The Battle of Britain is deemed by British historians to have begun on July 10 and ended on October 31, 1940. A clasp on the ribbon of the 1939–45 Star – indicated by a rosette when medal ribbons only are worn – was awarded to aircrew who served under the operational control of Fighter Command between those dates. But the four phases into which the battle is officially divided did not begin until August 8. This first phase continued until August 18. The second phase was August 19 to September 5, the third September 6 to October 5, and the fourth October 6 to October 31.
German historians see it differently. In the eyes of the Luftwaffe, the Battle opened on August 8, 1940 and did not close until May 11, 1941, with the 500-bomber raid on London on the night of the 10th/11th. Moreover, they consider that it was waged in five phases. But the period from February 9 to May 11, 1941 is regarded as an appendix to the main battle; a sixth phase. Thus the five phases proper, as seen by German historians, are defined as: August 8 to August 18 – Beginning of the All-Out Onslaught; August 19 to September 6 – Severest Fighter Combats; September 7 to October 5 – The Air Battle at Its Height; October 6 to October 31 – Fighters As Bombers; November 1, 1940 to February 8, 1941 – The End of the Air Battle.
That the battle had to be fought at all was a consequence of Hitler’s swift conquest of the Low Countries and France, on May 10, 1940, Germany had invaded Belgium and Holland and entered France on the 13th. On May 26 the British Expeditionary Force began to retreat from France. The bulk of the evacuation was completed by June 4, but the last British troops did not leave until the 17th. On that day the French Government asked Germany for surrender terms and on June 22 the armistice was signed. The last RAF squadrons based in France withdrew on June 18.
Before the battle came a brief breathing space for those already hard-pressed RAF fighter squadrons that had been fighting in French air space against heavy odds. Had Hitler launched an immediate invasion, treading on the heels of the departing British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the 112,000 officers and men of the French Army who accompanied them, he might have established a foothold on the south coast of England, even if it were only temporary. But he would have had to put an immense naval force at risk to protect his invasion fleet and to pound the Kent or Sussex shore. He would have had to cross at or near the Straits of Dover, to make the passage as short as possible. He would have had to concentrate the whole weight of his assault on only one or two points for it to be effective.
Hitler did not, for many reasons which are given elsewhere. Two of them were that he believed Britain, under a pusillanimous and appeasing Prime Minister, was too weak in both military strength and morale to fight, so would sue for peace. Another was that he could not resist showing off his victory ostentatiously to the world: hence the several days’ delay while he staged a vulgar, tawdry armistice ritual at Compiègne, when he should have been on a clifftop near Calais, watching his army, navy and air force trying to hammer Britain into surrender. In any event, the Royal Navy would have sunk a great part of an invasion fleet in those narrow waters, while the RAF’s Bomber and Coastal Command aircraft, however exiguous the protection that the grossly outnumbered Fighter Command could afford them, would have accounted for as many again.
The air battle did not suddenly burst upon Britain on July 10, 1940, without any preliminaries. The Luftwaffe was not entirely inactive during this lull. It had made its first large-scale raids on the night of June 18, when 100 bombers attacked targets between Yorkshire and Kent. A South African Flight Lieutenant, A. G. Malan of No. 74 Squadron, considered by his fellows to be the outstanding personality in the Battle, an exceptional pilot and gifted leader, was flying a Spitfire that night and shot down two bombers that were caught by searchlights. The next night, 100 bombers raided targets in southern, eastern and northern England, and south Wales. On seven more nights that month mainland Britain felt the impact of German bombs on the eastern counties, the Midlands, the south-west and west of England, south Wales and Scotland. On two successive nights, June 25 and 26, the defending pilots, groping their way about in the dark, flying aeroplanes designed for day fighting, and relying on their eyesight and searchlights to pick up a target, shot down three raiders. On June 28 the Channel Islands were bombed.
The Luftwaffe made its first daylight raid on July 1, on Hull, in Yorkshire and Wick, in Scotland and repeated this performance on the next two days. On July 3 the RAF brought down six bombers. On July 4 Portland was the target, again in daylight. Some small ships were sunk or damaged, buildings battered and civilians killed. On July 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 many parts of Britain suffered day and night raids during which slight damage was done to ports and factories and more people were blown apart. Aircraft on both sides were destroyed; not always a mere few – on July 8 the RAF shot down eight for the loss of three.
Now the most intensive aggression against Britain was about to be unleashed. Its objectives were:
1. The blockade of the British Isles in co-operation with the German Navy: attacks on ports and shipping, and the mining of harbour entrances and sea lanes.
2. The achievement of air supremacy as a preliminary to the invasion.
3. Annihilation of Britain by total air warfare.
It is salutary at this point to consider what would have been the consequences if this final objective had been attained. Among all the admiration and respect that has been expressed by former enemy airmen for each other, the much vaunted chivalry shared by the opposing air forces, and the general forgiveness and friendliness that have burgeoned in the half-century that has passed since the Battle, it should never be forgotten that victory for Germany in the Battle of Britain would have meant victory in the war.
RAF Fighter Command, Anti-Aircraft Command, the Observer Corps (later Royal), the Fire Service, the Civil Defence, were all fighting for the lives of their compatriots, men, women and children, and the freedom of future generations: generations of Britons who would never have been born if the Luftwaffe had had its way.
The following is a day-to-day diary of the immense struggle Britain underwent against tremendous odds during those summer months of 1940.
Wednesday, July 10: Rain over most of Britain. Showers south-east England and Channel.
Day: RAF No. 11 Group began detaching whole squadrons instead of flights to forward airfields at first light. Enemy dawn weather reconnaissance, and tactical reconnaissance during morning. A few inconclusive interceptions. Enemy activity heavier than usual. By 1330hrs some 20 Do 17s, 20 Bf 109s and 30 Bf 110s forming up in Calais area seen on radar. These attacked convoy escorted by six Hurricanes off Dover. Four more squadrons sent reinforcing Hurricanes. One ship sunk, three Hurricanes and four Bf 109s shot down. Near Newhaven, train attacked, driver killed. Seventy-bomber raid on Falmouth and Swansea killed 30, damaged ships, railways, power station and ordnance factory. RAF station Martlesham Heath in Suffolk slightly damaged.
Night: Scotland, south-east and east coast raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 6, Luftwaffe 13.
Thursday, July 11: Overcast in south, bright intervals and thunder elsewhere.
Day: Early morning, radar reported three formations approaching convoy off Dorset. Six Hurricanes ordered to intercept while six Spitfires covered ships. None sunk. Late morning, Douglas Bader scored his second victory, his first in the Battle of Britain. Taking off in rain and poor visibility to investigate an unidentified aircraft, he found it, recognised it as a Dornier 17, opened fire and last saw it disappear into cloud. Five minutes after he landed, the Observer Corps reported having seen the Do 17 crash into the sea, Early afternoon, six Hurricanes arrived at Portland while 15 Ju 87s, escorted by 30-plus Bf 110s, were bombing. Two Bf 110s destroyed. Afternoon, six Spitfires intercepted 12 Bf 109s off Deal, escorting Heinkel 59 seaplane, with Red Cross marking, on air-sea rescue, and shot down the He 59, which beached near Deal. Two Bf 109s and two Spitfires shot down. Afternoon, six Hurricanes attacked 12 He 111s and 12 Bf 110s over Isle of Wight.
Night: Bombs on Portsmouth, eastern and north-western England.
Aircraft Losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 11.
Friday, July 12: Cloudy, some thunderstorms.
Day: Bombers over convoys off Orfordness, Suffolk and North Foreland, Kent. Three Defiants and nine Hurricanes protected convoy off Suffolk while 12 Hurricanes went for attackers. Spitfires shot down a He 111 near Aberdeen. Small raids intercepted over wide area. 11 Group reinforced by moving 152 (Spitfire) Squadron from Acklington, Northumberland to Middle Wallop, Hampshire.
Night: South Wales and Bristol attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 6, Luftwaffe 8.
Saturday, July 13: Poor after early fog cleared.
Day: Weather kept down scale of enemy effort. Two raids on Dover thwarted but two convoys off Harwich and ships at Portland bombed.
Night: Thames Estuary mined.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 7.
Sunday, July 14: Fair
Day: Germans evidently using Red Cross seaplanes on convoy reconnaissance. British Government therefore announced that these were no longer immune from attack. Start of six days of reduced enemy activity. Morning, bomber’s attempt to hit a destroyer off Swanage failed. Convoy near Dover damaged.
Night: Bombers over west, south, south-east and east England.
Aircraft Losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 2.
Monday, July 15: Low cloud and heavy rain.
Day: Small raid damaged Westland Aircraft factory and runway at Yeovil in Somerset. Light force of Do 17s prevented by Hurricanes from hitting Channel convoy. At St Athan, south Wales, airfield cratered. Railway lines near Avon-mouth, Somerset, hit.
Night: No bombing, some mines laid.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 3.
Tuesday, July 16: Foggy in Channel, south-eastern England and northern France.
Day: Convoys off southern and eastern English and north-eastern Scottish coasts, and Westland Aircraft harassed when weather lifted a trifle.
Night: Minelaying in north-east England.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 5.
Major Josef Schmid, chief of Abteilung (Department) V, the Intelligence Service, submitted to Hitler a document entitled, ‘A Comparative Appreciation of the Striking Power of the RAF and the Luftwaffe’. In this he stated that the British had 900 first-line fighters, of which 675 could be considered fully serviceable. Not a bad estimate: the actual number available on an ideal day was 587. Schmid was less accurate when he wrote, ‘Taking into account both their combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannon, the Hurricane and the Spitfire are both inferior to the Messerschmitt 109.’ But right in adding, ‘The Messerschmitt 110, however, is inferior to the Spitfire . . .’, although his proviso, ‘if the latter is well piloted’ was nonsense. He concluded that the odds favoured the Luftwaffe ‘so long as the large-scale operations are begun early enough to permit the exploitation of the relatively favourable meteorological conditions of July to early October.’
Hitler issued an order, Directive No. 16, that a landing operation against England must be prepared. This was code-named Operation Sealion.
Wednesday, July 17: Rainy and dull.
Day: Bad flying conditions hindered even the daily weather and tactical reconnaissance sorties. In the afternoon bombers molested shipping off eastern England and Scotland.
Night: Mines sown off the Welsh coast at Swansea and Cardiff and in the Thames. A few bombers over south-west England.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 2.
Thursday, July 18: Cloud over eastern Channel, showers in southern England. The Goodwin lightship was sunk and bombs fell on the St Margaret’s Bay (Kent) coastguard station. Uncoordinated incursions against shipping in the Channel and harbours on its coast led to one major engagement when 28 Bf 109s were intercepted by 15 Spitfires.
Friday, July 19: Fair in the Channel. Bright intervals between showers elsewhere.
Day: 20 Bf 109s bounced 9 Defiants (two-seater with four-gun turret) of No. 141 Sqn and shot 5 down into the Channel, and one at Dover before 12 Hurricanes drove them off. In the afternoon some 70 enemy bombers with fighter escort attacked Dover and were intercepted by 35 Hurricanes and Spitfires.
Night: Sporadic raids on Harwich, Thames Estuary and Plymouth – Isle of Wight area.
Aircraft losses: RAF 11, Luftwaffe 2.
Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag appealing to Britain to surrender and threatening that continued resistance would mean her complete destruction. Goering held a conference with the Commanders of Luftflotten 2 and 3, and their Air Corps commanders. He told them, ‘Fighting alone all these weeks on the Channel Front, Jagdgeschwader 51 has already shot down 150 of the enemy’s aircraft: quite enough to have weakened him seriously. Think now of all the bombers we can parade in the English sky. The few RAF fighters will not be able to cope.’
Saturday, July 20: Cloudy at first over Straits of Dover, followed by bright intervals and sunny afternoon in the south. Some thunderstorms elsewhere.
Day: In the afternoon, Sergeant J. H. ‘Ginger’ Lacey, who had scored five victories in France and was destined to be the top-scoring RAF pilot in the Battle of Britain, made his first kill of the Battle and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Medal. His squadron, No. 501, was scrambled from Middle Wallop, in Hampshire, to intercept Ju 87s, escorted by Bf 109s, attacking a convoy which the sector controller said was near Jersey. They found it half-way between there and Portland Bill. Lacey picked on a 109 that was heading towards him, turned inside it, gave it three bursts while following it through its desperate attempts at evasion and recalls: ‘I can clearly remember watching him slanting down the sky at a hell of a steep angle. A beautiful little blue and grey mottled aircraft with white and black crosses standing out startlingly clear, getting smaller and smaller; and thinking what a terribly small splash he made when he went straight into the Channel.’ Lacey spotted another 109 and thought, ‘Well, he’s making a fool of himself. He’s going due north. He’ll have to turn any moment now, and then I’ve got him.’ ‘Then,’ he says, ‘as his turn continued, I thought for one awful moment that he was going to crash into me. Then I suddenly saw the aeroplane almost stagger as my bullets hit it. Its propeller started to slow down. We flashed past each other a few feet apart. By the time I had whipped round, “Pan” Cox latched onto it. He didn’t fire until he was in to about 20 yards (20m). It went in almost beside the oily patch where my first had gone in. I put no claim in for the half-share, because it was Pan Cox’s first success.’
Night: Mines laid along the east coast. In the west, from the Isle of Wight to Cornwall and the Bristol Channel.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 9.
Sunday, July 21: Fine at first, becoming cloudy, then fine in the evening.
Day: Raids on convoys in the Channel during one of which three squadrons drove off 20 Ju 87s and Bf 109s.
Night: Merseyside bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 6, Luftwaffe 7.
Hitler summoned his Commanders-in-Chief to consider plans for an invasion. The Army would not guarantee success unless the Navy transported 40 Divisions across the Channel. The Navy accepted responsibility for only 10.
Generalfeldmarschall Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, condemned this as suicidal. Goering declared that, given five days of good weather, he could do such damage to the RAF that 10 Divisions would suffice. On this assumption, the meeting settled details about logistics; and the administration of a subjugated Britain, down to the value of currency (£1 to equal 9.60 Marke). And it was now that the decision was taken to remove forcibly all British males between 17 and 45 to exile. But Hitler still seemed to have doubts. ‘The invasion of England is a specially audacious venture. Although the crossing will be short, we are not contending with a river, but the open sea controlled by a well-prepared enemy,’ he warned.
Goering sent for newly-promoted Field Marshals Kesselring and Sperrle, commanding Air Fleets 2 and 3 and ordered them to make plans. They in turn similarly charged the commanders of their Air Corps. There was general agreement that first must come the demolition of the RAF.
Monday, July 22: Fair in the Dover Straits, cloudy down-Channel. In eastern England, showery with bright intervals.
Day: Light attacks against ships in the Channel.
Night: Mines sown between Kent and north-east Scotland.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 1.
Tuesday, July 23: Dover Straits hazy, cloud and intermittent rain elsewhere.
Day: Little activity. Ships off east coast attacked.
Night: A few bombers inland. Minelaying, eastern England and Scotland.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
That night ‘Ginger’ Lacey flew a night patrol. ‘After being vectored all over the sky by the controller, I unexpectedly saw a Heinkel 111 caught in the searchlights some two miles (3km) ahead and slightly above, so started to climb after it. Immediately some of the searchlights switched to my Hurricane.’ (Pilots identified themselves by flashing the Letters of the Day, if they were fighters, and bombers fired Verey light Colours of the Day.) Lacey flashed the letters he had memorised on his downward light. The Heinkel fired a red light followed by a green. ‘To my surprise, the rest of the searchlights holding the hostile aircraft also switched over to me.’ Ten seconds later the anti-aircraft guns opened up at him. Blinded by searchlights, in danger of being shot down, he lost the He 111. On landing, he says, ‘I found that the time was past midnight, when the Colours and Letters of the Day had changed. I had flashed the wrong identification and the Germans had fired the right one: whether because enemy intelligence was superbly accurate, or by sheer fluke, who knows?’ Night patrols flown by single-seat fighters with no radar were extremely lucky to find enemy aircraft.
The expected attempt at invasion, and the increased danger to shipping in the Western Approaches since enemy occupation of France, meant the bulk of Britain’s sea traffic would have to travel up and down the east coast. Convoy movements in the Channel by daylight were restricted. The increased provision of convoy patrols imposed a demand on Fighter Command that could be met only by forming more squadrons. Until the necessary strength was attained, an adequate number of fighters must be kept for the defence of London, while others were moved about the coast as required.
Wednesday, July 24: Fog spreading across the country from the west. Clouds over the Channel.
Day: An unexpected interval of fair weather gave Adolf Galland – promoted to Major on July 18 – the opportunity to lead his Geschwader in action over England for the first time when they escorted bombers on a raid against a convoy in the Thames Estuary. Flight Lieutenant Alan Deere led a section when No. 54 Sqn was scrambled to intercept. At 20,000ft (6,700m) they saw that a second mass of enemy aircraft was attacking another convoy, near Dover. On instructions from the ground, the squadron split and sent one flight (two sections) to tackle each enemy formation, while reinforcing fighters were ordered off. Galland reports, ‘We made a surprise attack with height advantage. I glued myself to the tail of a Spitfire and during a right turn managed to get in a long burst. It went down almost vertically.’ He saw the pilot bale out and crash to his death in the water when his parachute failed to open. His comment in retrospect was, ‘On landing, we were no longer in doubt that the RAF would prove a most formidable opponent.’
At Brooklands, where the first flight in Britain was made, in 1909, and which became the cradle of British aviation, there was a small aircraft factory. A solitary Ju 88 joined the circuit with several aeroplanes that were landing there, and bombed the buildings but did little harm.
Night: No activity.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 8.
Thursday, July 25: Mist in Straits of Dover, elsewhere fine.
Day: The Germans now had some radar on the Channel coast. This morning it picked up 21 merchant ships with two armed trawlers as escort off Southend. The mist cleared as they entered the Straits. Sixty Ju 87s, escorted by Bf 109s led by Galland, attacked. They sank five and damaged five. Two destroyers that went out from Dover were also bombed and both hit. Two New Zealanders, Flight Lieutenant Alan Deere and Pilot Officer Colin Gray (who ended the war as New Zealand’s most highly decorated pilot and top scorer with 27½ kills) were among five Spitfire pilots scrambled to intercept. A squadron of Hurricanes arrived later. Galland reported, ‘In the space of about fifteen minutes I saw four fighters hit the sea and one pilot parachuting.’ Other Channel shipping was attacked during the day.
Night: Reconnaissance west of England and Channel, mines laid Thames and Firth of Forth.
Aircraft losses: RAF 7, Luftwaffe 16.
Friday, July 26: Rain and thick cloud.
Day: Ships off Isle of Wight and in Channel bombed, some sunk.
Night: Mines laid Severn, east coast and Thames.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 2.
Saturday, July 27: Fair in Dover area, Channel cloudy, eastern England and Midlands rainy.
Day: Dover harbour bombed twice. Bf 109s used for the first time as fighter-bombers, ships in Channel attacked. Air Ministry directed Fighter Command to send fighters in greater strength than the enemy’s to intercept raids on Dover. This necessitated increasing the number of fighter squadrons to 28. Plymouth, Wick (Scotland) and Belfast bombed.
Night: South-west England raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 4.
Sunday, July 28: Fine at first, deteriorating.
Day: Two abortive raids on Dover. One turned back in mid-Channel; the other, comprising 50 bombers and 50 fighters, was intercepted and driven off by two Hurricane and two Spitfire squadrons. Ports on south coast and Dover raided.
Night: Bombers over western and northern England, Midlands, Scotland and Wales, mines laid along east coast.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 15.
Monday, July 29: Misty in Straits of Dover, otherwise fair.
Day: Raid on Dover and convoy by 30 Ju 87s and 50 Bf 109s intercepted and foiled. Attack on Harwich intercepted.
Night: Light raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 6.
Tuesday, July 30: Low cloud and light rain.
Day: Weather precluded much enemy activity. Convoys off Essex and Suffolk coasts raided.
Night: Bombers over Midlands and south Wales.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 5.
Hitler ordered Goering to be ready to start main assault at 12 hours’ notice, but he asked for more time.
Britain initiated a respite in the scale of fighting over the Channel by sending no convoys through there for the next few days. The Luftwaffe’s priority was to destroy the RAF’s fighter force as a preliminary to wiping out aerodromes and the bomber force, which was essential before an invasion could be attempted. But with no convoys to protect, RAF fighters were not aloft to be drawn into combat by the Luftwaffe. Galland and his comrades constantly trailed their coats over England but Fighter Command would not respond. The Germans resorted to sending out a weak bomber force as a decoy for a strong fighter formation waiting at high altitude under Galland’s command, but failed to lure Dowding. Galland expressed considerable frustration over this period.
Wednesday, July 31: Generally fair, but mist in Channel.
Day: Convoys off south-west, south and south-east England, and Dover balloon barrage, raided.
Night: Mines laid. Bombs on Thames Estuary and south Wales.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 5.
Hitler informed Generalfeldmarschal von Brauchitsch, the Army C-in-C, and Generalfeldmarschal Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, Goering and General Jeschonnek, Chief of Air Staff, that he intended to attack Russia that year. ‘With Russia defeated,’ he said, ‘Britain’s last hope will be gone.’
Meanwhile the German Navy and Army had been arguing acrimoniously about Operation Sealion. Hitler had decreed that ‘The landing operation must be a surprise crossing on a broad front from Ramsgate to a point west of the Isle of Wight.’
In what manner he supposed that a surprise could be sprung on the British is obscure. The few hours of darkness on a summer night would not have been enough to conceal the approach of a fleet of over 2,000 tugs towing barges at a speed of some four knots. Nor would the other vessels have gone undetected. The shortest crossing would have taken perhaps five hours, the longer ones up to three times as much. Add to that the propensity for soldiers to succumb to seasickness, amply demonstrated during many landings later in the war; a quarter of those who got ashore would not have been fit for combat.
Plans, he demanded, must be complete by the end of August and the invasion carried out by September 15. The Army had compromised by making such a massive reduction in the estimated size of the necessary force that the grasp of reality displayed by its Generals must have caused the Admirals and Air Generals some dismay. But in an autocracy, where seasoned professionals had to bend to the whims of an unqualified dictator or lose their livelihoods at the least and their lives at the worst, these shifts of attitude were an obligation. The Army had reduced its requirement to 13 Divisions; but insisted on a broad front of 200 miles (320km) from Ramsgate to Weymouth. The Navy would not agree to more than a 50-mile (80km) front, from Dover to Eastbourne. The Army wished to land 90,000 men and 650 tanks on the first day. The Navy agreed but said that carrying the remaining 170,000 men and 34,000 vehicles would take two or three days. The Army demanded swifter transportation. The Navy claimed that assembling 155 ships, 470 tugs, 1,700 barges and 1,000 motorboats must delay the invasion until some time between September 19 and October 15. The autumn weather made this unacceptable to the Army and the Luftwaffe. The wrangling dragged on ...
Thursday, August 1: Channel and Dover Straits overcast, improving later, low cloud over east coast, fair generally.
Day: Two bombers off east coast intercepted. Two raids intercepted off Sussex coast; Norwich bombed, goods yard hit.
Night: Minelaying north-east Scotland and Thames. Bombers over widely separated parts of England, Scotland and south Wales, many of them dropping leaflets headlined ‘The Last Appeal To Reason’, a translation of Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on July 19 when he had appealed to Great Britain to sue for peace.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 5.
Hitler issued Directive No. 17, in which he said: ‘I have decided that war against Great Britain will be pursued and intensified by sea and by air with the object of bringing about the country’s final defeat.
1. The Luftwaffe must deploy its full strength in order to destroy the British air force as soon as possible.
2. When command of the air has been achieved, even on a local or temporary basis, the air attack will be directed against the ports and special attention will be given to food depots, particularly those that serve London.
3. Attacks on shipping, whether naval or merchant, will be accorded a priority second only to the efforts directed against the destruction of the enemy’s power in the air.’
The order went on to define how the objective was to be achieved . . .
First the aircraft, then their ground support organisation and fuel supplies would be destroyed. Afterwards the aircraft industry, including the factories producing anti-aircraft weapons would be attacked.
The intensification of the war in the air should begin on August 5, but the Luftwaffe General Staff would determine the exact date nearer the time, and bearing in mind the state of combat preparedness of men and aircraft and the vital long-range weather forecasts.
Friday, August 2: Cloud and drizzle in Channel, elsewhere fine.
Day: East coast and Channel convoys attacked.
Night: Bombers over RAF School of Technical Training, Halton (Buckinghamshire), Catterick (Yorkshire), Farnborough (Hampshire) and Romford (Essex) airfields, and Forth Bridge, in Scotland, Mines laid.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
Goering issued orders for Adlertag, Eagle Day, the day on which both Luftflotten 2 and 3 would begin the all-out – and, it was intended, final – air assault on Britain. The first objective was to destroy the whole Fighter Command organisation: aircraft in the air and on the ground, airfield buildings and landing areas, and radar stations. This was expected to take three days, so 72 consecutive hours of fine weather were essential. The meteorological experts predicted that these would occur at the beginning of August. But the air fleets needed six days’ preparation, so August 10 was the chosen date.
Saturday, August 3: Dull with bright intervals.
Day: No ships in the Channel, so no dive bombers to try to lure RAF fighters into battle.
Night: Raids on Bradford (Yorkshire), Crewe (Cheshire), Liverpool (Lancashire), south Wales, Orkney, Firth of Forth.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 4.
RAF Fighter Command strength at this point was 708 aircraft serviceable, 1,434 pilots.
Sunday, August 4: Fair to fine, becoming cloudy. Bright intervals.
Day: Bristol Channel and south coast reconnoitred.
Night: No raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 0.
Monday, August 5: Channel misty, otherwise fine.
Day: Enemy patrolling Channel in strength to seek shipping.
Night: Mines laid east coasts England and Scotland.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 6.
Tuesday, August 6: Cloudy.
Day: Reconnaissance over Channel.
Night: Mines on east and south-east coasts.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 1.
Wednesday, August 7: Fair, some thunder and cloud.
Day: East coast convoy attacked, shipping reconnaissance over Channel.
Night: Bombers over many areas of England and Scotland.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 4.
Thursday, August 8: Clouds over Channel. Generally showery with bright intervals.
Day: At 0900hrs, Ju 87s and Bf 109s attempted an attack on convoy of 20 ships in Channel met by six Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. Second raid by 60 Ju 87s at 1245hrs approaching Isle of Wight in battle with 4½ RAF squadrons. At 1700hrs, over 80 Ju 87s and Bf 109s made third attack. Seven RAF squadrons in position to intercept them.
Photographic reconnaissance of southern harbours and airfields.
Night: Minelaying and small bomber raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 19, Luftwaffe 31.
RAF Order of the Day promulgated: ‘The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Members of the Royal Air Force, the fate of generations lies in your hands.’
Goering confirmed August 10 as Adlertag.
Friday, August 9: Cloudy in Channel, rain between bright intervals.
Day: East coast convoy attacked, sporadic raids inland, Sunderland shipyard hit.
Night: Minelaying and attacks on east coast shipping.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 5.
Saturday, August 10: Channel cloudy, thunderstorms, windy, bright patches.
Day: Norwich bombed. Reconnaissance inland and over coastal waters.
Night: Minelaying.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 0.
Weather forced postponement of Adlertag by 24 hours.
Sunday, August 11: Cloudy, but fair morning.
Day: By 0700hrs, No. 74 Squadron was on patrol, led by Squadron Leader Malan, They met two formations of 15-plus Bf 110s and Bf 109s attacking Dover balloon barrage. A second attack on the same target was a diversion while 150 Ju 88s, He 111s, Bf 110s and Bf 109s raided Portland naval base. Five Hurricane and two Spitfire squadrons scrambled to engage them. Channel and east coast ships bombed.
Night: Minelaying. Raids on Mersey area. Mines in Bristol Channel.
Aircraft losses: RAF 27, Luftwaffe 36.
Adlertag was again postponed. Goering announced that 0530hrs on August 13 was Zero Hour for Adlertag. Meteorological forecast favourable.
Monday, August 12: Fine with patchy mist.
Day: Raids on radar stations, and Thames Estuary convoys and ships in the Channel. Ventnor radar put out of action but Germans not aware of it. Dunkirk (Kent) radar station damaged. Some damage to Dover aerial towers. Buildings in Rye demolished but technical installations undamaged. Pevensey hit and electricity supply partly affected. Heavy attacks on Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne airfields. Fires in Portsmouth docks and town. Dover and Hastings bombed.
Night: Minelaying, and indiscriminate bombing of villages and towns.
Aircraft losses: RAF 22, Luftwaffe 31.
Weather was deteriorating, instead of expected improvement, during the night.
Tuesday, August 13: Overcast at dawn. Foggy at French airfields, Channel under thick cloud. Mist and scattered drizzle, some cloud, otherwise fair.
Goering postponed Adlertag Zero Hour to afternoon.
Day: Some formations had already taken off before the order reached their units. One of these was led by Oberst Johannes Fink, Commander of KG2. He kept his rendezvous with the fighter escort at 0530hrs, but there were no 109s in sight, only a few Bf 110s. They kept closing on him, then diving away. He could not understand their message, nor did he share a radio frequency with them. Puzzled, he set course for his target with Nos. II and III Gruppen following. They crossed the English coast at 1,640ft (500m). The RAF radar had misread the strength of the 55-strong formation as ‘only a few’, so only No. 74 (Spitfire) Squadron had been scrambled. Meanwhile the Do 17s had found RAF Station, Eastchurch. Their bombs cratered the airfield, damaged hangars and other buildings and destroyed five Blenheims. The Spitfires, joined by Nos. 111 and 151 Sqns’ Hurricanes, caught them on their homeward journey. Before the bombers could hide in cloud, four were shot down and four damaged.
Goering’s new Zero Hour was 1400hrs. By then the weather had worsened further. Hauptmann Liensberger took off with 23 Bf 110s of V/LG1. His orders were to make landfall at Portland, then decide what to do next. Immediately his formation was over the English coast they saw Spitfires astern. British accounts state that this operation misfired because no bombers arrived to meet the 110s. In fact, the 110s were not intended as an escort, but as a decoy to draw fighters away from the bombers who would follow. The ruse was successful: two Spitfire squadrons were scrambled (the German version claims that there were 55 aircraft). The Messerschmitts sent three down, but lost five and many of the rest were badly damaged. The Germans failed to take advantage of having drawn the Spitfires: the first wave of follow-up bombers, Ju 87s, did not arrive until three hours later, by when the Spitfires had refuelled and rearmed. There was thick cloud down to 3,000ft (914m), so dive-bombing was impossible. The Stukas returned to base with their bombs. General von Richthofen’s diary entry reads, ‘The attack was a failure. The weather forecast had been wrong and the attack ordered from “on high”. Thank goodness the English fighters came too late.’
Raids on Odiham and Farnborough airfields were driven off. Southampton docks and Detling airfield were severely damaged. Six bombers reported that they had hit tents and sheds around the landing field at RAF Middle Wallop. Twelve bombers damaged nearby RAF Andover, but this was not a fighter station. A raid bound for RAF Rochford (not Rochester as alleged in some British accounts) failed to find the target and jettisoned over Canterbury.
Night: Norwich, Midlands, West Country and Scotland raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 13, Luftwaffe 34.
Wednesday, August 14: Cloud with bright intervals.
Day: The weather limited Luftwaffe operations to less than Gruppe strength. The designated targets were fighter airfields, radar stations and aircraft factories. Single bombers made many nuisance raids. Sixteen Bf 110s dived on Manston from cloud and destroyed four hangars, while a spoof raid on Dover was diverting the defence. Barrage balloons at Dover and Folkestone were shot down and the Goodwin lightship was sunk. Hawkinge, Colerne (Somerset), Sealand (Cheshire) and Lympne airfields were bombed. At Southampton and elsewhere railway lines were attacked.
Maintaining civilian morale was as important as shooting down the enemy and increasing the output of aircraft and munitions factories. The town and harbour of Dover, the Straits and RAF Manston were prime targets for the Luftwaffe and all had been considerably bombed and strafed. Only No. 60 Squadron, flying Blenheims, was stationed at Manston, but Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons used it as a forward base during daylight. If anxiety was felt most acutely in and around the extreme south-east corner of England, Kent as a whole was expectant of an attempted German landing at any moment. Not only for the benefit of this population, but also of the entire country, the world’s news reporters congregated at Dover, an appearance of confidence had to be kept up. To forbid the Channel to shipping by day would have been taken as a sign not of prudence but of timidity: so ships – albeit lightly laden – continued to traverse it. To ensure that Fighter Command’s meagre force was seen to be present, aircraft taking off from, or landing at, Manston were required to fly low over its neighbouring towns, Ramsgate and Dover, to reassure the inhabitants that enemy claims about the RAF’s allegedly crippling losses, broadcast daily by the traitor Lord Haw-Haw from Berlin, were false.
Night: Scattered weak nuisance raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 8, Luftwaffe 19.
Thursday, August 15: Fine over Britain. Began with cloud over France and the Channel, but this cleared by early afternoon. This, one of the three days that most influenced the outcome of the whole Battle, became known to the Luftwaffe as ‘Black Thursday’.
For the first time, Generaloberst Stumpff’s Luftflotte 5, based in Norway and Denmark, was to take part in operations against Britain. Its targets were in north-east England. Air Fleet 2’s were in the south-east and No. 3’s in the south. Their aerodromes stretched from Stavanger to Cherbourg and they were dispersed as follows:
Bf 109 and Bf 110; Guernsey, Caen, Le Havre, Dieppe, Abbeville, Wissant, St Omer, Calais, Rotterdam, Stavanger.
Ju 87: Flers, Falaise, Pas de Calais.
Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17: Tours, Orléans-Bricy, Chartres, Evreux, Villacoublay, Montdidier, Laon, Cambrai, Lille, Brussels, Amsterdam, Iborg (Denmark), Stavanger (Norway).
The Luftwaffe Intelligence Section had wrongly assessed the RAF fighter strength as 300: approximately half the actual figure.
Day: At 1130hrs 60 Ju 87s and about 40 Bf 109s attacked Lympne, which was out of use for the next two days, and also Hawkinge and Manston. Damage to mains electricity put radar stations at Dover, Rye and Foreness off the air. Nos. 54 and 501 squadrons intercepted this raid.
At 1245hrs, 63 He 111s from Stavanger escorted by 21 Bf 110s (with drop tanks) were 25 miles (40 km) north-east of their target, Newcastle-on-Tyne, when No. 72 Sqn jumped them, thanks to radar detecting activity soon after noon, apparently heading for the Firth of Forth. This was a feint, made by 20 German seaplanes. Coincidentally, when the real raid approached, it made a vast navigational error and also appeared off the Firth of Forth before turning south. This was No. 13 Group’s first daylight raid. Nos. 14, 65, 79 and 607 were also sent up. The attackers were driven off with the loss of 8 Heinkels and 7 Messerschmitts. No bombs hit the target airfields. For a second raid of some 50 unescorted Ju 88s from Årlborg. Nos. 73, 264, 616 and 219 Sqns were ordered off. No. 616 and a flight of No. 73 intercepted these. Bombs fell on houses and an ammunition dump at Bridlington (Yorkshire). The bomber station at Driffield (Yorks) was damaged and 10 aeroplanes were destroyed on the ground. Six of the enemy were brought down.
Luftflotte 5 did not attack by day again,
In the afternoon Ju 87s, Bf 109s and 110s bombed and strafed the fighter station at Martlesham Heath (Suffolk). Raids of 150 and 100 were engaged by Nos. 1, 17, 32, 64, 151 and 601 Sqns, but damaged the aircraft factory at Rochester. Some attacked Dover, Rye, Foreness and Bawdsey radars but without doing much harm. Late that afternoon more heavy raids were mounted. Seven fighter squadrons took off to deal with them. Biggin Hill, Worthy Down and Odiham aerodromes, and Portland, were damaged. Bombs intended for Kenley hit Croydon airfield. This was in Greater London and therefore proscribed by Hitler. Both he and Goering were enraged; not for humanitarian reasons, but because they feared a reprisal on Berlin. RAF flew 974 sorties. Abteilung 8, the Research Section, calculated that the Luftwaffe flew 1,786 sorties: 801 by bombers and dive bombers, 1,149 by fighters, of Air Fleets 2 and 3; and 169 of both by Air Fleet 5.
Night: Bristol, Birmingham, Boston, Southampton, Crewe, Harwich, Swansea, and the Yorkshire non-industrial town of Beverley were bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 30 fighters and 17 pilots, 16 pilots wounded. Luftwaffe: 75. Because the weather had looked unpromising that morning, Goering had summoned Sperrle and Kesselring to his home, Karinhall. His main theme was that the Stukas were too vulnerable to fighter attack. The decisions he took that day were:
1. That ‘Operations are to be directed exclusively against the enemy air force, including the aircraft industry. Shipping should be attacked only when circumstances are exceptionally favourable. Other targets are to be ignored.’
2. That three fighter formations must accompany each Stuka formation. The first would go ahead to take on the defending fighters. The second would dive with the Stukas. The third would give high cover.
3. That there must be only one officer in any crew flying over Britain.
4. That he doubted the value of raiding radar sites ‘as not one of those so far attacked has been put out of action.’
The first two decisions betrayed either his obstinacy or his obtuseness: it was not possible for fighters to fly as slowly as any bombers without wasting time and fuel on weaving; and, having no air brakes, they would out-dive the Stukas and leave them unprotected when they were at their most vulnerable. And he could, or would, not see that the RAF fighters were breaking up his raids: hence bombs falling elsewhere than on airfields and aircraft factories were either being jettisoned or aimed at secondary targets chosen by the pilots. The third decision acknowledged his sudden fear of Fighter Command. The fourth was a delusion for which faulty German intelligence was to blame.
Friday, August 16: Fair, but Channel hazy. Despite the inaccuracy of their Intelligence, the Luftwaffe opened the day with justified optimism. Germany calculated that Fighter Command’s strength was down to 430, of which 300 were operationally serviceable; and assessed monthly aircraft production as a maximum of 300. The facts were that Dowding had 570 Spitfires and Hurricanes and 102 Defiants, Gladiators and Blenheims at his disposal, with a reserve of 235 Spitfires and Hurricanes. Aircraft production had risen to 440 a month. (Bf 109 production was 164 in June, 220 in July, 173 in August, 218 in September.) Britain’s lack lay in fighter pilots, and that day there were only 1,379 against an establishment of 1,558.
But the enemy did have the advantage in numbers, because Fighter Command’s squadrons were spread throughout the British Isles, whereas the preponderance of the Luftwaffe’s strength was thrown against one, two or three small areas at a time. Also, the enemy bombers, which outnumbered even their escorting fighters, had a formdable aggregate of fire power. Every raid that the RAF, met, therefore, out-gunned it massively. The obvious comparison is with David and Goliath, and it is a good one.
Day: Raids began by noon. West Malling was rendered unserviceable for four days. This, Tangmere, and its satellite Westhampnet, and Manston were the only fighter stations attacked. Other airfields hit were Farnborough, Harwell, Brize Norton, Lee-on-Solent (Fleet Air Arm). Many aircraft were destroyed on the ground, but only three fighters. London docks and suburbs attacked, civilians killed, railway lines hit. Ventnor (Isle of Wight) radar put out of action despite Goering’s edict. Flight Lieutenant James Nicolson of No. 249 Squadron won Fighter Command’s first Victoria Cross. His aircraft set on fire by a Bf 110, he stayed with it until he had shot his enemy down.
Night: Light attacks on Bristol, Chester, Newport, Swansea, Portland, Tavistock (Devon non-industrial town), Worcester (cathedral city).
Aircraft losses: RAF 22, Luftwaffe 45.
Saturday, August 17: Fine.
Day: Frustrated, weary Luftwaffe flew only reconnaissance.
Night: Small raids on Wales, north-west England and Midlands.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
Sunday, August 18: Fine, becoming cloudy.
This was the day on which Germany expected to smash Fighter Command once and for all. Goering had available 276 Ju 87; 768 Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17; 194 Bf 110; 745 Bf 109; and, for reconnaissance, 52 Bf 110, Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17.
Fighter Command’s serviceability state was 419 Hurricanes and 211 Spitfires. There were also 25 Blenheims, 21 Defiants, 1 Gladiator.
Day: Midday saw attacks by huge formations on West Malling, Biggin Hill, Kenley – grievously damaged by 100 bombs – and Croydon. In early afternoon, heavy raids struck three Coastal Command and Naval airfields at Gosport, Thorney Island and Ford, and Poling radar station. No. 152 Sqn Spitfires and No. 43 Sqn Hurricanes did such terrible execution among the Stukas – I/St 77 alone lost 12 out of 28, and six barely limped back to France – that these were withdrawn from the battle. Galland was absent, on his way to see Goering. His second-in-command, Oberleutnant Schöpfel, leading III/JG26, shot down four Hurricanes in two minutes in the Folkestone–Canterbury area. On the subject of the Luftwaffe’s losses during the past 10 days, Galland said, comparing the Hurricanes’ and Spitfires’ eight machine guns with the Bf 109s’ one cannon and two machine guns, that the latter armament was ‘A good idea for a very good shot, but the average pilot is not so good: he needs a shotgun. The Spitfire is a real shotgun, so is better armed than the 109 when shooting while turning.’
Night: Bombs fell on Bristol, eastern England and south Wales. Minelaying in Bristol Channel.
Aircraft losses: RAF 31, Luftwaffe 53.
This day’s fighting forced a radical change of policy on Hitler and Goering. The Luftwaffe’s morale was greatly lowered by the disparity between their leaders’ assurances of easy victory and the reality of Fighter Command’s performance. The invasion date was postponed to September 17.
Monday, August 19: Cloudy, eastern England showery.
Day: Weather limited activity. The Luftwaffe flew many photographic reconnaissance sorties. Raids occurred at Dover, Portsmouth, Southampton and Pembroke Dock, in south Wales, where oil storage tanks were set alight. German records state: ‘In the second phase of the Battle of Britain from August 19 to September 6, 1940, airfields in inland England were attacked. These attacks were made by small bomber forces under strong fighter escort while other fighters flew “free chase”. That was a continuation of the action that had started on 21 July.’ (The term ‘free chase’ refers to fighter sweeps clearing the way and challenging RAF fighters to engage them.)
Night: Nuisance raiders bombed Bristol, Southampton, Sheffield, Wolverhampton, Derby, Hull, Nottingham, Leicester, Liverpool.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 6.
Goering held a conference at Karinhall, attended by his Air Corps and Geschwader commanders. He told them that the decisive period of the air war against Britain had been reached, and reiterated, ‘Our first priority is the destruction of the enemy’s fighters. If they do not take the air, we shall attack them on the ground. Surprise attacks on the aircraft industry must be made by day and night.’ The secondary targets were bomber stations. ‘There will no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets, but I reserve the right to order the bombing of London and Liverpool.’
After this meeting, decorating Galland and Mölders, his two most successful Gruppen-Kommandeure, with the gold pilot’s badge with jewels, he told them that he was not satisfied with the general performance of the fighters. He wanted young men with a high tally of victories to lead his Geschwader. Accordingly, he appointed Galland Kommandeur of JG26 with effect from August 22, 1940, in place of Major Gotthardt Handrick, winner of the gold medal for the modern pentathlon in the 1936 Olympic Games; and Mölders was appointed to command JG51 in place of Major General Osterkamp. Further, he replaced the Kommandeure of JG3, JG52 and JG54.
Air Vice Marshal Keith Park took fresh measures to counter the enemy’s air strategy, by instructing sector controllers:
1. To avoid forced landings on the sea by positioning fighters to intercept over land or within gliding distance of it.
2. Not to let fighters chase reconnaissance aeroplanes or small fighter formations out to sea.
3. To intercept single reconnaissance aircraft overland with a pair of fighters.
4. When the enemy approaches in cloud, to patrol one or two fighters over any airfield under threat.
5. To use the minimum number of fighters to intercept enemy fighters: bombers being the more important targets.
6. To request fighters from No. 12 Group to patrol certain No. 11 Group airfields, if all No. 11 Group squadrons based near London are airborne.
Tuesday, August 20: Mainly fine over Channel. Elsewhere, rain and cloud.
Day: Pembroke Dock bombed. West Malling, Manston, Eastchurch airfields and Dover balloon barrage hit. Ships off Welsh and East Anglian coasts attacked.
Night: Bombers over south-west.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 6.
Winston Churchill made his famous speech in the House of Commons that ended with, ‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.’
Wednesday, August 21: Rain and cloud.
Day: In the morning Bf 109s shot down some 50 barrage balloons at Dover. Formations of one bomber Gruppe escorted by a Geschwader of fighters attacked Debden, Eastchurch and Detling. In the afternoon Hornchurch and Biggin Hill were severely hit. But the raiders were badly mauled each time and Oberleutnant Hahn of I/JG3 spoke for them all when he said, ‘Only a few of us have not yet had to ditch in the Channel with a badly damaged aeroplane or dead engine.’ Weariness and discouragement were sapping the Germans. According to Lieutenant Ostermann of III/JG54, ‘Utter exhaustion had set in. For the first time, pilots discussed the prospects of posting to a quieter sector.’
Bombers over airfields: Bircham Newton, Coltishall, Stradishall, Horsham St Faith, St Eval, Exeter, Watton. Towns attacked: Southampton, Grimsby, Norwich, Canterbury, Bournemouth, Newmarket.
Night: Small raids on Harwich, Firth of Forth and Hull.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 12.
Thursday, August 22: Clouds and rain squalls.
Goering put Luftflotte 3’s fighters under Luftflotte 2’s command and ordered them to move from Cherbourg area to Pas de Calais.
Day: Channel shipping attacked. Manston airfield and Dover bombed.
Night: Convoy attacked at Wick; airfields North Coates, Manston, St Eval, Wick, Filton and aircraft factory at Filton bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 2.
Friday, August 23: Cloudy, showers, bright patches.
Day: Light raids on airfields at Abingdon, Biggin Hill, Tangmere. Bombs jettisoned over London residential suburbs. Bombers attacked Portsmouth, Maidstone, St Albans, Cromer and convoys off Essex and Norfolk coasts.
Night: Pembroke Dock, Midlands factories, and a convoy attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 5.
Saturday, August 24: Fine south, showers north.
Climactic days resumed and Britain entered a period of greatest jeopardy.
Day: Heavy raid on Manston, destroying buildings and telephone lines, leaving unexploded bombs on landing area, compelling evacuation. Raids on Hornchurch, North Weald, Dover, Ramsgate and Portsmouth.
Night: 170 raiders over northern and south-eastern England. Bombs intended for Thames Haven and Rochester fell on central London.
Aircraft losses: RAF 22, Luftwaffe 38.
Sunday, August 25: Fair, turning cloudy. All German bomber units received a telegram from Goering demanding the names of aircraft captains whose crews dropped bombs within the London perimeter. Luftwaffe High Command would punish them by posting to infantry regiments.
Day: Quiet until mid-afternoon. Warmwell airfield badly damaged, and targets in west of England, Scilly Isles RAF wireless station, and Pembroke Dock bombed. Heavy raid on Dover and Thames Estuary.
Night: Minelaying west and south. Midlands heavily raided, also south Wales, south of England, and airfield at Montrose, Scotland.
Aircraft losses: RAF 16, Luftwaffe 20.
The night RAF Bomber Command put up 81 Hampdens to attack the Siemens-Halske factory and other targets in Berlin. Crews unable positively to identify objectives through cloud jettisoned bombs over the city. This first damage to the enemy capital brought ridicule on Goering, who had boasted that it would never happen.
Monday, August 26: Channel cloudy. Britain generally cloudy; south better than the rest.
Day: At 1100hrs 150-plus hostiles attacked Biggin Hill and Kenley, bombed Folkestone and set fire to balloon barrage at Dover. Six RAF squadrons and three flights intercepted and scattered them. In the afternoon 100-plus hostiles made for Hornchurch and North Weald but were met and disrupted, managing only to attack Debden quite severely. A third 150-plus raid was intercepted. Portsmouth, Warmwell, Debden, Biggin Hill, Kenley under attack.
Night: Bombs on Plymouth, Coventry, Bournemouth and St Eval.
Aircraft losses: RAF 31, Luftwaffe 41.
Tuesday, August 27: Straits hazy, clouds over Channel clearing, rain Midlands and east.
Day: Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights spotted.
Night: Bombers over south and south-east.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
Wednesday, August 28: Straits cloudy, generally fair to fine.
Day: Eastchurch, Rochford bombed. Enemy fighter sweeps over Kent and Thames Estuary provoked engagement by RAF.
Night: 150 raiders on Liverpool, London, Birmingham, Coventry, Sheffield, Manchester, Derby.
Aircraft losses: RAF 28, Luftwaffe 30; one mail-carrying Gortha 154 lost its way and force landed.
Thursday, August 29: Bright intervals between rain.
Day: Light raids on south-east and south.
Night: Liverpool hit by 130 bombers. Diversionary singletons over Midlands and London.
Aircraft losses: RAF 9, Luftwaffe 17.
Friday, August 30: Channel fine, elsewhere fair.
Day: Shipping in Thames Estuary attacked. This was to distract attention from main targets; at 1030, 1100 and 1130hrs raids, each 30-plus, over French coast setting course for England. Sixteen defending squadrons airborne. Biggin Hill damaged. At 1330hrs three raids totalling more than 40 on Kenley, Biggin Hill, Tangmere, Shoreham; eight squadrons sent up to turn them back. Radar stations at Rye, Pevensey, Foreness, Dover, Fairlight, Beachy Head, Whitstable rendered unserviceable; electricity mains damaged. Another raid at 1600hrs targeted Kenley, Biggin Hill, North Weald and a convoy; Oxford, Luton and Detling were badly damaged. At about 1800hrs approximately 10 hostiles attacked Biggin Hill and caused widespread severe damage.
Night: Raids began at 2030hrs on London, Liverpool and south Wales. Singletons aimed at North Weald, Debden, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Detling, Eastchurch, Thorney Island, Calshot, Rochford, Broxbourne, Derby, Norwich and Peterborough.
Aircraft losses: RAF 25, Luftwaffe 36.
Saturday, August 31: Fair, Straits of Dover hazy.
Day: Action opened at 0800hrs. Dover balloon barrage destroyed. Debden hit by 100 bombs. North Weald, Croydon, Hornchurch, Biggin Hill, Detling all bombed or strafed during the day’s attacks. Radar stations at Pevensey, Rye, Beachy Head, Whitstable, Foreness damaged.
Night: Liverpool badly damaged, Portsmouth, Manchester, Bristol, Rotherhithe, Durham, Stockport, Gloucester, Worcester bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 39, Luftwaffe 41.
Fighter Command was feeling the increasing wear and tear of two months’ dawn readiness and unrelenting action. Pilots were weary. Some, even among the bravest and the most successful, were showing signs of excessive nervous tension. Dowding, his Group and Sector Commanders and the Operations Controllers were concerned about the high losses among squadron and flight commanders and the problem of finding replacements. They were no less worried by the curtailed training of the new pilots being hurried through the Operational Training Units and committed to meeting the enemy with only five to ten hours on Hurricanes or Spitfires, and without any practice at air-to-air firing. But that unquantifiable essential for victory, high morale, remained as buoyant as ever.
The Luftwaffe, both fighter pilots and bomber crews, were equally tired and worn. Although their fighting spirit remained unabated, they were disillusioned. Their leaders had promised them swift conquest, yet they had been unable to accomplish it. Instead of recognising his own defects, Goering heaped blame on his fighter units. However courageous the fighter pilots, they were nagged by the ever-present anxiety that their aircraft endurance allowed only ten minutes’ fighting time over England, and the Channel waited to swallow them up if empty fuel tanks forced them down. They had grown to hate the Channel and had many abusive names for it, the least scabrous being ‘The Sewer’. Under-achievement and Goering’s incessant recriminations had sapped their morale.
Sunday, September 1: Fine.
Goering ordered operations to concentrate on 30 factories making aircraft or aircraft parts.
Day: Heavy attacks on airfields at Eastchurch, Detling, Biggin Hill, Hawkinge, Lympne, and also on Dover and Tilbury.
Night: Bombs on Sheffield, Stafford, Liverpool area, Hull, Grimsby, Burton, Kent, south Wales.
Aircraft losses: RAF 15, Luftwaffe 14.
Monday, September 2: Fine, Straits hazy.
Day: Attacks on Rochford, Biggin Hill, North Weald, Eastchurch, Debden, Kenley, Digby, Hornchurch, Detling; and on airfield and aircraft factory at Brooklands. Random bombing of Kent.
Night: Minelaying and bombing south Wales, Liverpool, Birmingham and small towns.
Aircraft losses: RAF 31, Luftwaffe 35.
Tuesday, September 3: Mostly fine.
Day: Debden, Hornchurch, North Weald severely hit.
Night: South Wales, Liverpool and south-east England bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 16, Luftwaffe 16.
Wednesday, September 4: Fine.
Day: Action on Goering’s directive about attacking the aircraft industry was initiated. Dover balloon barrage, Lympne, Eastchurch, Brooklands (and aircraft factory) hit. Also aircraft factory at Rochester.
Night: Bristol, south Wales, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Tilbury, Gravesend airfield, Nottingham, all bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 15, Luftwaffe 20.
Thursday, September 5: Mostly fine.
Day: North Weald, Croydon, Lympne, Biggin Hill, Eastchurch airfields attacked.
Night: Liverpool, London, Manchester and more than 40 other places bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 20, Luftwaffe 23.
Day: Inaccurate bombing of Biggin Hill airfield and aircraft factory at Brooklands.
Night: Scattered light raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 23, Luftwaffe 35.
Saturday, September 7: Fair.
Armageddon was the name of the biblical last great struggle between Good and Evil. It could appropriately be applied to the period of plenary raids on London that began on this day.
The Operations Order issued on the previous day by Grauert, the General Officer Commanding I Air Corps, is a statement of intention and method that summarises and illustrates the many further high-intensity attacks that followed.
‘1. In the evening of 7.9 Luftflotte 2 will conduct a major strike against target Loge (the code word for London).
‘To this end the following units will operate in succession: for the Initial Attack: at 1800 one KG of II Air Corps; for the Main Attack: at 1840 II Air Corps at 1845 I Air Corps, reinforced by KG30.
‘2. Disposition of I Air Corps Units: KG 30 (plus II KG/76) on the right; KG1 central. KG76 (less II/KG76) on the left.
‘3. Fighter Cover. (a) Purpose of Initial Attack is to force English fighters into the air so that they will have reached end of endurance at time of Main Attack. (b) fighter escort will be provided by Jafu 2 in the proportion of one fighter Geschwader for each bomber Geschwader. (c) ZG76 (for this operation under I Air Corps command) will, from 1840, clear the air of enemy fighters over I Air Corps targets, thereby covering attack and retreat of bomber formations. (d) Jafu 2 guarantees two fighter Geschwader to cover I and II Air Corps.
‘4. Execution. (a) Rendezvous: To be made with fighter escort before crossing coast. Bombers will fly direct. (b) Courses: KG30, St Omer – just south of Cap Griz Nez – railway fork north of ‘Seveneae’ – to the target. KG1, St Pol – mouth of la Slack – Riverhead – to the target. KG76, Hesdin – north perimeter Boulogne – Westerham – target. (c) Fighter escort: JG26 for KG30, JG54 for KG1, JG27 for KG76. In view of the fact that the fighters will be operating at the limit of their endurance, it is essential that direct courses be flown and the attack completed in minimum time. (d) Flying altitudes after RV with fighters: KG30: 5,000–5,500 metres (16,400–18,000ft), KG1: 6,000–6,500m (19,700–21,300ft). KG76: 5,000–5,500m (16,400–18,000ft). To stagger heights as above will provide maximum concentration of attacking force. On return flight some loss of altitude is permissible, in order to cross the English coast at approximately 4,000m (13,000ft). (e) The intention is to complete the operation by a single attack. In the events of units failing to arrive directly over target, other suitable objectives in Loge may be bombed from altitude of approach. (It is chilling to pause here and reflect that the ‘other suitable objectives’ permitted in 4(e) were the men, women and children of London.) (f) Return flight: After releasing bombs formations will turn to starboard. KG27 will do so with care after first establishing that starboard units have already attacked. Return course will then be Maidstone – Dymchurch – escort fighter bases. (g) Bomb-loads: He 111 and Ju 88, no 50kg bombs, 20 per cent incendiaries, 30 per cent delayed-action 2 – 4 hours and 10 – 14 hours (the latter without concussion fuses); Do 17, 25 per cent disintegrating containers with BI, EL and no SD 50; load only to be limited by security of aircraft against enemy Flak. Fuel sufficient for completion of operation and marginal safety to be carried only.
‘5. To achieve the necessary maximum effect it is essential that units fly as highly concentrated forces during approach, attack and especially on return. The main objective of the operation is to prove that the Luftwaffe can achieve this.’
Day: London heavily bombed; widespread carnage and fires. Valiant and unremitting defence by RAF.
Night: Ruthless savage bombing of London.
Aircraft losses: RAF 25 aircraft (19 pilots), Luftwaffe 37.
Sunday, September 8: Fair, turning cloudy.
Day: Light attacks on Detling, Hornchurch, West Malling, Gravesend, Dover and Sevenoaks.
Night: 207 bombers on London kill 412 and grievously injure 747.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 15.
Monday, September 9: Rain and thunder.
Day: Ineffectual raids on Brooklands factory and London. Bombs jettisoned on residential areas in London and suburbs. Purley, Norbiton, Surbiton, Canterbury, Kingston, West Malling all bombed: Tangmere strafed.
Night: London badly hit.
Aircraft losses: RAF 19, Luftwaffe 28.
Tuesday, September 10: Cloud and rain.
Day: Tangmere strafed; West Malling slightly bombed.
Night: London, south Wales, Liverpool area raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
Wednesday, September 11: Mainly fine.
Day: Germans deferred intended invasion of England to 14th after RAF mauled attacks on London. Bombs on London, Hornchurch, Biggin Hill, Kenley, Brooklands, Eastchurch, Detling and Colerne.
Night: London pounded. Merseyside, west and east England attacked. Mines off east and south coasts.
Aircraft losses: RAF 25, Luftwaffe 21.
Thursday, September 12: Poor.
Day: Fairlight radar station slightly bombed.
Night: London, Midlands, north-east, east, south-east England attacked lightly.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 4.
Friday, September 13: Poor.
Day: Bombs on London.
Night: London again bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 4.
Saturday, September 14: Rain, clouds, thunder.
Day: London attacked. Invasion delayed again to 17th.
Night: London, Cardiff, Ipswich, Maidstone attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 14, Luftwaffe 14.
Sunday, September 15: Fair, becoming fine.
This date is observed annually as Battle of Britain Day. It was the third of the most critical days of the Battle, and the ultimately decisive one. The Luftwaffe was determined finally to break Fighter Command and the spirit of the civil population by the scale of its attacks that were intended to engage the RAF’s dwindling numbers of defending aircraft and pilots, while raining an annihilating weight of bombs on London. The outcome was not the overwhelming of Great Britain, but the further frustration and final disillusionment of the Luftwaffe, which suffered its heaviest losses of the Battle.
Day: Tremendous bombing of London rendered inaccurate by the fervour and passion with which the RAF’s fighter squadrons waded into one huge enemy formation after another and dispersed it. The bombs struck, nonetheless, scattered widely over inner and outer London, bringing ruin to homes and death to their occupants. The capital was not the only target: Portland and Southampton were also attacked.
Night: London badly hit. Lesser raids on Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Cardiff.
Aircraft losses: RAF 27 aircraft (13 pilots), Luftwaffe 56.
Monday, September 16: Cloudy, rain.
Day: Little activity. London raided.
Night: London strongly attacked; Bristol and Merseyside bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 9.
Tuesday, September 17: Poor.
Day: Invasion postponed indefinitely. German fighter sweeps foiled.
Night: London gravely hit; lighter raids on Glasgow and Liverpool.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 8.
Wednesday, September 18: Squalls and bright intervals.
Day: Thames Estuary bombed.
Night: London and Liverpool area raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 12, Luftwaffe 19.
Thursday, September 19: Wet.
Day: Bombers over London and Thames Estuary.
Night: Central London, Heston airfield and Merseyside attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 8.
Friday, September 20: Fair.
Day: Luftwaffe fighter sweep over Kent.
Night: London hit.
Aircraft losses: RAF 7, Luftwaffe 8.
Saturday, September 21: Fine.
Day: Brooklands slightly damaged. London, Kenley, Hornchurch and Biggin Hill attacked.
Night: London and Liverpool area raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 9.
Sunday, September 22: Bad, becoming good.
Day: A few enemy intrusions.
Night: Heavy bombing of London.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 5.
Day: Fighter sweeps over Kent.
Night: London bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 11, Luftwaffe 16.
Tuesday, September 24: Hazy and foggy.
Day: Attacks on Southampton and Tilbury. Galland scored his 40th victory – over the Thames Estuary – and was awarded the oak leaves to the Knight’s Cross, the third German to be thus honoured. The predecessors were General Dietl (Army) and Galland’s friend and fellow Geschwader Commander, Werner Mölders, who had scored his 40th kill three days earlier. Hitler accorded Galland a private audience when he decorated him.
Night: Merseyside and London bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 11.
Wednesday, September 25: Haze over Channel, followed by cloud and bright intervals.
Day: Raids on Plymouth and Bristol. Bristol Aircraft factory badly damaged and production set back for many weeks. Heavy casualties among personnel.
Night: London, north-west England and north Wales bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 13.
Thursday, September 26: Fair.
Day: Aircraft factory at Southampton devastated.
Night: Raids on London and Merseyside.
Aircraft losses: RAF 9, Luftwaffe 9.
Friday, September 27: Fair.
Day: Raids on London and Bristol thwarted.
Night: London, Midlands and Liverpool area raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 28, Luftwaffe 54.
Saturday, September 28: Fair to fine, but Straits cloudy.
Day: Raids on London and Portsmouth largely foiled.
Night: London savaged again.
Aircraft losses: RAF 16, Luftwaffe 10.
Sunday, September 29: Mostly fair.
Day: Nuisance attacks on convoys and also east and south-east.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 10.
Monday, September 30: Fair.
Day: Fighter sweeps over south-east, some raiders reached London. Non-industrial town of Sherborne bombed when Luftwaffe tried to hit aircraft factory at Yeovil (error of 7 miles/11km) through cloud.
Night: London, Bristol, Liverpool, eastern England battered.
Aircraft losses: RAF 16, Luftwaffe 44.
The bombs the Luftwaffe was dropping on London had increased in size since the first deliberate raid on September 7, when the heaviest used had weighed 110lb (50kg). Now 1,100, 1,650 or 2,200lb (500, 750 or 1,000kg) high-explosive bombs burst among the inhabitants, combined with incendiaries, as before.
The RAF had no operational purpose-designed night fighters yet. The Defiants had suffered such appalling casualties that they had been withdrawn from front-line service by day in August. They were now beginning to equip night fighter squadrons, but still lacked airborne radar. For the time being the eyes of a single-seater pilot or a Defiant pilot and air gunner had to suffice, to spot a hostile bomber’s exhaust flames or discern its silhouette against the clouds. Night fighter squadrons flying Blenheims were experimenting with the first – erratic, temperamental - radar sets to be fitted in aeroplanes. Searchlights were the best help available to those who hunted in the dark, until they had mistakenly illuminated friend in mistake for foe and invited a burst from a raider’s guns. But their limit was 12,000ft (3,660m) and most hostiles flew higher. Close control from ground radar stations was operating by this time, but it was rough and ready and a reliable radar set in the aircraft was essential for the last stage of an interception; but only the Blenheims had one, and dependable it was not.
The RAF made unrewarding attempts to use a new weapon effectively. This consisted of a bomb suspended beneath a parachute by 2,000ft (610m) of piano wire. A special flight of obsolete Harrow bombers converted for the purpose released these in the path of incoming raids, but lack of success soon led to the abandonment of this bizarre practice.
Tuesday, October 1: Cloudy but fair.
The first raid, at 0700hrs, heralded a change of enemy policy. Goering had decided to use his bombers mainly by night and to send out Bf 109s each carrying a 550lb (250kg) bomb and Bf 110s carrying up to four of these by day. They came in formations of 50 to 100, flying high. Throughout the Battle, the RAF’s severest tactical handicap had been lack of time to make altitude. When radar reported an approaching raid over the French coast and fighters scrambled to deal with it, they would have to climb away from it while gaining height, or they would have flown under it and been shot down themselves. This disadvantage became greater when German fighter-bombers climbed quickly over their own territory and arrived over England at a greater height than the day bombers used to.
Day: Raids on London, Portsmouth, Southampton, mostly by fighter-bombers, frustrated. Intruders over Scotland.
Night: Bombs on London, Manchester, Liverpool areas.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 6.
Wednesday, October 2: Fine.
Day: Fighter-bombers between 20,000 and 30,000ft (6,100-9,145m) attacked Biggin Hill and London continuously from 0930 to 1300hrs.
Night: Starting at 1915hrs, 180 bombers, of which 100 concentrated on London, crossed the English and Scottish coasts. Manchester, Aberdeen and the vicinities of airfields at Northolt, Hornchurch, Kenley, Hendon, Brooklands, Eastchurch, Redhill, Usworth and Duxford were hit.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 17.
Thursday, October 3: Rain. Visibility over England down to 500 yards (460m).
Day: Previous night’s raids continued until 0615hrs. Fighter-bombers, singly and in pairs, attack RAF stations at Cosford, Tangmere and Cardington, and also Thames Haven, Cambridge, Leamington, Bedford, Worcester, Reading, and the de Havilland aircraft factory at Hatfield.
Night: London bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 9.
Friday, October 4: Mist and rain by day, fog at night.
Day: A succession of some 70 German fighter-bombers singly and in pairs attacked London, Canterbury and other Kent towns and two convoys off Kent.
Night: London and Liverpool attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 12.
Hitler still deluded himself that Operation Sealion, the invasion of England, was practicable. His Navy wanted him to call it off and the Luftwaffe admitted that, with the deteriorating British weather, they had abandoned all hope of destroying the RAF in the air or on the ground. Their bomber crews were having to find their way through thick cloud. In recent months so many crews experienced in blind flying had been killed over Britain or been taken prisoner that there was an urgent need for replacements. But many of the Ju 52s used by the blind-flying training schools that had been borrowed to transport troops for the invasion of Holland and Norway had been lost, which delayed and reduced the output of new crews.
German fighter pilots’ morale was affected by the compulsion to operate as fighter-bombers with a load that made their Bf 109s sluggish. Also, as Goering never admitted any responsibility for failure, but always blamed his pilots and crews, it was now their turn to incur his venom. They complained to one another that they were reduced to being what General Galland described as ‘stopgaps and scapegoats’.
‘We fighter pilots looked on this violation of our aircraft with great bitterness,’ he says. ‘The fighter-bombers were put into action in a great hurry. There was hardly time to give the pilots bombing training. The Bf 109 carried a 500lb (227kg) bomb. The Bf 110 carried two of them plus four 100-pounders (45kg). No great effect could be achieved with that. Even less so because the fighter pilots were annoyed at carrying cargo and were glad to get rid of the bombs anywhere.’
Throughout the Battle of Britain, Dowding, Park, Leigh-Mallory, Saul and Brand understood the psychology of their pilots and treated them accordingly, whereas Goering had no understanding at all of how to handle his.
Park issued a directive to counter the enemy’s new tactic, from which the following excerpts are most relevant. ‘With the prevailing cloudy skies and inaccurate heights given by RDF the group controllers’ most difficult problem is to know the height of incoming enemy raids. Occasionally reconnaissance Spitfires and Hurricanes from Hornchurch or Biggin Hill are able to sight and report the height and particulars of enemy formations. Moreover the special fighter reconnaissance flight is now being formed at Gravesend (attached to No. 66 Squadron) for the purpose of getting information about approaching enemy raids.’
Because of lack of height reports and the delays in receipt of RDF and Observer Corps information at Group, and the longer time recently taken by squadrons to take off, pairs and wings of squadrons were meeting enemy formations above them, before reaching the height ordered by Group.
Park: ‘Tip-and-run raids across Kent by Bf 110s carrying bombs or small formations of long-range bombers escorted by fighters give such short notice that the Group controller is sometimes compelled to detail even single fighter squadrons that happen to be in the air to intercept the enemy bombers before they attack aircraft factories, sector aerodromes, or other such vital points as docks, Woolwich, etc. Normally, however, Group controller has sufficient time to detail from one to three pairs (two to six squadrons) to intercept raids heading for London.
‘Whenever time permits I wish Group controllers to get the readiness squadrons in company over sector aerodromes, Spitfires 25,000ft (7,602m), Hurricanes 20,000ft (6,100m), and wait until they report they are in good position before sending them to patrol lines or to intercept raids having a good track in fairly clear weather.’
Saturday, October 5: Rain with bright periods.
Day: Southampton, Folkestone and Detling all hit. Fighter-bombers on London.
Night: London and eastern airfields raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 9, Luftwaffe 9.
Sunday, October 6: Wet.
Day: London and east England under light attacks. Low-flying fighter-bombers demolished three barrack blocks at Biggin Hill.
Night: Slight enemy activity over London and environs.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 6.
Monday, October 7: Poor.
Day: Yeovil aircraft factory raided.
Night: London, Merseyside, Firth of Forth under attack. Airfields at Hatfield, Ford, Tangmere, Eastleigh, Lee-on-Solent hit.
Aircraft losses: RAF 17, Luftwaffe 21.
Goering announced a new plan for the demoralisation of London and the provinces. Its objectives were: 1, Absolute control of the Channel and the English coastal area. 2, Progressive and complete annihilation of London, with all its military objectives and industrial production. 3, A steady paralysing of Britain’s technical, commercial and civil life. 4, Demoralisation of the civil population of London and its provinces. 5, Progressive weakening of Britain’s forces.
Instead of weakening, the RAF was reacting with growing strength. On that very day, it flew 825 sorties and, as shown above, destroyed 25 per cent more enemy aeroplanes than it lost. And the civilian population remained defiant, its morale high. Instead of fear, its attitude towards Hitler and Goering was of ridicule: the former on account of his ranting and insane rages, the other for his obesity and flashy uniforms that were more appropriate to musical comedy than to the dignity of a Field Marshal.
Tuesday, October 8: Fair.
Day: London persistently bombed.
Night: London bombed again.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 14.
Wednesday, October 9: Poor.
Day: Raids on south-eastern airfields and London.
Night: London caught it badly.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 9.
Thursday, October 10: Patchy.
Day: Incessant raids by small numbers of fighter-bombers and bombers on south-east airfields, outer London and Weymouth.
Night: London, Merseyside, Manchester and airfields attacked.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 4.
Friday, October 11: Showers, fair intervals, early mist, night fog.
Day: Raids on Weymouth, Folkestone, Canterbury, Deal, and on airfields at Southend, Kenley, Biggin Hill.
Night: Bombs on London, Tyneside, Teesside, Merseyside, Manchester.
Aircraft losses: RAF 9, Luftwaffe 7.
Saturday, October 12: Mist and fog dispersed by light wind.
Day: London attacked.
Night: London bombed again.
Aircraft losses: RAF 19, Luftwaffe 11.
Hitler at last conceded that he must admit that he could not invade Britain that year. His decision was announced by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the unified Defence Staff, which had replaced the War Ministry and the Army Command in 1938. Hitler had chosen him for the post because of his lack of personality or intellect. Known as ‘Lakaitel’ – Lakai means lackey – he carried out orders without question. His announcement read: ‘The Führer has decided that from now until the spring, preparations for Sealion shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England. Should the Invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, orders for renewal of operational readiness will be issued later. In the meantime military conditions for a later invasion are to be improved.’
Sunday, October 13: Early fog clearing to fine, deteriorating afternoon to cloud.
Day: Fighter-bomber raid on London.
Night: Bombers attacked London, Wales, Merseyside, Bristol and Dundee.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 5.
Monday, October 14: Rain.
Day: Scattered light raids over Midlands and south-east.
Night: London gravely damaged by Bf 110s taking advantage of the full moon. Waterloo railway station was left with only two lines open. Services had to stop at all five main termini. Underground tracks were damaged. Roads, gasworks and power stations were hit, while 900 fires spread devastation with the usual heavy loss of civilian lives.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.
Tuesday, October 15: Fair, Straits cloudy.
Day: Fighter-bombers on London and Kent.
Night: Ferocious bombing of London and Birmingham.
Aircraft losses: RAF 12, Luftwaffe 13.
Wednesday, October 16: Foggy in France and Germany; Britain mist and rain at night.
Day: Weather prevented all but sporadic single sorties over west and south-east England.
Night: London lightly assaulted.
Aircraft losses: RAF 1, Luftwaffe 13.
Thursday, October 17: Rain with bright spells.
Day: Fighter-bombers on Central London, Stanmore, site of HQ Fighter Command, seaside resorts of Margate and Broadstairs.
Night: South-east raided.
Aircraft losses: RAF 3, Luftwaffe 15.
Friday, October 18: Fog in south-east.
Day: Widespread small-scale raids.
Night: The same.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 15.
Saturday, October 19: Cloud.
Day: Little activity.
Night: Feeble incursions over Bristol, London, Merseyside.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 5.
Sunday, October 20: Cloud.
Day: London and Kent hit by fighter-bomber raids.
Night: London and Coventry grievously damaged.
Aircraft losses: RAF 4, Luftwaffe 14.
Monday, October 21: Rain, cloud, fog.
Day: London, west England, Merseyside raided.
Night: London, Coventry, Liverpool, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, south coast radar stations all bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 6.
Tuesday, October 22: Rain and fog.
Day: Convoy in Thames Estuary and two off Dover fruitlessly attacked.
Night: London, Coventry, Merseyside bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 6, Luftwaffe 11.
Wednesday, October 23: Cloudy, rain.
Day: London and airfields at Tangmere, Biggin Hill, plus ports at Southampton, Cromer and Harwich all suffered nuisance raids.
Night: London and Glasgow bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 6, Luftwaffe 4.
Thursday, October 24: Low cloud.
Day: Sporadic intrusions over eastern and central England.
Night: London and Birmingham lightly hit,
Aircraft losses: RAF 0, Luftwaffe 8.
Friday, October 25: Fair with low cloud.
Day: London and south-east hit by both aimed and jettisoned bombs.
Night: Harwich raided by Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italiana).
Aircraft losses: RAF 10, Luftwaffe 20, RAI 2.
Saturday, October 26: Cloudy, improving to fair.
Day: Frequent fighter-bomber attacks on London, south-east and a Channel convoy.
Night: London, Manchester, Merseyside bombed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 10.
Sunday, October 27: Cloud.
Day: Mostly sweeps by fighters and fighter-bombers in formations up to 50 strong, which began at 0745hrs with attacks on convoys in the Thames Estuary and on London. The docks and south-eastern suburbs were damaged. At 1630hrs London, Southampton and Martlesham Heath airfield were attacked.
Night: London, Bristol, Liverpool bombed; RAF fighter stations at Kirton-in-Lindsey, Driffield, Coltishall, Leconfield, Hawkinge, Feltwell and Honington strafed.
Aircraft losses: RAF 8, Luftwaffe 12.
Monday, October 28: Cloud, some fog.
Day: London bombed, also convoys in Thames and Dover.
Night: Raids on London, Midlands and Merseyside.
Aircraft losses: RAF 2, Luftwaffe 11.
Tuesday, October 29: Haze and low cloud.
Day: The enemy made their last great effort of the Battle. The first raid, aimed at London, was engaged at 1100hrs. When the second raid came in, No. 602 Squadron, flying in pairs instead of threes, shot down eight fighter-bombers in 10 minutes, and another four when chasing the attackers back over the Channel. Three formations of fighter-bombers, numbering 112, attacked Portsmouth. The Italian Air Force, making its second appearance, with 73 Fiat CR42 Falco fighters escorting 15 Fiat BR20 Cicogna bombers, bombed Rams-gate.
Night: London and central England badly hit.
Aircraft losses: RAF 7, Luftwaffe 19.
Wednesday, October 30: Rain and overcast.
Day: At noon 80 German bombers and fighter-bombers appeared over the Thames Estuary and a quarter of an hour later two formations, together numbering over 100, crossed the coast at Dymchurch. Six RAF fighter squadrons on patrol intercepted them. In the late afternoon 130 enemy aircraft were over the south coast and a few managed to reach London. Poor visibility and general bad weather hampered both attackers and defenders.
Night: Scattered small raids.
Aircraft losses: RAF 5, Luftwaffe 8.
Thursday, October 31: Hazy and wet.
Day: Limp effort by fighter-bombers against London and Kent.
Night: Weak bomber effort.
Aircraft losses: None on either side.
The Battle of Britain was over. With regard to total losses contemporary claims were over-estimated by both sides. The speed and confusion of air fighting made this unavoidable. The British claimed that they had destroyed 2,698 aircraft. The Germans alleged that they had shot down 3,058.
Post-war investigation proved that the true figures were; RAF losses 915; Luftwaffe losses 1,733.