1. See Norberto Bobbio, Politica e cultura (Turin, 1955), ch. 11; Sergio Cotta, ‘La position du problème de la politique chez Rousseau’, in Etudes sur le ‘Contrat social’ de Rousseau (Paris, 1964), pp. 177–90; Rodolfo Mondolfo, Umanismo di Marx (Turin, 1968); and Giacomo Marramao, Marxismo e revisionismo in Italia (Bari, 1971).
2. Galvano della Volpe’s Rousseau e Marx, first published in Rome in 1964, passed through four editions over the next ten years; Lucio Colletti’s Ideologia e società, first published in Bari in 1969, appeared in two further editions by 1972.
3. See Galvano della Volpe, Rousseau and Marx, trans. John Fraser (London, 1978), and Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, trans. John Merrington and Judith White (London, 1972).
4. John Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man (Oxford, 1975).
5. See Mohr und General: Erinnerungen an Marx and Engels (Berlin, 1970), p. 158.
6. See the Marx and Engels Historisch-kritische-Gesamtausgabe (hereafter MEGA), ed. D. Rjazanov (Berlin and Moscow, 1927–36), vol. 1, I.2, pp. 120–21.
7. See Engels, Anti-Dühring, in Marx-Engels Werke (hereafter MEW), 39 vols. in 41 (Berlin, 1957–68), vol. 20, pp. 130–31.
8. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, p. 187. See also della Volpe, Rousseau and Marx, p. 149.
9. See MEW, vol. 1, pp. 80 (Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtsschule); MEW, vol. 1, pp. 103, 104 (‘Der leitende Artikel in Nr. 179 der Kölnischen Zeitung’); MEW, vol. 1, p. 370 (Zur Judenfrage); MEW, vol. 3, pp. 75, 317, 386, 387, 512–13 (Deutsche Ideologie), and the passage from this text, first published in 1962, in The German Ideology (Moscow, 1964), p. 213; MEW, vol. 4, p. 353 (‘Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral’); MEW, vol. 13, p. 280 (‘Die Kriegsaussichten in Preußen’); MEW, vol. 13, p. 615 (Einleitung [zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie], i.e. Grundrisse); MEW, vol. 14, p. 588 (Herr Vogt); MEW, vol. 15, p. 69 (‘Interessantes aus Preußen’), New York Daily Tribune, 30 June 1860; MEW, vol. 16, pp. 31, 32 (‘Über Proudhon’); MEW, vol. 19, p. 16 (Kritik des Gothaer Programms); MEW, vol. 23, p. 774 (Kapital I); MEW, vol. 27, p. 297 (Marx to Engels, 8 Aug. 1851); MEW, vol. 27, p. 314 (Marx to Engels, 14 Aug. 1851). Apart from MEW, vol. 3, pp. 512–13, where Rousseau is mentioned thirteen times (always in passing, and that mainly by way of quotations or paraphrases from Cabet and Grünn), reference to him, or to a ‘Rousseauschen Sinne’, appears only once on each of these pages, while MEW, vol. 3, p. 75 does not mention his name at all but cites a passage from the Contrat social. The only reference I have found anywhere in Marx to Rousseau’s most famous political concept, the ‘volonté générale’, appears in MEW, vol. 15, p. 69.
10. See MEW, vol. 16, p. 32. Cf. MEW, vol. 13, p. 280.
11. See Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth, 1973), Introduction, p. 83; MEW, vol. 13, p. 615; and Karl Marx, Texts on Method, ed. Terrell Carver (Oxford, 1975), pp. 48 and 91–92.
12. See Emile III, in Rousseau’s Oeuvres complètes (hereafter OC), ed. Bernard Gagnebin, Marcel Raymond et al., Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris, 1959–[95]), vol. 4, pp. 454–55 [E 184–85]. In Emile Rousseau cites Robinson Crusoe as a most useful book of natural education. See also Confessions, in OC, vol. 1, pp. 644, 1605 (note 2) [C 594] and Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, in OC, vol. 1, pp. 812, 826 [RJ 117, 128].
13. See Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Early Texts, trans. and ed. David McLellan (Oxford, 1972), pp. 107–8; MEW, vol. 1, p. 370; and Rousseau, Contrat social II.7, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 381–82 [SC 68–70].
14. See Marx, Early Texts, pp. 127–28 and 148; MEW, vol. 1, p. 390 and suppl. vol. 1, p. 536. See also Rousseau, Contrat social I.8, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 364–65 [SC 53–54].
15. See Terrell Carver, ‘Marx, Engels and Dialectics’, Political Studies 28 (1980): 354–58, and MEW, vol. 20, pp. 9 and 624.
16. See Carver, ‘Marx, Engels and Dialectics’, p. 357, and MEW, vol. 20, p. 9.
17. Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man, p. 60.
18. See Marx, Early Texts, pp. 101–5; MEW, vol. 1, pp. 362–77.
19. See MEW, vol. 20, p. 17, or the same passage in MEW, vol. 19, p. 190. See also della Volpe, Rousseau and Marx, pp. 85–86. It should be noted that Engels’s own references to Rousseau are scarcely more numerous than those of Marx, with the great majority concentrated in Anti-Dühring alone: MEGA, vol. 2, 2, p. 129 (‘Rationalismus and Pietismus’), Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser, 17 Oct. 1840; MEW, vol. 1, pp. 469 and 475 (‘Briefe aus London’), Schweizerischer Republikaner, 16 May and 9 June 1843; MEW, vol. 4, p. 295 (Der ökonomische Kongreß); MEW, vol. 4, p. 428 (‘Louis Blancs Rede auf dem Bankett zu Dijon’); MEW, vol. 16, p. 161 (‘Was hat die Arbeiterklasse mit Polen zu tun?’); MEW, vol. 19, pp. 190, 192, 202 (Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft); MEW, vol. 20, pp. 17, 19, 91, 95, 129–31, 134, 142, 239, 292 (Anti-Dühring); MEW, vol. 20, pp. 580, 584 (‘Materialien zum Anti-Dühring’); MEW, vol. 21, p. 282 (Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie); MEW, vol. 27, p. 318 (Engels to Marx, 21 Aug. 1851); MEW, vol. 37, p. 364 (Engels to Lafargue, 7 Mar. 1890); MEW, vol. 39, p. 97 (Engels to Mehring, 14 July 1893).
20. See, for instance, Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Early Texts, p. 108 (MEW, vol. 1, p. 370).
21. See MEW, vol. 20, p. 239 or MEW, vol. 19, p. 192.
22. See della Volpe, Rousseau and Marx, pp. 75–76 and p. 144, and Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, p. 188.
23. Of course, as John Hope Mason reminds me, any putative likeness drawn between the satisfaction of needs in Rousseau’s social theory and in that of Marx should not conflate their different perspectives on human needs and the manner of their satisfaction. For Rousseau our needs were fulfilled mainly through acts of self-reliance and political co-operation, rather than economic production. For Marx communist society would promote a progressively expanding rather than deliberately contracted set of needs, satisfied in accordance with some principle of proportional distribution based on relative requirements.
24. As Plamenatz has observed in another context (German Marxism and Russian Communism [London, 1954], p. 191), ‘Passing from German to Russian Marxism, we leave the horses and come to the mules’.
25. See, for instance, Rousseau, Emile I, in OC, vol. 4, p. 245 [E 37] and Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques III, in OC, vol. 1, p. 934 [RJ 213].
26. Especially in his Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (see MEW, vol. 13, pp. 8–9).
27. See G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, 1978), pp. 28–29, 137–38 and 143–44.
28. On this point Cohen (see Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 167–69) takes H. B. Acton and Plamenatz specially to task.
29. See Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 134–74.
30. Among revisionist contributions to Marxism, Perry Anderson’s account of the relation between a society’s economic base and its superstructure in different historical epochs is challenged by Cohen (see Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 247–48) particularly with respect to this point.
31. See Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 160–63.
32. Ibid., p. 147.
33. Until the recent spate of commentaries on Marx’s philosophy of history by, among others, D. Ross Gandy, Melvin Rader and William Shaw as well as Cohen, full-length book treatments of the subject have been scarce. For generations the most authoritative text was M. M. Bober’s Karl Marx’s Interpretation of History, first published in [Cambridge, Mass.,] 1927.
34. See, for instance, the comments of Walter Adamson in History and Theory 19 (1980): 196–201; Jon Elster in Political Studies, 28 (1980): 123–27; Richard Miller in the Philosophical Review 90 (1981): 91–117; and Peter Singer in the New York Review of Books 26 (Dec. 1980): 46–47. Cohen’s attempt to rebut other interpretations of historical materialism has been found by several reviewers to be more ingenious than convincing, largely because he seems to have paid too high a price for his gains. For one thing, his functional explanations appear out of keeping with the form and character of the arguments they purport to make clear, especially when applied to Marx’s other claims about the correspondence between certain primary and secondary factors in social life, such as his views about the link between existence and consciousness, or between economic base and political superstructure. A functional explanation of Marx’s theory of history, moreover, leaves us without a clear grasp of what he took to be the causal mechanisms of change and how they operate, whereas previously, following the perspective now regarded as insufficiently illuminating by Cohen, the prime examples of such mechanisms were thought to be social revolutions (‘the locomotives of history’), initiated by classes at a certain stage in the development of the material forces of production of an economic system (see Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 148–49 and 292). What I find particularly curious, too, and inadequately substantiated by any passages drawn from Marx himself, is Cohen’s attachment of the idea of human agency and the rational exercise of labour power to his account of the technological forces of production, since Marx regarded productive forces in pre-communist societies as ‘alien’ powers, passing through stages ‘independent of’, and even governing, human will—see Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 46 and 82 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 34 and 67).
35. See The German Ideology, p. 46, and the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Marx and Engels, Selected Works (hereafter SW), 3 vols. (Moscow, 1968–70), vol. 1, p. 503 (MEW, vol. 3, p. 34 and vol. 8, p. 8).
36. See Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, p. 290.
37. See especially Rousseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 173–74 and 177–78 [DI 168–70, 172–74]; the ‘Dernière réponse’ [to Charles Borde], in OC, vol. 3, p. 80 [LR 70–71]; and the preface to Narcisse, in OC, vol. 2, pp. 969–70n [PN 100–02].
38. A thesis developed by Marx above all in The German Ideology—see pp. 32–36, 77–84 and 379–91 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 22–25, 61–68 and 331–42).
39. For an elucidating treatment of this subject see Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 216–34.
40. In the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, no. 231 (25 Feb. 1849), MEW, vol. 6, p. 245.
41. For instance in his celebrated speech at Marx’s graveside, SW, vol. 3, p. 162.
42. See The German Ideology, p. 38, and the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, SW, vol. 1, p. 503 (MEW, vol. 3, p. 27 and vol. 13, p. 9). The verb Marx employed in each of these passages is ‘bestimmen’. See also The German Ideology, p. 42 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 30–31), where Marx speaks of consciousness as a social product. In Capital, vol. 1, ch. 19 he portrays certain ideas of political economists as ‘imaginary expressions’ which only represent relations of production. See Marx, Capital, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954–62), vol. 1, pp. 535–42 (MEW, vol. 23, pp. 557–64).
43. Cohen’s neglect of the passage might appear understandable in view of the stress he places upon human agency and rational purpose as features of the technological forces of production Marx describes (see Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, p. 147). That would be an utterly misleading impression, however, since Cohen has elsewhere devoted a whole article to the subject of ‘Being, Consciousness and Roles: On the Foundations of Historical Materialism’, in eds. Chimen Abramsky and Beryl Williams, Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr (London, 1974), pp. 82–97. There he discusses the remark from the Preface and takes issue with Plamenatz over its interpretation (in Plamenatz’s Ideology [London, 1971], chs. 2 and 3), claiming (p. 95) that ‘a person’s “being”, in the sense of Marx’s thesis, is the economic role he occupies’. I am extremely grateful to Jerry Cohen for drawing my attention to that essay and thus sparing me a most embarrassing oversight, but I still cannot see how he reconciles the meaning of this passage with the theory of history he attributes to Marx, in so far as that theory is said to allow a determinant place to what rational men do.
44. Marx, The German Ideology, pp. 491–92 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 432–33).
45. See Rousseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 164 and 177–78 [DI 161, 172–74], and the Contrat social II.7, in OC, vol. 3, p. 383 [SC 70–71].
46. See Rousseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, in OC, vol. 3, p. 151 [DI 149], and my ‘Perfectible Apes in Decadent Cultures: Rousseau’s Anthropology Revisited’, Daedalus 107.3 (Summer 1978): 118–20.
47. Against the general drift of my argument here David McLellan reminds me that Marx likewise believed that men make their own history, while Terrell Carver and Michael Evans perceive a more prominent place for language in Marx’s thought—in the ‘fetishism of commodities’, the ‘riddle of money’, and indeed his whole theory of ideology—than I have allowed. But it is economic producers, according to Marx, rather than moral agents, who characteristically shape our history, and its main patterns are not determined by individual, collective, or even conflicting, choice. Equally it is the illusory or ‘fantastic’, rather than linguistic, character of ideology and fetishism on which Marx lavishes most of his attention, at the same time pointing to an underlying reality which these abstractions are said to betoken or conceal: ‘The verbal masquerade only has meaning when it is the unconscious or deliberate expression of an actual masquerade’ (Marx, The German Ideology, p. 449, MEW, vol. 3, p. 394).
48. See Rousseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, in OC, vol. 3, p. 138 [DI 137–38].
49. See ibid., in OC, vol. 3, p. 177 [DI 167].
50. Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, in OC, vol. 3, p. 7 [DSA 6–7].
51. Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, ed. Charles Porset (Bordeaux, 1970), ch. 19, p. 187 [OC, vol. 5, p. 424; EOL 295]. For an assessment of some political aspects of Rousseau’s theory of music see my ‘Rousseau on Rameau and Revolution’, in R. F. Brissenden and J. C. Eade (eds.), Studies in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 4 (Canberra, 1979), pp. 251–83.
52. Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, ch. 20, p. 199 [OC, vol. 5, p. 428; EOL 299].
53. Marx, The German Ideology, p. 32 (MEW, vol. 3, p. 21). This famous line actually concludes a paragraph in which Marx speaks of the mode of production as a ‘definite form of activity’ of individuals which gives expression to their life. It is worth noting, therefore, as McLellan points out to me, that the final sentence seems a Non sequitur, though I cannot agree that the preceding sentences ‘entirely accord with Rousseau’.
54. Especially towards the end of his life Marx did read widely and meticulously through much of the current literature in cultural anthropology (see The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, ed. L. Krader [Assen, 1974]). But he did not show as much interest in the subject or its literature as Rousseau had done in the 1750s, and he never shared Rousseau’s (nor even Engels’s) fascination for physical anthropology.
55. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 48, p. 800 (MEW, vol. 25, p. 828).
56. Marx, Wages, Price and Profit, ch. 13, SW, vol. 2, p. 68 (MEW, vol. 16, p. 144).
57. Marx, Capital, vol. 1, 10, p. 302 (MEW, vol. 23, p. 320).
58. See Marx, The German Ideology, pp. 267 and 413 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 229 and 362).
59. See ibid., pp. 37–38 (MEW, vol. 3, pp. 26–27).
60. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 21, pp. 333–34 (MEW, vol. 25, pp. 351–52). In the Critique of the Gotha Programme (SW, vol. 3, p. 16, MEW, vol. 19, p. 18) the point is made as follows: ‘Is not [the present-day distribution] the only “fair” distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of production? Are economic relations regulated by legal conceptions or do not, on the contrary, legal relations arise from economic ones?’
61. These propositions are elaborated in an engaging essay by Allen Wood (‘The Marxian Critique of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 [1972]: 244–82), to which my remarks in this paragraph are much indebted (see especially pp. 260–75). For replies to Wood by Ziyad Husami and George Brenkert, and for Wood’s rejoinder, see also Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1978–79): 27–64, 122–47 and 267–95.
62. See Wood, ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice’, pp. 265 and 268–69.
63. In ‘Freedom and Private Property in Marx’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979): 122–47, Brenkert argues that Marx’s conception of freedom is a moral ideal, even if his view of justice is not, while McLellan informs me that Marx probably judged communism to be better than capitalism in terms of his picture of human nature and needs. Both of these claims, however, seem to me to draw their strength more from what Marx must have meant than from what he actually said.
64. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW, vol. 3, p. 19 (MEW, vol. 19, p. 21). I find it difficult to agree with Cohen that this passage implies that Marx thought moralities might be assessed one against another, some being found ‘higher’.
65. See Marx and Engels, The Holy Family (Moscow, 1956), p. 53 (MEW, vol. 2, p. 38).
66. See Marx, The German Ideology, p. 47 (MEW, vol. 3, p. 35).
67. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW, vol. 3, p. 14 (MEW, vol. 19, p. 16).
68. See, for instance, Rousseau’s Contrat social III.8–9, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 414–20 [SC 100–05]; Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, chs. 2–3, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 956–66 [P 179–89]; and Emile V, in OC, vol. 4, pp. 850–51 [E 468–69].
69. Hence, Rousseau wrote in the Contrat social III.8, in OC, vol. 3, pp. 414–15 [SC 100–01], ‘Liberty, as it is not the fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples. . . . In every climate there are natural factors according to which one may assign the form of government that climate requires, and, we might even say, what sort of inhabitants it must have’.
70. See Rousseau, Emile V, in OC, vol. 4, p. 836 [E 458].
71. Rousseau, Contrat social I.3, in OC, vol. 3, p. 354 [SC 44].
72. Ibid., III.12, in OC, vol. 3, p. 425 [SC 110].
73. See Emile II, in OC, vol. 4, p. 305 [E 81].
74. See Rousseau’s Lettre sur les spectacles, ed. M. Fuchs (Geneva, 1948), pp. 181–82n. [OC, vol. 5, pp. 123–24; LD 350–51] and Julie, ou la Nouvelle Hélöise V.7, in OC, vol. 2, p. 607 [J 497].
75. See Rousseau, Lettre sur les spectacles, pp. 168–69 [OC, vol. 5, pp. 114–15; LD 343–44].
76. See Rousseau, Lettres de la montagne VI, in OC, vol. 3, p. 810 [LWM 233–34].
77. See Rousseau, Emile IV, in OC, vol. 4, p. 549 [E 253].
78. Marx encouraged a communist revolution in Germany most vigorously in his Address to the Communist League of 1850. His endorsement of a Russian revolution based upon an indigenous form of peasant communism, which might signal proletarian uprisings in the West, appears or is implied in at least three places: a letter on Mikhailovsky of 1877, a letter to Vera Zasulich of 1881 and the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto.
79. See Rousseau, Emile III, in OC, vol. 4, pp. 468–69 and n. [E 194].
80. See Rousseau’s letter to the comtesse de Wartensleben, 27 Sept. 1766, in R. A. Leigh (ed.), Correspondance complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau (Geneva, Banbury and Oxford, 1965–[98]), no. 5450, vol. 30, pp. 384–88.
81. See Rousseau, Lettres de la montagne VI, in OC, vol. 3, p. 809 [LWM 233].
82. See Rousseau’s Confessions, in OC, vol. 1, p. 384 [C 358], and my ‘Rousseau on Rameau and Revolution’, pp. 251–55.
83. Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man, p. 472.
84. Rousseau, ‘Dernière réponse’ [to Borde], in OC, vol. 3, p. 94 [LR 83].
85. See Rousseau, Emile V, in OC, vol. 4, p. 859 [E 474].
86. My remarks about Rousseau in this final section are much inspired by the work of Ralph Leigh, Jean Starobinski, and Bronislaw Baczko, as well as Plamenatz. I am also grateful to several colleagues and other scholars who have read an earlier draft of the whole text, and whose expert knowledge, especially on Marx, has saved me from more errors than those that remain: Jerry Cohen, Michael Evans, Norman Geras, David McLellan, John Hope Mason, David Miller, Hillel Steiner, and William Weinstein. To Terrell Carver, who differs sharply from the bulk of my statements about Marx, my greatest thanks are due. If I have not managed always to be persuaded by him or others I take some comfort at least from their lack of an agreed alternative interpretation.
1. Cf. especially Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 5–57 and 100–43; Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952), pp. 3–11; Jean-François Lyotard, Le Différend (Paris, 1983), pp. 95–101; and Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1–30. I shall address some of the already vast literature on this subject in The Enlightenment Project and Its Critics [not completed], of which a kind of prefatory outline bearing the same title appears in Sven-Eric Liedman (ed.), ‘The Postmodernist Critique of the Project of Enlightenment’, special issue, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 58 (1997): 13–30.
2. See Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1932), particularly pp. 102–03. On Becker’s anticipations of the postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment, see especially Johnson Kent Wright, ‘The Pre-postmodernism of Carl Becker’, Historical Reflections 25.2 (1999): 1–19.
3. See Michel Foucault, ‘Une histoire restée muette,’ Quinzaine littéraire 8 (1966): 3–4.
4. Alfred Cobban, ‘The Enlightenment and Germany’, Spectator 26 September 1952, pp. 406–08.
5. See Gay, ‘The Social History of Ideas: Ernst Cassirer and After’, in Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr. (ed.), The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse (Boston, 1967), p. 117: ‘The really serious difficulty in Cassirer’s conception of intellectual history is . . . his failure to do justice to the social dimension of ideas’.
6. Among the most notable intellectual biographies of Cassirer are Dmitry Gawronsky’s ‘Ernst Cassirer: His Life and His Work’, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (Evanston, 1949), pp. 1–37; Toni Cassirer’s Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, first printed privately in 1950 (repr., Hildesheim, 1981); and David Lipton’s Ernst Cassirer: The Dilemma of a Liberal Intellectual in Germany, 1914–1933 (Toronto, 1978).
7. This proposition forms the kernel of my own contribution, ‘The Enlightenment, the Nation-State and the Primal Patricide of Modernity’, to the collection I have recently edited with Norman Geras, in The Enlightenment and Modernity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 161–83.
8. See d’Alembert’s Mélanges de littérature, d’histoire et de philosophie (Amsterdam, 1760), vol. 1, p. 246. As Thomas L. Hankins remarks in his Jean d’Alembert: Science and the Enlightenment (Oxford, 1970), p. 2: Cassirer ‘apparently found [the] most characteristic exemplification [of the “mind” of the Enlightenment] in d’Alembert’.
9. Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen, 1932) (hereafter PA), p. xvi, and The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James Pettegrove (Princeton, 1951) (hereafter PE), p. xi.
10. PA, p. xii; PE, p. viii.
11. See d’Alembert’s ‘Discours préliminaire’ in his Mélanges de littérature, vol. 1, pp. 36 and 156–57. D’Alembert here elaborates a theme of his Recherches sur la précession des équinoxes of 1749, which is pursued as well in somewhat different terms in Condillac’s Traité des systèmes of the same year, an intellectual link noted by Cassirer himself.
12. PA, p. 9; PE, p. 8.
13. See d’Alembert’s ‘Essai sur les éléments de philosophie’, in his Mélanges de littérature, vol. 4, pp. 1–6.
14. PA, p. 10; PE, p. 9.
15. PA, p. 13; PE, p. 11.
16. See PA, p. 336; PE, p. 251.
17. See PA, p. viii; PE, p. v.
18. See PA, pp. 477–78; PE, p. 357.
19. See PA, p. 482; PE, p. 360.
20. See PA, p. 444; PE, p. 331.
21. See PA, p. 39; PE, p. 30.
22. PA, p. 43; PE, p. 33.
23. PA, pp. 476–77; PE, p. 356.
24. See PA, pp. 308–09; PE, pp. 230–31.
25. PA, pp. 311–12; PE, p. 233.
26. See PA, p. 326; PE, p. 243.
27. See PA, pp. 332–33; PE, p. 248.
28. See PA, pp. 337–38; PE, p. 252.
29. PA, p. 339; PE, pp. 252–53.
30. See PA, pp. 332–33; PE, p. 248.
31. See PA, p. 351; PE, p. 262.
32. PA, p. 337; PE, p. 251.
33. PA, p. 367; PE, p. 274.
34. PA, p. 364; PE, p. 271.
35. See Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Westport, Conn., 1968), p. xiv.
36. For an elaboration and defence of this claim, see my ‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’, in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.), Toleration in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 69–85.
37. On the meeting of Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, see especially ‘Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger’, in Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 4th ed., in Heidegger’s Gestamtausgabe (Frankfurt, 1991), vol. 3, pp. 274–96; Pierre Aubenque (ed.), Débat sur le kantisme et la philosophie (Paris, 1972); Aubenque, ‘Le Débat de 1929 entre Cassirer et Heidegger’, in Jean Seidengart (ed.), Ernst Cassirer: De Marbourg à New York: L’itinéraire philosophique, Actes du colloque de Nanterre, 12–14 octobre 1988 (Paris, 1990), pp. 82–96; John M. Krois, ‘Aufklärung and Metaphysik: Zur Philosophie Cassirers und der Davoser Debatte mit Heidegger’, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2 (1992): 273–89; and Geoffrey Waite, ‘On Esotericism: Heidegger and/or Cassirer at Davos’, Political Theory 26 (1998): 603–51.
38. Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven, 1946), p. 293.
39. Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau des progrès de l’esprit humain, ed. Alain Pons (Paris, 1988), p. 296.
40. This essay, originally prepared for oral presentation at a 1998 ASECS discussion chaired by Mark Roche, owes a substantial debt to two unpublished works, each generously supplied to me by the author. These works are the forthcoming intellectual biography of Cassirer by Yehuda Elkana, of which I have consulted draft chapters devoted to World War I and the Davos Seminar; and an essay, ‘A Bright Clear Mirror: Cassirer’s The Philosophy of the Enlightenment’, by Johnson Kent Wright, soon to be published in What’s Left of the Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question edited by Keith Baker and Peter Hanns Reill [(Stanford, Calif., 2001), pp. 71–101]. I am grateful to these authors for the opportunity to consult their work, and also to the editors of Studies In Eighteenth-Century Culture for their forbearance in the face of my delay in completing the essay.
1. Ramin Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (London, 1992), pp. 95–96.
2. Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York, 1968, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 100–12.
3. In French, the expression ‘les lumières’ refers to the authors of Enlightenment ideas as well as to their doctrines’ collective character. Thanks to Rivarol and others, the term achieved a certain currency in the course of the French Revolution, and in the second half of the nineteenth century, partly by way of Taine’s surveys of the origins of contemporary France, what in English around the same time came to be described as the ‘the Age of Enlightenment’ was encapsulated in French as ‘le siècle des lumières’. On the inauguration in English of the expression The Enlightenment, see John Lough, ‘Reflections on Enlightenment and Lumières’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 8 (1985): 1–15, and especially James Schmidt, ‘Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, British Hegelians, and the Oxford English Dictionary’, Journal of the History of Ideas 64.3 (2003): 421–43. The modern imagery of the age of The Scottish Enlightenment owes much to James McCosh’s The Scottish Philosophy of 1875 and, above all, Henry Grey Graham’s Scottish Men of Letters of 1901, but it was first conceptualized within the eighteenth century by Dugald Stewart. With respect to the expression The Enlightenment Project, I am unaware of any published instances before the appearance in 1981 of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London, 1981); see chs. 5–6, pp. 49–75.
4. Norbert Hinske and Michael Albrecht (eds.), Was ist Aufklärung? Beiträge aus der Berlinischen Monatsschrift (Darmstadt, 1973); Ehrhard Bahr, Was ist Aufklärung? Thesen und Definition (Stuttgart, 1974); and James Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996). For Gegen-Aufklärung, see Friedrich Nietzsche’s Nachgelassene Fragmente of the spring and summer of 1877, in Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 1967–), sect. 4, vol. 2, p. 478, 22[17]: ‘Es giebt kürzere und längere Bogen in der Culturentwicklung. Der Höhe der Aufklärung entspricht die Höhe der Gegen-Aufklärung in Schopenhauer und Wagner’ [‘There are shorter and longer arches of cultural development. To the height of the Enlightenment corresponds the height of the Counter-Enlightenment in Schopenhauer and Wagner’].
5. William Barret, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York, 1958), p. 244.
6. Isaiah Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment, vol. 4 of The Great Ages of Western Philosophy (Boston, 1956), ch. 8, pp. 271–75.
7. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Philosophical Ideas of Giambattista Vico’, in Art and Ideas in Eighteenth-Century Italy (Rome, 1960), pp. 156–233.
8. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in Earl R. Wasserman (ed.), Aspects of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, 1965), reprinted in Encounter 25.1 (July 1965): 29–48 and 25.2 (August 1965): 42–51.
9. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London, 1990), pp. 91–174.
10. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism’, in G. P. Morice (ed.), David Hume: Bicentennial Papers (Edinburgh, 1977), reprinted in Berlin’s Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. and with a bibliography by Henry Hardy, with an introduction by Roger Hausheer (London, 1979); see especially pp. 181–85.
11. ‘It fell dead-born from the Press’, remarked Hume in his autobiography, recapitulating a line from Pope’s Epilogue to the Satires.
12. Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, first published by Thomas Butterworth in London in 1939, of which four editions and over ten translations had been published by 1978.
13. Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability, Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture no. 1 (London, 1954) and The Hedgehog and the Fox (London, 1953).
14. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (Oxford, 1959), most recently published in Berlin, Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford, 2002).
15. Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism (New Haven, 1984), ch. 1, ‘The Anatomy of Liberty’, pp. 28–52 and Lionel Gossman, ‘Benjamin Constant on Liberty and Love’, in Joseph Mali and Robert Wokler (eds.), Isaiah Berlin’s Counter-Enlightenment (Philadelphia, 2003), pp. 133–63.
16. Ernest Gellner, ‘Sauce for the Liberal Goose’ (review of John Gray, Isaiah Berlin [London, 1995]), Prospect, November 1995, p. 61.
17. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Montesquieu’, in his Against the Current, pp. 142, 144 and 157–58, and his ‘Two Concepts of Liberty, in Liberty, pp. 212–17.
18. Berlin’s pluralism was, to my mind, inspired ultimately by his reading of both Herder and John Stuart Mill, although its connections with later philosophical doctrines have still to be traced. I am unconvinced by Michael Ignatieff’s allusion in this regard (see his Isaiah Berlin: A Life [London, 1998], p. 336, n. 4) to James Fitzjames Stephen’s Liberty, Equality, Fraternity of 1873, and I suspect that ideas associated with pluralism would in Berlin’s own lifetime have come to his notice more by way of such distinctions as were made by W. D. Ross in 1930 in his account of The Right and the Good. Kingsley Martin, in his biography of Harold Laski (London, 1953), describes what he terms ‘the pluralist movement’ prevalent in London in the 1920s (see pp. 71–72 and 74), whose decentralist and syndicalist principles have scant connection with Berlin’s pluralism. In the final chapter of Isaiah Berlin, Gray argues (see pp. 141–56) that value-pluralism and liberalism are inconsistent ideals, notwithstanding Berlin’s endeavours to derive one from the other. But in his Conversations with Jahanbegloo (see p. 44) Berlin himself describes these principles as incompatible, even though he subscribes to each of them.
19. Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas (London, 1976), and Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. H. Hardy (London, 2000).
20. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, pp. 8–12, 13–16, 30–40, 111, 131–32, 143 and 169.
21. Ibid., pp. 57–62 and 212–13.
22. Ibid., pp. 14, 34–39, 131, 212, 233, 318 and 360.
23. Ibid., pp. 10, 55–56, 64–67, 73–78, 108, 192–96 and 314–15.
24. Ibid., pp. 15–16, 168–72, 176–77, 179–80, 189, 208–09, 224–25 and 231–39.
25. Isaiah Berlin, The Magus of the North: J. G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism, ed. H. Hardy (London, 1993), and Three Critics of the Enlightenment, pp. 283–84 and 328–29. As Hardy explains in his preface (p. 246), this text has been salvaged for readers partly by way of a machine relic found in the National Science Museum and the expertise of staff at the National Sound Archive, which together made possible the reconstitution of ‘Dictabelt’ recordings—now a defunct technology—embracing passages for which no original manuscript or typescript survived.
26. Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1965, ed. Henry Hardy (London, 1999).
27. White, books in review, Political Theory 5.1 (February 1977): 124–27, and Gardiner, review essays, History and Theory 16.1 (1977): 45–51. While largely welcoming Berlin’s scholarship, William Dray, however, in a critical notice, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9.1 (March 1979): 179–82, doubts whether Berlin had managed to establish Vico’s and Herder’s significance for readers today. Among commentaries of a predominantly descriptive rather than evaluative character, see, for instance, John Michael Krois, book reviews, Philosophy and Rhetoric 10.4 (Fall 1977): 276–80, and James C. Morrison, ‘Three Interpretations of Vico’, including assessments as well of Ferdinand Fellmann’s Das Vico-Axiom and Leon Pompa’s Vico, offering interpretations strikingly different both from Berlin’s and each other’s, Journal of the History of Ideas 39.3 (1978): 511–18.
28. Scouten, book reviews, Comparative Literature Studies 15.3 (1978): 336–40 (especially 338).
29. Hans Aarsleff, ‘Vico and Berlin’, collectively reviewing Russian Thinkers, Concepts and Categories, Against the Current, and Personal Impressions, as well as Vico and Herder, in the London Review of Books, 5–18 November 1981, pp. 6–7, succeeded by his published letter in retort to Berlin’s response of 3–16 June 1982, pp. 4–5. I greatly value Aarsleff’s friendship and regard his command of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century linguistics and philosophy as virtually unrivalled in the world of historical scholarship today. But, to my mind, his occasional rebuke of linguists and philosophers whose purportedly inflated self-esteem and standing he takes to be unmerited distracts from the strength of his arguments. Other critics, none more than Christopher Hitchens in an egregiously ill-tempered review of Ignatieff’s biography, have not hesitated to accuse Berlin of appeasement, inactivism or charlatanry. ‘Here is the rich man’s John Rawls’, remarks Hitchens (in the London Review of Books, 26 November 1998, p. 11), his aptitude for irony ‘conditioned . . . by his long service to a multitude of masters’.
30. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Professor Scouten on Herder and Vico’, Comparative Literature Studies 16.2 (June 1979): 141–45; and ‘Isaiah Berlin Responds to the Foregoing Criticisms of His Work’ and ‘Isaiah Berlin Writes’, London Review of Books, 5 November 1981, pp. 7–8, and 3 June 1982, p. 5.
31. W. H. Walsh, book reviews, Mind 87.346 (April 1978): 284–86 (especially p. 286).
32. Arnaldo Momigliano, ‘On the Pioneer Trail’, New York Review of Books, 11 November 1976, pp. 33–38 (especially pp. 34 and 38).
33. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), introduction, pp. 2–6, and ‘Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization’, dating from 1952, first published in Modern Judaism (1981), pp. 17–45, and reprinted in Strauss, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany, 1997), pp. 87–136. On Berlin’s assessment of Strauss, see Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, pp. 31–32.
34. British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 3 (1980): 89–106, and Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London, 1990), pp. 70–90. Berlin’s revisions first appeared in L. Pompa and W. H. Dray (eds.), Substance and Form in History: A Collection of Essays in Philosophy of History (Edinburgh, 1981).
35. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, pp. 76–78.
36. Ibid., p. 85.
37. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Liberty, p. 212.
38. The ‘Ionian fallacy’, as he termed it, was first discussed by Berlin in 1950 in his essay on ‘Logical Translation’ published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. It is treated in some detail by Claude Galipeau on pp. 50–58 of his Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism (Oxford, 1994).
39. John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London and New York, 1995), and my review, ‘Laying the Enlightenment to Rest’, Government and Opposition 32 (1997): 140–45.
40. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, pp. 21–22. Variants of the same argument appear in ‘The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West’, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, pp. 24–25, and in ‘Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism’, in Against the Current, pp. 162–64.
41. Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment, introduction, pp. 28–29.
42. Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, pp. 70–71.
43. Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952), preface, p. vii.
44. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, p. 32.
45. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1980).
46. Carl H. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1932), pp. 29–31.
47. On this theme, see especially my ‘The Enlightenment, the Nation-State and the Primal Patricide of Modernity’, in Norman Geras and Robert Wokler (eds.), The Enlightenment and Modernity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 161–62.
48. I have drawn the last three paragraphs largely from my own ‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’, in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.), Toleration in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 81–82.
49. See my ‘La Querelle des Bouffons and the Italian Liberation of France: A Study of Revolutionary Foreplay’, C. Duckworth and H. Le Grand (eds.), ‘Studies in the Eighteenth Century’, vol. 6, special issue, Eighteenth-Century Life 11, n.s., 1 (1987): 94–116.
50. I have in mind here Wolfgang Pröss’s edition of Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Munich, 2002).
51. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, pp. 281 and 328.
52. On this point, if I read him correctly, I largely subscribe to Aarsleff’s interpretation of a central tradition of Enlightenment linguistics and philosophy, inspired by Leibniz and embracing Locke, Condillac and Süssmilch, which he takes to have been misconstrued by other commentators, sometimes, as with regard not only to Berlin but also Noam Chomsky, because he regards them as skewed by nineteenth-century perspectives on the course of European intellectual history.
53. I have borrowed this remark from Mark Lilla.
54. In 1992 Jacques Derrida was awarded a highly contested honorary doctorate from Cambridge, by way of an unprecedented vote forced mainly by the university’s philosophers, triumphing with 336 votes in his favour against 204.
55. See especially the sixth chapter of Gray’s Isaiah Berlin, pp. 141–68.
56. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 7th ed. (Tübingen, 1953), p. 348, and Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven, 1946), p. 293.
57. Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, ch. 11, pp. 148–69.
58. Isaiah Berlin, ‘A Remarkable Decade. IV: Alexander Herzen’ (first published in Encounter in the mid-1950s), in Russian Thinkers, ed. Henry Hardy and Aileen Kelly, with an introduction by Kelly (London, 1978), p. 189.
59. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (London, 1953), pp. 46 and 79.
60. See especially Berlin’s commemorations of L. B. Namier and J. L. Austin in his Personal Impressions, ed. Henry Hardy, with an introduction by Noel Annan (London, 1980), pp. 63–82 and 101–15.
61. As recounted by Simon Schama at a meeting commemorating Berlin’s life and work held in New York’s Harvard Club in 1998.
62. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Jewish Slavery and Emancipation’, in The Power of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London, 2000), pp. 169–70.
63. Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, p. 234.
64. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Origins of Israel’ (first published by the Anglo-Israel Association in 1953), and ‘Jewish Slavery and Emancipation’, in The Power of Ideas, pp. 150 and 164.
65. Avishai Margalit, ‘Address delivered at the Commemoration in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford on 21st March 1998’, and Margalit, ‘The Crooked Timber of Nationalism’, in Ronald Dworkin, Mark Lilla and Robert B. Silvers (eds.), The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York, 2001), pp. 151–52.
66. See my ‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’, in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, pp. 69–85.
67. See the sixth of Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques. This text, incidentally, on account of its description of Presbyterians who only preach through their nose when they return to Scotland where they constitute the majority, might be said to form the Enlightenment’s reply to Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue.
68. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess’, in Against the Current, pp. 237–40, and Three Critics of the Enlightenment, pp. 296–97 and 309.
69. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Moses Hess’, in Against the Current, pp. 245 and 249.
70. On the circumstances surrounding the composition of Cassirer’s work and its defence of the German Enlightenment, see especially my ‘Ernst Cassirer’s Enlightenment: An Exchange with Bruce Mazlish’, in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 29 (2000): 335–48, and Kent Wright, ‘ “A Bright Clear Mirror”: Cassirer’s The Philosophy of the Enlightenment’, in Keith M. Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (eds.), What’s Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question (Stanford, 2001), pp. 71–101. Berlin reviewed the English translation of Cassirer’s Philosophie der Aufklärung, first published in 1951, in the English Historical Review 68 (1953): 617–19.
71. Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Westport, Conn., 1968), p. xiv.
72. Berlin, The Power of Ideas, p. 165.
73. Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, p. 21.
74. Perry Anderson, ‘Components of the National Culture’, New Left Review 50 (July–August 1968): 3–57.
75. Ibid., p. 3.
76. Ibid., pp. 7–8 and 15–19.
77. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Winston Churchill in 1940’, ‘President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’ and ‘Chaim Weizmann’, in Berlin, Personal Impressions (London, 1981), pp. 16, 31, 52–53 and 62.
78. Konrad Kalejs, allegedly a member of the Arajs Kommando Unit responsible for the murder of thousands of Latvian Jews during the Second World War, returned to Australia in January 2000 after a long stay in a retirement home in Leicestershire. He died in Melbourne the following year.
79. Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 113–16.
80. These remarks, initially prepared in January 2000 for the Oxford Political Thought Conference and the Tel Aviv symposium on ‘Isaiah Berlin’s Counter-Enlightenment’ from which this collection is drawn, were also delivered the following March as a public lecture at the Central European University in Budapest and subsequently for the political theory seminar at Harvard University directed by Harvey Mansfield. In their original format, and virtually without annotation, they were published in the second Jewish Studies Yearbook of the Central European University in 2002. I am grateful to Joshua Cherniss, Henry Hardy, Roger Hausheer, Joseph Mali and Wolfgang Pröss for supplying me with several leads and references.
This paper was first drafted for the Morrell Conference on ‘After MacIntyre’ at the University of York and then revised for the University of Manchester Political Thought Conference on ‘Truth and Rationality’ in March 1992. I am grateful to Keith Graham, John Horton, Geraint Parry and Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves for various comments on my views of MacIntyre’s philosophy; to Istvan Hont and Jim Moore for their reflections on Hutcheson; and above all to Dorothy Emmet for pointing me in the direction of MacIntyre’s M.A. dissertation, which she supervised.
1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London, 1981).
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London, 1988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry (London, 1990).
3. John Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man (Oxford, 1975), p. 472.
4. University of Manchester Library, M.A. thesis 7580, April 1951, pp. 1, 47–48, 81 and 92.