10
Globalization as a Problem
Roland Robertson
The Crystallization of a Concept and a Problem
Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole. The processes and actions to which the concept of globalization now refers have been proceeding, with some interruptions, for many centuries, but the main focus of the discussion of globalization is on relatively recent times. In so far as that discussion is closely linked to the contours and nature of modernity, globalization refers quite clearly to recent developments. In the present book globalization is conceived in much broader terms than that, but its main empirical focus is in line with the increasing acceleration in both concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century. But it is necessary to emphasize that globalization is not equated with or seen as a direct consequence of an amorphously conceived modernity.
Use of the noun ‘globalization’ has developed quite recently. Certainly in academic circles it was not recognized as a significant concept, in spite of diffuse and intermittent usage prior to that, until the early, or even middle, 1980s. During the second half of the 1980s its use increased enormously, so much so that it is virtually impossible to trace the patterns of its contemporary diffusion across a large number of areas of contemporary life in different parts of the world. By now, even though the term is often used very loosely and, indeed, in contradictory ways, it has itself become part of ‘global consciousness,’ an aspect of the remarkable proliferation of terms centred upon ‘global.’ Although the latter adjective has been in use for a long time (meaning, strongly, worldwide; or, more loosely, ‘the whole’), it is indicative of our contemporary concern with globalization that the Oxford Dictionary of New Words (1991) actually includes ‘global’ as a new word, focusing specifically, but misleadingly, on its use in ‘environmental jargon.’ That same Dictionary also defines ‘global consciousness’ as ‘receptiveness to (and understanding) of cultures other than one’s own, often as part of an appreciation of world socio‐economic and ecological issues.’ It maintains that such a use has been much influenced by Marshall McLuhan’s idea of ‘the global village,’ introduced in his book Explorations in Communication (1960). The notion of compression, or ‘shrinking,’ is indeed present in that influential book about the shared simultaneity of media, particularly televisual, experience in our time. There can be little doubt that McLuhan both reflected and shaped media trends, so much so that in time we have come to witness (self‐serving) media attempts to consolidate the idea of the global community. On the other hand the media fully acknowledge the ‘nationality’ of particular media systems, and report at length on the tough realities of international relations, wars and so on. Such realities are far from the communal connotations which some have read into McLuhan’s imagery. In the same period when McLuhan’s notion of the global village was becoming influential there occurred the ‘expressive revolution’ of the 1960s. That was, to put it very simply, a ‘revolution’ in consciousness among the young in numerous parts of the world, centred upon such themes as liberation and love, in both individual and collective terms. In fact the Oxford Dictionary of New Words maintains that the current term ‘global consciousness … draws on the fashion for consciousness‐raising in the sixties’ (1991).
Undoubtedly the 1960s ‘revolution’ in consciousness had an important effect in many parts of the world, in its sharpening of the sense of what was supposedly common to all in an increasingly tight‐knit world. Yet, as we will see more fully, this sense of global interdependence has rapidly become recognized in numerous other, relatively independent, domains and fora. World wars, particularly World War II with its ‘humanity‐shaking’ events and its aftermath, the rise of what became known as the Third World, the proliferation of international, transnational and supranational institutions and the attempts to coordinate what has become known as the global economy have played crucial parts in the twofold process of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ ‘globalization.’ And surely McLuhan’s own Catholic‐tinged observations concerning the media‐centred ‘global village’ were partly shaped by such developments. […]
Coming to Terms with the World as a Whole
[…] My model of what, in the most flexible terms, may be called the global field is centred on the way(s) in which we think about globality in relation to the basic makeup of that field. My formulation is more multifaceted than that of Dumont, in that I think in terms of four major aspects, or reference points, rather than two. These are national societies; individuals, or more basically, selves; relationships between national societies, or the world system of societies; and, in the generic sense, mankind, which, to avoid misunderstanding, I frequently call humankind. […]
In the broadest sense I am concerned with the way(s) in which the world is ordered. Whereas I am setting out this model of order in what may appear to be formal terms, the intent which actually guides it is to inject flexibility into our considerations of ‘totality.’ In so far as we think about the world as a whole, we are inevitably involved in a certain kind of what is sometimes pejoratively called totalistic analysis. But even though my scheme does involve a ‘totalizing’ tendency, it does so partly in order to comprehend different kinds of orientation to the global circumstance. It will be seen that movements, individuals and other actors perceive and construct the order (or disorder) of the world in a number of different ways. In that sense what my model does is to facilitate interpretation and analysis of such variation. So there is a crucial difference between imposing a model of the global field on all the present and potential actors in that field and setting out a model which facilitates comprehension of variation in that field. The latter is an important consideration. My interest is in how order is, so to speak, done; including order that is ‘done’ by those seeking explicitly to establish legal principles for the ordering of the world. To put it yet another way, my model is conceived as an attempt to make analytical and interpretive sense of how quotidian actors, collective or individual, go about the business of conceiving of the world, including attempts to deny that the world is one.
Nevertheless, in spite of my acknowledgment of certain denials of global wholeness, I maintain that the trends towards the unicity of the world are, when all is said and done, inexorable. […]
Globalization refers in this particular sense to the coming into, often problematic, conjunction of different forms of life. This cannot be accurately captured in the simple proposition that globalization is ‘a consequence of modernity,’ which I consider specifically towards the end of this volume. Present concern with globality and globalization cannot be comprehensively considered simply as an aspect or outcome of the Western ‘project’ of modernity or, except in very broad terms, enlightenment. In an increasingly globalized world there is a heightening of civilizational, societal, ethnic, regional and, indeed individual, self‐consciousness. There are constraints on social entities to locate themselves within world history and the global future. Yet globalization in and of itself also involves the diffusion of the expectation of such identity declarations.
This model, which is presented diagrammatically in Figure 10.1, gives the basic outline of what I here call the global field but which for other purposes I call the global‐human condition. The figure indicates the four major components, or reference points, of the conception of globality, the basic way in which we are able as empirically informed analysts to ‘make sense’ of globality, as well as the form in terms of which globalization has in the last few centuries actually proceeded. Discussion of different, or alternative, forms in terms of which globalization might have occurred or, indeed, did partially occur are discussed in later chapters. To provide an example at this stage, it is clear that Islam historically has had a general ‘globalizing’ thrust; but had that potential form of globalization succeeded we would now almost certainly comprehend contemporary ‘globality’ differently. There would be a need for a different kind of model.
The model is presented in primary reference to twentieth‐century developments. In that it partly summarizes such developments it draws attention to increasing, interrelated thematizations of societies, individual selves, international relations and humankind. At the same time, it opens the way to the discussion and study of the ways in which the general pattern came historically to prevail. It also allows for different, indeed conflicting, empirical emphases within ‘the field’ […]
Figure 10.1 The global field.
First, while I have emphasized that my perspective allows for empirical variation with respect to what later I call images of world order and that my primary task in analyzing globalization is to lay bare and open up relatively neglected aspects of that theme, there are clearly moral and critical dimensions of my approach to globalization. I will only mention the most general here. There is certainly a sense in which I am trying to tackle directly the problem of global complexity, a point which will become even clearer when I address the question of the shifting contents of the four major components of my model. It will, I hope, also become clear that I am arguing for the moral acceptance of that complexity. In other words, complexity becomes something like a moral issue in its own right. Specifically, the way in which I tackle the issues of globality and globalization suggests that in order for one to have a ‘realistic’ view of the world as a whole one must, at least in the contemporary circumstance, accept in principle the relative autonomy of each of the four main components and that, by the same token, one should acknowledge that each of the four is in one way or another constrained by the other three. In one sense, then, overemphasis on one to the expense of attention to the other three constitutes a form of ‘fundamentalism.’ Simply put, one cannot and should not wish away the reality of one or more aspects of the terms in which globalization has been proceeding. This certainly does not exhaust the issue of the extent to which my approach to globalization is moral and critical. But it must suffice for the moment.
Second, there is the issue of the processes which bring about globalization – the ‘causal mechanisms’ or the ‘driving forces.’ What happens here to arguments about the dynamics of capitalism and the forces of imperialism which have undoubtedly played a large part in bringing the world into an increasingly compressed condition? In arguing that mine is a cultural perspective on globalization I do not wish to convey the idea that I consider the matter of ‘the forces’ or ‘the mechanisms’ of globalization unimportant. However, I am well aware that that is well‐trodden ground. The spread of Western capitalism and the part played by imperialism have been addressed at great length, as has the increasingly complex crystallization of the contemporary global economy. In contrast, the discussion of the disputed terms in which globalization has occurred and is occurring has been greatly neglected. It is that and directly related issues which form the main concern […], and it is hoped that such a cultural focus will place work in the more traditional vein in a new light. While the use of the term ‘culture’ here is certainly not as broad and all‐embracing as is to be found in some tendencies within the relatively new field of cultural studies, it is employed much more fluidly and adventurously than in conventional sociological work. In particular, my approach is used to demonstrate discontinuities and differences, rather than the traditional sociological view of culture as integrating. It is also meant to indicate a particular way of doing sociology, rather than a sociology that concentrates on culture as such.
Third, in my representation of the global field I have emphasized a number of processes of relativization. That term is meant to indicate the ways in which, as globalization proceeds, challenges are increasingly presented to the stability of particular perspectives on, and collective and individual participation in, the overall globalization process. As I have said, this picture of the global field has been produced in primary reference to contemporary globality and globalization. It is an ideal‐typical representation of what is meant here by global complexity. In one important respect it indicates overall processes of differentiation in so far as global complexity is concerned. Broadly speaking, application of the model involves the view that processes of differentiation of the main spheres of globality increase over time. Thus differentiation between the spheres was much lower in earlier phases of globalization; while the effects of such differentiation have been encountered unevenly and with different responses in different parts of the world. […]
Globalization and the Search for Fundamentals
The approach to globalization which I have been advocating takes its departure from empirical generalizations concerning the rapidly increasing compression of the entire world into a single, global field and conceptual ideas about the ways in which the world as a whole should be ‘mapped’ in broadly sociological terms. The two strands of elaboration are, of course, closely linked. In the relatively early stage of my attempts to theorize the topic of globalization the issue of ‘fundamentalism’ was conspicuous. Indeed it was partly in order to account for the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s that I revitalized my longstanding interest in ‘international’ phenomena. Coming to terms with fundamentalism and related issues has been a prominent aspect of my work on globalization, even though over the last ten years or so I have revised my thinking about the relationship between globalization and fundamentalism (more generally ‘the search for fundamentals’). Whereas my first formulations tended to see politicoreligious fundamentalism as resulting largely from compression of the inter‐societal system (fundamentalism as an attempt to express society identity), my more recent attempts to grasp analytically the more general problem of the assertion of ‘deep particularity’ on the global scene have centred upon the global construction and dissemination of ideas concerning the value of particularism. The first perspective involves an emphasis on space‐time compression leading to the felt necessity for societies (and regions and civilizations, as well as ‘subnational’ entities) to declare their identities for both internal and external purposes. It tends to involve a focus on fundamentalism as a reaction to, rather than as an aspect – or, indeed, a creation – of, globalization; although that was not the exclusive focus of my earlier perspective. The second approach involves a more definite stress on the idea that the expectation of identity declaration is built into the general process of globalization. This does not mean that the notion of fundamentalism as reaction or resistance is thereby relinquished, but that that possibility is now viewed in a more general frame.
There have been four major focal points of the dominant globalization process since the sixteenth century: nationally constituted societies; the international system of societies; individuals; and humankind. At the risk of repetition, my argument in this respect can be restated. It is largely in terms of the enhancement of each of these reference points, in the sense of their being tangibly crystallized, and the raising of problems about the relationships between them that the globalization process has proceeded in recent centuries. At the same time there have been changes in the ways in which each of these major components of the overall global circumstance has been operatively constructed. All of this means that we have to conceive of the concept of globalization as having primarily to do with the form in terms of which the world has moved towards unicity. So when we speak of globalization we must realize that we are referring above all to a relatively specific path that the world has taken in the direction of it becoming singular. The world could in theory, as I have argued, have become a single entity along different trajectories – without, for example, involving the salience of the national society which has actually been a vital ingredient of the overall globalization process. […]
Universalism and Particularism Globalized
In my perspective globalization in what I call its primary sense is a relatively autonomous process. Its central dynamic involves the twofold process of the particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. The particularization of the universal, defined as the global concretization of the problem of universality, has become the occasion for the search for global fundamentals. In other words, the current phase of very rapid globalization facilitates the rise of movements concerned with the ‘real meaning’ of the world, movements (and individuals) searching for the meaning of the world as a whole. The universalization of the particular refers to the global universality of the search for the particular, for increasingly fine‐grained modes of identity presentation. To put it as sharply as possible, I propose that ‘fundamentalism’ is a mode of thought and practice which has become almost globally institutionalized, in large part, as far as the twentieth century is concerned, in terms of the norm of national self‐determination, announced after World War I by Woodrow Wilson, given new life after World War II with respect to what became known as the Third World, and then expanded on a global scale to all manner of ‘entities’ from the 1960s onwards. In so far as analysts see ‘the search’ entirely in terms of an atavistic response to globalization they are failing to deal with the participatory aspect of globalization. This does not mean that there are no atavistic, isolationist or anti‐global responses to globalization. But we have to be very careful in delineating these. They are by no means self‐evident. […]
In addressing globalization I have paid particular attention to what I have called the take‐off period of modern globalization, lasting from about 1870 through to the mid‐1920s; and I have been struck by the extent to which in that period the general issue of the coordination of the particular and the universal received widespread practical and political attention. This was a time when there was great emphasis on the need to invent tradition and national identity within the context of an increasingly compressed, globalized world. Indeed much of the desire to invent tradition and identity derived from the contingencies of global compression and the concomitant spread of expectations concerning these. During the period lasting from about 1870 to 1925 basic geohuman contingencies were formally worked out in such terms as the time‐zoning of the world and the establishment of the international dateline; the near‐global adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the adjustable seven‐day week; and the establishment of international telegraphic and signaling codes. At the same time, there arose movements which were specifically concerned with the relationship between the local and the panlocal, one of the most notable being the ecumenical movement which sought to bring the major ‘world’ religious traditions into a coordinated, concultural discourse. On the secular front, the international socialist movement had parallel aims, but it was even more ambitious in that it sought to overcome strong particularism in the name of internationalism. A more specific case is provided by the rise at the end of the nineteenth century of the International Youth Hostel movement, which attempted an international coordination of particularistic, ‘back to nature’ ventures. Other particular–universal developments of the time include the modern Olympic Games and Nobel prizes. The contemporary use of such terms as ‘fundamentals’ and ‘fundamentalism’ was also established, mainly in the USA, in the same period.
What is particularly significant about this period is that the material circumstance of the world (as a heliocentric globe) was, as it were, dealt with in relationship to the rapidly spreading consciousness of the global world as such, greatly facilitated by recently developed rapid means of travel and communication, such as the airplane and the wireless. One crucial aspect of these trends was that events and circumstances previously segregated in space and time increasingly came to be considered as simultaneous in terms of categories which were universalistically particular and particularistically universal. Spatial and temporal categories and measures were globally institutionalized so as to both accentuate consciousness of difference and to universalize difference.
Needless to say, such developments did not emerge de novo during the period in question. The steady growth in map‐making and its globalization, the interpenetration of modes of ‘travelers’ tales,’ the growth of postal services, the increase in the spread of travel, the early rise of tourism – all these, and still other, developments lay in the background to the rapid trends of the crucial take‐off period of modern globalization. One particularly important development of a somewhat different kind concerned what has been called the politicization of archeology in the mid‐nineteenth century. As we have seen, in that earlier period the monuments of classical and biblical civilization in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece and other areas of the Near and Middle East became national quests, within the context of increasingly international and industrialized society. In turn these monuments have become the bases of the official national symbols of the peoples of the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. Now in those areas both local and non‐local archeologists are shaping ‘a new past for the peoples of that region.’ All of this began, it should be remembered, in a period of great (often imperial) concern with the unification of humankind.
In sum I argue that the search for fundamentals – in so far as it exists on any significant scale – is to a considerable degree both a contingent feature of globalization and an aspect of global culture. In a sense ‘fundamentalism within limits’ makes globalization work. […]