¹² Opinions differ as to the precise details of the doctrine. See the papers reprinted in the section entitled ‘The Unity of the Virtues’ in Prior (ed.), vol. 4, and J. Cooper, ‘The Unity of Virtue’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 15 (1998), 233–74 (repr. in id., Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 76–117). On whether Laches qualifies Socratic intellectualism, see D. Devereux, ‘The Unity of the Virtues in Plato’s Protagoras and Laches’, Philosophical Review, 101 (1992), 765–89 (repr. in Prior (ed.), vol. 4, 124–43); T. Penner, ‘What Laches and Nicias Miss—and Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Merely a Part of Virtue’, Ancient Philosophy, 12 (1992), 1–27; J. Gericke, ‘Courage and the Unity of the Virtues in Plato’s Laches’, South African Journal of Philosophy, 13 (1994), 21–6.