Franz Hausmann’s first campaign was also Bavaria’s first experience as an ally of Napoleonic France. The War of the Third Coalition, that culminated in the Ulm/Austerlitz Campaign, was nearly two years in the making, a convoluted series of diplomatic and military manoeuvrings that led to the creation of a new alliance against France in the summer of 1805.1 The chief members of this coalition, Russia, Austria, Great Britain, Naples and Sweden, concocted a complex and grandiose operational plan to move against Napoleon while his principal army was supposedly settled on the Channel coast preparing for an invasion of England. A key component of this plan, particularly from the Austrian point of view, was the early invasion and occupation of Bavaria. A large Habsburg force would then station itself along the River Danube in central Bavaria to await the arrival of Russian reinforcements, while other Coalition armies advanced in Italy and northern Germany. Casting a covetous eye on Max Joseph’s territories, Vienna intended either to force Bavaria into the Coalition or to ‘devour’ it.2
Simultaneously, Napoleon was pressuring Max to enter into an alliance with France. Desiring only neutrality, but caught between the two antagonists, Max vacillated. In the end, however, Napoleon’s blandishments, and Max’s own deep-seated apprehensions about Austria, led him to chose the lesser of two evils by agreeing to a secret treaty of alliance with France in late August 1805. Having promised to provide Napoleon with 20,000 men as well as various types of logistical support, Max spent two anxious weeks desperately resisting clumsy Habsburg threats. Still temporising and dissembling when Austrian troops invaded his realm on 8 September, he and his court were forced to flee to Würzburg that night to escape the potential comforts of Habsburg hospitality. Twenty days later, Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte and the French I Corps marched into the same city, the left flank of an army of 165,000 men that was sweeping across central Germany towards the Danube.
The war had begun.
Early Encounters
As the Austrian battalions made their way from the River Inn to the Danube, the Bavarian Army hastened to assemble. Hoping to avoid antagonising Vienna, Max had delayed issuing mobilisation instructions. Furloughed officers and men were not recalled until 5 September and the actual order to concentrate the army was only released on the 7th, one day before the Austrians crossed the border. As a result, regiments had to leave their garrisons before they could come close to completing their preparations for war. This unseemly haste caused problems for the duration of the campaign, as clothing and equipment were often either lacking entirely or in poor repair. Footwear was the most pressing deficiency, and as early as 13 October, the commanders of the 3rd and 7th Infantry Regiments were reporting that ‘each regiment most urgently requires 400 pairs [of boots] as many NCOs are already nearly barefoot’.3 The historian of the 7th Infantry gives a sense of the atmosphere in early September 1805, ‘The feverish activity which surrounded our regiment escalated to panicked confusion when marching orders arrived on 14 September.’4
Furthermore, many men could not reach their garrisons before their regiments had to depart. In a remarkable testimony to the loyalty and dedication of the Bavarian soldiery, however, hundreds of men made their way through the Austrian army (and in defiance of Austrian penalties) to join their regiments in their appointed assembly areas. The 5th Infantry, for example, numbered only 440 men when it marched hurriedly out of Landshut on 9 September just ahead of the advancing enemy; by the middle of the month with some 1,800 men in its ranks, it was almost at full strength.5
Initially concentrating in two groups at Amberg and Ulm, the army soon moved farther north to place itself as far as possible from the Austrians and await the arrival of the French. By 1 October, therefore, the entire army, a total of some 26,000 men in six brigades, was gathered along the River Main between Bamberg and Würzburg under Deroy’s command.6
Franz’s 7th Infantry Regiment7, along with the 3rd Infantry, the 2nd Light Battalion and the 1st Chevauxlegers, made up the 3rd Brigade under Major General Paul Count von Mezzanelli. Commanded by Colonel von Pierron, the 7th Infantry had 1,421 officers and men in its two field battalions, with an additional 234 in the two companies that made up the depot. It also had a large wagon train: 12 regimental vehicles (for baggage, ammunition, medical supplies and staff personnel), 10 company wagons (for baggage, cooking gear, etc.), 10 bread wagons, and one wagon for officers who could not march, all requiring 53 civilian drivers and 117 horses.8 At first quartered in towns along the Main east and south of Würzburg for several days (the depot companies were sent to Würzburg itself), the regiment marched for the Danube on 2 October to embark on its first campaign.
As agreed in the treaty of alliance signed in August, Napoleon placed the the Bavarian Army under the command of a Frenchman, in this case, the proud and quarrelsome Marshal Bernadotte. The Bavarians were quickly added to Bernadotte’s I Corps as he headed for the Danube to form the extreme left wing of Napoleon’s great envelopment (though the 4th Brigade remained in Würzburg to guard Max Joseph and his court).
To avoid a time-consuming detour, Bernadotte crossed the neutral Prussian territory of Ansbach in accordance with Napoleon’s instructions. He employed the Bavarian troops under Wrede as his vanguard as he committed this intentional breach of international norms, probably because having Bavarians in the lead meant that they were the first to violate Prussian neutrality, thereby generating Bavarian-Prussian tension and increasing Max Joseph’s reliance on Napoleon. The Bavarian commanders, painfully aware of their country’s predicament, tried in vain to avoid this onerous task, but obediently executed their orders with as much dignity and conscientiousness as possible.
As the rapid advance continued, however, Bernadotte kept the Bavarians in the van, according them the honour of being the first to enter Max Joseph’s capital, which they did to much popular jubilation on 12 October, Max’s saint’s day.9 Wrede performed well as an advanceguard commander during this fast-paced drive on Munich, taking more than 1,400 prisoners and 19 guns from the retreating Austrians between the 11th and 13th.10 A brief operational pause then ensued as Napoleon prepared for the next phase of the war but, by the 26th, I Corps was on the move again, pushing for the line of the Inn and Salzach Rivers and seizing Salzburg on the 29th.
From this point, the activities of the Bavarian units diverged in two different directions. While Bernadotte and part of the Bavarian contingent left Salzburg on 3 November to participate in the march on Vienna and the subsequent manoeuvres in Bohemia-Moravia, three Bavarian brigades were assigned to assist in the conquest and occupation of the Tyrol. Under Deroy’s command, therefore, the 1st, 2nd and 6th Brigades engaged in a number of small actions against Austrian regulars and Tyrolean militia through November and December to protect the main army’s strategic right flank and its line of communications on the way to Vienna. As the French and their allies established control over the Tyrol, however, the 2nd Brigade was recalled to join Wrede in Moravia. Similarly, the 4th Brigade was released from its duties in Würzburg in late October and directed to join Wrede as well.
On the Edge of Austerlitz
Meanwhile, I Corps, including Wrede’s command (see Appendix 7, page 255), headed north and east into the Danube valley. Along the way, Wrede replaced Franz’s brigade commander, bringing in Major General Hippolyth von Marsigli and sending Mezzanelli back to take over the 2nd Brigade.
The weather was cold and snow frequently covered the ground, but operations began to move at a brisk pace as the climactic battle approached. Keeping up with the hurrying French, Wrede’s division reached Mautem on 14 November, crossed the great river on the 16th and 17th, arrived in Hollabrunn that evening (27 miles) and pushed on to Jetzelsdorf with its main body the following day (11 miles), while Wrede himself with his three cavalry regiments pressed as far as Znaim and Budwitz (10 and 17 miles respectively). Wrede was astonished at the exertions expected of his soldiers, writing to Max Joseph on the morning of the 19th,
If I did not actually see myself here this morning, I would consider it an impossibility that a force which only crossed the Danube the day before yesterday could already be here today and could already have a patrol of 100 troopers posted in Iglau.11
Passing through Znaim, Wrede had an opportunity to see Napoleon. After reviewing the Bavarian cavalry regiments, the French Emperor granted the Bavarian general an audience.
One could not be more graciously treated than I was yesterday by His Majesty the Emperor,
he reported to Max Joseph,
As I approached Znaim, I sent Major Rechberg ahead to report my arrival and request permission to pass through His Majesty’s headquarters with my cavalry. His Majesty saw fit to send his adjutant Bertrand to me and to say that he would review my cavalry with pleasure, but that he also wished to see me. After the review, I had a very long audience in which His Majesty spoke of the various manoeuvres still to be conducted against the enemy, of the present and future geographic situation of Your Highness’ realm and of Your Highness’ army.12
After this satisfying discussion, Wrede continued north towards Iglau. Expecting a major battle with the combined Austro-Russian army and knowing that Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was in command of a force near Prague, Napoleon wanted to ensure the security of his strategic left flank. He therefore ordered Bernadotte to draw closer to the Grande Armée at Brünn with his two French infantry divisions and to post the Bavarians on the road north of Iglau as a shield against anything Ferdinand’s corps of some 10,000-12,000 men and 30 guns might undertake.13 When Bernadotte’s French troops marched for Austerlitz on the 29th therefore, Wrede’s two brigades, with only 5,950 infantry, 800 cavalry and six guns, came to form the extreme left of the army, far from succour and outnumbered.14
Fearing that his small force would be outflanked, Wrede withdrew from his advanced position around Skurow and established himself at Pfauendorf just north of Iglau on 1 December, with outposts at Wonau. The forward position at Wonau, manned by the 2nd Light Battalion, came under attack on 2 December as Ferdinand advanced in three columns via Windig-Jenikau, Wonau and Polna. Its outposts surprised and captured, the 2nd Light regained its position under Wrede’s leadership. The cost, however, had been high - 253 Bavarian casualties - and the skirmish could have proved disastrous had the Austrians exploited their initial advantage more vigorously.15
The dawn brought news of the Austrian column moving though Windig-Jenikau, thus confirming Wrede’s concern about his flanks. Wrede also learned that his hoped-for reinforcements were being diverted to the Grande Armée. A message from General Mezzanelli reported that the 2nd Brigade, en route to Iglau, had received orders to march to the main army at Brünn. The Bavarians were thus in an unenviable position, outnumbered, outflanked and with no hope of imminent reinforcement.
Wrede, who may have already known of Napoleon’s overwhelming victory at Austerlitz on the 2nd, boldly decided to resolve this operational dilemma by attacking.16 The attack, launched by the 3rd and 5th Brigades at 1 p.m. on 3 December, was a complete success. In drawn-out fighting that continued into the night, the Bavarians pushed Ferdinand’s troops beyond Stecken and caused the Austrian archduke to call back his flanking columns and retire to Deutsch Brod. The 7th played a key part in the fight, especially the 1st Battalion, which seized a wood near Stecken ‘with rare determination’ according to Wrede’s report, while the I/8th pushed into the town itself and the 2nd Light struck the Austrian left. Bavarian losses for the day were less than 100 dead or wounded (2 wounded and 36 missing for the 7th Line), astonishingly light given the length of the engagement and the nature of the outcome.17
Combat was renewed on the 5th with a sudden Austrian attack against the Bavarian position at Stecken. That morning, the 7th Infantry was posted with its 1st Battalion in Stecken and the 2nd in a support position some distance behind the town. Moving through the thick woods, the Austrians again succeeded in surprising and capturing the Bavarian outposts (this time including those of the 7th Infantry). Indeed, the Austrian advance was so unexpected that the 1st Battalion in Stecken barely had time to conduct a somewhat disordered retreat on the 2nd Battalion. Fortunately, a timely charge delivered by the Kurprinz Chevauxlegers and the accurate fire of the 7th’s own Schützen gave the struggling battalion some breathing space. The Bavarians soon recovered their composure and even made some local counterattacks, but the Habsburg troops gained ground steadily and threatened to outflank the entire position.18 Wrede, who arrived after the engagement had opened, therefore had no choice but to order a withdrawal to Iglau.
To cover his infantry and guns as they pulled back, Wrede now collected his five cavalry regiments and delivered a short but fiery speech, concluding with,
I would rather be trampled under the hooves of your horses than let the enemy celebrate a single trophy! Swear that you will stand and fight to the last man!19
Inspired by Wrede’s determination, the Bavarian troopers repeatedly charged the advancing Austrians over the snow-clad fields through the gathering evening and on into the night.20 From 4 p.m. on the 5th to 2.30 a.m. on the 6th, the cavalry clashes rolled back and forth across the Moravian hills under the moonlight with varying results, but they sufficed to hold off the Austrians long enough for the rest of the Bavarian division to retreat to Budwitz in safety.21
Against Austrian losses of approximately 750 men, the 20-hour struggle had cost the Bavarians heavily: 200 dead or wounded and some 600 captured or missing. The 7th Line alone lost 199 captured or missing (as compared to only 18 dead or wounded). These men were probably taken prisoner when the 1st Battalion made its hasty withdrawal under pressure from Stecken. Both sides now learned of the armistice between Austria and France and its allies and these prisoners accordingly became an item of contention. Wrede had to threaten to reopen hostilities before Ferdinand would agree to return them. The armistice also required the two armies to redeploy, and, by 10 December, Wrede was back in Iglau, finally joined by the 2nd and 4th Brigades.22 The Bavarians remained in the area for two more weeks, before setting off for home on Christmas Day 1805, and mostly returning to their garrisons by mid-January.23
Observations
Having crushed his opponents on the battlefield, Napoleon proceeded to exploit his victory at the peace table. The Treaty of Pressburg, signed on 26 December, thus imposed harsh terms on the defeated Habsburg Empire, essentially evicting Austrian influence from Italy and Germany while levying a heavy war indemnity. His army broken, his allies in retreat and his exchequer in ruins, Austrian Emperor Franz had little choice but to accept the humiliating French terms.
While Austria reeled under Napoleon’s demands, however, his German allies enjoyed the fruits of the victory. Bavaria received the lion’s share of the rewards, acquiring the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, the Prussian territory of Ansbach (whose neutrality Bavarian troops had violated in October) and numerous small enclaves in and around its traditional lands.24 These acquisitions not only rounded out the monarchy’s borders and removed innumerable impediments to Max’s rule, they also dramatically increased its population, stature and income, permitting Napoleon to establish this newly enhanced Bavaria as an independent kingdom with Max Joseph elevated from prince-elector to king. Utterly defeated, Bavaria’s hereditary foe, Austria, had no real choice but to recognise its neighbour’s new royal status.
Furthermore, Napoleon bound the royal house of Bavaria, the Wittelsbachs, to his own by arranging for his step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais, the Viceroy of Italy, to marry Max Joseph’s daughter Auguste Amalie in January 1806. Enlarged, consolidated, provided with more defensible borders and basking in Napoleon’s grace, Bavaria, therefore, could only be satisfied with the outcome of the war.
The army, too, gained from the experience of 1805. Marching side-by-side with their veteran French allies under one of the greatest commanders of all time, the Bavarians learned first-hand how warfare was changing. It was a dramatic introduction to the speed and violence of Napoleonic combat. The key lessons for the Bavarian Army, however, were in security and mobility rather than tactics.
As in earlier wars, Bavaria’s soldiers proved themselves courageous on the battlefield and, in most cases, tactically competent as well. Some of the small scale operations in the Tyrol were particularly well executed, and Wrede’s command performed superbly on 3 and 5 December, these engagements being highlighted by excellent co-operation among infantry, cavalry and artillery. Outpost operations and field security, however, proved to be serious weaknesses. Wrede’s men, for example, were inexcusably surprised on at least two occasions, and his command was fortunate that its Austrian opponents were not more enterprising.
The endurance Napoleon expected of his men also came as a shock. French General de Division Marie François Caffarelli du Falga, an officer on the Imperial General Staff, thus remarked to Napoleon that,
the Bavarian troops are well motivated and have fought very well in a number of skirmishes, but they do not march like those of Your Majesty and must always be pushed.25
Poor march discipline and an excess of baggage and vehicles were major problems, leading Bernadotte in an especially egregious case to remove Colonel Karl Baron von Buseck from the head of the 4th Infantry Regiment during a march and send him off under arrest. Though he tried in vain to have Buseck reinstated, General Deroy acknowledged that Bernadotte’s assessment of Buseck had been accurate and that the regiment’s officers contributed to its poor appearance,
promoted from the ranks, old, fat from too much beer-drinking, clumsy, with long uniform coats down to their ankles and even longer overcoats which they can only drag through the mud with difficulty... moreover, they have long displayed an overly relaxed attitude toward the other ranks, which has caused discipline to deteriorate.26
The 7th Infantry earned some especially harsh criticism from Wrede on 4 October,
With displeasure I noted today the utterly unacceptable disorder in which the 7th Regiment marched. Not only had the regiment numerous stragglers, but I also noticed many companies with no officers, and I saw nearly half of the officers riding in wagons...
Four days later, the situation was no better,
I give a final warning to the 7th Regiment, which never marches closed up and in sections as prescribed.27
Indeed, problems like this remained a factor all the way through the campaign, so that Wrede felt it necessary to chastise his officers once more in mid-December,
I must express my displeasure to the brigade commanders that many regimental commanders, contrary to standing orders, rode in the midst of the columns in carriages with horses, and tolerated almost all of their subordinate officers riding behind their regiments in wagons rather than marching with their companies.28
These deficiencies notwithstanding (and it is worth recalling that the army was still in the process of reforming itself), Napoleon expressed his sincere thanks to Max Joseph for the contributions Bavaria’s soldiers had made to the triumph over Austria.
My brother!
At the moment when Your Majesty’s troops re-enter your kingdom and cease to come under my orders, I would like to express my satisfaction with their services and the courage they displayed in the various affairs against Kienmayer’s corps before the passage of the Inn and later at the engagements at Lofer and Iglau.
Desiring to give them a proof of that satisfaction, I ask you, my brother, to permit me to award General Deroy a pension and to make General Wrede a Grand Officer in my Legion of Honour, and to permit me to give to those who most distinguished themselves 40 places in my Legion of Honour, 20 to officers and 20 to soldiers, with the enjoyment of appropriate pensions according to the constitution of the Legion.
These recompenses are not proportionate to the services they have rendered, but they are a proof of my esteem and of the respect with which I regard your army. They were animated by the justice of our cause and by the knowledge that they were defending their sovereign and their fatherland. They are worthy to be a part of the Grande Armée.29
In this hard school of war, the Bavarian Army thus came to understand that Napoleon expected every exertion of officers and men all the time, that nothing was to be considered impossible, and that distinct rewards and punishments would be the consequences of every soldier’s action or inaction.
The army that returned to its home garrisons in January 1806 was still growing, just beginning to adjust to the shifting nature of war, but its own accomplishments and its association with the stunning success of the campaign allowed its soldiers to march with a new sense of self-respect and self-confidence.30 Casting aside many outdated notions along with their queues, they came home as victors for the first time in many years, feeling part of something greater than themselves and ready for the next challenge.
Military Diary of
FRANZ JOSEPH HAUSMANN
for the
FIRST AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGN
From 14 September 1805,
when the 7th (Fürst Löwenstein) Line Infantry Regiment
marched out, until its return to the garrison
on 17 January 1806.
September 1805
| 14 September | To Donauwörth in Bavaria. |
| 15 September | To Gundelfìngen in Bavaria. |
| 16 September | To Unterstotzingen in Bavaria. |
| 17 September | To Schneidheim in Bavaria. |
| 18 September | To Ellwangen in Württemberg, where the 19th was a day of rest. |
| 20 September | To Rappersdorf. |
| 21 September | To Orłach. |
| 22 September | To Kreitshausen. |
| 23 September | To Untereichenroth. |
| 25 September | To Onsfeld. |
| 26 September | To Rindensheim. |
| 27 September | To Kitzingen. |
| 28 September | Our army joined up with that of the French, and because of the hard marches the Bavarian Corps had to remain in place on this day. |
| 29 September | To Wiesenbronn. |
| 30 September | To Kleinlangheim. On these two days the army assembled en masse near Kitzingen. |
October 1805
| 1 October | Marched all afternoon and night, after which we |
| 2 October | arrived at Kitzingen at 5 o’clock in the morning, but in the afternoon we set out again and spent the night at Briksenstadt. |
| 3 October | To Lonnerstadt. Crossed the Aisch. |
| 4 October | Bivouac near Niederndorf in Prussia. |
| 5 October | Near Schwabach. |
| 6 October | Near Spalt. |
| 7 October | Near Weissenburg. |
| 8 October | At the fork near Ingolstadt. Crossed the Altmühl. |
| 9 October | Bivouac at Unser Herr. Today to Ingolstadt and crossed the Danube there. |
| 10 October | Bivouacked near Holzenkam. |
| 11 October | Bivouac near Schleissheim. |
| 12 October | Arrived in the city of Munich, crossed the Isar, and bivouacked near Neuwirtshaus. |
| 13 October | Bivouacked in the woods near Anzing. The Army Corps had to remain here; during this time, on the 23rd the victory of the seizure of Ulm was celebrated. |
| 26 October | Near Ebersberg. |
| 27 October | To Wasserburg. |
| 28 October | Crossed the Inn and bivouacked near Altenmark. |
| 29 October | Near Teisendorf. |
| 30 October | Salzburg taken, and bivouacked 1½ hours from Salzburg near Einödhöfen. |
November 1805
| 3 November | The Corps reconnoitred toward Hof and immediately came back. |
| 4 November | Camp near Frankenmarkt. |
| 5 November | Camp near Lambach. |
| 6 November | Camp near St Peter. |
| 7 November | Camp near Steyer. |
| 8 November | Camp near Seitenstetten. |
| 9 November | Camp near Hausmening. |
| 10 November | Camp near Steinakirchen. |
| 11 November | Camp near the Mölk monastery. |
| 12 November | Camp near St Pölten. |
| 14 November | Camp near Ambach. |
| 15 November | Camp near Mautern. |
| 18 November | Here crossed the Danube. Through Stein and Krems, across the battlefield near Schöngrabern. |
| 19 November | Marched until almost morning, then bivouacked near Hollabrunn. Set out again at noon and bivouacked near Budwitz in Moravia.31 |
| 20 November | Grossbietetzka. |
| 23 November | To Wangen. |
| 26 November | To Holzmühlen near Iglau. |
| 27 November | To Dim in Bohemia. |
| 28 November | To Linden. Here the division took up a position on the road to Prague, in order to cover it and to halt any enemy that might try to break through. |
| 29 November | It was learned that the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was threatening to throw a large corps of his from Prague against our corps, and therefore |
December 1805
| 1 December | we took up a defensive position near Pfauendorf and went into bivouac there. |
| 2 December | The (von Metzen) Light Infantry Battalion,32 which had passed ahead of us in the woods, was attacked by the enemy, and since it suffered considerable losses it was replaced by our regiment. On the evening of this day we were commanded to withdraw until behind Pfauendorf, where several hundred cords of wood had been piled up. The corps stood at arms throughout the night, while from time to time enemy patrols shot at us. |
| 3 December | Lieutenant General von Wrede had us take the offensive, and when we came to within half an hour’s distance from Stecken, we met up with the enemy. After a short but heavy skirmish the enemy withdrew past Stecken toward Linden, and we took up a position on the heights in front of Stecken. |
| 4 December | We remained quietly where we were. |
| 5 December | At about 2 o’clock in the afternoon the Austrians attacked our right flank with such a superior force that the troops that had been in the outposts had to abandon Stecken and sought to take the heights on this side. Owing to its weakness, the corps had to fear new flanking movements from the enemy’s superior strength at any moment in this wooded and uneven terrain, so we hung around on the above-mentioned heights until 5 o’clock in the evening and took advantage of the night for our gradual withdrawal. The rear-guard skirmish lasted until 2 o’clock in the morning, while the corps retreated through Iglau to Budwitz, where we arrived at 8 o’clock on the morning of the 6th. |
| 6 December | The news arrived that on the 4th a cease fire had been agreed upon between His Majesty the Emperor of the French and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria at Austerlitz, and that according to it the advantages obtained by Archduke Ferdinand were therefore not valid, and that the prisoners as well as the captured territory had to be returned. Therefore |
| 7 December | after Archduke Ferdinand would not agree either to releasing the prisoners he had taken or to turning over the terrain he had seized, we again moved forward to Neu-Cerowitz. |
| 8 December | The Bavarian brigade under General Baron Karg [4th Brigade] that had been sent to us arrived, and we also received reinforcement from several units from French Marshal Berthier’s [actually Bernadotte’s] Corps. |
| 9 December | Again advanced as far as Stannern, and there |
| 10 December | His Highness Archduke Ferdinand not only turned over the 500 prisoners he had taken but also withdrew the Imperial Austrian Corps to Deutsch Brod. Our corps thereupon marched into cantonment, specifically our regiment to Ruschenau. As peace was concluded between the supreme monarchs during this cease fire, all corps had to remove themselves from the Austrian provinces, and we therefore marched |
| 27 December | to Königseck in Bohemia. |
| 28 December | To Tomani in Bohemia. |
| 29 December | To Wienau near Gratzen in Bohemia. |
| 30 December | To Bömdorf. |
| 31 December | To Harmannschlag. The division remained here until 1 January 1806. Peace was officially announced, and the Prince-Elector of Bavaria was rendered homage as King, whereupon we marched |
January 1806
| 2 January | to Leopoltschlag in Bohemia. |
| 3 January | To Engewitzdorf in Upper Austria. |
| 4 January | To Linz in Austria. Crossed the Danube. |
| 5 January | To Weis in Austria. |
| 6 January | To Unterfils in Austria. |
| 7 January | To Oberleithen in Austria. |
| 8 January | To Altheim in Austria. |
| 9 January | To Oberrottenbuch in Bavaria. |
| 10 January | To Taufkirchen. |
| 11 January | To Pilsting. |
| 12 January | To Straubing. |
| 13 January | To Pfatter. |
| 14 January | To Pröll near Regensburg. |
| 15 January | To Pullach near Vohburg. |
| 16 January | To Ingolstadt. |
| 17 January | Crossed the Danube and into the garrison at Neuburg. |
1 For a detailed overview of the diplomatic background see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, chapter 5.
2 Quoted in Marcus Junkelmann, Napoleon und Bayern, Regensburg: Pustet, 1985, p. 89.
3 Joint report by Colonel Pierron (7th) and Colonel Neumann (3rd), 13 October 1805, in Auvera, p. 355.
4 Ibid., p. 346.
5 Some units did, however, experience problems with desertion (the 2nd Light had 58 deserters), and strict orders were issued to tighten security around the field encampments (Ibid., p. 350).
6 Max Leyh, Die Feldzüge des Bayerischen Heeres unter Max I. (IV.) Joseph von 1805 bis 1815, vol. VI/2 of Geschichte des Bayerischen Heeres, Munich: Schick, 1935, pp. 7-9.
7 General Count von Morawitzky had relinquished his post as regimental proprietor on 25 January 1805 and Max had not yet appointed a replacement, so the regiment fought through 1805 with no title other than its number (Auvera, p. 343).
8 Ibid., pp. 349-50.
9 The army celebrated Max’s saint’s (christening) day every year with all manner of festivities, including special religious services, banquets and balls (just as the French marked Napoleon’s birthday).
10 A small controversy surrounds Wrede’s actions before entering Munich. French General Auguste Ameil, then an officer in the 5th Chasseurs, claims in his recollections that Wrede intentionally paused outside of Munich to allow the Austrians to escape (extracts printed in Sauzey, pp. 373-8). Bavarian authors, on the other hand, maintain that Bernadotte ordered Wrede to halt (for example, Leyh, p. 16).
11 Leyh, p. 38.
12 Ibid.
13 One of Bernadotte’s two French infantry divisions was commanded by General de Division Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Count d’Erlon, who would serve first as chief of staff and then as commander of the Bavarian VII Corps in 1809.
14 These figures taken from Leyh (pp. 37, 43), Völderndorff disagrees, stating that there were only some 4,500 infantry and 400 cavalry (Völderndorff und Waradein, Eduard Freiherr von, Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern unter König Maximilian Joseph /, Munich, 1826, Book 3, p. 287).
15 Völderndorff, Book 3, pp. 289-91.
16 Leyh concludes that Wrede already knew of Napoleon’s victory, but Völderndorff maintains the Bavarian commander did not receive word of Austerlitz until the 5th. Auvera (p. 365) states that two couriers arrived on the morning of 6 December with news of Austerlitz and the armistice. Franz recorded that news of the armistice arrived on the 6th, but he makes no mention of the Battle of Austerlitz.
17 Auvera, pp. 360-1, describes the 7th’s participation.
18 For the 7th Infantry’s part in the battle, see ibid., pp. 362-5.
19 Ludwig von Madroux, ‘August von Floret’, Archiv für Offiziere aller Waffen, Band II, Munich: 1846.
20 The 2nd Dragoons and a battery had arrived by forced marches on the 4th (Leyh, p. 45).
21 Two companies of the 4th Infantry sent by Mezzanelli played a key role, holding the town of Iglau while their comrades filed through during the night (Völderndorff, Book 3, p. 302).
22 Note that Franz’s diary entry of 8 December only mentions the 4th Brigade, which was commanded by Major General Theodor Baron von Karg-Bebenburg.
23 The 7th Infantry, for example, returned to Neuburg on 17 January. Note that a number of units were ordered to occupy the newly-acquired Tyrol and thus did not return to their previous peacetime garrisons.
24 Bavaria gained more than one million inhabitants in its new territories, but also lost some 500,000 in giving up Würzburg (to Grand Duke Ferdinand, a Habsburg) and Berg (to French Marshal Joachim Murat).
25 Leyh, p. 53.
26 Reports from Deroy, late October 1805, in Auvera, pp. 370-1.
27 Wrede, march dispositions for 4 and 8 October 1805, in ibid., p. 353.
28 Ibid., pp. 48, 54; also Bezzel, p. 147.
29 Letter to Max Joseph, 6 January 1806 in Napoleon I, Correspondance, Paris: Plon, 1858-70, no. 9,652.
30 Leyh, p. 56.
31 Small discrepancies between Franz’s dates here and those in Leyh’s account probably result from the Bavarians marching in long, strung-out columns so that trailing units might not reach a given point until a day or two after the lead unit had passed through. However, Franz seems to have got the sequence backwards as regards Hollabrunn and Schöngrabern; the regimental history has the 7th Infantry passing through Hollabrunn first, which is almost certainly correct.
32 Franz mistakenly calls this unit Light Battalion von Metzen (that is, the 1st Light), it was actually the 2nd Light Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel von Dietfurth.