask for reinforcements from the flanking groups.
The defensive arrangements, so carefully tended throughout the long weeks of fighting by Keith Park, worked so well that the Biggin Hill Wing fought escorting 109s south of Canterbury, the Kenley Wing made a head-on attack near Maidstone, and two squadrons were in action over Gravesend. Nevertheless, the three German formations forged on and were met, over south London, by the North Weald Wing, who sorted out the bombers with surprisingly little interference from enemy fighters.
The Duxford Wing, big even by Teutonic standards, were next in action, but Bader had to delay his attack until some friendly fighters had cleared away; then, as carefully rehearsed, the three Hurricane squadrons went for the bombers while the two Spitfire squadrons held off the 109s.
Some bombs were dropped, but they did only little damage to property, an electricity station, and a bridge or two: an unexploded bomb lodged near Buckingham Palace. Thirty Germans were brought down at a cost of seven RAF pilots. The arithmetic was improving.
After a two-hour break, which gave the defending squadrons ample time to rearm and refuel, the Luftwaffe put in its second big attack, again consisting of three heavily escorted bomber formations which crossed the coast on a 20-mile (32km) front between Dover and Dungeness, within five minutes of each other. This time the radar warning was shorter, but nine wings and several independent squadrons came into action over south London, where there was some stiff fighting.
Once again, the defenders had the best of the exchange. There were fewer 109s than usual and these seemed less aggressive, so that some of the bombers were very roughly handled. Two formations were broken up near London – one retiring after a head-on attack by a lone Hurricane – and bombs were scattered over a wide area.
The Germans were harried by more Spitfires and Hurricanes as they withdrew. During this action RAF pilots claimed to have destroyed 59 bombers and 21 fighters at a cost of 11.
The fighting over London was at its height when about 20 Heinkels bombed Portland harbour. Only one squadron succeeded in intercepting, and that after the bombing. The final daylight operation was an attempt by 20 bombers to hit the Supermarine Works near Southampton, but the anti-aircraft gunners put up a heavy barrage and the factory was not damaged. At dark the bombers returned to London and continued their work throughout the night.
During this furious fighting the Luftwaffe lost 56 aeroplanes against 26 RAF pilots. More bombers struggled back to France, on one engine, badly shot-up, and with many crew members dead or injured. At the debriefings the bomber captains complained bitterly of incessant Hurricane and Spitfire attacks from squadrons that had long ceased to exist – if they could believe their own Intelligence and the Berlin radio.
The fighting on this day, September 15, clinched the victory, for two days later, on Hitler’s instructions, the German invasion fleet left the Channel ports for safer places, and Operation Sealion was called off, never to be repeated.
However, the offensive continued and again the bomber commanders complained bitterly about their fighter escorts, which because of the relatively slow speed of the bombers at 21,000 feet (6,400m), had to weave continuously to maintain the required close escort. This weaving sometimes took the fighters away from the bombers and once more Goering intervened with the absurd order that both Bf 109s and Bf 110s could not leave the bombers until they were attacked by RAF fighters!
As September drew to its close, there was another change of German tactics involving smaller bomber forces of about 30 Ju 88s escorted by between 200 and 300 fighters; but from the beginning of October enemy bombers operated only at night and the Blitz, in all its fury, was upon Britain. These raids, flown at great heights and taking every advantage of cloud cover, set Dowding new problems about high altitude interception, but they achieved little else, and Fighter Command continued along the path of recovery which had begun on September 7.
During his long tenure as Commander-in-Chief in the pre-war years, Dowding had recognised that radar would give him the ability to defend his island home and pressed hard to get the system completed before the inevitable war against Germany.
‘Stuffy’ Dowding’s pilots knew that behind that bleak and melancholy countenance was a man utterly devoted to his Command and his country. Few men in British history have shouldered such a burden of responsibility and he must be included in the great commanders of all time. His character and impeccable integrity flowed down the RAF’s simple chain of command, through the groups to fighting men in the squadrons, and to all those airmen and airwomen who laboured on the ground to service the fighters, and who manned the essential control and radar system. Dowding’s great qualities of leadership produced that priceless pearl, high morale, the most important single factor in the Battle of Britain.
Goering, unlike Dowding, had not done his homework. His Messerschmitt 109s should have had long-range tanks and he failed to realise the importance of radar. He cannot be blamed for Hitler’s order to attack London, but he did not conduct himself well with his harsh words and his ever changing orders which baffled and dismayed his fighting airmen.
Goering had been a drug addict and his integrity was, therefore, suspect. He was, according to ‘Dolfo’ Galland, and ‘Macky’, Steinhoff, something of a bully and when some of his more intrepid fighter leaders complained about his foolish tactical instructions he displayed the gangster-like methods which he and his evil cronies had used on their way to the top and threatened to have them shot – a habit not conducive to developing high morale. Indeed, the morale of the German Fighter Arm deteriorated as the Battle progressed.
And so the great battle was fought and won over the Channel, over the fields of Kent and Sussex, over the wolds of Hampshire and Dorset, over the flat marshes of Essex and the sprawling mass of London. Unlike the previous battles of destiny – Waterloo, Trafalgar, the terrible roar and devastation of the Somme bombardments – there was little sound or fury. People on the ground went about their business with little idea of what was taking place high in the sky. They saw a pattern of white vapour trails, slowly changing form and shape. Sometimes they saw the contestants as a number of tiny specks scintillating like diamonds in the splendid sunlight of those often cloudless days. The skilful parries of the defence continued throughout those long days of the late summer. Had they not done so London would have suffered the fate of Warsaw and Rotterdam.