| Figures |
| Preface: Disentangling Our Concept of Color |
| Acknowledgments |
| 1 | The Problem of Color Realism |
| 1.1 Cartesian Anti-Realism |
| 1.2 Oxford Realism |
| 1.3 Survey of Considerations in Support of the Intrinsic View |
| 1.4 Experimental Evidence |
| 1.5 The Need for a Genealogy of Color |
| 2 | The Aristotelian Strand |
| 2.1 Aristotle on Perception |
| 2.2 Color as the Proper Object of Vision |
| 2.3 The Doctrine of Species |
| 2.4 The Aristotelian Distinction between True and Apparent Colors |
| 2.5 The Persistence of the Aristotelian Strand |
| 3 | The Cartesian Strand |
| 3.1 Descartes on Light and Vision |
| 3.2 Descartes's Criticism of the Aristotelian Distinction between True and Apparent Colors |
| 3.3 Descartes's Criticisms of the Doctrine of Species |
| 3.4 Descartes on Color as the Proper Object of Vision |
| 3.5 The Cartesian Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities |
| 3.6 The Cartesian Strand's Presence |
| 3.7 Interlude: Where We Find Ourselves Now |
| 4 | Descartes's Quandary |
| 4.1 Descartes's Vacillation |
| 4.2 A Genealogical Explanation for Descartes's Vacillation |
| 4.3 The Emergence of Dispositionalism |
| 4.4 Philosophical False Friends |
| 5 | Moving Beyond the Problem of Color Realism |
| 5.1 The Target/Content Distinction |
| 5.2 The Problem with Cartesian Anti-Realism |
| 5.3 The Problem with Oxford Realism |
| 5.4 The Way Out of Descartes's Quandary |
| 5.5 Conclusion: Against Ahistorical Conceptual Analysis |
| Index |