³³ The principle of univocality is the somewhat odd assumption that terms are not ambiguous—that the Greek language, in having a single term for something, reflected reality. Of course Plato recognized the ambiguity of many terms, but for some reason he has his Socrates take for granted, and take as the foundation of his enquiries, the principle of univocality. Particularly prominent cases of the assumption in this volume can be found at Laches 191e and Meno 72a–c and 74d. Meno 73a is interesting, as the only time in the dialogues that the assumption of univocality is questioned and defended (though Laches 192b–c comes close), and we are not meant to take it as a serious worry, since it comes from Meno not Socrates. The assumption is that there is a character F which makes all instances have F-ness; that this character F is what F is; and that this character F is not identical with its instances, but is something that can be shared among instances.