SOURCES
INTERVIEWS
Army Captain Nathan Self, Silver Star, Bronze Star with V Device, Bronze Star, Purple Heart; Staff Sgt. Raymond M. DePouli, Silver Star; Spec. Aaron Totten-Lancaster, Silver Star, Purple Heart; Spec. Anthony Miceli, Bronze Star with V Device; Staff Sgt. Joshua Walker, Silver Star; Staff Sgt. Arin Canon, Silver Star; Sgt. Eric Stebner, Silver Star; Staff Sgt. Harper Wilmoth, Silver Star; Spec. Jonas O. Polson, Bronze Star with V Device; Spec. Randy J. Pazder, Bronze Star with V Device; Spec. Omar J. Vela, Bronze Star with V Device, Sgt. Matt LaFrenz, Silver Star—all from Company A, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Major (Dr.) Brian Burlingame, CO, 274th Surgical Team; Staff Sgt. Kevin D. Vance, Bronze Star with V Device, Purple Heart, interview augmented by his seven-page sworn statement on March 29, 2002, before Erin Bree Wirtanen, at Bagram; Staff Sgt. Gabriel Brown, Silver Star; Tech Sgt. Keary Miller, Silver Star; Tech Sgt. James Hotaling, Bronze Star with V Device; Lt. Col. Burt Bartley, 18th Fighter Squadron, Silver Star; Captain Andrew Lipina, Distinguished Flying Cross; Carol Darby, PAO, USASOCOM; CWO4 Alan Mack, 160th SOAR, Distinguished Flying Cross; Sgt. Dan Madden, 160th SOAR, Distinguished Flying Cross, Purple Heart; Col. Andrew Milani, CO, 160th SOAR; CWO4 Jason Friel, 160th SOAR, Distinguished Flying Cross; CWO4 Greg Calvert, 160th SOAR, Distinguished Flying Cross, Purple Heart; Cory Lamereaux, 160th SOAR, Silver Star; CWO5 Don Tabron, 160th SOAR, Silver Star; CO TF Blue, U.S. Navy SEALs; SEAL Master Chief Petty Officer “Slab,” Navy Cross; Kyle, Turbo, Randy, Vic Hyder, and Brett, Silver Stars; Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy SEALs and Deputy CO USCOCOM; “Brian” and “Rick,” U.S. Navy, SEAL Team 8; Capt. Donald Lee Sayre, CO, SEAL Team 8; Maj. D.J. Turner, Distinguished Flying Cross; Capt. Ian Marr, Distinguished Flying Cross; Major Dwight Davis. I used interviews conducted by Special Operations Command, Col. Milani, and two USSOCOM historians, Maj. Dave Christ, USMC, and Master Sgt. Eric Nunes, for SEAL Lt. Cmdr. Vic Hyder; Col. Frank Anders; Sheila Maghuhn (Crose's mother); Kelly Tyler, PAO, 160th SOAR; Dave and Judy Anderson (Marc's mother and father); Pat Marek (mother of Matt Commons); Pat and Jeanne Miceli; Jackie and Red Cunningham (mother and father of Jason); Terry Giaccone (mother of Chapman); Valerie Chapman (wife of John); Mike West, AF CCT and friend of Chapman; Roseann Svitak (mother of Philip); Marie Thompson (Gabe Brown's mother); Gloria Brown (wife of Gabe); Tammy Klein (sister of Chapman); Kenny Longfritz (24th STS's “first shirt”); Lori McQueeney (sister of Chapman); David Klein (Chapman's brother-in-law); David Rabel; Brian Torpor; Dave Allen.
BOOKS
The Hunt for Bin Laden, Robin Moore, Random House, 2003. Nobody can fault Mr. Moore's timing of his account of Operation Enduring Freedom, including a thumbnail report of Takur Ghar, though I would look elsewhere for a comprehensible view of the fighting of U.S. Army Special Forces Task Force Dagger.
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Edward N. Luttwak, Harvard University Press, 1990. Describes the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. Invaluable, brilliant, original.
Maneuver Warfare Handbook, William S. Lind, Westview Press, 1985.
Al-Qaeda's Great Escape, Philip Smucker, Brassey's Inc., 2004. A highly readable, detailed, and often amusing account of the hunt for bin Laden from the fall of Jalalabad onward, leading up to and including a lively account of Operation Anaconda by a sharp-eyed journalist for Time magazine and the Christian Science Monitor. Smucker's views of Tora Bora and Anaconda are based on his own observations and interviews in Afghanistan at the time. A worthwhile read.
No Room for Error, Colonel John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer, Ballantine Books, 2002. Carney, who is the father of AF Special Tactics, and Schemmer present an overview of SOF missions from Desert One to Operation Enduring Freedom, showing the growing pains of America's efforts to raise special operations forces.
U.S. Special Forces, Alan M. Landau, Frieda W. Landau, et al. MBI Publishing Co., 1999. A thorough rundown of SOF forces, their equipment, histories, training, etc.
U.S. Special Operations Forces, Benjamin Schemmer and John T. Carney, Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, a bulging compilation of information about SOF from the Special Operations Warriors Foundation.
The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists, Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, New York, 1990. Another important work on, basically, the “fog and friction” of war.
In the Name of Osama Bin Laden, Roland Jacquard, Duke University Press, 2002.
Chechnya, Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, New York University Press, 1998. Gall, a great reporter, tells the tragic story of the meat grinder of Chechnya and helps readers to infer the motivation and character of Chechens who fought at Takur Ghar.
Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, Ahmed I, Yale University Press, 2000.
ARTICLES
“Report on Takur Ghar Mountain, 3–4 March 2002,” Lt. Col. Andrew N. Milani, Joint After Actions Reports Service Office, Ft. Bragg, classified secret (unpublished). Cited hereafter as JAARSO, this lengthy and exhaustive report of Takur Ghar, consisting of forensic reports, individual statements, call signs, key players, photos, and enemy interrogation reports. JSOC chartered Milani “to capture a factual, historical chronology of the events of 3–4 March 2002 at Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan. This charter included a mandate . . . to develop and provide a level of certainty, where possible, to the sequence of actions, and actions, of our deceased personnel.” Milani began research on 20 March 2002, traveling to Bagram and Kandahar among other places, where he spoke with participants and C2; he scaled Takur Ghar with the team leader of MAKO 30. Milani studied forensic evidence provided by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C., and interviewed “most, but not all of the participants in this battle.” The resulting document is a full compilation of “participant statements, operational graphics, Joint Operations Command logs, video streams, photographs, forensic reports and a physical exploitation of what remained on Takur Ghar after the battle.” Milani concluded: “This is a story of courage and sacrifice. It is a story of how seven great Americans died fighting for their country—and for each other. It is a Joint Service story. The Departments of the Army, Navy and the Air Force all lost members in this one battle.” I made liberal use of this material. Milani's timeline was invaluable in reconstructing the battle, and while I diverged to collapse time for narrative purposes, the horse remained before the buggy.
“Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the Battle of Takur Ghar,” by Col. Andrew N. Milani (Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Project Advisor), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. A fascinating and original thesis paper that uses examples from Takur Ghar to explain “fog of war” created by the modern technological instruments that were designed to cut through that very fog. Hereafter cited as PITFALLS.
“Executive Summary of the Battle of Takur Ghar,” Milani and Crist, DOD, May 24, 2002.
“High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future,” Marcus P. Acosta, June 2003, Thesis, U.S. Navy Naval Postgraduate School.
“Anaconda a Success: Enemy Killed Unknown, Say Officials,” Armed Forces Press Service News Articles, March 15, 2002.
“Operation Anaconda Is Winding Down,” Linda Z. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service, March 12, 2002. The bombing campaign over the Shah-i-Kot in support of Anaconda.
“All Necessary Means—Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces,” U.S. Army Col. Kathryn Stone, USA War College, Carlisle, April 7, 2003. A general discussion vehicle for those legal issues associated with the employment of the CIA with SOF.
“Afghanistan—Operation Anaconda,” Richard Cooper, Military Visions, March 29, 2003. A very good, brief history of Anaconda.
“Interview of SSgt Kevin Vance, 25 March 2002—Bagram, Afghanistan,” certified on March 29, 2002, before Erin Bree Wirtanen, military notary. A 33-page transcript of an interview with Vance which offered a wealth of details about the day at Takur Ghar.
“U.S. Policy on Chechnya,” Steven Pifer, Dep. Assistant Sec. for European and Eurasian Affairs, Statement Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, DC, May 9, 2002.
“A Full Report on Operation Anaconda—America's First Battle of the 21st Century. A Complete After Action Interview with COL [Frank] Weircinski,” Austin Bay, FreeRepublic.com, June 27, 2002.
“Army Analyst Blames Afghan Battle Failings on Bad Command Set-Up,” Elaine M. Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, July 29, 2004. Article details thesis of Maj. Mark Davis, writing for a master's degree at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, in which he blames Afghan battle failings on a faulty command setup. “Ambiguous command structures established on an ad hoc basis and approved by U.S. Central Command created conditions that inadvertently excluded the Air Force from the planning of Anaconda,” Davis wrote in “Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare.”
According to Grossman (Inside the Pentagon, Oct. 3, 2002; and Nov. 21, 2002), a superb reporter who is acknowledged widely for her trenchant military analyses, “A plan to use Afghan troops as the vanguard force fell apart in the opening days of the campaign when they encountered heavy resistance and lost three soldiers. In the days that followed, a fierce battle against al-Qaeda fighters hidden in the steep mountainous terrain of southeastern Afghanistan resulted in eight U.S. losses and dozens more wounded. The battle's Army commander—initially convinced he could wrap up the fight in just a few days using ground forces with little external support—was forced to issue an emergency appeal for air and naval fires and logistical assistance.”