APRIL 30. 1863–MAY 6, 1863
After many costly and futile attempts to drive the Confederates from their positions behind the Rappahannock River at the Battle of Fredericksburg in mid-December 1862, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside struggled for a month to renew the offensive. In late January 1863, Burnside attempted to flank General Lee from his positions around Fredericksburg with a march along the Rappahannock upstream of the city, only to have his hopes literally sink into the mud when his marching columns were thwarted by heavy rains. With subordinates openly questioning his competence, Burnside called for widespread removals; Lincoln did indeed respond by authorizing several changes, but the most important was the replacement of Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. Brash and egotistical, but well known for his fighting spirit, Hooker nevertheless was determined to restore luster to the Army of the Potomac. He reorganized the army’s supply system, providing rations of fresh bread and meat, and through a combination of furloughs, reorganizations, and drills brought the once disheartened army back into prime fighting condition. As spring came, he prepared to take the offensive against Lee and a somewhat weakened Army of Northern Virginia. He outnumbered his opponent by two to one.
As an army commander, Joseph Hooker plans brilliantly. His plan is to force Lee to either retreat or come out of his Fredericksburg defenses and engage him on ground of Hooker’s choice. To achieve this objective, he sends Maj. Gen. George W. Stoneman’s cavalry corps out on a raid on April 27. Hooker then will swing westward around Lee’s position with three corps as a force of maneuver. These are the V Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, the XI Corps led by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, and the XII Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum. The three corps, a third of Hooker’s force, leave their camps behind Stafford Heights, north of Fredericksburg, on the morning of April 27. They march up the Rappahannock River and cross it at Kelly’s Ford, about 20 miles upriver from their camps. General Hooker, with part of his headquarters, accompanies the column of maneuver. Remaining behind at Falmouth is his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield. Hooker leaves four infantry corps behind, opposite Fredericksburg. Two of these infantry corps, the I and the VI, cross the Rappahannock on the 29th at and below Franklin’s Crossing, the site below town where Burnside’s left wing crossed the Rappahannock during the Fredericksburg campaign. This force demonstrates in front of the Confederates to divert Lee’s attention away from the corps executing the turning movement.
The II and III Corps remain in position behind Falmouth, ready to march when the three corps that cross the river at Kelly’s Ford reach the Confederate rear. Once Hooker crosses the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford, he will march two corps to Germanna Ford and one to Ely’s Ford, both on the Rapidan River, a major tributary of the Rappahannock. The three corps will then advance through the Wilderness, toward the key road junction at Chancellorsville. When they accomplish the march to Chancellorsville, they will uncover U.S. Ford, on the Rappahannock, three miles downstream from Ely’s Ford. This will reduce the distance that the II and III Corps will have to march to join them. Thus, while Stoneman and most of his cavalry are on a deep penetration raid, aimed at destroying vital railroads in Lee’s rear, three corps will turn the Confederate left, two corps are hidden and ready to cross at U.S. Ford when Hooker has seized Chancellorsville, and the remaining two corps are to keep Lee’s attention focused on his Fredericksburg front.
As soon as the infantry crosses the Rapidan River, Hooker arrives from Falmouth. He will travel with Meade. Everything is moving smoothly, and the plan is working. By April 30 Slocum and Howard are south of the Rapidan River at Germanna Ford with Slocum out in front, five miles upstream from Ely’s Ford. They march down the Germanna Plank Road toward its intersection with the Orange Turnpike at the Wilderness Tavern. By early afternoon the three corps converge on Chancellorsville. Meanwhile Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick’s VI Corps and Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds’s I Corps are positioned along the Richmond Stage Road.
What is Lee’s situation? The Confederate army that fought at Fredericksburg in December 1862 is larger than the army Lee will take to Gettysburg. But since the Battle of Fredericksburg, he has detached three divisions. Near Fredericksburg, Lt. Gen. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson commands four divisions. He still has Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill’s Light Division. A second division commander, Brig. Gen. Raleigh Colston, a Jackson favorite, may be a good French teacher at VMI, but as a replacement for the transferred Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro he does not measure up. Maj. Gen. Jubal Anderson Early and Brig. Gen. Robert Rodes, both capable veterans, lead Jackson’s two other divisions.
At the Battle of Fredericksburg, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet led the largest corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, composed of five divisions. Lee now has only two of Longstreet’s divisions, Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s and Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws’s. Longstreet has been sent off with his other divisions to southern Virginia and North Carolina to gather “hog and hominy” and to watch the Yankees who occupied Suffolk, a town to the west of Norfolk. Hooker is aware of their absence, and he knows that they can’t return in time to participate in the next battle. Lee’s army numbers about 60,000 soldiers, about half the troop strength available to Hooker.
In anticipation of the conflict to come at Chancellorsville, Virginia, soldiers of the 1st New York Light Artillery prepare for inspection of their bronze 12-pounder Napoleon cannon.
By the evening of April 30, the Federals have three corps in and around the Chancellorsville crossroads. Most of the army’s cavalry, under Stoneman, are beyond contact far to the southwest, in Louisa County. It will be the night of May 1–2 before General Reynolds’s I Corps will recross to the north side of the river, leaving only Sedgwick’s people south of the Rappahannock. On the afternoon of the 30th, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, the ranking corps commander, having marched from Stafford Heights with two of his three II Corps divisions, crosses the Rappahannock at U.S. Ford and closes on Chancellorsville. Close behind is Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles’s III Corps. This leaves for the time being at Falmouth only Brig. Gen. John Gibbon’s II Corps division.
Hooker has stolen a march on Lee, placing the Confederate commander where his foe wanted him. It looked so when three Federal infantry corps, with two close behind, moved into position at Chancellorsville, named after the Chancellor Tavern located there.
The Chancellor Tavern grew in stages. The center section is late 18th century; two wings were added in 1815, with an addition to the rear built in 1840. Chancellorsville is the home of a widow, Mrs. Sanford Chancellor, and her seven children. Six of them are unmarried daughters. The house serves as a home and a tavern, since it is one day’s ride in a heavily loaded wagon out of Fredericksburg. It’s a nice place for a good time and a headquarters.
Why is this a key point? Chancellor Tavern is near the eastern edge of the Wilderness, a 12-square-mile region of cutover scrub timber and impenetrable thickets, with scattered farms. The Ely’s Ford Road comes in from upper Culpeper County across the Rapidan. Coming from the southeast is the Orange Plank Road, from the east is the Orange Turnpike, a macadamized road. And then there’s the River Road. It goes out in a northeasterly direction, parallels the Rappahannock River, and enters Fredericksburg, less than ten miles away.
When Hooker gets here on the afternoon of April 30, there is lots of daylight left. But Hooker decides to wait until morning. He is going to telegraph and also send by messenger an order directing General Butterfield, who is back at Falmouth, to expedite the march of Couch’s and Sickles’s corps to Chancellorsville. Hooker is on a high. Addressing his staff and other officers back in March, he had said that General Lee has but two options: either to evacuate his position at Fredericksburg and flee ingloriously toward Richmond or come out of his earthworks and attack him. “My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out, may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.”
The Federals on the morning of May 1 advance along three roads. Meade, with two divisions, takes the River Road. The River Road’s disadvantage is that it follows along the river. It is a dirt track and has a lot more ups and downs in it than the other two roads. The divisions accompanying Meade are led by “Old Goggle Eye,” Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. People always ask, “Who has the most expletive-deleted vocabulary in the Army of the Potomac, Winfield Scott Hancock or Humphreys?” Hancock undoubtedly wins because he has a louder voice. Perhaps Humphreys is more original in his profanity, because he can spit out a long string of oaths and never use them again in the same combination. Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin is also a contender.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (seated second from right), commander of the Army of the Potomac, poses with his staff in this 1863 portrait.
Moving out in the center of the turnpike is only one division. It seems strange that Meade sends only one division along the Orange Turnpike. This division is commanded by Maj. Gen. George Sykes and is composed of the army’s two Regular brigades and a brigade of volunteers. Headed out the Orange Plank Road to the southeast is General Slocum with his two XII Corps divisions, led by Brig. Gen. Alpheus “Old Pop” Williams and Brig. Gen. John W. Geary. Stationed in this area in reserve is General Howard’s XI Corps, strung out along the Orange Turnpike from Chancellorsville to a point just west of the Wilderness Church.
Arriving here at mid-morning will be Couch with two divisions, that of hard-drinking Maj. Gen. William H. “Old Blinkey” French and that of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock “the Superb.” Soon thereafter Sickles’s III Corps comes up. By the time they arrive here the situation has changed. Having boldly seized the initiative and stolen a march on Lee, Hooker will soon lose his nerve and go over to the defensive.
By the evening of April 29, Lee is alerted to Hooker’s river crossings and flanking maneuvers, and he prepares to shift his forces in response. Lee orders the two divisions under his control—Anderson’s and McLaws’s—each less a brigade, to advance along the Orange Turnpike to determine the Yankees’ intentions. Lee directs Jackson to begin a march toward Zoan Church, a little more than five miles west on the Orange Turnpike. On May 1, Jackson moves out at 2 a.m. from his camps around Hamilton’s Crossing southeast of Fredericksburg. When Jackson marches, Jubal Early, along with Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade of McLaws’s division, remains behind with five brigades—about 10,000 men—to hold the stone wall fronting Marye’s Heights and the earthworks on commanding ground southeast of Fredericksburg, These earthworks are far more impressive than they were in mid-December 1862 when Burnside repeatedly assaulted them to no avail, because the Confederates have had all winter to work on them.
It is late morning when Jackson arrives at the Zoan Church, and in accordance with Lee’s discretionary orders, he seizes the initiative. He sends Brig. Gen. Ambrose Ransom Wright’s brigade of Georgians, part of Anderson’s division, along the unfinished railroad grade that is south and parallel to the Orange Plank Road. On Wright’s right, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey’s Mississippians engage Slocum’s vanguard as it approaches via the Plank Road. The divisions of Jackson’s corps, led by Rodes, press westward along the Plank Road in support of Posey. Jackson then advances the remaining three brigades of Anderson’s division, along with the brigades of McLaws’s division, via the turnpike.
As Meade feels his way along the River Road, he hears firing off to his right and rear, causing concern. Slocum continues to advance, with “Rans” Wright’s Georgians on his flank about a half mile to the south and moving toward his rear. The Confederates seize the initiative and press back Sykes’s division on the turnpike east of Chancellorsville. So what does Sykes do? He sends a message back to Hooker, cautioning that he has encountered the foe, and asking for instructions. Arriving at Hooker’s headquarters about now is General Sickles and the III Corps. He is told to position his people on Hazel Grove, key open high ground southwest of Chancellorsville.
Hooker now sends orders for Sykes to suspend his advance and pull back into the Wilderness. Sykes is not happy with the order since he feels that he is in a good position to face the Rebels, and as he pulls back, he runs into Hancock, who has reached Chancellorsville and is hastening east on the turnpike to his assistance. Being aggressive, Hancock favors moving forward. A message goes back to headquarters questioning the decision to withdraw. The reply comes from Hooker reiterating the order for both Hancock and Sykes to pull back. As they begin to withdraw, there’s a change of mind at Hooker’s headquarters, but by the time Hancock and Sykes get these orders to countermarch, they have given up the high ground on either side of the turnpike at the edge of the Wilderness.
Hardly do Hooker’s men reach Chancellorsville than you hear the thud of axes; Hooker has pulled back into a strong position and is entrenching and throwing up breastworks, inviting Lee to attack him. Meade digs in behind Mineral Spring Run with his left anchored on the Rappahannock. Couch’s two II Corps divisions cover Chancellorsville; on their right is Slocum’s XII Corps, with Sickles’s III Corps and Howard’s XI Corps extending the line westward past the Wilderness Church as far as the Talley Farm.
The XI Corps has severe communication problems between Howard and at least two of his three division commanders and four of the six brigade commanders. Many of the corps’ soldiers are of German descent—most of whose first language is German. Prior to Howard’s replacement of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel as corps commander, they had boasted and sung lustily, “I’m going to fight mit Sigel.”
Leaving a force facing Fredericksburg, Hooker sent three army corps to cross the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers to force Lee out of Fredericksburg. On April 29, realizing that his flank had been turned, Lee divided his army, leaving troops at Fredericksburg, and raced west to meet Hooker’s advance. After an engagement near the Zoan Church on May 1, Hooker withdrew to Chancellorsville. On May 2, Lee divided his army once again, sending Jackson across the front of the Federal position to attack the exposed Union right flank. Attacking in the evening, Jackson’s men routed the Federals along the Orange Turnpike, but darkness stopped the Confederate advance.
Hooker has taken up a strong defensive position except for his right flank, which is neither refused nor posted behind a natural obstacle. By now Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart’s cavalry is roaming unopposed through the Wilderness.
Lee, an experienced engineer, reconnoiters the Union defenses, searching for a means to turn the enemy’s left. There is no way to do so. Not only is the Union Army entrenched on that flank behind Mineral Spring Run, but it is an imposing physical barrier anchored on the Rappahannock River. Lee then reconnoiters Hooker’s center, and, having heard the thud of axes, realizes that an attack here would be a mistake. Soon Jeb Stuart arrives in camp. He has been reconnoitering the Union right and discovers that the XI Corps’ flank “is in the air.” The Reverend B. Tucker Lacy, whose brother owns Ellwood Plantation, is familiar with the area, including the Brock Road near the Union right flank. He does not, however, know all the roadways in the area between Lee’s campsite and the Union flank. The Confederates must find someone familiar with the road network in the Catherine Furnace area. Catherine Furnace is operated by Charles C. Welford, whose son, Charlie B., is 17 years old.
Robert E. Lee holds a military conference at the intersection of the Orange Plank and Catherine Furnace Roads. Fitz Lee, Tucker Lacy, and Charlie Welford are present. General Lee asks, “How can we get to those people?” Lee usually referred to the enemy as “those people.” Reverend Lacy outlines the road network that he knows. Charlie Welford says that there are wood roads in the vicinity of Catherine Furnace. Is a strike at the Union right practicable? Lee asks. The answer is yes.
Lee asks Jackson, “What do you propose to do?” Jackson answers, “Go around here,” and he traces on a map with his finger the route he proposes to keep on. Lee then inquires about how many men Jackson will take with him on his march around the Union Army. Lee’s blood must have run cold when Jackson replied, “My whole corps”—some 29,000 men in the divisions of Robert Rodes, Raleigh Colston, and A. P. Hill. What does that leave Lee? It leaves him two understrength divisions, some 14,000 men, and 24 cannon. As you remember, Barksdale’s brigade of McLaws’s division has been left with General Early back at Fredericksburg, and Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox’s brigade of Anderson’s division is watching Banks’s Ford. Still, Lee agrees with Jackson’s plan.
Earlier, as they sat around the campfire, Jackson was in some discomfort. Jackson had a bad cold, incipient pneumonia. So he lay down on the ground to get some sleep, and staffer Capt. Sandie Pendleton came along and covered him with his coat. Jackson had laid his sword and scabbard up against a tree; during the night the sword and scabbard fell with a clatter. At the time, Jackson’s staff thought nothing of it, but later on, as A. L. Long, Lee’s aide, recalled this incident, he felt that it had a sinister meaning: the symbolic falling of the sword prefiguring the fall of their illustrious leader.
As the night passes, the Union forces continue to entrench; the Confederates also throw up earthworks. McLaws’s and Anderson’s divisions have a desperate mission: To rivet Hooker’s attention on them while Jackson makes his famous, and last, flank march.
In the morning hours of May 2 the Confederates break camp. Jackson does not begin his march at daybreak. He moves out around 7:20 a.m. Jackson has Col. Tom Munford’s Second Virginia Cavalry out in front, another VMI man. Then the divisions of Rodes, Colston, and, last but not least, A. P. Hill come in succession. The road is narrow, and Jackson is going to be moving in the neighborhood of 29,000 men. He will march 50 minutes followed by 10 minutes rest. Add a column of 108 cannon, each gun with its limber and six horses or mules and the accompanying limber and caisson with its horses. It will take four to five hours for the column to pass a given point, with stops and starts giving the column the action of an accordion: Men at the front of the column will, as old soldiers well know, march at a certain pace, and the men at the rear of the column will be double-timing to keep up.
As Jackson’s men commence their march, Union forces posted near Hazel Grove, one of the few clearings in the vicinity, peer through an opening in the woods and spot their departure.
The Confederates come marching down the Catherine Furnace Road with Munford’s cavalry out front. Up on Hazel Grove is General Sickles’s headquarters along with his chief of artillery, Capt. George Randolph. As they look out in this direction, lo and behold, what do they see? They sight a Confederate column, seemingly endless, moving along the Catherine Furnace Road. Sickles notifies General Hooker about what he has seen, and a battery of rifled artillery (ten-pounder Parrotts) is put in position to shell the Confederate column. When he is notified, Hooker is not worried because the Catherine Furnace Road heads south and west. Hooker has said that Lee has but two alternatives: either come out of his defenses and attack, or ingloriously flee. So it looks to him like his plan is working and Lee is retreating.
The Confederates are not too concerned as they come under artillery fire, because a single shot could only strike one man and would do little other damage. The Confederate infantry double-time across this opening in the woods. But what about the 108 cannon, 216 limbers, 108 caissons, and the ambulances? What do they do? Having young Charlie Welford with them is a godsend, because he is familiar with the location of all the local wood roads. There is a parallel road east of the Catherine Furnace Road. The horse-drawn vehicles and wagons use that road, which is hidden deep in the timber.
Sickles, with permission from Hooker, sends two divisions in pursuit of the Confederates. His remaining division, Hooker’s old III Corps division now under Maj. Gen. Hiram Berry, is held in reserve. One of Howard’s six brigades, Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow’s, reinforces Sickles in the “pursuit” toward and beyond Catherine Furnace. Accompanying Barlow’s brigade is XI Corps commander Howard. By the time Sickles’s vanguard reaches Catherine Furnace, the last of Jackson’s column has moved through the area. In an attempt to discourage and distract this Union force, Lee sends Posey’s brigade to threaten and harass Sickles’s left flank near Catherine Furnace.
As Jackson marches, the Yankees are in hot pursuit. They drive the 23rd Georgia back to the unfinished railroad grade; it puts up stiff resistance, but is overwhelmed. In response, Jackson detaches two brigades from A. P. Hill’s division to slow down the Yankees. One can imagine the reports that Hooker is receiving at his headquarters. Howard and Sickles are excited about pursuing the retreating Confederates as they press on toward the southwest and the Brock Road, their vanguard skirmishing with the Rebs’ rear guard. All appears to be going well for the Union as the Confederates seemingly seek to escape the area. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, Jackson’s column snakes through the woods, headed for the Union right.
The total march is 12 miles. It was not a particularly fast march. As the head of the column reaches the intersection of the Brock and Orange Plank roads, more than three miles southwest of Chancellorsville, at 1:45 p.m., Fitz Lee rides up and says he wants Jackson to come with him to see something interesting. Up to this time, Jackson’s plan is to turn his column into the Plank Road, deploy his men, and attack up the axis of the Orange Plank Road. He orders Rodes to halt his men; this will allow the other troops to close up.
Then Jackson and Fitz Lee ride down the Orange Plank Road about a mile and a quarter until they reach the Burton Farm. North of the Burton House is high ground from where you can see the Talley Farm fields and the Orange Turnpike where Howard’s XI Corps has halted and camped. Cooks and butchers have strung up beef and are busy preparing meals for the men. Troops are strolling around the camps, their arms stacked, playing cards and doing whatever troops do when they are off duty. Jackson sees that if he deploys his men to attack up the Plank Road he will strike the enemy head-on. He recognizes that if he is to launch a devastating flank attack it cannot be along the axis of the Plank Road. Fitz Lee says that Jackson becomes concerned about what he has seen at this point, and he turns his horse and rides excitedly off the high ground. He is in such a hurry that onlookers fear he will pitch forward out of the saddle and over Little Sorrel’s head.
He returns to the Brock–Orange Plank Road intersection and writes his last message to General Lee. He states that “the enemy has made a stand at [Melzi] Chancellor’s which is about [two] miles from Chancellorsville,” and that his column is well closed up. He concludes by saying that with the help of “an ever kind Providence,” he hopes to achieve a great victory. He dates the dispatch as near 3 p.m., and the courier gallops off.
Jackson then turns his attention to Rodes and orders him to continue up the Brock Road. He orders Colston to detach the Stonewall Brigade from his division. He sends it down the Plank Road along with the Second Virginia Cavalry to guard against the Yankees, who may advance a column down the road toward the Brock Road intersection.
It is not until late afternoon that Jackson reaches his new destination astride the Orange Turnpike just west of the XI Corps position. Oliver Otis Howard’s men are posted parallel to and north and south of the turnpike. They are not entrenched, other than with a few crude piles of cut timber and fence rails. Even if Jackson’s attack had come from the southwest along the Orange Plank Road as planned, the Confederates would not have encountered any breastworks. But to strike Howard’s flank, Jackson determined that the additional two-and-a-half-mile march was warranted, even though he will need several more hours to get his men positioned, ready to attack.
Now, let’s look at the Union side. Col. Leopold von Gilsa’s brigade has two regiments facing west astride the Orange Turnpike. On the right is the 54th New York and on the left is the 153rd Pennsylvania, good German lads. Von Gilsa’s two other regiments—the 41st and 45th New York—are posted parallel to the turnpike facing south. Two cannon at the angle are sighted west. The regiments looking west number less than 700 men.
On the left of von Gilsa is Col. Nathaniel McLean’s brigade. When the fighting begins, two of his five regiments—the 25th and 75th Ohio—redeploy at right angles from their original alignment along the turnpike and face west. Along the turnpike to the left of McLean are the brigades of Col. W. Krzyzanowski and Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig. The men of these brigades have stacked arms and are milling about enjoying themselves. To the left and east of these two brigades is Col. Adolphus Buschbeck’s brigade. This brigade will end up the savior of XI Corps, because it will have time to deploy perpendicular to the turnpike before the Confederates are upon them.
Col. John C. Lee of the 55th Ohio had received reports beginning about noon from his scouts and pickets that there is Rebel activity out to the west; Col. Robert Reiley of the 75th Ohio receives similar reports. Thus several Union colonels go to their division commander, Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, with their concerns. Devens, in a patronizing manner, dismisses them and doesn’t alert Howard. Even if he did believe these stories, Howard was absent from his command post, having accompanied Sickles and Barlow. Artillerist Capt. Hubert “Leather Britches” Dilger, of Company I, First Ohio Light Artillery, a veteran of the Prussian Army, also sees the enemy. When he reports what he has seen to Hooker’s staff, they tell him to take his yarn to Howard’s headquarters. Hooker’s and Howard’s headquarters both receive advance warnings of what is about to take place, but they do not believe them.
Meanwhile, the Confederates are forming up into battle lines. Rodes’s division is in the lead; Rodes deploys two brigades north and two south of the turnpike. His line extends for just over a mile from flank to flank. Five hundred yards behind Rodes’s division are three of Raleigh Colston’s brigades and one of Rodes’s. Out in front, Maj. Eugene Blackford deploys the Fifth Alabama battalion as skirmishers. After Blackford reports to Jackson that the Fifth Alabama is ready, Stonewall turns to Rodes and tells him, “You can go forward then.” The time by Rodes’s watch is 5:15 p.m.
If you are one of those German boys out here, you see all sorts of wildlife—squirrels, foxes, and deer—come bounding from the woods toward you. Soon thereafter, you hear that terrible Rebel yell, as thousands of Confederates emerge from the woods as far as the eye can see and bear down on your front and flanks. You might get off a volley or two, but then it is “root hog” or die. The two guns astride the road get off a couple of rounds before they are overrun, and the 153rd Pennsylvania and the 54th New York facing west are overwhelmed by weight of numbers. In rapid succession, the XI Corps is rolled up from west to east like a wet blanket.
Buschbeck forms his brigade on the ridge east of Wilderness Church. He seeks to buy time for the corps to recover from Jackson’s devastating attack. Howard returns and tries to rally his men, sitting his horse athwart the turnpike with a flag under the stump of his amputated upper right arm and a pistol in his left hand.
Back at Hooker’s Chancellor House headquarters, Hooker and his staff hear firing to the west. They are not alarmed until it comes closer, and several of Hooker’s staffers go out onto the turnpike fronting the house. Looking west, they see them coming! An uncontrollable mob is rapidly approaching them.
Sensational as the Confederate attack is, before long soldiers in the lead division find themselves exhausted; elsewhere, a few brigades fail to join the attack. Jackson is everywhere, pressing his men forward.
The Confederates have scored a strategic surprise, sending thousands of XI Corps troops “skedaddling” pell-mell down the turnpike. As the Confederates advance they soon encounter pockets of resistance. Several Union regiments posted south of the turnpike, including the 75th and 25th Ohio, turn 90 degrees and face west toward the oncoming Confederates. This gives Buschbeck’s brigade, along with Dilger’s battery, time to take position near Dowdell’s Tavern on the turnpike facing west. It takes the Confederates considerable time to overwhelm the stubborn knot of resistance put up by Buschbeck’s people, who have been reinforced by hard-core units that had been rallied by division commander Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz. By the time they overrun Buschbeck’s brigade, Rodes’s three left brigades are exhausted and their ranks becoming disorganized. South of the turnpike are three Confederate brigades led by Brig. Gens. Alfred Colquitt, Stephen D. Ramseur, and Elisha F. “Bull” Paxton that have not kept pace, because of hesitation on Colquitt’s part. They do not move forward until the Confederates to their left have uncovered the intersection of the Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike. Time bought by Buschbeck and Dilger at Dowdell’s Tavern helps the XI Corps slow the Confederate advance and prevents a total rout of the XI Corps.
Colston comes forward, relieves Rodes, and pushes onward. His advance is on a three-brigade front. He gains another three-quarters of a mile and halts near where the Bullock Road diverges from the turnpike. It is beginning to get dark. Soon Jackson makes what proves to be a fatal decision: He rides ahead to conduct a personal reconnaissance on a moonlit evening.
The Confederates are advancing on a broad front, with some units encountering resistance and others fighting brambles and undergrowth in the Wilderness terrain. The onslaught is beginning to lose its momentum. As night comes you begin to appreciate the effect of the delays in the march of Jackson’s column, the late morning start, the impact of Jackson’s midafternoon reconnaissance to the Burton Farm, and the decision to use the axis of the turnpike rather than that of the Plank Road to smite Howard’s corps.
Soon, Colston’s division is pulled back to re-form; the Confederates call up Hill’s division. They initially bring forward Brig. Gen. James “Little Jim” Lane’s brigade and the brigade of Virginians led by Brig. Gen. Henry Heth. Behind them is Brig. Gen. William Dorsey Pender’s brigade. At this time, Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan’s brigade is not on the field, nor are Brig. Gens. Edward L. Thomas’s and James J. Archer’s. The latter two are farther behind; they have dropped back to discourage Sickles’s pursuit. The Confederates will attempt to restart their attack with just two brigades.
What units does Hooker have available? He has Hiram Berry’s III Corps division, as well as a II Corps brigade under Brig. Gen. William Hays. Berry’s people had not joined Sickles’s corps in the “wild goose chase” after Jackson’s column. Instead, they remained behind and are in position along with artillery. The XII Corps is south of the turnpike, and they are rapidly constructing breastworks fronting west. Cavalry commander Alfred Pleasonton sends the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry in a charge down a wood road leading north from Hazel Grove in an effort to blunt the Confederate onslaught. It gets the daylights shot out of it. But the charge unnerves some of the Confederates.
Jackson has chosen an inauspicious time to go out in front of his lines to undertake his reconnaissance, but he is desperate to get his stalled attack going again. Riding with him are members of his staff and three headquarters couriers, a total of nine people. Jackson is riding Little Sorrel. Their guide, David Kyle, leads them out the “Mountain Road.” Jackson wants to continue the advance toward U.S. Ford. South of the road is Williams’s XII Corps division. By this time of day, many Union Army units have recovered from the initial blow delivered by Jackson’s flank attack.
Having seen Hooker’s re-formed defensive positions and having come under artillery and small-arms fire, Jackson seeks to return to his lines. He and his party turn their horses around and ride west. The men in Jim Lane’s brigade hear them approach. They have just arrived on the front line, and they see riders approaching their position out of the darkness. They have been under artillery fire from the enemy, and there are reports of Union cavalry in the area. Soldiers in the 18th North Carolina open fire. Jackson’s brother-in-law and other staffers call out, “Cease fire! You are firing into your own men!” Maj. John Barry of the 18th North Carolina shouts that this is a Yankee lie and commands his men to “pour it into them, boys!” These men are armed with smooth bore muskets, and at this range fire buck and ball.
In the darkness there is mass confusion. Several horses go down. Nearby, over on the turnpike some 80 yards away, Gen. A. P. Hill and his nine-man entourage, including Corps Chief Engineer James Keith Boswell, have also been fired upon by the North Carolinians. Boswell and two others are killed.
As the deadly volley is unleashed on Jackson’s party, Jackson has raised his right arm into the air as if to ward off the bullets. A musket buckshot strikes him in the palm of his hand. A ball fractures his lower left arm, and another strikes his upper left arm, fracturing and shattering the bone. Jackson’s horse, spooked by the fire, heads off through the thick undergrowth with Jackson in the saddle. A staff officer quickly reacts, following Jackson and his mount into the undergrowth, and manages to grab the reins of his horse and bring Little Sorrel to a halt. A second staff member arrives and assists Jackson in dismounting. Jackson tells them that he is badly wounded. They see that his face is sorely lacerated by the thick undergrowth as well. In the confusion and chaos, Little Sorrel strays into the Federal lines, but he is later found and is returned about six weeks later.
Initially, Jackson is in considerable pain, but it does not last long. I say that because of personal experience, having myself been shot four times in World War II; the severe pain does not last as shock sets in. Members of Jackson’s staff stop the bleeding, and, seeing that Jackson has been seriously wounded, they seek to get him behind their lines for medical attention. They first try to walk him to the rear but they do not get far. They then place him on a stretcher and begin the perilous journey to an aid station. As the party reaches the turnpike, Federal artillery opens fire with canister. A stretcher-bearer is struck by a deadly missile and goes down, but a staffer catches the litter’s handle, and they ground the stretcher.
When they resume the journey, one of the litter-bearers trips, and Jackson is dropped. He moans as this causes more damage to his mangled left arm, and he begins to hemorrhage. Quickly, they stop the bleeding and get him back onto the stretcher and carefully work their way out of no-man’sland and out of harm’s way. When they get behind the lines, Jackson asks for the corps’ medical director, Dr. Hunter McGuire. He doesn’t want one of the regimental surgeons to get ahold of him because of what he fears might happen. Jackson is placed in an ambulance with Col. Stapleton Crutchfield, his chief of artillery, who has been badly wounded in the leg. Both are taken to the field hospital back at the Wilderness Tavern. Crutchfield will lose a leg; Dr. McGuire amputates Jackson’s left arm.
After the wounding of Jackson, his command is turned over to A. P. Hill. A shell concussion soon disables Hill. Although no blood is seen, it causes a severe contusion of the lower leg, which incapacitates him. He hands over command to Robert Rodes until they can find someone senior in rank to command the corps.
With Jackson and Hill down, the Confederate attack sputters to a halt in the dark. Jeb Stuart, although a cavalryman, is the only major general in the vicinity. He soon arrives and assumes command of Jackson’s corps. He orders his cavalrymen to smite the Federals with everything they have at daybreak. His action is confirmed by General Lee. Hooker scrambles to consolidate his command; Lee anxiously seeks to reunite his forces, while the word from Fredericksburg is that the Yankees opposing Early are advancing. Both sides focus on Sickles’s position on Hazel Grove. While the Union holds it, Lee can’t unite his army; if the Confederates gain control of it, they will be able to emplace their artillery to support infantry attacks on the restored Union positions.
The Confederates know that the Union Army is throwing up breastworks confronting Jackson’s corps along a north-south line throughout the night. The area is heavily wooded, so the Yankees make extensive use of timber in their construction, adding revetments and abatis. They clear brush for fields of fire. Three Union divisions are behind three lines of breastworks supported by Capt. Clermont Best’s 26 artillery pieces at Fairview. All face west and will receive the initial blows of Stuart’s attack on the morning of May 3, protected by earthen lunettes.
Henry Heth, who has replaced A. P. Hill, leads the division that spearheads the Confederate onslaught. Attacking on the Confederate right is James J. Archer’s brigade. He strikes at Sickles’s corps, which has returned to Hazel Grove. To Archer’s left Heth has four brigades and one in reserve. In line behind Heth is Raleigh Colston’s division. At Dowdall’s Tavern, Rodes’s division is re-formed and ready to constitute Stuart’s ready reserve. Jackson had more than 29,000 soldiers when he began his May 2 flank march. Stuart now has only 24,000.
On the Union “side of the Hill,” Meade’s corps has been pulled from their entrenchments behind Mineral Spring Run and sent to the right flank. Reynolds’s I Corps, making a late afternoon’s march from Falmouth, has crossed the Rappahannock at U.S. Ford and takes position behind Hunting Run, its left tied into Meade’s right and its right anchored in the Rapidan. Taking positions in the breastworks vacated by Meade are the re-formed divisions of the XI Corps. This is a good place for Howard because his corps holds an impregnable position. General Couch is missing one of his three divisions: General Gibbon’s, of which we will hear more later. Couch has the division led by Hancock and Samuel Carroll’s brigade of French’s division behind breastworks facing east, covering the Chancellorsville crossroads; French’s other two brigades face west, toward Stuart.
In the Union advance line south of the turnpike and facing west are soldiers of Slocum’s XII Corps—150 yards deep into the woods. There is a second line of breastworks and then a third, constituting a defense in depth. The undergrowth is dense and low to the ground. You would not see large trees such as the ones there now. If you are a Confederate, you can expect high casualties due to poor visibility as you move through this undergrowth and suddenly come upon Yankee breastworks. There are cleared areas and an abatis, lines of brush piled with sharpened branches facing the enemy, in front of the log barricades where Union troops have felled trees. The Confederate attacks will come forward in successive battle lines. Employing a mid-20th-century military term, the Rebels will attack in human waves. They lose many men because they’re going up against veteran Union troops posted behind breastworks.
Confederate attacks begin at daylight on May 3. It is incumbent that Lee reunite the two wings of his army. The combined number of men in Stuart’s and Lee’s wings is approximately 36,000. The Union force with Hooker is now concentrated, numbers more than 75,000, and is positioned between Stuart’s and Lee’s wings. If Sickles’s corps remains at Hazel Grove, there is no way for Lee to reunite the army.
About 6 a.m. Sickles receives orders from Hooker’s headquarters to abandon Hazel Grove. Hooker is concerned about Sickles’s people posted in the apex of the Union salient. Sickles protests the order. In Sickles’s mind, by giving up Hazel Grove, the Union Army will surrender to the enemy the battlefield’s key artillery position. But when Hooker insists, Sickles acquiesces and pulls back. Archer’s brigade of Stuart’s wing, which had been repulsed in an earlier attack, now occupies Hazel Grove. The way is open to a linkup of the two wings of Lee’s army.
The occupation of Hazel Grove enabled the Confederates to make use of this superb ground for artillery. Col. E. Porter Alexander, commanding Lee’s I Corps reserve artillery, quickly assembles more than 40 Confederate guns on Hazel Grove. A terrific and terrible artillery duel ensues between the Confederate cannon and Captain Best’s Fairview guns. Chancellorsville is one of the few battles in the Eastern Theater in which Confederate artillery overwhelmed the Union redlegs (artillerymen).
Following Jackson’s mortal wounding on May 2, Lee temporarily appointed brilliant cavalry commander Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to take charge of Jackson’s Corps.
Where is Hooker at this time? He is on the front porch of the Chancellor House. About 9 a.m. a shell fired by one of Alexander’s cannon strikes the column that Hooker is leaning up against, splitting the column from end to end and throwing him to the ground senseless. If he is dead or disabled, that might solve everything and leave General Couch in charge. Hooker soon recovers consciousness and gives the order for Couch to pull back. Hooker’s aides escort him around to the backside of the house. He lies down, trying to recover from the concussion to his head. While he is trying to shake off the effects of being knocked out, his aides move him again. When they do so, another shell comes in and hits the ground where he had been laying. If they had not moved him, that would have been the end of Hooker.
Many of Hooker’s staff gather around Couch and urge him to take command. In their opinion, Hooker is incapacitated. Some are wondering if Hooker has lost his nerve. Some even feel that he may have been hitting the bottle again. Hooker is befuddled. But suppose Couch takes command and things go awry. What happens if things get worse instead of better, and he has taken over command of the army without first having Hooker certified by the army’s chief medical officer as disabled? If the battle should further unravel for the bluecoats Couch could be accused of violating the articles of war. We all understand what the ramifications of that could be. As a result, Couch does not assume command and is compelled to carry out Hooker’s instructions to withdraw the army to the newly prepared defense line anchored on “the apex” at the Chandler House.
Sam McGowan’s and Jim Lane’s brigades, advancing south of the turnpike, seize the first line of Union breastworks. McGowan is wounded and his South Carolina brigade cut to pieces in front of the second line of log breastworks. The Stonewall Brigade comes forward—and General Paxton is killed at the second barricade. Now Rodes’s division surges to the front, and his Alabamians suffer the same fate as the South Carolinians. Rodes commits his freshest brigades, Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s. The fighting is vicious as the Confederates press forward and finally overrun the second line of Union breastworks and assail the final Union defensive line manned by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger’s XII Corps brigade. The fighting rages for what seems to be an eternity. Couch, implementing Hooker’s orders, directs Captain Best to pull his artillery off Fairview. Slocum’s and Sickles’s infantry give ground, and Ramseur’s North Carolinians climb the slope. Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham is a Sickles crony, and his Pennsylvania brigade covers the retreat from Fairview at a fearful cost, suffering 750 killed, wounded, and missing, more than any other unit in the morning’s fighting. North of the turnpike, Edward Thomas’s Georgians and Dorsey Pender’s North Carolinians hammer Hiram Berry’s and French’s Yanks, unmercifully gaining ground. Soldiers from the 13th North Carolina capture Brig. Gen. William Hays, one of French’s brigade commanders. General Berry crosses the turnpike to check on the fight for Fairview and is shot by a Confederate sharpshooter. That is the end of Hiram Berry. When Hooker learns of Berry’s death, saddened by the words, he sheds tears. They had been longtime comrades.
Meanwhile, John Reynolds’s I Corps has taken post behind Meade’s on the Union right covered by Little Hunting Run. Thomas’s Georgians gain ground but expose their left flank to a counterthrust by Meade. If Hooker had not been so preoccupied with a defensive posture, he might have capitalized on this situation. Meade and Reynolds could have been ordered to advance a short distance to the right and then turn south. They may have then overwhelmed Stuart’s left wing while he was engaged in his front with Sickles’s and Slocum’s corps at Fairview. But, unfortunately for the Federals, Reynolds’s and Meade’s 30,000 men remain idle while Sickles’s and Slocum’s corps bear first the brunt and then crumble under the weight of Stuart’s sledgehammer-like blows.
To shield the retrograde movement to their new position at the “Apex,” it is mandatory that General Hancock and his people hold their ground covering the Chancellorsville intersection. Hancock is the ideal soldier to accomplish this task. He has the charisma and leadership qualities that all combat infantry of modern wars admire in an officer. He and his division hold the line. It is 10:30 a.m. when the last Yankees leave Chancellorsville and the burning tavern, set afire by Rebel shells about the time Hooker is disabled. Confederate soldiers surge across the clearing and accept the surrender of the 27th Connecticut before it can escape up the Ely’s Ford Road. Lee arrives to the cheers of his veterans. But the supreme moment of his life as a soldier is interrupted and marred by bad news from Fredericksburg.
On May 3, Jeb Stuart, who succeeded the wounded Stonewall Jackson, launched a series of attacks against the entrenched Federals around Chancellorsville hoping to reunite his forces with Lee’s. At 9 a.m., despite a gallant defense, Hooker ordered a withdrawal to new positions north of Chancellorsville. As the Confederates continued their assault during the late afternoon, Lee received word that Federal troops had broken through at Fredericksburg. Lee again divided his forces, and on May 4 the Confederates defeated the Federal VI Corps at Salem Church, forcing them to retreat across the Rappahannock at nightfall. On May 6 Hooker abandoned his position at Chancellorsville and withdrew across the river.
Though Lee has succeeded in reuniting his main force on May 3, he now learns that another Union force is threatening disaster.
Back on the night of April 28–29, Reynolds’s and Sedgwick’s corps had crossed the Rappahannock River downstream at Franklin’s Crossing to hold Lee’s attention while Hooker maneuvered against Lee’s left flank. On May 2 Reynolds is withdrawn from the Fredericksburg area and marches west to join Hooker at Chancellorsville. That leaves Sedgwick near Fredericksburg with his three VI Corps divisions and Gibbon’s II Corps division, some 28,000 strong, to confront Jubal Early’s five brigades. On the afternoon of the second, before Jackson’s flank attack, Hooker, still under the delusion that Lee is retreating, messages Sedgwick to storm the heights behind Fredericksburg and vigorously pursue the foe. That evening, after the rout of Howard’s people, Hooker reiterates his orders for Sedgwick to seize the heights, but on doing so, he is to march west via the Orange Plank Road and come up in rear of Lee’s army confronting Hooker’s VI Corps at Chancellorsville. Because of problems with the military telegraph, Sedgwick does not receive the latter message until 11 p.m., when it is delivered by a mounted courier.
What does Jubal Early have available on the morning of May 3 to hold this front? Early’s five brigades of infantry must defend a front that Lee held back in mid-December with 78,000 men. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Harry T. Hays and William Barksdale hold a two-mile line behind Fredericksburg reaching from Taylor’s Hill on the river north of town, down along Marye’s Heights, and on to the Howison House just below Lee’s Hill overlooking Hazel Run. His remaining three brigades—Brig. Gens. Robert F. Hoke’s, John B. Gordon’s, and that of former Virginia governor Brig. Gen. William “Extra Billy” Smith—will guard the rest of the Confederate line from the Howison House to Hamilton’s Crossing.
What does the opposing Union Army have available in Fredericksburg? It has the largest corps in the Army of the Potomac, the VI Corps, led by “Uncle John” Sedgwick. He is a soldier’s soldier. His grandfather, also named John Sedgwick, was a major in Washington’s army during the Revolutionary War. General Sedgwick commands four divisions—three led by Brig. Gens. William T. H. “Bully” Brooks, Albion P. Howe, and John Newton. A fourth light division follows Col. Hiram Burnham. On the north side of the Rappahannock River the Federals have two brigades of John Gibbon’s II Corps division led by Col. Alfred Sully and Col. Norman Hall.
A thick fog envelops the Rappahannock Valley that morning, and it delays the Union troops as they seek to move into formation to attack Marye’s Heights. Holding Marye’s Heights is a brigade from McLaws’s division, commanded by William Barksdale. He has five regiments—four Mississippi and one Louisiana—to defend a sector where four brigades were committed in December 1862. Supporting these regiments are seven guns on Marye’s Heights, another four at Lee’s Hill, and another eight in the Howison Hill sector.
Employing the town of Fredericksburg as a staging area, Sedgwick sends Newton against the Confederate lines between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. Newton is a West Point graduate, a Virginian, a member of the Corps of Engineers, and a close friend of Meade’s. Newton’s first attack against the Confederate right on Hazel Run is repulsed. Newton’s second thrust against the Confederate positions on the Sunken Road and on Marye’s Heights is likewise turned back with little difficulty. John Gibbon’s brigades attempts to skirt the base of Taylor’s Hill to strike the Confederate left flank. Artillery fire from hastily assembled Confederate guns prevents his people from bridging the narrow industrial canal, forcing Gibbon to abandon efforts to outflank the Confederates northwest of town. Howe’s division then goes forward and endeavors to turn the Confederate positions on Marye’s Heights south of Hazel Run. His efforts also meet with no success. It is apparent to Sedgwick that the Confederate position on Marye’s Heights is invulnerable to thrusts against its flanks. Hooker’s insistence that the VI Corps hasten to the rescue of the army at Chancellorsville compels Sedgwick to risk a frontal assault.
By the time that the Federals launch their final attack against Marye’s Heights this day, they have learned much since their December 13, 1862, debacle here. They recall that when A. A. Humphrey’s division advanced, it did not go forward in line of battle, as was the standard practice. Instead, “Old Goggle Eye” led them forward by regimental column. Although men at the head of the column will suffer heavy casualties, it is felt that momentum will keep the formation moving ahead.
Sedgwick allots ten regiments to the assaulting columns—the 61st Pennsylvania heads the column of fours on the Orange Plank Road and the 7th Massachusetts on the Telegraph Road. Confederate artillery on the military crest of Marye’s Heights and infantry in the Sunken Road open fire on the advancing columns. The head of each column melts away. The Yankees’ attack is repulsed. A Union colonel sends forward a white flag and requests permission to remove the dead and wounded. Col. Thomas Griffin of the 18th Mississippi is naive. The Yankees come up under a flag of truce to gather up their dead and wounded and see that there aren’t many Rebels holding the Sunken Road. They report this important information to their commanding officers upon their return to the safety of their lines.
The Federals, with seemingly unlimited manpower, resume their relentless assault. Troops are instructed not to stop to reload their rifles this time, but to continue to advance at the double-quick with bayonets fixed and overrun the hopelessly outnumbered Confederates in the Sunken Road. Savage hand-to-hand fighting occurs in the road, but numbers tell. The Confederates abandon their position, and the Federals surge upward and over the crest of Marye’s Heights. By 11 a.m. they possess this key ground. Off to the south, General Howe’s brigades overrun the Confederates on Lee’s Hill. Early’s defeated brigades retreat south via the Telegraph Road, which leads to Guinea Station, away from Lee and the Confederate Army at Chancellorsville.
Now that the Federals control the Fredericksburg heights, what should they do? Sedgwick has suffered heavy casualties in the fight to secure Marye’s Heights, particularly in Newton’s division. Sedgwick wastes about four hours bringing up “Bully” Brooks’s fresh division before resuming the march toward Chancellorsville. During these precious hours Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox and his Alabama Brigade set the stage to become Confederate heroes. Wilcox first sends his men east toward Marye’s Heights and then toward the Salem Church, as his Alabamians fight a series of delaying actions along the Orange Plank Road.
Upon learning of the disaster at Fredericksburg, Lee responds to the emergency by splitting his army yet again and ordering four brigades under General McLaws to Salem Church. The question becomes who will reach Salem Church first, Lee’s reinforcing brigades or John Sedgwick’s laggard VI Corps?
It is 3:30 p.m. before the Federals near Salem Church. In advance is Brooks’s division, some 4,000 strong. Behind Brooks are Newton’s and Howe’s divisions, and bringing up the rear Colonel Burnham’s light division. Gibbon’s division has been left in Fredericksburg to guard against a Confederate attempt to retake Marye’s Heights. Confronting Brooks’s Vermonters are 1,200 men in Wilcox’s brigade and two cannon of the Pittsylvania Artillery. Wilcox, showing great initiative, selects excellent ground for fighting a delaying action. If General Lee does not send reinforcements, his choice of ground will be to no avail. Wilcox first deploys his brigade near a tollhouse a mile east of Salem Church. Later, he pulls his people back to take position along a north-south ridge at the church. Two regiments are north of the Plank Road and two south of it, with detachments of the Ninth Alabama inside the church building and schoolhouse. Artillery is unlimbered as Wilcox looks first at his watch with a concerned expression, then to the east, and finally the west, searching for signs of Lee’s oncoming reinforcements.
The Federals approach and deploy into battle lines. Brooks positions Col. Henry Brown’s New Jersey Brigade on either side of the road. Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett’s brigade takes ground on Brown’s left flank, with Brig. Gen. David Russell’s brigade in support. When the Yankees advance, they drive in Confederate skirmishers. They continue pressing ahead until they reach and occupy the Salem Church. But just as they gain the church, the four reinforcing Confederate brigades arrive from the west. Approaching the church on the north side of the road and anchoring its right on Wilcox’s left is Brig. Gen. Paul Semmes’s brigade. Next in line on Semmes’s left are Brig. Gen. William “Little Billy” Mahone’s Virginians. Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw brings his South Carolina Brigade into line on the south side of the road on the right of Wilcox, and finally, on Kershaw’s right, will be Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford’s Georgians.
The Confederates have arrived in time to save Wilcox from destruction. Fighting around the church is savage. Brown loses more than 500 Federals and Bartlett’s brigade more than 600. Their casualties are heavy, but the Confederates hold this vital ground, and Sedgwick’s hammer is checked before it can smash Lee on Hooker’s anvil.
What is General Lee going to do next? He decides to leave Jeb Stuart in command of the 23,000 men in Jackson’s corps with orders to watch Hooker’s 75,000 Union troops that are entrenched with their center anchored on the “Apex,” with their left behind Mineral Springs Run, and their right behind Hunting Run. Lee will assemble all remaining Confederate troops in the vicinity of Salem Church and deal Sedgwick a crippling blow before he can escape with his corps back across the Rappahannock at Banks’s Ford. He recalls Jubal Early’s division from the area of the Cox House. McLaws will attack at the same time from the west and Anderson from the south. McLaws’s division will lead off. When the other division commanders hear McLaws’s guns, they are to advance. If they can coordinate their attacks, Lee hopes to drive Sedgwick back into the cul-de-sac formed by a bend of the Rappahannock at Banks’s Ford and compel him to surrender.
On May 4 Sedgwick and his 25,000 bluecoats fight for survival. Confronting his command are almost 30,000 Confederates under Robert E. Lee’s personal command. Stuart still watches Hooker in the Chancellorsville pocket. Sedgwick is in a tight spot.
But it is not to be a good day for the Confederates, particularly not for General McLaws in the Salem Church sector. Attacking as scheduled at 8 a.m., Early’s division, spearheaded by John B. Gordon’s Georgians, has reoccupied the high ground behind Fredericksburg by midmorning. Here Early waits in vain for the sound of McLaws’s guns to the west. When General Lee arrives from Chancellorsville at 11 a.m., he is miffed to learn that Dick Anderson, with the three brigades that were to accompany him, is not up yet. Delay follows on delay, and soon Lee begins to fret, his ire centering on McLaws, who until Lee’s arrival was senior officer present. Lee’s staff officers present at the Salem Church command post recognize that Lee is angry. The signs are there as the back of their general’s neck reddens and one of his ears twitches. Lee’s ear will twitch a lot this afternoon as he waits for McLaws to act.
In the end, Lee’s plans to hammer and destroy Sedgwick come to naught. On the night of the fourth the VI Corps troops, squeezed by the Confederates, use Scott’s Ford to escape the trap Lee had forged for them south of the Rappahannock.
Disappointed that he could not gobble up one Federal force, Lee turns his attention once more to Chancellorsville.
Hooker expected Sedgwick to come to his rescue, but learning of Sedgwick’s defeat at Salem Church, he must reevaluate the situation. He decides to hold his first council of war since the start of the Chancellorsville campaign. Hooker is heretofore so self-assured of his plans for victory that he has disdained advice from his subordinates and staff. He has kept his battle plans closely guarded secrets. But rapidly changing events on the battlefield over the past several days have shaken his self-confidence. By May 4, the self-assurance exhibited earlier in the campaign has vanished. At midnight of May 4–5, when the council of war convenes in Hooker’s headquarters tent, Hooker has already decided what he is going to do following the unwelcome news of Sedgwick’s failed attempt to rescue the army.
The council of war begins with most of the corps commanders present, including Couch (second in command), Reynolds, Meade, Sickles, and Howard. Slocum has some distance to travel to reach army headquarters and arrives after the meeting has broken up. Sedgwick, understandably, is too busy to attend. Chief of Staff Dan Butterfield and Chief Engineer Gouverneur K. Warren are also present.
Confederate dead lie in the Sunken Road at the foot of Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg. Federal troops of the VI Corps stormed the position on May 3, 1863.
Hooker opens the meeting with a few remarks emphasizing the importance of protecting Washington. He makes disparaging remarks about the soldierly character of the men in the ranks and expresses apprehension regarding the want of steadiness in some of the units he has seen, demonstrated by unnecessary firing along some parts of the line. Having established a cautious atmosphere at the beginning of the meeting, he, along with Butterfield, leaves the corps commanders to consult among themselves. Dan Sickles takes the lead and speaks his piece. Butterfield and Sickles are Hooker cronies, and it is no wonder that Sickles supports Hooker’s intentions. After Sickles delivers a short speech regarding the dire political consequences of another Union defeat and of voting to retreat, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard, in turn, make brief remarks and vote to remain and fight it out.
Couch is a bit reticent when it comes time for him to speak: He is disgusted with Hooker and his fumbling attitude regarding the battle. He votes in favor of retirement. Later he states that the Army of the Potomac did not deserve to be further sacrificed because of Hooker’s incompetent leadership.
When Hooker and Butterfield return to the tent, Hooker asks each of his corps commanders for his vote. Meade, Reynolds, and Howard favor remaining and fighting it out. Couch and Sickles favor retreat. Hooker quickly intervenes, concluding that the vote was nearly even, so there doesn’t appear to be overwhelming support for remaining south of the Rappahannock. It is probably best, he adds, if the army gets itself out of a hopeless, boxed-in situation and recrosses the river.
Retiring from the meeting, Hooker thanks his corps commanders for their opinions. Reynolds, following Couch out of Hooker’s tent, echoes the sentiments of his fellow corps commanders: “What was the purpose in calling us together at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?”
Hooker’s decision to withdraw from his strongly fortified defensive position came just as Robert E. Lee was preparing to assault it. Perhaps Hooker was wise in forestalling disaster; it is even more likely, however, that Lee would have suffered a serious and bloody repulse. As it was, he could claim a bittersweet victory in what many scholars believe to have been his finest offensive battle during the war. Inflicting some 18,000 casualties at a cost of 12,800 men, he had rescued victory from the jaws of disaster, but it had deprived him forever of the services of Stonewall Jackson, who would die on May 10 of complications arising from his wounds. If Chancellorsville was Lee’s masterpiece, it was a costly one.