Katō Naoto treats an event of high drama: the betrayal of the Khoshud Mongols of Kokonor, to whom the Qing emperor had promised the restoration of their former dominion over Central Tibet, first held, however lightly, by Gushri Khan and then later by Lajang Khan. The emperor offered this in return for the Khoshuds’ vital assistance in driving out the Zunghar Mongols from Lhasa. When the Qing empire withdrew its troops and left Tibet in the hands of Tibetans instead, the leader of the Qinghai Khoshud Mongols, Lobjang Danjin, challenged the Qing empire in Qinghai. Naoto makes use of contemporary Manchu sources, a special strength of Japanese scholarship on Tibetan history. One of the more revealing elements of these documents is that they make clear that Tibet was considered a separate country outside the borders of the Qing empire, even according to a 1722 high-level Qing secret memorial. Moreover, the Qing were quite eager for the Seventh Dalai Lama to take control of Tibet, which would have restored the tradition of religious rule the Fifth Dalai Lama had established earlier. The Tanguts referred to in these documents are the Amdo Tibetans, who were thought of as a distinct people from the Central Tibetans. The Khoshud and Tangut uprising against the Qing was to have epoch-changing consequences for Amdo; most of its territory, and large portions of Kham as well, that had been under the sway of the Khoshud Mongols came under the influence of the Qing court by 1724.
The rebellion instigated by Lobjang Danjin in 1723 (Yongzheng 1) in Qinghai (Köke naghur/Kokonor) was, as already noted by Luciano Petech who described it as “the most important turning point in the history of Qinghai,”1 an event that exerted no small influence on the history of Mongolia and Tibet and even on the Qing dynasty’s rule of foreign peoples. On the basis of Qing historical sources such as the first part of the Qinding pingding zhunge’er fanglüe (Authorized Military Record of the Subjugation of the Zunghar; abbreviated below: Subjugation of the Zunghar) and the Huangchao fanbu yaolüe (Summary Exposition of Frontier Parts of the Present Dynasty), Tibetan historical sources and missionary records, Petech published a study of Tibet’s relations with China and Mongolia2 in which he touched on this rebellion.3 Then, availing himself of the Da Qing Shizong jingtian changyun jianzhong biaozheng wenwu yingming kuanren xinyi daxiao zhicheng Xian huangdi shilu (abbreviated below: Shizong shilu [Veritable Records of Shizong]; records of other reigns follow this example) and other Chinese historical materials, Satō Hisashi clarified many points that had remained unclear in Petech’s study and, carefully comparing the place names and so forth appearing in the Neifuyutu (Palace Treasury Map) of the Gengwulong era with other accounts, made a comprehensive study of this rebellion.4
The results of the above two detailed studies made a considerable contribution towards elucidating the relations obtaining between the Qing on the one hand and Qinghai and Tibet on the other during the first half of the eighteenth century, a subject that had hitherto constituted a blank in the study of this period. The reason that we have nevertheless undertaken to write the present paper is that there has since appeared some new historical material.
In 1971 a collection of material entitled Nian Gengyao zouzhe (Confidential Memorials of Nian Gengyao) was published by the National Palace Museum (Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan) in Taipei. It contains the confidential memorials presented to the throne by Nian Gengyao, who in his capacity as governor-general (zongdu) of Sichuan and Shaanxi and general-in-chief for the pacification of distant lands (fuyuan dajiangzhun) was the supreme commander on the Chinese side responsible for the suppression of Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion and subsequent countermeasures, as well as Yongzheng’s instructions in reply to these memorials, correspondence between Nian Gengyao and his subordinates, and other documents. In particular, the 333 documents that have been photographically reproduced in their original form in volumes 1 and 2 date from the period between the first month of Yongzheng 1 and fourth month of Yongzheng 3, which corresponds to the time when Nian Gengyao was dealing with matters relating to Qinghai and Tibet, culminating in Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion, and they may be described as historical sources of the first order for acquainting oneself with details of this rebellion. Since we have elsewhere already given a review of the content of this collection of material,5 we do not wish to repeat ourselves here. It may, however, be noted that although Satō utilized the Chinese-language documents contained in this collection,6 to date use has not yet been made of the Manchu documents, which account for the greater part of the collection.
In addition to the above material, the confidential memorials of Chinese government officials other than Nian Gengyao who were involved with Qinghai at the time are also preserved at the Palace Museum in Taipei and are to be found, together with those of Nian Gengyao, in a photographically reproduced collection of material published by the Palace Museum under the title of Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe (Confidential Memorials of Yongzheng’s Reign Among the Documents of the Palace Museum).7
Our aim in the present paper is to reexamine Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion on the basis of the many new facts that have come to light in these sources which have now become available. (The spelling of Mongolian and Tibetan names generally follows that given in Fuheng’s 1750 Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi [Authorized Polyglot Dictionary of the Western Regions].)
I
With the accession to the throne of Yongzheng following the death of Kangxi there arose the question of whether to withdraw the Chinese troops stationed in Tibet. In 1717 (Kangxi 57) Cewang Arabtan (Tsewang Rapten), the leader of the Zunghars (Jünghar), had sent his elder cousin Cering Dondub (Tsering Döndrup) to kill Lajang Qaghan of the Khoshuds (Qoshuud), who was the de facto “king” of Tibet.8 At the request of Khoshuds residing in Qinghai, the Chinese had dispatched troops9 and, after having routed Cering Dondub’s forces,10 they had kept stationed in Lhasa for more than two years as many as 3,000 troops, including 500 Chahar troops and 1,200 Green Bannermen from Sichuan, on the grounds that “although Tibet has already been subjugated, it is of great urgency and importance to keep troops stationed there.”11 On the second of the first month, Yongzheng 1, Yansin (Yanxin), acting general-in-chief for the pacification of distant lands, and Nian Gengyao, governor-general of Sichuan and Shaanxi, submitted the following memorial to the emperor:
As a result of our investigations, we have found that in the past [Chinese] soldiers have never set foot in Tibet. Some years ago, on account of Cewang Arabtan’s having sent troops and raised a disturbance [there], the previous Emperor (Kangxi) dispatched officers and men for the enhancement of Imperial authority, and they entered [Tibet] from two routes for the purpose of subduing the rebels, whereupon the latter met with a crushing defeat and fled to far distant regions. When I, Yansin, led my troops into Tibet some years ago, the previous Emperor gave me instructions to the effect that “when you have advanced with your forces into Tibet and pacified it, in the event that the Dalai Lama and the people of Qinghai do not ask your forces to remain, it would be splendid if you could withdraw all your forces.” Later, after we had pacified the land of Tibet, the living Buddhas (qubilghan) and Tanguts all requested that the forces remain for a short time to watch over them, and so we kept our troops stationed there. Considering the matter now, it appears inconceivable that the rebels will again enter Tibet. There have been difficulties involved in stationing troops for more than two years in order to guard [Tibet] and in transporting rice to a locality situated several thousand li [from Inner China], and it also requires considerable levies on grain crops. At present, even though we do attempt to purchase [grain] here and distribute it among the troops, the prices of grain and so forth are gradually rising because Tibet is a small country. In addition, our troops are suffering from having been outside the borders [of China] for a long period of time, and the Tangut soldiers and people also desire the affair to be brought to a conclusion. Not only that, but if we keep the troops in such a remote region for any length of time, it is impossible to anticipate what they will end up doing. However, the Dalai Lama is still young in years and has been instated only recently, nor is there anyone in Tibet to administer all the affairs of state. If [state affairs] are not dealt with in such a manner as to appease the minds [of the Tanguts], this will run contrary to the previous emperor’s desire for “extreme benevolence in pacifying distant lands.” In our humble opinion it would be advisable to have the Dalai Lama, numerous local abbots (qambu / khenpo) and the leaders of the Tibetan people elect someone who is trusted and serious-minded and has the trust of the Tanguts to attend to all the affairs of state in the capacity of majordomo (depa) of Tibet. Since this majordomo will not be someone who has been appointed [by the Chinese], if it should later turn out that he is incompetent, it will not prove difficult to immediately replace him. In the fourth to fifth months of the first year of the Yongzheng era and by the time the new grass has sprouted we intend withdrawing the troops at present stationed in Tibet, the Mongolian troops via the Murui-usu route and the Manchu and Green Banner troops via the Barkham route. In addition, we shall station one thousand Green Bannermen from Sichuan in Chamdo for a short period, under the supervision of an able vice-commander (fujiang) whom we shall choose, in order to protect the land of Tibet. We shall also inform the Dalai Lama of Your Majesty’s thoughts of compassion towards the Tanguts and have the Tanguts set up courier stations along the route from Lhasa to Chamdo in preparation for sending reports relating to military secrets. We shall have the Dalai Lama understand that, in the event of the rebels reentering Tibet, they should promptly report the matter to Chamdo, whereupon we will be able to immediately lead troops to their relief. In this manner we will be able to always keep the Dalai Lama under our protection and also win the hearts of the Tanguts. It will also lead to a considerable saving in grain levies. Once Cewang Arabtan has sent an envoy to receive punishment and has truly submitted [to our country], then we shall withdraw all government forces stationed in Chamdo. But [these matters] are military secrets, and it is extremely important that they be interconnected. After we have received Your instructions as to whether or not they ought to be dealt with in this manner, we intend writing another confidential memorial and reporting to Your Majesty. It was for this reason that we have respectfully submitted this as a secret memorial. We await Your Majesty’s orders.12
The Dalai Lama in question, namely the seventh Dalai Lama Kelzang Gyatso, had been installed following the Chinese subjugation of Cering Dondub. The course of events leading to his instatement has been dealt with in detail by Petech,13 and we rely heavily on his account. This Dalai Lama had the support and assistance of Dashi Baghatur, the paramount chief of Qinghai (and tenth and youngest son of Gushri Qaghan, progenitor of the Qinghai Khoshuds), his son Lobjang Danjin, and dayiching qoshuuchi Chaghan Danjin, a man of considerable influence among the tribes.14 After the defeat of Cering Dondub, the Chinese saw no problems in installing this Kelzang Gyatso as Dalai Lama, but they did have reservations about placing the control of Tibet in the hands of the Khoshuds, and so they established an administrative body composed of six members, two each from the Khalkhas, the Tibetans and the Khoshuds.15 The two members from the Khoshuds were Lobjang Danjin and Abuu (son of Qoroli, the eldest son of Bayan Abughai Ayushi, in turn the fourth son of Gushri Qaghan),16 the latter an imperial brother-in-law (erfo) and residing in Alashan. But at the time in question, namely, Yongzheng 1, it was Abuu and the Khalkha Cewang Norbu (Tsewang Norbu—adopted son of Todo Erdeni, who belonged to the Khalkha left wing, Jodba)17 who remained in Tibet and were in actual control of military affairs there. Cewang Norbu, in particular, had been given the post of acting general for the pacification of the west (shulidingxi jiangzhun yinwu) by the Qing18 and, according to Nian Gengyao, he was “a grand minister in command of troops and stationed [in Tibet] in order to deal with all matters concerning Tibet, and his function is to supervise the troops.”19
As will be considered in greater detail below, it was a cause of considerable malcontent to the Qinghai Khoshuds that the withdrawal of the Chinese forces should be effected in such a manner that their control over Tibet be left unrecognized and instead control of Tibet be entrusted to the Tibetans themselves. In reply to the memorial quoted above, Yongzheng made the comment that “although your memorial is sound, I remain undecided,”20 and he summoned Nian Gengyao to Peking. As a result it was decided to withdraw the troops as proposed in the memorial,21 and the control of Tibet, including military affairs, was placed almost completely in the hands of the Tibetans themselves.22 The Mongolian troops among the Chinese forces stationed in Lhasa withdrew as planned via the Murui-usu route, namely, from the Murui-usu River through Tsaidam, and they passed through the border region between Tibet and Qinghai in about the middle of the seventh month of that year.23 According to the report submitted by commander-in-chief (dutong) Sirentu (Xiluntu), who was stationed at Chaghan Tologhai on the southeastern shores of Kokonor, the soldiers were short of arrows, gun powder and bullets, many of their tents, pots and other daily necessities were beyond repair, and their horses and livestock were emaciated and of insufficient numbers,24 and it is to be surmised that the troops were not in a very good condition after their sojourn of more than two years in Tibet. On the grounds that not only were Abuu’s troops few in number and their weapons unserviceable but Abuu himself was a descendant of Gushri Qaghan and his troops could not be deployed in Qinghai, Nian Gengyao had him leave Xining on the ninth of the tenth month for his home in Alashan.25 The Chahar troops that had been brought in by Cewang Norbu,26 on the other hand, were in a better state than those of Abuu and numbered 400; to these were added their children and servants, making a total of about 500, and of these 400 were kept at Xining under the charge of commander-in-chief Uge (Wuge), while the remaining 73 soldiers were placed under the command of Cewang Norbu and sent home via Hengcheng and Ordos on the 15th of the 10th month.27
Details of the conditions in Tibet following the withdrawal of the Chinese forces may be found in Petech’s study.28 According to a confidential memorial submitted by Nian Gengyao, a lama by the name of Tsültrim Zangpo Rapjampa,29 who arrived in Xi’an from Tibet on the ninth of the fifth month, Yongzheng 1, brought the following information:
At present there is no trouble whatsoever in Tibet. But the seal conferred [by the Qing dynasty] on the [present] Dalai Lama is smaller than that of the previous Dalai Lama. Because the Tanguts are all stupid and ignorant, they give credence to the rumor that, because the seal is small, the present Dalai Lama may be smaller than the previous Dalai Lama, and they do not appear to act promptly if one sends documents stamped with that seal. They are now saying that they will be obliged to bring out the seal conferred on the Dalai Lama during the Yüan dynasty and use that.30
In response this report Nian Gengyao asked that a seal a little larger than that of the Northern Yüan be made. Tsültrim Zangpo further stated that
the present Dalai Lama is a fine person with a lucid mind. The Tanguts all want the present Dalai Lama to administer the affairs of state. But the Dalai Lama says that, because he has taken the tonsure, he can on no account attend to state affairs.31
Nian Gengyao also did not desire the advent of a majordomo, and he maintained that it would be best for Tibet if the seventh Dalai Lama himself assumed control of government:
Rather than vice-minister (shilang) Orai (Olai) going [to Tibet] to nominate a majordomo, it would be far better if the Dalai Lama devoted himself to the affairs of state. If Your Majesty (Yongzheng) were to send the Dalai Lama a message persuading him of this matter and putting him in a mind to undertake the task, and if he were to administer the affairs of state in the manner of the fifth Dalai Lama, the Tanguts would obey him and it would greatly benefit political affairs.…32
It is thus evident that, following the withdrawal of the Chinese forces, there was clearly some bewilderment within Tibet, and the Chinese were at this point also undecided in regard to their future policy towards Tibet.
II
In the tenth month of Kangxi 61 (1722) the princes (taiji) of Qinghai held a conference at which they ostensibly pledged to halt brigandage, not to shelter fugitives, and to consolidate mutual relations.33 But after the conference they secretly reached the following agreement:
From the time of our grandfathers up until the present we have together acted in accordance with the orders of Amughulang Khaghan (Kangxi) of the Qing dynasty. But when we consider the matter in recent times, it has brought us no benefit whatsoever. Because Lajang Khaghan’s own conduct was wrong, he was killed by Cewang Arabtan and Tibet was occupied. Our soldiers advanced together with the Chinese, routed Cering Dondub, and requested the instatement of the Dalai Lama. There was earlier an instruction from Amughulang Khaghan to the effect that “once you have taken Tibet, appoint a khaghan from amongst yourselves.” But since then, despite our attempts to appoint a khaghan from amongst ourselves, we have had no communication on this matter even though three or four years have elapsed. There is probably no longer any hope of our being able to appoint a khaghan. From the time of our grandfathers up until the present we have been on friendly terms with the Zunghars. But because Lajang Khaghan acted wrongly, they became our enemies. But of what concern to us [is the Lajang Khaghan incident]? Now, during the twelfth month, let each taiji promptly send someone to Cewang Arabtan and have him speak there as follows: “[The Zunghars and Khoshuds] have been friendly with one another since the time of their grandfathers, and this friendly relationship exists still today. Henceforth let us act of one heart and one mind. If we continue to follow Amughulang Khaghan, there will again be no advantage to us.” Let us quickly send people to advise [Cewang Arabtan] of these matters. [The Khoshud taiji] deliberated and pledged themselves in this manner.34
This information had been obtained by Cewang Norbu while in Tibet from elder clan cousins living in Qinghai, and on the second of the fourth month, Yongzheng 1, it was passed on to Gao Qizhuo, governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, who then reported it to the emperor on the fifth day of the same month. This does not appear to have been the first such anti-Chinese assembly, for the same report went on to state:
Noyan and others of Kokonor are now seeking to join forces with Cewang Arabtan, but it seems to us (Cewang Norbu’s elder clan cousins) that Noyan and others of Kokonor have in the past held repeated meetings and made pledges, yet their words have still not been implemented and have all been suspended. Although repeated consultations have been held in the past, they have all been discontinued.…35
After obtaining this information, Gao Qizhuo strengthened the defenses along the principal roads leading into Tibet and contacted those concerned.
Lobjang Danjin sent a person by the name of Durai Jayisang to Cewang Arabtan,36 and it was not only Lobjang Danjin who sent a messenger to Cewang Arabtan; Chaghan Danjin also dispatched a person by the name of Bayartu Qoshu-uchi to Zunghar on the tenth of the second month, Yongzheng 1,37 and he reached Cewang Arabtan’s place of residence on the twenty-sixth day of the fourth month.38
As was noted earlier, not only Nian Gengyao but also Yongzheng had no intentions whatsoever of placing the control of Tibet in the hands of the Qinghai Khoshuds. This was partly because of Tibetan opposition to any such measure,39 but also because the Chinese feared any expansion of the Qinghai Khoshuds and the possibility of their uniting with the Zunghars. But the Qinghai side had faith in the promise (quoted above) made by Kangxi, namely, “Once you have taken Tibet, appoint a khaghan from amongst yourselves,” and they expected it to be fulfilled. These expectations were only natural for the Khoshuds, who had ruled Tibet since the time of their progenitor, Gushri Khaghan, and it was the breach of this promise that was to become a major factor in Lobjang Danjin s subsequent anti-Chinese actions, a fact of which the Chinese were also fully aware.40
It was in such circumstances that on the 12th of the 1st month, Yongzheng 1, Yongzheng gave instructions that consultations be held concerning rewards for the Khoshud taiji of Qinghai who had participated in the subjugation of Cering Dondub in Tibet and that a report be submitted to the throne.41 The results of the deliberations of the princes and grand ministers to whom this task was assigned are given below.42 In the case of beise Danjung (Tensung), who had died prior to the bestowment of these rewards, he was posthumously conferred the title of commandery prince, with the emperor sending an envoy to perform a memorial service in his honor, and granted 200 taels of silver in recognition of his services43 during the advance into Tibet.44
REWARDS GRANTED TO QINGHAI TAIJI IN YONGZHENG 1
Imperial Prince (qinwang) Lobjang Danjin
→ 200 taels of silver and 5 pieces of satin
Commandery Prince (junwang) dayiching qoshuuchi Chaghan Danjin
→ title of imperial prince
Beile (beiluo) Erdeni Erke Toghtonai
→ title of commandery prince
Beise (beizi) Baljur Arabtan
→ title of beile
Beise mergen dayiching Lachab
→ title of beile
Bulwark Duke (fuguogong) Galdan Dashi
→ title of defender duke (zhenguo gong)
Bulwark Duke Dondub Dashi
→ title of defender duke
Chuyiragh Nomchi
→ title of beile
Beile Arabtan Ombu
→ 100 taels of silver
Duke (gong) Norbu Püngchugh
→ 50 taels of silver
Beise Danjung
→ posthumous title of commandery prince and 200 taels of silver (Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 4, 32b–33b)
The two figures to wield influence at this time in Qinghai were Lobjang Danjin and Chaghan Danjin.45 Following the death of his father Dashi Bātur,46 Lobjang had become paramount chieftain, and being the only person in Qinghai to have been conferred the title of “imperial prince” by the Qing dynasty,47 he was, as it were, the head of the Qinghai Khoshuds. Chaghan, on the other hand, had considerable influence among the tribes and also had strong connections with Tibet, and one of the reasons for his being conferred the title of imperial prince in the above list of awards was doubtless that the Chinese wished to prevent power being concentrated in the hands of Lobjang. But there then arose a question concerning the territory that had formerly been under the jurisdiction of the late Danjung, who had been posthumously conferred the title of commandery prince.
According to a secret memorial dated the ninth of the fifth month, Yongzheng 1, and submitted by Yue Zhongqi, provincial military commander (tidu) of Sichuan, he had left Chengdu on the twenty-fourth of the fourth month of that year under orders from Nian Gengyao48 and had reached Songpan to the north of Chengdu and near the border between Shaanxi province and Qinghai on the fourth of the fifth month.49 There he had received the following report from squad leader (bazong) Tang Yimei, whom he had sent to gather intelligence from across the border:
Danjung’s wife has already been taken away by Chaghan Danjin, and because Danjung’s concubine had not been on friendly terms with his wife, she is still in the region of Dzongkhar where they had originally been grazing their livestock. In this tribal domain there are those who have followed after Chaghan Danjin and those who remain in Dzongkhar.50
Danjung and Chaghan Danjin were both descended from Ilduchi, the fifth son of Gushri Khaghan, and Danjung was the son of Chaghan’s younger brother Gender. Chaghan’s inheritance of the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of Danjung, his nephew, was “recognized” by Yongzheng in the sixth month of Yongzheng 1,51 but it had in fact already been “occupied” by Chaghan.52 In addition, as is suggested by the above report, there existed deep-rooted animosities inside Danjung’s former territory, and the situation required prompt action.53
As regards the size of the territory in question, it is described in Yue Zhongqi’s report to Nian Gengyao in the eighth month of Yongzheng 1 in the following terms:
According to the register drawn up by Chaghan Danjin, Danjung’s domain was of no more than 900 households. But according to a register secretly sent [to the Chinese] by a former jayisang of Danjung, it comprised 2,560 households. Furthermore, this figure does not include Tanguts. I (Yue Zhongqi) have always known that Danjung’s was a powerful domain in Kokonor, and the jayisang’s register is certain to be true.54
This “arbitrary”55 action on the part of Chaghan did not make a good impression on Nian Gengyao, Yue Zhongqi and other Chinese government officials involved with Qinghai,56 and it also appears to have been regarded as impermissible by the taiji of Qinghai. For example, mergen dayiching Lachab, the son of Chaghan’s elder brother Mergen Noyan, denounced Caghan’s exclusive possession of the territory in question, took some of Danjung’s former retainers into his own fold, and reported the matter to Lobjang Danjin.57
For Lobjang, Chaghan’s action represented an expansion of the latter’s sphere of influence58 and was a serious matter that could lead to the decline of his own influence among the tribes and, in the words of Lobjang himself, had to be “dealt with squarely”59 by him in his capacity as paramount chieftain of Qinghai. Yet, in spite of these circumstances, Yongzheng continued to support Chaghan.60 This was the result of Yongzheng’s consultations with imperial prince Yi, Longkodo (Longgeduo), Rashi (Lashi) and other brains in his administration.61 The reasons for this stand were that, as has already been noted, they feared power being concentrated in the hands of Lobjang Danjin and also that, if Chaghan’s dominium was not recognized, there was a strong possibility that he would resort to drastic measures.62
As a result of these Chinese policies towards the Khoshuds, ranging from the decision on rewards to the question of Danjung’s former territory, animosities among the taiji in Qinghai began to surface. As was pointed out earlier, the Qinghai Khoshuds, especially their leader Lobjang Danjin and those associated with him, had been greatly disappointed at the breach on the part of the Chinese of their “promise,” and because of their contacts with the Zunghars they were apprehensive about information being leaked from within the tribes to the Chinese side.63 Then, towards the end of the fifth month of Yongzheng 1, Lobjang took action to rid the tribes of those forces hindering their unification.
III
First of all, Lobjang Danjin attacked Erdeni Erke Toghtonai (Erteni Erkhe Toktoné),64 Sonom Dashi (Sönam Trashi),65 and Galdan Dashi (Ganden Trashi).66 In the aforementioned rewards Erdeni Erke Toghtonai had been conferred the title of “commandery prince,” and this appears to have rankled Lobjang Danjin, for there is a record stating that he attempted to divest him of this title.67
According to one of Nian Gengyao’s confidential memorials, dated the sixth of the sixth month, Yongzheng 1, Nian Gengyao had received the following report from left vice-minister (zuoshilang) Cangsheo (Changshou) of the ministry of war, who had been involved in the negotiations with Qinghai taking place at Xining:
Lobjang Danjin’s troops have appeared and will attack Erdeni Erke. We should dispatch troops and you yourself ought to go to Xining.68
In response to this Nian Gengyao decided to write a letter in Mongolian and send it to Erdeni Erke:
… I understand that some of your brothers are sending troops to attack you. Be well prepared. At present I am having the troops of our country gather provisions and fodder along the border. Even if their troops should come, be sure to defend yourselves. Have no fear. Our large forces will immediately go to your assistance.69
But Yongzheng made the following comment on this:
It stands to reason, and in the event of any trouble it will be advisable to act accordingly, for otherwise it will impair China’s reputation and make the hearts of those in the outer provinces [of Mongolia, Tibet and Qinghai] turn cold [towards us].70
The reason for this comment by Yongzheng was that Nian Gengyao had no intentions of dispatching troops to the relief of Erdeni Erke, for he was advocating a policy of nonintervention in the internal strife among the Qinghai Khoshuds.
The people of Qinghai are all descendants of Gushri Khaghan, and if they should now forget their great indebtedness to our country and kill their own flesh and blood, it is of no concern whatsoever to us, and if Lobjang Danjin is really able to eradicate Erdeni Erke, let them reduce by themselves their own strength as they please.…71
This standpoint of his was also influenced by the following practical considerations:
Even though one may maintain that we must always protect those who have looked towards us, it is at present just the time when grass has sprouted on the steppes of Mongolia and the horses are well-fed, and if we were to raise troops now and set off to attack them, we would only waste the strength of our own forces when they fled far off into the distance on their well-fed horses.72
Yongzheng’s comments on this view were:
If Erdeni Erke should seek to enter [Inner China], let him enter and protect him. Otherwise it will later lead to error in the path of pacifying distant lands and showing kindness to foreigners. Erdeni Erke [and others] are on our side and most deserving of our pity. If we now let them [into Inner China], they will be of assistance at a later date.73 ([…] added by a later hand)
He further gave orders that they be protected, and this policy was subsequently to become the basic stance of the Qing dynasty, proving to be extremely effective. In the form of a “decree from the Yongzheng Emperor”74 and with some degree of intimidation Nian Gengyao then conveyed to Lobjang Danjin that he wished to have the reasons for the latter’s actions explained.
But before that could be done Erdeni Erke was defeated by Lobjang Danjin75 and made good his escape to Ganzhou via Suyoukou.76 Sonom Dashi was taken prisoner because his elder brother Dondub Dashi informed Lobjang Danjin that “Sonom Dashi is an ally of China,”77 and he was held in custody by Dondub Dashi. But with the assistance of his retainers he later escaped on the fifteenth of the tenth month and, with more than 300 followers, went to Jiayuguan,78 from where he dispatched a messenger by the name of Metechi Jayisang to seek protection from the Chinese garrison at Bulunggir.79 As in the case of Erdeni Erke, the Chinese granted him generous protection.80 Galdan Dashi, on the other hand, was attacked by Arabtan Ombu (Rapten Wönpo) and others and fled to seek protection in Ganzhou, where he was made to reside together with Erdeni Erke.81
To date there have come to light no new historical sources describing the details of Lobjang Danjin’s movements from the time after his attack on Erdeni Erke until the end of the eighth month, but the course of events was probably as outlined by Satō Hisashi,82 with Yongzheng sending Cangsheo and others to Lobjang in an attempt to bring this incident to a peaceful conclusion.83 But in actual fact movements running directly counter to this were under way throughout Kham (Xikang). A letter of censure in Tibetan, dated “eighth of seventh month, guimao (Yongzheng 1),” was sent to the eight leaders of Kham who had neglected to visit Nian Gengyao by a functionary named Dzung Ren, who exercised jurisdiction over the “Manchurian Emperor’s territories of Barkham and so forth.” This letter contains the following passage:
… If you do not come [to pay your respects], it will mean that you have turned against the Great Lord (Yongzheng). I will see to it that you are punished in accordance with the law. On no account will I forgive you [your offense].…84
The bewildered leaders contacted Lobjang Danjin, who had general control over them, in Qinghai. Although not directly from Lobjang himself, a charge was later made by his mother against the Chinese for this action, which was denounced as an unwarranted action against “our people” and the possibility of an insurrection by the Tibetans was also hinted at.85 The fact that such an incident occurred within Qinghai at this time when the Chinese forces were withdrawing from Tibet would suggest that the Chinese were exerting a form of pressure on Qinghai.
According to the report submitted by the messenger Cangsheo, Lobjang Danjin told him that he had resorted to the course of action that he had taken because Erdeni Erke Toghtonai and Chaghan Danjin had attempted to occupy Tibet and had made a false charge to the Chinese accusing him of allying with the Zunghars and seeking to instigate a rebellion, and it was now only a question of time before he would attack Chaghan.86 Chaghan, on the other hand, asserted that Lobjang had assembled the taiji of Qinghai at Bar Tologhai and intended taking possession of Tibet and Qinghai, while the Mongolians stated that Lobjang was having people call him Dalai qong tayiji and had forbidden the taiji to use the titles conferred on them by the Chinese, demanding that they instead use their former titles.87
IV
As was noted earlier, Chaghan Danjin’s “inheritance” of Danjung’s former territory was “recognized” by Yongzheng shortly after Lobjang Danjin’s attack on Erdeni Erke Toghtonai, and in order to dispose of the formalities of the matter Yongzheng sent Danai, imperial guardsman first class of the Qian-Qing Gate (Qian-Qingmen toudeng shiwei), to Chaghan.88 That the Chinese should have taken such an action, which would incite Lobjang at a tense time just when he was moving to rid the tribes of any pro-Chinese elements, was based on their understanding that Chaghan’s forces would be quite capable of resisting Lobjang’s attacks,89 and it was also, as already mentioned, probably because there was a need to prevent power in Qinghai being concentrated in the hands of Lobjang. But Chaghan’s appropriation of Danjung’s former territory provided Lobjang with a perfect excuse for attacking him.
Danai arrived back in Xi’an on the twenty-third of the eighth month, Yongzheng 1,90 after having seen to the formalities of Chaghan’s inheritance of Danjung’s former territory, and on the same day Cangsheo received the following report from Yue Chaolong, acting vice-commander of Hezhou:
Prince Chaghan Danjin has sent someone to say, “We were unable to check Lobjang Danjin’s first assault. If we are unable to check his second attack, we wish to cross the border into China.”91
This first attack on Chaghan Danjin by Lobjang Danjin took place on the seventeenth of the eighth month.92 Chaghan proved to be no match for Lobjang and was routed, fleeing through Laoyaguan into Hezhou.93 Nian Gengyao’s reaction to this was as follows, but it was already too late to do anything.
The disposition of the Mongolians is such that they are afraid of those who are powerful, and this is not at all surprising. But Chaghan Danjin’s domain is known for its strength, and it ought not to be easily defeated. The reason for this outcome was perhaps that the messenger sent by Lobjang Danjin had returned from Cewang Arabtan, but he did not allow him to meet anyone and instead fabricated a false report, misled people, and intimidated them.…94
Lobjang Danjin then attacked a garrison of the Chinese army near Xining, but was put to rout. Once the taiji of Qinghai realized that the Zunghar reinforcements on whom they had been counting would not be coming, they gradually dissociated themselves from Lobjang and were won over by the Chinese, who then went on to suppress this rebellion within a short span of time, while Lobjang fled to the Zunghar Cewang Arabtan.95
Although it is true that Lobjang Danjin had hoped to unify Qinghai and bring Tibet under his control, it was partly out of considerations of defense against the Zunghars that the Chinese should have dealt with a confrontation within Qinghai—namely, the conflict between the Lobjang faction and Erdeni Erke Toghtonai (who was pro-Qing), Chaghan Danjin (who stood intertribally opposed to Lobjang) and others—as an act of hostility against the Qing dynasty, and therefore a rebellion, and should have taken immediate measures to suppress it.96 The reasons for Lobjang’s having acted as he did may be inferred from the following letter sent by Nian Gengyao to Lobjang when the latter attacked Chaghan Danjin.
When you earlier attacked Erdeni Erke Toghtonai and people said that you had turned traitor, I took no heed since you have received great favors from successive emperors, and so how could you turn traitor? When vice-minister Cangsheo went with an imperial decree to mediate between you, you did not obey the decree, nor did you recognize your wrong and submit a memorial to the emperor, and not only that, but you also said that you wished to acquire the title of khaghan and that you wished to be given Tibet and placed in charge of all the land of Tibet and Qinghai and to act as dalai bātur, and you would not be satisfied unless we took Erdeni Erke Toghtonai’s title and gave it to you. Furthermore, your statement “After having decided the matter with Chaghan Danjin, I will myself go to Jingcheng (Peking) or else send someone to submit a memorial on the reasons [for my action] to the emperor” was a serious violation of the law. The land of Tibet was originally a place, which your grandfather Gushri Khaghan established by spreading the way of the law. In the decree issued by the Emperor Shengzu Ren (Kangxi) it is quite clear that “when the business [of expelling the Zunghar Cering Dondub from Tibet] has been concluded, everything will be restored to its original state.” Not once have we said that [our Chinese army] will occupy and take possession of Tibet. In fact when Cewang Arabtan sent troops to kill your [Khoshud] Lajang and occupy Tibet, because you were totally incapable of revenging yourselves and reestablishing Tibet, His Majesty (Kangxi) dispatched a large army, spent tens of millions of taels, and defeated the rebels, took Tibet and installed the Dalai Lama. The laws established by your grandfather were once again disseminated. In spite of the fact that at the moment the matter has not yet been brought to a conclusion, can you say that you now want to retrieve Tibet immediately? The [Khalkha] duke Cewang Norbu is a grand minister in command of troops and stationed [in Tibet] in order to deal with all matters concerning Tibet, and his function is to supervise the troops. What has [this] got to do with your wrath? You do not make zealous efforts like your ancestors and are still dissatisfied even though we allow you to inherit [the title of] imperial prince and make you paramount chieftain of Qinghai saying that you want to assume the title of khaghan. Erdeni Erke Toghtonai is a commandery prince appointed by the emperor, and it was quite outrageous and the height of presumption for you to arbitrarily attack him, even though he is quite innocent, and to say that you want us to deprive him of his title and give it to you.… Under no circumstances will we grant you the title of dalai qong tayiji. If at that time you again wish to be appointed paramount chieftain of Qinghai and imperial prince, it will be too late.
It was, in other words, not possible for Nian Gengyao to nullify Kangxi’s decree, and the only grounds he had for questioning the justifiableness of Lobjang Danjin’s conduct aiming at the unification of Qinghai and the control of Tibet was that “at the moment the matter has not yet been brought to a conclusion.” But Nian Gengyao’s basic attitude towards Qinghai was:
Lobjang Danjin should himself come forward in supplication, for since all [of Qinghai] has already become liege to His Majesty, it all belongs to His Majesty regardless of whether [the Chinese] should take your territory or not.…97
Yongzheng was also in agreement with this view.98 This was diametrically opposed to Lobjang’s understanding (of which the Chinese were of course fully cognizant), which regarded the Khoshud control of not only Qinghai but also Tibet as quite proper ever since the time of Gushri Khaghan.
CONCLUSION
The reason for Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion has been described by Petech in the following terms:
One of the causes of the revolt was Lobjang Danjin’s frustrated ambition to be placed in some form at the head of the Tibetan government. His rash and badly prepared rebellion meant the final break with his former associate Caghan Danjin, who remained loyal.99
In addition to this, Satō Hisashi has noted that the rewards given to Lobjang Danjin for his military services in Tibet were scanty100 and that he aspired to becoming the ruler of Qinghai and Tibet.101
These reasons are all convincing, but they fail to provide any positive explanation as to why Lobjang Danjin should have on the one hand been so desirous of controlling Tibet and on the other hand taken action to oust Chaghan Danjin and other forces opposed to him among the Khoshuds at this particular point in time.
In the present paper I have reexamined these issues on the basis of original historical sources from the Chinese side such as the Nian Gengyao zouzhe, only recently made available, and within the context of major political changes accompanying the death of Kangxi and Yongzheng’s accession to the throne. An underlying factor in the reasons for Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion was, namely, the fact that, on the occasion of the subjugation of Cering Dondub in Tibet, Kangxi had promised to entrust the control of Tibet to the Qinghai Khoshuds and that their leader Lobjang and other taiji of Qinghai were expecting this promise to be fulfilled. But even after the pacification of Tibet this promise was not acted upon, and in Qinghai the taiji held repeated meetings where he suggested that they dissociate themselves from the Chinese and join forces with the Zunghar Cewang Arabtan. It was at such a time that Kangxi died and Yongzheng ascended the throne, and although the taiji of Qinghai were rewarded for their earlier services rendered during the advance into Tibet, Khoshud control over Tibet was not recognized and the rewards consisted mainly of conferral of relatively high titles on the pro-Chinese faction within the tribes. In addition, with this change in emperors Yinti (fourteenth son of Kangxi), who had been in charge of military affairs in this region, including the subjugation of Cering Dondub, was summoned to Peking102 and an almost total withdrawal from Tibet was decided upon. At the same time a tense situation developed within Qinghai when Chaghan Danjin, whose influence among the tribes rivaled that of Lobjang, appropriated beile prince Danjung’s former territory. Because Lobjang now made actual moves to unify the tribes, Yongzheng, fearful of an alliance with the Zunghars, not only endorsed Chaghan’s action but also recognized his inheritance of Danjung’s former territory. Lobjang and his followers, objecting to these developments, made a raid on Chaghan and eventually attacked a Chinese garrison. The main causes behind Lobjang Danjin’s rebellion were, in other words, a major change in the situation brought about by Yongzheng’s accession to the throne and the active political intervention in Qinghai on the part of the Chinese as evidenced in their bestowment of rewards and treatment of Chaghan.103
1. Luciano Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” T’oung Pao 52, no. 4–5 (1966): 276–292.
2. Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, T’oung Pao, Monographie I (Leiden: Brill, 1972).
3. Petech, History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, 95–98; Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 288–289.
4. Satō Hisashi, “Robuzan Danjin no hanran ni tsuite” [On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion], Shirin 55, no. 6 (Kyoto: Shigaku Kenkyūkai, 1972).
5. Katō Naoto, “Kokuritsu Kokyū Hakubutsuin hen Nen Kōgyō sōshō” [Confidential Memorials of Nian Gengyao, National Palace Museum], Tōyō Gakuhō 60, no. 3–4 (1979).
6. Satō, “On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion,” 32, and “Postscript.”
7. On this collection of material there have appeared reviews by Kanda Nobuo, “Kyūcyūtō yōseicyō sōshyō” [Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period], Tōyō Gakuhō 60, no. 1–2 (1978) and Saeki Tomi, “Kyūcyūtō yōseicyō sōshyō” [Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period], Tōyōshi Kenkyū 37, no. 3 (1978).
8. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 278, xinsi, 4th month, Kangxi 57; Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 227; Petech, History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, 30–37.
9. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 289, gengxu, 10th month, Kangxi 59.
10. Veritable Records of Shengzu., fasc. 289, xinyou, 10th month, Kangxi 59. After their entry into Tibet, Cering Dondub’s troops had been considerably reduced in numbers through illness and other causes (Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 277, yihai, 1st month, Kangxi 57), and it has been suggested that Cering himself died in Tibet (Eva S. Kraft, Zum Dsungarenkrieg im 18. Jahrhunder: Berichte des Generals Funingga, aus einer mandschurischen Handschrift übers und an Hand der chinesischen Akten erlaütert [On the Zunghar War in the 18th Century: Explanations of General Funingga’s Reports in Manchu Handwriting.…] [Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1953], 83). There is much concerning Tibet during its occupation by Cering Dondub that has hitherto remained unclear, but recently Morikawa Tetsuo has been studying the subject primarily on the basis of new historical material (Tetsuo Morikawa, “On the Documents of the Kangxi Period of Köke Qota-yin Tümed Qosigu [The Tümed Banner of Köke Khota],” in Proceedings of the Fifth East Asian Altaistic Conference, December 26, 1979–January 2, 1980, Taipei, China, ed. East Asian Altaistic Conference and Chiehhsien Ch’en [Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1980], 131–139).
11. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 291, jiwei, 2nd month, Kangxi 60.
12. Manchu confidential memorial from Yansin and Nian Gengyao dated 2nd of 1st month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed. Nian Gengyao zouzhe [Nian Gengyao’s Memorials], vol. 1 [Taipei: Taipei National Palace Museum, 1977], 63–67).
13. Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 266–281.
14. Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 281–287.
15. Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 287–289.
16. Fuheng, Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi [Authorized Polyglot Dictionary of the Western Regions] 1750, fasc. 17; Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 288.
17. Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 287.
18. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 294, jiawu, 9th month, Kangxi 60.
19. Manchu letter from Nian Gengyao to Lobjang Danjin dated 11th of 9th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 723–728).
20. Manchu comments by the emperor on the confidential memorial given in n. 12 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 67).
21. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 5, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc. 11, jiachen, 3rd month, Yongzheng 1.
22. See n. 21; Petech, History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, 85; and Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 338.
23. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 16th of 10th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 138–141).
24. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 2nd of 7th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 95–97). In accordance with a written directive from Nian Gengyao dated 11th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 711–712), Sirentu moved from Tsaidam to Chaghan Tologhai, which was where meetings of the Qinghai taiji were usually convened. Nian Gengyao cautioned Sirentu against causing any friction there and ordered him to report not only the progress of the withdrawal of the Chinese army but also any other information he might obtain. As support, he also sent 500 musketeers (100 horse and 400 foot) from Xining to Chaghan Tologhai.
25. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 16th of 10th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 132–137); see also abstract of this memorial in Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 12, and Subjugation of Zunghar, fasc. 12, renxu, 10th month, Yongzheng 1. Petech writes that this Abuu later participated in the subjugation of Lobjang Danjin (Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 289), but this is probably a misunderstanding.
26. See the confidential memorial given in n. 25. Petech states that the troops commanded and stationed in Tibet by Cering Norbu on the occasion of the subjugation of Cering Dondub were “Qinghai Mongolian troops” (Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 287), but they were probably “Chahar troops” as stated in this memorial.
28. Cf. Petech, History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, Chapter 7 (“Tibet and the New Policy of Yongzheng”), 91–112.
29. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 11th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 80–84), Tsültrim Zangpo, who had been appointed the new lama official to Dajianlu, left Xi’an for his new post on the 20th of the same month.
30. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 24th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 86–88). The seal in question is probably that bestowed upon the new Dalai Lama by Kangxi at the time of the advance into Tibet (cf. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 285, imperial edict dated yiwei, 9th month, Kangxi 58, and deliberations and report thereon [Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 286, xinyou, 12th month, Kangxi 58]).
33. Chinese confidential memorial from Gao Qizhuo dated 5th of 4th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe [Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period], vol. 1 [Taipei: Taipei National Palace Museum, 1977], 164–168).
36. Undated Manchu confidential memorials from Nian Gengyao (judging from their content, probably sent during 2nd month, Yongzheng 2; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 673–676, 684–686).
37. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 25th of 1st month, Yongzheng 2 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 334–339). In addition, Arabtan Ombu sent Erdeni Tayiji together with Lobjang’s messenger (Manchu confidential memorial given in n. 36, Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 673–676).
38. Manchu confidential memorial given in n. 37 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 334–339).
39. Undated Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 51–52).
41. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 3, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc. 11, renchen, 1st month, Yongzheng 1.
42. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 4, yihai, 2nd month, Yongzheng 1.
43. See, for example, Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 281, entry for jiazi, 10th month, Kangxi 57.
44. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 4, yihai, 2nd month, Yongzheng 1.
45. Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 20th of 6th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 14–15).
46. He died in the second half of 1714 (cf. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 260, yichou, 9th month, Kangxi 53).
47. Veritable Records of Shengzu, fasc. 270, yimao, 12th month, Kangxi 55.
48. Two Chinese confidential memorials from Yue Zhongqi dated 24th of 4th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period, vol. 1, 205–206, 206–207).
49. Chinese confidential memorial from Yue Zhongqi dated 9th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period, vol. 1, 236–238).
51. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 8, mouchen, 6th month, Yongzheng 1.
52. A letter from vice-minister Cangsheo (Changshou to Nian Gengyao, which arrived on 13th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1, has “Chaghan Danjin has occupied Danjung’s tribal domain” (Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 14th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 8–9]), and Nian Gengyao also criticized this action.
54. Undated Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao (judging from its content, probably sent around 15th of 8th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 58). In addition, Danjung’s former territory is described as having been “extremely extensive, exceeding even the area comprising of Ningxia, Liang[zhou], the Helanshan [Mts.] to the north of Gan[zhou] and Su[zhou], and the Kundulun [River]” (undated Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 40–42]).
56. See nn. 49, 52, and 57.
57. Undated Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao (judging from its content, probably sent during 11th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 676–680). According to the account given by Yue Zhongqi when he reached Nian Gengyao on the 17th of the 6th month, Yongzheng 1, the situation in Danjung’s former territory was as follows:
The key figures handling administrative affairs in Danjung’s domain were taken away under duress by Chaghan Danjin, but now they have all fled and returned. In addition, some have gone to stay with the beile prince Lajab. The women in the service of Danjung’s two wives have also all fled. Chaghan Danjin is at present preparing to depart in one or two days with five to six hundred troops, and he is speaking falsely, saying, “Because Lobjang Danjin took all of Danjung’s domain, I will go myself to put a halt to it.” But the truth of the matter is that he is pursuing [the inhabitants of] Danjung’s domain in an attempt to kill them.… (Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 20th of 6th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 14–15]).
Allowing Chaghan Danjin to inherit Danjung’s former territory in such circumstances represented a gamble, as Nian Gengyao himself was aware (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials).
59. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 7th of 10th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 123–124); see also n. 19.
60. See Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 17th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 6–8) and the comments added by Yongzheng to the confidential memorial given in n. 52.
62. According to Cangsheo’s views as expressed in the confidential memorial given in n. 52, “If Danjung’s domain is not given to Chaghan Danjin to supervise, … then an emergency may arise at any time in Xihai, and he will seek to side with foreign norms (viz. the Zunghars) …,” and this view was to a certain degree held in common by the Chinese (cf. Chinese comments added by Yongzheng to the confidential memorial given in n. 60).
63. This is also evident from the fact that when Lobjang later attacked some tribal members, it was because they had leaked internal information to the Chinese (cf. nn. 64, 65, and 66).
64. The son of Gümbü (Mgon po), son of Gushri Qaghan’s third son, Dalantai (Waifan Menggu Huibu wanggong biaozhuan [Biographies of the Princes and Dukes of the Outer Provinces, Mongolia and the Muslim Region], fasc. 81). According to Satō, “on the occasion of Galdan’s uprising, [Gümbü] acted as guide to envoys in the Chinese operations against Cewang Arabtan and supplied provisions, fodder, camels and horses. He also took no part in the private league of the Qinghai taiji and remained loyal to the Qing dynasty” (Satō Hisashi, “Kinsei Seikai shoburaku no kigen [The Origins of the Tribal Domains of Early Modern Qinghai] [1],” Tōyōshi Kenkyū 32, no. 1 [1973/74]: 96). One reason for Lobjang Danjin’s attack on Gümbü’s son Erdeni Erke was that he had leaked internal information to the Chinese (undated Manchu edict of Yongzheng [judging from its content, probably issued in middle or towards end of 6th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 800–801]).
65. He issued from the line of Gushri Qaghan’s eighth son, Sangara, and his pasturage bordered on that of Lobjang Danjin (see Satō, “The Origins of the Tribal Domains of Early Modern Qinghai [2]”). According to Nian Gengyao, he regularly provided the Chinese with information (undated Chinese confidential memorial [annex?] from Nian Gengyao [judging from its content, probably sent during 6th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 35]). It may also be noted that his name is the same as that of Erdeni Erke’s second son.
66. He belonged to the lineage of Gushri Qaghan’s eldest son, Dayan, and lived on the southern banks of the Datong River (Zhang Mu, Menggu youmu ji [Record of the Mongol Nomads], fasc. 12). He was also attacked on the grounds that he had leaked information to the Chinese (see imperial edict given in n. 64).
67. Manchu letter to Lobjang given in n. 19.
68. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 6th of 6th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 89–94).
70. See Manchu comments added by Yongzheng to the confidential memorial given in n. 68 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 91).
73. See Manchu comments added by Yongzheng to the confidential memorial given in n. 68 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 89–90).
74. See n. 68. In his Manchu comments appended to this confidential memorial, Yongzheng wrote as follows in regard to this seemingly presumptuous action on the part of Nian Gengyao:
Your sending [of a decree to Lobjang Danjin] represents my will and its wording accords with the draft that I sent to you. I was most delighted to see it. This will be the end of the matter. But anyone other than you would not have dared to act in this manner, and anyone other than I would not be delighted in this manner. It is this that may be described as selfless service in the true sense and as the intimacy of ruler and subject like that of water and fish.…
But this was followed with a warning not to go too far:
It is Arabtan Ombu and Lobjang Danjin who are the most abominable. Do not on any account confuse the relative importance of matters.…
75. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 8, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc. 11, renxu, 6th month, Yongzheng 1.
76. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 8, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc.11, jiazi, 6th month, Yongzheng 1.
77. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 16th of 12th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 264–268).
79. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 7th of 11th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 175–176).
81. See n. 76, the imperial edict given in n. 64, and Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 19th of 1st month, Yongzheng I (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 309–311). The original sources do not tell us whether or not it was Arabtan Ombu who attacked Galdan Dashi, but we have followed the account given in the Veritable Records of Shizong (see n. 76). Arabtan Ombu was at this time on an expedition to appropriate the wife Changmar of Lajang Qaghan’s second son Surza (who had been taken prisoner at the time of the Zunghar invasion of Tibet and sent to Ili) and her pasturage (Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 11th of 11th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 178–184]), and they may have come into conflict at this time. This Changmar also appears to have been leaking information in Qinghai to the Chinese (Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 8th of 5th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 77–80]), and her pasturage was situated in the basin of the Boru Chüngkeg River (see confidential memorial given in n. 65).
82. Satō, “On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion.”
83. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 9, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc. 11, jimao, 7th month, Yongzheng 1.
84. Manchu letter from Cangsheo to Nian Gengyao dated 24th of 9th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 728–733).
86. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 10, and Subjugation of the Zunghar, fasc. 12, gengwu, 8th month, Yongzheng 1.
87. See n. 86. The title dalai qong tayiji is identical to that conferred by the fifth Dalai Lama on Dalai Baghatur Dorji, the sixth son of Gushri Qaghan, who became the representative of the taiji of Qinghai following the latter’s death (Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 267).
88. The Manchu letter from Nian Gengyao to Danai dated 20th of 6th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 718–720) represents the written directive in question, and in it Nian Gengyao advises Danai to carefully observe how Chaghan Danjin changes following his “inheritance” and warns him against conveying Yongzheng’s words of commendation immediately upon meeting with Chaghan.
89. Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 22nd of 8th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 21). Yongzheng’s dispatch of Danai took into full consideration Lobjang Danjin’s attack on Chaghan Danjin (undated Manchu imperial edict [judging from its content, probably issued towards end of 8th month or early in 9th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 788–789]).
90. Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 22nd of 8th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 103–104).
91. Undated Manchu imperial edict (according to Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 11, issued on Jichou [12th], 9th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 785–787). This edict reached Nian Gengyao on the 13th of the 9th month (Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 18th of 9th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 105–118]).
92. Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 3rd of 9th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 22). According to a comment added by Yongzheng (Manchu comment [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 288] on Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 28th of 12th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 287–291]), when Lobjang Danjin crossed the Yellow River and attempted to capture Chaghan Danjin, the reincarnated lama Chaghan Nomun Qaghan is said to have spread his robes on the ground and remonstrated with Lobjang (although the truth of this incident remains to be confirmed). The annex to the Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 19th of 1st month, Yongzheng 2 (Palace Museum Archives [Gugong Bowuyuan Wenxianguan] in Beiping, ed., Wenxian congbian [Collection of Documents], vol. 5 [Beijing: Guoli Beiping gugong bowuyuan wenxianguan, 1930]) probably represents the reply to Yongzheng’s query.
93. Manchu confidential memorial from Cangsheo deated 27th of 8th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, Secret Memorials of the Yongzheng Period, vol. 28, 614–628). In dealing with this situation, Yongzheng sent Cangsheo a letter instructing him to give Chaghan Danjin all necessary goods and assistance, and at the same time he dispatched Hūwashan (Huashan), vice-minister (shaoqing) of the court of the imperial stud (tai pusi) to give him protection (two undated Manchu imperial edicts [judging from their content, issued around 13th or 14th of 9th month, Yongzheng 1]). These two edicts were issued at about the same time; one of them (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 787–788) was directed at Nian Gengyao and Fan Shijie, acting governor (xunfu) of Xi’an, and gave instructions concerning material and financial aid for Chaghan, while the other (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 769–770) contained military directions for Nian Gengyao. The latter reached Nian Gengyao in the first watch (xu) of the 15th of the same month, and after having considered it together with an edict (see n. 91) that he had received two days earlier, he submitted a memorial (see n. 91) listing nine countermeasures. Yongzheng then suggested that Nian Gengyao help Chaghan regain his strength and use him to subjugate Lobjang, while Nian Gengyao proposed that he himself use Erdeni Erke Toghtonai’s troops, and although this proposal was not adopted (Manchu edict in reply to the confidential memorial given in n. 91 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 793–794]), it indicates that even at this stage the Chinese still had a high estimation of the influence exerted by Chaghan and Erdeni Erke in Qinghai. Subsequently the greater part of Chaghan’s forces did not gather around him in Hezhou, and because Lobjang was furthermore giving it out that he would capture Chaghan, Nian Gengyao charged Hūwashan with the task of moving 90 members of Chaghan’s kin and followers from Hezhou (which they left on the 3rd of the 11th month) to Lanzhou (which they reached on the 8th; Manchu confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao dated 11th of 11th month, Yongzheng 1 [Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 188–189]).
94. Undated Chinese confidential memorial from Nian Gengyao (judging from its content, probably sent towards end of 9th month, Yongzheng 1; Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, 56).
95. In regard to these events, see Katō Naoto, “Robusan Danjin no hanran to Shinchō—hanran no keika o chūshin to shite” [Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion and the Qing Dynasty: With a Focus on the Course of the Rebellion], Tōyōshi Kenkyū 45, no. 3 (Kyoto: Seikei Shoin, 1986) and Satō, “On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion,” 8–19.
96. See for example the imperial edict given in n. 91. In addition, Ishihama Yumiko, using the Chinese confidential memorials contained in Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 1, has made a detailed and suggestive study of this question: “Gushri Han ōke no Ghibetto ōken sōshitsu katei ni Gansuru ichi kōsatsu—Ropusan-Danjin (Blo bzang bstan ’dzin) no ‘hanran’ saikō” [A Study of the Process Whereby the Royal House of Gushri Qaghan Lost Its Sovereignty Over Tibet: A Reconsideration of Blo bzang bstan ’dzin’s “Rebellion”], Tōyō Gakuhō 69, nos. 3–4 (1988).
98. Manchu letter from Nian Gengyao to Lobjang Danjin’s mother dated 28th of 9th month, Yongzheng 1 (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 733–736).
99. Chinese comment added by Yongzheng to a “copy” of the letter given in n. 98 that had been sent to him (Taipei National Palace Museum, ed., Nian Gengyao’s Memorials, vol. 2, 736).
100. Petech, “Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century,” 289.
101. Satō, “On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion,” 20.
102. Satō, “On Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion,” 21.
103. Veritable Records of Shizong, fasc. 4, gengshen, 2nd month, Yongzheng 1.