Part XI Significant Figures of the Twentieth Century in Science and Christianity

Wolfhart Pannenberg

HANS SCHWARZ

Born in 1928, Wolfhart Pannenberg is one of the two most prominent theologians of Germany in the latter part of the twentieth century, the other being Jürgen Moltmann (b. 1926). While Pannenberg claimed that he “never became a Hegelian,” he “decided that theology has to be developed on at least the same level of sophistication as Hegel’s philosophy” (Pannenberg 1988, 16). Indeed, the breadth of his undertakings certainly has a resemblance to Hegel, as does the unashamed wedding together of reason and revelation. At times he can be carried away in his determination to make the Christian faith credible, for instance in comparing the working of the Holy Spirit with field theory in physics. Yet he remains one of the most thought-provoking theologians of the latter part of the twentieth century, and in his astounding command of the history of thought also one of the most erudite.

As with Hegel, history became Pannenberg’s most important reference point, as evidenced in his provocative “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation” in Revelation as History (1961). In thesis 3 Pannenberg claimed: “In contradistinction to the special appearances of the Godhead, revelation in history is open to everyone. It has universal character” (Pannenberg 1961, 135). With this claim Pannenberg wanted to redirect our attention from the “ghetto” of a special salvation history toward God’s self-disclosure in the open court of universal history. This was an outright rejection of the then prevailing existential history favored by Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) and of Barth’s abandoning the natural world in favor of God’s total otherness. Pannenberg’s claim that revelation can be maintained in the court of reason opened the possibility of engaging in a dialogue with the secular sciences, of correlating their truth claims with those of theology, and of achieving a coherent picture of the world which is both reasonable and open to the notion of revelation. But how can this be executed?

Theology as the Science of God

Like Thomas F. Torrance (1913–2007), Pannenberg asserts that theology is not inferior in status to the sciences. Pannenberg’s assertion was intensified by the challenge to theology in Germany in the 1970s as to whether it was indeed a science and belonged in a modern university or whether it should be excluded from the academic discourse. In direct contradiction to Karl Barth, Pannenberg picked up on the demand of Heinrich Scholz (1884–1956), who was a student of Adolf von Harnack and first became a philosopher of religion and later made a name for himself as a logician. When Scholz taught with Barth at the University of Münster he challenged Barth with the presupposition that theology, just like any other intellectual discipline which aspired to be considered a science, must undisputedly have formal consistency, internal coherence, and be subject to external control and verification (Scholz 1931, 231ff.). But Barth claimed that theology can “flatly declare” that this concept of modern science is unacceptable. Theology cannot “take over the obligation to submit to measurement by the canons valid for other sciences” (Barth 1936, 8–9.). Theology is a science sui generis on account of God’s self-disclosure. Yet Pannenberg had made it clear that this self-disclosure does not occur in a separate realm apart from all other reality and picked up the challenge posed by Scholz.

Pannenberg contends that if theology does not subject its claims to rational examination it inadvertently nourishes the suspicion that theological claims have nothing to do with empirical reality but are only language events, that is, they only show what one believes. But there is more to these claims. For instance, when one asserts in the words of the Apostles’ Creed “I believe in God the Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth,” one does not only claim a certain belief, but this belief includes a claim which can be empirically examined (Pannenberg 1974, 13f.). The logical consistency of an assertion results from the fact that every claim implies truth and excludes untruth. Similarly, internal coherence implies that the assertions concerning a certain object can be distinguished from the object itself. Therefore different assertions can be made concerning the same object. It is there that Pannenberg notices a difficulty for contemporary theology. If the object investigated by theology is the Word of God, “it appears that the object cannot be clearly distinguished from statements about it” (Pannenberg 1974, 15). Is it really the Word of God or is it just a human word? When we consider God and not just God’s word as the object of theology, then the difficulty still exists as to how God is accessible as a reality distinct from the assertions of theologians. Pannenberg questions whether God appears only in assertions of theologians, especially when these assertions are not taken seriously today as true assertions but appear to be figments of the faithful and of theologians. According to Pannenberg this is the point at which the question of theology’s object, or even the question whether theology has an object at all, leads directly to Scholz’s third requirement: that of external control and verifiability of theological statements. This means that the issue of whether theology has an actual object cannot be determined apart from answering the question whether that object can be verified.

But how can one examine the truth claim of theological assertions? Claims concerning God’s activities cannot be examined against their object, since the reality of God itself is in dispute. Such an examination would contradict the notion of God as the all-determining reality. Such a reality is not at our disposal so that human claims could be verified. Claims concerning God, God’s activity, and God’s self-disclosure cannot be directly verified with regard to its object. This does not mean for Pannenberg that the criterion of verifiability cannot be met, since one can “test propositions in terms of their implications. Propositions about divine reality or divine activity can be tested according to their implications for our understanding of finite reality, insofar, that is, as God is asserted to be the all-determining reality” (Pannenberg 1974, 16). Pannenberg concedes that the notion of God as the all-determining reality does not sufficiently settle the issue of divine reality, but at least in monotheism this is the fundamental presupposition for all talk about God. Therefore, claims concerning God can be examined as to whether their content is indeed determined for all finite experience, at least as it is accessible to us. If such claims are verified then the implication is that “nothing real can be understood fully in its uniqueness without reference to the God thus proposed, and, in turn, one must expect that a deeper understanding of all reality is only possible in reference to the supposed divine reality” (Pannenberg 1974, 16). To the extent that this is true, Pannenberg concludes that theological claims have proven truthful. With this approach Pannenberg led theology out of its ghetto and gave it the tremendous task of adding a depth dimension to all (scientific) pursuits. By bringing theological claims alongside (secular) scientific ones, he also challenged its apodictic character.

Provisionality of All Knowledge

While for Barth it is only in obedience to the word of God that this word becomes recognizable as God’s word, for Pannenberg it is clear that “all thought rests ultimately on unprovable assumptions” (Pannenberg 1974, 13). Whether we are Christians or not, we always live to some extent by faith. Pannenberg illustrates his point: thinking in modern science is thinking in hypotheses and assumptions and this also characterizes its peculiar rationality. Each claim is logically hypothetical, since such a claim can be true or false. Only by admitting its hypothetical character can we examine its status as a claim to truth, because otherwise it would be an apodictic statement but not a claim to truth. In every science, theology included, we encounter provisional statements.

The provisionality of all knowledge does not mean that this knowledge does not contain any truth but that the result of its verification has not come to a final conclusion. “A final judgment is impossible for someone who stands within this still open process, and not at its end” (Pannenberg 1976, 343). Only in the end, when the whole historical process has come to its conclusion, do we know which claim is true and which is false. At present, however, we must judge a truth claim by how well a hypothesis can interpret convincingly our total experience of reality. Neither mere existential certainty (“I am sure this is true”) nor the force of logic (“this is the most elegant way of reasoning”) makes a hypothesis true, but the substantiation of a hypothesis in all the dimensions of our experience accessible at any particular time. A reformulation of a hypothesis with regard to its truth content, then, must show that it can explain the experience of all reality to which it pertains in a more differentiated and convincing way than the older formulation. We can see this in an exemplary way with the theory of evolution, which as a hypothesis has seen continuous reformulation as new evidences have surfaced. Pannenberg cautions that:

A strict verification in the sense of logical positivism, by tracing theological assertions to sense observations, is certainly impossible. But such strict verification is not possible even for the posited laws of physics because no general rule can be exhaustively tested by a finite number of cases to which it applies.

(Pannenberg 1974, 21)

Conversely, however, a single exception can already falsify a general law. Without circumventing the necessity for provisional and ultimate verification, Pannenberg does not want to narrow down verification to a sense experience, especially since we must consider the whole of reality and the whole of experience. While he does not want to leave everything open until the end of history when there is the final verification (or falsification) of theological claims, he notes that theological hypotheses can already illuminate present experience and thereby witness to their truth content. Yet why do we even need a theological dimension? Should we not just stay with the natural sciences and the insights into reality offered by them?

Necessity for the Theological Dimension

In his youthful work What Is Man? Anthropology in the Theological Perspective, originally a series of radio addresses in the winter of 1961/62, Pannenberg already claimed that humans are not tied to their environment but are open for the world:

1. Man’s openness to the world presupposes a relation to God. … 2. Man’s openness is not yet grasped with sufficient depth if one speaks only of man’s destiny for culture. … 3. The animal’s bondage to its environment corresponds, not to man’s relation to the world of nature or to his familiarity with his cultural world, but to his infinite dependence on God. What the environment is for animals, God is for man. God is the goal in which alone his striving can find rest and his destiny be fulfilled.

(Pannenberg 1970b, 12f.)

This conclusion sounds very much like what Augustine wrote in the opening sentence of his Confessions: “Thou hast made us for thyself and restless is our heart until it comes to rest in thee” (Augustine 1955, 31).

More than a decade later in his Anthropology in Theological Perspective Pannenberg elaborates on this claim:

Even when we move beyond all experience or idea of perceptible objects they continue to be exocentric, related to something other than themselves, but now to an Other beyond all the objects of their world, an Other that at the same time embraces this entire world and thus ensures the possible unification of the life of human beings in the world, despite the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the world’s actions on them. A mere very general horizon containing all objects would have no inherent existence. In fact, when human beings reach out to a very general horizon embracing all the individual objects of actual or possible perception, they are relating themselves exocentrically to a reality prior to them; in this reaching out they are therefore implicitly affirming at the same time the divine reality, even though they have not yet grasped this thematically as such, much less in this or that particular structure.

(Pannenberg 1983, 69)

There is a certain relatedness of humans to God even if this relationship attests itself in a very diffuse way. It is not only Christians but also modern atheists who look for an anthropological basis for the universal validity of their claims. We may think here of Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and their followers.

Pannenberg then poses the issue which he wants to address:

If it can be shown that religion is simply a product of the human imagination and an expression of a human self-alienation, the roots of which are analyzed in a critical approach to religion, then religious faith and especially Christianity with its tradition and message will lose any claim to universal credibility in the life of the modern age. The Christian faith must then accept being lumped together with any and every form of superstition.

(Pannenberg 1983, 15)

Since anthropology is the terrain on which the battle is fought over whether the Christian faith rests on truth or on fiction, Christian theology must have a foundation in general anthropological studies. There is the danger, however, that theology then focuses only on the human being instead of on God and lets the true subject matter of theology fall by the wayside. But this does not mean that theology should evade anthropology, because in so doing the impression is given that theological assertions are purely subjective assurances. Pannenberg contends against Barth: “Theologians will be able to defend the truth, precisely of their talk about God, only if they first respond to the atheistic critique of religion as being on the terrain of anthropology” (Pannenberg 1983, 16). Then he continues his argument for an anthropological base, saying: “In the modern age anthropology has become, not only in fact but also with objective necessity, the terrain on which theologians must base their claim of universal validity for what they say” (Pannenberg 1983, 16). He pleads for a “critical appropriation” of secular anthropology, because there the relation between anthropological findings and the subject matter of theology has in large measure been lost from sight. Since the God of the Bible is indeed the creator of all reality, such critical appropriation for theological use must be possible.

Pannenberg does not argue for a point of contact in (secular) anthropology, since that would mean that anthropology would be the avenue through which the eternal subject matter of theology is conveyed to humanity. Critical appropriation means something quite different:

The aim is to lay theological claim to the human phenomena described in the anthropological disciplines. To this end, the secular description is accepted as simply a provisional version of the objective reality, a version that needs to be expanded and deepened by showing that the anthropological datum itself contains a further and theologically relevant dimension.

(Pannenberg 1983, 19f.)

But how can such a theological anthropology be attained? Pannenberg shows that traditional dogmatic anthropology has two central themes: the image of God in human beings and human sin. These themes still surface when one connects anthropological phenomena with the reality of God. The tension between closeness to God and distance from God may shed a special light on the empirically derived anthropological phenomena.

Pannenberg now turns his attention “directly to the phenomena of human existence as investigated in human biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, or sociology and examines the findings of these disciplines with an eye to implications that may be relevant to religion and theology” (Pannenberg 1983, 21). For instance with regard to societal institutions Pannenberg concludes:

The legitimacy crisis of the secular state is not a question solely of public morality and of appropriate political reforms. It has deeper roots in the loss of the religious foundation for moral obligation and the authority of law. The crisis is repeated every time the discovery is made that the state is justifying its power by manipulating public awareness.

(Pannenberg 1983, 472)

The theological perspective, as Pannenberg convincingly shows, is not just an option for secular anthropology but an integral dimension without which anthropology loses sight of the whole human being and its relatedness with other human beings and the world.

Posing Theological Questions to Scientists

Pannenberg does not just focus on anthropology. In The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions he writes: “If the Christian God cannot be understood as the creator of the world, my personal experience of being indebted to him for everything can well be pious self-deception. Even the devout man knows very well that this material world is the foundation of his existence” (Pannenberg 1972, 36). Anthropology by necessity leads to cosmology. In 1970, with the physicist A. M. Klaus Müller (1931–1995), Pannenberg had already treated the concept of contingency extensively (Pannenberg 1970a). As Pannenberg explained, for the biblical understanding of God the creator it is essential that God acts freely and unrestrictedly not only in laying the foundations of the universe but also in the subsequent course of events: “This ‘continuous creation’ is basically characterized by contingency because future acts of God cannot be deduced from the past course of events. And yet there emerge regularities and persistent forms of created reality giving expression to the faithfulness and identity of God in affirming the world that he created” (Pannenberg 1981, 44).

Contingency is not only theologically relevant for the beginning of creation, where God could, so to speak, push the button after which the creation unfolded. Unless we opt for a non-biblical deistic God, contingency is also relevant for the subsequent upholding of creation and each creative activity of God in the unfolding process of the universe and of life within it. Moreover Pannenberg is convinced that the affirmation of divine reality “can be justified only on the condition that the affirmed reality can be understood as the origin of all that is real” (Pannenberg 1970a, 75). The scope of history in which the reality of God needs to be asserted and rationally justified extends both to human history and the history of the universe.

Though nature is the field of modern natural science, a God who is not the origin and perfecter of this nature which science investigates could not be the power that determines all reality of being, and therefore could not truly be God. As a result Pannenberg sees the necessity of looking for common ground on which scientific and theological concerns can be discussed without losing sight of the specific differences of their respective ways of thinking. The Judeo-Christian understanding of the world was characterized by the experience of contingency. “New and unforeseen events take place constantly that are experienced as the work of almighty God” (Pannenberg 1970a, 76). An understanding of nature characterized by such contingency stood in fundamental contrast to the unbreakable order in the natural events as seen in the Greek view of the eternal recurrence of the same, or in the understanding of classical modern science regarding the thoroughgoing regularity of nature. This strict determinism of all natural occurrences by laws, known and still unknown, that are always alike has been shown to be an illusion.

Contemporary physics has produced a more realistic consciousness of the limits of physical and scientific laws as such. Pannenberg writes: “The micro structure of natural events can be described only by statements of probability, and this obviously not because of the limitedness of present physical knowledge but because of the nature of the matter itself” (Pannenberg 1970a, 77). Furthermore new observations make it necessary for formulas, previously considered as constantly valid, to be regarded as mere approximations of more general regularities. “Thus the possibility exists that the laws of nature that are today familiar to humanity are limited in time and space in their field of application, so that they do not have to be applicable in every former or future time and not everywhere in the same way” (Pannenberg 1970a, 78). Pannenberg is aware that such insights into the limited scope of scientific explanations cannot be founded by exploiting still-existing gaps in the pursuit of scientific discoveries, since such gaps could quickly be bridged. A more fundamental issue emerged in modern science: in every new stage of research, the total process of natural events presents itself again as a mesh of contingency and regularities. Or differently stated: every formula in science contains a certain degree of provisionality, and scientific discoveries thrive on surprises.

The provisionality of our knowledge of nature implies that at no point in time can we grasp the whole of nature. Theologically speaking, only in the eschatological future will we be able to look at creation as a whole and understand it. In the present we can obtain some insight into the nature of creation, since at least in partial aspects in each case there is regularity, while in the world process as a whole, as well as in individual events, there is a contingency of occurrences. If contingency rules supreme, what happens then to the so-called laws of nature? Pannenberg responds: “If the world process as a whole represents a unique process that as a whole is unrepeatable, then it also cannot be understood in its entirety as the application of a law” (Pannenberg 1970a, 106). Since each individual occurrence participates in the uniqueness of the total process, not a single event is exhaustively expressed by the applicable laws. This means that the formulation of natural laws is possible only if one abstracts from the peculiarities that characterize the individuality of each event and focuses just on that which is typical and common to various occurrences. On this basis statements concerning the unique world process are made in such a way that one thinks of the unique total process as a chain of individual events. The regularities of nature, however, which can be described by natural laws, have then a certain but limited stability. This means they are not strictly unchangeable.

The belief in the inviolable regularities of natural processes made possible a methodological atheism which is an intrinsic feature of modern science. As Pannenberg claims, however, these regularities are based on the unfailing faithfulness of the creator God to God’s creation and do not ensue from themselves. They then form the basis for individual and more precarious transitory natural systems from stars, mountains, and oceans, to plant and animal life, and finally to the rise of the human species. Therefore the abstract investigation of the regularities underlying the emergence of the natural forms, as it occurs in modern science, need not separate these regularities from their natural context in God’s creation, and thus from God’s own self. Yet Pannenberg discerns a strong tendency in modern science toward such separation “by putting the knowledge of the abstract regularities of nature to the use of man to whatever purpose he thinks fit” (Pannenberg 1981, 39). This opens the floodgates to the abuse of science and of nature, its object of investigation. Therefore one must ask what has been abstracted and what has been methodically disregarded. It soon becomes clear that God the creator and the nature of things as creatures are abstracted from the mathematical language of science. Theologians then must pose questions to scientists concerning the compatibility of modern science with faith in the biblical God as creator and redeemer of humanity and the whole of creation. While Pannenberg is more concerned with dogmatic issues and only implicitly with ethical ones regarding the mutual interaction of science and theology, such interaction would also militate against the abuse of nature and its resources.

In view of the importance of contingency in the natural processes, the first and foremost issue with which scientists are confronted is the principle of inertia. Pannenberg contends that “the introduction of this principle in modern science played a major role in depriving God of his function in the conservation of nature and in finally rendering him an unnecessary hypothesis in the understanding of natural processes” (Pannenberg 1981, 39). If things or events continue by themselves there is at most a need for an initial impetus by an uncreated creator but not for a continuously active presence of God. God is relegated to inactivity. But this principle of inertia is not as self-evident as one often assumes. If the stuff of the universe consists of events rather than of solid bodies, and if these are already the products of the regularities of events, then their inertia or self-persistence is no more self-evident than any other natural regularity. Pannenberg suggests that “the phenomenon of inertia may tacitly imply the framework of a field of force to provide the conditions for such a phenomenon to exist” (Pannenberg 1981, 42). With this notion of a field of force, which Pannenberg then equates with God’s enlivening Spirit, Pannenberg aroused the attention of many scientists and also stirred up much controversy, as we will see later. Yet there are two important facets to his line of argument: (1) do things go on in the world as they always have? and (2) is there an active God to uphold the whole world process? To clarify the issue, he asks whether the reality of nature must be understood as contingent and whether the natural processes must be understood as irreversible.

As we have noted, contingency is essential for the theological notion of a continuous creation because the future activity of God as the all-determining reality cannot be deduced from the past course of events. Yet through this activity emerge regularities and persistent forms of reality which show the faithfulness of God who affirms the world God has created. God stays with it and sustains it. In referring to God’s activity in and with creation, Pannenberg introduces a historical dimension which also adds continuity of the natural processes. The natural laws formulated by science to describe these regularities, however, are abstract from the contingent conditions of their occurrence. In other words science proceeds as if these regularities were self-explanatory as regularities. But the category of history provides a more comprehensive description of the continuous process of nature by comprising the contingency of events together with the emergence of regularities. If the God of history who provides continuity were thought to be outside the created process, God is separate from nature and would act in a supernatural way. Such extra-categorical activity would be rejected by any serious scientist. Therefore it is crucial to see whether this continuity manifests itself also inside the process of nature. To elucidate his point Pannenberg refers to the biblical notion of the divine Spirit as the origin of life.

Scientific Metaphors in Theology

In the biblical tradition life is not considered as a function of the organism, rather the life-giving power is seen as an agent that influences the organism from the outside. Now Pannenberg comes to the decisive point:

This view of life as originating from a transcendent source is an indispensable presupposition for the hope in a resurrection to a new life beyond death. Only if the source of life transcends the organism is it conceivable that the individual be given a new life that is no longer separate from the divine spirit, the source of life.

(Pannenberg 1981, 45)

Though this view is from an ancient context which is quite different from ours today, Pannenberg notes that even in modern biology a living organism is not a closed system. Pannenberg now describes the evolution of life through the power of the divine Spirit in terms of a generalized field theory. With this theory he wants to express “the biblical idea of the divine spirit as the power of life that transcends the living organism and at the same time is intimately present in the individual” (Pannenberg 1981, 45f.). Pannenberg contends:

Since the field concept as such corresponds to the old concept of pneuma and was derived from it in the history of thought, theologians should consider it obvious to relate also the field concept of modern physics to the Christian doctrine of the dynamic presence of the divine Spirit in all of creation.

(Pannenberg 1989, 40)

In proposing the concept of a field only as a model Pannenberg does not intend to equate the activity of the Spirit with the field theories in physics. The fundamental differences between views in physics and theology in describing the reality of the world does not allow for Pannenberg to interpret field theories in physics and use them directly for theological issues. For theology one can use them only as approximations to the reality which is also the object matter in theological discourse about creation. Since the Holy Spirit is regarded as one person of the Trinity, Pannenberg also sees theological restraints in equating the Spirit with a field. “The person of the Holy Spirit is not himself to be understood as the field, but as a unique manifestation (singularity) of the field of the divine essentiality” (Pannenberg 1994, 83). The activity of the Spirit in creation is not exhausted in the field character of the divine essence. But this said, one must also consider that God’s transcendence cannot be conceived of without considering a spatial dimension. While it is inappropriate to think of God as localized in space and to be distinguished from other parts of space, one must note that by creating, God gives the creatures space next to God’s self and this ‘next to’ or ‘in opposition to’ remains enveloped by God’s presence. God’s essence and activity cannot be divorced from space.

Microcosmic events can be understood as manifestations of the future, since they are the foundation for macrocosmic events which seem to proceed according to the laws of nature as traditionally understood. Pannenberg sees here considerable theological consequences: “The force field of future possibility is thus responsible for the fact that the process of nature, which as a whole tends towards the dissolution of creatures through increase of entropy also offers space for the rise of new structures of increasing differentiation and complexity” (Pannenberg 1991, 100f.). This would allow for increasing differentiation and complexity as it has occurred in the evolution of life. Pannenberg cautions that “even though field concepts may speak of a force field as the origin of what is possible in the future, we have here an extension of such usage” (Pannenberg 1991, 101). We note here again a deepening of scientific insights, similar to what we noticed with his interpretation of anthropology.

Pannenberg even includes angels into his field concept. He suggests: “From the point of view of the field structure of spiritual dynamics one could consider identifying the subject matter intended in the conception of angels with the emergence of relatively independent parts of the cosmic field” (Pannenberg 1989, 41). If one keeps in mind the idea that angels are personal spirits that can be explained by “the fact that the concept of person in the phenomenology of religion is related to the impact of more or less incomprehensible ‘powers,’” then the problem of personhood in the doctrine of angels can be overcome. Considering the “background of the biblical language about angels as personal realities, they may very well be related to fields of forces or dynamic spheres, the activity of which may be experienced as good or bad” (Pannenberg 1989, 41).

As noted above, Pannenberg’s use of the field concept has created considerable discussion.¹ While he insists that the theological understanding and application of the concept will be different from those in the natural sciences, his use is more than a metaphorical one. He makes great effort to show how his own theological use connects to the use of field theory in physics to the point that he sometimes seems to (con)fuse both concepts. This reminds us of the physico-theology of bygone days. Since Pannenberg is deeply convinced that God as the creator is the all-encompassing entity, he endeavors to show that when the events of nature and history are properly understood, knowledge of their being rooted in God and God’s will is conveyed. Therefore he sees no need for an alternative creationistic science, but simply states: “Our task as theologians is to relate to the natural sciences as they actually exist. We cannot create our own sciences. Yet we must go beyond what the sciences provide and include our understanding of God if we are properly to understand nature” (Pannenberg 1989, 48).

There is a new consonance between theology and science, if science admits to its own partial knowledge which needs deepening to tell the whole story. Pannenberg has led theology out of its self-imposed ghetto and made it into a dialogue partner of equal standing with the natural sciences.

Note

1 See especially Worthing (1998, 120–124). Worthing (1996, 377–385) has also carefully and extensively dealt with Pannenberg’s use of the field-theory concept. Pannenberg was somewhat concerned about this and cautioned him to tone down his criticism, otherwise “he would make a fool of himself.” Yet Pannenberg’s use of the field concept has met a similar fate to Bultmann’s use of demythologization. Both Pannenberg and Bultmann always claimed to be misunderstood.

References

Augustine of Hippo. 1955. The Confessions. Trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Barth, Karl. 1936. The Doctrine of the Word of God (Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics, being Vol. 1, Part 1). Translated by G. T. Thomson. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1961. Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation. In Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. Revelation as History. Translated by D. Granskou. New York: Macmillan, pp. 123–158.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1970a. Contingency and Natural Law. Translated by Wilhelm C. Linss. In Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and Faith. Ted Peters, ed. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993, pp. 72–122.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1970b. What Is Man? Anthropology in the Theological Perspective. Minneapolis: Fortress.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1972. The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions. Translated by Margaret Kohl. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1974. Is There Any Truth in God-Talk? The Problem of Theological Statements from the Perspective of Philosophy of Science. Translated by Linda Maloney. In The Historicity of Nature: Essays on Science and Theology. Niels Henrik Gregersen, ed. West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008, pp. 11–22.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1976. Theology and the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Francis McDonagh. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1981. Theological Questions to Scientists. In Carol Rausch Albright and Joel Haugen, eds. Beginning with the End: God, Science, and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Chicago: Open Court, 1997, pp. 37–50.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1983. Anthropology in Theological Perspective. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1988. An Autobiographical Sketch. In Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton, eds. The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Minneapolis: Augsburg, pp. 11–18.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1989. The Doctrine of Creation and Modern Science. In Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and Faith. Ted Peters, ed. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993 pp. 29–49.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1994. Systematic Theology, vol. 2. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Scholz, Heinrich. 1931. Wie ist eine evangelische Theologie als Wissenschaft möglich? In Gerhard Sauter, ed. Theologie als Wissenschaft. Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1971, pp. 221–264.