Americans tend to view the nation and its foreign policy in exceptional terms, with a history and a future unlike those of any other country. In recent decades, the United States has been seen as the “leader of the free world” and “the world’s sole superpower.” The result has been a kind of hubris, that the United States can dictate the terms of geopolitics and local politics to other parts of the world. Trump’s America First doctrine is an especially crass version of this hubris, as it supposes that the United States can reject UN treaties and decisions, break trade agreements, maintain unrivaled military dominance in all parts of the world, and go it alone when it chooses.
As the old aphorism puts it, this is worse than a crime, it is a mistake. The United States lacks the economic and technological advantage to thumb its nose at the world. American economic power, in relative terms, has declined markedly in recent decades, most importantly because of the economic rise of Asia, especially China. The world is converging economically, meaning that gaps in income per capita and technological know-how are shrinking. No country in the world, neither the United States nor China, will dominate the rest in the twenty-first century.
As America’s relative power has waned and others have begun to catch up, the United States has taken the increasing pushback as an affront. When the United States pushes NATO toward Russia’s borders, and Russia reacts, the United States blames Russia for its belligerence, rather than also noting the provocations of its own policies. When the United States intervenes in Iraq, Syria, and Libya to overthrow regimes, and China and Russia rebuke the United States, the U.S. position has been to accuse those countries of being obstructionist.
What look like offensive actions by America’s counterparts are often viewed as defensive actions by those same countries, a phenomenon known to political scientists as the “security dilemma.” Defensive actions by one country look offensive to the other, thereby provoking escalation. Throughout this book, I’ll invoke the security dilemma to encourage deeper scrutiny and understanding of world conflicts—from the world’s point of view, as well as America’s.
American exceptionalism could leave the United States on the sidelines as other parts of the world move forward. One notable case is the increasing economic and infrastructural integration of Eurasia, the giant land mass that is home to Europe and Asia. China has proposed the One Belt One Road initiative to link Asia and Europe in their common geographical home. The United States has so far stood aloof. Over time, Eurasia is likely to strengthen its economic, environmental, and investment cooperation. Instead of looking for dynamic new partnerships like these, the United States is falling back into old exceptionalist patterns—exemplified by revived tensions with Russia.
In this part, I will look at the history of American exceptionalism, its current manifestations, and what this vision misses.