Israel and the Bomb

Since the Baruch Plan, the United States had opposed the spread of nuclear weapons. In the 1950s, however, it still lacked a coherent nuclear nonproliferation policy.¹ The United States dealt with proliferation risks through legislation, through bilateral safeguards agreements on nuclear cooperation, and by supporting the creation of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM. Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy became a tool of American foreign policy.² The United States was also committed to safeguarding its atomic assistance to foreign governments. Safeguarding, however, did not mean outlawing nuclear proliferation.

The Eisenhower administration opposed the spread of nuclear weapons, but it recognized that sovereign nations had the right to pursue such an objective on their own. The objective of the IAEA was to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to set in place a safeguards system to ensure that nuclear cooperation would not be bent to military purposes. At the same time, its statute did not forbid member states from acquiring nuclear weapons, or require IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials and facilities acquired without IAEA assistance. The idea of a no-weapons pledge was considered by American policy makers but was rejected by the Eisenhower administration as infeasible.³ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was convinced that it would be difficult for the United States to persuade other nations to forgo the right to build nuclear weapons as long as the Big Three continued to do so.

By the late 1950s it became clear that technologically advanced nations would be able to acquire nuclear weapons on their own. The Soviets acquired the bomb in 1949, the British in 1952, and it was only a matter of time until France did the same. Other West European nations—Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland—also considered acquiring nuclear weapons. The question for America was whether to provide NATO with nuclear weapons, making it unnecessary for NATO members to build their own independent nuclear arsenals, or, instead, limit its security commitment to Europe. The Eisenhower administration chose to introduce nuclear weapons into NATO, allowing for greater nuclear sharing with its members.⁴ Recognizing the growing American nuclear deployment in NATO, the Atomic Energy Act was amended to accommodate the new reality. In 1958 the Act was amended to allow the transfer of weapon-grade fissionable material and weapons design information to nations that had “made substantial progress in the development of nuclear weapons” (the reference was to Great Britain). The Eisenhower administration thus gave priority to nuclear weapons cooperation with allies over efforts to stem nuclear weapons proliferation.

When, in 1958, the idea of an international agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was introduced by Ireland, the Soviets supported it while the United States and its NATO allies opposed it. This called for the nuclear nations not to transfer nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states and for the nonnuclear states not to manufacture them. The Eisenhower administration opposition had to do with concerns about allied nuclear deployments.⁵ A year later, when Ireland modified its resolution by introducing a weaker language,⁶ the United States supported it while the French and Soviets abstained. In 1960, when the Irish proposal was amended further, calling on the nuclear states not only to refrain from relinquishing their control over nuclear weapons but also from transmitting “information needed for their manufacture,” the Soviet Union voted in favor of the proposal and the United States abstained, citing verification concerns.⁷

These shifts in positions revealed the conflicts and confusion in the Eisenhower administration over the merits of this nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy relative to other goals and priorities. The legacy of Atoms for Peace was that preventing nuclear weapons proliferation was less of a priority than enhancing nuclear information and technology sharing within NATO, and sharing the civilian-industrial benefits of nuclear energy with the world. America was undecided about what it could and should do to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, as could be seen in the cases of France and Israel.

France began seriously to contemplate the acquisition of nuclear weapons after the 1956 Suez campaign. The Eisenhower administration recognized the French policy but could not, or would not, dissuade France from pursuing it.⁸ When EURATOM was founded, with American backing, its statutes were written so as to allow France to acquire nuclear weapons.⁹ The United States did not protest France’s February 1960 nuclear test, which marked its new status as a nuclear-weapon state. The Eisenhower administration’s lack of a response to the Israeli nuclear weapons program, however, was more complex.

Until 10 January 1956 Israel’s nuclear activities were of no interest to the American intelligence community. Israel was not categorized as a potential nuclear proliferation threat. In January, however, Israel was added to the Third Category Priority list, the lowest category for intelligence collection purposes.¹⁰ Still, Israel’s nuclear activities in 1956—its interest in purchasing a 10-megawatt, natural uranium, heavy water reactor from the United States, in addition to ten tons of heavy water—did not arouse the interest of intelligence analysts and was not taken as an indication of Israel’s intention to embark on a major reactor construction program.¹¹

In 1957 Israel reversed direction. While in 1956 Israel indicated its interest in skipping the pool-type reactor stage and constructing instead a “real reactor” (10 MW, natural uranium/heavy water), for which it asked to purchase heavy water from the United States, in 1957 this interest was hardly mentioned. Rather, Israel now wanted to utilize the American offer of 1955 to construct a 1-MW, pool-type research reactor, to be designed and manufactured by the firm American Machines and Foundry (AMF) Atomics. In December 1957 the long-awaited project proposal and hazard analysis for the reactor was submitted to AEC by AMF on behalf of Israel for the Nachal Soreq site. This reactor qualified Israel to receive a $350,000 grant from the United States under the terms of the presidential offer. On 19 March 1958 Israel signed its contract with AMF, expecting that the reactor’s start-up date would be about fifteen months later.

When an AEC official asked the Israeli science attaché in Washington about the status of the 10-MW, natural uranium, heavy-water reactor, for which in July 1956 Israel had requested ten tons of heavy water from the AEC, the Israeli representative replied that “no firm decision had been taken with regard to this reactor, and that a determination as to whether to proceed with it would be dependent upon the availability of money, manpower, and uranium.”¹² Not only was the Israeli flip not registered as a warning flag with the AEC, but the Soreq reactor actually shielded the Dimona reactor. The construction of the Soreq reactor by AMF was an important factor indicating why the United States failed to identify Israel’s other, top-secret nuclear project, namely, Dimona.

A series of private and public comments made by chairman Bergmann in 1958–60 about a likely or forthcoming Israeli decision to start building a nuclear power plant added to the American failure to see what was happening. In a public interview given by Bergmann in early 1958, in which he discussed the research reactor to be supplied by the United States (Soreq), Bergmann elaborated on the need for nuclear power in Israel but noted that no formal decision on nuclear power had yet been made by the Israeli government. Two months later, on 15 April, Bergmann said that the decision to build a power reactor had already been taken in principle, but he added that “it would take two and half years to construct the experimental reactor now contemplated, and five to seven years before a large, economically feasible reactor could be put into operation.”¹³ The United States intelligence assumed that the small experimental reactor that Bergmann mentioned was the small American pool-type reactor which was at the final stage of negotiation with Israel at the time.¹⁴ In that interview Bergmann “stated categorically” that the agreement with France “was limited to the exchange of information on uranium chemistry and the production of heavy water.”¹⁵

A follow-up interview of Bergmann by an officer from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in July further added to the confusion. In that interview Bergmann stated that “the decision to build a heavy-water plant had been taken, but the capacity of this plant was still undecided.” Bergmann added that “he expected to submit a report by the end of July 1958 that would enable the government to decide about the plant.” It is unclear whether these statements about nuclear power were part of a deliberate strategy designed to deceive the United States and protect Dimona, a reflection of the discussions about nuclear powers in those days, or the result of Bergmann’s tendency for loose talk. In any case, the result was that the United States was blind to the possibility that Israel might be secretly engaging in building a production reactor. Thus Israel was not among the countries the United States was reviewing in connection with the “fourth country” problem. The concern was mostly in regard to France’s cooperative relations with other European nuclear energy programs. On the watch list were also West Germany, Italy, China, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.¹⁶

During 1958–59 there were indications that Israel might have launched a nuclear program, but these indications were not properly interpreted. There were reports relating France’s assistance to Israel in the nuclear field, and “a few of these reports indicated that the French would supply, or aid in the development of [Israeli] atomic weapons.” On 15 April 1958, however, Bergmann denied that the French-Israeli nuclear cooperation went beyond exchanges of information on uranium chemistry and heavy water, and the United States accepted his explanation (10). In May 1959 the U.S. Embassy learned that the resignation of Dan Tolkovsky as head of the Development Authority in the Israeli Ministry of Defense might be related to his opposition to Peres’s attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, but the information was not confirmed and no intelligence action followed (10–11). In June 1959 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed a representative of the AEC of its agreement to sell Israel heavy water subjected to “safeguards and inspection,” but the AEC representative did not inquire about the quantity of heavy water, and the information was not disseminated to the American intelligence community until mid-December 1960 (11). In April 1960 the Clandestine Service of the CIA (CIA/CS) learned that the Norwegian-Israeli agreement involved twenty tons of heavy water, but the information was not distributed through the intelligence system (11). In early 1960 the CIA/CS “obtained information that specific Israeli observers would be present at the first French nuclear weapons tests,” but the information, too, was never passed on “because it could not be confirmed that any observers actually attended” (11).

The most perplexing failure to disseminate intelligence data regarding Israel concerns the early aerial photographs of Dimona. In early 1958 the United States became aware, through U-2 aerial reconnaissance flights, of the construction under way in a Negev site near Beer Sheba.¹⁷ According to Dino A. Brugioni, who served at the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center (CIA/PIC), the first aerial pictures of the “Beer Sheba site” (as the Dimona site was called) were found accidentally, as the United States “was watching periodically” an Israeli practice bombing range in the Negev desert in 1958.¹⁸ The early excavations were determined to be a “probable” nuclear-related site, but U.S. intelligence failed to grasp the meaning of its own findings. It took more than two years for the intelligence agencies to identify Dimona as a nuclear reactor site.¹⁹

Almost forty years later Brugioni still recalls how the program director, Arthur C. Lundahl, took the first aerial photographs (called “briefing boards”) to brief President Eisenhower and other officials in early 1958. Brugioni remembers the episode well because of the appearance of a lack of reaction on the part of Eisenhower and Lewis Strauss, the AEC chairman. Brugioni recalls that Lundahl returned from the White House meeting, noting that Eisenhower “did not say a word.”²⁰ CIA/PIC was not asked for further photographs of the site or for follow-up presentations. For an enthusiastic consumer of intelligence like Eisenhower, this was unusual. Lundahl and Brugioni were left with the feeling that Eisenhower wanted Israel to acquire nuclear weapons.²¹

In itself the 1958 photographic material was inconclusive, and it was difficult to determine the purpose of the excavation. Notwithstanding, Lundahl and his team of interpreters referred to it as a “probable” nuclear-related site.²² The site stood out: the long security fence erected around the perimeter, the extent of the dig itself and the efforts to conceal the dirt, the extensive road system into the site and around the perimeter, and the power lines that had been constructed.²³

Those suspicions were fed into the system. As early as 27 March 1958 the CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIA/OSI) requested detailed information about Israel’s nuclear activities, particularly Israel’s production of heavy water and uranium. The requests were submitted to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv on 13 June 1958, and later “served almost verbatim” to Bergmann. Bergmann “was somewhat perturbed” by the questions, but he answered them “in some detail.” He stated that the decision to build a heavy water nuclear plant had been taken, “but the capacity of this plant was still undecided … [and] he expected to submit a report later that month which would enable the government to decide about the size.” According to the American report, “his [Bergmann’s] answers contained no indication of reactor construction.”²⁴

American intelligence thus failed on the matter of Dimona. In mid-December 1960, shortly after the discovery of Dimona, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) asked the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) “to prepare a detailed postmortem on why the intelligence community did not recognize this development [Dimona] earlier.” The study concludes that “information was available to some elements of the intelligence community as early as April 1958 that could have alerted the atomic energy intelligence community to Israeli intentions.”²⁵

What were the reasons for the failure? On the analytical level, U.S. intelligence failed to identify Israel’s intentions and motivations. Israeli secrecy and deception, and Bergmann’s confusing references, misled the United States. It was also presumed in those days “that Israel could not achieve this [nuclear weapons] capability without outside aid from the U.S. or its allies, and … any such aid would be readily known to the U.S.” This assumption “led to a tendency to discount rumors of [the] Israeli reactor and French collaboration in the nuclear weapons area.” The other reason for the failure was bureaucratic: important information was available but was not disseminated through the system. Israel may also have had friends in high places in the intelligence and nuclear establishments who might have helped to suppress the early information. Information about Israel was jealously held within the CIA, where James Jesus Angleton was in charge of the Israeli desk. Angleton did not share sensitive information with other agencies, and also withheld much of it from other CIA sections.

The Eisenhower administration had knowledge of the Dimona project as early as 1958–59 but did not act on it, setting the precedent that Israel’s nuclear weapons program was treated as a special case. Politicians and intelligence chiefs recognized the need to tread softly around it. The late-1950s might have been the only time the United States could have successfully pressured Israel to give up its nuclear weapons project in exchange for American security guarantees, but the opportunity was not explored.

More than two and half years after the Eisenhower administration received the initial information about Dimona, the site again became the center of attention. In June 1960 the American Embassy in Tel Aviv became aware of rumors that the “French were collaborating with the Israelis in an atomic energy project near Beer Sheba.” Sometime that summer, in response to the embassy’s informal inquiries, Israel described the Dimona site as a “textile plant.” On 2 August the embassy reported for the first time that a “French-Israeli atomic energy project [is] being built near Beer Sheba.” The report was discussed at the 25 August JAEIC and members were requested to report any available information for the next meeting on 8 September 1960.²⁶ This triggered the chain of events that led to the public disclosure of the Dimona reactor in December.

In September, in response to renewed American inquiries about the Dimona site, Israeli officials referred to the project under construction as a “metallurgical research installation.” In mid-September the CIA responded to a State Department probe concerning the 2 August report from Tel Aviv, saying it had “no confirming information” concerning the Dimona construction site and informed the State Department that it had instructed its field officers to obtain answers to specific questions about it. The State Department, too, instructed the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to seek more information on the subject.²⁷ In late October and early November the United Kingdom informed the United States that it believed a reactor was under construction near Beer Sheba. On 8 November British intelligence provided CIA/PIC with ground photography of the site. The next day, based on a hurried analysis of the photography, a preliminary assessment was made in the CIA—“the site was probably a reactor complex.”²⁸

The same day, Air Force Intelligence instructed the air attaché in Tel Aviv to obtain additional photographs of the “Beer Sheba site.” Once again he was told that the facility under construction was “a metallurgical research laboratory.” The attaché took ground photography of the site, but it took a month and a half for the photographs to be disseminated to nuclear intelligence, although a copy of one photograph was received in Washington in early December and made available to JAEIC. It turned out that the Army attaché in Israel had taken many photographs of the site on 9 August, but he had not realized what the installation was. These photographs were processed along with many others by Army Intelligence in October, but only in December was their significance recognized, and they became available to Atomic Energy Intelligence on 8 December.²⁹

By late November 1960, in response to a request by the CIA, the U.S. Embassy in Paris reported an interview in which the AEC representative in Paris confronted a CEA official with information that the United States had learned of the “construction of a nuclear power plant in Beer Sheba” and requested information on the French participation. The French CEA official “flatly denied” that the CEA or any French company were collaborating with Israel in the construction of a nuclear power reactor, asserting that the French-Israeli agreement had nothing to do with power reactors, and was limited only to uranium and heavy water production.³⁰

Days later came the final confirmation. On 26 November Henry Gomberg, a University of Michigan nuclear scientist who had visited Israel, reported that he had an “urgent and secret” item regarding Israel’s nuclear program. He noted that he had already informed Ambassador Reid in Tel Aviv of this information.³¹ When Gomberg returned to Washington, D.C., on 1 December, he was debriefed at the State Department by representatives of the AEC, CIA, and State Department. He reported that he was convinced that the large installation Israel had been constructing in the Negev desert, which was referred to as “a large agricultural experimental station,” was “a Marcoul-type reactor being constructed with French technical assistance.” He said that the construction had been under way for “about two years,” and it “was scheduled to be completed in about a year.”³²

He concluded that Israel was pursuing two parallel nuclear paths, one aimed at scientific research at the Nachal Soreq reactor and another aimed toward producing weapon-grade plutonium at Dimona. His suspicions were based primarily on negative evidence. In his visit to the Technion in Haifa, for example, he found no correlation between the institution’s program of personnel training and the purpose of the program. “The Israelis had a clear requirement for personnel of specific types which could not be used in any program they would identify. Furthermore, their familiarization program was much more detailed and operational in its nature than was called for by their research activities. A number of trained people had recently been put to work but were not apparent in any known installation.”³³ Another reason was the result of his visit at “a facility called Plant or Laboratory No. 4 [Machon 4]”:

Israel’s particular interest in plutonium was apparent to Gomberg, especially because the Israelis were secretive and reluctant to discuss specific projects or explain personnel needs. Gomberg noted that in his last meeting with Bergmann, he was told that in three weeks Ben Gurion would issue a statement concerning Israel’s atomic energy program.³⁵

After Ambassador Reid learned of Gomberg’s debriefings in Paris and Washington’s reactions to it, he acknowledged, on 30 November, that he himself had discussed these issues with Gomberg before the latter’s departure. Gomberg reported that he believed “Israel is engaged in a very broad range of activities in this field and is pursuing projects which they were not prepared to discuss with him.” In particular, Gomberg called attention to “Israel’s strong interest in plutonium”—measured in gram amounts, which he considered significant. In response to Reid’s query, Gomberg thought “it was conceivable that Israel could have weapons capability in less than ten years.”³⁶

Two days later Reid met Bergmann to discuss Israel’s nuclear energy program. Bergmann told Reid that Ben Gurion planned to make a policy announcement on nuclear energy the next week while announcing the establishment of a new university in Beer Sheba. Ben Gurion’s announcement, according to Bergmann, was to mention a “new 10 to 20 megawatt natural uranium and heavy water nuclear reactor to go critical in about a year and a half.” Bergmann also noted that the reactor “is exclusively of Israeli design, with some French equipment.” It is “to be used for research in desert plants, drought resistant seeds, short-life isotopes and radio biological research not now possible at present [Soreq] reactor.”³⁷ It was the first time Bergmann acknowledged that a second reactor was being built in Israel.

The first week of December 1960 the American intelligence community finally understood that a new reality was in the making. Gomberg’s debriefing, Reid’s report, and new information received from Britain revealing that Norway had furnished Israel with twenty tons of heavy water changed the American view of Israel’s nuclear activities. Israel’s intentions were reinterpreted as directed toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, and Bergmann’s comments were now seen as part of Israel’s effort to mislead the United States.³⁸

On 2 December a technical assessment made by the JAEIC concluded that “a 200 megawatt reactor appeared [to be] under construction near Beer Sheba.”³⁹ British intelligence reached a similar conclusion.⁴⁰ The assessment was inaccurate, but it recognized that this was a major project with implications of nuclear weapons proliferation. The next day, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee in Congress was informed of the new development. On 8 December the CIA issued a Special National Intelligence Report (SNIE) about Dimona, stressing the gravity of the project’s repercussions.⁴¹

The same day, the National Security Council (NSC) was convened, with the Dimona issue high on the agenda. CIA director Allen Dulles informed the NSC that Israel, with French assistance, was constructing a nuclear complex in the Negev desert, which probably included a reactor capable of producing weapon-grade plutonium. Dulles mentioned Ben Gurion’s forthcoming announcement, but noted that experts from the CIA and the AEC believed “that the Israeli nuclear complex cannot be solely for peaceful purposes.” Dulles reiterated in the CIA estimate that Arab reaction to Dimona would be “particularly severe.”⁴²

At this point the State Department decided to raise the issue of Dimona with Israel discreetly. On 9 December Secretary of State Christian Herter summoned the Israeli ambassador, Avraham Harman, presented him with the U.S. intelligence findings, including ground photographs, and pointed out that the site seemed to be appropriate for a reactor ten times the declared size. Herter mentioned that in the U.S. estimate such installation, with “this apparent size, would cost on the order of $80 million dollars and has not been mentioned in recent discussions of Israeli economic development plans and possible U.S. financial assistance.” Herter referred to the inconsistencies between the American intelligence findings and the Israeli account as conveyed to Ambassador Reid.⁴³

Herter talked of the American suspicions that Israel had launched a secret nuclear weapons program, warned of the consequences of this, and asked for an accurate report on Israel’s nuclear program. Harman, who “disclaimed any knowledge of facts,” told Herter he would request “urgent advice.”⁴⁴ Herter also called the French charge d’affaires and reported to him what Bergmann had told Reid in Tel Aviv, noting that the United States had ascertained that the reactor was “at least ten times as large as claimed.” Herter added that it appeared that the large reactor was not intended to provide power but to produce plutonium, “which in a comparatively short time would give them [Israel] considerable weapons potential.” Herter commented that Bergmann’s talk about isotope research “does not make any sense since they already have an experimental reactor [Soreq] big enough to take care of that.”⁴⁵ Within days the story became public.

On 13 December Time magazine disclosed that a “small power,” which was “neither of the communist nor the NATO bloc,” was developing a nuclear weapons capability. Three days later, the London Daily Express named Israel as the state, adding that “British and American intelligence authorities believe that the Israelis are well on the way to building their first experimental nuclear bomb.”⁴⁶ On 18 December the chairman of the AEC, John McCone, appeared on the television program “Meet the Press” to confirm that Israel was secretly building a nuclear reactor and that the United States had asked Israel for information. Without going into details, McCone said that, thus far, the United States had “only informal and unofficial information” concerning Israel’s activities in the nuclear field. He pointed out that, while the possession of a reactor did not in itself constitute a weapons capability, it could be used to produce plutonium.⁴⁷

The issue of the Israeli nuclear reactor now became a public issue for the first time. The front-page story in the next day’s New York Times, written, we now know, with the help of McCone, revealed that “U.S. officials [are] studying with mounting concern recent evidence indicating that Israel, with assistance from France, may be developing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.”⁴⁸ The State Department also acknowledged for the first time that Herter had summoned the Israeli ambassador on 9 December to express concern and ask for information, and that “a response has not yet been received.”⁴⁹ On the same day, 19 December, the Israeli reactor was the topic of a meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House. The minutes indicate that both Herter and Allen Dulles referred to Dimona as a “plutonium production plant.” Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates asserted that “our information is that the plant is not for peaceful purposes.” In response to Herter’s remark that the Israelis “have constructed this plant through diversions from private and public aid to Israel,” Eisenhower noted that the cost of the Dimona plant was estimated to be between “100 to 200 million dollars.”⁵⁰

Less than six months after Ben Gurion’s confrontation with de Gaulle over the future of Dimona, he had a second opportunity to appreciate the limits of the nuclear weapons project, through a confrontation with the United States. Before Israel could fulfill the November 1960 agreement with the French to announce publicly the peaceful nature of Dimona, the secrecy shrouding Dimona was lifted on the other side of the Atlantic.

In his first meeting on the subject, it was already possible to discern the president’s desire to look the other way with regard to the Israeli case. President Eisenhower suggested that the United States was confident, in view of Israel’s adherence to the Vienna agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy, that the reactor was for peaceful uses, and that Israel should permit inspection visits to the reactor. Later, the president made the point that “there is more of a problem than that involved,” and that the United States had now to decide what “we do as further countries become atomic producers.” To this, Herter responded that “it may still be possible to head off this production by the Israelis.”⁵¹ The next day, 20 December, the political significance of Dimona was highlighted in a follow-up New York Times story, which revealed that Israel had led the United States to believe that the nuclear site was a textile plant, and that the issue had been discussed in a high-level presidential briefing at the White House the previous day.⁵²

The same day, Ambassador Harman met Secretary Herter and provided, for the first time, the formal Israeli reply to the secretary’s queries of 9 December. Harman acknowledged that a 24-MW research reactor had been under construction for a year, not 100 to 300 megawatts as the United States suspected, and that it would “take three to four years to complete.”⁵³ The reactor was described as having no industrial importance; the purposes were the “development of scientific knowledge for eventual industrial, agricultural, medical and other scientific purposes.” The project was said to be “part of the general program of development of the Negev.” It was acknowledged that the project was assisted by the French and, in a minor way, by several other countries, but it was built under the direction of Israeli scientists. He assured Herter that the project was for peaceful uses only and, once completed, would be open to students from friendly countries. The project cost Israel about five million dollars per year exclusive of local currency costs. He also added that Ben Gurion would issue a public statement on the project in the Knesset the following day. Herter, his doubts not satisfied, posed additional questions to the ambassador.⁵⁴

Now that Dimona’s secrecy was lifted, the secrecy itself was fueling speculations about Israel’s intentions and capabilities in the nuclear field. The Dimona story became an international crisis, and Israel could no longer delay issuing a public statement explaining the nature of its nuclear project. The first Israeli public responses to McCone’s televised statement were unofficial and ambiguous. Bergmann was the first to respond, referring to the reports that Israel was developing nuclear weapons as “very flattering, but untrue,” adding that “Israel’s industry in the present state is incapable of undertaking such a task.”⁵⁵ He mentioned nothing about Israel’s future intentions. An even more ambiguous message came the next day as the New York Times reported that the Israeli Defense Ministry declined to say “whether it was developing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.” The IAEC issued a brief statement, reiterating the chairman’s comment of the day before, saying that “Israel is not engaged in the production of atomic weapons.”⁵⁶ The first official confirmation of French assistance in building a natural uranium reactor in Israel also came on 19 December in separate statements issued by the French Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Embassy. The Israeli Embassy noted that Israel’s atomic development was “dedicated exclusively” to the needs of industry, agriculture, medicine, and science. The French statement went beyond that and insisted “that all necessary provisions have been taken by France to assure that the French aid to Israel in the nuclear field would be used only for peaceful purposes.”⁵⁷

These statements, however, were not enough to restore calm. The long delay in Israel’s response to Herter’s official query and the continued absence of any authoritative public statement from Ben Gurion only heightened the crisis. Finally, after three days of speculation, Ben Gurion delivered a circumspect statement on the matter to the Knesset on 21 December. This was the first occasion that the citizens of Israel were told that their country was constructing a nuclear reactor in the Negev, and the only time that an Israeli prime minister issued a statement about Dimona. Since the seeds of the Israeli opaque nuclear posture were planted in this statement, it is worth quoting in full:

Ben Gurion dismissed the reports that Israel was manufacturing a nuclear bomb as a “deliberate or unwitting untruth,” adding that Israel had proposed “general and total disarmament in Israel and the neighboring Arab states on conditions of mutual rights of inspection.” In line with the Couve de Murville-Peres agreement, the statement made no mention of France as the reactor designer, stating only that the reactor was constructed under Israeli direction.⁵⁹ By that time the French government was no longer involved in the construction.

Ben Gurion’s statement of 21 December held some elements of truth, but it certainly did not tell the whole story. His immediate goal was to allay American suspicions and political pressures. A confrontation with America would jeopardize the project and Israel’s relationship with the United States, and Ben Gurion was determined to keep both intact. The strategy seemed to work. The Israeli explanations, especially Ben Gurion’s public pronouncements, eased the U.S.-Israeli confrontation, at least in the public sphere, allowing the State Department to issue a statement that “the government of Israel has given assurances that its new reactor … is dedicated entirely to peaceful purposes.” The State Department noted that the U.S. government welcomed the Israeli statements, and went on to say that “it is gratifying to note that as made public the Israeli atomic energy program does not represent a cause of special concern.”⁶⁰ It was convenient for the State Department to read Ben Gurion’s assurances as going beyond what he actually stated.⁶¹ The Israeli statement created an American expectation “that Israel will make its reactor accessible to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency,”⁶² even though Ben Gurion did not say anything of the kind. Israel’s assurances, however, allowed the United States to defuse the crisis.

Ben Gurion’s statement prevented public confrontation, but it was not enough to remove the nuclear weapons issue from the U.S.-Israeli agenda. The United States still insisted on receiving more detailed technical information on the Dimona reactor, but now it decided to pursue the issue less publicly. Ben Gurion’s assurances left many aspects of the project unclear. The Eisenhower administration, which only months before had celebrated the opening of Israel’s first research reactor at Nachal Soreq, provided by the United States as part of its Atoms for Peace program, had been left in the dark on Dimona and was determined to obtain further clarification and concrete commitments. The Israeli nuclear program thus became a sore point between the two countries.

On 21 December Ambassador Reid was asked to convey to Ben Gurion the message that the U.S. government “is firmly opposed to proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities and therefore deeply interested in having full and frank account [of] Israeli atomic activities, including plans for disposing of plutonium which will be bred by Israel’s new reactor.” Furthermore, Reid was asked to tell Ben Gurion that “unless suspicions are firmly laid to rest programs such as those of Israel can have grave repercussions in the Near East area particularly but also outside it.”⁶³ Three days later, on 24 December, Reid met with Ben Gurion to convey the administration’s message in person. He told Ben Gurion that the United States welcomed the public and private assurances that Israel provided concerning the “peaceful purposes” of the reactor and Israel’s atomic energy program, noting that his government “did not wish to prolong or exaggerate this issue.” Reid reiterated Herter’s request that safeguards “be applied to any plutonium produced by reactor and referred to Secretary’s mention of Israel’s affirmative vote on IAEA safeguards at September general conference.”⁶⁴

Ben Gurion was “direct and spirited, as always,” recalls Reid, but “friendly.” At one point, however, he expressed “mild irritation” in reference to the continuing flap in the United States over Israel’s reactor. “Why in the States is everything being told everybody,” Ben Gurion asked. He added that “he was very sorry that he had not been able to tell President Eisenhower of this project during his recent visit to Washington,” and “were it not so close to end of Eisenhower administration, he would wish to give personal account to President, whom he had long known and admired.”⁶⁵ Reid also raised in that meeting the possibility of having a scientist take a look at the reactor. There is no record of Ben Gurion’s reply to his request.⁶⁶

The issue of an American or IAEA visit to Dimona continued to preoccupy the State Department and Reid in the last days of December 1960. On 31 December Reid received instructions to raise the nuclear program issue with Ben Gurion or Foreign Minister Meir, despite the domestic cabinet crisis in Israel, since “neither Department nor other interested Washington agencies consider Ben Gurion’s statements thus far satisfactory.” It appears that Ben Gurion’s replies on “plutonium safeguards, reactor’s power and production capability, inspection by a visiting scientist” were too vague, if not evasive.⁶⁷ Reid was authorized to state that the U.S. government (USG) was “gratified by assurances given thus far,” and “would not welcome another round of alarmist publicity,” however, this did not signify “cessation legitimate USG interest in this matter,” since “USG policy is unequivocally opposed to proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.” The telegram went on to say that the Israeli government could act to restore confidence in U.S.-Israeli relations “by providing clear and complete answers to such cogent and crucial questions.” The five questions were:

The U.S. documents and Ben Gurion’s biographer are in agreement about the content of the five questions, but it is not clear how and when they were presented. According to Bar-Zohar, on 3 January Reid met with Meir and presented her with the five questions as an ultimatum, “requesting that answers be returned to him by that midnight.”⁶⁹ Meir met with Ben Gurion that day, and the two decided to ignore the American deadline. Ben Gurion was “infuriated by this disrespectful demand” and summoned Reid to Sdeh Boker.⁷⁰ He chided him, saying, “you must talk to us as equals, or not talk to us at all,” but then responded to the five questions one by one:

As to the first question, he replied: “As far as we know, those who sell uranium do so on condition that the plutonium reverts to them.” In reply to the second question, concerning “guarantees,” the Old Man replied: “International guarantees—no. We don’t want hostile states meddling in our business.” At the same time he expressed complete willingness to permit visits by scientists from a friendly state, or from an international organization, but not immediately. “There is anger in Israel over the American action in leaking this matter,” he said, and expressed his view that the visit would be conducted in the course of the year. He answered in the negative about the construction of an additional reactor and concluded by declaring that Israel did not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons. “All that I said in the Knesset holds, it was said explicitly, and you must accept it at face value.”⁷¹

The State Department’s chronology and Reid’s recollections tell a different, less dramatic story. The State Department’s record does not show a meeting between Reid and Meir, indicating instead a lengthy meeting between Ben Gurion and Reid on 4 January, in which Reid presented the five questions. According to Reid, the tone of the meeting was friendly and there was no ultimatum—“sovereign states don’t act that way”—although it was clear that Ben Gurion was uncomfortable discussing Dimona. For Reid, the questions were designed to elicit “clarifications.” As to Ben Gurion’s answers, the State Department chronology relates a straightforward exchange: “(a) Plutonium would go to the uranium supplier; (b) Visits by nationals from friendly powers would be permitted; (c) No IAEA safeguards until others agree—“no Russians”; (d) No third reactor is now contemplated; (e) Categoric assurance that no nuclear weapons planned.”⁷²

The differences between the two versions appears to be a matter of perception and tone. Reid is probably correct that no ultimatum was made, while Bar-Zohar’s account probably reflects Ben Gurion’s perception of the purpose of the five questions. The State Department’s sanitized version of the telegram of 31 December conveys toughness. If Israel wanted “to restore the confidence which should be cornerstone of our relations,” it could do so “by providing clear and complete answers to such cogent and crucial questions.” There is no formal ultimatum, but the conditioning of restoring relations on the questions is clear. Reid may be right that no formal deadline was set, but the State Department telegram did instruct him of the following: “You should add that the Secretary will welcome a personal report from him at earliest possible opportunity.” This is not the last time a U.S.-Israeli exchange on the nuclear program was perceived differently by the two sides, with Israel seeing American actions as on the verge of violating national sovereignty, let alone diplomatic etiquette.

Ben Gurion’s assurances to Reid did not end the Eisenhower administration’s probe. On 11 January 1961 Herter met Harman for four hours on the issue of the Israeli atomic energy program. Harman reiterated the assurances Ben Gurion had given Reid, noting that Ben Gurion considered the answer to Reid’s fifth question—“that Israel has no plans for developing nuclear weapons”—as the “major point.” Herter, however, asked for stronger reassurances concerning the issues of international control and ownership of the fissile material that would be produced.⁷³ On 17 January, two days before the close of the Eisenhower administration, Herter instructed Reid to continue pressing Ben Gurion for an early visit to Dimona by scientists from a friendly power.⁷⁴

The final legacy of the Eisenhower administration on the matter of Dimona was a “secret” report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, dated 19 January 1961. The report detailed the American understanding of the Dimona project. It suggested that the U.S. government took Ben Gurion’s private and public statements as a solemn pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The first article of the report asserts: “We [the United States] have been assured categorically at the highest level of the Israeli government that Israel has no plans for the production of atomic weapons.” The question of a weapons option, as distinguished from actual weapons in stock, was not raised by either the United States or Ben Gurion. As to the question of foreign visits to Dimona, which meant some form of international control, the report states: “We have been assured that Israel will be glad to receive visits by scientists from friendly countries at the Dimona reactor when public interest has quieted down. In particular a scientist from the United States will be welcome as early as possible on this condition.”⁷⁵

Israel, however, did not agree to formal IAEA or other international inspections. Although it accepted “the general principle of international safeguards to assure peaceful use of atomic energy,” the report noted that Israel also believed in the “principle of equality.” Israel would not be willing to open Dimona to international inspections until such procedures applied to “comparable reactors everywhere.” These two understandings set the stage for the agreement Ben Gurion and Kennedy would reach in later visits, first in 1961, on provisional visits, and again in 1963, on periodic visits.

Article 6 of the report attributed Israeli secrecy to “fears of participating foreign companies over the prospects of [an] Arab boycott.”⁷⁶ It is evident from the report that the United States had received “responsible assurances” from the French government concerning the degree of French-Israeli cooperation, and the nature of that cooperation.

The dealings between Ben Gurion and the Eisenhower administration shaped the priorities and policies of both governments. On the Israeli side, Ben Gurion’s priority was to lessen American pressures in order to allow for the completion of the physical infrastructure for a nuclear-weapons option.⁷⁹ He was willing to say almost anything the United States wanted to hear, giving the impression that his statement in the Knesset was an unequivocal pledge not to produce nuclear weapons. On practical issues, however, Ben Gurion was more cautious. He evaded the question of the ownership of the plutonium and rejected a formal international inspection of Dimona. He accepted a visit by American scientists, but made it clear that it would be carried out under Israeli control.

On the American side, the administration sought to force Ben Gurion to change his original plans. Washington remained skeptical about Ben Gurion’s assurances that Dimona was dedicated to peaceful research. American officials were convinced that Dimona’s purpose was to produce materials for use in nuclear weapons. In order for the United States to freeze the Israeli nuclear project, it had to insist on verifying Ben Gurion’s assurances by placing Dimona under international safeguards or opening it to foreign scientists.

The Eisenhower administration’s legacy is mixed and inconsistent. Eisenhower did not act on early intelligence information about Dimona, giving the impression that he might have preferred Israel obtaining nuclear weapons. The lack of action was consistent with Eisenhower’s lack of a coherent policy on nuclear proliferation. Once the intelligence about Dimona was shared with other governmental agencies, however, the Eisenhower administration was forceful in drawing the line against proliferation. The determination that the line against nuclear weapons proliferation had to be drawn in Israel evolved during the final weeks of the administration.