67
Ozone Depletion
Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown
Ozone is a pungent, slightly bluish gas composed of three oxygen atoms (O3). Ninety percent of naturally occurring ozone resides in the stratosphere. This “ozone layer” helps to shield the earth from ultraviolet radiation produced by the sun and plays a critical role in absorbing UV‐B radiation. Because large increases in UV‐B radiation would seriously harm nearly all plants and animals, the ozone layer is considered an essential component of the natural systems that make life on earth possible.
In the 1970s, scientists discovered that certain man‐made chemicals, called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), posed a serious threat to stratospheric ozone. CFCs release chlorine atoms into the stratosphere that act as a catalyst in the destruction of ozone molecules. Created in the 1920s to replace flammable and noxious refrigerants, CFCs are inert, nonflammable, nontoxic, colorless, odorless, and wonderfully adaptable to a wide variety of profitable uses. By the mid‐1970s, CFCs had become the chemical of choice for coolants in air conditioning and refrigerating systems, propellants in aerosol sprays, solvents in the cleaning of electronic components, and the blowing agent for the manufacture of flexible and rigid foam. Scientists later discovered other ozone‐depleting compounds, including halons, a tremendous and otherwise safe fire suppressant, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and methyl bromide. Each can release ozone‐destroying chlorine or bromine atoms into the stratosphere.
The economic importance of these chemicals, especially CFCs, made international controls extremely difficult to establish. The absence of firm scientific consensus on the nature and seriousness of the problem, a strenuous anti‐regulatory campaign by corporations producing or using CFCs, concerns for the cost of unilateral regulation, worries by developing countries that restricting access to CFCs would slow economic development, and opposition by the European Community prevented effective action for many years.
The political definition of the ozone depletion issue began in 1977. The fact‐finding process lasted many years, however, because scientific estimates of potential depletion fluctuated widely during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and no evidence emerged in nature to confirm the theory. Indeed, when the bargaining process formally began in 1982, the exact nature of the threat was unclear even to proponents of international action.
The United States, which at that time accounted for more than 40 percent of worldwide CFC production, took a lead role in the negotiations in part because it had already banned CFC use in aerosol spray cans, a large percentage of total use at that time, and wanted other states to follow suit. However, for an ozone‐protection policy to succeed, it was essential that all states producing and consuming CFCs be part of the regime. Thus, the European Community, which also accounted for more than 40 percent of global CFC production and exported a third of that to developing countries, opposed controls and constituted a potential veto coalition. Germany supported CFC controls, but the EC position was effectively controlled by the other large producing countries – France, Italy, and the United Kingdom – which doubted the science, wanted to preserve their industries’ overseas markets, and wished to avoid the costs of adopting substitutes. Japan, a major user of CFCs, supported this position.
Large developing countries, including Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia, formed another veto coalition. Their bargaining leverage stemmed from their potential to produce very large quantities of CFCs in the future – a situation that would eventually eviscerate the effectiveness of any regime. Although most developing countries did not play an active role early in the regime’s development, they eventually used this leverage to secure a delayed control schedule and precedent‐setting financial and technical assistance.
Although negotiations began with an explicit understanding that only a possible framework convention would be discussed, in 1983, the lead states (the US, Canada and the Nordic states) proposed the adoption of binding restrictions on CFC production. The veto coalition, led by the EC, steadfastly rejected negotiations for regulatory protocols. Thus, the regime’s first agreement, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, affirmed the importance of protecting the ozone layer and included provisions on monitoring, research, and data exchanges, but imposed no specific obligations to reduce the production or use of CFCs. Indeed, it did not even mention CFCs. However, because of a last‐minute US initiative, states did agree to resume formal negotiations on a binding protocol if further evidence emerged supporting the potential threat.
Only weeks after nations signed the Vienna Convention, British scientists published the first reports about the Antarctic ozone hole. Although the hole had been forming annually for several years, the possibility of its existence fell so far outside the bounds of existing theory that computers monitoring satellite data on ozone had ignored its presence as a data error. Publication of its existence galvanized proponents of CFC controls, who argued that the hole justified negotiations to strengthen the nascent regime (despite the lack of firm evidence linking the hole to CFCs until 1989). Thus, faced with domestic and international pressure, the veto states returned to the bargaining table in December 1986.
The lead states – a coalition that now included Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States – initially advocated a freeze followed by a 95 percent reduction in production of CFCs over a period of ten to fourteen years. The industrialized‐country veto coalition – the EC, Japan, and the Soviet Union – eventually proposed placing a cap on production capacity at current levels. Lead states argued that the capacity cap could lead to actual increases in CFC production (and involve few adjustment costs for veto states) because Europe already possessed significant excess production capacity. Lead states then offered a 50 percent cut as a compromise. As late as April 1987, the EC would not accept more than a 20 percent reduction, but relented in the final days of negotiations. The ten‐year evolution of the EC position from rejecting all discussion of control measures to proposing a production cap to accepting a compromise reduction target reflected several factors: disunity within the European Community (West Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands all supported strong regulations); the personal role played by UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] Executive Director Tolba; diplomatic pressures by the United States; pressure from domestic NGOs; and reluctance by the EC to be seen as the culprit should negotiations fail to produce an agreement.
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer mandated that industrialized countries reduce their production and use of the five most widely used CFCs by 50 percent. Halon production would be frozen. The expanded regime also included scientific and technological assessment panels, reporting requirements, potential trade sanctions for countries that did not ratify the agreement, and a robust procedure for reviewing the effectiveness of the regime and strengthening controls through amendment and adjustments. To gain the acceptance of the developing country veto coalition, delegates agreed to give developing countries a ten‐year grace period, allowing them to increase their use of CFCs before taking on commitments.
Within months of the Montreal accord, there emerged new scientific evidence supporting strengthening the regime. In late 1987, scientists announced that initial studies suggested that CFCs probably were responsible for the ozone hole, which continued to grow larger every year, although natural processes peculiar to Antarctica contributed to its severity. Studies during the next two years confirmed these findings. In March 1988, satellite data revealed that stratospheric ozone above the heavily populated Northern Hemisphere had begun to thin. Finally, the 1989 report of the regime’s own Scientific Assessment Panel signaled conclusively that the world’s scientific community had reached broad agreement that CFCs had indeed begun to deplete stratospheric ozone.
This period also saw changes in the pattern of economic interests. In 1988, DuPont announced that they would soon be able to produce CFC substitutes. They were followed the next year by other large chemical manufacturers, including several in Europe. The major producers no longer opposed a CFC phaseout but lobbied instead for extended transition periods and against controls on potential substitutes, particularly hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) – a class of CFC substitutes that deplete ozone but at a significantly reduced rate. In response to these scientific and economic changes, and to increased pressure from domestic environmental lobbies, the EC abruptly shifted roles.
At the second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP‐2), in London in June 1990, EC states assumed a lead role during difficult negotiations that eventually produced amendments and adjustments that significantly strengthened the regime. Production of the CFCs and halons controlled in 1987, and of carbon tetrachloride and all other CFCs and halons, would now be phased out by 2000, and methyl chloroform by 2005. […]
In response to evidence of increasing ozone‐layer depletion, parties again strengthened the regime at MOP‐4 in Copenhagen in 1992. Delegates accelerated the existing phaseouts and added controls on additional chemicals, including […] HCFCs, which parties agreed to phase out by 2030, all but 0.5 percent being eliminated by 2020. MOP‐4 also established an Implementation Committee that examines cases of possible noncompliance and makes recommendations to the MOP aimed at securing compliance.
During this period, the EC and United States completed a near reversal of their respective roles during the regime’s development in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1993, the EC argued for the importance of eliminating all threats to the ozone layer as soon as possible when it began the first in a series of attempts to accelerate HCFC controls. Meanwhile, a veto coalition led by the United States and Australia argued that further restrictions on HCFCs would not reduce enough total damage to the ozone layer to justify the extra costs; it would prevent firms that had made significant, and good‐faith, investments in HCFC technologies (as substitutes for CFCs) from recouping their investment; a significant proportion of the substitutes for HCFCs would be hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are potent greenhouse gases manufactured almost exclusively by European companies; and other available measures would have a greater impact on the ozone layer. […]
At MOP‐11, held in Beijing in 1999, the EC finally secured US agreement to strengthen controls on HCFCs, albeit modestly. MOP‐11 also agreed to phase out the production of bromochloromethane (a recently developed ozone‐depleting chemical […]). The Beijing amendment also bans trade in HCFCs with countries that do not ratify the 1992 Copenhagen amendment, which introduced the HCFC phaseout. […]
The history of global ozone policy illustrates the role that veto coalitions play in weakening a regime as well as how veto states sometimes shift roles as a result of increasing scientific evidence, domestic political pressures, and changing economic interests. It is also the best example of a global environmental regime that has been continually strengthened in response to new scientific evidence and technological innovations.
Indeed, when one combines all the amendments and adjustments to the Montreal Protocol, the current set of binding controls is impressive. Industrialized countries were required to phase out halons by 1994; CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and HBFCs by 1996; bromochloromethane by 2002, and methyl bromide by 2005 – although various exceptions exist. These parties must still phase out HCFCs by 2030 as well as meet important interim targets. Developing country parties were required to phase out hydrobromofluorocarbons by 1996 and bromochloromethane by 2002. These parties must still phase out CFCs, halons, and carbon tetrachloride by 2010; methyl chloroform and methyl bromide by 2015; and the consumption of HCFCs by 2040.
Figure 67.1 Worldwide production of CFCs, HCFCs, and HFCs.
Data source: Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS), “Production and Sales of Fluorocarbons,” (Arlington, VA: RAND Environmental Science & Policy Center, 2004). http://www.afeas.org/2002/production_2002.html.
The ozone regime stands as perhaps the strongest and most effective global environmental regime. The worldwide consumption of CFCs, which was about 1.1 million tons in 1986, was approximately 100,000 tons in 2003. The Ozone Secretariat calculates that without the Montreal Protocol, global CFC consumption would have reached about 3 million tons in 2010 and 8 million tons in 2060, resulting in a 50 percent depletion of the ozone layer by 2035. (See Figure. 67.1.) Most parties continue to meet their commitments to reduce or eliminate production and consumption of ozone depleting chemicals; as a result, atmospheric concentrations of these chemicals are declining and, if all the mandated phaseouts are fully achieved (still a big “if”), the ozone layer could fully recover during the twenty‐first century. […]