Chapter 1

Hardinge at Bay

‘A leader is a dealer in hope.’

(Napoleon)

3 July 1917 was a warm summer day in London and the Chamber of the House of Lords was overcrowded and stuffy. The attendance of so many peers was a clear indication that something of significance was about to happen.

A tall, slim, 59-year-old man in a frock coat entered, stood briefly by the Clerk’s table and looked around. On either side of the Chamber he saw four terraces of benches, all completely filled, which rose above the floor of the House. Above them ran a line of galleries, occupied this afternoon by peeresses and members of the lower house.

The chattering voices were stilled and all eyes were focussed on the man at the Clerk’s table.

He was Lord Hardinge, latterly Viceroy of India, and one of the most distinguished public servants in the land. He also had the dubious distinction of being the most senior of those subject to severe criticism in the recently published Mesopotamia Commission Report.

This report, now firmly in the public domain, published the result of enquiries into the conduct of the disastrous military campaign of 1914–16. This took place in what was, allegedly, the Garden of Eden but which turned into a version of hell for the British and Indian soldiers engaged there. Of those, 30,000 died and thousands more were still languishing in Turkish prison camps in conditions of extreme privation.

Lord Hardinge was to make a public statement, which his friends all hoped would completely rebut the ‘absurd’ charges laid at his door. This was a key moment in the career of a distinguished public servant and also of some significance to His Majesty’s Government, led by the priapic David Lloyd George.

Hardinge walked briskly up to the table. Exuding self-control and apparently quite unflustered by the situation, he laid his notes down. He tugged at his coat, put on his spectacles, rested his right hand on his notes and allowed his left arm to hang at his side. A journalist who was present observed:

His body was turned to face diagonally across the Chamber. From this position he rarely moved, and then only to turn one sheet of paper aside as he had finished reading from it.

It was a model of deliverance, clearly enunciated, in well audible, measured tones. There was no impassioned appeal to sentiment, plea for leniency of criticism. Just a plain, well thought out, logically arrayed statement of justification from the point of view of the Indian Government. It was scrupulously free from embittered recrimination.

The performance was really a notable one; the more so seeing that it was the first time he had ever spoken in the House of Lords.

The impression I got was that he had said his say and did not care what the world might choose to think of him.¹

The MC had formed its conclusions several months before and had published its Report on 20 June 1917. A minority report included the utterly damning observation that Hardinge, as Viceroy, and General Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, had shown:

little desire to help and some desire to actually obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war.

This was an accusation that implied malfeasance, bordering on treachery. Little wonder then that the House of Lords was packed and that the Report had stunned the Government. It had sat on the Report for several weeks, but now HMG was in a dilemma as to how to deal with the quite specific charges made against several of the ‘great and the good’.

The speech by Hardinge, in which he absolved himself of any culpability for the defeat of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ (IEF ‘D’) and of the neglect of the sick and wounded, did not staunch the flow of criticism. His biographer, B.C. Bush, was overly generous in his judgment when he wrote that, ‘the general reaction to his defence was favourable.’ This was not the case. Busch continued, ‘It was his maiden speech in House of Lords and he had not convinced his audience on all the charges, but most recognised his culpability was on a different level to that of the military authorities.’² The speech was widely reported in the Press,³ on 4 July 1917, and the reaction to his performance was generally negative. Hardinge had said nothing to rebut the strictures of the MC and had not helped his cause. He was unduly verbose, reiterated facts that were not in dispute but, crucially, he did not address the key issues.

1. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

The following day the Press commented as follows:

Daily Mail

Lord Hardinge’s defence does not rebut – it hardly answers the judgment that the majority of the Commission were compelled to pass on him.

Morning Post

The public in reading Lord Hardinge’s speech will no doubt be reminded of a certain unhappy attempt to shift responsibility, of which Mesopotamia was again the scene when the man blamed the woman and the woman blamed the serpent. In the result – if our recollection serves – judgment was pronounced on all three. It is a pity that Lord Hardinge did not resign, for he was condemned by an impartial tribunal.

Daily Telegraph

Thorough reform of the higher command in the administration of India is a proved and pressing necessity. Lord Hardinge was silent on one matter which general common sense seized upon as the most deplorably weak and unbusinesslike of all administrative facilities with which the Commission dealt, namely the practice of governing the Indian Empire, to say nothing of conducting a military effort of unparalleled magnitude from a hill top in the Himalayas.

Daily Chronicle

[We] doubt whether of those who have most carefully studied the reports will be found half a dozen whose judgment is materially modified by what Lord Hardinge said.

Daily News

The impression left by Lord Hardinge’s speech in no way diminishes the disquieting effect of the Report.

The Times

Although Lord Hardinge’s statement brought to light few new facts, it was accepted as an important addition to the material on which the public and both Houses of Parliament will pronounce final judgment. The debates, for which the Government has promised facilities, can hardly be delayed beyond next week. It is true that the Government have not yet decided on the nature of their disciplinary measures, but when the law officers’ opinions and precedents are before them, they cannot long be postponed.

*  *  *

Clearly this issue, which had aroused public opinion, still had some way to run. The House of Commons would, of necessity, now debate the matter at length. Along the way the performance of some very senior military officers would be questioned and the Government would have cause to regret the manner in which it set up the MC in the first place. A full-on public scandal was underway and to ‘the man on the Clapham omnibus’ of legend there seemed to be every likelihood that heads would roll.

Chapter notes

1 ‘Journal’ (By special wire) 5 New Bridge St, EC4, 3 July 1917.

2 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.269.

3 The Aberdeen Daily News, 4 July 1917.