28
Natural Gas: Aftermath in Canada
2007
The new CEO of the Bank of Montreal, Bill Downe, must report a record loss for the second quarter of 2007 due to failed commodity price speculation. Half a year after Amaranth’s bankruptcy, another natural gas trading scandal shakes market participants’ confidence.
“How all of a sudden does a USD 450 million loss just materialize like this? Was it a lack of control from a risk perspective or was somebody hiding trades in a desk drawer?”
—Leigh Parkinson, Risk Advisory
It was the middle of April when three of the directors of Optionable, a New York commodity broker, unloaded a share package worth nearly 30 million USD. Just days later, the auditor Deloitte and Touche released a report to its principal, the Bank of Montreal (BMO), stating that there was a 350 to 450 million CAD loss in its natural gas portfolio. This came as a nasty surprise for CEO Bill Downe, who had been in his position for only a month and who was about to announce BMO’s quarterly figures.
A Canadian Institution
Founded in 1817, the Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the fourth-largest bank in Canada in terms of deposits and has played a major role in the development of the country, having financed the construction of the first transcontinental railroad in the 1880s. Today BMO’s business activities are divided into private and commercial clients (retail banking), investment banking (BMO capital markets), and wealth management. Tony Comper served as CEO from 1990 to 2007, and during his leadership, in 2000, a small trading scandal occurred in futures trading of natural gas, causing damage of around 30 million CAD. Seven years later, Bill Downe took over.
The responsible trader at BMO was David Lee, who dealt in natural gas options both on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and over the counter. Lee had joined BMO in his mid-20s, coming from the Bank of New York, where he had been involved in building the commodity derivatives business from scratch. Beginning as an analyst, he soon switched to trading and specialized in natural gas options.
At BMO, Lee handled a large portion of his trades via Optionable. For a broker like Optionable with fewer than 20 employees, these trades represent almost 30 percent of his total revenue. It was no wonder that Lee and Kevin Cassidy, the CEO of Optionable, were close friends.
BMO’s commodity trading achieved a huge profit in 2006.
Trading in natural gas delivered an attractive additional income for BMO. Its commodity trading was 15 to 20 times larger than that of the Canadian market leader, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). BMO’s energy-trading business had grown to 25 traders. The bank had offices in Houston, New York, and Canadian energy metropolis Calgary, where in March 2006, at BMO’s annual general meeting, Tony Comper had announced excellent results in the investment banking segment, driven primarily by trading profits in oil and gas.
The commodity business was booming. Due to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the price of natural gas was rising. In 2004 and the first half of 2005, the price hovered between 6 and 7 USD, but after the hurricane season, corporate clients increasingly were interested in price-hedging transactions. In December 2005, the price of US natural gas went over 15 USD/MMBtu.
This trend did not go on forever, though. Within weeks benchmark gas prices in New York had lost around two-thirds of their value. A mild winter ensured a sufficient supply of the commodity, which this time was unaffected by hurricanes. Customer interest cooled down significantly, but energy trading at BMO continued to grow.
The BMO team around David Lee was betting on a rebound in prices.
BMO’s star trader David Lee got it massively wrong with natural gas options.
Market participants could see that someone was building massive options positions on the NYMEX and over the counter, but prices continued to fall and volatility declined. The value of call options imploded.
The trading positions in Lee’s team were getting out of balance, but he was able to disguise his losses with the help of Optionable. Later the law firm Schatz Nobel Izard would accuse Optionable of having helped the BMO trader falsify his book and, among other things, of confirming incorrect trading prices. When Deloitte and Touche examined the upcoming quarterly figures, the loss could no longer be concealed. The auditors estimated the deficit came to 350 to 450 million CAD. BMO canceled collaboration with Optionable immediately, and Optionable stock lost almost 90 percent of its value.
Figure 25. Natural gas prices in USD/MMBtu, 2003–2007, New York Mercantile Exchange. Data: Bloomberg, 2019.
At the end of April 2007, just days before the announcement of its quarterly figures, BMO announced a profit warning and pointed to the bank’s deferred trading positions in the commodity market, namely positions in natural gas, that would weigh heavily on quarterly profits. Companies such as Goldman Sachs and Citadel, a major Chicago hedge fund manager, showed interest in taking over the portfolio. However, BMO’s managers were convinced that they could handle the situation themselves. It turned out, though, that publicizing the trading positions before they could be reduced was the wrong strategy. The losses continued to increase.
When the quarterly figures came out in May, BMO had upped the losses on its commodity trading book to 680 million USD, the equivalent of about 12 percent of its total annual profit. Gritting his teeth, Downe reported the biggest trade loss of any Canadian bank in history, blaming market illiquidity and lower volatility. His rationale was not wrong, but market participants were skeptical, and analysts asked some unpleasant questions, about both the bank’s business strategy and the quality of its risk management. Bob Moore, executive managing director for commodity products, and David Lee had to leave the company. Lee was fined 500,000 USD and was banned from working in the banking industry. The total cost of the BMO trade scandal added up to around 850 million USD.
Key Takeaways
•Half a year after Amaranth Advisors’ bankruptcy, another natural gas trading scandal shook the commodity markets in 2007.
•David Lee was a celebrated star trader at BMO, and he and his team bet on a rebound of natural gas prices, after prices had declined from a record high of 15 USD due to damages from a record hurricane season.
•But prices declined further. Natural gas even traded temporarily below 4 USD again. For a while, Lee could disguise his loss of 350 to 450 million USD with the help of his broker Optionable. But auditors uncovered the problem.
•After earning record profits the year before, Lee’s energy trading imploded. Losses from the trading scandal added up to more than 800 million USD.