MAY 8–21, 1864
The Battle of the Wilderness, fought May 5 and 6, 1864, resulted in a bloody tactical draw. If Grant did not deal Lee a decisive blow, neither did Lee force Grant to retire back across the Rapidan River. By choosing to advance, Grant showed that he would not allow his strategic plan to be upset by tactical setbacks. Grant intended to keep contact with his enemy, Robert E. Lee, and to allow the Confederates no opportunity to break contact and gain the advantage of maneuver. Grant employed his superiority in manpower to grind down the Army of Northern Virginia. The Union advance also signaled the continuation of what became a nearly continuous moving battle, in which the opposing armies either were fighting or preparing to fight nearly every day for the next six weeks.
The objective of the Union march was Spotsylvania Court House, about ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It was a county seat and a hub of roads going out to all points of the compass. It was also on open ground, where the Union could use its superior numbers and artillery. By moving to Spotsylvania Court House, Generals Grant and Meade could establish the Army of the Potomac’s forward supply depot at Fredericksburg. If it’s at Fredericksburg, supplies can reach the army by boats ascending the Rappahannock River to Falmouth, just above Fredericksburg. Federal engineers restored service over the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad southward from Aquia Landing—on the Potomac downstream from the present Quantico Marine Corps Base—to Fredericksburg. They also opened a major supply depot downriver at Belle Plain near the mouth of Potomac Creek.
Army wagons and transports at the lower landing at Belle Plain, Virginia, a major supply depot for Federal forces near the mouth of Potomac Creek on the Potomac River.
Grant hopes to beat Lee to Spotsylvania. On May 7 Chief of Staff Andrew A. Humphreys distributes orders for a movement that night. As soon as it gets dark, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, whose V Corps is concentrated in and around Wilderness Tavern, is to march his men southeast along Brock Road. Brock Road will carry them through and beyond the intersection with Orange Plank Road, where II Corps is positioned behind lines of earthworks—as ground fires still rage. Warren will continue through the intersection to Todd’s Tavern, then on to Spotsylvania Court House. At some point south of Todd’s Tavern, Warren is expected to encounter two divisions of Federal cavalry charged with clearing any Confederate cavalry out of the way.
Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, commanding VI Corps, is to leave the area northwest of Wilderness Tavern, taking the Orange Turnpike. He is to follow the turnpike as far as Chancellorsville and turn south, employing the local road network to gain the Piney Branch Church Road and trail Warren to Spotsylvania Court House. Taking the same route will be Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside with his IX Corps, who, when he passes beyond Alrich’s place, will follow a series of roads and eventually turn onto the Fredericksburg–Spotsylvania Court House Road. To relieve Burnside’s feelings of outranking Meade but having to serve under him, Burnside will continue to report directly to Grant’s headquarters.
As soon as the roads are clear, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock is to take his II Corps and follow the route pioneered by Warren. Brig. Gen. James Harrison Wilson’s cavalry division will swing east to Fredericksburg, take the road from Fredericksburg to Spotsylvania, and be at the courthouse when Warren arrives. The army’s trains are to roll along the Orange Turnpike and into Fredericksburg.
Meanwhile, at Confederate headquarters, Lee decides that Grant will break contact with the Army of Northern Virginia and probably head for Spotsylvania Court House. He calls in Chief of Artillery Brig. Gen. William Nelson Pendleton and tells him to take the pioneers and open a road from the Orange Plank Road to Catharpin Road west of Todd’s Tavern. This will give the Confederates an alternate route—the Shady Grove Church Road—by which they can hopefully reach the courthouse first.
So what is the situation at midday on May 7? The burial parties are hard at work interring the Wilderness dead. They’re recovering the wounded and sending them to hospitals—if you’re a Yank, to the Fredericksburg area; if you’re a Confederate, to Orange Court House or Gordonsville. The wounded General Longstreet ends up at the former, getting faster service than other people being sent to hospitals.
The Confederates have a number of new people in key leadership positions. With Longstreet wounded, Lee names Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson of South Carolina to lead “Old Pete’s” corps. He had been Longstreet’s West Point classmate, a steady division commander, but with a rumored drinking problem. Lee discovers that another corps commander, A. P. Hill, is too sick to exercise command. He settles upon Maj. Gen. Jubal Anderson Early, a confirmed bachelor, as Hill’s replacement. Don’t get ideas that he’s not a ladies’ man—he has two families and doesn’t marry either woman.
Early turns over his II Corps division to Brig. Gen. John Brown Gordon; Brig. Gen. William “Little Billy” Mahone takes over Anderson’s III Corps division. Mahone has the most elaborate headquarters of any senior officer in the Army of Northern Virginia. They call him “Old Porte” because he reminded everybody of an Ottoman Empire sultan when he went into the field.
At Spotsylvania, the important features are two rivers. The Ni flows from northwest to southeast. It cuts across the Fredericksburg Road about two miles northwest of the courthouse. The Po flows easterly until it approaches the area two and a half miles west of the courthouse, where it makes a sharp bend and flows southward and into a horseshoe bend about two miles before resuming its eastward course. The Po and Ni join near Guinea Station to form the Poni River.
Between May 8 and May 20 Spotsylvania sees a series of battles. On May 8 combat centers on Laurel Hill, northwest of the courthouse. The fighting on Laurel Hill continues through May 9 and 10. On May 10 there’s a fight at the Po River, west of Block House Bridge. Then there are two all-out assaults on the Confederate salient south of the Ni on May 10 and 12, followed on May 14 by fights at Myers Hill east of the courthouse, and three days later on Lee’s “Final Line” at the Harrison House, closing out on the 19th at the Harris Farm. Grant started the campaign with about 116,000 men; he’s now down to 100,000. Lee had about 65,000, but some of his losses have been offset by reinforcements. He now has around 55,000.
The bloodshed is forcing commanders to consider new tactics. Earlier Civil War generals had embraced Napoleonic tactics, with shoulder-to-shoulder advances and mass assaults with artillery pushed forward to within 800 yards of the foe. These were good tactics when the standard weapon of the infantryman was a smoothbore musket with an effective range of 60 to 70 yards. This meant you closed on the enemy, providing he didn’t have any artillery, fired a few rounds, and then a bayonet charge would decide the issue. When the Civil War got under way, a technological revolution had outdated these linear tactics.
In 1849, Capt. Claude E. Minié of the French Army developed a new type of bullet for use with the rifled muzzle-loaders then being introduced into warfare. This bullet was a conical-shaped projectile with a concavity in its base that expanded into the helical grooves of a gun barrel’s rifling when fired. This gave what was soon known as the minié ball a spin that reduced the projectile’s air resistance, flattened its trajectory, and provided an effective range of 200 to 250 yards—and a killing range of up to 500-plus yards.
The old tactics of moving men forward shoulder to shoulder in linear formation were now flawed. The learning curve began at the bottom with the rank and file, not the generals. It was the common soldier who became as efficient as engineers at selecting favorable ground and proficient in throwing up earthworks, which made it all but suicidal for the enemy to advance in line of battle. By this point in the war, if you gave soldiers eight hours they would have an all but impregnable position. You’re going to need three- or four-to-one odds to carry that position, and in the process, you will probably suffer prohibitive casualties.
It is dusk on May 7 when Warren’s men move out from the Wilderness battlefield. Expecting to turn left and retreat back down the Germanna Plank Road, they instead turn right and advance. Near the Plank and Brock Road intersection they see Grant riding along. They cheer. The Confederate rank and file first wonder and then begin to realize what this means. The Union Army is not turning back across the river following the Battle of the Wilderness. Soon joining the columns are Grant and Meade and their staffs. They travel together but don’t intermix. Meade and his people are in one group, Grant and his staff in another. Events on May 7 and 8 will cause Grant to reconsider his hands-off relationship with Meade as to tactics and personnel.
Grant from his youth has had a stubborn streak. Once he turned into a road going someplace, he never liked to admit he was wrong and turn back. As the cavalcade rides south down Brock Road, Grant inadvertently turns right at a fork into what is today known as the “Jackson Trail West.” If they keep going along that road, Grant, Meade, and their staffs might blunder into the Confederates. Unknown to Grant and Meade, General Lee has divined Grant’s plan and has started Anderson’s corps on a forced march to Spotsylvania Court House. Anderson leaves the Wilderness battlefield via the road opened by General Pendleton and the pioneers. Fortunately for the Union, Grant’s staffers hear the noise of people up ahead. They have a hard time convincing Grant he’d better turn back, but they succeed. Otherwise, Grant and Meade may have blundered into Anderson’s column and been killed or captured.
Meanwhile, Anderson moves his corps along the road cut by Lee’s pioneers and races forward toward Spotsylvania. Along Brock Road to the north, Warren’s Federal V Corps finds its way blocked beyond Todd’s Tavern. For most of the day on May 7, two divisions of Federal cavalry seek to drive back Maj. Gen. Fitz Lee’s Confederate cavalry, which block the Federal advance on Spotsylvania Court House.
Warren gets to Todd’s Tavern about 11 p.m. on May 7, only to find the Federal cavalry there in bivouac and the road to Spotsylvania blocked by Confederate cavalry. Meade discovers that the Federal cavalry is also without orders from Sheridan and decides to order David M. Gregg’s division west on Catharpin Road to screen the Federal movement and Wesley Merritt’s division to clear the courthouse road. Merritt’s horse soldiers encounter a series of roadblocks manned by Rebel cavalry led by Fitz Lee. Merritt is compelled to dismount and deploy to break the roadblocks. Valuable time is lost as the Rebels slow and stall Merritt. Warren’s column moves at a snail’s pace.
Cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan and his staff. During the Spotsylvania campaign Sheridan led cavalry operations against Confederate forces defending Richmond.
Anderson, marching along the Shady Grove Church Road, crosses the Po and reaches the Block House, two miles west of the courthouse, about 8 a.m. on May 8. Wilson’s horse soldiers come down the road from Fredericksburg, charge into Spotsylvania Court House, and run Tom Rosser’s Confederate cavalry out of the village. But Wofford’s Georgians, rushed there by Anderson, drive out Wilson’s horsemen and reclaim control of the courthouse road hub.
An hour later Anderson gets word that Yankee infantry are approaching south on the Brock Road; in response, he heads toward Laurel Hill, a mile north. He beats Warren to Laurel Hill; now his challenge is whether he can hold this ground in the face of a slashing enemy onslaught.
When Warren’s lead division, commanded by Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson, arrives via Brock Road just beyond the Alsop Farm, the Yankees look up and across the Sarah Spindle Farm to their south and see that Confederates have won the race to Laurel Hill and are tearing down and piling up fence rails, anything they can get their hands on, to throw up breastworks. The Yankees are too late. It will be a long day from 8:30 a.m. until 6 p.m. as V Corps, 20,000 strong, battles Anderson’s 12,000 Rebels. But the men in butternut hold the blue back.
Robinson has three brigades, but none of them makes any headway. Among the casualties is Robinson, shot out of his saddle at a range of 50 yards. Warren’s First Division commander, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, commits his division piecemeal, brigade by brigade. The Yankees have a big bulge in numbers, but the Confederates work like Trojans, constantly strengthening their earthworks while beating off repeated attacks. Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres’s Union brigade, which opened the fighting at the Wilderness, appears with several regiments—what’s left of his Zouave brigade. In a failed effort to break the stalemate, Warren throws in the divisions of Brig. Gens. Lysander Cutler and Samuel W. Crawford. The entire V Corps sees combat during the day at Laurel Hill, but Anderson doesn’t drive worth a damn.
Today nothing has gone right for the Union Army. When Warren fails to storm Laurel Hill and is stopped less than two miles from Spotsylvania on the evening of May 8, the Union leadership is in turmoil. Meade and cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan have a heated discussion. Both are hot-tempered individuals. “Old Snapping Turtle” Meade is cantankerous and bespectacled. Sheridan at this time is about 110 pounds and five feet four. He had been suspended from West Point for one academic year for fighting.
There were only two changes to the leadership of the Army of the Potomac that Grant made as general in chief. He brought Sheridan in from the West to take over the Cavalry Corps; Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson was given a mounted division. So far in the campaign the latter has been a disappointment. Sheridan had complained to Meade: Your infantry leaders are not using the mounted arm right. We ought to employ our cavalry as a striking force to carry the fight to the enemy and not be the infantry’s handmaiden. Why don’t I use our horse soldiers to go after the enemy’s cavalry? Today Meade tells Sheridan that his cavalry has failed and the Federals would have been at Spotsylvania Court House if the cavalry had carried out their mission. Sheridan heatedly counters, “You should have used the cavalry to engage the enemy’s horsemen and not see their strength dissipated doing the infantry’s work scouting and as couriers. If you would let me use my cavalry like I want to, I’ll go out and beat Jeb Stuart.”
Meade is shocked that a subordinate talked to him in such a manner, and they take up their dispute in Grant’s presence. This is where Meade begins to lose his effectiveness in the army’s day-to-day operations. Meade, as senior, expects Grant to side with him. But Grant comes down on Sheridan’s side, and after learning of his boast about taking care of Jeb Stuart and his cavaliers in gray says, “Did Sheridan say that? Well he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it.” Meade shrugs his shoulders. Orders are drafted giving Sheridan authority to take all of the cavalry except one brigade and see if he can draw Stuart into a fight well away from the army. On the morning of May 9, 10,000 horse soldiers ride east via the Orange Turnpike; near Fredericksburg, they turn south on the Telegraph Road heading toward Richmond. Stuart pursues with half his cavalry.
Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s Confederate II Corps arrives at dusk on May 8. They go into position on Anderson’s right. The soldiers, moving out without any guidance from their engineers, occupy the high ground separating the Ni and Po watersheds. As they dig they create a salient soon to be known as the “Mule Shoe,” because of its shape. Lee debates getting rid of the salient. He knows a salient takes more men to defend, and it can become the target of converging fire. He concludes, however, that it will damage morale to give up this ground.
It’s a new kind of war. Heretofore the armies paused and went into camp between battles. Antietam and Fredericksburg were three months apart. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were five months apart, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, two months. Now, they’re in contact every day. Grant’s objective is to wear Lee down. He will use superior numbers and economic power to outmaneuver and overwhelm Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. He can succeed provided he and his way of war retain the confidence of President Lincoln and the electorate.
By May 9 both armies have concentrated at Spotsylvania Court House, and Grant looks to find a weakness in Lee’s lines. John Sedgwick’s VI Corps deploys to the left of V Corps, within sight of Laurel Hill but facing southeast.
“Uncle John” Sedgwick had been commandant of cadets at West Point. He is popular with his troops. But he is not a favorite of the secretary of war and the administration. He is the last McClellan loyalist and avowed Democrat in the Army of the Potomac’s senior command. Today, May 9, he’s inspecting a position some 500 yards in front of Laurel Hill, where a Massachusetts battery has placed its guns. The Yankees are throwing up earthworks; skirmishers are out. Confederate sharpshooters watch the Union forces dig in. Soldiers are moving about, and there is a crack! One of the Union soldiers throws himself to the ground. Sedgwick remarks, “Why my man, I am ashamed of you, dodging that way,” and taps him with the toe of a boot. A staffer recalls that his general, to reassure his people, says in jest, “They couldn’t hit an elephant at that distance.” The soldier scrambles to his feet and takes off. There is another crack followed by a splat. Blood appears under Sedgwick’s left eye. He is dead by the time he hits the ground. His body will be sent to Cromwell, Connecticut, his home, to be interred.
He has a handsome statue at the United States Military Academy’s Trophy Point, looking out over the Hudson. If you are a senior cadet having trouble in mathematics, you rub the right spur before you go for your final examination.
Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, an engineer, and Sedgwick’s choice to succeed him, becomes the VI Corps commander.
Thwarted in his efforts to drive the Confederates off Laurel Hill on May 8, Grant looks for new ways to crack Lee’s line and plans an all-out attack for May 10. Late on the afternoon of the previous day, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock with three of his four divisions crosses the Po River with orders to maneuver against Lee’s left flank, hoping to find a weak spot.
They plan to push southward, strike the Shady Grove Church Road, seize the Block House Bridge, recross the Po, and turn Lee’s left. The Confederates successfully counter Hancock. Early’s corps, on May 9, had marched out of the Wilderness. On reaching Spotsylvania, Early posted his troops on Ewell’s right, fronting east and guarding the sector between the courthouse and the Mule Shoe. During the night Lee is apprised of Hancock’s movement against his left and rushes two of Early’s divisions under Mahone and Maj. Gen. Henry Heth to counter this move. Hancock, on the morning of May 10, finds Early waiting and entrenched.
Grant now orders Hancock to join Warren in front of Laurel Hill. The Confederates have different ideas. They don’t want to let Hancock re-cross to the Po’s north side. They want to punish him. Early’s people cross the Po downstream from Block House Bridge and hope to pocket Hancock between the Shady Grove Church Road and the Po. Hancock withdraws two of his divisions under Maj. Gen. David B. Birney and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon and leaves a third division, that of Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow, as rear guard.
Barlow has a difficult task to get his men across the Po with a strong Confederate force to his front. The Rebels come on hard and strong, hoping to drive Hancock’s men into the river. Up to this day men of II Corps have boasted that they haven’t lost a cannon since June 1862. But today that becomes “trash talk” as Barlow’s people are fortunate to even escape across the Po, but they are compelled to leave a cannon behind.
Meanwhile, several senior officers of VI Corps preparing for their role in the May 10 all-out attack ponder whether there might be an alternative to yet another deadly frontal assault in the traditional style.
Brig. Gen. David A. Russell, who now commands Horatio G. Wright’s old division, reflects on past experiences. He recalls that at Fredericksburg, division commander Andrew Humphreys did better than anyone else in the assault on Marye’s Heights in December 1862. When Humphreys sent his last brigade forward, the troops were ordered not to cap their muskets. They were to try and go over the Confederates’ stone wall in a rush without stopping to fire. They didn’t get over, but they got nearer than any other unit. So, the senior officers think, maybe we shouldn’t halt and fire as we advance against the Confederate earthworks at Spotsylvania.
Capt. Ranald S. Mackenzie, No. 1 in the West Point class of 1862, was assigned by General Wright the task of reconnoitering just where to assault the Confederate line, which might be critical to the attack’s success. Col. Emory Upton, West Point class of 1861, commanding a brigade in Wright’s old division, is not even consulted until the decision has been made to make the attack. Generals Russell and Wright inform Upton that he will lead the assault, that 12 regiments, the best in the corps, have been made available. The ideal site selected for the attack is on the west face of the Mule Shoe, the salient held by Brig. Gen. George Doles’s Georgia Brigade.
The only Confederate cannon nearby are two 3-inch rifled guns and two 12-pounder Napoleons posted on Doles’s left. Yankee skirmishers have driven in the Confederate pickets. When he returns from reconnoitering, Mackenzie explains, “If we’re careful and shield ourselves in the woods, we can place our men within 200 yards of the enemy. If we don’t make any noise and nobody sees us, our attack will come as a surprise.: Col. Martin T. McMahon a staffer, tells Upton that General Russell had selected him to lead the attack, and if he fails, not to come back. If you’re successful, McMahon says, you will be a brigadier general.
Upton’s regiments will advance by regimental column. Instead of forming ten companies in line, a regimental column forms two companies in line. Behind them another two companies until you have accounted for ten companies. They line up three regiments abreast. Upton posts his brigade in front. The 12 regiments number 5,000 men. The men are told to load their weapons, but only the front line are to cap their muskets. They shuck everything except their canteens, cartridge boxes, and cap pouches.
Upton will not move out alone. Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott’s division from Hancock’s corps, posted three-quarters of a mile to Upton’s left, will attack in support, then link up with Upton to exploit the expected success. Hancock and Warren can either pin down potential Confederate reinforcements being rushed to Doles’s salient by attacking Laurel Hill or shuttle regiments to reinforce the point of Upton’s attack.
Upton will advance on a narrow front. His men are to keep a low profile and remain silent to facilitate surprise. The artillery is to open fire at 5 p.m., followed by the assault ten minutes later. Upton’s columns are to charge at the double-quick; the officers will not say anything until they break out of the woods. Then the officers will chant the order again and again, “Forward! Forward!” That’s how it is supposed to work.
Then things start to go wrong. Hancock has trouble extracting Gibbon, Birney, and Barlow from south of the Po River. Warren gets nervous and perhaps, in his heart, wants his corps to score the success that had eluded him on May 8. He dons his dress uniform and at 4 p.m. attacks Laurel Hill, but is repulsed. Hancock now arrives and throws his men in at 5 p.m. and doesn’t do any better. Because of their Laurel Hill fiasco, Hancock and Warren cannot support Upton.
Because of what has happened at Laurel Hill, Upton’s attack is postponed one hour. No one tells Mott about the revised time schedule. Mott is separated by V and VI Corps from Hancock and the remainder of the II Corps. Communications with Hancock are arduous, and other senior generals also send requests seeking support from the orphaned division. Mott attacks at 5:10 p.m., unsupported, with about 3,500 men. He seeks to cross more than half a mile of open ground against a Confederate position, the point (the north face) of the Mule Shoe, defended by more than 20 cannon. He advances about 400 yards before he is stopped by artillery fire.
The Confederates are oblivious to what is about to happen in front of Doles’s western side of the salient. In Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s division they’re on a high after seeing Mott easily repulsed. They hear the sounds of heavy fighting coming in from the direction of Laurel Hill. They are getting good vibes from what is happening at Laurel Hill. They also know that Burnside’s thrust against their right down the Fredericksburg Road and across the Ni has bogged down.
What was to have been a ten-minute artillery bombardment has been extended for another hour in conjunction with the delay of the main assault. About 6:10 p.m. Upton leads his men forward. He is riding on the right of the 121st New York, his old regiment—the only mounted man in the assault column. They move up as “quiet as a mouse” to the edge of the woods. Then it’s forward at double-time for 120 yards.
The only hindrance Upton’s men face involves breaking through an abatis about 40 yards in front of the Confederate works. An abatis is the Civil War equivalent of barbed wire. Usually it is felled trees fronting the earthworks with the sharpened branches fronting the enemy. At most Doles’s Rebels get off two volleys. They gun down a number of Federals. But, with successive waves coming in hard on the heels of the front ranks, the Yanks break through.
On May 10, Col. Emory Upton, shown here as a major general, lei an assaulting column of 12 regiments in an attempt to storm the Confederate salient at the Mule Shoe.
The first wave overruns the earthworks of the 44th Georgia and opens a breach, then turns both left and right to widen the gap. The right of Upton’s force wheels right and heads for the Confederate cannon manned by Third Company, Richmond Howitzers, commanded by Capt. Ben H. Smith. Smith’s men get off one or two rounds, but Upton’s bluecoats capture their four guns. The Confederates, however, make off with their loading implements and friction primers. The Yanks don’t have the means of servicing the guns. Doles pretends he is dead; thus he escapes a trip to a Union prison camp. But his brigade suffers more than a thousand casualties.
Another wave of Federals, led by the Fifth Maine, crashes through the Rebels’ reserve line. They have punched a gap in the Confederate line, which Upton “guesstimates” at a quarter of a mile in width. He looks for Mott. Where is Mott? He’s already been repulsed. No one told Upton that Mott had not been apprised of the one-hour delay and that he had already attacked and been thrown back.
The Confederates respond rapidly because no one rushes to Upton’s support. The Stonewall Brigade under Brig. Gen. James A. “Stonewall Jim” Walker folds back its left wing and takes position perpendicular to Upton’s line of advance. With Burnside checkmated, Brig. Gen. George “Maryland” Steuart’s brigade, posted on the other side of the salient, faces about to repel Upton’s surge. General Lee rushes artillery and infantry to seal the breach. There is another “Lee to the rear” incident, this time involving Brig. Gen. Robert Johnston’s North Carolina brigade. Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle’s Alabamians and Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel’s Tarheels recover the four captured cannon.
Upton, Russell, and Wright want help. They send a message to General Warren. Warren says we have lots of trouble ourselves over at Laurel Hill. They’re sent a preemptory order from Meade to reinforce, but by this time the Confederates are counterattacking.
Upton pulls out, but when he gets back to headquarters, Grant is impressed by what he had accomplished. Since he carried the works, albeit temporarily, and comes back despite admonition, Grant, likes his “new style of fighting,” and gives him a spot promotion that night to brigadier general.
What had started as a spectacular success turns into defeat because of a failure to follow through. But Grant doesn’t see it that way. He sees it as a lesson on how to end the stalemate and break the enemy line. Maybe when he does it again the supporting players will perform their roles correctly. Instead of 5,000 men, the next time he will employ 20,000 men in a bold attempt to shatter Lee’s line. Where a division went, Grant will say, a corps can go. The next day Grant sends his patron Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne back to Washington, bearing his ringing words, “I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer.”
On May 11, Grant shifts forces in preparation for a grand assault on the morning of May 12. His primary target will be the Mule Shoe salient at the center of the Confederate line. If he can replicate Upton’s attack on a larger scale, commence an assault in the early morning hours so that he will have plenty of time to exploit opportunities, and commit all his men either to the main attack itself or in support of it, he believes Lee’s line must break somewhere.
Along the Confederate line at the Mule Shoe are 22 cannon. With these guns Allegheny Johnson easily repulsed Mott’s advance on May 10. But he is not going to have these 22 cannon on the night of the 11th and 12th. Why not?
Lee, who usually can read his enemy’s intention, having a talent for looking into their eyes and knowing their thoughts, has read the Federals wrong. Reports of movement behind the Union lines lead him to believe that the Union Army is preparing to move around to his right. If that happens Lee wants to be ready to sweep out fast to intercept and engage the enemy. He orders Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long, chief of artillery of II Corps, to withdraw the guns. Twenty of the 22 pieces are limbered up and sent to the rear.
The scheme worked up by Grant and Meade calls for Burnside to attack at the eastern neck of the Mule Shoe with IX Corps. This time two of Grant’s staff officers will make sure that he does what is expected of him. Warren will have his V Corps people ready to either attack the enemy to his front on Laurel Hill or reinforce Hancock. Wright is to pull two of his three divisions out of the works and have them prepared to support Hancock.
Hancock with his four divisions will spearhead the onslaught. On the evening of May 11 it starts to rain and the temperature falls. It’s a cold, miserable rain. Capt. George Mendell, the staff officer who is to identify the jumping-off points for Hancock’s divisions, becomes disoriented. An impatient Francis Barlow finally snaps, “For heaven’s sake, at least face us in the right directions, so that we shall not march away from the enemy and have to go around the world and come up in their rear.”
Barlow’s division is to advance in regimental column by company front. The other three divisions are to attack in different formations. On Barlow’s right is David Birney’s division, which will attack in line of battle. He is to be supported by Mott’s and Gibbon’s divisions. The Union troops are on the ground by 2 a.m. on May 12. They wait to step off at 4 a.m. But, because of the darkness and fog, Hancock postpones the attack 30 minutes.
Meanwhile, Allegheny Johnson is getting nervous. Despite the storm, his pickets hear suspicious noises out in front, and Johnson sends a message to corps commander Ewell to ask Lee to return the 20 guns to the Mule Shoe. Lee orders the artillery to come up, but this time it’s the Confederates who are unlucky. At 4:35 a.m. the Yankees move out. The Rebels can’t see Barlow’s people through the mist and fog until they close to within 50 yards.
Barlow’s columns become so intermingled that they appear to be a mob. The Confederate skirmish line is under orders to delay the enemy, but their ill-fortune continues. Many Rebel soldiers have loaded and capped their rifled muskets. Water has seeped into the bores and the cartridge boxes. Many of them find that when they squeeze the trigger, the cap pops but there is no mule-like kick into the shoulder nor a sharp crack as their piece misfires. The pickets fall back before the enemy. Barlow, as he closes on the Rebel works, comes in at an oblique angle and crosses them at the “Apex.”
About the time the Federals arrive, the Confederate artillery comes up. Using whip and spur, the Rebel redlegs arrive, but they are too late. Only two cannon are unlimbered at the Apex. These get off a round or two before the Yankees are over the works. Allegheny Johnson is hitting slackers across the backsides with the cudgel that also serves him as a cane. He also strikes out at the Yankees. But it is too little and too late. Twenty-two cannon—20 still limbered—are captured. The Federals also capture about 3,100 Confederates. They all but destroy Johnson’s division, capturing Johnson and one of his brigade commanders, Maryland Steuart. But the Yankees do not press on. They are almost as disorganized by their success as the enemy is by their disaster. There are too many men hunting flags—if you get a flag it’s an almost automatic Medal of Honor. Too many men are looking for souvenirs. There is lack of leadership in reorganizing Barlow’s division and his supporting II Corps units to press on and exploit their success. They give the Confederates a respite.
When the Confederate prisoners are escorted back to the Brown House, the Yankee headquarters, Johnson is greeted by Hancock. Old Allegheny is a jovial and convivial sort, and Hancock and his staff will soon be passing a bottle to him, extending a cigar, and Johnson will ride into captivity at Belle Plain. When Maryland Steuart shows up, Hancock extends his hand, and Steuart says, “Under the circumstances I decline to take your hand.” Hancock responds, “Under any other circumstances I should not have offered it.” No whiskey, no cigar for Steuart. He has to walk to Belle Plain.
Although Barlow has scored a breakthrough, Hancock fails to capitalize on the success. Piling in on top of Barlow’s people are Gibbon’s and Mott’s. When Birney comes forward with his two brigades, they move into and occupy the Rebel works between the Apex and the west angle of the Mule Shoe, a place soon to be known as the Bloody Angle. No one takes charge or urges the Yanks to press ahead deeper into the Mule Shoe. This gives the Confederates much needed time to recover from their disaster. Lee takes corrective action. He turns out his pioneers to continue work on a reserve line south of the Harrison House at the base of the Mule Shoe. He has been overseeing this project since May 10 to meet just such an emergency. Staffers ride out to bring up troops from other points. Meanwhile, the Confederate reserve division is responding. It is commanded by John B. Gordon and consists of three brigades, Robert Johnston’s four North Carolina regiments, Col. John Hoffman’s five Virginia regiments, and Gordon’s old brigade, six Georgia regiments under Col. Clement A. Evans.
This is a critical moment for Lee. Barlow’s men, supported by Birney, Gibbon, and Mott, have destroyed Edward Johnson’s division. The beginning of what will prove to be a long day of crises is at hand. Lee rides up and tells Gordon that we must drive those people back. Lee almost always refers to the enemy as “those people.” Gordon replies that his men have never failed him. Lee pulls away and starts riding toward the enemy. Sgt. William A. Compton of Hoffman’s brigade dashes up, grabs Traveller’s reins, turns him aside, and leads Lee to the rear. Again, for the third occasion since May 6, the cry of “Lee to the rear” is raised by the Confederate rank and file.
Johnston, Hoffman, and Evans advance toward the Apex; the Union threat there is nullified. The battle shifts toward the Bloody Angle.
Southeast of the Mule Shoe, despite the presence of two Grant staffers, Burnside’s contributions to Union success are scant. He is unable to get started before Brig. Gen. Jim Lane’s North Carolina and Brig. Gen. Edward R. Thomas’s Georgia brigades arrive at the choke point of the salient east of the Harrison House. In the afternoon, the defenders again stop Burnside in his tracks.
Barlow’s men overwhelm Johnson’s brigades to the right and left of the Apex about 5 a.m. The fighting is going to continue until after midnight, some 20 hours. From 8 a.m. until after 10 p.m. combat of a most savage character rages for possession of the Bloody Angle. The Confederates must hold tight while their pioneers continue work on the line of earthworks south of the Harrison House to their rear.
Wright’s VI Corps surges toward the Bloody Angle at 6 a.m. But, by the time Wright commits himself, Lee has responded and sent in first Brig. Gen. Stephen Dodson Ramseur and then Daniel’s Tarheel brigades of Robert Rodes’s division. Bad luck for Daniel because he is killed. Lee will pull men out of Billy Mahone’s division, Alabamians under Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin, then Mississippians under Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Harris. Perrin soon numbers among the slain and Harris’s people again raise the call “Lee to the rear!” Lee feeds brigade after brigade into the western sector of the Mule Shoe.
The Federal VI Corps does likewise. The bluecoats are outside of the works, and the Rebels are inside. It has been raining for eight hours. The Yanks wheel up two cannon. There is no recoil mechanism built into the carriage of a Civil War cannon, so when the guns are fired, the wheels soon sink up to their hubs in the mud. You’re going to have these two cannon mired here from 10 a.m. till midnight. You’re not going to fire many rounds. Lewis Grant’s Vermonters seek to bolster Hancock’s right flank. They are answered by Lee when he commits Brig. Gen. Sam McGowan’s South Carolinians.
Here, at a slight bend in the Mule Shoe, is the most savage of the day’s fighting. Yanks get atop the works and use their bayoneted rifles as javelins to hurl down into the Confederates. Men fire down into the Rebel works. Others pass loaded weapons forward for men in the front rank to use. It continues to rain. It’s muddy, and the water has a red tint. Wounded men drown, pressed head-down in the mud-filled “hog pens.” Some Yankees reach down and grab Confederates by the collar (or their “stacking swivel,” in World War II Marine Corps lingo) and pull them out of the works. Rebs pull Yankees down into the works and either beat them to death or send them to the rear as prisoners. The Confederates fight from “hog pen to hog pen” in a futile struggle to recover the Mule Shoe’s Apex. Their task is to buy time so that the Harrison House line can be completed and manned.
The struggle goes on. Everybody wonders when the slaughter will end. It does not end until 3 a.m., when Lee receives word the Confederates have completed work on the Harrison House line. Only then do the butternuts pull back, and the most terrible, prolonged fighting of the Civil War ends. It involves 20,000 men from II Corps and 10,000 VI Corps soldiers. The Confederates employ about 15,000 men, but lose about 8,000. This is a bad day for the Confederates. Union casualties for the fight may have exceeded 9,000.
The fighting at Spotsylvania on May 12 is arguably the most severe of the war—so heavy that at the Bloody Angle, rifle fire felled a tree 22 inches in diameter. It is only one of many trees felled by the sleet of lead and iron. Despite suffering terrible losses, however, Lee hangs on; not to be deterred, Grant seeks new opportunities.
On May 13 the soldiers rest after a horrible night. A Rebel band strikes up “The Dead March” from Handel’s Saul. A Union band answers with “Nearer My God to Thee.”
Warren’s and Wright’s Federal corps on the night of May 13–14 shift to the left, crossing the Ni. Their attack the next day at Myer’s Hill is repulsed by Early’s corps. Grant is sure Lee is looking to protect his right, so he schedules an attack against the Confederate center at the Harrison House for the morning of May 18. He will employ Wright’s and Hancock’s corps at that point, while Burnside’s will again attack the salient’s eastern face. This time the Confederates have felled timber in front of them, and their cannon are dug in and sighted. It is not going to be a happy day for the Union. When the Yanks come, Ewell’s and Early’s infantry are only lightly engaged, while Confederate cannon savage the attackers. Imagine what would have happened if those 22 cannon had been in position in the Mule Shoe on May 12. This is not a happy day for Grant. The only thing good about it for the rank and file is that Grant calls off the attack before he is too deeply committed. Even so his casualties exceed 1,500. Confederate losses are slight. Grant now decides to leave Spotsylvania.
By noon on Thursday, May 19, Meade has redeployed the Army of the Potomac east of the Ni, with his right flank refused. Hancock’s corps is encamped at Anderson’s Mill, ready and eager to take the road toward Massaponax Church and beyond. That afternoon Ewell, seeking to determine Grant’s intentions, undertakes an unwise reconnaissance in force across the Ni. This brings about a bitter fight at Harris Farm, initially with Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler’s numerically strong division recently arrived from the Washington area. Tyler’s men are heavy artillery regiments, garrison troops from the capital’s defenses. The heavy artillerists, fresh from months of “soft duty,” became instant combat infantry. They stand the test. Ewell loses his cool, and General Lee has to step in and withdraw the Confederates. The last of the Spotsylvania battles ends in a Rebel repulse in which they “accomplished very little, whilst we lost some good men.”
Grant may have pledged to “fight it out on this line if it takes all summer,” but when he made that statement he was operating under the assumption that the other Virginia Union offensives he has set in motion—Gen. Benjamin Butler’s advance along the James River and Franz Sigel’s thrust up the Shenandoah Valley—were proving successful, and that he could best assist them by pinning Lee down and landing a telling blow. Within days he learned that Butler and his Army of the James had bogged down at Bermuda Hundred on the James between Richmond and Petersburg and that Sigel had been defeated at New Market. He now knows he will have to rely upon his own skills to bring Lee to heel.
Even as Grant and Lee battle at Spotsylvania, Philip Sheridan acts upon his pledge to go out and defeat the Confederate cavalry. In the process, he deprives Grant of the use of cavalry for reconnaissance and probing that might have turned the tide in the second week of May. But Sheridan would rather pitch into Jeb Stuart and his horse soldiers and on May 11, at Yellow Tavern, he gets his chance.
On May 8 Meade had drafted orders directing Sheridan to take whatever force he thinks requisite and make a dash toward Richmond. The hope is that he can draw Stuart’s cavalry into battle, defeat the “Plumed Cavalier,” and, if he can catch the Confederates unaware, dash into Richmond. On the morning of May 9, 10,000 Union cavalrymen head east toward Fredericksburg before turning south. By evening they have reached the North Anna River. Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer’s brigade lunges across the North Anna and, at Beaver Dam Station, captures two trains and releases some 275 Union prisoners, most of them captured in the Laurel Hill fighting on the previous day.
Stuart learns that Sheridan is out and about. He assembles about half his cavalry and starts in pursuit. By evening of May 10, Sheridan’s men have reached the South Anna, about 20 miles from Richmond. Stuart thunders ahead, steals a march on Sheridan, and arrives at Yellow Tavern first. He posts his horsemen parallel to and east of the Telegraph Road to threaten the Union rear. Sheridan responds by attacking. This is what he has boasted he can do. In the ebb and flow of the fighting, the Fifth Michigan Cavalry charges. A number of the Yankees are dismounted, and as they are running back to their lines, they look to their right and see a group of people sitting their horses near some Confederate guns.
One is a large man, well mounted, with a bushy beard—he is firing his pistol at them. It’s Stuart. Pvt. John A. Huff of the Fifth Michigan turns and snaps off a round. The bullet hits Stuart in the abdominal area and penetrates his liver. As he is carried off he speaks to Fitz Lee: “Fitz, I had rather die than be whipped.” He is placed in an ambulance and taken to his brother-in-law’s house on Grace Street in Richmond, where he dies the next day. On the morning of May 13, Lee receives word that Stuart has died. His eyes well up with tears, and his voice chokes as he says, “He never brought me a piece of false information.”
Ulysses S. Grant, center, leans in to examine a map held by Gen. George Meade outside Massaponax Church on May 21. The men are seated on pews removed from the church.
While Stuart’s death is both demoralizing and damaging, the Confederates block Sheridan’s efforts to approach Richmond, and eventually he decides to link up with Butler’s army before returning to Grant. That means that Grant will be without most of his cavalry for two weeks, at a time when he could use it to assist his operations against Lee. Grant decides it’s time to slide around Lee’s right and head south.