MH/CHAOS

The Times’ source also said the CI special operations branch, one of the most clandestine units in the U.S. intelligence community, conducted domestic surveillance and the collection of domestic intelligence.¹ “That’s really the deep snow section,” one top intelligence expert, identified by the Times as a longtime CI official who had served in New Delhi for CIA, said of the unit run by Ober. Hersh later indirectly contradicted this source when he reported that Colby said the “good thing about all this was the ‘red flag’ raised by a group of junior officers within the agency.” What Hersh failed to report is that Colby added the comment, “I think family skeletons are best left where they are—in the closet.” In addition, if junior officers knew about MHCHAOS, the “deep snow section” could not have been that clandestine.

Because of our efforts, some fellow Agency officers not directly involved in the program misinterpreted what our mission was, exactly. They believed that we were more focused on the Americans involved in dissident or black radical activities than trying to determine any connections with foreign intelligence services or foreign governments. These junior officers expressed their concern about the whole issue of student unrest and whether CIA should have a role in the domestic aspect of this issue. Helms informed them that the president asked CIA to look into the question of student unrest, therefore it was a legitimate role for CIA to attempt to discover if foreign elements or powers might be influencing student unrest on campuses. Helms told these officers that CIA had other issues to pursue. One was whether Cuban intelligence had targeted or recruited any of the American students who were traveling to Cuba to cut sugar cane. The other issue involved those countries that wanted to bring pressure to bear on the United States to get out of Vietnam. In the end, it was not these CIA officers but congressional staffers who blew this all out of proportion.

Colby told the president that there were a few “cases in which actions were taken, which overstepped proper bounds.” He cited our recruitment of Americans for insertion into radical circles to build New Left credentials for operations abroad against foreign elements, which might be supporting, encouraging, or directing these radicals and their activities in the United States. We did not overstep any bounds. Our recruitment of Americans was a logical step by us to try to respond to the president’s questions. Access is the lifeblood of a successful clandestine operation; where you find it is unimportant, but find it you must. Without access all operations, regardless of how brilliantly conceived, fail. We needed Americans with the proper credentials to go abroad and make contact with foreign intelligence services. Colby’s problem was that he didn’t understand counterintelligence. Colby, who was involved in intelligence work for most of his life, beginning with his Office of Strategic Service days, seemed proud to admit that he “could just not figure out at all” what his own CI staff did.²

After all was said and done, it was established that we had placed an individual in the radical student movement to build up his bona fides, his legitimacy. This individual then participated in a demonstration in the United States. He saw some things that he reported to us, and we in turn passed the information on to the FBI. Some would say this was a misjudgment on our part, that we should not have allowed this individual to report on his U.S. activity.

In the course of establishing their Leftist bona fides or working in foreign countries, these American sources reported on the activities of American New Leftists with whom they had contact. The information we collected was reported to the FBI, but in the process, Colby said that CIA files were established on these Americans. I was not involved with covering the New Left, so I don’t know how many of these files were actually opened, but I doubt that it was a significant number. We probably already had files on many of these individuals in order to hold FBI and open-source reporting.

The Rockefeller Commission expressed its concern that CIA did not formally or informally scrutinize our program and that the program remained outside all CIA internal control channels. Its report further stated that “the excessive secrecy surrounding Operation MHCHAOS, its isolation with the CIA, and its removal from the normal chain of command prevented any effective supervision and review of its activities by officers not directly involved in the project.”

It is a fact that Helms never asked his general counsel about CIA’s conducting the MHCHAOS program. However, the report is misleading in its conclusion. In early December 1972 Executive Director-Comptroller Colby critically reviewed the program. Helms again defended it. Helms felt that just because some officers did not believe CIA should be involved in MHCHAOS-type activities did not mean he should stop the program. Although concerned that MHCHAOS might straddle the line with regard to CIA’s charter, he also felt that he had to respond to the insistent White House requests.

In 1972 Colby, with DCI approval, issued an internal memorandum to senior CIA officials describing the program with the objective of clarifying its scope and inviting reports of any departures from its policy:

To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA’s responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA’s responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces.

On May 9, 1973, DCI James Schlesinger issued a bulletin to all CIA employees requesting them to report any indication of any activity they felt was outside CIA’s charter. Some employees responded citing MHCHAOS, but Schlesinger resigned from CIA on July 2, 1973, to become secretary of defense. With Schlesinger’s departure, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who served as acting director, issued on August 29, 1973, specific directions to MHCHAOS managers emphasizing that the focus of the program was to be clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved in links with American dissidents, and only incidentally on the American contacts involved. While there may have been some heartburn over MHCHAOS, nothing was done to stop it at that time.

There was secrecy in the unit, but not about its existence in the Directorate of Operations. The secrecy involved the sensitivity of the information collected. Besides disseminating pertinent information, we were also responsible for preparing and providing special reports, studies, and estimates in response to requirements levied by the White House and other government agencies and offices. To maximize compartmentation we prepared all special studies, reports, or estimates rather than the Directorate of Intelligence, utilizing either all information available to CIA or all information available to the government, depending on the nature and scope of the particular requirement.

Others continue to cite Hersh’s specific allegations in his New York Times articles as proof that our unit engaged in nefarious activities within the United States. The press willingly accepted the job of being used as an instrument of those seeking punishment through publicity. Charges, like those of Hersh, were blown up on the front page and given an undeserved significance in relation to the truth. In the 1973 compilation by the Agency of the “Family Jewels,” there were five activities raised that had nothing to do with us. Specifically, they were:

1. CIA made unauthorized entries of the premises of a defector and two former CIA employees to determine whether they had classified documents, and in one case to recover them. These occurred in 1966, 1971, and 1972 respectively. Two of these incidents involved breaking and entering.

2. Electronic surveillance (telephone tap) of two newspaper reporters in 1963 and physical surveillance of five reporters in 1971 and 1972 to determine the sources of classified information published by them. Similar physical surveillance of three former CIA employees who were suspected of unauthorized possession of classified documents in 1969, 1971, and 1972. From 1967 to 1971, agents were developed to monitor dissident groups in the Washington, D.C., area considered to be potential threats to CIA personnel and installations, and Agency security field offices in the United States also collected information on similar dissidents in its areas, to advise CIA of potential threats to its personnel and installations.

3. A list of individuals suspected of particular offenses considered to pose a security vulnerability was collected over a number of years prior to 1973. This practice was terminated and the file destroyed in 1973.

The OS conducted these activities under the authority of the section of the National Security Act of 1947 that provides that the DCI is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Although the above actions may have overstepped the responsibilities of the DCI contained in the Act’s language, Colby thought all these activities were minor transgressions.

The wiretaps were conducted against CIA employees or ex-employees in almost all cases. The same was true for the surveillance operations. There were several cases of surveillance against a few journalists who had leaked classified information. Colby saw a legal basis for CIA’s activities against these journalists. The CIA director is in charge of protecting sources and methods, and the DCI can make a legal argument that the law requires him to discover where a leak originates. Because of the legal ambiguity, there are those who would say that the DCI has no legal right to conduct surveillance of U.S. citizens. Hersh apparently learned of some of the activities but erroneously associated them with MHCHAOS.

Within the “Family Jewels” list was another category of questionable activity, which was related to CIA’s mission to collect foreign intelligence. Colby told President Ford that the Agency exceeded proper bounds, or its activities were subject to misconstruction as being aimed at purposes outside its charter. One example possibly related to the New York Times charges: Records were made of the identities and addresses of individuals exchanging correspondence between the United States and certain Communist countries as an aid in determining possible leads to potential operations.

This program, known as HTLINGUAL, included the surreptitious opening of certain first-class mail to extract positive intelligence or data valuable for the development of foreign intelligence operations against the Communist country. This program was initiated in 1953 and from its inception was fully coordinated with the FBI, which received much of its product.

The issue of mail openings was very controversial, but one thing the New York Times got right and people seem to miss is that various postmasters general approved this operation. However, these same postmasters general went before the Church Committee, took the oath, and then proceeded to lie about what they knew about the mail-opening operation. The CIA directors always cleared this operation with each postmaster general after he took his office. The briefing was verbal because CIA did not want to leave a paper trail within the postal service about a sensitive operation. In fact, Colby stated that while this operation was in existence, it was cleared by “at least three Postmasters General and CIA records indicate that Helms discussed it with then–attorney general John Mitchell.”³

Colby obviously believed the mail-opening operation was wrong and should never have been approved. He did understand the reasoning behind the program, and it should be remembered that the operation began in the 1950s, just after the start of the Cold War. We had limited knowledge of Soviet intelligence and the workings of the Soviet system. Colby held the opinion that the operation produced nothing of importance and that it had become another bureaucratic activity that goes on and on. It should have been stopped long ago.

The New York Times reported this information and indirectly tried to link it to us, but no one in SOG had any direct connection with HTLINGUAL. In 1952 Angleton, with the support of CIA’s OS, started the operation. The international mail openings were done from the main postal facility in Jamaica, New York. In proposing the operation, Angleton argued that the mail-opening operation was a necessary alternative to the Agency’s foreign operations. In 1958 the FBI was informed of the operation after it requested permission from the postmaster general to mount a similar operation. The postmaster informed the Bureau that CIA had been opening the mail for five years.

The OS actually opened the letters and the CI staff processed the information. The operation ran smoothly until Colby, then the DDO, recommended to DCI James Schlesinger that the operation be terminated. Angleton made a strong appeal for its continuation, saying the mail information was valuable. To legalize the operation, he urged Schlesinger to obtain the president’s personal approval. Not wanting to take sides, Schlesinger suspended the operation and it eventually died from neglect. CIA destroyed most of its formal HTLINGUAL records in 1990, at the direction of CIA’s Office of General Counsel.