Chapter 4

Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 report two versions of the aggregate Boyer and Hatton index, including and excluding employment loss from short-time work, which was common in mining and textiles. The average unemployment rate for 1870 to 1913 was 6.6% when employment loss from short time is included and 5.4% when it is excluded. The effect of including short time is large because mining and textiles were large sectors—in 1901 they account for a quarter of the workforce included in the index—in which the number of “wholly unemployed” workers “substantially under-stated the true volume of unemployment.”⁴ When employment loss from short-time work is included, the unemployment rate exceeded 8% in 1878–79, 1885–87, 1893–95, 1904–5, and 1908–9, more than a quarter of the years from 1870 to 1913.

Unemployment varied substantially across sectors. For 1870–1913, it was highest in mining (11.3%), shipbuilding (8.7%), metals (6.7%), textiles (7.0%), and general unskilled labor (9.5%), and lowest in woodworking (3.1%), printing and bookbinding (3.7%), clothing and footwear (3.8%), and carriage and wagon (3.8%).⁵ It is useful to examine a few sectors in more detail. Figure 4.2 presents the unemployment series for two large sectors—metals and the building trades. While the two series move in a similar pattern, at least through 1903, the average unemployment rate was higher and the severity of cyclical fluctuations larger in metals than in construction. The other major difference between the two series is their trends over time. From 1870 to 1898, the average unemployment rate was much higher in metals (6.7%) than in the building trades (3.9%). Unemployment in construction increased sharply thereafter, while that for metals remained roughly constant, so that for 1899–1913 the average unemployment rate in the two sectors was nearly identical—6.8% in metals and 6.7% in construction.

Unemployment data for unskilled workers do not exist. Following MacKinnon, Boyer and Hatton constructed an unemployment series for general unskilled laborers using time-series data for male able-bodied indoor paupers as a share of the male population aged 15–64.⁷ The estimated unemployment series for general unskilled laborers is presented in Figure 4.4. The series follows the same cyclical pattern as the other sectoral series, except that unemployment among unskilled laborers increased sharply over time—the unemployment rate was below 10% in every year from 1870 to 1892, then above 10% in all but four years from 1893 to 1913. Figure 4.4 also presents an unemployment series constructed using vagrancy data.⁸ Vagrants were typically adult males under age 60. While not all vagrants were in search of work, their numbers increased during downturns and declined during booms, suggesting that a substantial share were in fact unemployed men “forced to migrate in search of work.”9 The unemployment series constructed using vagrancy data is quite similar to that constructed using data for male indoor paupers. These series indicate that employment opportunities for casual and general laborers deteriorated—both absolutely and relative to those of skilled workers—during the last two decades before the First World War.¹⁰

Contemporary observers agreed that unemployment rates were higher for the unskilled than for skilled workers. The Boyer and Hatton estimates show that the average unemployment rate for unskilled workers in 1870–1913 was 50% greater than that for skilled and semiskilled workers. The aggregate unemployment rate is a poor measure of the extent of economic insecurity among the unskilled.¹¹

Seasonality in mining typically was handled by reducing the number of shifts worked per week in slack seasons rather than by laying off workers. From 1897 to 1911, the average number of days worked per week varied from 5.47 in December to 4.92 in June. Employment at gas works was highly seasonal, with 11–17% fewer workers employed from March to September than in December. In the furnishing trades, unemployment varied from a low of 2.5% in April and May to over 7% in December and January; in tobacco, unemployment exceeded 9% in July and August, but was 3.2% in November. Other trades experienced less pronounced seasonal fluctuations in labor demand; a 1909 Board of Trade memorandum concluded that “seasonal fluctuation is found to a more or less marked degree in nearly every industry.”¹³

Systems of temporary or casual employment developed in some low-skilled occupations that were subject to sudden and irregular fluctuations in labor demand. Casual employment existed to some degree among painters and unskilled laborers in the building trades, and among workers in land transport, menial services, and certain declining manufacturing trades.¹⁴ It was especially pronounced among dockworkers, due to the irregularity in the arrival and departure of ships. Dockworkers were hired by the day or half day, chosen by foremen each morning and afternoon from groups of workers at calling-on stands. As a result employment was extremely intermittent, and apart from a minority who were regularly employed, most dockworkers spent a substantial proportion of the year unemployed. Booth found that in 1891–92 approximately 22,000 men regularly competed for work at the London docks, and that the average number employed per day was 15,175.¹⁵ Thus, on an average day upward of 6,800 London dockers were without work. A 1908 Charity Organisation Society Report on Unskilled Labour concluded that “the independent action of the separate employing agencies, each seeking to retain a following of labour as nearly as possible equal to its own maximum demand” led to “the maintenance of a floating reserve of labour far larger than is required to meet the maximum demands of employers . . . [and] a mass of men chronically under-employed.”16 A large share of dockworkers suffered chronic distress as a result of their irregularity of employment.

The method of hiring painters and low-skilled laborers in the building trades was similar to that of the docks, except that there were no fixed calling-on stands and workers were hired by the job rather than the day. Hiring was done by foremen at job sites. A foreman would start a new job with a few “permanent” employees and hire more workers as they arrived at the job site, “guided by recommendations from their mates or stray hints in public houses . . . [or] tramping without guidance about likely districts.” Hiring typically was done on a first-come first-served basis—workers who proved unsatisfactory were fired after a few days or weeks and replaced by newcomers. This system led to the creation of “a floating mass of labour . . . drifting perpetually about the streets” in search of work. Robert Tressell, in The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, described the process as follows: “It is usual for [casual hands] to put in a month with one firm, then a fortnight with another, then perhaps six weeks somewhere else, and often between there are two or three days or even weeks of enforced idleness.” Beveridge concluded that, while distress among dockworkers was chronic, among building laborers it was “recurrent, with bad weather or the end of a job.”¹⁷

In sum, the possibility of employment loss faced by manual workers was far greater than the aggregate unemployment estimates suggest. A majority of workers lost no time due to unemployment within a calendar year, but a substantial minority lost several weeks of work even during years of low unemployment. Low-skilled workers were the most likely to suffer income loss due to unemployment, and before 1870 they also had relied most heavily on the Poor Law for assistance when unemployed. Section II examines the major changes in the forms of income assistance for the unemployed brought about by the Crusade Against Outrelief.

Why didn’t friendly societies provide benefits to unemployed members? There were moral hazard issues associated with the provision of unemployment benefits. An insuring organization had to determine whether a member who applied for relief was in fact eligible for benefits, and whether benefit recipients were actively searching for work. Most craft unions eliminated this moral hazard by forcing applicants to make their claims for benefits at branch meetings in front of fellow workmen, and those deemed eligible had to sign their branch’s “vacant book” every day. Branch secretaries directed unemployed members to local firms in need of labor, and members who did not apply for a job when informed of a vacancy or refused a job offer forfeited their unemployment benefits. The cost of monitoring members’ eligibility for benefits and search activity, and of finding work for unemployed members, was far higher for friendly societies than for trade unions because their membership typically belonged to several occupations. Contemporaries recognized the unique ability of trade unions to reduce moral hazard. The Webbs maintained, “Out of Work pay cannot be properly administered except by bodies of men belonging to the same trade and working in the same establishments.” Similarly, Beveridge concluded that unions “come nearer than any other bodies to possessing a direct test of unemployment by which to protect their funds against abuse. . . . They are better able, therefore, than anyone else at the present time to assist the unemployed on honourable terms without imminent risk of encouraging unemployment.”¹⁹

In 1893, 744,000 trade union members (59% of union members) were eligible for unemployment benefits. Table 4.4 shows that by 1906 more than 1,456,000 workers were eligible for unemployment benefits, representing nearly 73% of union members, but only 12% of the adult male workforce.²⁰ The benefits took various forms. Many unions provided weekly benefits to unemployed members. Others provided “payments to members travelling in search of work, . . . payments on account of cessations of work due to fires, failures of firms, temporary stoppages and breakdowns of machinery, emigration grants (in a few instances), and special grants in times of excessive slackness.”²¹

The availability of unemployment benefits differed markedly across occupations. Virtually all union members in engineering, shipbuilding, cotton weaving, printing, woodworking, and glass trades were entitled to unemployment benefits, compared with 89% in the building trades, 44% in mining, and 40% in iron and steel unions. Among low-skilled workers, 29% of unionized laborers in the building trades, 20% of carmen and dock laborers, and 62% of general laborers were eligible for unemployment benefits of some sort. One must be careful in interpreting these numbers, however, because the types of unemployment benefits differed across occupations. This can be seen by examining expenditures per union member—spending was far greater in unions providing unemployed members with weekly benefits than in unions that provided only traveling benefits or occasional grants. Column 4 shows that spending per union member varied substantially across occupations. It exceeded 10s. per member for carpenters, iron founders, engineers and shipbuilders, printers, woodworkers, and glass workers. On the other hand, it was less than 3s. per member in mining and textiles, and less than 1s. per member for railway servants, building laborers, carmen and dockworkers, and general laborers. The benefits offered to low-skilled workers were quite meager.

Why didn’t all unions offer their unemployed members weekly benefits? In coal mining, textiles, and some other industries, the widespread use of short time and sliding wage scales meant that there were few layoffs except at times of “excessive slackness.” Unions of low-skilled workers did not provide unemployment benefits because the irregularity of employment in most low-skilled occupations and the typical oversupply of labor raised the cost of insurance substantially above the weekly premium paid by skilled workers and above what the unskilled could afford to pay.²²

The Board of Trade reported total expenditures on unemployment benefits of 100 principal trade unions for the years 1892–1910. Spending varied from a low of £184,600 in 1899 to a high of £1,004,685 in 1908; the average annual expenditure was £468,500. The Labour Department estimated that all British trade unions spent a total of £1,257,913 on unemployment benefits in 1908—the 100 principal unions accounted for 80% of total expenditure.²⁴ If that ratio held throughout 1892–1910, then the average annual expenditure on unemployment benefits by all trade unions was £585,600.

The generosity and maximum duration of benefits differed substantially across unions. In 1892, the average weekly benefit was about 10s., at least for the first 12–14 weeks of unemployment. The benefit plans of the following four unions provide an idea of the range in generosity and duration. The Amalgamated Engineers paid an unemployed member 10s. per week for the first 14 weeks of unemployment, then 7s. per week for the next 30 weeks, and 6s. per week for another 60 weeks. An unemployed member could collect benefits for 104 consecutive weeks. The Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners paid 10s. a week for the first 12 weeks of unemployment, then 6s. a week for the next 12 weeks. The maximum duration of benefits was 24 weeks. The London Society of Compositors paid an unemployed member 12s. per week for a maximum of 16 weeks in one calendar year. The Amalgamated Smiths and Strikers paid 6s. per week for a maximum of 8 weeks.²⁵

The weekly benefit was supposed to be enough to enable unemployed members to subsist without turning to charity or the Poor Law. In this, most trade unions appear to have been successful. Beveridge maintained that union members receiving unemployment benefits hardly ever applied to local distress committees. He added, however, that by itself the typical benefit was too small to provide subsistence for a worker and his family, and had “to be supplemented . . . by the earnings of wife and children, by private saving, by assistance from fellow-workmen and neighbours, by running into debt, by pawning and in other ways.” Nevertheless, union benefits prolonged “almost indefinitely the resisting power of the unemployed.”²⁷

Outside of London, the policies of the LGB and the COS were less successful. Some Poor Law unions that had begun to shift to workhouse relief in the early 1870s felt compelled to provide outdoor relief to the unemployed in 1878–79.²⁹ In those unions that resisted the temptation to provide outdoor relief, local governments and voluntary agencies adopted ad hoc measures for relieving the unemployed. The typical procedure was for a city’s mayor to set up an emergency fund whenever distress reached a certain level: “[The mayor] issued an appeal in the Press or by letter, the response to which in the form of donations was of course very uncertain, varying with his personal popularity as well as with the general opinion of the wealthier classes as to the existence of exceptional distress. . . . The distribution was usually undertaken by a committee formed either from a few people selected by the Mayor, or from the borough councilors, or from a public meeting to which representatives of charitable agencies and others were specifically invited.”³⁰ During the winters of 1878–79 and 1885–86 emergency funds were initiated in several large cities. In 1878–79 the Manchester and Salford District Provident Society, a philanthropic organization “dominated by the elite of Manchester’s commercial and industrial bourgeoisie,” raised £26,000 for the “temporary relief of distressed operatives.” In the same year the Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund raised over £33,000 to assist the unemployed, and relief funds were established in Liverpool, Leeds, and elsewhere.³¹ These emergence funds typically provided the type of indiscriminate relief that the COS strenuously opposed.

The story of the Mansion House Fund reveals a serious unintended consequence of the Crusade Against Outrelief—the decline of options for assistance available to unemployed low-skilled workers. Most workers felt a strong stigma against entering a workhouse, and the COS was unable, and unwilling, to relieve more than a small share of the unemployed. When levels of distress increased during downturns, the unemployed pressured local governments for aid. Feelings of compassion, guilt, and fear among the middle and upper classes led to the launching of emergency funds and the granting of indiscriminate relief. To many, the consequences of the Mansion House Fund’s lax administration were far worse than the consequences of outdoor poor relief had been. The crusade had succeeded in reducing the relief roles, but the downturn of 1885–86 showed that it was unable to cope with unemployment during cyclical downturns.

The LGB reissued the Chamberlain Circular in 1887, 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1895. An 1893 Board of Trade inquiry found that 96 local authorities had initiated some form of public employment in the winter of 1892–93 in response to the issuance of the circular; 33 of them were in London. The forms of work relief included road repairing, road sweeping, sewerage work, stone-breaking, snow removal, leveling land, and planting trees.³⁴ Few local authorities offered full-time work to those who applied; rather, they dispersed the available work among all of the applicants. Each person typically was employed two or three days per week.

For example, from December 1892 through April 1893, the corporation of Leeds employed 1,103 men to excavate and level ground for new parks. Each person was employed three days a week; the average man was given about 60 days’ work. Wages were 5d. an hour for a 9-hour day, so that each worker was paid about 11.25s. per week. Similar projects were initiated in other years. In the winters of 1903–4 and 1904–5, the corporation of Leeds employed 2,644 and 2,384 men to work on parks and roads, paint, and lay out a cemetery. As before, each worker was employed three days a week, and paid 5d. per hour for a 9-hour day.³⁵

The borough of West Ham, just east of London, initiated relief works during six of the ten winters from 1895–96 to 1904–5. From November 1904 to May 1905, the borough council employed 5,271 men to lay out and pave streets and to paint and clean buildings. In order to distribute the available work fairly, every applicant was offered two or three days’ work until all had been employed, at which point the first applicants were offered another two days’ work. The rate of pay was 7d. per hour, for an 8-hour day.³⁶

Similarly, in the winter of 1904–5 several London newspapers raised relief funds for West Ham. The Daily News raised £11,800, £7,000 of which was spent on work relief; the rest was used to purchase bread, groceries, and coal, which was distributed to the poor. The Daily Telegraph raised £14,835, much of which they gave to local clergy and the Salvation Army to distribute to the poor. Altogether, newspaper funds raised £27,900 for relief of the unemployed, slightly more than the amount spent on work relief by the borough council.³⁸

In view of the fact that the relief works outlined in the Chamberlain Circular were supposed to employ workers “temporarily deprived of employment,” almost all of the projects undertaken between 1886 and 1905 must be deemed failures. The 1893 Board of Trade inquiry noted above reported data on the occupations of men registered for work relief in nine London districts and six provincial cities in 1892–93. In London three-quarters of those on the registers were general or “chronically irregular” laborers, while in Liverpool 62% of those registered were general laborers, carmen, stablemen, porters, or messengers and another 26% were unskilled laborers in the building trades. Finally, in Leeds, where work relief was set up in response to an “acute depression of the iron trades,” 23% of those registered were from the engineering and metal trades, whereas nearly 50% were general laborers.³⁹

Public awareness of unemployment as a problem increased during the late 1880s. The reason for the change in public perception is not entirely clear, but the publication of Charles Booth’s study of poverty in London—the first volume of which appeared in 1889—and the increased agitation by the unemployed were probably instrumental. Socialist groups such as the Social Democratic Federation began to organize protest marches at times of high unemployment during the mid-1880s.⁴¹ Pressure for new government policies to deal with the unemployed declined during the prosperity of the late 1880s, but reappeared during the downturn of 1893–95. In response to the high level of distress in the winter of 1894–95, the government established the Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employment. Nothing of practical importance came from it, but it bought time for the government until the pressure for reform died down when the economy returned to normal in the late 1890s. When unemployment rates increased sharply in 1904–5, demand that the government intervene returned. Demonstrators in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and other major cities “demanded that great works should be carried out by the municipalities on which they should be employed.”⁴²

In response to this pressure, Parliament in 1905 adopted the Unemployed Workmen Act, which established distress committees in all 29 metropolitan boroughs and in municipal boroughs and urban districts with populations exceeding 50,000.⁴³ The act also provided for the formation of a Central (Unemployed) Body in London, to administer relief and coordinate the work of the metropolitan distress committees. The committees—comprising nominees chosen by the local boards of guardians, borough councils, and charitable organizations—were empowered to register applicants for relief and provide temporary employment to those “deserving” applicants who previously had been regularly employed, had resided in the locality for the previous 12 months, were “well-conducted and thrifty,” and had dependents. The work projects were to be of “actual and substantial utility,” and workers’ total remuneration was to be less than would be earned by unskilled laborers.44

The act enabled localities to levy a rate of 0.5d. in the pound for administrative expenses, which could be increased to 1d. with consent of the LGB. Money from the rates was not to be used for work relief—relief projects were to be funded exclusively from voluntary contributions. The act’s framers apparently believed that, once distress committees and the machinery for administering relief were in place, the charitable public would contribute generously to relief funds during times of distress. This system of financing relief worked smoothly at first. In November 1905, Queen Alexandra’s appeal to the public for funds drew nearly £154,000, of which £125,000 was distributed to distress committees throughout Britain and Ireland.⁴⁵

Despite the success of the queen’s appeal in raising money, few in the government believed that such appeals could be repeated annually. In 1906 Parliament made a grant of £200,000 to local distress committees; similar grants were made in the four following years. The parliamentary grant was meant to supplement voluntary contributions, but instead it led to a sharp reduction in contributions. According to Harris, “the charitable public declined to subscribe voluntarily to a scheme for which they were being compulsorily taxed.”⁴⁶ The grants also led many local authorities to stop levying the 0.5d. rate for administrative expenses. Evidence of the changing nature of relief-project funding is given in Table 4.6, which compares the sources for the receipts of distress committees in 1906–7, the first year of the parliamentary grant, and 1909–10. In 1909–10, the distress committees received £146,835 from the parliamentary grant, or £41,415 more than they had received in 1906–7. During the same period, income from local rates and voluntary contributions declined by £46,774. By 1909–10 the majority of funding for local work relief projects came from the Treasury rather than from local contributions and taxes, as the Unemployed Workmen Act had envisaged.

Reports of individual distress committees give a better idea of the composition of the applicants for relief. In 1905–6 the Manchester distress committee registered 1,532 applicants for work relief. Of these, 52% were general laborers, 13% were laborers in the building trades, and 11% were carmen, stablemen, porters, and messengers. Altogether, three-quarters of the applicants could be classified as general or casual laborers.⁴⁸ The COS, analyzing the registration papers of 2,000 applicants in West Ham in 1905–6, determined that 55% were casual laborers, 12% were laborers in the building trades, and 3% were carmen. Only 12% of applicants were classified as skilled workers, and half of these were in the building trades and subject to irregular employment. In 1906–7, 64% of the applicants for work relief in West Ham were classified as casual laborers, and an additional 14% were classified as “chronically bad—industrially, privately, or both,” or physically or mentally incapable of regular work. Less than 2% of applicants were skilled and regular artisans.⁴⁹ In sum, only a small share of those given work relief were in fact temporarily unemployed.

The London Central (Unemployed) Body employed men on relief works for 43 hours per week at 6d. an hour, for a weekly income of 21.5s. For comparison, in 1907 building laborers in London were paid 7d. per hour for a 50 hour week in summer.⁵¹ Weekly hours typically were shorter in winter, when relief works were in operation. If the workweek was six hours shorter in winter than in summer—one hour shorter per day—a man employed on a relief project would earn 84% as much per week as a fully employed laborer in the building trades. In 1905 “preference men” and casual laborers at the London docks were paid 6d. per hour for an uncertain number of hours per week. The average weekly earnings of this group of dockworkers, who made up nearly a quarter of the workforce at the docks, was almost certainly less than that of men employed on relief works.⁵²

Outside of central London, employment on relief projects was less continuous. The reports of local distress committees to the Board of Trade for February 1907 show that the average number of days worked by men employed on relief works varied from 21 in Leicester and Glasgow and 17 in Norwich to 11 in Bristol and 6.8 in Brighton. The average earnings for the month varied from 83.8s. in Leicester to 44.3s. in Bristol, 42.5s. in Glasgow, 34.1s. in Norwich, and 21.6s. in Brighton. The average daily wage of men on work relief projects was slightly higher than the estimated wage of unskilled laborers in the building trades in Bristol, and was 80% or more of building laborers’ wages in Brighton and Leicester, but less than 60% of laborers’ wages in Glasgow and Norwich. Despite the high daily wage rates for work relief jobs in some cities, the low number of days worked per week meant that such jobs clearly were not a substitute for full-time employment in the building trade. However, many building laborers did not work full-time in the winter months, and many other casual labor markets also experienced “seasonal slackness” in winter. Because laborers in these markets could alternate work relief with private sector employment, it is not surprising that the majority of applicants for work relief were general or casual laborers, or that the same men tended to reapply for work relief year after year.⁵³

Some historians maintain that the Unemployed Workmen Act “marked a decisive turning-point in national policy” because it accepted “a measure of national responsibility” for relieving the unemployed.⁵⁵ Most contemporaries, however, viewed the act not as the beginning of state intervention in the labor market, but rather as the last in a long line of failed attempts to use municipal relief works to solve the unemployment problem. According to Beveridge, “The Act started as a carefully guarded experiment in dealing with a specific emergency—exceptional trade depression—by assistance outside the Poor Law. One by one all the guards and restrictions have been swept away, or have become forgotten. The assistance, for the most part, has been given neither out of the resources contemplated by the Act (voluntary subscriptions), nor to the persons contemplated by the Act (workmen temporarily and exceptionally distressed), nor in substantial accordance with the principles of the Act as interpreted by the Local Government Board (that assistance should be less eligible than independence).”⁵⁶

For many, the Unemployed Workmen Act was merely a stopgap measure. The same pressure that led to its adoption led the Conservative Government in December 1905 to appoint the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. Virtually everyone who testified before the Royal Commission was impressed with the existing trade union unemployment insurance schemes and was in favor of extending insurance to a larger share of the workforce, although many opposed the adoption of a state-administered program. Despite the opposition to an increased role for the state, Parliament in 1911 established a compulsory, state-run system of unemployment insurance in a limited number of industries. The findings of the Royal Commission and Parliament’s reasons for adopting compulsory unemployment insurance are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

1. Webb and Webb (1929: 633); Webb and Webb (1909b: 243); Beveridge (1909: 1).

2. See Parl. Papers, British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions (1905, LXXXIV), pp. 79–98 and Feinstein (1972: 225–26). For a detailed discussion of the Board of Trade series and its shortcomings, see Boyer and Hatton (2002: 644–48).

3. Boyer and Hatton (2002: 648–57); Lee (1979).

4. Beveridge (1944: 332).

5. Boyer and Hatton (2002: 661).

6. Board of Trade, Labour Gazette, October 1895, p. 308; Boyer and Hatton (2002: 661).

7. MacKinnon (1986: 306–7, 330–34); Boyer and Hatton (2002: 654–56, 659–60). The unemployment rate was benchmarked at 5.0% in 1875.

8. Data on the number of vagrants on January 1 and July 1 of each year are from MacKinnon (1984: 118, 337), and from the Board of Trade, Seventeenth Abstract of Labour Statistics (1915: 332–33). For the construction of the vagrancy series, see Boyer and Hatton (2002: 655, 659). To turn the vagrancy series into an unemployment series, the unemployment rate was benchmarked at 5.0% in 1875.

9. MacKinnon (1984: 117). Beveridge (1909: 48–49) and Crowther (1981: 254) also concluded that unemployment was a cause of vagrancy.

10. The Majority Report of the Royal Poor Law Commission concluded in 1909 that while the “material condition” of most workers improved “during the last few decades,” that of “the lower grades of unskilled labourers . . . was worse than formerly.” Parl. Papers, Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1909, XXXVII), p. 361.

11. The average unemployment rate, including short time but excluding the unskilled, was 6.3%. See Boyer and Hatton (2002: 663). Thomas (1988: 123) calculated that in 1931 the unemployment rate for skilled and semiskilled manual workers was 12.0%, while that for unskilled manual workers was 21.5%, nearly 80% greater.

12. Dearle (1908: 66–81).

13. The Board of Trade memorandum was published in Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, Appendix Vol. IX, Unemployment (1910, XLIX), pp. 638–55. See also Poyntz (1912). On seasonality in U.S. labor markets, see Engerman and Goldin (1994).

14. Jones (1971: 52–66) estimated that in London in 1891 casual workers and their families totaled about 400,000 persons, or one-tenth of the population.

15. Booth (1892a: 532–33). Howarth and Wilson (1907: 185–254) give a detailed discussion of the labor market at the Victoria and Albert Docks. See also Beveridge (1909: 77–95).

16. Charity Organisation Society (1908: 34).

17. Beveridge (1909: 96–98); Dearle (1908: 82–102); Tressell ([1955] 2005: 385).

18. Webb and Webb (1897: 160–61); Harris (1972: 295).

19. Webb and Webb (1897: 160–61); Beveridge (1909: 227). A similar conclusion was reached by the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on Trades Unions. See Parl. Papers (1868–69, XXXI), p. xliii.

20. Data for 1893 are from the Board of Trade’s Seventh Annual Report on Trade Unions (1895). Data for 1906 are from Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, Appendix Vol. IX, Unemployment (1910, XLIX), pp. 614, 620–21. Data on total union membership and the adult male workforce in 1906 are from Bain and Price (1980: 37).

21. Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, Appendix Vol. IX, Unemployment (1910, XLIX), p. 613.

22. Boyer (1988: 324–28); Beveridge (1909: 220–21); Porter (1970).

23. Data on unions’ annual expenditures on unemployment benefits are from Wood (1900: 83–86).

24. In 1908 the 100 principal trade unions contained 61% of the total membership of all 1,058 trade unions. See Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions in 1908–10 (1912: xxxviii, lxxv).

25. Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on Labour: Rules of Associations of Employers and of Employed (1892, XXXVI), pp. 31–32, 45–46, 84–85, 157–58.

26. Wage data for carpenters and fitters in 1892 are from an unpublished Board of Trade report on Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour in Various Industries (1908). Wage data for 1908 are from Board of Trade, Twelfth Abstract of Labour Statistics (1908: 40–42).

27. Beveridge (1909: 225).

28. Ryan (1985: 145–50); Jones (1971: 278).

29. On the use of outdoor relief in 1878–79, see, for example, Trainor (1993: 305–9).

30. Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance given to the “Unemployed” since 1886 (1909, XLIV), pp. 72–73.

31. Kidd (1984: 52, 54); Beveridge (1909: 66); Cage (1987: 92–95); Webb and Webb (1929: 640–41).

32. Charity Organisation Society (1886: 91); Beveridge (1909: 158–59); Jones (1971: 291–94, 298–300); Harris (1972: 111).

33. Parl. Papers, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1886–87 (1887, XXXVI), pp. 5–7.

34. Parl. Papers, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed (1893–94, LXXXII), p. 212.

35. Parl. Papers, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed (1893–94, LXXXII), pp. 222–28; Parl. Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance (1909, XLIV), p. 359.

36. Parl. Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance (1909, XLIV), pp. 541, 551.

37. Parl. Papers, Third Report from the Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employment (1895, IX), pp. 232–33, 515, 519–20.

38. Parl. Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance (1909, XLIV), pp. 108–9; Howarth and Wilson (1907: 346–48).

39. Parl. Papers, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed (1893–94, LXXXII), pp. 210–11.

40. Parl. Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance (1909, XLIV), p. 39.

41. Harris (1972: 6–101); Himmelfarb (1991: 40–53); Brown (1971).

42. The quotation is from the testimony of Walter Long, President of the Local Government Board, before the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: Parl. Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Witnesses Relating Chiefly to the Subject of Unemployment (1910, XLVIII), p. 59.

43. Boroughs and urban districts with populations between 10,000 and 50,000 could apply to the Local Government Board for permission to establish a distress committee. By 1909, 14 such districts had established committees.

44. The best discussions of the Unemployed Workmen Act are found in Beveridge (1909: 162–91) and Harris (1972: 157–210).

45. Slightly more than half of the money distributed, £65,900, went to the London and West Ham distress committees. The fund also gave £9,450 to assist migrants to Canada, and made grants to the Salvation Army, the Church Army, and other charitable agencies. Parl. Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance (1909, XLIV), pp. 82–83.

46. Harris (1972: 179).

47. Beveridge (1909: 168–69).

48. Data on the occupations of Manchester applicants for work relief were obtained from the Webb Local Government Collection in the British Library of Political and Economic Science, Part 2: The Poor Law, vol. 307.

49. Howarth and Wilson (1907: 370–72, 376).

50. Beveridge (1909: 187).

51. Webb and Webb (1909b: 138). Wage date are from the Board of Trade, Eleventh Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom, 1905–06 (1907: 38–39).

52. Beveridge (1909: 89–94).

53. Work relief data from Board of Trade, Labour Gazette, vol. 15, March 1907, p. 67. Wage data from Board of Trade, Eleventh Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom, 1905–06 (1907), pp. 38–39. Webb (1912: 312–93); Jones (1971); Howarth and Wilson (1907: 378).

54. Beveridge (1909: 109).

55. Bruce (1968: 188).

56. Beveridge (1909: 189).

TABLE 4.1. Unemployment Rates, 1870–1913: Two Variants and the Board of Trade Index
Year	Excluding Short Time	Including Short Time	Board of Trade
1870	4.4	4.6	3.7
1871	3.1	3.6	1.6
1872	2.1	2.3	0.9
1873	2.3	2.5	1.1
1874	2.8	3.2	1.6
1875	3.3	4.1	2.2
1876	4.1	5.2	3.4
1877	5.4	7.7	4.4
1878	7.0	9.5	6.2
1879	9.1	11.1	10.7
1880	6.3	7.7	5.2
1881	5.4	6.5	3.5
1882	4.7	5.6	2.3
1883	4.6	5.4	2.6
1884	5.9	7.3	8.1
1885	7.5	9.5	9.3
1886	7.8	9.4	10.2
1887	6.9	8.4	7.6
1888	5.6	6.7	4.9
1889	3.8	4.5	2.1
1890	3.3	4.2	2.1
1891	3.8	5.3	3.5
1892	5.2	7.0	6.3
1893	6.8	8.6	7.5
1894	6.6	8.2	6.9
1895	6.5	8.6	5.8
1896	5.3	7.0	3.3
1897	5.3	6.7	3.3
1898	4.6	5.4	2.8
1899	4.0	4.5	2.0
1900	4.0	4.5	2.5
1901	5.0	6.5	3.3
1902	5.6	6.8	4.0
1903	6.0	7.6	4.7
1904	7.8	9.6	6.0
1905	7.4	8.9	5.0
1906	6.0	6.9	3.6
1907	5.5	5.7	3.7
1908	8.7	9.9	7.8
1909	9.1	10.6	7.7
1910	6.6	7.9	4.7
1911	5.2	6.2	3.0
1912	4.8	5.0	3.3
1913	4.1	4.4	2.1
Source: Boyer and Hatton (2002: 662).

TABLE 4.2. Distribution of Unemployment in Four Trade Unions
	Amalgamated Engineers (Manchester and Leeds)			Carpenters and Joiners		London Compositors		Woodcutting Machinists
	1887–95	1899	1904	1898–99	1904–5	1898	1905	1898	1904
Unemployment rate	6.1	3.0	7.6	1.1	6.0	2.8	5.0	1.4	4.3
% unemployed at some time in year	29.7	18.6	35.0	19.7	43.1	17.9	22.4	22.1	33.7
Days lost per member	18.7	9.1	23.3	3.4	18.8	8.9	15.7	4.5	13.4
Days lost per unemployed member	63.1	49.1	66.5	17.4	43.6	49.5	70.3	20.5	39.8
% unemployed for 4 weeks or more	16.7	9.1	21.1	4.3	24.3	11.5	16.0	5.7	16.6
% unemployed for 8 weeks or more	12.0	5.6	15.0	1.7	15.9	7.3	11.5	2.9	10.6
% unemployed for 12 weeks or more	9.3	3.8	11.0	0.7	9.5	4.7	8.3	1.4	7.2
Sources: Parl. Papers, British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions (1905, LXXXIV), p. 101; Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. Statistics Relating to England and Wales (1910, LIII), pp. 870–76.

TABLE 4.3. Seasonality of Employment in Five Sectors
	BUILDING TRADES			COAL MINERS	GAS WORKERS	FURNISHING TRADES	TOBACCO WORKERS
	Skilled Men	Laborers	All Men
	Number Employed 1907–10	Number Employed 1907–10	Wage Income 1906	Days Worked per Week 1897–1911	Number Employed 1906	Unemployment Rate 1897–1906	Unemployment Rate 1897–1906
January	84.4	84.0	76.2	5.20	97.2	7.9	5.8
February	89.0	87.7	82.7	5.43	93.9	6.5	6.5
March	94.5	92.5	92.6	5.39	89.1	3.3	7.4
April	96.3	95.3	97.6	5.03	85.5	2.4	7.8
May	96.3	96.2	100.0	5.23	84.2	2.5	8.3
June	94.5	95.3	96.5	4.92	83.0	3.2	8.6
July	96.3	98.1	96.6	4.98	83.6	4.1	9.3
August	100.0	100.0	98.7	4.99	84.4	4.1	9.4
September	95.4	96.2	96.3	5.35	87.8	4.2	7.3
October	89.0	90.6	91.3	5.41	92.3	4.5	5.1
November	86.2	87.7	82.6	5.39	97.2	4.9	3.2
December	80.7	82.1	78.7	5.47	100.0	7.1	4.7
Sources: Columns 1 and 2: Webb (1912: 334). Column 3: Board of Trade, Earnings and Hours of Labour . . . Building and Woodworking Trades (1910: 13). Column 4: Data for 1897–1901 from Board of Trade, Eleventh Abstract of Labour Statistics (1907: 5). Data for 1902–11 from Board of Trade, Fifteenth Abstract of Labour Statistics (1912: 9). Column 5: Popplewell (1912: 196). Columns 6 and 7: Poyntz (1912: 23–24). Notes: The series in columns 1, 2, and 5 are indices; the index numbers show each month’s employment as a percentage of the peak month’s employment. The series in column 3 is an index; the index numbers show each month’s wage income as a percentage of the peak month’s wage income.

TABLE 4.4. Trade Unions Paying Unemployment Benefits of Some Form, 1906
	UNIONS WITH UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS				UNIONS WITHOUT UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Sector	Number of Unions	Membership	Expenditure (₤s)	Expenditure per Member (s.)	Number of Unions	Membership	% Eligible for Benefits
Building trades	53	175,434	127,909	14.6	43	20,902	89.4
Masons	6	16,310	5,043	6.2	4	3,932	80.6
Carpenters	4	78,434	84,701	21.6	0	0	100.0
Laborers	18	4,684	37	0.2	23	11,248	29.4
Mining	40	251,858	36,566	2.9	29	319,262	44.1
Metals, etc.	164	314,396	181,480	11.5	58	46,570	87.1
Iron and steel	3	18,379	7,370	8.0	6	27,101	40.4
Iron founding	7	33,800	25,246	14.9	2	4,380	88.5
Engineering/shipbuilding	82	237,580	139,918	11.8	24	8,749	96.4
Textiles	204	280,586	37,365	2.7	55	20,299	93.3
Cotton weaving	120	150,271	13,350	1.8	6	1,381	99.1
Clothing	20	55,095	5,277	1.9	17	4,419	92.6
Transport	9	115,391	4,533	0.8	49	73,570	61.1
Railway servants	4	98,165	4,401	0.9	2	3,410	96.6
Carmen, dock laborers	5	17,226	132	0.2	47	70,151	19.7
Printing	36	63,472	50,789	16.0	5	979	98.5
Woodworking	90	41,849	29,586	14.1	8	480	98.9
Misc. trades	123	89,045	38,000	8.5	70	34,501	72.1
Glass trades	18	8,620	13,701	31.8	1	40	99.5
General labor	6	68,991	2,223	0.6	12	42,843	61.7
Total	745	1,456,117	513,728	7.1	346	563,825	72.1
Source: Parl. Papers, Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, Appendix Vol. IX, Unemployment (1910, XLIX), pp. 620–21.

TABLE 4.5. Unemployment Benefits Paid by Trade Unions, 1908
(A) MAXIMUM WEEKLY BENEFITS (PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNION MEMBERS)
Weekly Benefits	Building Trades (21 Unions)	Mining and Quarrying (46 Unions)	Metals, Engineering, and Shipbuilding (166 Unions)	Textile Trades (212 Unions)	All Trades (699 Unions)
12s. 3d. and over	0.0	0.3	0.9	13.2	11.4
10s. 3d. to 12s.	0.1	9.4	2.3	4.5	8.7
9s. 3d. to 10s.	70.8	60.5	50.4	17.9	41.2
8s. 3d. to 9s.	25.6	20.2	9.3	14.0	13.6
7s. 3d. to 8s.	0.1	0.7	5.8	10.3	4.5
5s. 3d. to 7s.	0.7	0.3	1.2	20.3	6.2
5s. and under	0.4	2.0	27.8	17.2	10.1
Not ascertainable	2.2	7.0	2.3	2.6	4.2
Total Union Members	95,077	392,542	293,666	310,499	1,473,593
(B) MAXIMUM DURATION OF BENEFITS (PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNION MEMBERS)
Duration	Building	Mining	Metals	Textiles	All Trades
52 weeks or more	0.0	41.0	48.4	1.2	21.9
39–51 weeks	0.0	0.4	2.6	4.3	1.9
27–38 weeks	0.0	9.0	7.9	3.4	4.8
26 weeks	0.1	0.9	8.1	9.9	11.9
19–25 weeks	57.7	3.1	7.8	9.3	12.1
14–18 weeks	0.0	0.2	17.4	17.7	9.0
12–13 weeks	3.0	8.9	3.0	16.3	11.9
7–11 weeks	36.4	23.5	1.8	2.8	13.3
6 weeks or under	0.7	6.1	1.2	33.3	9.6
Not ascertainable	2.2	7.0	2.0	1.8	3.8
Total Union Members	95,077	392,542	293,666	310,499	1,473,593
Source: Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions in 1908–10 (1912), pp. lxxvi–lxxxi.

TABLE 4.6. Sources of Funds for Distress Committees, 1906–7 and 1909–10
	1906–7		1909–10
Source of Funds	£	%	£	%
Parliamentary grant	105,420	40.2	146,835	57.2
Local rates	90,088	34.3	68,069	26.5
Voluntary contributions	36,202	13.8	11,447	4.5
Other sources (including repayments for work done)	30,759	11.7	30,463	11.9
Total receipts	262,469		256,814
Sources: Board of Trade, Labour Gazette, vols. 15 and 18 (1907: 327; 1910: 370). Note: For 1906–7, voluntary contributions include donations from the Queen’s Unemployed Fund.