CHAPTER 18

Work and Conflict

Churchill’s ten months in charge of the wartime Admiralty, from August 1914 to May 1915, were perhaps the most active and intense of his life, with the possible exception of 1940. He went well beyond the normal scope of the Admiralty in setting up an air base at Dunkirk and directing naval and land warfare there, taking over the defence of London against bombing, organising and to some extent commanding troops at Antwerp, and initiating work which led to the development of the tank. He was often absent from the office on trips to the Dunkirk base, to try to relieve Antwerp, and at the Western Front – though there were far fewer visits to naval bases. Despite all that he kept up his constant stream of memos on every aspect of the navy and of the defence of the country. Even Lord Fisher, no sluggard himself, wrote that ‘His power of work is absolutely amazing!’¹

Churchill was in personal control. As he wrote: ‘I accepted full responsibility for bringing about successful results, and in that spirit I exercised a close general supervision over everything that was done or proposed. Further, I claimed and exercised an unlimited power of suggestion and initiative over the whole field, subject only to the approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord on all operative orders.’² But to start with at least, he did not expect the pressure of war to become an excuse for shoddy administration. On the fourth day of the war he asked Hood to inform the staff that ‘… the adoption of regular and careful methods is enjoined in all departments. In particular thrift and scrupulous attention to details are the mark of efficient administration in war.’³ Though he had a strong hand in naval strategy, he tended to pay less attention to matters of material and personnel than in peace, perhaps because originally he believed that it would be a short war in which far-reaching changes would have no effect. He modified that view in May 1915 when he minuted the heads of departments that ‘for the present it is assumed that the war will not end before the 31st December 1916’ and that ‘All Admiralty arrangements and plans should be prepared on this basis …’.⁴ But by then his time at the Admiralty was nearly over.

There were far fewer meetings of the main Admiralty Board after the war started, only three in the first six months of 1915 before Churchill left.⁵ Sir Graham Greene, the permanent secretary, agreed that ‘A Board is not the place nor the manner of conducting business such as that transacted between the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the staff, and if all members of the Board had to be consulted about orders to the fleet efficient executive action would be much impaired, while the administrative duties of the members of the Board would seriously suffer.’⁶ Churchill put it far more strongly: ‘To collect a set of petty potentates sitting round a table every one of whom has a right to record a minute of dissent, and apply that to the conduct of the operations of war, full of hazard and often turning out wrong … would, I am sure, be absolutely an impossible way of working.’⁷ The junior sea lords complained that they were ‘too much set aside and not consulted enough’.⁸ ‘The sea lords are not the accepted advisers of the First Lord on naval war policy. They may not be and in many cases have not been informed of what that policy until after it has been embarked upon and even on technical matters within the scope of the departments under their individual superintendence First Lord can and does consult subordinates to the exclusion of the superintending members of the Board.’⁹ To Churchill they were merely ‘a reserve of naval opinion … but they did not take part in the daily executive decisions’.¹⁰

Instead Churchill relied on his war group to make the major operational decisions. According to Greene, ‘At the commencement of the war the First Lord arranged for daily meetings in the War Room over which he presided. The meetings comprised the First Sea Lord, the Second Sea Lord, the Chief of Staff and the Permanent Secretary. These meetings were held in the first place every morning and evening when the important events of the war were discussed and general orders determined.’¹¹

Apart from Churchill himself, this inner circle was led by the First Sea Lord. The colourless Sir Francis Bridgeman had been retired from the post in December 1912, ostensibly due to ill health but also because he was not compatible with Churchill’s style. His successor was Prince Louis of Battenberg, who had been born in Austria in 1854, a grandson of Queen Victoria and a member of the minor German royalty in Hesse. Determined on a sea career, he entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1868, two years before Germany was unified. His royal connections, his slight German accent and his intelligence attracted suspicion, but he rose through the ranks. He served as secretary to the predecessor of the CID and as director of naval intelligence before being appointed to command a cruiser squadron in 1905. He was Second Sea Lord from December 1911. He was a good administrator and he got on well with Churchill and understood his intentions, while offering sensible and constructive criticism – he was the only one of four First Sea Lords with whom Churchill could work well; he wrote of Battenberg: ‘He was a thoroughly trained and accomplished Staff Officer, with a gift of clear and lucid statement and all that thoroughness and patient industry which we have never underestimated in the German race.’ But by October Churchill was having doubts and was ‘pouring his woes’ into Asquith’s ears; the latter thought that ‘Battenberg will have to make as graceful a bow as he can to the British public’.¹² Fisher, who had everything to gain by Battenberg’s retirement, wrote in October that the Prince was ‘played out’, and Churchill blamed him for exonerating Milne over the Goeben affair.¹³

Sir Frederick Hamilton was appointed Second Sea Lord on 28 July 1914 in succession to Jellicoe. He was well-connected; according to Fisher he was ‘a bosom friend of the King, who calls him by his Christian name and who lends him a cottage at Sandringham …’.¹⁴ He had his hands full with his regular job of mobilising, recruiting, training and deploying the navy’s personnel during wartime, but he had recent sea experience as a squadron commander with the Home Fleet, and he attended the War Group as understudy to the First Sea Lord. This arrangement continued until 1917, when Wester Wemyss came in as Deputy First Sea Lord. Until then, Wemyss pointed out, ‘should the First Sea Lord for any reason be absent from the Admiralty, the whole of the burden and responsibility of the war devolved automatically on the Second Sea Lord, whose duties in connection with personnel did not allow him sufficient time to discuss staff matters’.¹⁵ This goes some way to explain failures in communication which led to the escape of the Goeben and the loss of Cradock’s squadron off Cornel in 1914.

Henry Oliver was director of intelligence until October 1914, naval secretary for about three weeks, then chief of war staff from 7 November. ‘Stern and sombre’, he held the Churchillian view that ‘if you never did anything except what the text-books bore you out in, you would never do anything in war, because you would always find a reason for not doing a thing somewhere’.¹⁶ Sir Arthur Wilson wrote of him: ‘He is a man of marvellous knowledge of almost all the branches of the navy, and has a most extraordinary power of working longer hours, I think, than anyone I have ever seen.’¹⁷ Oliver would need that while working with Churchill, and certainly his whole life was devoted to the task. He wrote: ‘I had the library in the First Lord’s official house for my office with three windows looking out on the Horse Guards Parade. I had a camp bed in the corner and a tin bath. I went up to Churchill’s bedroom as soon as I was dressed about 7.15 am. He would be sitting up in bed with a big cigar working at papers and telegrams.’ In the evening, ‘I went to bed generally about 12.30 and Churchill would often look in on his way to bed …’.

At the centre of the tactical scheme was the War Room, a development of the one set up by Fisher in 1908 and revived for the 1912 manoeuvres. By 1914 the War Room itself was in a large former bedroom of Admiralty House with the chief of war staff in the library next door. The director of the operations division was in a smaller bedroom and the war registry, which was ‘responsible for the correct issue of all telegraphic orders’ in a medium-sized one.¹⁸ It covered a far wider range of activities than ever before. ‘From the middle of September onwards we began to be at our fullest strain. The great map of the world which covered one whole wall of the War Room now presented a remarkable experience. As many as twenty separate enterprises and undertakings dependent entirely upon sea power were proceeding simultaneously in different parts of the globe.’¹⁹ At the start there was a problem with the security of the room, according to Oliver:

Then I went to a big room near my office where there was an immense chart of the world covering the whole of one wall with pins and flags showing the positions of all ships. I would then shift the flags showing the places of any important movements to incorrect places. This was a necessity because Churchill and Fisher and other dignitaries brought in MPs and lords and cabinet ministers and bishops and all sorts of club gossips and editors etc. to see the map and an incorrect map impressed them just as much. I kept correct charts covered up in a chest in my office and when I was not in it or the chairwoman was dusting, the duty captain came in and kept watch.²⁰

This had to stop. Churchill wrote: ‘when the war broke out the War Group Room, where the operations were conducted from, was crowded by an enormous concourse of people who came in while others were working there: that our most secret plans and our dispositions of the fleet were on the wall, and all sorts of secret matters were being transacted and I took the very drastic action at the beginning of the war to cut down the number of persons who had access to that room’.²¹ So, according to Cecil Lambert the Fourth Sea Lord, ‘A list was put on the door in Mr Churchill’s own handwriting of people who were allowed to go there and the names of the junior lords were crossed out and the names of the civil members of the board were crossed out.’²²

From the War Room Churchill could enjoy the thrill of distant battle.

There can be few purely mental experiences more charged with cold excitement than to follow, almost from minute to minute, the phases of a great naval action from the silent rooms of the Admiralty. Out on the blue water in the fighting ships amid the stunning detonations of the cannonade, fractions of the event unfold themselves to the corporeal eye. … But in Whitehall only the clock ticks, and quiet men enter with quick steps laying slips of pencilled paper before other men equally silent who draw lines and scribble calculations, and point with the finger or make brief subdued comments. Telegram succeeds telegram at a few minutes’ interval as they are picked up and decoded, often in the wrong sequence, frequently of dubious import; and out of these a picture always flickering and changing rises in the mind, and imagination strikes out around it at every stage flashes of hope or fear.²³

There was a growing campaign against Battenberg in the nation at large. Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, Fisher’s implacable opponent, had to deny that he had suggested ‘that the First Sea Lord cannot be trusted to maintain the interests of this country because of his German descent’ in various clubs and other places.²⁴ But there was anti-German hysteria among the public – shops with German names were looted and families, including eventually the royals, changed their names. In October Churchill was aware of a newspaper campaign ‘for raising suspicion against Prince Louis’, backed he believed by Beresford and the editor of the Morning Post.²⁵ There were anonymous letters and by the end of the month Prince Louis had been ‘driven to the painful conclusion that at this juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty’ and offered his resignation.²⁶ Churchill was fulsome in his praise despite his doubts about Battenberg:

The Navy of today, and still more the navy of tomorrow, bears the imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of 32-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction which are now coming to hand, are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in which the Board of Admiralty owes so much to your aid.²⁷

Asquith regretted ‘our poor blue-eyed German will have to go, and (as Winston says) he will be reinforced by two well-plucked chickens of 74 and 72’.²⁸ The first of these was Fisher, who had been advising Churchill since the start of the war; five days before it was declared he came to London and had ‘some momentous conversations’. After that he ‘constantly saw Mr Churchill’.²⁹ It was a difficult job to persuade the King to consent to his reappointment. According to his private secretary, ‘The First Lord then suggested to His Majesty that Lord Fisher should be brought back to the Admiralty as successor to Prince Louis …. This proposal was a great surprise to the King who pointed out to Mr Churchill his objections to the appointment. Lord Fisher has not the confidence of the Navy: he is over 73 years of age. When First Sea Lord he no doubt did much for the Navy but he created a state of unrest and bad feeling among the officers of the service.’ They went through a list of other candidates including Sir Hedworth Meux, Sir Henry Jackson and Sir Frederick Sturdee, but Churchill rejected them all.³⁰ The King insisted on taking the matter up with the Prime Minister before he approved it, which was about as far as a constitutional sovereign could reasonably go in such a matter. Asquith supported Churchill as he did not want his resignation, for he had ‘a most intimate knowledge of the navy’.³¹ On 29 October the King finally agreed as ‘he could not … oppose his minsters in this selection but felt it his duty to record his protest’.³² Next day Churchill took Fisher round the War Room just as the situation in South America approached a crisis: ‘I … went over with him on the great map the positions and tasks of every vessel in our immense organisation. It took more than two hours.’³³

The second of the ‘chickens’ was Sir Arthur Wilson, retired as First Sea Lord in 1912. At first Churchill suggested him as chief of staff, an irony in view of his opposition to the setting up of such a body.³⁴ Instead he came in with Fisher in an advisory capacity, though apparently he had had some role before that. Immediately after Battenberg’s resignation he wrote: ‘I think you had better leave me to go on working much as I am doing now, except that I should like to have a room set apart for me near the War Room, and a confidential clerk well acquainted with the different departments who could get me any information I want. I would then work simply as Fisher’s slave to tackle any problems he likes to set me.’³⁵ Later he testified: ‘It was my place to help the First Lord and First Sea Lord as much as I could … Discussion went on from day to day of all these different schemes, and it was always a question of getting over difficulties which we saw in carrying out any of them.’³⁶ Churchill wrote to Jellicoe on 11 January 1915: ‘Sir Arthur Wilson rules our councils in tactics and is incomparably superior to anyone I have seen.’³⁷

At first Churchill and Fisher seemed to work well together, and Churchill wrote to Jellicoe in January 1915: ‘The machine is working far better than it has ever worked before.’³⁸ Under Fisher the War Group meetings were suspended and replaced by more formal conferences which were summoned by the First Lord.³⁹ As well as Churchill and Fisher they were attended by Sir Arthur Wilson, the Chief of Staff, the Permanent Secretary and the Naval Secretary to the First Lord. – Sir Frederick Hamilton was no longer invited as Fisher suspected him of trying to undermine his reforms. According to Churchill, ‘… the War Group in its new form brought all our opinions more effectively into common stock and most of the proposals for the movement of ships’.⁴⁰ Sir Graham Greene testified: ‘At these meetings a great variety of questions relating to the war were brought forward and discussed and decisions arrived at, many of which were embodied at the time in minutes dictated by the First Lord and concurred in by the First Sea Lord.’⁴¹ This hints at the growing rift between the First Lord and the First Sea Lord. There were two huge egos in the same department, or as Greene put it, ‘two very active and strong personalities in the position of First Lord and First Sea Lord’.⁴² Churchill was not used to strong character in his chief adviser; Fisher was not used to a dynamic First Lord. For a time he tolerated his position due to the necessity of war: ‘In the peace organisation I should say that my position with the First Lord as First Sea Lord was one of close communion. If I could not agree, I should say, “Well, I do not think it is a good thing for me to be here,” and I should go away; but in war I should say to myself, “Now, look here; here is a very big thing going on and it does not do to have any quarrels or partings now. It is too big a business.” And I should to a large extent sacrifice my views unless it led to anything disastrous.’⁴³

Ostensibly the main cause of dispute was the Dardanelles Campaign. Fisher testified: ‘Mr Churchill and I worked in absolute accord until it came to the question of the Dardanelles.’⁴⁴ But in addition there was what some called an ‘objectionable change of practice’ and Greene admitted that ‘While Mr Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty he would initiate orders to the fleet and consult the First Sea Lord afterwards.’⁴⁵ Greene hinted that from his long experience this was unusual. ‘I think that very few First Lords would attempt to deal with the initiation of orders to the fleet, they would probably prefer to indicate their views on a point of policy and ask the First Sea Lord to give those instructions to the fleet.’⁴⁶ Fisher wrote: ‘Winston has so monopolised all initiative in the Admiralty – and fires off such a multitude of purely departmental memos … that my colleagues are no longer “superintending Lords” but only “the First Lord’s Registry”!’⁴⁷ Churchill summed up the decline in the relationship: ‘… his letters were couched in an affectionate and paternal style. “My beloved Winston,” they began, ending usually with a variation of “Yours to a cinder,” “Yours till Hell freezes,” or “Till charcoal sprouts.” … Alas, there was a day when Hell froze and charcoal sprouted and friendship was reduced to cinders; when “My beloved Winston” had given place to “First Lord: I can no longer be your colleague.”’⁴⁸

It was largely a question of initiative. In May 1915 Hamilton, Admiral Tudor, the Third Sea Lord, and Captain Lambert, the Fourth Sea Lord, supported Fisher and claimed that ‘the present method of directing the distribution of the fleet, and the conduct of the war by which the orders for controlling movements and supplies appear to be largely taken out of the hands of the First Sea Lord’. Churchill replied that ‘No order of the slightest consequence’ was ever issued without Fisher’s agreement, but the three sea lords were not satisfied: ‘… in most cases action has been initiated by yourself and referred to the First Sea Lord for concurrence. What we maintain is that all such orders should be initiated by the First Sea Lord and referred to you for criticism or concurrence.’ Churchill did not accept this. ‘Had I neglected to propose it in default of the First Sea Lord’s initiative, injury would have resulted to vital interests. It is better that the First Sea Lord should make proposals, and the First Lord criticise them or concur. But no rule can be laid down.’⁴⁹

Then Churchill was accused of a much more serious breach of etiquette over a signal to move ships from the Dardanelles to Taranto, marked ‘First Lord to see after action.’⁵⁰ This allegedly was the last straw and the cause of Fisher’s resignation after he had already withdrawn it several times. Lambert, the Fourth Sea Lord, claimed:

When Lord Fisher had left, Mr Churchill sent for me. I was with him for several hours and he asked me if I would go over to Lord Fisher the next morning [Sunday] and endeavour to persuade him to come back. I was unwilling because I did not suppose I anything I could say would influence Lord Fisher, but as Mr Churchill put it to me in that way I went. Lord Fisher was very excited. He told me a long story which I cannot remember, but the gist of it was his annoyance at this particular telegram on which was written in Mr Churchill’s handwriting, ‘The First Lord to see after action.’⁵¹

Churchill denied this, but Fisher’s resignation had already damaged him beyond repair and his position at the Admiralty was doomed.